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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is about the role of the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War of 1853-
1856 and the impact of the war on Ottoman state and society. The study is based mainly 
on archival material from the Ottoman archives in Istanbul. Chapter 1 reviews the 
existing literature on the subject in various languages with a more detailed coverage of 
the Ottoman/Turkish and Russian sources. Chapter 2 analyzes the diplomatic, economic 
and political origins of the war as well as the European and Ottoman public opinion 
before the war. Chapter 3 is about the battles of the war and diplomatic negotiations 
during the war, from the point of view of the Ottoman involvement in these battles. This 
chapter dwells on the Ottoman war effort and military practices. Chapter 4 is on the 
finances of the war. It attempts to assess the war expenses of the Ottoman Empire and 
how they were met, including the story of the first two Ottoman foreign loans as well. 
Chapter 5 is on the social impact of the war on the Ottoman state and society. This 
chapter includes subsections on the status of women, the Reform Edict of 1856 and the 
question of Muslim and Non-Muslim equality, slavery and the Black Sea slave trade, 
municipal affairs in Istanbul, law and order in the provinces, desertions and the 
başıbozuk troops as a source of disorder, Ottoman public opinion and patriotism. Finally 
this dissertation argues that the Crimean War had an important role in Ottoman 
modernization. 
 
Key words: Crimean War, Ottoman Empire, Reform Edict of 1856, Paris Treaty of 
1856 
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ÖZET 
Bu tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı’ndaki rolü ve savaşın 
Osmanlı devlet ve toplumu üzerindeki etkisi hakkındadır. Tez esas olarak Başbakanlık 
Osmanlı Arşivi’nden belgelere dayanıyor. 1. Bölüm’de konu üzerine çeşitli dillerdeki 
mevcut literatür Osmanlı/Türk ve Rus kaynakları üzerinde daha çok durarak gözden 
geçiriliyor. 2. Bölüm savaşın diplomatik, iktisadi ve siyasal kökenleri ile savaş 
öncesindeki Avrupa ve Osmanlı kamuoyunu irdeliyor. 3. Bölüm savaşın muharebeleri 
ve savaş süresince meydana gelen diplomatik görüşmeleri Osmanlıların bu 
muharebelere ve görüşmelere katılımı açısından ele alıyor. Bu bölüm Osmanlı savaş 
çabaları ve askeri pratiklerini anlatıyor. 4. Bölüm savaşın finansmanı üzerine. Bu bölüm 
Osmanlı devletinin savaş giderlerini ve ilk iki Osmanlı dış borçlanması dahil olmak 
üzere bu giderlerin nasıl karşılandığını değerlendirmeye çalışıyor. 5. Bölüm savaşın 
Osmanlı toplum ve devleti üzerindeki toplumsal etkisi hakkında. Bu bölüm kadınların 
statüsü, Islahat Fermanı ve Müslüman-Gayrimüslim eşitliği sorunu, kölelik ve Kara 
Deniz beyaz köle ticareti, İstanbul’da belediyecilik, taşrada kanun ve nizam, firarlar ve 
bir nizamsızlık kaynağı olarak başıbozuk askerleri, Osmanlı kamuoyu ve yurtseverlik 
altbaşlıklarını içeriyor. Sonuç olarak bu tez Kırım Savaşı’nın Osmanlı modernleşme-
sinde önemli bir rolü olduğunu savunuyor. 
 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: Kırım Savaşı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Islahat Fermanı, 1856 Paris 
Antlaşması 
vi 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
I have accumulated much debt in writing this dissertation. First I would like to 
thank my supervisor Asst. Prof. Hakan Erdem and Asst. Prof. Akşin Somel for their 
enthusiastic support from the beginning to the end. They have also been influential in 
my choice of this subject. I am also grateful to my jury members Assoc. Prof. Tülay 
Artan, Prof. Aydın Babuna and Prof. Cemil Koçak for their comments. Prof. Winfried 
Baumgart from the Mainz University has read the draft of the dissertation and made 
some suggestions and comments. Prof. Şevket Pamuk and Prof. Edhem Eldem from the 
Boğaziçi University and Prof. Ali Akyıldız from the Marmara University have been 
kind enough to answer my questions about Ottoman finances. Prof. Pamuk and Prof. 
Eldem have read the draft of the chapter on finances and made some critical comments. 
Assoc. Prof. Halil Berktay made some comments on the Battle of Sinop. Sinan 
Kuneralp read an early draft and made some comments. While I thank all for their 
comments and criticism, I alone am responsible for all possible mistakes, omissions and 
interpretations. 
Mehemed Malmisanîj, author of books on Kurdish history, has given valuable 
information on Kurdish geography, names and history. Karolina Fursewicz brought 
from Poland for me Michal Czajkowski's (Sadık Pasha's) memoirs in Polish and 
translated some passages from it. Joanna Błaszkowska has also helped me in the 
translation of some passages from Czajkowski’s work. Alexandru Balas translated a 
document in Rumanian from the Ottoman archive. My Arabic teacher Aziz Nazmi 
Shakir has helped me in some Arabic and Bulgarian texts. My friends at the Sabancı 
University Aysel Danacı Yıldız and Tuba Demirci have helped me in the transcription 
of some Ottoman texts. Toufoul Abu Hodeib from the University of Chicago helped me 
in the transcription of some Arabic names. Irma Kreiten from the University of 
Tübingen has generously shared with me the AKAK, which is really hard to find. 
Cengiz Fedakar and Fatih Akyüz, whom I have met in the BOA, also helped me in 
transcription. 
I have benefited from conversations with Prof. Andrew Lambert from King’s 
College of the University of London. Prof. Lambert has also kindly sent me some 
vii 
 
documents on the battle of Sinop from the TNA. Vladimir Kazarin, Natalia Ischenko 
and Oleg Shkedya from the Tavriya University in Simferopol, have brought some 
Russian sources to my attention. Prof. Vitaliy Sheremet from the Russian Academy of 
Sciences sent me some of his articles. Douglas Austin from the Crimean War Research 
Society in the UK sent me copies of some issues of the ILN. Prof. Moshe Gammer from 
Tel Aviv University answered my questions about Sheikh Shamil. Assoc. Prof. Nadir 
Özbek from Boğaziçi University sent me some articles from the Times newspaper. 
The staff of the BOA has been very helpful. I am especially grateful to Fuat 
Recep, Dilek Cansel and Ayten Ardel for their help in deciphering some difficult words 
in the documents. I have held conversations with Dr. Mustafa Budak, deputy general 
director of the BOA, whose doctoral dissertation was on the Caucasian front of the 
Crimean War. Dr. Budak has also kindly given me the copies of some documents which 
were at that time in use by the staff of the BOA for a collection of documents on the 
Crimean War. I must add that historians of my generation should be happy to work in 
much better technical conditions in this archive than, say, 10 years ago. Furthermore, 
the atmosphere in the BOA is such that everybody is ready to help others.  
Caroline Shaw from the Rothschild Archive in London has been kind enough to 
send me free of charge copies of many documents related to the 1855 loan.  
Among librarians, I am indebted most to Mehmet Manyas from our university for 
his efforts to provide me with books and articles from other national and international 
libraries. Veronika Lapshina and Yelena Strukova from the GPIB in Moscow have also 
been kindly helpful. Librarians of the Boğaziçi University were also very kind and 
helpful. The staff of the library of the Centre for Islamic Studies (ISAM) was also very 
helpful. I think the ISAM Library is a good research library in Istanbul.  
Associazione Europiemonte in Turin financed my participation in the congress on 
the 150th anniversary of the end of the Crimean War in Turin in November 2006. 
My friend Kemal Çetinelli has generously financed all the costs of my research 
trip to Moscow during June 2006. My friend Tarık Tayfun has also given me financial 
support, when Sabancı University made me pay my university fees in my last semester. 
I am grateful to my wife Esra, who has supported me throughout my studies. 
Finally, my daughter Ekim's birth in September 2006 has been a source of happiness.  
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
Chapter 1:  Introduction and Historiographical Survey…………………........ 
1.1.  Introduction………………………………………………………….. 
1.2.  Ottoman and Turkish Sources ………………………………………. 
1.2.1.  Turkish Official Military History………………………………….. 
1.2.2.  Turkish History Textbooks for Schools………………………........ 
1.2.3.  Dissertations and Theses in Turkish………………………………. 
1.3.  Sources in Russian ..………………………………………………… 
1.4.  Sources in Other Languages ..………………………………………. 
Chapter 2:  The Origins of the War ………………………………………….. 
2.1.  Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the War …..………. 
2.2.  Relations with Britain……………………………………………….. 
2.3.  Russia between Expansionism and Legitimism .................................. 
2.4.  Dispute over the Holy Places………………………………………... 
2.5.  Positions of France, Austria and Other States……………………… 
2.6.  The Sick Man of Europe…………………………………………….. 
2.7.  The Mission of Prince Menshikov…………………………………... 
2.8.  The Vienna Note and the “Turkish Ultimatum”…………………...... 
2.9.  European and Ottoman Public Opinion before the War………....….. 
Chapter 3: Battles and Diplomacy during the War………………………….. 
3.1.  The Declaration of War……………………………………………… 
3.2.  The Danubian Front in 1853…………………………………………. 
3.3.  The Battle of Sinop and European Public Opinion………………….. 
3.4.  The Caucasian Front in 1853………………………………………… 
3.4.1. Relations with Imam Shamil in 1853………………………………. 
3.4.2. The Battle of Şekvetil…………………………………………......... 
3.4.3. The Battles of Bayındır, Ahısha and Başgedikler………………….. 
3.5.    The Danubian Front in 1854 and the Declaration of War 
          by France and Britain………………………………………………. 
3.6.    The Caucasian Front in 1854-1855………………………………… 
3.6.1. Relations with Shamil and the Circassians in 1854-55…………….. 
3.6.2. The Summer 1854 Campaign and the Battle of Kürekdere………… 
 
1-47 
1 
5 
20 
22 
25 
28 
36 
48-94 
48 
57 
59 
62 
64 
66 
69 
79 
83 
95-247 
95 
97 
103 
131 
135 
139 
141 
 
159 
171 
176 
190 
 
ix 
 
3.6.3. The Siege and Fall of Kars and Ömer Pasha’s  
           Caucasian Campaign in  1855……………………………………... 
3.7.  The “Turkish Contingent”…………………………………………… 
3.8.  Battles in the Crimea and the Siege of Sevastopol………………….. 
3.9.  The End of the War and the Treaty of Paris ………………………. 
Chapter 4:  Financing the War ………………………………………………. 
4.1.  Ottoman Financial Crisis before the War………………………......... 
4.2.  The Abortive Loan of 1852………………………………………….. 
4.3.  Ottoman War Expenses ……………………………………………... 
4.4.  Conspicuous Consumption of Palace Ladies……………………… 
4.5.  The Mission of Namık Pasha ……………………………………….. 
4.6.  The Mission of Mr. Black and Durand and the First Foreign Loan 
4.7.  The İane-i Harbiye……………………………………………………........ 
4.8.  The Guaranteed Loan of 1855………………………………………. 
4.9.  The Loan Control Commission……………………………………… 
Chapter 5:  The Impact of the War on Ottoman Social Life ………………… 
5.1.  Contacts with the Europeans………………………………………… 
5.2.  The Status of Women……………………………………………….. 
5.3.  The Islahat Fermanı and the Question of the Equality of the   
Muslims and Non-Muslims …………………………………………. 
5.4.  The Prohibition of the Black Sea White Slave Trade……………….. 
5.5.  Law and Order in the Provinces…………………………………….. 
5.5.1.  The Insurrection of Yezdanşer…………………………………….. 
5.5.2.  British Interference and the Suppression of the Rebellion ……… 
5.5.3.  Desertions and the Başıbozuk Troops as a Source of                          
           Disorder …………………………………………………………… 
5.6.  Municipal Matters in Istanbul………..……………………………… 
5.7.  Public Opinion and Patriotism ………………………………...…….. 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………. 
Appendices…………………………………………………………………… 
 
197 
223 
232 
244 
248-284 
248 
253 
254 
258 
259 
274 
276 
279 
281 
285-351 
285 
291 
 
293 
304 
314 
315 
324 
 
330 
345 
347 
352-361 
362-376 
377-539 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A. AMD.   Sadâret Amedî Kalemi 
A. DVN.   Divan-ı Hümayun 
A. MKT. MHM. Sadâret Mektubî Mühimme 
A. MKT. NZD. Sadâret Mektubî Nezair ve Devair 
A. MKT. UM.  Sadâret Mektubî Umum Vilâyat 
AGKK   Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs. Ed. Winfried Baumgart. 
AKAK   Akty, Sobrannye Kavkazskoyu Arkheograficheskoyu Komissieyu.  
   Tiflis, 1863-87. 
ATASE  Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih Arşivi, Ankara. 
AVPRI  Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Moscow. 
BOA    Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul. 
C. AS.   Cevdet Askeriye 
CH    Ceride-i Havadis. Ottoman semi-official newspaper. 
DMA   Deniz Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul. 
DŞA   Dâr-ı Şûray-ı Askerî (Military High Court) 
FO    Foreign Office 
GARF   Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow. 
GPIB Gosudarstvennaya Publichnaya Istoricheshkaya Biblioteka, 
Moscow. 
HR. MKT.   Hariciye Nezâreti Mektubi Kalemi 
HR. SFR (04)  Hariciye Nezâreti Paris Sefareti 
HR. SYS.   Hariciye Nezâreti Siyasi Kısım 
HR. TO.  Hariciye Nezâreti Tercüme Odası 
ILN   The Illustrated London News. 
İ. DH.    İrade Dahiliye 
İ. HR.    İrade Hariciye 
İ. MMS.   İrade Meclis-i Mahsus 
İ. MSM.   İrade Mesail-i Mühimme 
İ. MTZ.(05)   İrade Eyalat-i Mümtaze Mısır 
İ. MVL.   İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ 
MVL Meclis-i Vâlâ-i Ahkâm-i Adliye, (Meclis-i Vâlâ in short) The 
Supreme Council for Judiciary Ordinances. 
xi 
 
NYDT   New York Daily Tribune. Newspaper. 
OBKS Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı 1853-1856. Ankara: BOA 
Yayın Nu. 84, 2006.  
PRMA Papers relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey and the 
Defence and Capitulation of Kars. Presented to Both Houses of 
Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London: Harrison and 
Sons, 1856. 
RGIA   Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, St. Petersburg 
RGVIA  Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, 
Moscow. 
RGVMF Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvenny Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, St. 
Petersburg 
Savaştan Barışa Savaştan Barışa: 150. Yıldönümünde Kırım Savaşı ve Paris 
Antlaşması (1853-1856). 22-23 Mayıs 2006. Bildiriler. Istanbul: İ. 
Ü. Ed. Fak. Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 2007.  
TNA   The National Archives, London. (Formerly the Public Records 
Office, PRO) 
TTK    Türk Tarih Kurumu  
TV    Takvim-i Vekayi. Ottoman official newspaper. 
 
 
LIST OF GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES 
     
Turkish Russian  
(in transcription) 
English / French 
 
Ahısha, Ahıska Akhaltsykh Akhaltzikh, Akhaltsik 
Ahılkelek Akhalkalaki Akhalkelek 
Akmescit Simferopol Simferopol 
Akyar Sevastopol Sevastopol 
Almalu, Elmalı Alma Alma 
Anakra Anakliya, Anakriya Anakria 
Başgedikler Bashkadyklar Bashgedikler 
Boğdan Moldava Moldavia 
Cizre Djezire Jezireh, Jezira-ben-
Omer, Jazira 
Çamçıra, Çamşıra Ochamchire Shemsherrai, 
Tchamshirah 
Çatana Chetati Cetate, Citate 
xii 
 
Turkish Russian  
(in transcription) 
English / French 
 
Çürüksu Churuk-Su, Kobulety  
Eflak Valakhiya Wallachia 
Erzurum Erzrum Erzeroom 
Gözleve Yevpatoriya Eupatoria 
Gümrü Aleksandropol Alexandropol 
Hocabey Odessa Odessa 
Halep  Aleppo 
İsakçı, İsakça Isakchi Isaktschi, Isacchea 
Kancaçay Kacha Katscha 
Kefe Feodosiya Feodosia, Kaffa 
Kılburun Kinburn Kinburn 
Megrelistan Megreliya Mingrelia 
Oltaniçe Ol'tenitsa Oltenitza 
Or Kapusu Perekop Perekop 
Özi Ochakov Ochakof 
Rahova Rassova Rassova 
Rusçuk Ruschuk Ruse 
Semirzağan Samurzakan Samursachan 
Sohum, Sohumkale Sukhumi Souchoum, Sukhum, 
Soukoumkale 
Süzebolu Sizopol’ Sizepolis 
Şekvetil, Şefketil Svyaty Nikolai St. Nicholas 
Şumnu Shumla Shumla, Schumla 
Trabzon Trebizond Trapezund 
Tutrakan, Totrakan Turtukai Turtukai 
Üsküdar Skutari Scutari 
Yergöğü, Yerköy Zhurzhev Giurgevo  
Ziştovi Svishtov Sistov 
Zugdidi Zugdidi Sugdidi 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
 
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES 
 
 
 
 
All Ottoman-Turkish proper names have been given in their modern Turkish 
orthography. Thus, instead of Omar (or Omer) Pasha we have Ömer Pasha. 
Nevertheless, the final –d has been preserved. Thus, instead of Ahmet, Mehmet and 
Mahmut, I preferred Ahmed, Mehmed, Mahmud etc. Geographical proper names with a 
different Turkish version have also been given in the original Turkish version, with their 
European counterpart provided in the list of geographical names. Thus we have Gözleve 
instead of Eupatoria and Şekvetil instead of St. Nicholas.  
Russian personal Christian names were not anglicized but their original 
orthography was maintained. Thus, instead of Nicholas I and Alexander II, we have 
emperors Nikolai I and Aleksandr II. Russian proper names were also transliterated in a 
phonetic way, closer to their pronunciation. Thus, instead of Evgeny (or Eugene) and 
Muraviev, I used Yevgeniy and Muravyov which correspond better both to the 
pronunciation and spelling of these names.  
European proper names that appear in Ottoman texts are also duly given in their 
original spelling as far as possible.  
Muslim (Hicri) and Julian (Rumi) dates were converted to the Western calendar 
by using the online calendar converter at the website of the TTK (www.ttk.gov.tr).  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE SOURCES 
 
 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the Ottoman involvement in the Crimean War of 
1853-56. The necessity for such a study arises from the fact that while there is a huge 
literature in the European languages (including Russian) on the topic, there hardly exists 
any modern, up-to-date, comparative, scholarly monograph based on original research 
in Ottoman sources and focusing on the Ottoman state and society. The main concern of 
this study is to re-construct the narrative of the war as experienced by the Ottomans, 
setting the record right by an up-to-date, comparative study of factual data from primary 
sources. In so doing, I will also examine the political, economic, social and intellectual 
impact of the war on the Ottoman state and society. Language barriers, neglect and even 
ignorance of the Ottoman archival material have hitherto prevented Western and 
Russian historians to devote sufficient attention to the role of the Ottomans in the war.
1
 
The present study aims to fill this gap in the historiography of this all-European, proto-
world war of the long 19
th
 century. While a good deal of the Western historiography 
focused on the origins of the war and the role of diplomacy, the present study will rather 
be interested in the conduct of the war itself and its implications, results and impact 
upon the Ottoman state and society. 
There are two big gaps related to the Ottoman Empire in the overall 
historiography of the Crimean War, despite the rich international literature on the 
subject. One of them is, as said above, that Western and Russian historians do not use 
Ottoman sources. The other is that the Ottoman and Turkish historians themselves have 
neglected this topic and their references also come from Western sources. Although 
recently there have been new studies and some dissertations written in Turkey, the 
                                                 
1 Prof. David Goldfrank adds “parochialism” to the list of causes. See his article “The Ottoman 
Empire and the Origin of the Crimean War: Sources and Strategies”, in The Turks 4, Ankara: Yeni 
Türkiye, 2002, p. 233. 
2 
general outlook of the Turkish historiography on the subject is not very bright. Existing 
general histories of the 19
th
 century give scanty place to the war and the few 
monographs on the topic confine themselves to making a summary of Western sources, 
whereas Ottoman archives are open and the subject is waiting for its researchers. 
The Crimean War is the only all-European war in the one hundred years between 
the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. It is also the only war in the 19
th
 century 
when the Ottomans held victory against Russia. Of the ten wars between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire from 1678 to 1917, only three ended with victory for the Ottomans. 
The Crimean War is also the only time when two European great powers, Britain and 
France fought against the Russians on the side of the Ottomans. The Crimean War 
indeed proved to be of utmost importance for the Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century. It 
officially introduced the Ottoman Empire into the European state system, the so-called 
Concert of Europe. The Crimean War is an exceptional example of Russian diplomatic 
isolation due to Russian Emperor Nikolai's personal miscalculations and successful 
alliance policies of the Porte. Ottoman statesmen, however, would soon find out the 
“practical” value of being included in the European system or becoming allied with 
European powers, when in 1877 their hopes of British or French help against Russia did 
not materialize. Even the promulgation of the 1876 Constitution did not help the 
Ottoman Empire to gain European favour. Nevertheless, the doctrine of Turkey‟s 
geopolitical strategic importance carried over into the 20
th
 century.  
One of the possible reasons of the relative oblivion concerning the war in Turkish 
historiography is that the war is seen as bringing too much trouble although the 
Ottoman Empire was on the victorious side at the end of it. In fact, the Treaty of Paris 
neutralized the Black Sea for both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Territorially the 
Ottoman Empire neither gained nor lost, but it was exhausted economically and 
morally. Soon after the war the idea that it was quite a useless and senseless war gained 
popularity in both European and Ottoman public opinion. Public opinion was indeed 
important during the war: We can argue that the Crimean War was the first war in world 
history where public opinion did matter. This was in part due to the wonderful effect of 
the telegraph and photography, bringing news from the front almost daily. In 1877 when 
Russia again attacked the Ottoman Empire, the British were still under the influence of 
this public opinion, however, this time Britain took Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire as 
a reward of its support without going into war. That Britain could gain its ends without 
going to war against Russia also contributed to the common (especially British) notion 
that the Crimean War was useless. Such a view is very misguided because it does not 
3 
pay attention to the tensions between Russia and Europe over the influence over the 
Ottoman Empire. Needless to say, these tensions were based on very material interests 
and not on some personal matters or religious quarrels.  
From a wider perspective, the Crimean War divides the long 19
th
 century (from 
1789 to 1917) into two periods, ending the reign of peace in Europe after the 
Napoleonic wars. It starts the age of modern warfare and many military novelties. It 
gives us a prototype or foretaste of the long trench wars of the First World War. There 
has been a debate around how to call this war properly. Recently some new studies, 
especially those of Trevor Royle
2
 and Winfried Baumgart
3
 also challenged the naming 
of this war. They have pointed to the inadequacy of the term Crimean to describe the 
war. On this point I feel sympathy with them. I think this war comes very close to the 
definition of a “Proto-World War” or an All-out European War. Some Turkish sources 
call it simply the 1853-56 Turco-Russian War, which is doubtlessly as narrow as the 
term Crimean. Not surprisingly, there is very little mention of the Baltic and White Sea 
fronts of the war in Turkish historiography. 
We can ask a very legitimate question: what is a World War or a European War? 
How should we define it? Should we define it by the importance and number of 
belligerent states? That is, by whether all great powers participate in it? Alternatively, 
should we define it by the extent and proximity to Europe of the war areas? The 
Crimean War was fought on six fronts and not just in the Crimea: in the lower Danube, 
in the Black Sea, in the Baltic and White Seas, and in the Caucasus. All major powers 
either actively fought or came close to war, as in the case of Austria. Now the only 
missing party for this war to be called a world war seems to be the USA. Then, was the 
USA a great power in the middle of the 19
th
 century? Did it have a say in world 
politics? I rather think it did not. Nevertheless, even the USA came close to breaking its 
isolationist stand in world politics during the war.  
On the other hand, I was surprised when I first discovered that Russian sources 
also used the term Vostochnaya Voina (eastern or oriental war). The term was first used 
in Europe (guerre d'Orient) and came to Russia later. Nevertheless, as in many other 
cases, this intellectual invention proved to be more permanent in Russia than in Europe. 
Russian historians used the term as if it was an originally Russian term. As for the 
                                                 
2  Trevor Royle. Crimea. The Great Crimean War 1854-1856. London: Little, Brown and Company, 
1999. Second edition: London: Abacus, 2000. As is seen from the title, like many other Western 
narratives of the war, the book starts the war from 1854, when Britain and France joined the war, 
ignoring the battles of 1853 to a great extent.  
3  Winfried Baumgart. The Crimean War, 1853-1856. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
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Turkish historiography, naturally there is no mention of an “eastern” or “oriental” war. 
In some cases the war is called Turco-Russian war of 1853-56. I think the term 
Vostochnaya Voina is useful only in that it reminds us the so-called Eastern Question of 
the 19
th
 century. Apart from that, it is of course rather Eurocentric. What is east of 
Europe may well be west of Asia. Geographically speaking, for instance, Trans-
Caucasus (Zakavkaz‟e in Russian), is the area beyond the Caucasian mountains for 
Russia, Ukraine and also for Europe, but for someone looking from Turkey, it is the 
area before the Caucasian mountains, or it is simply the Caucasus. Nevertheless, such 
kind of Euro-centrism or Orientalism is so powerful that that we find even some 
Ottoman and Turkish sources using the literal translation of Trans-Caucasus or 
Zakavkaz'e as Mavera-i Kafkas or Kafkaslar Ötesi. 
One of the problems of the Ottoman-Turkish historiography was that it simply did 
not have recourse to Russian and did not use Russian sources. I would like to give a 
small example of the consequences of this. The name of the Russian extraordinary 
ambassador Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov is usually misspelled in Ottoman and 
Turkish sources as Mençikof while the correct form in Turkish would be Menşikov. 
Only in the work of Akdes Nimet Kurat we encounter a correct spelling of his name. 
The confusion probably stems from using French sources instead of Russian or from the 
influence of the Italian, which was still a popular lingua franca between the Ottomans 
and the Europeans. In the Ottoman archive the name of the Russian extraordinary 
ambassador is mostly spelled as Mençikof, although there are instances of the more 
correct spelling of Menşikof. History textbooks of the 1930s use the almost correct 
form, Menşikof. From the 1950s onward we observe a return to the old incorrect form of 
Mençikof. Even recent publications still misspell his name as Mençikof. This seemingly 
insignificant spelling error in fact mirrors a lot about the perils of using secondary 
sources and not checking the orthography of proper names.  
What‟s more, in Turkey, Russian history and Turkish-Russian relations came to 
be written by émigré intellectuals who fled the Russian revolution and who were very 
fervently anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. These historians could not be objective in their 
studies due to personal affiliations and ideological-political engagements. One of them, 
Prof. Akdes Nimet Kurat, who comes from an ulema and mirza family, has written two 
voluminous books on Russian history and Russo-Turkish relations from such a 
perspective. In the period of cold war, it was hard to find unbiased approaches to the 
questions of Russo-Ottoman relations. Now the ice is broken, there are more and more 
Turkish researchers willing to learn Russian and study these relations in a more relaxed 
5 
and objectively detached way.  
The method used here is comparative historical social analysis that aims to present 
a balanced view of all sides without any nationalist agenda to prove the “heroism” of 
one side and / or the “cowardice” of another. This requires a thorough critique of the 
nationalist, imperialist, state-worshipping and apologetic discourses in the Ottoman, 
Turkish, Russian and European historiographies. 
 
 
1.2.  Ottoman and Turkish Sources 
 
 
Now let us begin our survey with the primary and secondary sources of the 
Ottoman-Turkish historiography on our subject.
4
  First a few words about the archives. 
In Turkey, the most important archive is of course the Prime Ministerial Ottoman 
archive in Istanbul (BOA). It contains the former archive of the Ottoman foreign 
ministry as well. The other related archives in Turkey are those of the Turkish Naval 
Museum in Istanbul (DMA) and of the General Staff in Ankara (ATASE). I applied to 
the DMA in January 2006 and only at the end of May 2006 I was told that my 
application was rejected without citing any reason. Therefore I did not apply to the 
ATASE. However, I do not think that I have lost much, because, as we will see later, 
there are two doctoral dissertations related to our subject that have used these two 
military archives and their results imply that these archives may not contain much 
significant information on our topic. 
The Ottoman official chronicler (vakanüvis) Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895), 
served in this office from 1855 to 1865 and he wrote his Tarih-i Cevdet, a history of the 
Ottoman Empire from 1774 to 1825. After that he continued to write historical notes or 
memoranda (Tezâkir) about current events of his time for his successor at the post of 
chronicler, Lütfi Efendi. Cevdet Pasha was a first-hand witness of many of the events he 
describes in his notes. Although he was a protégé of Mustafa ReĢid Pasha (1799-1857), 
he managed to survive under all cabinets, because he was also a bureaucrat of all times, 
capable of preserving his position amid changes in the government. Cevdet Pasha's 
observations are sharp and witty. Prof. Cavid Baysun first began publishing the whole 
                                                 
4  For an introduction to the Ottoman-Turkish historiography of the Crimean War, see Candan 
Badem, “The Treatment of the Crimean War in Turkish Historiography”, Vostochnaya 
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of the Tezâkir only in 1953.5 Until then it was a manuscript. Another work of Cevdet 
Pasha that concerns us is the Ma'rûzât, which covers the period from 1839 to 1876.6 
The work was written on the order of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909). It was also 
published lately in 1980. Although the subjects of the two works overlap, the Tezâkir is 
more reliable because it does not try to appeal to Sultan Abdulhamid II. In general, 
Cevdet Pasha is an influential source for our subject. Some mistakes in the secondary 
sources originate from his account of the war. But in any case Cevdet Pasha is a very 
valuable and indispensable source for understanding the attitudes of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy towards the war. He was the first Ottoman chronicler to attempt a reform in 
Ottoman historiography by introducing comparative analysis and social history into it. It 
is a pity that even those international historians who read Turkish have neglected him. 
Ahmed Lütfi Efendi (1816-1907) was the Ottoman official chronicler after Cevdet 
Pasha. From 1866 until his death Lütfi was responsible for the chronicle of the period 
1826-1876. Unfortunately, his work is very insipid, insignificant, scanty and without 
much analysis. In many cases he copies from the Takvim-i Vekayi and the Tezâkir. Lütfi 
wrote his chronicle when many participants and statesmen of the time of the Crimean 
War were still alive, yet in so many cases where he gives so little information, he 
simply makes the following comment: “only this much information has been given in 
the Takvim-i Vekayi”! Nevertheless, on the question of the actual losses of the Ottoman 
army during the Crimean War, he writes of his having applied to the war ministry and 
their inability to give an answer. The new edition of his chronicle by Münir Aktepe is 
unfortunately full of transliteration errors. For example, the French Admiral Bruat 
figures as “amiral bir zat”.7 On the same page, the name of the Russian schooner 
Alupka is transformed into “Elvikalı”. In the same sentence, the date of the capture of 
the Alupka (Kanun-ı Evvel 1269) is converted into December 1852, while in reality it 
corresponds to December 1853. The French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys appears 
as “Verone (?) de Louis”, (question mark by Aktepe), etc.8 Admittedly, the Ottoman 
script can be very troublesome for some foreign words; in this case, however, the editor 
is not excusable, because it is easy to check out who the French foreign minister was at 
that time. 
The scarcity of Ottoman primary sources may at times be disappointing for the 
                                                 
5  Cevdet PaĢa. Tezâkir. Ed. Cavid Baysun. 4 vols. Ankara: TTK, 1991. First Edition 1953.  
6   Cevdet PaĢa. Ma'rûzât. Ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu. Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınevi, 1980. 
7   Lütfi Efendi. Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi. C. IX. Yayınlayan Prof. Dr. Münir Aktepe. 
Istanbul: Ġstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984, p. 209. 
8  Op. cit., p. 216. 
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historian of the Ottoman Empire. Although the BOA contains a great wealth of 
documents, they are by their very nature prosaic and official. The two newspapers in 
Turkish, the official Takvim-i Vekayi and the semi-official Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis 
are also very dry and colourless. What is missing is personal narratives, memoirs. As it 
has been noted by James Reid, while many Russian and British officers have written 
their memoirs, Ottoman officers did not, with a few exceptions.
9
 Thus in the absence of 
Ottoman personal narratives, we have to make do with those of the foreign officers who 
were temporarily in Ottoman service such as the Hungarian György Kmety (Ismail 
Pasha), the Pole Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) and the British naval 
advisor Adolphus Slade (Mushaver Pasha), General William Fenwick Williams, 
Colonel Atwell Lake and Doctor Humphry Sandwith. (Their memoirs will be dealt with 
below in subchapter 1.4.). The Ottoman exceptions are those of Zarif Mustafa Pasha 
(1816-1862),
10
 governor of Erzurum in 1853 and commander of the Anatolian army 
from March to October 1854; Nafiz Efendi,
11
 an artillery officer who wrote on the siege 
of Silistria of 1854, and Major Osman Bey (alias Frederick Millingen), step-son of 
Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha (1853-54 and 1859-61). During the war, Osman 
Bey was the adjutant (aide-de-camp) of MüĢir Mustafa Pasha, the commander of the 
Batum army from August 1854 to August 1855. Osman Bey‟s article was also 
published in a Russian journal in 1877 and has not been translated into Turkish to the 
best of my knowledge.
12
 In fact there are no references to this article in Turkish 
literature. Osman Bey went over to the Russians in 1874, converted to Orthodoxy, and 
became a major in the Russian army by 1877 when he wrote his article. Like his mother 
Melek Hanım, he is very hostile to Islam, but he is not biased against all Muslims; he 
even shows some sympathy to Muhammed Emin, the naib of Sheikh Shamil (1797-
1871) in Circassia. He gives us interesting information about his stepfather's relations 
with Mustafa Pasha and others. AĢçıdede Halil Ġbrahim‟s memoirs are only very slightly 
tangential to the war: He was appointed ruznamçeci (daybook accountant) of the 
Anatolian army in March 1856 and when he arrived at Erzurum in April 1856, peace 
                                                 
9  James J. Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878, Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 47-51. 
10  Enver Ziya Karal (ed.). “Zarif PaĢa'nın Hatıratı 1816-1862”, Belleten IV, Ankara, 1940, pp. 442-
494. These memoirs had not been published anywhere until 1940. 
11  Nafiz Efendi, “Krepost‟ Silistriya v 1854 godu”, Voenny Sbornik 106(12), 1875, pp. 488-502. M. 
Bogdanovich writes that the article is the translation of part of a brochure published in 1874 in 
Ottoman Turkish. The editor of Voenny Sbornik remarks that the article is published as a rare 
example of “Turkish” military literature. I could not find the Ottoman original.  
12  Mayor Osman Bey. “Vospominaniya o 1855 gode”, Kavkazskiy Sbornik, vol. 2, 1877, pp. 143-
214. 
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had already been declared.
13
  
It would be very interesting to read the memoirs of Ömer Lütfi Pasha (1806-
1871), the commander-in-chief, MüĢir Selim Mehmed Pasha and MüĢir Mustafa Pasha 
of the Batum Army, Abdi Pasha, Kerim Pasha and Vasıf Pasha of the Anatolian Army, 
Vice-Admiral Osman Pasha, commander of the Ottoman squadron at Sinop, etc, if such 
memoirs existed. Indeed the memoirs of any Ottoman officer or soldier or bureaucrat 
would be very valuable. We only have the statements (evidence) of some pashas during 
their trial at the MVL for their misdeeds in battles and in the administration of the army. 
Unfortunately for historians, Ottoman statesmen like Mustafa ReĢid Pasha, Mehmed 
Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuad Pasha (1814-1869) have left no memoirs either, 
except for the unauthenticated political testaments by Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha.14   
On the other hand, there is a rich literature in Turkish, mostly poetry and theatre 
plays on the Crimean War. There are many military marches (harbiyye), epic poems 
(destan, zafername) and epic folk songs (koçaklama). Some of the destans are indeed 
good sources for information on the war. For example Salih Hayri's Hayrabat is such a 
work.
15
 The editor Necat Birinci informs us that Salih Hayri, also known as “Türk 
Hayri”, was a quarantine officer in Istanbul and a protégé of Âli Pasha. He must have 
talked to many people and listened to many high officials during the war because he 
gives much specific information about the war. Unfortunately, this modern Turkish 
edition of the Hayrabat by Necat Birinci is not free from transliteration errors of proper 
names. Thus Russian generals Muravyov and Brimmer become “Moradif” and 
“Barimov”, the title of the Georgian rulers, Dadyan, becomes “Tatya”, the British 
officer Teesdale (Mir Teesdale) becomes “mir-i tez-dil”, geographic name Çengel is 
turned into “Haykel”, Zugdidi into “Zükdit” and Poskhov into “Boskhov”, etc. Necat 
Birinci refers to Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu's work, but seems not to have read it carefully, 
because if he had done so, at least some of his mistakes could have been prevented.
16
 
Birinci has provided some useful biographical notes, however, these also include some 
errors, such as confusing the Hungarian-British refugee HurĢid Pasha (Richard Guyon) 
with another HurĢid Pasha, who was a slave of Yahya Pasha and confusing Abdi Pasha 
                                                 
13  AĢçıdede Halil Ġbrahim. Hatıralar. Istanbul: Ġstanbul Ansiklopedisi Kütüphanesi, 1960. 
14   See Roderic Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms. Istanbul: Isis Press, 
1999, pp. 27-40, 47-64. Also see Engin Akarlı, Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından 
Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyyetnameleri. Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1978. 
15 Salih Hayri. Kırım Zafernamesi - Hayrabat. Hazırlayan Necat Birinci. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988. Written first as manuscript and published partially in 1883.  
16  Cf. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, 100. Yıldönümü Dolayısıyla 1855 Kars Zaferi, Ġstanbul: IĢıl Matbaası, 
1955, pp. 210-213. 
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with a certain Circassian Abbas Pasha. In his biographical footnote for Sheikh Shamil, 
the editor even argues that Shamil was a “Turkish hero”.17 Shamil was, as is well 
known, ethnically an Avar from Dagestan. Though he accepted the authority of the 
Ottoman caliph, he never considered himself a “Turk”.  
Another important zafername or destan is Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni's Manzume-i 
Sivastopol that was first printed in 1869.
18
 Ahmed Rıza was a trader from Trabzon who 
had business in the Crimea. He seems to have been in Gözleve, Sevastopol, Kerç and 
Sohum and talked to Ottoman officers during the war. He has depicted many battles of 
the war. While his account is not altogether reliable, especially for numbers, it is not 
entirely without interest either. Occasionally he gives an interesting piece of 
information or interpretation. Veysel Usta‟s recent edition is in general good, with some 
minor biographical errors in dates and persons, like confusing Kerim Pasha with 
Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha and giving a totally unrelated Hüseyin Pasha‟s biography for 
Riyale Bozcaadalı Hüseyin Pasha who died during the battle of Sinop, and a few 
transliteration errors. Usta‟s introduction also contains a few minor errors like bringing 
the French and British troops to the defence of Silistre. 
Other known destans are AĢık Selimi's Rus Destanı, Eflâki's Şuregel Destanı, 
Karslı Ġbrahim Baba's 72 Kars Destanı, Gülzâri's Destan-ı Sivastopol, Karslı Süleyman 
ġâdi's Muzaffername19 and Râzi‟s Destan-ı Şeyh Şamil.20 Apart from these, Bezmi, 
Yusuf Halis Efendi, Hayali, Cemali, Ervahi, Muhsin and Safderi have also written or 
composed such epics.
21
 Among them Yusuf Halis Efendi, who was an Arabic translator 
in the Translation Bureau of the Sublime Porte, stands out as probably the first 
Ottoman-Turkish patriotic poet. He wrote many poems in the newspaper Ceride-i 
Havadis during the war and then these were published in October 1855 under the title of 
Şehname-i Osmani.22 These were epic and patriotic poems and marches in plain Turkish 
                                                 
17  Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 96. 
18 Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni. Manzume-i Sivastopol. Hazırlayan Veysel Usta. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
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19 See Selahattin Tozlu. “Kırım Harbi'nde Kars'ı Anlatan Kayıp Bir Eser: Muzaffer-Name”, 
Akademik Araştırmalar 1(2), Erzurum, Güz 1996, pp. 123-144.  
20   Ömer Faruk Akün. “Eski Bir ġeyh ġamil Destanı”, in Atsız Armağanı, Erol Güngör et al (eds.), 
Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1976, pp. 17-59.  
21 See Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, “Yardıma KoĢan Manevi Ordu ve Kırım Harbi (1853-56)”, 
Kubbealtı Akademi Mecmuası 16 (3), Temmuz 1987, pp. 25-41. By the same author, “1853-1856 
Kırım Harbi‟yle Ġlgili Destanlar”, X. Türk Tarih Kongresi. Ankara: 22-26 Eylül 1986. Kongreye 
Sunulan Bildiriler, V. Cilt, Ankara: TTK, 1994, pp. 1977-2009. Also see Cahit Öztelli. Uyan 
Padişahım. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, pp. 344-371. 
22 Yusuf Halis Efendi. Şehname-i Osmani. Istanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası, 1855. For some of 
these poems, see Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, ibid, pp. 53-55 and 214-215. Also see Cahit Öztelli, ibid, pp. 
372-373. 
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that are probably the first of its kind. For example, he used the word vatan (la patrie or 
fatherland) in a very European and modern way. Before, the word simply meant one‟s 
place of birth or native area. His Destan-ı Askeri contains lines resembling the 
Marseillaise of the French (Vatan oğulları gayret edelim). 
Namık Kemal, one of the first Turkish patriotic poets and by far the most famous 
of them in the 19
th
 century, wrote the first patriotic Ottoman (and Turkish) theatre play 
Vatan yahut Silistre which took its theme from the siege of Silistria in 1854. Thus the 
word vatan was for the first time used in a theatre play. Indeed the literary legacy of the 
Crimean war in Turkish literature is interesting and could be a good topic of for a 
separate study. Nevertheless, such literature (with a few exceptions) is of little value for 
writing the history of the war. It is all the more surprising that despite the old tradition 
of Ottoman prose writing, we have few prosaic narratives of this war other than epic 
poems. 
For periodicals, I had some luck. I must be thankful to Hakkı Yapıcı, who in his 
master's thesis has transliterated many articles about the war that appeared in the 
Takvim-i Vekayi. This has saved me much time, notwithstanding the fact that he has 
mistransliterated many foreign proper names, without bothering to find their original 
spellings. The result is such that the British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe appears 
as “istirak fort dö rödklif”, the French ambassador Baraguey d'Hilliers as “Brake 
Diliye”, Generals Raglan as “Reğlan”, Canrobert as “Kanrober”, Pelissier as “Pilise”, 
Colonel Simmons as “Senmis”, Colonel Ballard as “Bilard”, Captain Dymock as “Katin 
Dimak”, British steamship Retribution as “TirebiyaĢün” and elsewhere “Deretere 
BüyüĢün”, Yılanlı Tabya as “Bilanlı” Tabya, Ozurgeti as “Azerkit”, Zugdidi as 
“Zekdide”, Muravyov as “Morafbif”, General Williams as “Vilyamis”, Major Teesdale 
as “Tizvil”, Colonel Lake as “Lik”, etc. The thesis covers the period from 13 August 
1853 to 30 June 1856.  
Hüseyin Hüsnü‟s Saika-i Zafer (Lightning of Victory)23 and Hayreddin Bey‟s 
1270 Kırım Muharebesinin Tarih-i Siyasisi (A Political History of the 1270 [1853] 
Battle of the Crimea)
24
 are two monographs that do not offer much insight. The first is a 
summary account derived from foreign sources and the latter is mainly about the 
diplomatic history of the question of the “holy places”. Hayreddin Bey (later Hayrettin 
Göçen?) was a bureaucrat of the ministry of foreign affairs. Although he says that he 
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has made a lot of research for the book, the result is not satisfactory, unfortunately. He 
was aware of the existence of Cevdet Pasha's Tezâkir, but he could not get hold of it. He 
also writes that he went to Paris, but he could not gain access to the archives of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the end, one cannot help but feel sympathy to 
him because he has at least tried to do original research. 
Ali Fuat Türkgeldi (1867-1935), who served as head secretary (mabeyn başkatibi) 
of the Sultan from 1912 to 1920, has written some important articles which were later 
published in a book that includes many documents which are not available elsewhere.
25
 
I have been unable to locate some of these documents in BOA; others must be either 
lost or still unclassified. Among these rare documents is an account of the proceedings 
of the war council in Istanbul in September 1853, narrated by Rifat PaĢazade Rauf Bey 
(later Rauf Pasha). The three volume work was published only in 1960 by Bekir Sıtkı 
Baykal who has also written probably the first research based article on the question of 
the holy places. A deficiency of this work is its inattention to dates, mixing the Russian 
old style (Julian calendar) dates with the Gregorian (Miladi) calendar. 
Ali Haydar Emir has published some documents about the naval battles of the war 
in the naval journal of Risale-i Mevkute-i Bahriye (Periodical Naval Pamphlet) in 1916 
and 1918.
26
 Another naval officer, Ali Rıza Seyfi has written a series of articles about 
the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha and fall of Kars in 1855, drawing largely from 
Laurence Oliphant's book.
27
 These articles were published in the Donanma Mecmuası 
(Journal of the Fleet) in 1912.
28
  
The first book from the republican era of Turkey belongs to Captain Fevzi 
(Kurtoğlu).29 Kurtoğlu was a teacher at the Military Naval School (Bahriye Mektebi). 
He is also the author of many works on Turkish naval battles. This work is a military 
history of the war focusing on military-naval techniques and technology. However, he 
does not analyse Turkish defeats, devoting too little space to them. One exception is the 
Sinop naval battle of 30 November 1853, which is given in some detail. However, even 
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here he makes some factual mistakes. As captain of the Fazlullah frigate, (former 
Russian frigate Rafail captured by the Ottomans) he cites Kavaklı Mehmet Bey whereas 
in reality it is Ali Bey, who was taken prisoner by Russians and thanks to Russian 
painter Ivan Aivazovskiy, there is even a portrait of him published in Vasiliy Timm's 
Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok in 1854.
30
  
Another book from an officer belongs to Captain A. Tevfik Gürel, published in 
1935.
31
 This is a rather superficial military history without serious research and with 
many factual and even grammatical errors. Besides, almost all foreign and many 
Turkish proper names have been misspelled, such as Menshikov being spelled as 
“Minçikof”, Bebutov as “Robodof”, Vasıf as “Vasfi”, Muravyov as “Moravyef”, Vivian 
as “Viyoban”, Canrobert as “Kont Rober”, Sandwith as “Sandoviç”, Osten Saken as 
“Ostan Saksen”, Vrangel as “Varangel”, Gözleve as “Güzelova”, Simferopol as 
“Sahferpol”, Sasık Göl as “Sarık” Göl, ġekvetil as “ġevketil”, etc. The author also 
confuses Mustafa Zarif Pasha, commander of the Anatolian army, with Mustafa Pasha 
of Batum army and MüĢir Mehmed Selim Pasha of the Batum army with Ferik Selim 
Pasha of the Bayezid army corps. He also does not realize that General Cannon and 
Behram Pasha are not two different persons but the latter is simply his new Muslim 
name. As James Reid has noted, Gürel also mistakenly states that Ahmed Pasha 
commanded at the battle of Kürekdere, without naming Zarif Pasha.32 One of the rare 
good parts of the book is those passages that are taken directly from the Russian 
General Andrey Nikolaevich Petrov's book. (Gürel acknowledges Petrov). 
As we have said before, in 1940 Enver Ziya Karal published the memoirs of Zarif 
Pasha, who was the governor of Erzurum at the beginning of the war and the 
commander in chief (müşir) of the Anatolian army from February to the end of October 
1854. These memoirs are very important because they are the only known memoirs of 
an Ottoman pasha about the Crimean War, except for the court evidences and 
interrogations of Abdi Pasha, Ahmet Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha as well about their 
participation in the war. In fact, part of Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs is also part of his 
testimony at the military court in Istanbul. I have found in the BOA another copy of the 
second part of Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs, related to his commandership of the Anatolian 
                                                 
30   Vasily Timm (Georg Wilhelm). Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok. St. Petersburg, 1854. 
31  Kur. Yzb. A. Tevfik Gürel. 1853-55 Türk-Rus ve Müttefiklerin Kırım Savaşı. Istanbul: Askeri 
Matbaa, 1935. 
32  Reid, op. cit., p. 238. Reid mentions some other shortcomings of Gürel‟s work as well. However, 
as we will see in Chapter 3, Reid is not fully right in his critique of Gürel‟s narrative of the 
behaviour of the Ottoman troops in the Battle of Balaklava on 25 October 1854. (Gürel‟s account 
in general is not correct either). 
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army from February to October 1854, among the documents related to his trial.
33
 There 
are some slight differences between this document and the one published by Karal. 
Zarif Pasha (also called Mustafa Zarif or Zarif Mustafa Pasha) had written his memoirs 
in Istanbul towards the end of 1854 while he was under custody for charges of 
corruption, made by the British military commissioner Colonel Williams. Zarif Pasha 
had been dismissed after the defeat of the Ottoman army in the Battle of Kürekdere (or 
Gökdere or Kurudere) in August 1854 and after the reports of Williams. As Karal noted, 
Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs covering the period from 1829 to 1854, do not give us any 
information on the great changes of his time beginning with the Tanzimat, focusing 
instead only in his petty affairs like how much money he accumulated, how he bought 
his wife, etc. These memoirs indeed may serve as an indication of the intellectual, 
cultural and military interests of a successful, careerist Ottoman officer of the pre-war 
years. Nevertheless, Zarif Pasha still makes some valuable observations. For example, 
he attributes his imprisonment to Stratford de Redcliffe's personal grudge against him 
because of his handling of some affairs of the Christians in Jerusalem in 1847, when he 
was the governor (mutasarrıf) there. Karal transliterated and wrote an introduction to 
these memoirs. He has also noted the problem of the lack of memoirs of Ottoman 
statesmen. On the other hand, Karal has made some errors (for example, spelling Azğur 
(Atskhur) as “Azgor”, NorĢin as “NurĢin”, ġüregel as “ġirkâl” and, as Fahrettin 
Kırzıoğlu noted, somar as “himar” and Ahılkelek as “Ahleklik”) and omissions in 
transliteration (such as not transliterating the words “ve konsullar” but giving in Arabic 
letters). Karal‟s biographical notes on the officers also contain many mistakes, such as 
mistaking the Polish refugee officers Arslan Pasha (Bystrzonowski) and ġahin Pasha 
(Breansky) for some other Ottoman pashas with the same names, mistaking the illiterate 
chief of staff of the Anatolian army Ahmed Pasha for the Nazır Ahmed Pasha of the 
Rumeli army, who was one of the first graduates of the Mekteb-i Harbiye (War 
Academy), mistaking the Prussian Ferhad Pasha (Stein) for another Ferhad Pasha, etc. 
Karal makes some useful editorial comments as well, however, he does not ask the most 
delicate question: Did Zarif Pasha commit embezzlement? The fact that Karal received 
the memoirs from a grandson of Zarif Pasha must have complicated matters. 
In 1943, Ali Rıza Seyfi translated Adolphus Slade‟s important book.34 This is in 
general a good translation into Turkish with some minor mistakes and omissions and a 
                                                 
33  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10.   
34  Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade (Mushaver Pasha). Turkey and the Crimean War. A Narrative of 
Historical Events. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1867. Translation: Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi. 
Istanbul: Genelkurmay X. ġ., 1943. 
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few real blunders. The book is long out of print and I think a revised edition is much 
needed. 
Karal has devoted 35 pages to the Crimean War and the Rescript of Reform in his 
Osmanlı Tarihi.35 Karal's bibliography on the subject includes only four books and two 
articles. One of these books is Hayreddin Bey's above mentioned book. Karal is of the 
opinion that the British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe was happy to see that war 
had began against Russia. Karal totally omits (or is unaware of) the White Sea and the 
Pacific fronts of the war and does not mention the battles of BaĢgedikler, Ahısha, 
Kürekdere etc and the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha. He even argues that at the 
time of the fall of Sevastopol (September 1855), Ömer Pasha defeated the Russians in 
“Eupatoria”, while in reality the battle of Gözleve took place in February 1855 and 
Ömer Pasha had left the Crimea for Trabzon shortly before the fall of Sevastopol. In 
short, besides unfounded conclusions and interpretations, Karal‟s account includes 
many omissions and material errors in dates, numbers, etc. For example, he gives the 
number of Ottoman troops landed in September 1854 in the Crimea as 60,000, which 
was in fact only about 6,000. (The number of Ottoman troops in the Crimea reached 
55,000 to 60,000 only in 1855).  
Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu (1917-2005), a native of Kars, published in 1955 a book titled 
1855 Kars Zaferi (“1855 Kars Victory”) on the centennial anniversary of the Battle of 
Kars.
36
 For him it was victory, despite the fact that one month after this victory the Kars 
garrison capitulated to the Russian army. In general, Kırzıoğlu's work has a strong anti-
Russian bias. The relative merits of his work are some good research in the BOA 
(considering the conditions of work in the archives at that time), use of at least one 
Russian source (Blokada Karsa, Tiflis 1856), although without giving its original title, 
and collection of some unknown Turkish local epic folk poetry on the war. He has also 
used the works of the English doctor Humphrey Sandwith (whose name he turns into 
“Sandoviç”) and Colonel Atwell Lake (whose name he spells as “Lik”). In 1994, in a 
symposium on “Kars and Eastern Anatolia in the Recent History of Turkey”, Kırzıoğlu 
states the Russian casualties (dead and wounded) from the unsuccessful Russian attack 
on Kars fortification as more than 20,000, although in his 1955 book he had given a 
more reliable and accurate figure (around 7,000) depending on reports of the Ottoman 
commanders. He repeats Cevdet Pasha to the effect that “this battle was greater than the 
battle of Silistria” and “Kars victory was greater than Sevastopol victory”.  
                                                 
35  Enver Ziya Karal. Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. V. Ankara: TTK, 1995. First edition in 1947. 
36  Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu. 100. Yıldönümü Dolayısıyla 1855 Kars Zaferi. Istanbul: IĢıl Matbaası, 1955. 
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In 1957 Emin Ali Çavlı published a superficial treatise written for the occasion of 
the centennial anniversary of the Treaty of Paris.
37
 Like Gürel, Çavlı changed Gözleve 
into Güzelova, which means “beautiful plain”; being unaware that Gözleve itself is a 
Turkic (Tatar) word, which means a hunters‟ hut. He also uses the spelling of 
“Menchikov” for Menşikov. As James Reid has noted, Çavlı failed to consider even the 
basic issues of the war.
38
 
In 1959 Can Yücel translated Stanley Lane-Poole‟s biography39 of the British 
ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe into Turkish.
40
 Yücel‟s father Hasan Ali Yücel 
wrote a long preface to the translation. Allegedly this was a summary translation of 
those parts of Poole‟s book that related to “Turkey”. However, in reality, a whole 
chapter from the book, directly related to the Ottoman Empire, was omitted. This 
chapter (vol. II, ch. 18) is on the question of the punishment of the “Christian 
Renegades” (that is to say Ottoman apostates, those Christian subjects who after having 
converted to Islam returned back to Christianity) in the Ottoman Empire. Thus Yücel‟s 
translation is a very partial translation or rather an arbitrary summary of those parts 
related to the Ottoman Empire. Many pages, paragraphs, sentences and words have been 
omitted. The translation contains many minor errors and some blunders as well. Some 
of these translation errors and some of the omissions are indeed deliberate distortions. 
For example, the expression “had murdered one of his Christian concubines” is 
translated as “Hıristiyan olan karısını öldürmüştü”, thus making the perpetrator  
(Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha) murder “his wife who was Christian”. It is impossible and 
not necessary to show all the translation errors here. Yücel has also turned Menşikov's 
name into Mençikov, under the unhealthy influence of Turkish historiography. The book 
was reprinted in 1988 and in 1999 without any revision.  
Akdes Nimet Kurat published a book on Russo-Turkish relations in 1970.
41
 
Although his account is much biased against Russia, we must admit at least one merit of 
Kurat: he has spelled correctly Menshikov‟s name, (Menşikov in Turkish) thanks to his 
ability to read Russian. Kurat seems to have read Temperley and Tarle (in fact he cites 
                                                 
37  Emin Ali Çavlı. Kırım Harbi (Paris Muahedesi 1956). Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1957. 
38  Reid, op. cit., p. 238. 
39 Stanley Lane-Poole. The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning: Viscount Stratford de 
Redcliffe. Two volumes. London & New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888. 
40 Lord Stratford Canning'in Türkiye Anıları. Çev. Can Yücel. Ankara: Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası Yayınları, 
1959. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1988. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999. 
41  Akdes Nimet Kurat. Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus 
İlişikleri (1798-1919). Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 
1970. 
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only three sources on the Crimean War, including these two authors). He also seems to 
have visited the Ottoman, Austrian, British, French, German and even Swedish 
archives, but his account of the war is surprisingly very superficial and contains several 
blunders. First of all, he really confines the Crimean War to the battles in the Crimea 
and for him the war begins in 1854 (instead of 1853). In his narrative, Prince 
Menshikov‟s mission to Istanbul, then the Russian occupation of the Danubian 
principalities and the battle of Sinop all happen in 1854, whereas all three of these 
events happened in 1853. He does not mention the Danubian front at all and for the 
Caucasian front, he only mentions shortly at the end that Kars had been captured by the 
Russians. Kurat considers that the theatre of war was transferred from Wallachia and 
Moldavia to the Crimea, whereas the principalities were involved in the war only 
tangentially, most of the battles being fought along the Danube or south of it, as in the 
case of the siege of Silistria. Then he claims that the “Ottoman-Turkish” forces in the 
Crimea raided Russian positions (Osmanlı-Türk kuvvetlerinin Rus mevzilerini basması), 
while in fact it was the Russians who attacked the Ottoman forces in Gözleve. (The 
Russians were repulsed). He then argues that Nikolai I died of grief when he received 
the news of the defeat of the Russian army in Gözleve, which is rather an exaggeration. 
All of this gives the impression that he did not read Tarle carefully. 
Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı‟s biography42 of Mehmed Namık Pasha gives some important 
information on the then Minister of Commerce and Public Works Mehmed Namık 
Pasha‟s (1804-1892) loan mission to Paris and London in 1853-54. Sinaplı, who claims 
to be a relative of Namık Pasha, gives some correspondence of Namık Pasha from the 
BOA. However, as in many other cases, this information is intertwined with 
misinformation and one has to be careful. Sinaplı shows the attitude which is so 
characteristic of so many traditional Turkish Ottomanists: an uncritical narrative of the 
events and simple juxtaposition of the documents. He unquestioningly accepts whatever 
Namık Pasha says. Finally his work is full of transliteration mistakes, such as reading 
the name of Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London, as “mösyö Roz”, 
“Mösyo Ruso” and also “Kostaki mösyö Roz”. Other examples are “Ġrdin” and then 
“Alberti” for the British prime minister Aberdeen, “Golsmod” for the London banker 
Goldsmid, “Kalerond” and then “Kile Rondone” for Clarendon, the British foreign 
minister, “Lord Reklen” for Lord Raglan, the British commander in chief, “Derin 
Dölives”, “Dinin de Lhinyi” and then “Doroin Dolayı” for Drouyn de Lhuys, the French 
                                                 
42  Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı. Şeyhül Vüzera Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa, Istanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 
1987. 
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foreign minister, “mühimma imkan” for meh-ma-emken, etc.  
In the 1990‟s and after, Besim Özcan wrote several articles on some aspects of the 
Crimean War. His doctoral dissertation is also about the Battle of Sinop (See subchapter 
1.2.3.). He has also written a book on the financial situation and the war “policy” of the 
Ottoman subjects during the war.
43
 There he published long lists of contributions to the 
so called “iane-i harbiye” (war assistance), which was in fact a war tax. In Özcan‟s 
view, these were only voluntary donations showing the willingness of the population in 
their support of their government's war against Russia. However, there are many 
documents in the BOA showing that the iane-i harbiye was for all practical purposes a 
tax, only euphemistically named so, the amount of which was strictly determined 
beforehand based on everyone's material wealth. Moreover, if this were a donation and 
not a tax, then distant governors would not have paid exactly the same amounts.  
Prof. Fahir Armaoğlu devoted more than 30 pages to the Crimean War and the 
Islahat Fermanı in his political history of the 19th century.44 Armaoğlu‟s account is 
based largely on Karal, Temperley, Kurat, A. Debidour and Edouard Driault. Therefore 
he repeats some of their mistakes. For example, he quotes from Karal that “60,000 
Turkish troops” were landed on the Crimea on 20 September 1854.45 This is, as we have 
seen above, incorrect. Armaoğlu gives at first three alternative spellings for Menshikov 
including the correct one (as Mençikof, Menchikov and Menshikov) but then sticks to 
the usual wrong one (Mençikof) throughout the text.  
Fuat and Süphan Andıç‟s recent book46 is mainly a short diplomatic history, 
written from secondary sources in a popular style without bibliographical footnotes and 
marred by hero-worshipping in the person of the Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, whom the 
authors called “the last of the Ottoman grandees” in another book. The narrative has 
some minor factual, chronological and logical errors and gaps as well. 
Necdet Sakaoğlu and Nuri Akbayar have written a large book on Sultan 
Abdülmecid and his reforms. The book was published in English as well.47 This is a 
richly illustrated, popular and rather touristic edition without footnotes, being mainly a 
                                                 
43   Besim Özcan. Kırım Savaşı'nda Mali Durum ve Teb'anın Harb Siyaseti (1853-1856). Erzurum: 
Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997.  
44  Fahir Armaoğlu. 19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (1789-1914). Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 227-260.  
45  Armaoğlu, op. cit., p. 244. 
46 Fuat Andıç; Süphan Andıç. Kırım Savaşı. Âli Paşa ve Paris Antlaşması. Ġstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 
2002. 
47 Necdet Sakaoğlu; Nuri Akbayar. Avrupalılaşmanın Yol Haritası ve Sultan Abdülmecid. Ġstanbul: 
Denizbank Yayınları (Creative Yayıncılık Ltd), December 2001. Sultan Abdülmecid. A Milestone 
on Turkey's Path of Westernization. Ġstanbul: Denizbank Publications (Creative Yayıncılık Ltd), 
January 2002.  
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social history of reforms under Sultan Abdülmecid. The authors have not bothered 
themselves to find the original quotations and seem to have had some passages from 
Can Yücel‟s inaccurate and abridged translation of Lane-Poole‟s biography of Lord 
Stratford translated back into English. They have also translated (or made others 
translate) passages from Adolphus Slade‟s and Melek Hanım‟s books‟ Turkish 
translations back into English.
48
 Overall the book is not scholarly, but contains some 
interesting material. 
Kezban Acar's small book is about the visual history of Russo-Ottoman wars.
49
 It 
has a section on the Crimean War as well. Acar analyses Russian folk pictures (lubki) 
and caricatures on Russo-Ottoman wars. This study is in general good, but contains one 
blunder: Acar translates the Turkish expression “üç tuğlu paşa”, which literally means a 
pasha with three horse-tails (as the symbol of a vizier), from its Russian version “trekh-
bunchuzhnoi pasha” back into Turkish as “üç boncuk yüklü paşa” (“pasha laden with 
three loads of beads”). Acar then even comments on it, arguing that beads might be 
precious things!  
ġevket K. Akar and Hüseyin Al's thin monograph50 on the Ottoman foreign loans 
and loan control commissions of 1854-1856 is the most up-to-date and factually most 
correct work in Turkish on the subject. Akar and Al have done quite a good job, with 
only a few minor errors. However, their work is too technical and lacks comparative 
analysis. The authors have not searched all the relevant correspondence of Namık Pasha 
available in the BOA, or even in the work of Ahmet Sinaplı, whom they do not mention 
at all. Furthermore they also subscribe to Olive Anderson‟s thesis of Namık Pasha‟s 
“amateurishness” as the reason of his failure to contract the loan. I have shown Chapter 
4 that the causes were more complex and deeper. 
Thanks to the happy coincidence of the round-number (150
th
) anniversary of the 
war, there have been conferences, symposia, exhibitions and publications in Turkey as 
well as in Russia, Ukraine (the Crimea), France and Italy from 2003 to 2006. The BOA 
has published a collection of documents
51
 for the 150
th
 anniversary of the war and of the 
Treaty of Paris. Unfortunately this collection of documents was offered to sale in 
                                                 
48 Cf. for example, Sakaoğlu and Akbayar, op. cit., p. 99, “Lord Stratford Canning‟s „Memoirs of 
Turkey‟ [sic]” with Stanley Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, “The Sultan‟s First Ball”, p. 444.  
49 Kezban Acar. Resimlerle Rusya, Savaşlar ve Türkler. Ankara: Nobel, 2004. On the Crimean War, 
see pp. 11-30, 107-124. 
50 ġevket K. Akar; Hüseyin Al. Osmanlı Dış Borçları ve Gözetim Komisyonları 1854-1856. Istanbul: 
Osmanlı Bankası ArĢiv ve AraĢtırma Merkezi, 2003. 
51   Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı 1853-1856. Ankara: BOA Yayın Nu. 84, 2006. (Hereafter 
OBKS). 
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Istanbul only on 26 February 2007, when I had already finished most of my work and 
had already done most of the transcriptions of those Ottoman documents given in the 
appendices of this dissertation. I felt some relief in discovering that very few documents 
were in fact common between my transcriptions and those in the book, which includes a 
total of 126 documents under six headings: Diplomatic Relations, Reforms, Military 
Activities, War and Economy, Immigrants and Settlement, and Rewards and 
Promotions. To the best of my knowledge, only three of the 126 documents have been 
published before. As such, this is a useful collection of documents for researchers. 
However, its use is limited due to several reasons. First, while we must admit the 
difficulty of selecting 126 documents from among thousands of documents, the 
selection of documents nevertheless leaves much to be desired. Especially the section 
on reforms is rather weak. Other sections are also fragmentary. Secondly, there are 
almost no editorial notes, the documents are simply transliterated. This makes the 
selection useful for only historians and specialists of the period. For example,  
Document 56 is given as a document on the Ottoman loan, whereas it is only a fictitios 
(estimated) calculation of loan repayments over assumed rates. However, since there are 
no explanatory notes, the reader may think that these calculations refer to an actual, 
executed loan agreement.
52
 The collection also includes some errors in the 
transliteration of proper nouns, such as “Paul” instead of Buol, “Edgar Duplier” instead 
of Argiropulo, “Brock” instead of Brück, “Brany” instead of Pisani, “Chiffer” instead of 
Schefer, etc. 
Istanbul University in colloboration with Marmara University organized its annual 
seminar on 22-23 May 2006 around the theme of the 150
th
 anniversary of the Crimean 
War and of the Treaty of Paris. The papers presented in this symposium were published 
in May 2007. The collection includes many interesting papers.
53
 
Sadberk Hanım Museum in Büyükdere, Istanbul held an exhibition on the 150th 
Anniversary of the Crimean War from 9 December 2006 until 25 February 2007. The 
museum also published a fully-coloured, large-size catalog of the exhibition, including 
some articles.
54
 
 
 
                                                 
52  See OBKS, pp. 209-211. For a review of the book, see my review article in Toplumsal Tarih 160, 
Istanbul, April 2007, pp. 92-94. 
53  Savaştan Barışa: 150. Yıldönümünde Kırım Savaşı ve Paris Antlaşması (1853-1856). 22-23 Mayıs 
2006. Bildiriler. Istanbul: Ġ. Ü. Ed. Fak. Tarih AraĢtırma Merkezi, 2007. 
54  Kırım Savaşı‟nın 150nci Yılı / 150th Anniversary of the Crimean War, Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı 
Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, December 2006. 
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1.2.1.  Turkish Official Military History 
 
 
The Turkish General Staff has published a multi volume history of the Turkish 
Armed Forces and three monographs on the Crimean War. Retired Full Captain Saim 
Besbelli of the Turkish Navy has provided a naval history of the war.
55
 The book is 
written in the form of a textbook from secondary sources (among which Adolphus 
Slade's book is prominent) without any references to archival documents and without 
any footnotes except a few for explanation. Besbelli argues that the Russian fleet was 
equal to the Allies in terms of battleships and guns and also that it was a mistake of the 
Russian command to sink its own fleet in order to blockade the entry of the Sivastopol 
harbour. We know that the Battle of Sinop was the first major international 
demonstration of the destructive power of explosive shells against wooden ships. 
Interestingly this point is not clearly understood and sufficiently explained by Turkish 
historians, even the military historians including the present one. Besbelli also argues 
that while the “Turkish” forces fought on the Danube, Caucasus, the Crimea and 
Anatolia, the allies fought only in the Crimea. He is simply unaware of the Baltic, North 
Sea and Pacific (Kamchatka) fronts of the war.  
Part 5 of the volume III of the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (History of the 
Turkish Armed Forces) published by the general staff in 1978 includes 17 pages 
devoted to the Crimean War.
56
 In 1981 the general staff published another book with a 
long title including a section or an article on the Caucasian front of the Crimean War. 
The following quotation from the conclusion of this article is very characteristic of the 
perspective of the works of the Turkish general staff on the Crimean War:  
   During the time of the Crimean War Turkey had almost no real friends in the 
outside world. Those who seemed friendly were not real friends either… Turkey 
in this war lost its treasury. For the first time it became indebted to Europe. What 
is worse, by participating in this war with allies, thousands of foreign soldiers and 
civilians were allowed to see closely the most secret places and shortcomings of 
Turkey… Even some friendly opponents [sic, “dost muhalifler”] characterised as 
perfidy the indifferent attitude and foot-dragging of the allies for a long time in 
the participation in the war. Another negative impact of this war was that some 
semi-intellectual circles of Turkish society came to admire Western fashions and 
values, losing their identity. While Turkish people showed their traditional 
hospitality and opened their seashore villas to Allied commanders, their soldiers 
did not show respect to Turkish people and Turkish graves. Furthermore, they 
                                                 
55  Saim Besbelli [Retired Naval Colonel]. 1853–1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı (Deniz 
Harekâtı). Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Yayınları, 1977. 
56 Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi BaĢkanlığı. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. III. Cilt. 5. Kısım. 1793-
1908. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1978, pp. 450-466.  
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prevented Turkish troops from landing on the shores of the Caucasus for months 
because this was against their political aims and national interests. While the great 
city of Istanbul with its hospitals, schools and military buildings was laid at the 
discretion of the Allied commanders, they caused such historical army 
headquarters as Davut Pasha, Harbiye and Varna to catch fire due to their 
carelessness... While Turkish soldiers showed every sign of selflessness and shed 
their blood on the fronts, the Allies took all the honours of the war to themselves. 
Likewise some historians came under the influence of this propaganda and 
neglected the role of the Turks in this war, despite the fact that Turkish casualties 
in this war amounted to 120,000.
57
 [My abridged translation]   
 
The Caucasian front of the Crimean War was studied in another book by the 
general staff. The book 1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi (1986) 
written by Retired Brigadier General (Air Commodore) Hikmet Süer is about the 
Caucasian (Anatolian) theatre of the war. Süer seems to have written the above article 
as well, because the conclusions of the article and of this book are very similar.
58
 
Many of Süer‟s arguments in his conclusion come from Slade‟s book. In fact 
many of his sentences are simply translations of Slade‟s sentences without, however, 
due references.
59
 For example, the idea that the Ottomans should have better accepted 
the “Vienna Note” comes from Slade. By this, Slade argued and Süer repeated, the 
Porte would have avoided war and the Rumanian independence (meaning union of the 
Danubian principalities that later formed Rumania) would perhaps not take place and 
also Syria would not be occupied by the French.
60
 Süer also argues that the Caucasian 
people fighting for the last 30 years against Russia for independence were Turkish or of 
the Turkish “race” (“30 yıldır vatanları için savaşan 500,000 Kafkas Türkü”, “Türk 
ırkından gelen yarım milyon Kafkasyalı halkı”, “Acara ve Laz dediğimiz Türk türleri”, 
“Avar Türkleri”).61 As for Georgians and Circassians, Süer does not go so far as to 
make them Turks as well, but still makes them originate from Central Asia.
62
 The 
fallacy of these arguments is too obvious to demand any refutation here. 
Both military historians of the Turkish general staff (Süer and Besbelli) do not 
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mention in any way Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels‟s articles on the Crimean War, 
even those articles that are written from a military strategic point of view. As we shall 
see below, these articles were translated into Turkish and published in 1966, 1974 and 
1977. Despite the manifest pro-Turkish stand of Marx and Engels, the military 
historians have simply ignored them, probably because of the cold war mentality or 
simply out of their ignorance. 
 
 
1.2.2.  Turkish History Textbooks for Schools 
 
 
A survey of Turkish national historiography would be incomplete without an 
analysis of history textbooks for schools. Therefore I will also analyse critically the 
content of the Crimean War in Turkish history textbooks for schools. Let me first offer 
my periodization of the Ottoman – Turkish official historiography from 1853 up to the 
present. I divide this period into six distinct sub-periods: (1) The period from the war to 
the Balkan Wars (1912-13), (2) from then to the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 
(3) the early Republican or Kemalist era until 1950, (4) from then on the liberal era of 
the Democrat Party until 1970s, (5) the new traditionalist-nationalist period of National 
Front governments (the so called Turkish-Islamic synthesis) and (6) finally the new 
period from 1990s onwards which is characterized by Turkey‟s efforts to join the EU. I 
will cover the first five periods here, because the last period is still in formation. 
In the 1930s and 1940s history textbooks in Turkey were written by the Turkish 
Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu). These textbooks were more critical of the 
Ottoman Empire and of European great powers in comparison with later books. As for 
Russia, the following statement was typical:  
   Nikolai did not like it when Ottomans tried to put an end to anarchy in their 
internal affairs and reform themselves. Europe‟s economic exploitation of the 
Ottoman lands and Britain‟s effective control of Ottoman affairs were not in the 
interests of Russia either. Tsar Nikolai wanted to seize the Bosphorus and Istanbul 
with a successful operation and put an end to the Ottoman Empire, giving shares 
to some of the European states as well… Using the quarrel of Catholic and 
Orthodox priests in Jerusalem as a pretext, Nikolai sent Prince Menshikov to 
Istanbul as an ambassador with extraordinary powers to force the Ottoman state to 
accept his demands from the Sublime Porte. This ambassador who came with 
much noise and ceremony wanted to intimidate the Sublime Porte into 
recognizing the tsar as protector of all Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
and thus give an exceptional status to Russia among other states. Relying upon 
Britain and France, the Sublime Porte rejected Menshikov‟s demands.63 [My 
                                                 
63 TTK, Tarih 3, 1931, pp. 119-121 and 1933, pp. 244-247.  
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translation] 
 
 In most of the 1950s and some of the 1960s, Niyazi AkĢit and Emin Oktay‟s 
history textbook
64
 was read in Turkish secondary schools. Their narrative of the 
Crimean War is even faultier than the one before on many accounts. It begins by 
observing that the Ottoman Empire had started becoming a European state thanks to the 
reform movements of the Tanzimat. While France and Britain were glad with these 
efforts, Russia was not. Ottoman diplomats like ReĢid Pasha, Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha 
had managed to secure the friendship of France and Britain. Then the authors mention 
the Hungarian refugee crisis, “Tsar” Nikolai‟s plans of partitioning the Ottoman Empire 
with Britain, the holy places dispute and Prince Menshikov‟s (the spelling is again 
turned into Mençikof) mission (in 1851!, while it was in 1853). The authors state that 
after the occupation of the Danubian principalities by Russia, a conference was held in 
Vienna with the participation of Britain, France, Austria and Prussia and despite long 
negotiations an agreement was not reached, upon which the war began. Obviously they 
confuse the Vienna conference of April 1855 with the pre-war negotiations and 
exchange of notes among embassies in Vienna in 1853.  
Then, very interestingly, the authors argue that British and French fleets came to 
Istanbul contrary to the regulations of the London [Straits] Convention. Why should the 
fleets‟ arrival in Istanbul be contrary to the said convention if the Ottoman Empire was 
at war? In fact this argument could be and has only been expressed by Russian 
nationalists. Surprisingly and contradictorily for themselves, our authors seem on the 
one hand very anti-Russian and rightly accuse it of trying to partition the Ottoman 
Empire, yet on the other hand, they articulate a very fallacious pro-Russian argument. 
Then they argue that the Russians were defeated in the Danubian and the Anatolian 
fronts. As far as the Anatolian front is concerned, this is, as we will see in Chapter 3, 
very far from the truth. The authors also conclude that the new military organization 
after the removal of the Janissary troops had proved to be serious and regular. This is 
also only partially and relatively true, as we will see in the discussion of the Ottoman 
army and the battles. Other inaccuracies and errors of the authors include describing the 
Piedmontese army as 25,000-strong, whereas in fact it was only 15,000-strong, and the 
statement that both Prince Menshikov and “Tsar” Nikolai I died during the capture of 
Sevastopol (September 1855), whereas in reality the Russian emperor died earlier in 
March 1855 and Menshikov died much later. The authors also transform the name of 
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the Ottoman ambassador in London Musurus into “Mazaros”. In conclusion, they argue 
that the inclusion of the Rescript of Reform of 1856 in the Treaty of Paris was harmful 
to the Ottoman Empire because some European states later interfered with the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire depending on this article. 
Let us now have a look at the 1970s. The textbook for this period is very laconic 
on the Crimean War. However, its novelty is that is gives a rather aggressive role to 
ReĢid Pasha, much contrary to what we have heard from Cevdet Pasha. Since the 
section on the Crimean War is really short I can quote it here almost in full:  
   ReĢid Pasha was of the opinion that Turkey could not breathe freely without 
dealing a heavy blow to Russia. In the 1850s it was not possible for Turkey alone 
to deliver this blow. Although Turkish land forces came third after France and 
Russia and the Turkish fleet also came third after Britain and France, an offensive 
war against Russia was beyond the power of the Turkish Empire. But in a 
defensive war Turkey was self confident. ReĢid Pasha provokes Russia into war in 
a way that this state realizes this too late. He has already prepared the diplomatic 
scene. Russia‟s demand for more privileges to the Orthodox confession over 
Catholicism in Jerusalem gives the opportunity to ReĢid Pasha. The Sublime Porte 
rejects Russian demands and ultimatum. There begins a war with Russia (1853). 
This is the famous Crimean War. Ömer Pasha defeats the Russians several times 
in Romania. The Russians who want to take Silistria are defeated very heavily 
(1854). While the war goes on favourably for the Turks, ReĢid Pasha signs treaties 
of alliance with France, Britain and even Sardinia that wanted to unite Italy and 
they all enter war against Russia. Because Britain and France are afraid of Russia 
defeating Turkey and going down to the Mediterranean Sea. The Allies land on 
the Crimea (1854). Russia waives the white flag after it suffers very heavy losses 
with the fall of the well fortified city of Sevastopol (1855). The Treaty of Paris 
(1856) puts an end to the war.
65
 [My translation] 
 
Clearly, there is no mention of either the Battle of Sinop or the fall of Kars. The 
author then goes on to say that by the Treaty of Paris Russia was obliged not to keep 
any arsenals on the Black Sea, forgetting to add that this rule applied to the Ottoman 
Empire as well. Apart from such obvious omissions this account of the 1970's is 
remarkable for using the term Turkish Empire for the Ottoman Empire, something 
which was not possible during the early Republican era, as in its founding phase, the 
Turkish republic had a visible tendency to distance itself from the Ottoman Empire.  
 
 
1.2.3.  Dissertations and Theses in Turkish 
 
 
Finally, a review of the doctoral dissertations and master's theses in Turkish will 
not be out place here. I will make here only very short comments on some of their 
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strengths and weaknesses. I could locate five doctoral dissertations (plus one partially 
relevant PhD) and four master's theses on the subject, completed recently in the period 
from 1990 to 2003, from the archives of the Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK).  
Among these dissertations and theses, Mustafa Budak‟s doctoral dissertation 
about the Caucasian front of the war (1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı'nda Kafkas Cephesi, 
Istanbul University, 1993) stands out. Budak has made good use of the BOA, TNA and 
the ATASE. Nevertheless, the dissertation focuses on military history and covers only 
the Ottoman side, without use of the Russian sources, therefore it does not address the 
questions of how the Russians organized their efforts, how Georgians, Armenians and 
other Caucasian peoples reacted to the war. It has also little analysis over the causes of 
Ottoman defeats at battles and in the war in general. The question of the slave trade that 
was conducted by some Ottoman officers is omitted as well. We must add that this 
omission is general to all dissertations and theses. 
The topic of Cezmi Karasu's doctoral dissertation is about the Ottoman diplomacy 
during the war: Kırım Savaşı Sırasında Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856) (Ankara 
University, 1998). It is a pity that the thesis could not benefit from the archive of the 
political section and translation bureau of the Ottoman foreign ministry (BOA. HR. 
SYS and HR. TO) because these sections were not open at that time. Karasu argues that 
the handling of this war was the biggest ever success of the Ottoman diplomacy in all its 
history. He uses the incorrect and abridged Turkish translation of Stanley Lane-Poole's 
biography of Stratford de Redcliffe. Like Besim Özcan, he also presents the iane-i 
harbiye as donations. Repeating Sait Açba's mistake, who himself repeated A. du 
Velay's mistake, Karasu sends Lord Hobart instead of Edmund Hornby to Istanbul as 
the British commissioner for the Turkish loan in 1855. Like most Turkish historians, 
Karasu uses the incorrect spelling of the name of the Russian ambassador Menşikov as 
Mençikof. 
We have already cited above Besim Özcan's doctoral dissertation. Its title is Rus 
Donanmasının Sinop Baskını (30 Kasım 1853) (Atatürk University, 1990). The 
dissertation is based upon serious archival research in the BOA (except for the HR SYS 
and HR MKT collections which were not included in the BOA at that time and was 
probably not open to researchers), DMA and ATASE, yet it is one sided, because it 
does not tell the Russian story. Özcan states that it was difficult to get Russians sources. 
He still refers to some secondary and general reference sources in Russian, but these are 
superficial sources and there are translation and even transcription mistakes in these 
references. For example, referring to Sergeyev-Tsenskiy's historical long story 
26 
(Sinopskiy Boy), he makes Admiral Nakhimov commander of the Russian Black Sea 
fleet and puts Admiral Kornilov under Nakhimov's command, which is incorrect and is 
not meant by Sergeyev-Tsenskiy at all. Özcan also refers to some articles in the NYDT 
but he fails to indicate Karl Marx as the author of those articles, for example for the 
leader (article) on 27 December 1853.
66
 In one place, Özcan quotes approvingly an 
openly racist comment on the Russians from an unimportant article, stating that the 
Russians exhibited “the savagery that is characteristic of their race” (ırklarına has 
vahşeti bir kere daha sergilediler).67 I think such expressions are not compatible with a 
scholarly study. I have given a more comprehensive, comparative, analytical and 
unbiased account of the Battle of Sinop in Chapter 3.3, using new archive material from 
the BOA as well as Russian and British sources. 
Mehmet Yıldız's doctoral dissertation has an interesting topic: 1856 Islahat 
Fermanının Tatbiki ve Tepkiler (Istanbul University, 2003). Yıldız has made good use 
of the Ottoman archive (except for the political section of the foreign ministry (HR 
SYS) which could be used more fully). Some important documents are published for the 
first time, but there is almost no use of works in other languages than Turkish. This 
reliance on translations is dangerous as shown above in the case of the translation of 
Lane-Poole's biography of Stratford de Redcliffe. Yıldız argues that the ulema did not 
oppose the reform much. Except for this, the dissertation does not contain original 
arguments. He is also one sided in his conclusion on why the non-Muslims were not 
accepted into military service, with a pro-Muslim bias.  
Hasan ġahin‟s doctoral dissertation carries the title 1855 Erzurum Harekatı 
(Atatürk University, 1995). Nevertheless, the title is a misnomer, for it was Kars, and 
not Erzurum, that was involved to a greater degree in all the operations of 1855 (or 
indeed in the whole war on the Caucasian front). ġahin has a definite anti-Russian bias, 
as if Russia was the only power that wanted to subdue the Ottoman Empire. The 
dissertation includes no references to sources in Russian; it includes some references to 
English sources like the works of Lake, Sandwith and Allen-Muratoff, but no reference 
to the PRMA. There is a lack of critical attitude towards sources such as Zarifi Mustafa 
Pasha's memoirs. No evaluation of the charges against him is made either. Moreover, 
ġahin misunderstands the “Turkish Contingent” as a “reform” in the Anatolian army, 
while in reality it had nothing to do with the Anatolian army or with reform. ġahin also 
confuses the identity of some persons, turning the Circassian Sefer Pasha into a 
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Georgian notable (eşraf), the Polish refugee officer Arslan Pasha (Bystrzonowski) into a 
brother of Ġzzet Bey of Göle, again Polish officer ġahin Pasha (Breanski) into a refugee 
from Dagestan. Like Budak, ġahin makes no mention of the question of slave trade. 
Problems of spelling include the classical case of Menşikov given as Mençikof, General 
Dannenberg as “Donneberg”, General Lüders as “Lüdens”, ġekvetil (Sv. Nikolai) as 
“ġevketil”, etc.  
ġenol Kantarcı's MA thesis is about the building of the earthworks or bastions of 
Kars: Kars Tabyalarının İnşası (Atatürk University, 1997). Kantarcı made very little 
use of the BOA and shows a weak grasp of military terms. For example, explaining 36-
pound cannons, he gives the definition of “fund” (pound) as “bir top çeşiti” (a type of 
cannon), whereas, as is well known, pound is a measure of weight. A 36-pound cannon 
(sometimes called a 36-pounder) is a cannon that projects balls of 36 pounds. 
Elvira Kazas‟s MA thesis concerns immigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman 
Empire during the ten year period beginning with the Crimean War: 1853-1863 
Yıllarında Kırım'dan Osmanlı Topraklarına Yapılan Göçler (Marmara University, 
1994). Kazas uses Ottoman and Russian archive material. But she covers only the 
Crimean Tatars, leaving out Jews and others, despite the comprehensive title of her 
thesis. Kazas is openly anti-Russian and pro-Crimean Tatar. She calls the Crimean 
Tatars “the Crimean Turks” (Kırım Türkleri). 
Sema Emel Göksel‟s doctoral dissertation, entitled The Ailing Imperialists: The 
Ottoman Empire in British Travel Literature 1821-1876 (Boğaziçi University, 2003) 
has a section on the Crimean War. Göksel makes good analysis of the orientalist 
mentality with regard to the Ottomans in British travel books.  
Caner Türk has written his MA thesis on the Ottoman-Iranian relations and secret 
Russo-Iranian treaty during the war: 1853-56 Kırım Harbi Sırasında Osmanlı-İran 
İlişkileri, Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Rus-İran Gizli Antlaşması (Atatürk University, 
2000). His supervisor is Hasan ġahin. Türk has also committed many transliteration, 
translation and spelling errors. Thus Dolgorukov, the Russian ambassador to Tehran, 
becomes first “Dolgorki” and then “Dolgorkof”, Russian foreign minister Nesselrode is 
transformed into “Neseldorf”, “Neseldrof” and “Neseldroft”, the word züvvar (visitors) 
is read as zevar, “evahir” is translated as beginning instead of end (thus announcing the 
declaration of war at the beginning of the Muslim year 1269, while it was at the end of 
it). To the credit of Türk must be mentioned his reference to the AKAK. 
Hakkı Yapıcı's MA thesis was already discussed above. I could not read the MA 
thesis of Ahmet Teoman Özkaya, entitled Kırım Savaşı (Erciyes University, 1991), 
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because the copy was too faded to be read. Finally, I have seen two master‟s theses 
partly related to the Crimean war. These are Veysel ġimĢek‟s Ottoman Military 
Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853, (Bilkent University, 2005) and Ġbrahim 
Köremezli‟s The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War (1830-
1864), (Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, 2004). 
 
 
1.3.  Sources in Russian 
 
 
The international literature on our subject is very large and for the purposes of this 
dissertation the focus will be more on Ottoman and Russian sources rather than on 
British, French and other European sources, because the emphasis here is to fill the gaps 
in the narrative of the war by using the less used Ottoman and Russian sources. 
Although the literature in Russian is probably larger than that in other European 
languages, it is almost totally unknown in Turkey. The number of memoirs (books and 
articles) alone of the participants of the war is 242 according to a bibliography
68
. 
Therefore it is not possible here to mention even all the major works. Indeed the 
Crimean War is one of the well-researched and well-discussed topics in Russian and 
Soviet historiography.
69
 Here I will also try to introduce some of these sources into the 
English-reading community of historians. Attention will be given especially to those 
works that are more or less related to the involvement of the Ottomans in the war. 
In Moscow, I visited the Russian Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA) and the 
State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Although some sections (fonds) of 
these archives were closed, they contain many relevant materials. Another important 
archive in Moscow is the archive of the foreign policy of Russian Empire (AVPRI). 
Unfortunately, I could not get permission into this archive while I was in Moscow from 
29 May to 21 June 2006. Sadly, the permission came too late, after I returned from 
Moscow to Istanbul. This archive contains important consular reports. The two other 
important Russian archives for our research are located in St. Petersburg: The Russian 
State Historical Archive (RGIA) and the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGVMF). 
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The second one is especially valuable for the papers of Prince Menshikov, commander 
in chief of the Russian forces in the Crimea for most of the campaign. Unfortunately for 
me, these two archives were closed during the year 2006 due to reorganization and 
transfer to new premises. As for libraries in Moscow, the State Historical Public Library 
(GPIB) is a very rich, specialized library for historians. It contains many rare books and 
periodicals of the 19
th
 century. The former Lenin library (now Russian State Library) is 
also very helpful. Its manuscripts section includes some documents related to the 
Crimean War.  
Imperial Russia published many documents related to the war. Among these the 
AKAK (Documents Collected by the Caucasian Archival Commission) is a very 
impressive mass of documents relating to many aspects of the Caucasian wars and 
affairs. Then there are many articles in the journals Kavkazskiy Sbornik (Caucasian 
Journal), Russkaya Starina, (Russian Antiquity), Russkiy Arkhiv (Russian Archive), 
Russkiy Invalid (Russian War Veteran) and Voenny Sbornik (Military Journal) as well 
as newspapers like Kavkaz (Caucasus). Nikolai Putilov has published 33 volumes of 
documents from 1854 to 1957.
70
  
In 1856 a diary of events during the siege of Kars was published in Tiflis: 
Blokada Karsa (Blockade of Kars).
71
 Although the title is about letters of witnesses of 
the campaign into Asiatic Turkey, all these “letters” seem to be written by an officer 
from the general staff of the commander in chief (General Muravyov) from the 
Çivilikaya camp near Kars, most probably after the war on the basis of notes or diaries, 
because the senders are not identified, the letters are too well informed to be written by 
ordinary soldiers, and finally their literary style is the same throughout. The 
unsuccessful attack on Kars and the defeat of the Russian army on 29 September 1855 
is narrated very shortly, in an understatement of the Russian defeat, without citing exact 
details of the Russian and Ottoman losses, while in all other battles and skirmishes won 
by the Russians, losses are given in detail. The news of the fall of Sevastopol during the 
siege of Kars is not mentioned. Except for these two gaps, the narrative is interesting 
and seems to be realistic. 
Many of the Russian generals who have taken part in the war have also written 
their memoirs. Although all these works were published under censure, they are full of 
details of events and comments. Expectedly, tsarist writers and historians in their 
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analyses tried to justify the policies of Nikolai I and Aleksandr II. Nevertheless, they 
have made important contributions to the historiography of the war. Thus, when 
General Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyov-Karsskiy, conqueror of Kars, writes in his 
memoirs that “the Turks do not write anything”, he is very right in his complaint.72 It is 
the Russians and the British and the French who continued the discussion in writing, 
while the Turks wrote only patriotic theatre plays (Namık Kemal, the patriotic “Young 
Ottoman”) and verses about the war. Some of the other Russian officers who have 
written their memoirs are Pyotr Alabin, A. S. Korsakov, Colonel Mikhail Lihutin, 
General Yakov Baklanov, General Yegor Kovalevskiy, Prince Aleksandr Dondukov-
Korsakov, General Nikolai Ushakov, etc.  
Russian novelist, publicist and revolutionary democrat Nikolai Chernyshevskiy 
(1828-1889) has published in his journal Sovremennik in 1863 a partial translation of 
the British historian Alexander Kinglake's book The Invasion of the Crimea and wrote a 
preface to the translation.
73
 Chernyshevskiy comments that although politically 
Kinglake is just a Tory (whom Chernyshevskiy does not like) he has fulfilled the duty 
of a historian conscientiously (dobrosovestno). Nevertheless, the great Russian 
revolutionary democrat was mistaken, because Kinglake has not, and could not have, 
written an unbiased history. 
Typical tsarist military historians whose works on the Crimean War I have been 
able to consult are Modest Ivanovich Bogdanovich
74
 and Andrey Medardovich 
Zayonchkovskiy (1862-1926).
75
 The latter gives probably the most developed classical 
tsarist account of the war, rich in detail and amply documented. Staff Colonel 
Zayonchkovskiy was commissioned by the Russian general staff to write this history in 
1900, with all archives opened to him. For this work he was paid 2000 roubles per 
year.
76
 He had the opportunity to read Prince Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov's diary 
as well. (Nevertheless the diary is not published in the appendices of his work). The 
colonel finished his work in 1904 but the Russo-Japanese war delayed its publication 
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until 1908. The two-volume book (bound in four), which amounted to more than three 
thousand pages, was dedicated to Emperor Nikolai II. Unfortunately for researchers, the 
new edition of 2002 has omitted many appendices (actually more than half) from 
volume one. Among these are many important documents like the instructions to 
Menshikov and Nikolai's letter to Sultan Abdülmecid  (prilozheniya no. 105-112). I 
have had only a short time to see and read the first (1908-12) edition, and therefore I 
could not read all the appendices there and take notes accordingly.  
General Staff Captain (later General) Pyotr Ivanovich Averyanov (1867–1937) 
was a Russian military agent who worked some time at the Russian consulate general in 
Erzurum. His book on the Kurds in Russian-Persian and Russian-Ottoman wars 
includes a chapter on the Crimean War and covers the revolt of Yezdan ġer at some 
length.
77
 Depending on Russian sources, Averyanov gives important information on the 
relations of the Kurdish tribes with the Russian army. Nevertheless, he mistakes Yezdan 
ġer as brother of Bedirhan Bey, while in reality Yezdan ġer was the grandson of 
Bedirhan‟s uncle. The book has been translated into Turkish as well. I have not seen the 
1926 translation, which is out of print now.
78
 The new edition of 1995 is actually a 
transliteration into modern Turkish of an earlier translation from Russian into Ottoman 
Turkish.
79
 Due in part to the inconveniency of Arabic letters, almost all Russian proper 
names, beginning with that of the author, have been mistransliterated. The author‟s 
name is given as Avyarov. There are translation errors as well. For example, the 
Ottoman word kese, which means a purse of 500 piastres or five Ottoman pounds, has 
been turned into çuval (sack). Thus we read 400 çuvals of money, which does not make 
sense. The anonymous Kurdish editor has provided some footnotes, correcting some 
mistakes and arguing with the author from a Kurdish nationalist position. Nevertheless, 
the editorial quality of this translation in general is very low, there is no information on 
the author, even his first name is not given. 
A common characteristic of the tsarist apologist military historians was their 
inclination to neglect socio-economical processes in their explanations of the reasons 
for the war, to give too much emphasis to individuals and individual mistakes in their 
explanations of the defeat of Russia, and to try to put all the blame on the French and 
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British cabinets. Since these historians could not criticise Nikolai‟s despotic regime and 
Russia‟s relative economic backwardness, they explained Russia‟s defeat by certain 
blunders of certain commanders and by the “tactical superiority” of the allies. 
The Soviet era of the Russian historiography of the Crimean War begins even 
before the October revolution of 1917, with an article of the Bolshevik historian 
Mikhail Pokrovskiy, published in 1908. There he made an attempt to explain Russia‟s 
defeat in the war by its economic and political backwardness. His characterization of 
Nikolai I is brilliant. Thus he explains Nikolai‟s inability to understand the social-class 
essence of politics: 
   The Emperor (Gosudar-Votchinnik) believed naively that all around the world, 
politics were determined by the personal tastes and sympathies of those who led 
it. For this reason, it always remained an enigma for him why Wellington or 
Aberdeen, sincere and profound conservatives, who were personally well-
disposed towards him, could not prevent Britain‟s involvement in various 
“revolutionary” conspiracies against Russia.80 [My translation] 
 
Pokrovskiy  became very influential in the foundation of the Soviet historical 
school in the 1920‟s. Pokrovskiy's articles can be considered the first attempts of a 
Russian Marxist historian to give a Marxist account of the war. He was later criticised 
for being not so critical against the cabinets of Napoleon III and Palmerston as against 
tsarism and for exaggerating the victories of the allies, while not giving enough 
attention to the “heroic defense of the Russian people”. He also came under criticism for 
his treatment of Sheikh Shamil‟s movement as an anti-colonial freedom struggle against 
tsarism, because the new trend in Soviet historiography on the eve of the World War II 
was rather nationalistically pro-Russian. After Pokrovskiy, we see a more moderate 
attitude in the Soviet historiography in the 1940's towards imperial Russian policies. Yet 
Pokrovskiy had also politicized history too much, even arguing that history is simply 
politics turned towards the past (istoriya yest‟ politika, oprokinutaya v proshloe). 
 On the eve of and during the World War II, interest towards the Crimean War 
among Soviet historians had risen considerably. Many new monographs began to 
appear. The naval battle of Sinop was the subject of several monographs. Two 
collections of documents about the admirals Nakhimov and Kornilov were also 
published during this period. Without doubt, the single most important monograph from 
this period is Yevgeniy Tarle's two-volume classical diplomatic history, the Krymskaya 
Voina, which has since set the standard in the Soviet historiography of the Crimean 
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War. Tarle in his work subjected all the warring states and their diplomacies to a 
thorough critique. He also criticised some tendencies of the Russian intelligentsia. He 
wrote that the contradiction of the Slavophiles consisted of the fact that they did not 
wish to admit for a long time that Nikolai Pavlovich was as concerned about the 
freedom of the Slavs as Palmerston and Napoleon were about the independence of 
“Turkey”.81  
 Tarle shows good command of the Russian archives and of the European sources, 
with only a deficiency in Ottoman / Turkish sources. Considering that the Ottoman 
archives were not open to all at that time and the published sources in Turkish were 
insignificant, this was not so important a gap at that time. However, Tarle in general 
gives too much  role to Stratford and almost no role to individual Ottomans. His 
Ottoman terminology is also somewhat old fashioned, for example, he calls the 
Ottoman foreign minister Reis Efendi, a title which was already out of use at that time, 
replaced by Hariciye Nazırı. 
 Tarle also made an analysis of the economic relations among the warring states, 
trying to show the importance of the Ottoman markets for Britain. However, Tarle also 
warned against the vulgarised Marxist conception of history that might reduce the 
reasons of the war just to economic rivalry. Tarle is incorrect in the details of the 
Ottoman foreign loans. He writes that Namık Pasha contracted a loan in Paris and 
London in 1853, while in fact Namık Pasha had failed in contracting a loan and the task 
was accomplished by others in 1854.
82
 Tarle‟s characterization of the Ottoman ministers 
is also somewhat simplistic and superficial, suffering from the wide-spread tendency 
among so many Western writers to create a permanent dichotomy between pacifist and 
warlike or between conservative and reformist Ottoman statesmen. Thus Tarle writes 
that there were two tendencies among the Ottoman ministers. Some of them, headed by 
ReĢid Pasha and Grand Vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha (Damad, a brother-in-law of the 
Sultan) were trying to solve the dispute by diplomatic negotiations, while others headed 
by Ömer Pasha and Fuad Efendi firmly believed that it was time to revenge for the 
peace of Adrianople.
83
 However, as we will see in Chapter 2, this view is erroneous, 
because the differences of policy among Ottoman ministers did not as a rule originate 
from ideas, they originated rather from personal rivalry. Those who had lost their office 
and were yet unemployed (mazul) simply tried to replace those in office. Differently 
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put, their policies depended upon whether they were in office or not. For example, our 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, after being dismissed or forced to resign from the office of grand 
vizier in May 1853 became much belligerent immediately. Finally we must note that 
Tarle‟s work, being written during the WWII, bears a certain tone of Russian 
nationalism, which seems  quite un-Marxist.  
In the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, there was an acute discussion among Soviet historians 
about the role of the movement of Sheikh Shamil in the 19
th
 century. While the 
movement was until then seen as a progressive, anti-colonial independence movement, 
now the emphasis was on the reactionary side of the movement, the so called 
“muridism”. E. Adamov and  L. Kutakov's article in the Voprosy Istorii, the prestigious 
journal of the historical section of the Academy of Sciences contains fifteen documents 
from the AVPR, showing relations among British agents, Circassians and the 
Ottomans.
84
 The article represents one of the turning points in Soviet historiography on 
the question of the historical role of Shamil and his movement. At that time, it was 
considered reactionary. Another collection of documents about Shamil‟s movement was 
published in Tiflis 1953: Shamil' - Stavlennik Sultanskoy Turtsii i Angliyskikh 
Kolonizatorov. Sbornik dokumental'nykh materialov (Shamil – Agent of the Sultan‟s 
Turkey and of British Colonizers. Collection of documentary materials). As the title 
clearly indicates, it was intended to prove that Shamil waged a reactionary war and not 
a national liberation war, and that he was an agent of the Turkish Sultan and British 
imperialism. This collection showed the anti-Shamil atmosphere of the Soviet post-
WWII years.  
After 1956 this policy was abandoned under Khrushchov, and once again Shamil 
became an anti-colonial freedom fighter. Shamil had indeed rendered invaluable service 
to the Ottoman army by distracting a large portion of the Russian Caucasus army. (See 
Chapter 3). Recently Khalat Omarov from the Dagestan branch of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences translated and edited a collection of one hundred letters of Shamil, written 
in Arabic.
85
 These letters have also been translated into Turkish by Fikret Efe.
86
 
However, Omarov's name has not been mentioned at all. In this form the translation 
represents a case of plagiarism.  
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After Tarle's work, Soviet historiography of the Crimean War was mainly 
engaged in filling the gaps in his work in one way or another. Igor Vasilyevich 
Bestuzhev concentrated on military technology in his book.
87
 Three important 
contributions complemented the work of Tarle on the Caucasian front. These are the 
dissertations and books of the Georgian Yermolai Burchuladze, the Armenian A. M. 
Pogosyan and the Azerbaijanian (of ethnic Circassian origins) Khadji Murat 
Ibragimbeyli (1924-1999). Burchuladze and Pogosyan‟s contributions were on the 
Georgian and Armenian participation in the Crimean War respectively. But their books 
were published in their native languages only, thus reaching a limited public. 
(Burchuladze wrote two articles in Russian as well). On the other hand, Ibragimbeyli 
wrote two books on the contributions of the Caucasian peoples to the war effort of 
Russia, based on his doctoral dissertation.
88
 He described Sheikh Shamil as the spiritual 
and military leader of the national liberation movement of the mountain peoples of 
Dagestan, Chechnya and the North Caucasus against tsarism. He made good use of 
Russian archives, in addition to European, Turkish and Iranian sources. However, 
Ibragimbeyli‟s work, ostensibly Marxist, does not give in fact a non-biased, non-
nationalist, materialistic explanation of the Russian defeats and victories on the 
Caucasian front. His main concern is to stress the contribution of the Caucasian peoples 
in the war against “Turkish” aggressors. He explains Russian victories simply by the 
heroism and patriotism of the Russian army (including local militias), not bothering 
himself to try to understand what problems (political, social, strategical, tactical, 
logistics, etc) the other side had had. It would not be irrelevant or redundant here to note 
that Ibragimbeyli showed himself as an ardent anti-Communist and a Muslim Circassian 
nationalist politician and publicist after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
In the 1970‟s Vitaliy Ivanovich Sheremet has written several articles on the 
Crimean War and the Ottoman Empire. One of them (co-author L. S. Semenov), is on 
the foreign economic ties of the Ottoman Empire in the era of the Crimean War.
89
 
Another article, written together with Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli, is a review or survey 
of the modern Turkish historiography of the Crimean War. The authors are in general 
highly objectively critical, except for the fact that they have omitted some historians and 
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most notoriously undervalued (or simply not understood) Cevdet Pasha's Tezâkir. This 
may probably stem from their inability to understand the text of the Tezâkir written in 
the rather bookish style of the Ottoman Turkish.
90
 Sheremet also dealt with the question 
of the Crimean War and Ottoman-West European relations in his book published in 
1986. 
V. E. Bagdasaryan and S. G. Tolstoy have written a recent book on the historical 
lessons of the Crimean War.
91
 This is an anti-Western, anti-Soviet, anti-liberal, 
nationalist Russian historiographical account that tries to analyse the lessons of the 
Crimean War for today, arguing that the West is still a threat to Russia‟s security. The 
authors also make comparisons between Nikolai I and Stalin and between Nesselrode 
and Molotov. 
 
 
1.4.  Sources in Other Languages 
 
 
A great work has already been done by Prof. Winfried Baumgart by publishing 
the Austrian, British, French and Prussian documents in a twelve-volume series called 
Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs (AGKK).
92
 However, I could get access to only 
two volumes. These are well-edited, well-annotated, invaluable primary sources. They 
almost remove the need to go in person to these archives. With the help of Prof. Andrew 
Lambert, I was able to get some documents from the TNA (the former PRO) as well. 
The Rothschild archive in London has also sent me some documents on the Ottoman 
loan of 1855.  
Besides the AGKK, an important source of published documents is the British 
parliamentary papers, the PRMA. These documents cover the correspondence among 
the British cabinet in London, ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe in Istanbul, Her 
Majesty‟s military commissioner Colonel (General) Williams in Kars and the British 
commander in chief Lord Raglan in Sevastopol in the period from 2 August 1854 to 18 
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March 1856. Fortunately, they are now available online at www.victoriantimes.org 
under the heading of “the Crimean War”. I was also able to download many articles 
from the digital archive of The Times newspaper, which is searchable by keywords and 
dates. I was able to get some issues of the Illustrated London News of the period.  
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels contributed many articles to the newspaper New 
York Daily Tribune during the war. These articles sometimes appeared as anonymous 
leaders. Engels‟s articles also appeared under the name of Marx. Marx and Engels saw 
tsarist Russia as the stronghold of monarchy and reaction against the forces of 
democracy and revolution. Therefore they had a clear anti-Russian and pro-Turkish 
attitude. Although they wrote from London and Manchester, they provided 
astonishingly sound analysis and good foresight into military affairs. Especially the 
anonymous articles of Engels were written with an expert knowledge of military 
strategy. These articles are among the best reportages of the war. They were published 
in a volume by Marx‟s daughter and son in law in 1897.93 There are two Turkish 
translations as well.
94
 The latter of these is well-edited and contains other articles as 
well by Marx and Engels that were not included in the 1897 edition. 
The Times correspondent William Howard Russell‟s despatches from the Crimea 
and his book The British Expedition to the Crimea are among the important first-hand 
eyewitness narratives.
95
 But eyewitnesses can be misleading. Russell‟s despatches and 
book, together with Lord Raglan‟s nephew and aide-de-camp Colonel Somerset 
Calthorpe‟s book96 formed the basis of the false reports on the “cowardice” of some 
Ottoman troops defending the redoubts on the hills of Balaklava on the day of the 
famous (for the British) battle of Balaklava on 25 October 1854. However, it was again 
some British historians and researchers who set the record right on this question and not 
Ottoman or Turkish historians, who have been quite disinterested in general and in the 
battles fought in the Crimea in particular. (See Chapter 3.8.). 
Alexander W. Kinglake‟s six-volume work is the first major history of the war in 
                                                 
93 Karl Marx. The Eastern Question. A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the Events 
of the Crimean War. Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling. London, 1897. New 
York: B. Franklin, 1968. London: Frank Cass, 1969. 
94 Türkiye Üzerine (Şark Meselesi). Çevirenler Selahattin Hilav, Atilla Tokatlı. Ankara: Gerçek 
Yayınevi, 1966. Ġkinci basım 1974. Doğu Sorunu [Türkiye]. Çeviren Yurdakul Fincancı. Ankara: 
Sol Yayınları, 1977. 
95  William Howard Russell. The British Expedition to the Crimea. Revised Edition. London: G. 
Routledge & Co., 1858. Despatches from the Crimea 1854-1856. London: Deutsch, 1966. 
96  [Colonel Somerset Calthorpe]. Letters from Head-Quarters, or the Realities of the War in the 
Crimea. By an Officer on the Staff. Two vols. Vol. I. London: John Murray, 1856. 
38 
English, based chiefly on Lord Raglan's papers.
97
 While the book is not altogether 
useless, Her Britannic Majesty‟s apologist is strongly anti-Napoleon III and anti-
Stratford. Kinglake‟s study is interesting but it does not cover much material related to 
the Ottoman involvement. 
There are also a number of memoirs of British officers, doctors and journalists 
who have served in the Anatolian front. Colonel Atwell Lake has written two books on 
the defence of Kars. The second book is with letters from General Williams (the British 
military commissioner at Kars), Captain Thompson and Major Teesdale.
98
 Doctor 
Humphry Sandwith has also written his memoirs.
99
 Lake and Sandwith are too pro-
Williams, failing to point out any deficiencies on the part of their superior officer. 
Surprisingly, Sandwith even thinks that Williams arrived already with the rank of 
General, while in fact Williams had come to Istanbul as a lieutenant-colonel and in 
December 1854 the Sultan conferred upon him the Ottoman rank of ferik (division 
general) and after the battle of Kars on 29 September 1855, he was promoted to the rank 
of müşir (general of army). Nevertheless, these memoirs contain very valuable, lively 
observations especially on Ottoman rule in the province of Erzurum, on the influence of 
European consuls and the situation of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. 
The Morning Chronicle correspondent Charles Duncan‟s two-volume memoirs of 
the Kars army give lively and interesting details of the Ottoman army and of the people 
of Kars.
100
 While Duncan is not altogether unbiased, his account is very useful. Duncan 
gives a detailed description of the battle of Kürekdere (he even gives a wonderfully 
correct spelling of “Kürekdere”, same as in modern Turkish). Interestingly, Duncan 
includes the despatch of General Bebutov on this battle as well. However, he does not 
tell where he got this despatch. In addition to the testimonies of Abdi Pasha, Ahmed 
Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha before the court, Duncan‟s narrative is a useful 
counterbalance to Russian eye-witness accounts of the battles around Kars in 1854.  
The eccentric English journalist and writer Laurence Oliphant participated in the 
Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha during the fall of 1855 as correspondent of the 
Times newspaper and published his memoirs (see footnote 27). Oliphant is critical of 
both the British and the French governments for delaying the campaign. Like almost all 
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foreigners, he has a high opinion of the “gallantry” of the Ottoman (“Turkish”) soldiers 
and a very low opinion of the Ottoman officers, of whom, he argues, “the less said the 
better”. He has in general a low opinion of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, 
considering them “the two most barbarous nations in Europe”.101 Nevertheless, he gives 
many details on the battle of Ingur and on the Circassians and Georgians. 
Lady Emilia Bithynia Hornby, wife of Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby, arrived at 
Constantinople on 8 September 1855 together with his husband. Lady Hornby wrote her 
memoirs of their stay in Istanbul first under the title In and Around Stamboul (London, 
1858), then an enlarged and illustrated version of the above book appeared in 1863.
102
 
The book is in the form of letters sent by Lady Hornby from Constantinople to England 
from September 1855 to September 1856. They are generally superficial, but contain 
some insights into Turkish daily life. Especially valuable is the description of the balls 
at the British and French embassies in February 1856, when for the first time an 
Ottoman Sultan visited a ball at an embassy.  
Lady Alicia Blackwood has written a book under the same title as that of Lady 
Hornby, but I could not get hold of this book. 
Another lady who has written her memoirs of Istanbul after the Crimean War was 
Marie de Melfort, a relative of Edouard Thouvenel, the French ambassador to Istanbul. 
But the book was published much later in 1902 under the new marital name of the 
author, La Baronne Durand de Fontmagne.
103
 These memoirs include some important 
episodes of Ottoman statesmen like Fuad Pasha and some details of social life like 
women wearing corset. The rest is the usual orientalist banalities that are characteristic 
of the European travel literature of the 19th century. The book has been translated into 
Turkish as well.
104
  
Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby (1825-1896) was appointed the British commission-
er for the “Turkish Loan” of 1855. His duty was to control the spending of the loan 
money of more than five million pounds sterling strictly on the needs of the Ottoman 
army. In his Autobiography, written most probably after the “Bulgarian horrors” of 
1870s, he argues against Britain‟s fighting for “Turkey”, because of her misgovernment 
of the Christian subjects. He also argues that without the fear of the Russians, “the 
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Turks” did not consent to reforms in the long run. His words are indeed quite indicative 
of the mentality of many British gentlemen of the time. They are worth quoting here 
because of their unusual openness: 
   I have never been able to understand any adequate cause for the Crimean War, 
or why England took any prominent part in it. It began by a squabble between the 
European Powers about the “Holy Places”. We had absolutely nothing to do with 
that quarrel… the Treaty of Paris (1856) was a huge diplomatic blunder. It freed 
Turkey from the fear of Russia and left her to misgovern her Christian subjects as 
she pleased, which she forthwith proceeded to do. I know that although during the 
war, and immediately after it, neither Lord Stratford nor myself acting under his 
orders felt much difficulty in getting the Turks to consent to reforms, especially in 
their courts of law, in provincial administration, and in the management of their 
prisons; yet within eighteen months of the treaty it was impossible to do anything 
with them.
105
   
 
Another Englishman who took part in the war and has written his memoirs is 
Adolphus Slade (1804-1877) whom the Ottomans called Mushaver (Adviser) Pasha. 
Slade had come to the Ottoman Empire first in 1829-31 and written his reminiscences in 
1833.
106
 In 1847 he came again to Istanbul and was employed as an advisor in the 
Ottoman navy, his rank being promoted to Mirliva (Rear-Admiral). Together with 
Captain Borlase (Bahri Bey) his duty was mainly to train the Ottoman sailors. Slade‟s 
account of the Crimean War is more interesting than those of other European observers, 
because he has more knowledge about the Ottoman bureaucracy and people in general, 
and because he was in a unique position of acting as intermediary between the Ottoman 
navy and the Allied navies. His attitude is also very pro-Ottoman and anti-Stratford. He 
also takes issue with General Williams. In many cases he speaks up for the Ottomans. 
Indeed he fills to a certain extent the void in the literature caused by the lack of Ottoman 
accounts about the war. The fact that Slade published his book in 1867, when he had 
retired from Ottoman service
107
 and already returned to Britain, gives more credibility 
to his words because he was no longer an Ottoman official and in principle he could be 
more objective. Nevertheless, as for all sources, a critical attitude is necessary towards 
him as well. We must also admit that memoirs are more valuable when they are written 
not long after the events described in them.  
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Another late remembrance is Dr. Thomas Buzzard's book.
108
 Dr. Buzzard was a 
member of the British medical staff and he was for some time attached to the 
headquarters' staff of Ömer Pasha in the Crimea and the Caucasus.  
Georges Kmety (Ismail Pasha) was a Hungarian revolutionary émigré officer who 
served in the Ottoman Anatolian army. He has also left a narrative of the defence of 
Kars, however, I have been unable to find this book.
109
  
The Polish refugee Michal Czajkowski (1804-1886), who accepted Islam and the 
Muslim name of Mehmed Sadık (Mehmed Sadyk in English and Polish) also left 
important memoirs for the year 1854.
110
 Sadık Pasha was the commander of the first 
Cossack regiment in the Balkans. His memoirs seem to contain important information 
and remarks about many Ottoman officers and statesmen. Although I received some 
help from native speakers in translating some passages from this book, I could not make 
full use of it. (My Russian was of little help in understanding Polish fully). I think this 
important book must be translated into Turkish, Russian and English. Fortunately, 
Czajkowski also left an autobiography which was translated into Russian and published 
in the journal Russkaya Starina with intervals from 1895 until 1904. It contains an 
important remark about Stratford de Redcliffe‟s attitude towards the issue of Christian 
or non-Muslim military service in the Ottoman army. (See Ch. 5.3.) 
Stanley Lane-Poole's biography
111
 of the British ambassador in Istanbul Stratford 
de Redcliffe is useful but the biographer exaggerates the role of his hero. This is not an 
objective biography but rather a eulogy of the “Great Elchi”. Lane-Poole also 
exaggerates the role of the British military officers-advisers in the Ottoman army to 
such an extent that sometimes becomes ridiculous, as in the following passage:  
   Perhaps with merely Ottoman commanders the garrison might have surrendered; 
but it happened that two young English officers, Butler and Nasmyth, had thrown 
themselves into the beleaguered city and had inspired the defenders with a zeal 
and enthusiasm that no skill of Russian engineers could quench. Silistria was 
saved…112 
 
Nevertheless, the author had the private and official papers and memoirs of Canning at 
his disposal and this gives some interest and value to his work. 
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From 1932 to 1936, English historian Harold Temperley wrote four long articles 
and a book on the Crimean War. In his articles and his book he made good use of the 
British, Austrian, French, and remarkably of the Dutch archives. He has indeed shown 
that Stratford was not “the human agency which caused the Crimean War” and that he 
was not “animated throughout by personal feeling against Tsar Nicholas”. Nevertheless, 
despite his achievements in setting some points right in the record, Temperley basically 
followed a British imperialist, Orientalist and pro-Stratford view of the British policy in 
the Ottoman Empire. The following quotation provides ample proof of his Orientalist 
and hero-worshipping approach:  
   Stratford had set out to drive orientals along new roads, a task to baffle the most 
expert of drovers. There seem to be two ways of moving orientals in new 
directions. One way is to imitate them, to yield to them to pretend to be theirs. 
Then they follow you as a flock of sheep the bell-wether. That was Lawrence's 
way with the Arabs... There is another way, and one by which an Englishman may 
preserve his faith and yet instruct orientals in reality. It is 'to stand against them, to 
persuade himself of a mission, to batter and to twist into something which they, of 
their own accord, would not have done'. That is to drive, not to lead, and it was 
Stratford's way with the Turks.
113
  
 
The American historian Vernon John Puryear, on the other hand, criticized this 
pro-Stratford view. In 1931 he published an article (“New Light on the Origins of the 
Crimean War”) and a book: England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856.114 
This book was based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of California, 
Berkeley, in 1929. He was very critical of Stratford de Redcliffe. The book included a 
chapter on the “commercial preliminaries” of the war, where an interesting economic 
analysis of the importance of the Black Sea trade was made. In 1935 he published 
another book, where he developed his economic analysis in full. Puryear was probably 
the first Western historian who argued that “the causes of the Crimean War, although 
several in number, were in great part economic in nature”.115  
Olive Anderson has written several articles on the Crimean War and the best 
article is in my opinion the one on the beginnings of Ottoman public debt.
116
 This is 
probably the only research based article (although based only on the British archives) in 
                                                 
113 Harold Temperley. England and the Near East: The Crimea. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
Ltd., 1936. Reprinted: London: Frank Cass, 1964, pp. 242-43. 
114  Vernon John Puryear. England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856. Berkeley: University 
of California Publications in History, 1931. Reprinted, Hamden: Archon Books, 1965. 
115 Puryear. International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial 
Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853. Stanford University Press; London: H. Milford, Oxford 
University Press, 1935. Reprinted, Hamden: Archon Books, 1969. 
116 Olive Anderson. “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55”, The 
Historical Journal 7(1), 1964, pp. 47-63. 
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English on the “Turkish” loans of 1854 and 1855. Nevertheless, the article includes 
several minor factual errors. Furthermore, its general attitude is pro-British, it puts the 
blame too easily on Namık Pasha for his unsuccessful efforts to contract a loan, taking 
Lord Clarendon‟s117 words for granted that Namık Pasha abided by unrealistic 
instructions. We will see in the chapter on finances that this claim does not reflect the 
whole picture. 
English scholar, Foreign Service officer, politician and businessman William 
Edward David Allen‟s book, the Caucasian Battlefields, written together with Paul 
Muratoff and first published in 1953, includes two chapters (totally 45 pages) on the 
Caucasian battles of the Crimean War.
118
 The authors give a clear and understandable 
account of these battles, based upon English and Russian sources. Although they also 
refer to some works in Turkish, it is highly doubtful that they could read Turkish. The 
book includes a few minor errors like giving in one passage the commander of the 
Batum army as Ahmet Pasha (instead of Selim Pasha) and turning the Abkhazian prince 
Mikhail Sharvashidze‟s name into Iskander Sharvashidze. The book was translated into 
Turkish and published by the Turkish general staff in 1966, but I could not find this 
translation. 
Ann Pottinger Saab‟s book is one of the first Western revisionist and pro-Ottoman 
accounts of the war, trying to understand the views of the Ottomans from their 
sources.
119
 Saab makes some use of Ottoman archive sources. However, very 
surprisingly, she makes no mention of Cevdet Pasha. This is all the more surprising 
because she acknowledges help from Stanford Shaw and other Ottomanist historians as 
well.  
Robert Edgerton‟s book was among the first to try to revise the Western notions 
of the role of the Ottoman soldiers and officers in this war.
120
 The book has a chapter 
titled “Pride and Prejudice: the Turks at War”. There he shows that at the battle of 
Balaklava, 500 “ethnic Turks” in the first gun positions were attacked by 6,000 
Russians with superior artillery and despite these “overwhelming odds” they did not 
leave their position for an hour while losing 170 men. Finally they broke and retreated 
                                                 
117   George William Frederick Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800-1870). British secretary of state 
for foreign affairs 1853-1858. See www.wikipedia.org. 
118  Allen, W. E. D.; Muratoff, Paul. Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-
Caucasian Border, 1828-1921. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Nashville: The 
Battery Press, 1999. 
119 The Origins of the Crimean Alliance. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977. 
120  Robert B. Edgerton. Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999. 
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and from then on the British and the French troops held the “Turks” in contempt. Before 
Edgerton and later other authors, researchers and historians also tried to set the record 
right and thus the “Turks” at the battle of Balaklava were rehabilitated by many British 
historians.
121
  
Prof. Winfried Baumgart‟s book The Crimean War 1853-1856122 is up to date and 
shows good command of Russian and Western sources. It also covers the battles in the 
Danubian front remarkably better than any other Western study that I have seen. 
However, it contains little information on the Ottoman army, a fact admitted by the 
author himself. 
James J. Reid published in 2000 a book with substantial coverage of the Crimean 
War.
123
 He has also made a review of Ottoman and Turkish sources in his introduction, 
giving concise and correct evaluations. However, like Saab, he has very strangely 
omitted Ahmet Cevdet Pasha‟s Tezâkir and Ma‟rûzât. This is all the more surprising 
because Reid makes some marginal, trivial references to the Tezâkir elsewhere in his 
book, which means that he is at least aware of the existence of Cevdet Pasha‟s work. 
Nevertheless, Reid is unaware of other Turkish works such as those of YüzbaĢı Fevzi 
Kurtoğlu and the military historians Hikmet Süer and Saim Besbelli, not to mention 
theses and dissertations in Turkish. Nevertheless, Reid‟s study addresses some 
important issues and suggests some interesting explanations as well. It also attempts to 
introduce elements of psychohistorical inquiry and analysis of cultural mentality into 
the study of the Ottoman 19
th
 century. I think one of the major contributions of Reid‟s 
study is its ability to show the hazards of the Ottoman outmoded strategy of the 
“scattered” or “piecemeal” or “detached” or “dispersed” deployment of troops. As Reid 
stated, 
   Rather than concentrate armies to build greater force, Ottoman generals feared 
the loss of even a small territory to invasion or rebellion, and attempted to deploy 
forces everywhere to hold everything. Part of their problem was the factional 
strife in the officers corps and in the Ottoman government. Such factional 
conflicts made it difficult for a general staff to operate in unity and placed a 
                                                 
121   These are Michael Hargreave Mawson and Major Colin Robbins of the Crimean War Research 
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179.  
122  Winfried Baumgart. The Crimean War, 1853-1856. London: Arnold; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999.  
123  James Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878. Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 236-306. 
45 
commanding officer in jeopardy for failing to defend any part of the empire from 
loss.
124
  
 
Therefore I will try to refer to some of its positive achievements as well as 
mistakes in Chapters 3 and 5. The basic problem with Reid‟s book is that it is almost 
exclusively based on Western sources, with few references to Russian and Ottoman / 
Turkish sources and with no reference to Ottoman archive material. Reid even makes a 
very strange statement on the Ottoman archives: 
   Ottoman documents relating to the period 1853 to 1862 exist outside the 
Ottoman archive in Istanbul. In addition to former Ottoman provinces [now 
independent states where one can find Ottoman archival remnants] the following 
archival sources exist.
125
 [Brackets in the quotation are from the original]. 
   
Reid mentions the Walpole Papers, Fraser Papers and Ottoman salnames 
(almanacs) after this statement. The above statement is indeed vague at best: Does the 
author really mean that Ottoman documents relating to the period 1853 to 1862 exist in 
those former provinces? Alternatively, does he mean that there are some Ottoman 
documents outside the BOA as well? But then, what about the documents in the BOA? 
Has the author ever tried to do research in the BOA? In reality, these documents do 
exist in the BOA. There are tens of thousands of them (if not more) only for the period 
in question (the nature and scope of these documents is another matter). Reid‟s 
statement only betrays a complete ignorance of the contents of the BOA. Indeed, the 
statement comes especially surprising, because Reid claims that the place of his book in 
modern scholarship on the Crimean War is “to give a uniquely Ottoman perspective on 
the conduct of that war”.126 After such a claim, we have a right to expect from the 
author some serious research in the BOA. Furthermore, referring to some authors, Reid 
chooses not their relevant works but some other irrelevant works of them. For example, 
he does not mention at all Adolphus Slade‟s important book on the Crimean War 
(Turkey and the Crimean War). Instead he refers to another book by Slade, published in 
1833, which is doubtless an important source on the Ottoman Empire, but (naturally) is 
not related to the Crimean War. I think that any study of the Ottoman involvement in 
the Crimean War without reference to Slade‟s book will suffer from a serious 
deficiency. Again, in the chapter on the Crimean War, Reid refers to the Turkish 
historian Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu‟s book on the history of Kars (Kars Tarihi, vol. I), but not 
to that book of Kırzıoğlu which is directly related to the Crimean War (1855 Kars 
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Zaferi).
127
 These omissions also show that the author has not researched well the 
Turkish historiograpy of the Crimean War. 
Referring to Helmut von Moltke, Reid spells the name of the Kurdish rebel chief 
Bedirhan Bey as “Vede Khân Bey”.128 Then in the section on the insurrection of 
“Yazdân Shîr” (Yezdan ġer, a relative of Bedirhan and another Kurdish rebel chief), 
Reid mentions the Kurdish chief “Bedir Khân Bey”, this time referring to a 
contemporary Kurdish writer.
129
 One can of course use different spellings, however, 
“Vede Khan” is simply wrong and Reid should have indicated its correct form(s). The 
problem here is that Reid does not realize that “Vede Khan” and Bedirhan are the same 
person. For this reason, Reid‟s index too gives Vede Khan and Bedir Khan separately 
without any cross references.  
While Reid‟s critical attitude towards the efficiency of Ottoman reforms in 
general in the 19
th
 century and military reforms in particular is welcome, it is not 
possible to say that he has provided an objective and balanced account throughout his 
analysis. In many cases he relies upon one Western source without referring to others. 
For example, in his interpretation of the conduct of the Ottoman troops in the Battle of 
Balaklava, Reid does not rise about the traditional cliché view of Russell and (to a lesser 
degree) Kinglake that has lately been challenged by new research. (See Chapter 3).  
To sum up, Reid‟s book has some aims and claims similar to those of this 
dissertation; however, the result is fragmentary. While he promises a separate book on 
the “Ottoman Crimean War”, it did not appear in print until now to the best of my 
knowledge. Reid has also written an interesting article based upon Dr Humphry 
Sandwith‟s article on the roots of the Armenian question in the Crimean War.130 In 
particular, Reid has been able to show the impact on the Armenian question of the 
disorders resulting from the abuse of the Ottoman irregular troops by Ottoman pashas. 
Fikret Turan's bibliography of monographs includes 657 entries (of which 53 are 
in Russian and 5 in Ottoman Turkish) with a thematic index.
131
 As the title itself 
suggests, it does not include document collections, reviews, articles, etc. In any case, the 
bibliography is far from being comprehensive even for monographs alone. Very 
                                                 
127  Reid, op. cit., p. 239. 
128  Reid, op. cit., p. 79. 
129  Reid, op. cit., p. 299. 
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surprisingly the author has not consulted the online catalogs of the British Library or the 
Bibliotheque de France, and (not surprisingly) the libraries or bibliographies from 
Russia in the compilation of this bibliography.  
Tobias Heinzelmann‟s work132 on military conscription in the Ottoman Empire in 
1826-1856 has some relevance for our study, though it has very few references to the 
Crimean War. Recently, Clive Ponting published a book with a provocative subtitle: 
The Truth Behind the Myth. Unfortunately, this book does not tell the Ottoman story 
either.
133
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CHAPTER  2:  THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Overview of the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the War 
 
 
At the beginning of 1853, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power, 
despite contrary claims by Ottoman officialdom. Its very existence depended on the 
balance of power prevailing in Europe. Constant wars with Russia since 1768 and 
revolts in all the empire from Serbia, Greece, Egypt to Kurdistan had weakened the 
Ottoman state. By this time, however, the Ottoman Empire had become an important 
market for European great powers and had to be defended against its main adversary, 
Russia. The Ottoman Empire had not taken part in the post-Napoleonic Vienna 
conferences, it was not a member of the Concert of Europe and did not play a role in 
European politics as such. It had become the object of the so called “Eastern Question”. 
Its participation in the 1841 Straits Convention did not make it a member of the 
European state system either, but rather the empire became subordinate to the European 
system.
134
 In fact, European diplomacy had long forgotten when the Ottoman Empire 
for the last time took any initiative in European politics. One notable exception was 
during the crisis of Hungarian refugees in 1849, when Grand Vizier Mustafa ReĢid 
Pasha (1800-1858), supported by Britain and France, refused to hand over Hungarian 
revolutionaries to Austria and Russia. This stand of the Ottoman Empire was to prove 
indeed very beneficial for its standing in the European public opinion, which gained 
considerable influence during the Crimean War thanks to war reporting and telegraph. 
For many of his contemporaries, Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861) appeared as a 
weak and indecisive person, with a “melancholic” face. The weakness and indecision of 
Abdülmecid meant that every reform movement was applied halfway and then 
compromised to the “Old Turkish” party, the enemies of reforms. In contrast, Butrus 
                                                 
134   This was clear from the form of address of the Padishah as “His Highness”, while European 
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Abu-Manneh portrays a different Abdülmecid:  
   Through his tutor on the one hand and his mother on the other, it is believed that 
Sultan Abdülmecid at a young age was exposed to Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi belief 
and that orthodox Islamic ideals formed the foundation of his convictions and 
socio-political outlook, which naturally after his rise and for some years to come 
continued to reflect itself in his actions.
135
 
 
However, such an orthodox Islamic outlook is not in easy conformity with his 
way of life, characterised by attraction to women and heavy drinking, and his 
benevolent attitude toward Western customs and methods.  
On the other hand, it is not easy to establish a dichotomy of “old Turkish” and 
“reformist” parties within the bureaucracy. Because in most cases the real reasons of 
opposition or favour of the Ottoman elite to this and that reform or measure was not a 
matter of principle but rather a question of personal intrigues and petty interests. The 
same person who followed a policy of reforms could oppose those very reforms when 
out of office. The classic example is the best known reformer himself, that is, ReĢid 
Pasha, whose jealousy of Âli Pasha, one of his protégés, made him oppose the 
recognition of equal political rights to the Christian subjects of the Empire.  
Grand viziers, ministers and governors did not stay long in their office because the 
Sultan would yield to the influence of one party, then another, reshuffling the ministries 
and military positions all the time. These reshuffles were also due to the rival influences 
of the great powers. Abdülmecid knew some French and liked to talk about politics and 
life with ambassadors like the British ambassador Stratford Canning, who had great 
influence in Istanbul. Promoted to peerage as Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe in 1852, 
he was bound to play an important role before and during the war. However, his 
overbearing character turned many people against him, and in the 1850s he also began 
to lose faith in his main protégé in the Ottoman bureaucracy, ReĢid Pasha, who had 
become less enthusiastic in reforms. Still Lord Stratford considered him the best man in 
the Ottoman Empire to carry out reforms.
136
 
Beginning from the 1830s, the office of the foreign ministry had become much 
prominent among all Ottoman institutions due to the need for the Ottoman Empire to 
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balance out great powers against each other in order to survive. The Tercüme Odası 
(Translation Bureau) prepared many prominent statesmen, among whom Mustafa ReĢid 
Pasha was the foremost. The Ottomans were now more dependant on diplomacy and the 
necessity to treat the Europeans as equals was becoming clear more and more. Mustafa 
ReĢid Pasha tried to modernize diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire along European 
lines.
137
 ReĢid Pasha first became grand vizier (sadrazam) in 1845 and his office lasted 
until 1851 with two short intervals. In May 1853, during the final stage of the 
Menshikov crisis in Istanbul, he became foreign minister, actually controlling the 
Sublime Porte, and again sadrazam in 1854. Nevertheless, his office did not last to see 
the end of the war and to participate in the peace negotiations in Paris. His relations 
with his former protégés Âli and Fuad Pashas had already deteriorated in 1853 and after 
the Islahat Fermanı of 1856, ReĢid Pasha‟s criticism of their policy increased.138 (See  
Chapter 5.3.). 
ReĢid Pasha resigned in May 1855 when Sultan Abdülmecid forgave his brother-
in-law (Damad) Mehmet Ali Pasha, whom he had recently exiled to Kastamonu due to 
charges of embezzlement. Mehmed Ali owed his return from exile to the quarrel and 
rivalry between Stratford de Redcliffe and his French colleague Edouard Thouvenel, 
who, in the absence of Lord Stratford in August 1855, managed to get his protégé 
Mehmed Ali back into government as marine minister. As the Ottoman statesman and 
chronicler Cevdet Pasha admitted, the state had lost its power and its ministers their 
honor and dignity, each one seeking protection from the embassy of this or that great 
power. Therefore interferences of the great powers into the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire were now conducted openly.
139
 The Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye), as 
the Ottoman Empire called itself, was really in a pitiable situation. 
Despite his much enthusiasm and efforts, Sultan Mahmud II had been only 
partially successful to set up a new modern army. The biggest problem was to find 
European officers of high reputation to drill and train the army. Mehmet Ali Pasha of 
Egypt was more successful and effective in bringing out a modern army on the 
European model. He was willing to pay 17,500 piastres monthly to his French instructor 
Colonel Joseph Sève (Süleyman or Soliman Pasha, 1788-1860) who trained his troops, 
while Mahmud II would not give more than 2,000 piastres in salary to any foreign 
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advisor.
140
 Sultan Mahmud II did not like foreign advisors much and he asked Mehmed 
Ali Pasha of Egypt to send him some Muslim advisors. In fact, Mehmed Ali had much 
more impact on Mahmud II than anyone else.  
Although Abdülmecid was luckier with foreign military advisers, the army and 
the navy were still not professional in a modern European sense. As the Russian 
commander in chief of the Danube army General Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich 
Gorchakov
141
 (1793-1861) reported in his “Instructions for Battle against the Turks”, 
submitted to Emperor Nikolai I on 30 June 1853, the Ottomans had destroyed the old 
army, but they had not built a new regular army in a European sense.
142
 The Ottoman 
army was not professional in a strict sense, because high ranks as a rule were still 
distributed by favouritism and not by merit. There was also the rivalry and hatred 
between the uneducated “old Turks” and those officers who received some education in 
Europe. For example, in the Anatolian army the commander in chief (müşir) Abdi Pasha 
represented the latter, while his chief of staff Ahmet Pasha belonged to the former. 
There was mutual distrust between them. (More will be said on this question in Chapter 
3). The Rumeli army under the command of Ömer Lütfi Pasha (1806-1871)143 was 
better officered and better trained, yet still not a match for the Russian army, despite 
some successes in the battles. (This point will also be seen in Chapter 3). Lower ranks 
had few incentives to work hard for promotion because without links to the court elite 
or without some luck they had few chances of being promoted, while those with the 
right connections rose rapidly.
144  
Recruitment for the Ottoman army was through levies among the Muslim male 
population at the age of 20 to 25 by draft (kur‟a). Draftees could send a substitute for 
themselves. Military service in the Ottoman army lasted six years in active service and 
then seven years in reserve (redif). Non-Muslims did not serve in the army, paying a 
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144 Levy, ibid, pp. 21-39. 
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poll-tax (cizye, after 1855 called iane-i askeriye
145
) instead. Nevertheless, patriotic 
feelings seem to have spread among Ottoman non-Muslims as well at the beginning of 
the war. 3,000 Bulgarians from notable families had also applied voluntarily for service 
in the Ottoman army, according to the Berliner Zeitung on 1 September 1853.146 They 
were not accepted. Likewise, some patriotic Ottoman Armenians and Greeks from 
Saruhan and Ġzmir applied to the Porte to serve in the army, however, they were kindly 
rejected.147 Thus the Ottoman Empire, with an estimated population of around 35 
millions, that is, roughly half of Russia‟s population, had still fewer human resources to 
fill up the ranks of its armies, because of depending only on its Muslim subjects, while 
Russia could levy troops from a much larger (approximately four times larger) base of 
population. 
Muslims could rise to high ranks in the Russian army, whereas non-Muslims were 
not accepted in the Ottoman army either as officers or NCOs or privates, except for the 
two Cossack regiments recruited from the Dobruca Cossacks, the Old Believers 
(starovertsy), especially the Nekrasovites (Nekrasovtsy) known as Ignat-Cossacks,148 
and Polish refugees under the command of the Polish officers Mehmed Sadık Pasha 
(Michal Czajkowski) and Count Wladislaw Zamoyski.
149 
In November 1853, 799 Polish 
emigrants in France headed by General Wysocki signed a petition to Sultan Abdülmecid 
to form a “Légion Polonaise” in the Ottoman Empire. However, their request was not 
satisfied mainly due to the disapproval of the French government.
150
 During the war, 
Adam Czartoryski, leader of the Polish emigrants in France, sent many Polish officers 
to the Porte.
151
 Czartoryski‟s son Vitol also served as colonel in the second Cossack 
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regiment.
152
 However, the Porte was careful not to name these regiments as Polish 
regiments, preferring instead the name of Cossack regiments. It was also careful not to 
employ these Polish and Hungarian officers near the Austrian border, because it had 
given guarantees on this issue to Austria before.
153
 Ottoman Greeks from Macedonia 
and other places were recruited for the navy and the naval arsenal (Tersane-i Amire) for 
some time but this practise was abandoned.
154
  
On the other hand, we must not forget that Russia had a longer border to defend 
and only a very small part of the Russian army did actually fight in the Crimea, 
Caucasus and other places, while the rest guarded the borders, awaiting attacks from 
hostile neighbours. For example, the Russians had to hold the larger part of the 
Caucasus army against Shamil and the Circassians and the smaller part had to fight 
against the Ottoman army. Russia also had to post large armies on the Swedish, 
Prussian, and Austrian borders.
155 
Almost all Russian and European military observers of the time coincide in the 
opinion that the Ottoman soldiers were good fighters while the quality of the Ottoman 
officers was low. In terms of military art the Ottoman officer class as a whole lacked the 
ability of manoeuvring in the open field with a coordinated use of the cavalry, the 
infantry and the artillery. The once formidable Ottoman cavalry that had threatened all 
Europe was now the worst part of the Ottoman army, while artillery was the best arm of 
the Ottoman army.
156 
However, the ability (or desire?) of these three groups to help each 
other in battle was again very limited. Cavalry and infantry had much reliance on the 
artillery, but if the enemy did not get confused in the face of bombardment, the cavalry 
and infantry did not show much discipline. In many cases, especially on the Caucasian 
front, some of the Ottoman officers left their troops unguided in the battlefield. The 
irregular cavalry, the so called başıbozuk troops were more of a trouble than of help. 
They were also inclined towards plundering villages and their army quarters, when they 
did not receive their pay and rations. In fact, for some of them, hope of plunder was the 
ultimate reason for joining the war. (More will be said in Chapter 3). 
                                                 
152  Sultan‟s irade, dated 15 ġaban 1271 (3 May 1855). BOA. Ġ. HR. 120/5904 lef 5. 
153  Grand vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha‟s tezkire to Sultan Abdülmecid, dated 4 Safer 1271 (27 
October 1854). BOA. Ġ. MMS. 2/88 lef 2. 
154   Heinzelmann, op. cit., pp. 269-279, 305-310.  
155 V. E. Bagdasaryan and S. G. Tolstoy, two academicians from Moscow, in a recent study argued 
that during the war only 15 per cent the Russian army was engaged in actual war. See Russkaya 
Voina: Stoletniy istoricheskiy opyt osmysleniya Krymskoi kampanii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGOU, 
2002, preface. 
156  This view is also shared by many 19
th
 century military observers and contemporary historians. See, 
for example, James Reid, op. cit., (2000), pp. 81-83. 
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The upper ranks systematically robbed the poor soldiers of their rations, uniforms 
and pay (this will also be shown in Chapter 3). The differences of pay among upper and 
lower ranks were also much greater than those in European and Russian armies. For 
example, infantry privates in the Ottoman army received 20 piastres (kuruş) per month, 
corporals 30 piastres, captains
 
270 piastres, majors 900 to 1200 piastres, colonels 1,800 
piastres, brigadier generals 7,500 piastres, division generals 15,000 piastres, while the 
full general or field marshal (müşir) earned 70,000 piastres.157 Navy men and officers 
received the same amounts for corresponding ranks, while the cavalry earned slightly 
more. Indeeed the salary of privates (20 piastres for infantry and 24 piastres for cavalry) 
had not changed since at least the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, despite 
inflation.
158
 It would be raised to 30 piastres only two years after the Crimean War, on 
10 April 1858.
159
 Furthermore, while the privates and lower ranks received as rations 
barely enough amounts of food items, the upper ranks received again much bigger 
money and fodder allowances. 
 
By comparison, the differences in pay among Russian officers were much smaller. 
For example, a Russian captain received about 36 silver roubles, equivalent of 6 pounds 
sterling or 750 piastres per month including salary (zhalovanye) and house rent money 
(kvartirnye) but excluding rations, while a full general received about 420 roubles or 70 
pounds or 8,750 piastres (including pay, rent and stolovye). Thus a Russian general 
earned about 12 times as much as a Russian captain, while in the Ottoman army, as it 
can be calculated from the above numbers, a general (ferik) earned 55 times as much as 
a captain.
160
 (If we equate the Russian full general to the Ottoman müşir and not to the 
ferik, and if we also take into account the rations, then the difference gets even bigger). 
Furthermore, we see that while the Ottoman captain earned only 270 piastres, his 
Russian colleague earned about 750 piastres in equivalent, thus 2.77 times as much! If 
we go higher in rank, then the situation differs in the opposite direction. The Ottoman 
                                                 
157   Russian military agent Count Osten Sacken‟s report to the Russian minister of war, June 1852. 
RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 45. Also available at fond 846, opis 16, delo 5414, list 14. Also 
see Troops in Turkey. Returns of the Pay and Allowances… War Department, London, April 1856, 
Turkish Contingent, p. 11. Cf. Hikmet Süer, op. cit., p. 160. The pay of the men and officers of the 
“Turkish Contingent” was by treaty equal to those in the Ottoman army. On the other hand, Süer‟s 
table of salaries and rations, with less differences among ranks, seems rather more egalitarian 
(with smaller differences among ranks) than the British and Russian accounts given here. For 
example, Süer gives 30 piastres to the private, 400 piastres to the captain, 3,000 piastres to the 
colonel and 10,000 piastres to the ferik, without mentioning the müĢir‟s salary at all. However, 
Süer does not give any references for his table. 
158  See Avigdor Levy, op. cit., (1982), pp. 496-497. 
159  Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 13-20, p. 48. 
160   Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. I, p. 442. 
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ferik earns 1.7 times as much as the Russian full general and the müşir earns nearly 8 
times as much as the Russian general! Nevertheless, we must note that the Ottoman 
pashas had to care for a large household of servants, slaves, wives and concubines. 
When we compare the rank and file, then the situation is at first sight favourable 
to the Ottoman soldier: he earns 4 times as much as his Russian colleague, who receives 
only 2.7 roubles per year, that is, about 5 piastres per month, assuming food rations to 
be more or less equal. Thus the Ottoman soldier was in theory better paid than the 
Russian soldier, but in practise the Ottoman soldier did not receive his salary for months 
and years during the war, while the Russian soldier received even money rewards after 
victories. For example, after the battle of BaĢgedikler (1 December 1853), the rank and 
file received 2 roubles each.
161
 
The well-known Russian diplomat, military agent, traveller, geographer, 
geologist, botanist, zoologist and palaeontologist, Pyotr Aleksandrovich Chikhachev 
(1808-1890), who had made many travels in the Asia Minor and published many works 
on the geography and palaeontology of the region, had also reported on the 
disproportion between the pay of higher and lower ranks in the Ottoman army while he 
worked at the Russian embassy in Istanbul in 1849.
162
 He even seems to have written 
these remarks in the first volume of his monumental 8-volume work L‟Asie Mineure, 
which was published in France in 1853. Chikhachev wrote that the yearly cost of the 
Ottoman (“Turkish)” infantry soldier consisted of 12.5 silver roubles (equivalent of 120 
piastres) for salary and 6.25 roubles for rations and clothing, thus a total of 18.75 silver 
roubles, whereas the Russian infantry soldier cost 31.25 roubles, British infantry soldier 
134 roubles, Austrian soldier 53 roubles, Prussian soldier 60 roubles and French soldier 
cost 85 roubles.
163
 The Ottoman officer, however, received more than his European 
colleagues. In the case of the müşir, he wrote that only 25 per cent of his pay went to the 
expenses of his konak, and the rest to his pocket. 
As recognized by many Russian and European observers, the Ottoman regular 
soldier in general, excluding the irregulars and the redif, fought bravely under so many 
deprivations. These poor soldiers could not even hope for any promotion or reward, 
                                                 
161  Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 1, p. 416. 
162   “Donesenie kamer-yunkera Chikhacheva iz Konstantinopolya o sostoyanii turetskoi armii i 
Bosforskikh i Dardanellskikh ukrepleniy”. 1849 g. RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 33. 
163   “Iz sochineniya l‟Asie Mineure izvestnago russkago puteshestvennika P. A. Chikhacheva”, Kavkaz, 
[Russian official newspaper of the viceroyalty of the Caucasus], No. 45, Tiflis, 20 June (2 July) 
1853, Saturday. 
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except for bringing live prisoners.
164
 On the other hand, the Ottoman officer class had 
all the opportunities for promotion and rewards during the war, but few of them, 
especially among the high command, showed themselves worthy of praise. For these 
and other reasons the Ottoman army was not fit for an attack in the open field but was 
very firm in defending a fortified place.  
It is necessary to note here that Emperor Nikolai I had well-founded information 
on the condition of the Ottoman army through the reports of the Russian military agents 
in Istanbul and other cities. Before and during the war, the military agent in Istanbul, 
Staff Colonel Count Osten-Sacken (not to be mixed with the other Osten-Sacken, 
governor of Odessa) regularly sent reports to the war minister General Prince Vasiliy 
Andreyevich Dolgorukov (1804-1868). On all these there is the note “His Majesty has 
read”. In his reports, Count Osten-Sacken tried to give every information on the 
Ottoman army and navy, in detail for all corps, from material to moral conditions. He 
also provided characteristics of all the leading commanders in the Ottoman army. For 
example, in his report on the “general review of the condition of the Turkish military 
forces in the year 1852”, he describes the Ottoman commander in chief Ömer Pasha as 
“more suitable for small war, than command of an army, although the Turkish 
government expects much from him in this latter respect” [My translation, italics 
underlined in the original]
165.
 Osten-Sacken gives only a handful of Ottoman 
commanders worthy of some military training or knowledge. Nikolai‟s overconfidence 
might partly stem from these reports. While the Ottoman army included many foreign 
military advisers and émigré officers who had the knowledge of modern warfare, their 
effect was not very healthy due to jealousy and bickering among themselves. The 
Anatolian army at Kars for example had many foreign (Polish, Hungarian, French, 
British, etc) officers in all battles but they were divided among themselves as to what to 
do. Even if they offered sound advice, then its application by the lower ranks was a 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164  In a letter from the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (25 February 
1854), it was said that a reward of 100 piastres would be given to those who brought a live 
prisoner of war. BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 111/79. But this reward was abused as some soldiers 
caught civilians instead of soldiers.  
165 RGVIA. Fond 846 (VUA), opis 16, delo 5414, list 19. “Obshchiy obzor sostoyaniya turetskikh 
voennykh sil v 1852 godu”. This report is also available at RGVIA, fond 450 (Turtsiya), opis‟ 1, 
delo 45. 
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2.2.  Relations with Britain 
 
 
It has been long argued that the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of 1838 was an 
important turning point in the process of the commercialization of the Ottoman 
agriculture and the peripheralization or semi-colonization of the Ottoman Empire within 
the capitalist world system. Ever since the appearance of David Urquhart's book166 in 
1833, the importance of Ottoman markets for the British industry is well researched.
167
 
A brief look at the figures of foreign trade of Britain with the Ottoman Empire shows a 
big growth in exports and imports especially from 1845 on. These figures show clearly 
that the Ottoman Empire was an important exporter of raw materials such as madder 
root, raw silk, raisins, wool, wheat and valonia to Britain and an important importer of 
British manufactured goods such as cotton cloth, refined sugar, iron and steel, woolens, 
hardware and cutlery.168 According to data published by the The London Economist, 
the British exports to the Ottoman Empire, including Egypt and the Danubian 
principalities, increased nearly three times from 1840 to 1851.
169
  
Recent studies have also shown that not all Ottoman industries became dead after 
the opening of the Ottoman markets to British goods and some sectors adapted 
themselves to new conditions.
170
 But these are just slight modifications in the whole 
picture. The fact is still there that Britain dominated Ottoman imports and exports. 
Increasing competition from other European powers made Britain ever watchful for new 
markets for its fast growing manufactures. It is also well known to the students of 19
th
 
century Ottoman economic history that the Ottomans did not give any thought to 
maintaining the trade balance or a protective system of tariffs. The Ottomans levied 3 
per cent customs duty on imports and 12 per cent on exports, doing exactly the opposite 
of other states that tried to protect their industries and domestic market. Thus it was 
                                                 
166 David Urquhart. Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization, ... Prospects of English 
Commerce in the East, etc. London, 1833. 
167  See for example, Puryear, op. cit., (1935), ġevket Pamuk, Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya 
Kapitalizmi (1820-1913). Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1984. Revised edition: Osmanlı Ekonomisinde 
Bağımlılık ve Büyüme 1820-1913. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994. 
168 See Frank Edgar Bailey, “The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50”, The Journal of 
Modern History XII/4, December 1940, pp. 462-476. Also see from the same author, British 
Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1942, chapters II and III.  
169 Quoted by [Friedrich Engels], in Marx, op. cit., p. 16.  
170   See Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 
& New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Also see by the same author, “Manufacturing”,  
in Halil Ġnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 
Empire, vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 888-933. Also see Pamuk, op. 
cit., (1994), p. 21. 
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very important for Britain to prevent the Ottoman Empire from falling into other, more 
efficient hands.  
Before and during the war, when the Porte or its dominions (Wallachia or Egypt) 
tried to increase the export duty on grain or to prohibit the export of grain in order to 
secure enough grain for itself, the British ambassador strongly protested such practices 
as a breach of the treaty of 1838. For example, in June 1853, when Wallachia wanted to 
increase its export duty on grain, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe gave the following note to 
the Sublime Porte: 
   It being generally understood that the Government of Wallachia intended to 
increase the duty on grain destined for exportation to a degree which would 
contravene the Commercial Treaty of 1838, the Undersigned received Instructions 
from his Government to enter his Protest against any such departure from the 
engagements subsisting between the Two Governments.  
In execution of those instructions the undersigned now protests in the customary 
form against this supposed infraction of Treaty, and holds the Porte responsible 
for any losses which may accrue therefrom to any subject or subjects of Her 
Britannic Majesty.
171
 
 
Even at a time of war, Britain did not want to restrict its foreign trade. Thus when 
in July 1854 the pasha of Egypt tried to restrict the export of grain, Stratford protested 
again: 
   Her Majesty's Government having received information from Egypt that the 
Pasha of that Province has of late allowed measures to be adopted by his officers 
calculated to impede the free trade in grain, I am instructed to inform the Porte 
that the system adopted by His Highness is clearly an infraction of the Treaty, and 
to request that proper communications may be addressed to him for his future 
guidance in that matter.   
Her Majesty's Government attach much importance to a due compliance with their 
requisition, because as the supplies usually drawn from Russia, are now 
interrupted, it is extremely desirable that the trade should be unfettered in all other 
quarters and His Government are fully entitled to expect that in the dominions of 
the Sultan no unnecessary impediments shall be thrown in their way.
172
  
 
Two months later Stratford gave another note when the Porte tried to restrict the 
export of grain: 
   The British Embassy cannot assent to the Porte's memorandum of the 8
th
 
Zilhidje 1870 [sic, it must be 1270, 1 September 1854], with participating in what 
appears to be an unfounded and unnecessary measure. The Commercial Treaty 
stipulates for unrestricted liberty of commerce in articles of Turkish produce, as 
well for exportation as for internal trade. The occasional restrictions which have 
been submitted to with respect to grain were justified by urgent necessity. In the 
present instance no such necessity exists. There is an abundant harvest, and the 
                                                 
171  Stratford to the Ottoman foreign ministry, dated 4 June 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 11. See 
Appendix 1. 
172   BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 36, dated 10 July 1854. See Appendix 52. 
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armies no longer look to Constantinople for their supplies. A continuance of 
restriction with partial exceptions can therefore be of no benefit except to 
speculators and those who encourage them. The plan is contrary to treaty and 
warranted by no necessity. On these grounds I rely upon the Porte's sense of 
justice and wisdom not to persevere in its original intention as stated in the 
memorandum.
173
 
 
In fact, freedom of trade was so important for Britain that even during the war its 
subjects were allowed to trade with Russia. 
 
 
2.3. Russia between Expansionism and Legitimism 
 
 
Emperor Nikolai I
174
 had seen the revolt of the Decembrist (Decabrist) officers 
shortly after ascending the throne in December 1825. From then on he had vowed to 
suppress any revolutionary disorder in Russia and Europe and to be the defender of 
order. Russia, on the other hand, was the main antagonist of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. From his ascension until the Crimean War, 
Nikolai I had seen two major wars, one with Iran in 1826-1828 and the other with the 
Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829. In both cases Russia continued its expansion, gaining 
Nahçivan and Erivan from Iran by the Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828 and Ahıska, 
Ahılkelek and the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea from the Ottomans by the Treaty of 
Edirne in 1829. Nikolai I ruthlessly suppressed the Polish insurrection during the 
upsurge of revolutions in Europe in 1830. Marshal Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich, 
conqueror of Warsaw and afterwards Prince of Warsaw, started to rule Poland in a 
military manner as Nikolai‟s viceroy. However, in 1833, Nikolai I helped Sultan 
Mahmud II against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. The Treaty of Hünkâr Ġskelesi, signed 
on 8 July 1833, made Russia and the Porte allies for a period of eight years. At the end 
of its term, this treaty was changed to the advantage of European great powers by the 
Straits Convention of 13 July 1841. In 1848 Nikolai I helped Austria to crush the revolt 
of the Hungarians. This earned him the title of the “gendarme of Europe”. Nikolai‟s 
notion of legitimism did not allow any revolutionary disorders or nationalist 
insurrections against the “lawful” sovereign of a state. However, this principle had not 
deterred him from supporting the Greek War of Independence in 1827. In fact, Nikolai I 
                                                 
173   Lord Stratford‟s instruction to head dragoman Stephen (Etienne) Pisani on export restrictions, 7 
September 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 31. See Appendix 57. 
174 Interestingly, Nikolai calls himself “Nicolas Premier” in his own letters written in French, as if 
knowing for sure that there will be a second Nikolai. See for example BOA. Ġ. HR. 327/21182, 
Nikolai's letter dated 27 January 1853. 
60 
pursued a policy of autocratic rule and police control in internal matters and of 
reactionary conservatism in international matters. At home, all liberties were 
suppressed, the press and universities brought under strict supervision and a special 
third division of the imperial chancellery was organised as the secret police. 
Consequently, many talented officers, civil servants, artists were arrested, exiled or 
removed from their duties.
175
 
In 1853, Emperor Nikolai I was probably the most powerful person in the world. 
He commanded the biggest land army of Europe. The army was indeed Nikolai's 
favourite agency, yet he “stressed unthinking obedience and parade ground evolutions 
rather than combat training”.176 He had surrounded himself with all military men, filling 
most of the ministries by generals. Thus by 1840, ten of the thirteen ministers were 
generals aide-de-camp.
177
 His army was not up to date because of incapacity at the top, 
inflexibility, corruption
178
 and technical backwardness. The soldiers were supplied with 
outdated weapons and had little training, if at all. Dmitriy Alekseevich Milyutin (1816-
1912), War Minister from 1861 to 1881 under Nikolai‟s successor, Aleksandr II, writes 
the following in his notes: 
   Speaking frankly, like most of the contemporary young generation, I also had no 
sympathy for the then regime, at the basis of which lied administrative 
arbitrariness, police repression and strict formalism. In most of the state affairs, 
undertaken during the reign of Emperor Nikolai, a police point of view prevailed, 
that is to say, a concern about the maintenance of order and discipline. From here 
originated the suppression of personality and the extreme tightening of freedom in 
all spheres of life, in science, arts, speech, and press. Even in the military affairs, 
in which the Emperor took a passionate interest, the same concern about order and 
discipline prevailed; not the substantial well-being of the army, not the adaptation 
of it to military tasks were pursued, but only orderliness in appearance, bright 
outlooks in parades, pedantic observation of countless small formalities were 
sought after, blunting one‟s judgement and killing genuine military spirit.179 [My 
translation] 
                                                 
175  George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Yale: Yale University Press, 1969, pp. 212-213. Nicholas 
Riasanovsky has described the regime of Nikolai in similar terms, yet he has also insisted that 
Nikolai I “retained the earmarks of his basic belief in legitimism” in his attitude toward the 
Ottoman Empire. See Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 
p. 337. Seventh edition, with Mark Steinberg, vol. I, 2005, p. 314. 
176 John Shelton Curtiss, “The Army of Nicholas I. Its Role and Character”, The American Historical 
Review 63(4), July 1958, pp. 886. 
177  Albert Seaton, The Crimean War. A Russian Chronicle, London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1977, p. 22. 
178  On corruption in the administration of the Russian army, see Curtiss, The Russian Army under 
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Friedrich Engels, in one of his anonymous leaders in the NYDT had also written in 
1854 that Nikolai  
   limited promotion to mere parade martinets, whose principal merit consists in 
stolid obedience and ready servility, added to accuracy of eyesight in detecting a 
fault in the buttons and button-holes of the uniform – constantly preferring such 
sticks to men of real military ability and intellectual superiority.
180
 
 
The exception to the rule in Nikolai‟s armies was the Caucasus army that was 
waging an irregular war against the Caucasian mountaineers for many years. Many 
talented but politically unreliable officers had also been sent to the Caucasus as a 
punishment. But they in turn enhanced the capacity of the Caucasian army through 
constant war with the guerrilla forces of Caucasian mountaineers. Thus during the war, 
Russia would gain its great victories in the Caucasus front.  
Russia's weak point was the navy, where Britain and France had the advantage. 
Russia had a strong naval base at Sevastopol but its Black Sea fleet was no match to the 
British or French fleet, let alone their combined power. In a one-to-one fight Nikolai I 
had no doubt of beating the Ottoman armies and navy, but he knew very well that the 
other powers would not let him gain control of the Turkish Straits or even control of he 
mouth of the Danube. Nevertheless, the fact that he occupied part of the Ottoman 
Empire without gaining the consent of the great powers is a clear indication that he had 
lost some sense of reality by this time. Before that Nikolai had already discussed with 
the British ambassador Seymour his plans on the partition of the “sick man of Europe”. 
(See subchapter 2.6.)  
Economically, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were rivals, both of them 
exporting wheat to Europe. Grain exports represented 35 per cent of the total value of 
Russian exports in 1855.
181
 Russia was also fostering its own industries. The Russian 
port of Odessa was in competition with the Danubian principalities that had been freed 
from the obligation to sell their grain only to Istanbul at fixed prices and given the right 
of export of their produce by the Treaty of Edirne of 1829 and confirmed by the Anglo-
Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838. After 1830 Moldavia and Wallachia increased 
their wheat exports from the ports of Galatz and Brailov on Austrian and British 
commercial ships to customers that before bought wheat from Russia. Nevertheless, 
Russian exports continued to increase. For the period from 1832 to 1840, Russian grain 
                                                 
180   “The Russian Failure”, Leader, NYDT, 11 July 1854, quoted in Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 397. 
181  Riasanovsky and Steinberg, op. cit., (2005), p. 320. 
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trade increased by 56 per cent annually on average.
182
 Russian industry was weak and 
could not compete with that of Britain with its cheap prices and better quality. Thus an 
economic alliance of Russia and the Ottoman Empire was not possible.  
On the other hand, Russia's trade with Britain in 1851 accounted for around one 
thirds of its total foreign trade.
183
 But the relative importance of Russia for the British 
economy had fallen in comparison with the Ottoman Empire. As a customer of British 
goods Russia had fallen behind the Ottoman Empire. While in 1827 the British exports 
to Russia was three times more than the exports to the Ottoman Empire, this ratio had 
changed significantly by 1849, when the Ottoman Empire (including the Danubian 
principalities) bought much more British goods than Russia. Even the principalities 
alone imported from Britain more goods than Russia.
184
 This was largely the effect of 
the 1838 Commercial Treaty. The Turkish Straits had become important channels for 
the trade of both the Euxine and the Indian trade, which now reached Trabzon via Iran. 
Caravans reached Trabzon from Turkistan, Mesopotamia and Persia. Thus the spices of 
India, the grain, wool and hides of Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, carpets of Iran, etc all 
flew through the Turkish Straits.  
 
 
2.4.  Dispute over the Holy Places 
 
 
 The Holy Places were the Church of Nativity and some other places of early 
Christianity in Jerusalem and its vicinity. Both Latin (Catholic) and Greek (Orthodox) 
churches endeavoured to gain supremacy in controlling these places. The dispute over 
holy places revolved around such seemingly trivial issues as to whether Latin or Greek 
clergy would possess the key to the Great Church of Bethlehem and which of them 
would have the priority of holding services in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in 
Jerusalem. The Ottomans on their part were happy to check both churches but Ottoman 
bureaucracy, stressed from both sides, was hard pressed to satisfy both sides. France 
justified its demands on firmans from the time of Süleyman the Magnificent.  
 Russia on the other hand claimed the right of remonstration on behalf of the 
Orthodox subjects of the Porte by a broad interpretation of the Treaty of Küçük 
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Kaynarca of 1774, reaffirmed by the treaties of Bucharest in 1812, Akkerman in 1826, 
Edirne in 1829 and Hünkar Iskelesi in 1833.185 The Orthodox subjects of the Porte were 
by far more numerous than the Catholics, their number reached 13,5 millions, almost 
equal to the total Ottoman European population. In Jerusalem as well they were by far 
more numerous than the Catholics. In 1850, when the question was raised, the Catholic 
population of Jerusalem was less than six per cent and Catholic pilgrims constituted a 
negligible percentage of the total visitors of Jerusalem.
186
  
 From a legal point of view, the position of France was more powerful since it was 
based upon capitulations, the last of which dated from 1740. Yet from then on the 
Latins had not fulfilled their responsibilities and the Greeks were given special firmans. 
Thus in practice the Greeks had more rights.
187
 In this quarrel France took the initiative 
by officially demanding from the Porte the return of some places to the Latin Church. 
The Sultan became vexed in this meaningless Christian dispute and finally tried to solve 
the problem in February 1852 by two firmans, giving the keys to the Latins and assuring 
the Greeks that their rights would remain unchanged. Russia was not late in protest. 
Thus began a diplomatic war in Istanbul where the Ottomans were caught up between 
France and Russia, unable to find a solution acceptable to both. Commissions were set 
up and all documents examined, yet it was difficult to satisfy both sides.  
At present most historians (except the new Russian Orthodox nationalists) accept 
that the question of the holy places was but a pretext for the Crimean War. That the 
issue of the holy places was but a pretext for the imperialist aims of tsarist Russia or that 
the defense of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France was simply because of 
imperialist rivalry has always been a commonplace expression in contemporary Turkish 
historiography. While this is true, one has to be consistent and apply the same 
scepticism to the actions of the Ottoman Empire as well. Nevertheless, some Turkish 
historians like to perceive the Ottoman state just as a victim of great powers, without 
itself having any imperialist or expansionist aims or practices and in other cases even as 
the “last island of humanity”.188  
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2.5.  Positions of France, Austria and Other States 
 
 
In France Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte had been first elected president in 1849 and 
then through a coup d'état in 1852 proclaimed himself as Emperor of the French under 
the name of Napoleon III in a clear association with his great uncle. Looking for some 
cause to reassert the greatness of France, Napoleon III willingly took up the issue of the 
Holy Places against Russia. France being the protector of Catholics in the Ottoman 
Empire, Napoleon III made strong representations at the Porte in defense of the Latin 
Church in Jerusalem. He owed also a lot to his Catholic followers for his coming to 
power. Thus contrary to most Turkish histories, it was Bonapartist France and not tsarist 
Russia that first initiated the question of the holy places. France had always been 
interested in the maintenance of the Nativity Church (Kamame Kilisesi) and other 
Christian holy places in Jerusalem. ReĢid Pasha had held many negotiations on this 
issue with the French authorities in the 1840s as well.
189
 
Napoleon III had a personal grudge against Nikolai as well, because Nikolai had 
not addressed him as “my brother” in the usual form between monarchs, but as “good 
friend” (bon ami). Nikolai thought only those monarchs who like him came to rule “by 
the grace of God” were worthy of being addressed as a brother, whereas Napoleon had 
only been elected by the people.
190
 Napoleon III could not help but feel slighted. 
Furthermore, at that time he found it necessary to attract the attention of the French 
people away from domestic problems to an international, religious problem. In 
European politics, ever since the 1815 restoration, France wanted to get rid of the policy 
of containment led by other great powers, especially by Britain against France. 
Although France was a member of the Concert of Europe, it had been excluded for a 
short time in 1840-1841. An alliance with Britain was essential for France to break its 
isolation. 
Austria's position was troublesome during the war, torn between Russia and the 
Allies. Nikolai had saved the Austrian Empire by suppressing the Hungarian revolution 
in 1848. In the eyes of the absolutist Austrian aristocracy, he was a true monarch who 
ruled with an iron hand against all kinds of revolutionaries and democrats. In the recent 
dispute over Montenegro with the Porte, Austria had again depended on Russian 
support. Count Leiningen‟s mission to Istanbul on the Montenegrin question had ended 
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successfully a few days before or on the day of Menshikov‟s arrival, with the Porte 
succumbing to Austrian demands.
191
 While thus owing gratitude towards Russia, 
Austria‟s interests dictated otherwise.  
Facing no longer any revolutionary threats, Austria did not want war, not could it 
allow Russia's control over the mouth of Danube or over Balkans in general. Austria‟s 
large Slavic population made it sensitive to any moves that would unite Balkan Slavs or 
show them an example of insurrection even against the Ottoman Empire, because, once 
began, an insurrection of Slavic peoples would certainly affect the Austrian Slavs 
(Serbs, for example) as well. Austria also could not afford to be on hostile terms with 
Napoleon III, because of the question of Venice and Lombardy, claimed by the Italians. 
While Nikolai could not help Austria against France in Italy, France could help and was 
willing to help Austria on the Danube. Thus the Austrian foreign minister Count Buol
192
 
tried to strike out a compromise between the last Ottoman note and the Russian note. 
Yet he was unsuccessful, ReĢid Pasha refused to compromise. Finally Austria‟s 
ultimatum to Russia at the end of December 1855 contributed much to the peace. 
Nevertheless, Austria was among the losers at the end of the war, for it had gained 
Russia's hate, yet without gaining France and Britain's sympathy. 
Iran had a basically stable frontier with the Porte since the Treaty of Kasr-ı ġirin 
in 1639, despite occasional wars. Border violations of nomadic Kurdish tribes was an 
issue of controversy between Iran and the Porte. In 1847 a commission had re-adjusted 
the Ottoman-Iranian border. Nevertheless, the nahiye of Kotur in Van province was 
captured by Iran and the Porte demanded it back. The Tehran - Tabriz - Trabzon 
caravan road was an important outlet for Iran‟s foreign trade. Iran always had intentions 
on the Baghdad province due to the importance of the holy places (such as Kerbela) of 
this province for the Shiite sect. For this reason Iran and the Porte had never made an 
alliance even against such a Christian power as Russia that threatened both of them. 
Consequently, Russia had defeated Iran and the Porte one at a time from 1826 to 1829. 
The present war presented a good opportunity for Iran to capture Baghdad, but it was 
intimidated by Britain. During the war it signed a secret agreement with Russia on 29 
September 1854. Iran promised not to give any assistance (including exports of military 
items) to the enemies of Russia and Russia promised to cancel Iran‟s remaining debt of 
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500,000 tümens at the end of the war.193 Nevertheless, Iran also moved some troops 
towards the Ottoman border and its attitude remained as an uncertainty for the Porte and 
the allies. 
The young state of Greece under King Otho was the most ready client for 
Nikolai‟s propaganda. At the beginning of the war, the Greek government secretly 
supported the Ottoman Greek insurgents in Thessaly and Epirus. Some Greek officers 
including Lieutenant-General Hatzi-Petros, an aide-de-camp of King Otho, crossed the 
border with some troops to join the insurgents.
194
 However, the Porte suppressed the 
revolt and the allies blockaded Greece from the sea in May 1854. Austria and Prussia 
also did not want the Greek revolt spread into the Balkans. Therefore soon Greece had 
to give up its policy of support for insurgence.  
 
 
2.6.  The Sick Man of Europe 
 
 
Emperor Nikolai I had first announced “Turkey” sick just two months after the 
Treaty of Hünkâr Ġskelesi in September 1833 during his meetings in Münchengrätz with 
Prince Metternich of Austria. Metternich avoided discussion on this point according to 
his words.
195
 In 1844, the Russian Emperor visited England and this time talked with 
the British ministers (at that time the foreign secretary was Lord Aberdeen) about the 
“Eastern Question”. The fall of the Ottoman Empire was not, however, in the interests 
of British policy in the East. A weak Ottoman state best suited British interests. 
Therefore British ministers did not make any pledge to Nikolai. The two parties agreed 
to maintain the Ottoman Empire as long as possible, but in case of its dissolution they 
would come together for an understanding on its partitioning. The results of the 
negotiations were summarised by the Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode in a 
memorandum, which the British government accepted as accurate.
196
 The British 
considered the memorandum as a secret exchange of opinions and not as a binding 
agreement, while Nikolai thought of it more seriously.  
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On 9 January 1853, Emperor Nikolai I once again approached the British 
ambassador Sir Hamilton Seymour (1797-1880) in St. Petersburg and repeated his 
famous words about the Ottoman Empire: “Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade - 
un homme gravement malade”. Nikolai added that “Turkey” seemed to be falling into 
pieces and it was important that England and Russia should come to an understanding 
as to what was to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of “Turkey”.197 A few 
days later (on 14 January) Nikolai held a long conversation with Seymour, this time 
being more definite. He said he did not want to expand at the cost of “Turkey”, but there 
were several millions of Christians in the Ottoman Empire whose interest he was called 
upon to watch over, and he was making “moderate and sparing” use of his right of 
doing so. While he avowedly did not want the fall of the “sick man”, this “man” might 
suddenly fall upon their hands and in that case he would not allow any other power to 
occupy Istanbul; neither would he himself do so. Therefore he wanted to reach a 
preliminary agreement with Britain for such a case.  
Nikolai supposed that the alliance of the strongest land power (Russia) with the 
strongest naval power (Britain) would be enough to decide the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire and he openly said that he did not care what others would think in case of such 
an alliance. Seymour on his part said that, in his opinion, “Her Majesty‟s Government 
will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of Turkey, 
but it is possible that they be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements 
which might, in that event, be attempted”. Then on the question of the holy places 
Nikolai seemed quite content with the Sultan‟s firman of February 1852 and believed 
that his objects would be attained by negotiation. However, as Vernon Puryear has 
pointed out, Seymour was not shocked by these frank comments of Nikolai. Therefore, 
in his report to Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he 
seems to endorse the plan: 
   A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the nineteenth century 
if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be filled up 
without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions 
adopted by the two principal governments the most interested in the destinies of 
Turkey.
198
  
 
In reply to the report of Ambassador Seymour‟s conversations with Emperor 
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Nikolai I, Lord John Russell reflected that Her Majesty‟s Government saw no actual 
crisis, “which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem”. It was also 
uncertain when the event was going to happen. In twenty, fifty or a hundred years? “In 
these circumstances”, it was said, “it would hardly be consistent with the friendly 
feelings towards the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the 
Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion”.199 
Furthermore it was noted that such an agreement between England and Russia could not 
be kept secret and “European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent 
it”. It is also worth noting here that Russell characterizes the attitude of the Ottoman 
Sultan and his government as “inert” and “supine”. Nevertheless, it seemed from 
Russell‟s reply that these inert and supine Turks should be allowed to rule in Istanbul, 
simply because there was no better replacement without causing a European war.  
Emperor Nikolai I and Sir Hamilton met again on 20 and 21 February 1853. 
Seymour read the above reply of Russell to Nikolai. Nikolai repeated that the 
catastrophe was “impending” on “Turkey” (“the bear is dying”) and “it might be 
brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by a feud between the “old 
Turkish party” and that of the “new superficial French reforms”, or again, by an 
uprising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient of shaking off the 
Mussulman yoke (“joug”)”.200 Nikolai wanted a gentlemanly agreement with the British 
cabinet as to what not to do in the event of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Did he really 
believe that the end of the Ottoman Empire was so close? If so, on what grounds? These 
are interesting, yet not so easily answerable questions. In any case, he did not or could 
show any compelling evidence of the “sick man‟s” or the “bear‟s” dying, and failed to 
impress the British.  
On the other hand, Nicholas Riasanovsky has argued that  
   Even his [Nikolai‟s] ultimate decision to partition the Turkish Empire can be 
construed as a result of the conviction that the Porte could not survive in the 
modern world, and that therefore the leading European states had to arrange for a 
proper redistribution of possessions and power in the Balkans and the Near East in 
order to avoid anarchy, revolution, and war.
201
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2.7. The Mission of Prince Menshikov 
 
 
In the meantime Emperor Nikolai I sent to Istanbul a mission headed by Prince 
Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov (1787-1869) as ambassador extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary in order to press upon the Porte to arrange for a solution of the holy 
places and to receive formal guarantees for the future. Prince Menshikov, who bore the 
titles of Governor General of Finland, General-Adjutant, Admiral and Marine Minister 
was not a good choice for a diplomat. He was a rather sarcastic, self-conceited and 
vainglorious person. As such, he had a rather high opinion of his own abilities and had 
little respect for the opinions of others.
202
  
Count Karl Robert Vasilyevich Nesselrode (1780-1862), the Russian foreign 
minister (1816-1856) had recommended instead of Menshikov, such experienced 
diplomats as General Prince Aleksey Fyodorovich Orlov (1786-1861), the Russian 
representative of the Treaty of Edirne (1829) and of Hünkar Ġskelesi (1833), or Count 
Nikolai Dmitrievich Kiselev (1802-1869), the Russian ambassador in Paris, or his 
brother Pavel D. Kiselev. But either they had excused themselves for the mission 
because they did not believe in its success, or Nikolai did not accept them. In any case, 
Nikolai wanted not only a diplomat but also a military-naval commander who could 
take military decisions if need be. Furthermore, Menshikov possessed at least one 
virtue, which was rare among the ministers and officials of the emperor: He was rich 
and he did not steal from the state treasury. For this reason he was a favourite of 
Nikolai.
203
 
Menshikov received oral instructions from Emperor Nikolai and a letter to Sultan 
Abdülmecid and some written (in French) instructions from Count Nesselrode, the 
foreign minister. These instructions described in detail how and what he should demand 
from the Porte, and if not accepted, how to leave Istanbul.
204
 Menshikov had also 
received the project of a treaty and a secret defense agreement with the Sublime Porte, 
where the Emperor offered military aid to Turkey in case of any attack. Nikolai also 
gave Menshikov a personal letter to Abdülmecid, dated 24 January 1853, where he 
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wrote in friendly terms as if it was not he who discussed the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire with the British ambassador. Another letter dated 27 January 1853 simply 
informed of Prince Menshikov's being appointed ambassador extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary, citing all the titles of Nikolai and all the orders worn by Menshikov.
205
 
The tsar also instructed Menshikov to threaten the “Turks”, if necessary, with 
recognition of the independence of the Danubian principalities. 
Menshikov‟s (and his staff‟s) tasks included a military reconnaissance of the 
defences of the Bosphorus as well, because Nikolai‟s plans included a possible lightning 
attack on Istanbul and the Dardanelles as well. While talking to Seymour and signing 
letters to Abdülmecid, Nikolai had also signed a plan of attack on the Turkish Straits on 
19 January 1853. For this purpose he detached the 13th division at Sevastopol and the 
14th division at Odessa. On 28 March Menshikov would send a report on the weakness 
of the Ottoman fleet and the fortifications of the Straits, naming the most suitable places 
for landing Russian troops.
206
  
On his route to Istanbul, Prince Menshikov made two conspicuous inspections, 
made for the effect of demonstration: he visited first the 5th army corps in Kishinev 
(capital of Bessarabia, north of Moldavia), and then the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. 
General Nepokoychitskiy, chief of staff of the fifth army corps and Vice-Admiral 
Vladimir Alekseyevich Kornilov (1806-1854), chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, 
joined his mission. Thus Menshikov with a large and impressive retinue arrived at 
Istanbul on board the steam frigate Gromonosets
207
 on 28 February 1853.
208
 The 
Russian military and naval officers had come to observe the defences of the straits and 
of Istanbul and the possibilities of a sudden attack on the city. They were also enjoined 
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to mobilize Russian land and naval forces in case of necessity. In Istanbul a crowd of 
Greeks, other orthodox subjects and Russians cheerfully welcomed the mission with 
applauds.
209
  
On 2 March, Menshikov, dressed in an overcoat instead of full uniform,
210
 went to 
the Porte to visit the grand vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha, to whom he declared flatly that he 
does not trust Fuad Efendi the foreign minister, on the question under negotiation, and 
asked for someone else to be appointed for negotiations. Then, as he wrote in his diary, 
   My declaration disturbed the vizier, and on leaving him, wishing to confirm my 
words with actions and to show how little I value Fuad Efendi, I did not pay him 
the usual courtesy visit. This made a big impression and aroused the Porte's 
displeasure, and Fuad resigned.
211
 [My translation] 
 
Fuad Efendi was not liked by the tsar for his conduct during the 1849 crisis of the 
Hungarian refugees and he was known as pro-French. Having heard of the 
concentration of the Russian fourth and fifth army corps in Bessarabia, the Sultan was 
frightened. Rifat Pasha was made the new foreign minister and he took his office on 6 
March.
212
 Thus Menshikov had dealt his first blow to the pride of the Porte.  
At that time the French and British ambassadors were on leave and the two great 
powers were represented at the level of chargé d'affaires. The British chargé d'affaires 
was Colonel Hugh Rose (1801-1885) and the French Vincent Benedetti (1817-1900). 
Rose recommended to the Porte to temporize until the return of Stratford de Redcliffe, 
who had resigned the ambassadorship in January 1853 but reappointed by the new 
Aberdeen
213
 government in February. But Rose had become so alarmed at Menshikov‟s 
actions that he also ordered Vice-Admiral Sir James Whitley Deans Dundas (1785-
1862), commanding the British Mediterranean squadron at Malta, to bring his fleet up to 
Urla near Izmir. However, Dundas refused to move without confirmation from the 
government. Colonel Rose was informed on 23 March that the British government did 
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not approve of his order and the fleet remained at Malta.
214
 On 19 March, however, 
Napoleon III had already ordered to send a squadron from Toulon to the island of 
Salamis (near Athens and Piraeus).
215
  
Menshikov was given the audience of the Sultan on 8 March only when he 
submitted Nikolai's letter to the Sultan (written in French, dated 24 January). Nikolai's 
letter contained both proposals of friendship and a threat. Nikolai put the blame on the 
“inexperienced and ill-advised” ministers of the Sultan, who had not informed him well 
of the consequences of the non-compliance with the firman already issued by the Sultan 
one year before. The tsar added that in the case of another state insisting on the Sultan 
not to fulfil his promises towards Russia, or threatening The Ottoman Empire, Russia 
was ready to come to help.
216
 Menshikov submitted to the Sultan the project of the 
secret defense agreement as well. In short the tsar wanted to have an exclusive 
agreement with the Ottoman Empire, by adding an article to the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca, giving a formal guarantee of the rights and privileges of the Greek Church in 
The Ottoman Empire under the protectorate of Russia, in return for a military alliance, 
implicitly against France. The demands exceeded by far the question of the custody of 
some religious places.  
The new foreign minister Rifat Pasha was authorized to negotiate with 
Menshikov. After the courtesy visits of Menshikov and Rifat Pasha, the first serious 
negotiation took place on 16 March 1853 at the pasha's house and lasted for six 
hours.
217
 According to the minutes of the meeting, Menshikov did not follow a gradual 
opening of demands but opened all his demands and offers at once. He told that he was 
especially authorized to negotiate the question of revision of the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca and that unless Rifat also had the authority to negotiate the whole question, 
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the beginning and continues to this day. It is also an interesting question whether the second 
translator was ordered to make a literal translation or it was his decision to do so. Most probably 
he was ordered to; otherwise there should not be a second translation at all.  
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there was no point in negotiations.
218
  
Rifat Pasha, by a skilful diplomatic tactic, separated the question of holy places 
from the question of protection of the Greek Church and said that they must first finish 
the first question. Menshikov threatened Rifat Pasha as well not to reveal the Russian 
proposals to the British embassy; otherwise he would cut off relations. Nevertheless, 
grand vizier Mehmet Ali Pasha told the essence of Russian intentions to Colonel Rose 
on 1 April. He added that “nothing whatever should be added to the Treaty of Kaynarji; 
that he would ask to retire from office rather than agree to either of the two propositions 
made by Prince Menshikov, which would be fatal to Turkey”.219 As Lane-Poole pointed 
out, this shows that the Ottoman ministers were resolved to resist Menshikov's demands 
before Lord Stratford's arrival, which took place on 5 April 1853.
220
  
Lord Stratford had an interview with the grand vizier and the foreign minister on 
the day after his arrival. He advised them “to keep the affair of the Holy Places separate 
from the ulterior proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia”.221 He also advised them 
that the rights and privileges of Christians should be guaranteed by direct sovereign 
authority and not by any instrument addressed exclusively to Russia. For Protestant 
Britain a religious quarrel between Catholic France and Orthodox Russia was indeed 
not important in itself, it did not care whatever privileges these obtained within the 
religious sphere. However, any real increase of authority of one of them over the 
Ottoman Empire that could tilt the European balance of power was not to be tolerated. 
Yet what was clear to Stratford was also clear to the Ottoman ministers, the difficulty 
was that Menshikov would not accept anything less than a formally binding treaty or a 
sened (convention). The demands of Russia stipulated that all the Orthodox subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire would be under Russian protectorate, that the patriarchate would 
be life long and no patriarchs would be dismissed, that a new Russian church and 
hospital would be built in Jerusalem and put under the protection of the Russian 
consulate and that a new firman would point out clearly all the rights of the Orthodox in 
the holy places in Palestine. On the other hand, in his conversations with Lord Stratford 
and the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour, Menshikov told them that if the Porte 
did not agree with his proposals, this would at most result in a break-up of relations but 
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not war. Yet these assurances would prove to be false. Lord Stratford pleased 
Menshikov by justifying his demands concerning the holy places, yet avoided any 
discussion of the broader question of Russian protectorate of the Greek Church. 
On 19 April Menshikov gave another note to Rifat Pasha urging for a decision. 
The note included accusations and threats. The Ottoman extended council of ministers 
(Meclis-i Mahsus) convened on 23 April to discuss the demands of Menshikov. It found 
the demands on the holy places negotiable but the question of the privileges and rights 
of the Orthodox subjects was not to be negotiated.
222
  
On 5 May Menshikov gave an ultimatum and duration of five days for an answer. 
This time he informed the Porte that if the sened was not signed, he would cut off 
diplomatic relations and leave Istanbul.
223
 At this stage of the play Lord Stratford 
entered the scene. On 8 May he pointed out to Menshikov that his demand “was an 
innovation altogether disproportionate to the question which is the chief cause of your 
Embassy, and as being little in accordance with the spirit of legality recorded by 
common consent in the Treaty of 1841”.224 From then on their intercourse practically 
ended.  
On the next day Stratford visited the Sultan and found him full of “weakness and 
melancholy” and “ready to die”, because his mother had just died. The British 
ambassador informed Abdülmecid that in case of danger he “was instructed to request 
the commander of her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in 
readiness”.225 Emboldened by this information, the Ottoman cabinet rejected 
Menshikov‟s demands at the end of the ultimatum, on 10 May. In his official reply, 
Rifat Pasha used a very careful and conciliatory language, stressing that the Porte would 
continue as always to respect the rights and privileges of the Greek Church, and 
maintain friendly relations with Russia, but such a convention with another state would 
harm its independence and would be against international law.
226
 Upon this Menshikov 
gave another ultimatum on 11 May, demanding an answer until 14 May. In this note 
Menshikov was still calling Emperor Nikolai I as an ally (müttefik-i alileri) of the 
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padishah.
227
 The Ottoman foreign ministry (ReĢid Pasha), however, did not consider 
Russia an ally of the Porte, but talked of “friendly relations” (münasebat-ı dostane) 
between the two states.
228
  
Meanwhile Stratford and ReĢid Pasha probably agreed to act together and decided 
to send the patriarchal logothete and the representative of Wallachia (Eflak kapı 
kethüdası) the Greek Nicholas Aristarchi to Menshikov. ReĢid told the logothete that the 
matter under negotiation was not to be exaggerated and could be solved.
229
 The 
logothete (Logofet Bey) told Menshikov that ReĢid Pasha would better serve his ends. 
Menshikov thought he might have a chance if he gets ReĢid Pasha appointed, so he 
applied to Abdülmecid to appoint ReĢid as foreign minister. Abdülmecid should not 
have received him, but he received him, although according to Lane-Poole, referred him 
back to his ministers.
230
 On 13 May, the indignant grand vizier resigned and a reshuffle 
of ministers took place. Grand vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha became the new Seraskier, 
Mustafa Naili Pasha, president of the MVL, took the office of the grand vizier and 
ReĢid Pasha replaced Rifat Pasha in the foreign ministry. The latter took the presidency 
of the MVL. Yet the prospects for Menshikov did not improve, for the new government 
was not pro-Russian at all. Menshikov had made a grave mistake by replacing a less 
skilful opponent with a more skilled one.  
The new foreign minister had only one day left for answering Menshikov's 
ultimatum. He therefore asked Menshikov for five or six days more to prepare “an 
arrangement, conveying assurances satisfactory to both parties” on a matter of such 
delicacy as this of the religious privileges.
231
 On that day he had received the dispatch 
of the Ottoman ambassador in London, Kostaki Musurus. Musurus wrote that in his 
interview with the British foreign minister Lord Clarendon, he received the assurances 
of Britain's guarantees for the independence and sovereign rights of the Ottoman 
Empire.
232
 This news of course made ReĢid bolder. The Ottoman ambassador in Paris 
Veli Pasha had also reported the reactions to Menshikov's conduct from Paris.
233
 Berlin 
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charge d‟affaires Ali Rıza Efendi reported that Prussian policy was not necessarily pro-
Russian.
234
 
On 15 May Menshikov received a note from the Porte and on the evening of the 
same day replied that he had cut off official relations with the Porte but would wait a 
few days more in Istanbul. Storms in the Black Sea were delaying his departure. Finally, 
on 21 May, Menshikov with his suit departed from Büyükdere towards Odessa on board 
his steamer. The Russian coat of arms was taken down from the palace of the embassy. 
On his departure, Menshikov wrote a non-official, personal letter to ReĢid Pasha from 
the Gromonosets at the harbour of Büyükdere.235 He still attached a draft of an official 
note to his letter hoping for a last minute solution. He must have been disappointed by 
ReĢid Pasha, whom he himself had suggested to the post of foreign minister. Now that 
the crisis reached a high point, ReĢid Pasha decided to convene a general assembly 
(Meclis-i Umumi) of 46 persons from the bureaucracy, including former ministers and 
sadrazams, undersecretaries and the ulema. There ReĢid‟s rival Mehmet Ali carried the 
day and a majority of 43 persons against 3 voted down the Russian demands.
236
  
Menshikov had started demanding a treaty, then a sened, finally he was content 
with a ministerial note but the essence of his demands had not changed. He had not 
shown himself up to the skills of a great diplomat. On 26 May, the Russian charge 
d'affaires Ozerov also departed with the rest of the embassy personnel. Only a secretary 
and the head dragoman Argyropoulo remained in Istanbul. In the meantime, the French 
and British fleets had come to the BeĢike Bay, which is at the entrance of the 
Dardanelles.  
At this time Nikolai I had already set up his mind on what to do next if the Porte 
did not comply with his demands. In his instructions to Baron Peter von Meyendorff, 
the Russian ambassador in Vienna, dated 29 May 1853, he described four steps of 
action: 1) to demand from the Porte the signature of the demanded treaty, otherwise 
immediate occupation of the Danubian principalities, 2) If “Turkey” continues 
resistance, then a blockade of the Bosphorus and the recognition of the independence of 
the principalities, 3) If it is still obstinate, then recognition of the independence of 
Serbia and 4) Request from the Austrian emperor moral support.
237
 [Italics underlined 
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by Nikolai]. It seems that after his plans to reach an agreement with Britain on the 
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire failed, Nikolai began to approach Austria. 
After Menshikov's departure and the interruption of diplomatic relations, Russian 
foreign minister Count Nesselrode confirmed Menshikov's demands in a note dated 31 
May and ReĢid Pasha responded on 16 June.238 ReĢid Pasha in his reply stressed that the 
rejection of the demanded sened on grounds of violation of the sovereignty of the state 
did not mean an insult to the tsar. He added that if it is approved by them an 
extraordinary envoy could be sent to St. Petersburg to renew negotiations. ReĢid Pasha 
also informed the embassies of the four signatories of the 1841 Straits Convention 
(Great Britain, France, Austria and Prussia) in Istanbul with a note on 27 May 1853.
239
 
ReĢid Pasha informed them that while the question of holy places was solved in a way 
to please all sides, an agreement was not reached on the question of the rights and 
privileges of the Greek confession and the clergy. On the same day he also wrote to 
Lord Stratford explaining that Menshikov's demands were not acceptable for an 
independent government.
240
  
Meanwhile the Porte was working on a new firman to please its Christian and 
even Jewish subjects and leave no excuses for Russia. On 7 June an imperial firman was 
issued to the Greek patriarchate, reassuring the Orthodox subjects of the Porte of their 
rights and privileges ab antiquo.
241
 Similar firmans were addressed to other religious 
communities. Stratford in a letter to his wife claims that he “put two good sentences into 
them”.242  
Towards the end of June, Nikolai ordered the two Russian armies in Bessarabia to 
occupy the Ottoman tribute-paying principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte 
on its part sent orders to the commander of the Rumeli army Ömer Pasha to strengthen 
fortifications along the Danube and be ready for defense. It also sent orders to the 
Ottoman dominions Egypt and Tunis to send troops.
243
 According to a report dated 24 
June from the British consulate in Alexandria, 10,000 to 15,000 Egyptian troops had 
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already received their salaries in arrears for the past 15 months and an advance of six 
months pay before sailing off to Istanbul.
244
 Salih Hayri in his Hayrabad writes that the 
governor of Egypt Abbas Pasha sent 17 battalions and the governor of Tunis Ahmed 
Pasha sent three regiments under Ferik ReĢid Pasha.245 Süleyman Kızıltoprak gives the 
number of Egyptian and Tunisian troops in the Crimean War as 20,000-22,000 and 
7,000-8,000 respectively.
246
 
On 2 July the Russian armies commanded by General Gorchakov crossed the river 
Pruth, forming the border between Russia and Moldavia. The news reached the Porte on 
7 July. This was an apparent casus belli for the Sultan, but he did not declare war. Nor 
did the tsar declare war, arguing that this action was just intended to put pressure on the 
Ottoman Empire to protect the rights of the Orthodox. The Russian consulate in 
Bucharest also warned the principalities to interrupt all relations with the Porte and not 
to send the tribute. The Porte requested then the Hospodar of Wallachia Prince Stirbey 
and the Hospodar of Moldavia Prince Ghyka to quit the principalities but they declined 
this request saying that they were needed by their people. The Serbian prince Aleksandr 
declared his loyalty to the Porte.
247
  
On 15 July the Porte issued its official note of protest against the occupation of 
the principalities by Russia.
248
 It also reminded the four signatories of the 1841 Treaty 
of their obligations, and declared that it will not accept the occupation of a part of its 
territory and be prepared for war but did not intend to start it.
249
 Meanwhile, there had 
already begun a dense traffic of plans and projects of notes coming and going in all 
directions among the great powers. It seemed that none of them wanted war and strove 
for a peaceful solution. Several offers and plans were presented to ReĢid Pasha from 
different powers. Vienna became the centre of diplomatic transmission between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire thanks to Austria‟s neutral and interested position. Austria was 
both politically and geographically in the middle of Europe and was the natural 
candidate for an intermediary because it had good relations with both Russia and the 
allies. While it was grateful to Russia for the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 
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1848, it could not allow Russian possession or influence in the Principalities and around 
the mouth of the Danube. Several notes were sent from the Porte to Russia via Vienna. 
In fact there occurred a “revolution” in international diplomacy. Never before had been 
so much diplomatic efforts by so many parties to prevent war. Nevertheless, these 
efforts were complicated by the distances involved, so many of them became obsolete 
before reaching their destinations. Istanbul had not yet been connected to European 
centres by telegraph.  
 
 
2.8.  The Vienna Note and the “Turkish Ultimatum” 
 
 
When ReĢid Pasha‟s note (known as the “Turkish Ultimatum”) reached Vienna, it 
was not seen as conciliatory enough and was not sent to St. Petersburg. The Austrians 
did not want to irritate Russia. Instead on 27 July, the Austrian foreign minister Count 
Buol, in collaboration with the British and French ministers, prepared another project of 
a note, which came to be known as the Vienna Note (in Turkish Viyana Müsveddesi250) 
and sent to both Istanbul and St. Petersburg. The note was close to Russian demands but 
differed in that it spread the guarantee to all the great powers. This time the tsar 
accepted the note but the Ottoman Meclis-i Umumi convened on 14 August 1853 did 
not approve of it as such and subjected to some modification.
251
 The embassies of the 
four great powers in Istanbul tried in vain to persuade the Ottoman ministers. ReĢid 
Pasha was now bitter at his European friends who first supported him against Russian 
demands and now seemed to force him into accepting those demands. “It would have 
been better for Turkey, he said, to have yielded at the first, than after so much support 
from the Powers to be now unseasonably abandoned”.252 The questions of whether Lord 
Stratford did all in his power to support the Vienna Note or not, and whether he 
informally encouraged the Ottoman statesmen to resist or not, belong to the disputed 
areas of the diplomatic history of the Crimean War. However, we will not go into such 
details, because this is rather difficult to prove and remains a question of opinion.  
Meanwhile ReĢid Pasha talked with the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour 
but received no support from him. In any case the Ottoman council accepted the note 
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only with modifications. These modifications stressed the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
Empire and the fact that the rights and privileges to the Orthodox were given by the will 
of the Ottoman Sultan and not by the enforcement of Russia or any treaty.
253
 However, 
on 7 September Russia totally rejected the Ottoman modifications.
254
 All the diplomatic 
efforts until then now seemed fruitless. War was impending. The question had now 
acquired all-European interest.  
Meanwhile in the capital of the Ottoman Empire signs of warlike enthusiasm 
appeared on the part of the population or at least of the most conservative sections of 
society. Medrese (theological schools) students or softas demonstrated in favor of war 
against the “infidel”. A placard was posted on the walls of mosques, calling the 
Padishah to holy war. Its style and language leaves no doubt as to its being written by 
the ulema or the softas:  
   O Glorious Padishah! All your subjects are ready to sacrifice their lives, 
property and children for the sake of your majesty. You too have now incurred the 
duty of unsheathing the sword of Muhammad that you girded on the mosque of 
Eyyub-i Ansari like your grandfathers and predecessors. The hesitations of your 
ministers on this question stem from their addiction to the disease of vanity [izzet-
i nefs illeti] and this situation has the possibility (God forbid) of leading us all into 
a great danger. Therefore your victorious soldiers and your praying servants want 
war for the defense of their clear rights, O My Padishah!
255
 [My translation] 
 
Lord Stratford during this time still tried to gain time for a peaceful solution. It 
was now the cabinet that actually instructed him to bring the navy to Istanbul. On 3 
October, Clarendon wrote privately to Stratford: 
   We should have been glad if the fleets were now in Constantinople... great care 
must be taken that they don't give too much encouragement to the Turks nor 
assume an aggressive position towards Russia, with whom, however much we 
may be displeased with her for her conduct to Turkey, we have as yet no 
quarrel.
256
  
 
From the beginning of the dispute over the holy places, the Ottoman diplomacy 
was anxious to appease the tsar without impinging on the independence of the state. The 
tsar practically wanted to put the whole Ottoman Empire into the status of the Danubian 
principalities. No sovereign body would accept another state's protection over a 
significant part of its subjects. Indeed Bolshevik Soviet historian Mikhail Nikolayevich 
Pokrovskiy was probably the first Russian historian to express the absurdity of Nikolai's 
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demands:  
   In order to evaluate this demand correctly, it is enough to imagine the Kazan 
Tatars receiving the right to complain of the Russian Emperor to the Turkish 
Sultan, whose representations the Emperor would have to take into consideration 
and to satisfy them.
257
 
 
Curiously, however, the Ottoman diplomacy did not use at all a card that could 
countermand the demands of Russia: the Sunni Muslims (Tatars, Kuban Nogays, 
Circassians and Dagestanis) of the Russian Empire. If Russia interfered on behalf of the 
Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, then the Ottomans could also interfere on 
behalf of the Sunni Muslims of Russia. While there is no doubt that by the 19
th
 century 
the Ottomans were not in a position to seek protectorate over the Muslims of Russia, it 
could nevertheless make an argument for the sake of diplomatic rhetoric. But why did 
not the Ottomans ever raise any questions about them vis-à-vis Russians? Were they 
simply scared to take up issue with Russia or did they think that they did not have 
anything to say? It is really difficult to find an answer. In fact it seems that the 
Ottomans did not have a plan even for the future of the Crimean Tatars even after the 
war was transferred to the Crimea. The Ottomans did not try to make use of the Gerays, 
descendants of the Crimean khans who lived around ġumnu and other parts of Bulgaria. 
One of them, Mesud Geray applied to French in Varna and went to Gözleve with them. 
The Porte on the other hand had no interest in him. The Porte formed a Tatar cavalry 
regiment in Gözleve, however, this was only by the request of Tatars and after the 
French had already accepted 150 Tatars into their cavalry.
258
 
It is indeed one of the peculiarities of the Crimean War that diplomatic efforts 
never ceased during more than two years of war. War and diplomacy went in parallel. 
Numerous notes, conventions, declarations were prepared in Vienna, Paris, Istanbul, 
London and then sent in all directions. The Prussians also tried to make Berlin a 
participant and venue for the negotiations. Sweden and Denmark maintained a policy of 
active neutrality.
259
 Sardinia-Piedmont lately (early 1855) joined the war on the side of 
the Allies in the hope of gaining further support for Italian union. Iran vacillated 
between Russia and the Ottomans, and had it not been for the efforts of Britain and 
                                                 
257 Pokrovskiy, op. cit., p. 19. 
258  Hakan Kırımlı, “The Crimean Tatar Units in the Ottoman Army during the Crimean War”, 
unpublished symposium paper presented at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA) in 
Istanbul on 27 November 2004. Instead of Gözleve, Kırımlı uses the name Kezlev, which might be 
the local Tatar pronunciation of Gözleve.  
259  For more information, see Emanuel Halicz, Danish Neutrality during the Crimean War (1853-
1856): Denmark between the Hammer and the Anvil, Odense: University Press of Southern 
Denmark, 1977. 
82 
France, it could have joined the war on Russia‟s side. The war had the full potential of 
turning into an all-out European war. All powers of Europe in one way or another were 
involved in the war. Diplomacy in this war was almost as important as military action. 
There were so many times when it seemed that a solution to satisfy all parties was found 
yet these efforts were fruitless until the capture of Sevastopol by the Allies and Kars by 
the Russians towards the end of 1855. Yet this was an unfinished war, and the peace 
that ended this war would also prove to be unfinished.  
Cevdet Pasha is an important Ottoman primary source for our subject, being a 
contemporary eyewitness and the official chronicler of the Porte. Although his chronicle 
did not cover the period, still he left many notes or memoranda (called Tezâkir) to his 
successor Lütfi Efendi. His account in these Tezâkir seems sober and realistic:  
   At the beginning of this matter, naïve people of the time acted quite belligerent 
and ambitious with hopes in vain of going as far as Moscow and maybe 
Petersburg or at least conquering the Crimea. As for the Western-minded 
[alafranga efkârda bulunan zevat], they claimed that in case of war Russia would 
come as near as Edirne. Both parties had wrong opinions. That our forces are not 
equal to those of Russia is out of question. Nevertheless, it was also known to 
well-informed people that the regular and reserve forces mustered by our state 
could for a long time engage and stop the Russian forces. Events too have proved 
this fact. His Majesty Abdülmecid Han did not like shedding blood and ReĢid 
Pasha too was trying to solve the matter by pen. Diplomats like Âli Pasha and 
Fuad Efendi who were raised in his school were also of the same opinion with 
him. The military people, on the other hand, especially Mehmed Ali Pasha, 
cunningly appeared as supporters of war. Even those of them who at heart were 
for the maintenance of peace, were dreaming of saying: „Let the diplomats forbid 
war, then we will be able to say that we could do this and that, alas, this and that 
person prevented war‟.260 [My translation] 
 
The Ottoman Empire had become an arena of contest among the great powers. 
While these powers contested among themselves over the question of who is to have 
more influence over the Porte, Ottoman sovereignty suffered every time. The Ottoman 
Empire had to answer even for matters totally alien to it. A good example is the affair of 
the Hungarian revolutionary refugee Martin Koszta, who had taken refuge in the 
Ottoman Empire and lived for a while in Kütahya. Koszta was then released and he 
went to America. After a while he came back to Izmir, where he was arrested by the 
Austrian consulate and imprisoned in an Austrian ship in the harbour. Since he was 
under American protection when he was arrested, an American corvette had forced the 
Austrian brig in Ġzmir harbour to return Koszta to the Americans. Some Italians had also 
attacked three officers of the Austrian ship in a café, killing one of them and injuring 
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another. Yet the newly appointed Austrian envoy (the internuncio) in Istanbul, Baron 
Karl Ludwig von Brück protested and demanded the dismissal of the governor of Izmir 
Âli Pasha, (the former foreign minister) and the appointment of a new governor who 
would be capable of restoring the security of the Europeans in Izmir. This was in June 
1853, when the crisis with Russia was ripe. The Porte did not want a quarrel with 
Austria as well (Rusya ile zuhura gelen bürudet üzerine bir de Avusturya ile 
bozuşulmasını zihinler almayıp) and it had to satisfy his demand. It was first decided 
that Âli Pasha and the governor of the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid (Aegean 
islands) would be interchanged. However, Brück did not accept this solution and 
therefore Âli Pasha was simply removed from his office. Just as in many other cases, an 
Ottoman official had been forced to resign because of a dispute between rival great 
powers.
261
 
 
 
2.9.  European and Ottoman Public Opinion before the War 
 
 
In the summer of 1853, European public opinion was definitely pro-Ottoman, 
because Russia was seen as the aggressor and the Ottoman Empire as the victim. As 
mentioned by Winfried Baumgart, since the 1830s (especially after the Treaty of 
Hünkâr Ġskelesi in 1833) a strong Russophobia had developed in Britain. Russian 
southward expansion against the Porte and Iran had enlarged such fears. Among the  
chief representatives of Russophobia we can cite Lord Palmerston and David Urquhart. 
Russian suppression of the struggles of Poles (1831) and Hungarians (1849) had also 
made Russia the stronghold of autocracy and reaction in the eyes of the liberal and 
socialist European public opinion. An increase of Russian influence on the Ottoman 
Empire was not in the interests of the European bourgeoisie who controlled most of the 
newspapers. Almost all British and many French newspapers were full of pro-Ottoman 
and anti-Russian sentiments. Even the neutral Prussian newspapers noted that anti-
Russian sentiments increased in the European public opinion.
262
 There is no doubt that 
the Ottoman cabinet knew what was written in these newspapers. Especially the 
Ottoman ambassador in London Kostaki Musurus was sending home clippings of 
newspaper articles on the Russo-Ottoman conflict. Thus we have many of them in the 
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BOA. Let us see some of them.
263
 Upon the news of the passage of the river Pruth by 
12,000 Russian troops and the occupation of Jassy, capital of Moldavia, British 
newspapers in general were much excited against this act of aggression. For example, 
the Observer wrote on 3 July 1853: 
   The present and late conduct of the Czar, in his insolent aggressions upon his 
weak Neighbour and Ally, and his contempt for the opinion of his best friends in 
Europe have left him without an apologist in England.... And why should we not 
sustain our old and faithful Ally, whose conduct is so just under most unjust 
aggression – who has conceded all that was tolerant – who does nothing on the 
offensive, but who is prepared in his own defence, and strong in kind and 
generous offers and acts of support, from friends both near and far? ... She 
[Russia] must, most of all, have undervalued or not known the strength and the 
force of public opinion, which is irresistible, without in the least fanatical.
264
   
 
The Sun on the other hand, reflecting the voice of the British bourgeoisie, declared 
on 4 July 1853, that Britain had nothing to lose from a loss of trade with Russia,  
   We have nothing to fear from Nicholas; and Russia is not so profitable a 
customer that we need care for the suspension of commercial intercourse. In 1851 
our export trade to Russia amounted to less than 1,300,000l., while we have 
admitted her raw produce, her hides and hemp, and tallow to an enormous 
account, on the most favourable terms. Her magnates will regret the loss of  our 
custom far more than we shall theirs. There is nothing then to create 
apprehension, or to depress the public securities, even if Nicholas should carry his 
greatest threats into execution, a matter which we still believe to be very 
improbable.
265
 
 
The Daily News, a Liberal paper, wrote on 4 July 1853: “It seems the die is cast, 
and Russia has at length resolved to put to proof the value of Europe's diplomatic 
declarations that the faith of treaties and the integrity of the weaker states must be 
maintained”. The Standard on 4 July 1853 also declared that “the conquest of Turkey by 
Russia would seriously damage the commerce of England, if it should not threaten her 
Eastern empire”. The Tory newspaper The Morning Herald argued that “the honour and 
safety of Europe both demand that the act of invasion cannot be passed over unnoticed” 
(4 July 1853). The Morning Chronicle, another Liberal, Peelite paper, played the same 
tune on 4 July 1853: 
   Russia wages war upon Turkey, not to redress any wrong, nor to avenge any 
affront, but to wring from a weaker Power an acknowledgement of the sovereign 
rights of the EMPEROR over a large portion of its subjects; and, so far as the Porte 
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is concerned, the attack is as wanton and unprovoked as if he believed that the 
moment had arrived when he might with impunity overrun and subdue what he 
probably regards as a falling empire...
266
 
 
Tory newspaper The Morning Advertiser advised firm action against the tsar on 5 July 
1853:  
   The Czar has carried his cunning to excess. He has overreached himself... He 
must be brought to his senses immediately... He must be forthwith and 
peremptorily called on to give satisfactory guarantees that he will not again 
menace and molest the Turk, nor groundlessly and recklessly inspire a general 
alarm for the peace of Europe.. By exacting these securities for the good 
behaviour of the Northern Bear, both the Sultan and the other Powers of Europe 
will have no reason to regret that Nicholas has indulged in those acts of absolute 
madness which have filled the world with amazement and alarm.
267
 
 
Even the conservative Times could find no apologies for Russia on 4 July 1853: 
   The utter insufficiency of the alleged causes of resentment against Turkey, 
especially after satisfaction had been obtained on the only tangible grievances 
complained of, suggests that other and deeper motives must be at work... the 
concentration of armies on the frontier, the review at Odessa, the demeanour of 
the Envoy and his reception at Constantinople, awakened other suspicions. He 
seems to have been sent not so much to obtain a treaty as to pick a quarrel...
268
 
 
After 7 July, when the manifesto of Nikolai was published and reached Britain, the 
newspapers increased their criticism. For example, the Daily News, on 6 July 1853 
wrote that the Russian emperor had declared a new crusade:  
   The Manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas, which we this day publish with less 
surprise than regret, affects to proclaim against the Ottoman Empire a religious 
war... it is the summons to a new crusade. It is an appeal, direct and undisguised, 
to the fanaticism of a bigoted priesthood and an ignorant population... 
269
 
 
The next day the Daily News, proposed action against Russia: 
   France and England united can, if they will, not only save an ancient and 
peaceful ally from the robber lust of the Barbarian, but by a prompt and steadfast 
course they may secure for Turkey better guarantees for its future independence 
and security than it has enjoyed during the present century... It is tolerably evident 
that Austria is now bitterly conscious of the folly of her late proceedings with 
regard to Turkey. The mission of Count LEININGEN to Constantinople last winter 
served as a species of rehearsal for that of Prince MENCHIKOFF a few months 
later; and the overbearing and menacing line of conduct pursued by the Cabinet of 
Vienna, in the affair of Montenegro, and the unconcealed disposition 
treacherously to stimulate the fanaticism of the discontented subjects of the Porte, 
is now imitated on a more perilous scale by the reckless and rapacious adviser of 
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the CZAR...
270
 
 
The Morning Herald, went so far as to accuse some members of the British 
cabinet of being pro-Russian  
   There is no use in concealing the disastrous truth. There is a Russian party in the 
Cabinet – that is, Russian as far as their feeble blundering permits them to have 
any settled foreign policy at all. We care not by what foreign influence this party 
is backed; it is high time that England should know to what extent they have 
sacrificed – to what greater extent they are prepared to sacrifice – English honour 
and English interests. (7 July 1853)
271
 
 
The Morning Advertiser wrote on 6 July 1853: 
   By force of arms the Czar will endeavour to impose upon Turkish subjects a 
protection which they hold in such horror, that they will brave death to escape it ... 
the moment a Russian soldier has crossed the Pruth for hostile purposes, that 
moment Turkey is at war, and the Dardanelles are, by treaty, open, with 
permission of the Sultan, to the ships of war of all nations. The right, then, of the 
fleets to advance is undisputed.
272
 
 
The Morning Advertiser on the next day wrote that “the Autocrat of all the Russias has 
thrown down the glove to public opinion and to Europe. The opinion he despises, the 
Europe he defies can never hesitate to take it up”. The Globe defended ReĢid Pasha‟s 
and the Sultan‟s “temperate and dignified” stand on 5 July 1853: 
   The text of the note addressed by Redschid Pacha, in reply to the note of Count 
Nesselrode, is now before the public, and it will be found to support the temperate 
and dignified position of the Turkish Government... The Sultan has newly 
confirmed the privileges, rights and immunities of the Greek Church as they have 
existed  ab antiquo... 
273
  
 
The Morning Herald, 28 July 1853, even threatened the British ministers:  
   Once it comes to this, that the Cabinet are avowedly ready to prostrate British 
honour and British faith before the ambition of Russia, we venture to promise that 
the British people will make very short work of the Ministers.
274
 
 
Reading these newspapers, one gets the idea that especially the British public 
opinion was very strongly pro-Ottoman and belligerent. But this was all the more 
misleading for the Ottoman ministers, because they did not really understand that 
newspapers do not necessarily reflect the views of their governments. A more or less 
free press was not quite conceivable for them. Therefore they mistook the tone of the 
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newspapers as proof of real support of their respective governments in case of Ottoman 
war against Russia. Adolphus Slade argues that the “prime councillor” of the Porte 
(London Ambassador Kostaki Musurus?) contributed to its indecision about the 
inevitability of war by sending the minister for foreign affairs articles extracted from the 
Western press, eulogizing “Turkey”, depreciating Russia. Thus, 
   Unused to free discussion, their own newspapers being strictly censored, the 
Turkish ministers were unable to discriminate justly between the government and 
the press. Innately suspicious, they may readily have fancied collusion. The 
warlike articles of sundry English and French journals weakened the effect of 
foreign offices‟ pacific despatches. They were decidedly more palatable. The 
latter alluded to social aberrations and rayas‟ [reaya, non-Muslims, CB] rights; 
whereas the former made no allusion in that day to such delicate topics.
275
 
 
Lord Beaumont, in a letter to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, published in the Times, 
defended the Ottoman case in the following way:  
   A great, albeit a gradual, revolution, has been taking place during more than 30 
years in the more important portions of the empire; one by one, every law or 
custom which tended to oppress the rayah or keep up the barbarous privileges of 
feudalism has been abrogated or repealed… The Porte has, by its own exertions, 
placed itself in the rank of the great powers of Europe. It has an army and a fleet 
inferior only to those of the three or four greatest military states; its ministers of 
state have displayed a tact and ability which has thrown western diplomacy into 
the shade... So changed is now the relative position of the different powers in the 
east of Europe, that the Crescent means religious toleration, personal freedom, 
national independence, and social order; while the Cross (whether Greek or 
Roman) is misused as the banner of those who would establish religious 
intolerance, personal slavery, absolutism in governments, and a return to the 
middle ages in literature and society. The question at issue and the subject at stake 
are something far beyond a personal quarrel between the Czar and the Sultan. The 
contest is between civilisation and barbarism, right and wrong, progress and 
retrogression, liberty and tyranny. All this ought to be put in detail before the 
public; nor ought the difference between the commercial codes and tariffs of 
Turkey and other European states to be forgotten. Beyond all this, it is easily 
shown how necessary the Sultan's independence is to the peace of the world and 
the balance of power in Europe...
276
  
 
At the beginning of September 1853, the anti-Russian spirit in Istanbul had 
reached a peak. The pacificity of the government was also much criticised. This was 
largely the result of the pressure of the Ottoman public opinion that favoured war 
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against Russia. This public mood was mainly expressed by the professors and students 
of religious schools (medreses), the ulema and the softas. Some of the ministers like 
Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha and part of the military also backed them. They were 
organized easily in the mosques. Ann Pottinger Saab has asserted that the reactions of 
the ulema and the softas were based largely on their own deteriorating material 
conditions. The new secular schools had largely diminished their career prospects, 
opening the way instead to the graduates of the new schools. The expropriation of the 
waqf (pious foundations) property had also deprived them of some of their traditional 
revenues. Therefore as a social group they were discontented.
277
 ġerif Mardin has also 
argued that the destruction of the Ottoman industries had created new unemployment 
and increased the number of medrese students together with their disobediance.
278
 
However, the medrese students were still numerically stronger than those attending the 
new Western style rüşdiye schools. According to Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 
at the beginning of the Crimean War there were only 60 rüşdiye schools in the entire 
empire with 3,371 male students, whereas medreses in Istanbul alone had 16,752 
students, all male. However, the numbers for rüşdiye schools seem doubtful.279 Cevdet 
Pasha was of the opinion that Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha provoked the softas in order to 
secure the dismissal of ReĢid Pasha.280  
On 10 September 1853, some 36 or 35 members of the ulema submitted a petition 
(arzuhal) to the MVL, citing verses from the Koran and the prophet Muhammad‟s 
words (hadis) that the imam of the true believers must fulfil his duty of proclaiming 
jihad.
281
 The Times newspaper in London gave the news as follows:  
   … The petition was principally composed of numerous quotations from the 
Koran, enjoining war on the enemies of Islam, and contained covert threats of 
disturbance were it not listened to and complied with. The tone of the petition is 
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exceedingly bold, and bordering on the insolent. Some of the principal Ministers 
endeavoured to reason with those who presented it, but the answers they obtained 
were short and to the point. The spokesman observed – „Here are the words of the 
Koran: if you are Mussulmans you are bound to obey. You are now listening to 
foreign and infidel ambassadors who are the enemies of the Faith; we are the 
children of the Prophet; we have an army and that army cries out with us for war, 
to avenge the insults which the Giaours have heaped upon us.‟ It is said that on 
each attempt to reason with these fanatics, the Ministers were met by the answer 
„These are the words of the Koran.‟ The present Ministers are undoubtedly in a 
state of alarm, since they look upon the present circumstance (a very unusual 
event in Turkey) as but the commencement of a revolution, and fear to be forced 
at the present inopportune juncture into a war. It seems that three petitions have 
been presented by these softas, one to the Sultan, one to Mehemet Ali, the 
Seraskier or Commander-in-Chief, and one to the Council. The party of Redschid 
Pacha believe the affair to have been instigated by Mehemet Ali, who has been 
from the first openly and avowedly in favour of war… Should a popular 
movement urge the Ministry to declare war, the peaceful and reasonable policy of 
Redschid Pacha would of course be at an end, and so would his services, while 
Mehmet Ali would become practically the chief man in the Empire; whereas 
should these unhappy questions with Russia be settled by the acceptation by the 
Emperor of the note of Redschid Pacha, the latter would acquire thereby immense 
influence and consolidation of power, with the confusion of all his rivals… The 
Ministry is much puzzled in its endeavours to ascertain how far the body of the 
nation agrees with the sentiments expressed in the petition – whether, in short, 
public opinion supports the movement of these softas, or whether their bold 
address has originated entirely within the walls of their mosques and tékés.282  
 
On the next day a special council of eleven ministers and high officials (havass-ı 
vükela-i fiham) convened in the seaside mansion of the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha 
to discuss the petition. According to the protocol or minutes (mazbata) of the council, 
the reason for not proclaiming war against Russia until then was the insufficiency of the 
military preparations. To the questions on this issue, the commander of Rumeli army 
Ömer Pasha had replied that the Rumelian army needed 40,000 regular troops in 
addition to the present forces and several months for the preparation of bridges and 
fortifications. The Anatolian army was in a similar situation, as confirmed by the 
seraskier. While the Porte was trying to find a political solution, it was obvious that if a 
political solution was not found, then war was inevitable.
283
  
The ministers further argued that since the decisions until then were taken by 
unanimity and since calling for the assistance of other states was approved by the şeriat, 
and since the şeyhülislam had not yet sanctioned proclamation of war, then the protest 
                                                 
282   “Turkey. (From Our Own Correspondent). Constantinople, Sept. 12”, The Times, Issue 21544, 
London, 27 September 1853, p. 7.  
283  BOA. Ġ. MVL. 26350 lef 2, dated 7 Zilhicce 1269 (11 September 1853). The mazbata is sealed by 
ġevket Bey, Mehmed Arif Efendi, Mehmed ?, Mahmud Pasha, Rifat Pasha, Ali Fethi Pasha, 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, Mustafa ReĢid Pasha, Rauf Bey, Esseyyid Ahmed Arif Efendi and Mustafa 
Naili Pasha (the grand vizier). See Appendix 5. 
90 
of some hoca efendis was very improper and contrary to law. Therefore they should be 
reprimanded and punished. Then the ministers observed that “the real issue to be 
regretted here was the audacity and insolence of the common people to interfere with 
state affairs”. Such things had caused a lot of trouble in ancient times and had been 
unseen for a long time “by the will of God and thanks to his Imperial Majesty‟s firm 
rule”. Therefore it was very urgent to prevent such insolence.284 Now we see a really 
interesting development here with regard to Ottoman public opinion. It seems that the 
Ottoman public by then had started to take an active interest in “state affairs”. 
The mazbata added that according to the news from Vienna, the modifications of 
the Porte in the Vienna Note were not disapproved by the ambassadors in Vienna and 
sent to St. Petersburg. The answer from Petersburg was expected in eight to ten days. If 
the answer will be negative then the Porte would not yield. Finally the council decided 
to summon prominent members of the ulema and receive from them written approvals 
of the policy of the government. Thus the excitement and agitation of the people would 
also be diminished. In any case the petition was not signed by well-known hoca efendis 
but only by the lesser ones. Vidinli [Mustafa] Hoca Efendi was inclined to sign the 
petition but after a reprimand from the Ģeyhülislam he had abstained from putting his 
seal. It was also observed that while the petition was prepared and circulated for 
signature for days, the police had not duly informed the authorities and had not taken 
measures to prevent it. Such indifference by the police,
285
 in such a delicate time when 
it had to be more vigilant than ever was really regrettable. Therefore the zabtiye müşiri 
should be strongly admonished to be on the alert. On the next day, the grand vizier 
submitted the mazbata together with the arzuhal to the Sultan, who approved the 
decision of the ministers.
286
 On the other hand, the Berliner Zeitung wrote that the 
ulema and the medrese students had collected 60,000 signatures from Istanbul and its 
vicinity for war against Russia.
287
 This number seems exaggerated. 
The disturbances caused by the softas worried some of the European diplomats for 
fear of a fanatical wave of Christian massacres. The French ambassador Edmond de La 
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Cour sent alarming news to his government and the French foreign minister Drouyn de 
Lhuys
288
 telegraphed the news to London as well. Lord Clarendon, without waiting for 
despatches from Stratford, instructed him “to send for the British fleet to 
Constantinople” on 23 September. Then the Russian ambassador in London, Baron 
Filipp Ivanovich Brunnov (1797-1875) declared that the call to the fleet was a violation 
of the Treaty of Straits of 1841, which banned the passage of battleships from the straits 
in peace time. To this protest, Clarendon‟s reply was that the Porte “had ceased to be at 
peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian 
Principalities”.289  
Stratford, however, was not aroused so much. He simply ignored the order, as if 
the summons to the fleet was left to his discretion. But still he called for two or three 
steamers to Istanbul for emergencies. The French ambassador also called in some 
steamers.  Stratford in his despatch wrote: “Fortunately there is no necessity whatever 
for calling up the squadron… I wished to save Her Majesty‟s Government from any 
embarrassments likely to accrue from a premature passage of the Dardanelles”.290 Thus 
it seems that Stratford probably did not have belligerent aims, contrary to allegations of 
some historians, especially the Russian historians who consider him as a great enemy of 
Russia and one of the chief causes of the war. On the contrary, he seems here careful 
not to provoke Russia while defending British interests. Nevertheless, the question of 
the role of Stratford de Redcliffe is a complicated and still controversial point among 
historians. Some documents published by Prof. Baumgart in AGKK show that even 
such British statesmen as Lord Clarendon, Sir James Graham (1792–1861), First Lord 
of the Admiralty, and Baron Henry Cowley (1804-1884), British ambassador to France, 
saw Stratford as “bent on war”, “resolved to embroil matters at home and abroad in the 
hope of obtaining a triumph for his own morbid vanity and implacable antipathies”, his 
tendencies being “clearly more for war than for peace”.291  
On 26 and 27 September 1853, another grand council (Meclis-i Umumi) of 163 
high-level official dignitaries was convened to discuss the question of war against 
Russia. The council consisted of the three distinct groups of the Ottoman bureaucracy: 
the mülkiye, that is, ministers, ex-ministers and other officials, the seyfiye, i.e. the 
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military, and the ulema, i.e. the religious establishment. According to the testimony of 
Rauf Bey, who was present at the meeting, first the hoca efendis were asked to give 
their opinion. Hoca Yahya Efendi answered that the ministers (vükela) knew better and 
they should be asked. Finally Vidinli Mustafa Hoca Efendi asked why the war was not 
begun until then.
292
  
At this point ReĢid Pasha the foreign minister interfered and told the council that 
the state did not have enough military preparation at that time. He added that although 
the ambassadors of the great powers advised not to declare war until the European 
opinion was clarified, the Sublime State was free in its decision. Therefore it would 
either accept the advice or declare war. Everybody should speak up, he told. Then some 
of the ulema asked: “If we begin war, will the great powers be against us or how?”. To 
this question ReĢid Pasha replied that they were not expected to be against but their 
fleets might go back, or may be they would not leave. It was up to the Porte to 
endeavour to keep them or not. Again some of the ulema told what use they would be 
of, referring to them as one nation of infidels (el küfrü milletün vahide). Then ReĢid 
Pasha explained that although their religion was one, they also had conflicts among 
them like the one between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. 
The ulema then turned to the seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha to learn whether the 
Ottoman Empire had enough military strength to fight against Russia. The seraskier 
pasha gave an account of the military strength of the empire but avoided giving a 
definite answer as to whether this power was sufficient for a war against Russia. Edhem 
Pasha told about the population and the military power of Russia and concluded that 
war against them was a difficult job, even such a great conqueror as Napoleon I had 
been unsuccessful against them.  
Rauf Bey writes that at this point the majority of the ulema attacked these words 
and made “unbecoming” remarks about Edhem Pasha as if he were an infidel. Former 
grand vizier Ġzzet Pasha also read a paper, saying that war should not be started without 
proper preparations. Another former grand vizier Âli Pasha also recommended 
precaution. Former foreign minister Fuad Efendi told that “the Ottoman Empire cannot 
make another treaty like the Treaty of Edirne. The matter must be considered well. 
Furthermore, the question of war finances should also be taken into consideration”. 
Rauf Bey further remarks here that some hoca efendis said “we will seize the wealth of 
                                                 
292   Rauf Bey was son of Rıfat Pasha, the president of the MVL. For the text of his minutes of the 
meeting, see Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 315-320. However, we do not know when he wrote 
these minutes, immediately after or much later? 
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the enemy by the force of sword and recover our expenses”; therefore, the question of 
money, which was the essence of the matter, was not discussed but instead irrelevant, 
meaningless words were uttered (ruh-i maslâhat olan akça maddesi yine söyleşilmeyib 
başka abes sözlere girişildi).  
Rıfat Pasha, the president of the MVL said that the real point to be looked after in 
this matter was the alliance of the naval powers with the Ottoman Empire and internally 
the unanimity of the officials of the state. After some negotiations, Rıfat Pasha asked 
the opinion of the high ranking ulema. Then the mufti of the MVL Arif Efendi (the 
future şeyhülislam) referred the question to the office of the fetva. To this the fetva 
emini from the office of the şeyhülislam replied that if the commander of the Muslim 
armies says that there are enough forces to go against the enemy then it is necessary to 
go to war. Arif Efendi also complained about the rumours about himself spread by the 
softas because he had participated in the negotiations of Rıfat Pasha with Menshikov. 
After that he referred to the seraskier to tell whether the state had enough force. The 
seraskier again stated the number of the imperial troops but said that he was not sure 
whether this amount was sufficient for a war against Russia. Rauf Bey remarks that the 
seraskier did not give a certain answer to the repeated question, because he did not want 
to be held responsible if the result of the war would turn out to be unfavourable. When 
some lieutenant-generals (feriks) from the DġA were asked, they gave some vague 
answers. Then ReĢid Pasha asked the Kapudan Pasha, the grand admiral. Mahmud 
Pasha told that “if the great powers do not send fleets to the Mediterranean and attack 
the Ottoman Empire, then the imperial fleet could certainly be a match to the Russian 
fleet in the Black Sea. But if later we will be called to responsibility for these words 
then I will not accept it”. These words surprised all and a total silence fell to the hall.  
ReĢid Pasha broke the silence and told that “It is better to die with arms in hand 
than to die with tied hands. God willing, we will be victorious and destroy the harmful 
treaties as well”. ReĢid Pasha seems to have carried the day and determined the 
outcome. 
Thus after two days of discussions, war was decided unanimously and the 
resolution was sent to the Sultan for approval. The resolution (mazbata) of the council 
was written by Mustafa ReĢid Pasha immediately in the night of the second day of the 
negotiations.
293
 It was stated that Russia had not accepted the modification made by the 
                                                 
293   The text of this mazbata can be seen at Türkgeldi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 320-321. Türkgeldi or his 
editor Baykal gives the date of the mazbata as 23 Zilhicce 1269 (25 September 1853). 23 Zilhicce 
1269, however, corresponds to 27 September 1853. A better transliteration is provided by OBKS, 
pp. 126-127. 
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Porte on the Vienna. While the four great powers had asked the Porte to accept the note 
without alterations and offered some guarantees (teminat ve kefalet) against the risks it 
contained, this was not sufficient from the point of view of honour (mesele-i 
namusiyyece kâfi294 görülemeyip) even if it had any legal benefit. Acceptance of the 
note without alterations would mean taking the “killing poison” (semm-i kaatil). 
Therefore it was decided unanimously to declare war. It was also warned that the war 
was declared on the Russian state and the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
should not in any way be offended, on the contrary, more care and protection than 
before should now be exercised with regard to them in order not to cause any hostility 
from other states because of their ill treatment. Sheikhulislam Arif Hikmet Bey Efendi 
issued a fetva sanctioning the declaration of a holy war (cihad ve kıtal) and on 30 
September Sultan Abdülmecid approved the resolution.295 
If we can rely on the accuracy of the account of Rauf Bey, then an interesting 
picture emerges. Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha, whom some sources like to assign to the 
war party, seems to have kept a very low profile at the meeting. ReĢid Pasha on the 
other hand, who is seen as proponent of a diplomatic solution, seems to have played the 
role of the hawkish party. It is also important to observe that the Western oriented  
ReĢid Pasha was rather in tandem with the ulema, supporting the war effort. Therefore  
we cannot make all-sweeping generalizations on the basis of this account alone, 
however, it is certain that there are no clear cut dichotomies of reformers versus 
conservatives or pacifists versus belligerents among the Ottoman statesmen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
294  Türkgeldi gives this word as “faidesi”, which is not correct. Cf. OBKS, p. 126 for transcription 
and p. 377 for a copy of the original document. 
295   See OBKS, pp. 126-128. 
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CHAPTER 3: BATTLES AND DIPLOMACY DURING THE WAR 
 
 
 
 
3.1.  The Declaration of War 
 
 
In this chapter I will dwell on the battles of the war to the extent that Ottomans 
were involved in them, using Ottoman, Russian and European sources in a comparative 
and critical way. Because of space limitations, I will focus on those battles, events and 
aspects of the war that I see more important. One of the aims of this chapter is to see the 
extent of reforms in the Ottoman army, how the Ottoman armies fought, how they were 
led, organized and supplied. I will also analyse how the Porte led diplomacy in this 
period, the diplomatic efforts of the great powers and the Porte from the declaration of 
war in October 1853 until the Treaty of Paris at the end of March 1856.  
On 1 Muharrem 1270 (4 October 1853), the Porte‟s declaration of war was 
published in the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi. On the same day official notes 
were sent to the embassies of the four great powers in Istanbul (France, Britain, Austria 
and Prussia).
296
 The next day a leaflet was published in French, bearing the title 
“Manifeste de la Sublime Porte”.297  
The declaration was still mild and conciliatory in style. It stated that the Sublime 
Porte was forced to declare war since Russia had occupied Ottoman territory and had 
not evacuated it despite various diplomatic efforts. It also announced that as a last sign 
of peaceful intentions of the Porte, the commander of the Rumeli army Ömer Pasha was 
instructed to give a term of 15 days to the Russian commander of the Danubian armies 
General Mikhail Gorchakov to evacuate the principalities. Ömer Pasha sent the 
ultimatum on 8 October 1853, stating that if he received a negative answer or no 
answer, then hostilities would begin. General Gorchakov replied on 10 October that he 
was not authorised to remove his armies. Thus from a legal point of view, war was fully 
                                                 
296  BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/4, dated 1 Muharrem 1270 (4 October 1853). Also see CH, nr. 648, 6 
Muharrem 1270 (9 October 1853). 
297   Manifeste de la Sublime Porte. Imprimerie du Journal de Constantinople. BOA. HR. SYS. 907/5, 
5 October 1853. 
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declared on the day when General Gorchakov rejected the ultimatum of Ömer Pasha.298 
This point is important because later Nikolai I and some Russian sources would claim 
that the Porte did not wait until its own ultimatum expired, when Ottoman artillery 
opened fire on Russian ships on the Danube on 21 October. 
Meanwhile ReĢid Pasha was afraid that a sudden Russian attack on Istanbul could 
take place before the end of the duration of the ultimatum. Therefore he requested the 
French and the British embassies on 8 October
299
 to bring some part of their fleets from 
the Dardanelles to Istanbul. He knew that the ambassadors were instructed and 
authorised by their governments to bring their fleets to Istanbul in case of necessity to 
protect the Sultan. Nevertheless, the ambassadors did not hasten to answer. Their notes 
came only on 16 October. The French note was positive and clear. It stated that Russia 
had violated Ottoman territorial integrity and the Porte was now by treaty entitled 
freedom of action concerning the Straits. It informed that the French fleet was ready to 
come as a sign of friendship.
300
 It also added that due to weather conditions, it was in 
any case desirable that the fleet entered the Straits. The British note was also positive, 
though not so enthusiastic as the French note.
301
  
On 1 November 1853 (20 October according to the Julian calendar), the “All-
Russian
302
 Emperor and Autocrat” Nikolai I issued his manifest, finally declaring war 
on the Porte.
303
 In his manifest Nikolai distorted the facts so much, as if his subjects did 
not know anything apart from his manifest. He argued that the Porte had declared war 
despite the peaceful efforts of Europe and his long endured patience, pretending that 
Europe was behind him. He added that the Porte had accepted insurgents of all countries 
into its army and started military operations on the Danube. Russia now had to defend 
                                                 
298  Mustafa Budak writes that the Russians rejected the proposal on 17 October, referring to an 
ATASE document, the contents of which he does not explain. See Mustafa Budak, 1853-1856 
Kırım Savaşı‟nda Kafkas Cephesi, unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 1993, p. 41. 
299   This date is given by Lane-Poole (op. cit., p. 309). I could not find ReĢid Pasha‟s note in the BOA; 
therefore its date is not certain, although I found the replies of the two ambassadors to it. 
300   Translation of the French note to the Ottoman foreign ministry. [Edmond] de la Cour to ReĢid 
Pasha, dated 16 October 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 9. I could not find the original of this 
note. See Appendix 7. 
301  Translation of the British note to the Ottoman foreign ministry. Stratford to ReĢid, dated 16 
October 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 8. I could not find the original of this note. See 
Appendix 6.  
302  Nikolai‟s official Russian title, “Imperator i Samoderzhets Vserossiyskiy” is usually translated as 
“Emperor and Autocrat of All Russias”.  
303   For the Russian original, see Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part two, p. 531. This manifest was 
translated into Bulgarian as well and distributed in Bulgaria. The kocabaşı of Rusçuk (Ruse) sent it 
to the governor of Silistria, who forwarded it to Ömer Pasha and to the Porte. The manifest in 
Bulgarian, its translation into Ottoman Turkish and the letter of the governor of Silistria Mehmed 
Said Pasha to the grand vizier, dated 18 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (18 March 1854) can be found at 
BOA. A. AMD. 51/1. 
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its sacred cause of protecting the Orthodox faith by arms, he declared. Yet he had lost 
his confidence and initiative. Now it was not he who guided events but events which 
started to direct him. He did not give definite orders to the Danubian army as to what to 
do against the Ottoman army, other than self-defence. Although war was declared by 
both sides, they remained yet on the defensive. There were still hopes of a diplomatic 
solution. Emperor Nikolai on his part was still assuring the European powers that his 
actions would be defensive. Meanwhile, Sultan Abdülmecid assumed the title of Gazi 
on 3 November 1853.
304
 
On 30 October, General Louis-Achille Baraguey d‟Hilliers (1795-1878) was 
appointed to replace Ambassador Edmond de la Cour at the French embassy in Istanbul. 
The general, who had distinguished himself in Algeria like so many other French 
generals, was chosen by Napoleon III to balance the influence of Stratford de Redcliffe 
on the Porte. The new French ambassador arrived at Istanbul in mid November. 
 
 
3.2.  The Danubian Front in 1853 
 
 
Now that the war was declared, the Ottoman side was expected to initiate actual 
hostilities first, because it was Ottoman territory that was occupied. Thus actual 
hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire broke out on the mouth of the 
Danube, near Ġsakçı on 21 October 1853.305 Ottoman shore batteries opened fire on two 
Russian steamships with eight barges going to Galatz. However, this was only a small 
skirmish and the sides were not yet ready for a great confrontation. In some works of 
the Russian literature, the Ottomans are accused of beginning the war without waiting 
for the end of their own ultimatum. However, this view is not confirmed by documents.  
The Ottoman Rumeli army was commanded by MüĢir Ömer Pasha. The 
conqueror of revolts in Bosnia, Kurdistan and Arabistan, he was at the height of his 
career and full of energy at the age of 52 in 1853. He spoke several European languages 
(with some accent) in addition to Turkish and was considered by both the British and 
                                                 
304   BOA. HR. MKT. 68/4, dated 5 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 / 6 December 1853. Also see Lütfi, op. cit., p. 
91. 
305   General Hikmet Süer gives this date as 23 October 1853. See Süer, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. 
Osmanlı devri. Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi Harekatı (1853-1856). Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt BaĢkanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p. 193. Captain Fevzi 
writes “1853 Teşrin-i Evvel‟in yirmi birinci ve Muharrem‟in yirminci Pazar ertesi günü”, which is 
contradictory in itself, because 21 October 1853 corresponds to Friday, 18 Muharrem 1270. 
Likewise 20 Muharrem 1270 corresponds to Sunday, 23 October 1853. See [Kurtoğlu], YüzbaĢı 
Fevzi. 1853-1855 Türk-Rus Harbi ve Kırım Seferi, Ġstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1927, p. 16. 
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the French as the most talented officer in the Ottoman army. Nevertheless, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Russian military reports sent before the war about his 
capabilities were not so much laudatory. Marshal Saint-Arnaud, the French 
Commander-in-Chief, evaluated him as a good general but needing guidance. Saint-
Arnaud also commented that the Ottoman army had a high command and soldiers, but 
“no officers and even fewer NCO‟s”.306 
Ömer Pasha‟s chief of staff and later (from December 1854 on) deputy 
[kaimmakam] was Ferik Çerkez Ġsmail Pasha (1815?-1861)307 and another chief of staff 
was Nazır Ahmed Pasha (?-1860).308 It seems that they did not like each other. 
According to Hüseyin Avni Pasha, who was a staff officer in the Rumeli army during 
the war, Ömer Pasha saw Ġsmail Pasha as a rival and tried to undermine him, while 
Ahmed Pasha did not help Ġsmail Pasha in the battle of Çatana.309  
There were also some Polish and Hungarian refugee officers on the staff of Ömer 
Pasha, veterans of the Polish uprising of 1831 and the Hungarian uprising of 1849. In 
November 1853, the Polish émigré Michal Czajkowski, who had converted to Islam and 
taken the name of Mehmed Sadık Efendi, was promoted to the rank of mirmiran and 
appointed to recruit and command a Cossack (Kazak or Kozak) regiment from Polish 
emigrants and the Ignat-Cossacks.
310
 For the Russians, Czajkowski was a “renegade” 
like any Christian who converted to Islam. About one year later a second regiment was 
formed under the command of Count Wladislaw Zamoyski, as we have seen in Chapter 
2.  
The Rumeli army was the best Ottoman army in terms of discipline, training, and 
quality of officers, arms and provisions. Its supplies of arms and provisions were not 
                                                 
306  David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1990, p. 62. 
307  According to Mehmed Süreyya‟s Sicill-i Osmani he was a Circassian slave of Ġzzet Mehmed 
Pasha. He became a mirliva in 1838 in Nizip. He was made a vizier in March 1854 after his 
success at the battle of Çatana. See Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996, p. 830. 
Michal Czajkowski calls him Satan Ġsmail Pasha (“Szajtan Izmaił Pasza”), which is rather a 
doubtful and informal nickname. See Czajkowski, Moje Wspomnienia o Wojnie 1854 Roku, 
Warsaw: Wydawnicstwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1962, p. 44 and the editorial note on p. 
292. Veysel Usta gives Ġsmail Pasha‟s birth year as 1805. See Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni, Manzume-i 
Sivastopol, (Hazırlayan Veysel Usta), Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000, p. 95. 
308   Ahmed Pasha was one of the first graduates of the war academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye). He became a 
ferik and the superintendent (nazır) of the Mekteb-i Harbiye in 1848. He was made a vizier in 
November 1854 and commander of the Ottoman forces in the Crimea in September 1855. See 
Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., pp. 216-217. Ahmed Pasha was sentenced to death by Fuad Pasha for 
his involvement in the massacres of Christians in Damascus in 1860. See Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 
13-20, p. 111. 
309  See Cevdet Pasha, ibid.  
310  Abdülmecid‟s irade, dated 5 Safer 1270 (7 November 1853). BOA. Ġ. DH. 282/17740. 
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inferior to that of the Russian army. The number of troops under Ömer Pasha‟s 
command was about 145 to 178 thousand.
311
 These troops were stationed along the 
Danube, from Vidin to Varna, mainly in ġumnu, Vidin, Kalafat, Tutrakan, Rusçuk, 
ZiĢtovi, Silistria and Varna. The headquarters of Ömer Pasha was in ġumnu with about 
40,000 troops. 
Field Marshal Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich (1782-1856), the Count of Erivan, 
Prince of Warsaw, the conqueror of the Persians in 1826-28, of Erzurum in 1828-29, of 
Warsaw in 1831 and of the Hungarian insurrection in 1849, was at that time 
commanding three Russian armies in Europe from his headquarters in Warsaw. He still 
held much prestige and authority in the eyes of Emperor Nikolai I, who called him 
“father-commander” (otets-komandir). Yet Paskevich, at the age of 72, had lost 
initiative and deep in his heart he opposed the war, though he could not say so openly. 
According to Tarle, he did not use his influence on the emperor.
312
 His hesitations and 
contradictions would have a negative impact on the Russian war efforts along the 
Danube. Afraid of ruining his reputation by an unlucky defeat, he behaved with too 
much caution, although he did not think that the Ottoman army could fight well against 
the Russian army. In his report to Nikolai, dated 23 September 1853, he wrote that  
   As is known, the Turks are strong in fortresses, but they cannot hold out against 
our troops on the field. It is necessary to manoeuvre in such a way as to lure them 
out of their fortresses and smash them... I do not share the idea that the Turks 
could dream of causing us great damage from the Asian side. The Turkish 
cavalry, the Kurds, have always been beaten by our Muslims and line troops… As 
regards their regular troops, they are not frightening in Europe and even less in 
Asia. 
313
 [My translation] 
 
However, on 6 October 1853, Paskevich recommended to Nikolai a defensive 
position without crossing the Danube.
314
 Then, in contradiction to this defensive 
position, he added that they had a powerful weapon against the Ottoman Empire in their 
influence on the Ottoman Christians. Therefore Russia could take advantage of a 
Christian revolt against the “Mussulman yoke”. Paskevich, knowing well Nikolai‟s 
dislike of any revolutionary movements against any “legitimate” monarch, added that 
                                                 
311   There are different numbers for the strength of the Rumeli army. While Tarle gives 145 thousand 
troops excluding the başıbozuk, (op. cit., vol. I, p. 264), Captain Fevzi (Kurtoğlu) gives 178 
thousand with 12 thousand baĢıbozuk troops and thus 166 thousand without the başıbozuk. See 
YüzbaĢı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 8.  
312   Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 255. 
313  Paskevich to Nikolai, 11 (23) September 1853, Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., (1912), vol. 2, 
Prilozhenie 40, pp. 105-107. 
314
   “Vsepoddanneyshaya zapiska knyazya Paskevicha”, Warsaw, 24 September [6 October] 1853, 
Russkaya Starina, August 1876, pp. 698-702. Also see Tarle, ibid, p. 262-263. 
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this was not a “revolutionary” call to insubordination to a sovereign, but a rightful 
cause, because Russia could not remain indifferent to the suffering of orthodox 
Christians under the Ottoman rule. Thus, while the Russian armies would remain behind 
the Danube, the Ottoman Christians‟ revolt against the Sultan was expected to happen 
somehow under the obvious hostility of Austria to such revolts. Did Paskevich really 
believe what he recommended to Nikolai? It seems doubtful. Paskevich might have 
simply wanted to please Nikolai I, who until then was not inclined towards Slavophils at 
all, but now thought that the Slavs could be of use. Paskevich also did not want to move 
his second army corps in Poland neither to the Danube nor later to the Crimea, referring 
to the danger of Austria‟s intervention. One month later, Paskevich developed his 
cautious attitude further and recommended to stay in defense in “Europe” and not to 
anger great powers. He argued that even if they were to take Edirne, the great powers 
would interfere and not let them to benefit from their conquests. The Russians would 
suffer many losses from diseases and not gain much even if they hold victory. 
According to him, time was on the side of Russia. It was necessary to wait. Thus he 
recommended a defensive position on the Danube, but an offensive one in the Caucasus. 
He argued that with 16 battalions now in the Russian Caucasus army, it was possible to 
act offensively, because there the great powers could not interfere and the Russian army 
could easily beat the Ottoman army when it was alone.
315
 
The Russian occupation army in the Danubian principalities numbered about 
88,000 in October 1853. The headquarters of this army was in Bucharest. The 
Commander-in-Chief General Prince (Knyaz) Mihail Dmitrievich Gorchakov, having 
served twenty two years as Paskevich‟s chief of staff in Warsaw, was used to receiving 
orders and was not noted for resolution and initiative. According to Tarle, from 
Gorchakov‟s army only a small portion of about 10,000 men under the command of 
General Count Anrep was given the vanguard position to guard against the Ottoman 
forces until February 1854.
316
 
Taking the events of the 1828-29 Russo-Ottoman War into consideration, Ömer 
Pasha had concentrated a considerable force around Vidin, the westernmost fortress on 
the Danube. The importance of Vidin also came from its closeness to Serbia. However, 
Russia did not intend to arouse the suspicions of Austria by being too close to the 
Serbians. Therefore the Russians did not concentrate their troops there.  
                                                 
315  Paskevich to Nikolai, dated 24 September (6 November) 1853, Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., (1912), 
vol. 2, Prilozhenie 41, pp. 108-111. 
316  Tarle, ibid, p. 274. 
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On 28 October, Ferik Ġsmail Pasha‟s forces crossed the Danube from Vidin and 
occupied the small town of Kalafat with a force of 12,000. The small Russian force in 
Kalafat retreated. On 30 October Ömer Pasha himself came to Tutrakan (Turtukai), in 
the middle of the Danube front. An Ottoman infantry battalion with six guns under the 
command of Kaimmakam Hüseyin Bey crossed the Danube on 2 November and 
occupied the quarantine house of Wallachia (Eflak Karantinahanesi) at the village of 
Oltenitsa (or Oltenitza, in Turkish Oltaniçe). These forces were reinforced by another 
battalion next day and they built some earthworks there.
317
  
On the Russian side, the characteristic indetermination had passed from 
Gorchakov to his generals commanding various positions on the Danube. Thus General 
Pyotr Dannenberg, commanding the forces in Little Wallachia, had given orders to his 
forces to the effect that if the “Turks” crossed the Danube, they should not be engaged 
in battle with them but should definitely not let them go farther. General Pavlov at 
Oltenitsa, on the left hand (north) side of the Danube was at a loss trying to understand 
this order. How would he not engage in war and at the same time not to let them pass? 
When the Ottomans started crossing the Danube at the beginning of November, 
Dannenberg at first did not believe that it was a serious affair but soon he was proven 
wrong.
318
  
On 4 November 1853 (3 Safer 1270)
319
 Russian forces commanded by General 
Pavlov attacked the fortified Ottoman positions in Oltenitsa. The Russian forces were 
met with a powerful cannonade from the Ottoman positions. Russian and Ottoman 
sources give different numbers for the strength of both sides, each side arguing that the 
enemy troops were more numerous. Ömer Pasha‟s report after the battle and the official 
chronicler Lütfi Efendi maintain that a few Ottoman battalions fought against 20 
infantry battalions and 4 cavalry regiments. Ömer Pasha‟s report states that at the 
quarantine house the Ottoman forces consisted of 3 companies of infantry, 2 companies 
of rifles or chasseurs (şeşhaneci), 150 cavalry men and 6 guns, while the Russians 
attacked with 20 battalions of infantry, 4 battalions of cavalry and 32 guns.
320
 On the 
                                                 
317   See Ömer Pasha‟s report in Lütfi, op. cit., p. 205. Also see YüzbaĢı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 17. 
Kurtoğlu gives the date as 1 November. 
318  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 280. 
319  According to the TV and Ömer Pasha, the battle took place on Friday, 3 Safer 1270, which, 
however, corresponds to Saturday, 5 November 1853. Either the authors or the calendar of TTK 
must be wrong. See TV, 14 Safer 1270 (16 November 1853), transliterated by Hakkı Yapıcı, op. 
cit., p. 13. For Ömer Pasha‟s report on the battle see Lütfi, op. cit., pp. 205-207. Kurtoğlu gives the 
date as 17 November. See Kurtoğlu, ibid. 
320  See Lütfi, op. cit., p. 206. I could not find Ömer Pasha‟s report after the battle in the BOA, but I 
found the draft of the tezkire-i samiye of the grand vizier, which refers to it and confirms the above 
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other hand, Russian generals Petrov and Kovalevskiy, participants of the Danubian 
campaign and the Soviet historian Tarle argue that only one Russian brigade (2 infantry 
regiments consisting of 4 battalions each and 9 cavalry squadrons) attacked the Ottoman 
forces, which in turn amounted to 8,000 men with 20 cannons.
321
  
In any case, on that day the Ottomans held their first serious victory on the 
Danube. The Russian force retreated. E. H. Nolan stated that the Cossacks “suffered 
considerably from the rifle carbine of the Turks, a weapon superior to any which their 
assailants used”.322 However, the Ottoman army did not follow the enemy. Ömer Pasha 
was content with having won the battle. According to Ömer Pasha, Russian losses were 
more than 2,000, while the Ottomans lost 30 dead and 150 wounded.
323
 Ömer Pasha had 
remained in Tutrakan during the battle, together with some foreign officers including 
the Spanish General Prim.  
According to General Yegor Petrovich Kovalevskiy (1809-1868), Russian losses 
amounted to 236 dead and 734 wounded.
324
 Russian sources in general argue that the 
defeat was due to the untimely or unnecessary order of retreat given by General 
Dannenberg to General Pavlov. However, General Gorchakov endorsed the decision of 
Dannenberg, for which he is also criticised.
325
 Although this battle was not an important 
battle from a military technical point of view, the European press exaggerated it as a 
great “Turkish” success. However small a battle it might be, Russian pride was certainly 
damaged and Ottoman confidence increased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
numbers. See BOA. A. AMD. 50/5, dated 9 Safer 1270 (11 November 1853). As for the Ottoman 
forces, Lütfi mentions a few battalions with some guns and adds that during the battle another 
Ottoman battalion was sent from Tutrakan. See Lütfi, op. cit., p. 89-90. 
321  See Eg. Kowalewski. Der Krieg Russlands mit der Türkei in den Jahren 1853 und 1854 und der 
Bruch mit den Westmächten. Leipzig: Verlag von Bernard Schlicke, 1869, p. 74-79. This is the 
German translation of the original book in Russian. Tarle, op. cit., p. 281. 
322  E. H. Nolan, The Illustrated History of the War against Russia, London, 1857, vol. I, p. 30, quoted 
by James Reid, op. cit., p. 244. 
323  Lütfi, however, writes that the Russians lost about 1,000 dead and twice as much wounded, while 
the Ottomans (İslamiyan) lost 18 dead (şehid) and 83 wounded. Nevertheless, right after this Lütfi 
writes that this battle is called the battle of Çatana (Cetate). He probably mixes the battle of 
Oltenitsa with the battle of Cetate. 
324   Kowalewski, op. cit., p. 79. Kowalewski is simply the German version of Kovalevskiy. 
325  See General Andrey Nikolayevich Petrov. Voina Rossii s Turtsiey. Dunayskaya kampaniya 1853 i 
1854 gg. St. Petersburg, 1890, vol. I, pp. 142-144. Also see Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 283-284. 
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3.3. The Battle of Sinop and European Public Opinion 
 
 
The event that started the war in earnest and turned the Russo-Ottoman war into a 
European one was the naval battle of Sinop on 30 November 1853. The battles on the 
Danube front until then were but skirmishes in comparison to it.  
The Ottoman navy had never recovered its strength after its crushing defeat at the 
battle of Navarin on 20 October 1827. Not only the fleet but also a whole generation of 
best mariners was lost in that battle, when the combined fleet of Britain, France and 
Russia had destroyed the combined Ottoman and Egyptian fleet during the Greek war of 
independence. Mahmud II had appointed as Kapudan-ı Derya or the Kapudan Pasha 
(marine minister and grand admiral) in 1829 a certain Pabuççu Ahmed Pasha (?-1830), 
who was a shipyard sergeant (tersane çavuşu) during the revolt of the janissaries in 
1826. From then until 1853 little progress had been achieved.
326
  
In April 1851, Adolphus Slade reported to Lord Stratford on the condition of the 
Ottoman navy.
327
 According to Slade, the navy consisted of about 15,000 men and 68 
vessels in more or less good conditions. The naval hospital was in good order. The 
biggest problem was the poverty of the naval chest. The budget of the navy was 
£400,000, while only the cost of coal for a year was £55,000. The navy was in debt like 
all the institutions of the Porte. It can be safely assumed that from 1851 to 1853 there 
did not occur any substantial improvement, because the financial crisis of the Porte was 
not solved (See Chapter 4).  
Therefore in 1853, the Ottoman navy, although probably the fourth or fifth naval 
power in the world, was not a match for the Russian Black Sea fleet in terms of training 
and firepower.
328
 Most of the Ottoman sailors (the rank and file) were untrained 
novices. Since September 1852 Kapudan Pasha was Mahmud Pasha, who had no naval 
training or education. He was a protégé of Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha, who was 
promoted to the office of the grand vizier from the admiralty. The officers of the navy, 
like those of the army, were divided into the educated and the uneducated, with the 
                                                 
326  Besbelli, op. cit., pp. 18-25. Süer, op. cit., p. 40. 
327 Bernard Lewis, “Slade on the Turkish Navy”, Journal of Turkish Studies / Türklük Bilgisi 
Araştırmaları 11, Harvard University, 1987, pp. 6-7, also cited by Besim Özcan, Rus 
Donanmasının Sinop Baskını (30 Kasım 1853), unpublished PhD thesis, Atatürk University 1990, 
p. 66. 
328  For a recent comparison between Russian and Ottoman naval forces in 1853, based on the works 
of Kurtoğlu, Gürel, Besbelli, Slade and Özcan, see Ali Fuat Örenç, “Kırım Harbi Deniz SavaĢları”, 
in Savaştan Barışa, 2007, pp. 23-27. Örenç, however, has mistransliteretated most of the names of 
the Russian ships and repeated some mistakes of Kurtoğlu, such as mistaking horse power for 
number of guns on board for some Russian war ships.  
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latter in higher positions. Both groups had their deficiencies in theory and practice. The 
system of promotion like everywhere else was not professional. The uniforms of the 
sailors had been changed but the mentalities required more time.
329
 
After the declaration of war by the Porte on 4 October 1853, some necessary 
defensive measures were taken by the naval authorities as well. Russian commercial 
ships were not to be arrested but requested to quit Ottoman waters within 15 days or 
more in some specific cases. Orders were also given that commercial ships were not to 
be allowed to lay anchor near Ottoman men-of-war for fear of fire, explosion or 
sabotage.
330
 Indeed this measure should already have been taken immediately after the 
suspension of relations with Russia, because, as Slade points out, any commercial ship 
(i.e., a Greek ship) could transform itself into a fire-ship and then anchor among the 
wooden ships of the Ottoman fleet at Büyükdere. However, the Ottoman captains were 
helpless against foreign commercial ships, because the Ottoman captains were unable to 
apply the right of keeping clear water round them, exercised by all other navies, for fear 
of the representations of consulates and embassies. Even the allies did not respect this 
right of the Ottoman navy. Thus Slade observed that “notwithstanding repeated 
representations the co-operation of the European legations could not be obtained to 
make their respective merchant vessels anchor clear of the lines of the Turkish fleet”.331  
Meanwhile the French and British fleets had anchored at Beykoz on 23 October. 
The French fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Ferdinand Alphonse Hamelin consisted 
of three line-of-battle ships, seven two-deckers (kapak), three brigs and three steamers. 
The British fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Dundas included two line-of-
battle ships, four two-deckers, one frigate and ten steamers.
332
 Their combined power 
was more than necessary to keep the Russian navy at bay. Thus their presence in the 
Bosphorus gave the Porte much confidence that the Russian fleet would not dare leave 
its port into the Black Sea. Furthermore the Egyptian fleet consisting of two galleons, 
three frigates, one corvette, one brig and two steamers under Patrona Halil Pasha had 
also joined the Ottoman fleet.
333
 Egypt‟s total contribution of troops during the war 
reached 23,931 men towards the end of 1855.
334
 Nevertheless, the troops were mainly 
                                                 
329  Slade, op. cit., p. 129. 
330 Özcan, op. cit., pp. 49-52.  
331 Rear-Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade, op. cit., (1867), p. 96. 
332  Saim Besbelli, op. cit., p. 35. 
333 Ibid. 
334  Report of the Ottoman finance ministry to the loan control commission, Le Moniteur Universelle, 
Paris, 8 January 1856. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1355/3. 
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selected from among volunteers and veterans who had fought in the Greek war of 
independence and in the army of Ibrahim Pasha against the Porte in the 1830‟s.335 
The Ottoman fleet was divided into four squadrons. The commander of the fleet 
Bahriye Feriki (Vice-Admiral) Kayserili Ahmed Pasha (1796-1878) was commanding 
the patrolling (karakol) ships charged with protecting the merchant ships of the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as allied and neutral ships. The Egyptian Mirliva Hasan 
Pasha‟s squadron was to carry troops to Varna and to patrol the shores of Rumelia. The 
Egyptian squadron landed the Egyptian troops in Varna and returned to Istanbul on 13 
November 1853. A third group, composed of four paddle steamers (Saik-i Şadi, Feyz-i 
Bari, Taif and Ereğli)336 under the command of Ferik Ġngiliz337 Mustafa Pasha was 
tasked with patrolling the north-eastern coasts of Anatolia and those of Georgia and 
Çerkezistan (Circassia). He was bound to call on the harbours of Trabzon, Batum, 
Çürüksu, Sohum and Soğucak (Novorossiysk), gathering information, landing 
ammunition for the Circassian insurgents against Russia and communicating with Hassa 
MüĢiri Haseki Selim Mehmed Pasha (?-1872), the commander of the Ottoman army in 
Batum. Mustafa Pasha‟s flotilla had on board Çerkes Ġsmail Bey, who carried letters to 
the emissary (naib) of Sheikh Shamil in Circassia.
338
  
Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871), the Muslim leader of North Caucasus, had been 
waging a war of independence against the Russians in Chechnya and Dagestan since 
1834. His naib in Circassia, Muhammed Emin was also active among the Çerakise 
(Circassians) trying to organize their resistance to the Russian army. Nevertheless, this 
was not an easy task, neither for Shamil nor for the Porte and its allies, as we shall see 
later. 
The fourth group of ships was sent to cruise the shores of north-western Anatolia 
from Amasra to Sinop under Patrona (Vice-Admiral) Osman Pasha (1798-1860) and 
Riyale (or Mirliva, Rear-Admiral) Hüseyin Pasha on 5 November. In case of coming 
across Russian ships, their instruction was to engage in battle only if they were certain 
                                                 
335  Süleyman Kızıltoprak, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
336  BOA. Ġ. HR. 106/5182 lef 7, not dated, end of December 1853 or beginning of January 1854, cited 
by Özcan, op. cit., p. 90. To the four steamers in this squadron, Özcan adds the steamer Mecidiye 
and the frigate Muhbir-i Sürur. See Özcan, op. cit., p. 81. However, Mustafa Pasha does not 
mention these two ships in his own statement referred to above. Besbelli also includes the frigate 
Muhbir-i Sürur. See Besbelli, op. cit., KuruluĢ 5, p. 44ff. 
337  Because he had been to England and knew English. 
338   Özcan, op. cit., p. 82. Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha to the grand vizier before his dismissal on 
17 December 1853. BOA. Ġ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, written between 4 and 17 December 1853. See 
Appendix 23. Özcan mentions this document elsewhere but he does not quote from it. 
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of winning (kazanacağınızı aklınız kestiği ve gözünüze kestirdiğiniz halde).339 However, 
this order seems at some variance with the order given to Slade, where he was 
instructed to abstain from firing first. These differences stemmed from the contradictory 
orders of the Porte, hesitating to engage fully in war, yet having declared it, unable to 
prevent being drifted into it. However, the Porte was also under the influence of the 
French and British embassies and the admirals, as far as naval affairs were concerned. 
The Porte also asked the French and the British embassies to bring the rest of their fleets 
from the Dardanelles to the Bosphorus. 
At this time a Russian squadron of three line-of-battle ships, two frigates and a 
steamer was reported to be cruising the north western coasts of Anatolia, 120 miles 
away from Istanbul.
340
 Having heard this news, Mahmud Pasha gave orders to reinforce 
the light squadron of Osman Pasha, consisting of frigates and corvettes, with another 
frigate from the fleet at Büyükdere. Slade, alias the Mirliva Mushaver Pasha, reminded 
him of the superiority of the Russians in nominal force and the dangers of sending a 
squadron of unequal strength against the enemy. Mahmud Pasha said he could not 
discuss orders with the Porte but promised to send the second squadron intended to 
winter at Sinop to be made up of line-of-battle ships and frigates instead of frigates and 
corvettes. The Kapudan Pasha also gave a written order to abstain from firing first in 
case of meeting the enemy. “Are we not at war?” asked Mushaver Pasha. “We are, but 
such is the Porte‟s order” replied the Ottoman grand admiral. When Mushaver Pasha 
excused himself on the grounds that the first broadside fire from a ship in position might 
be decisive, Mahmud Pasha was indifferent: “I have given you the order and that 
suffices me”.341 
The Porte decided to send line-of-battle ships to the Black Sea, but when the ships 
were ready to sail, the order was cancelled. The grand admiral said it was the desire of 
the British ambassador. It was indeed the desire of the British and French ambassadors, 
both of whom sent their dragomans to the Porte on 4 November, warning the Porte of 
the danger of sending the fleet into the Black Sea in the face of the superior Russian 
fleet, until their fleets fully gather in the Bosphorus and even after that. The French 
ambassador, in his written instructions to his dragoman, stated to ReĢid Pasha his 
readiness to bring the rest of the French fleet to the Bosphorus. But the ambassador also 
                                                 
339 Kapudan Pasha‟s instructions to Patrona Osman Pasha and Mirliva Hüseyin Pasha, dated 15 Safer 
1270 (17 November 1853). BOA. Ġ. HR. 106/5182 lef 6. See Appendix 28. Cf. Özcan, op. cit, p. 
74-75, 85.  
340 A line-of-battle ship is a two or three-deck ship with minimum 70 guns. 
341 Slade, ibid, p. 132. 
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expressed his surprise at the decision of the Porte to send the Ottoman fleet to the Black 
Sea. He wrote that this measure seemed untimely to him, because he expected the 
Kapudan Pasha to concert his activities with the admirals of the allied fleets, before 
taking action.
342
 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the same day, also expressed his readiness to bring 
the rest of the British fleet to the Bosphorus, as it was decided together with Mr de la 
Cour. He wrote that they were impressed by the “courage et de l‟esprit de patriotisme” 
manifested by the Ottoman ministers by sending their fleet into the Black Sea, except 
for the three-deckers. However, he observed that the opinions of both the French and 
British experts were against this enterprise because of the advanced season and the big 
danger coming from the great Russian force in Sevastopol. It would be imprudent to 
risk such a big part of the Ottoman fleet and a failure at this moment would cause a lot 
of problems for the Porte. He argued that in any case it would be “une folie” to send the 
Ottoman fleet before the allied fleets arrived in full in the Bosphorus. He further 
commented that according to the opinion of the allied admirals, even after the arrival of 
the allied fleets, three or four big steamships should be sent instead of sail ships of the 
line. He concluded that if the Porte decided to send sail or steam ships to the Black Sea, 
it should wait until the appearance of the full moon that would diminish the danger of 
navigation in the Black Sea in November.
343
 
On 5 November, the date of departure of the light squadron of Osman Pasha and 
Hüseyin Pasha, the French ambassador sent another warning to the Porte of the serious 
disadvantages of sending the fleet and advised the Porte to defer it.
344
 On the same day 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote to Lord Clarendon that he had “succeeded in 
dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and frigates into 
the Black Sea at this moment”.345  
Some time later, when the parliamentary papers (the Blue Books) were published, 
                                                 
342   Instructions of the French ambassador Edmond de la Cour to head dragoman Schefer, 4 November 
1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 17 (translation into Ottoman Turkish in lef 16). See Appendices 
10 and 11. 
343   Stratford de Redcliffe‟s instructions to head dragoman Etienne Pisani, 4 November 1853. BOA. 
HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 15. See lef 14 for the official translation into Ottoman Turkish. This 
translation, however, has rendered the expression of “sail ships of the line” (in the original 
“vaisseaux de ligne a voile”) into “birtakım bayağı kapaklar”, which means “certain ordinary two-
deckers”. It seems that either the concept of the line-of-battle ship was not used by the Ottomans at 
that time or simply the translator was unaware of it. See Appendices 12-13. 
344   Edmond de la Cour to head dragoman Schefer, 5 November 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 19. 
See Appendix 14. 
345 From Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Therapia, Nov. 5, 
1853, quoted by Slade, op. cit., p. 136. 
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Slade asked the ambassador why he had prevented sending line-of-battle ships to Sinop. 
Stratford replied that he had depended on the advice of Admiral Hamelin of the French 
fleet and Admiral Dundas of the British fleet. Slade further asked why he had relied on 
the opinion of men unacquainted with the local conditions; he said that their rank and 
position given by their governments left him no choice. Lord Clarendon from London 
on 21 November also approved the decision of Admiral Dundas and his Excellency the 
ambassador, adding that the Porte would do better by relying on the authority of the 
British and French admirals.  
Stratford de Redcliffe‟s motives are open to a double interpretation. Those who 
believe that he wanted to accelerate the war suggest that he deliberately left the 
Ottoman squadron to destruction in order to involve Britain in the war against Russia. 
Those who are of the opinion that he had most peaceful intentions can argue that he 
wanted to prevent a possible collision between the Ottoman and Russian fleets. As an 
alternative to these views, we can argue that he simply followed the advice of the 
admirals, without a hidden agenda. But in any case it is difficult to understand the logic 
of not sending line-of-battle ships here: If there was danger from the Russian fleet, then 
would it not be bigger for a light fleet consisting of only frigates and corvettes than for a 
fleet consisting of line-of-battle ships and frigates? Was it not logical to advise either 
not sending any ships at all or sending a strong squadron? Did Stratford and the 
admirals think that since the Porte was so determined and destruction was so imminent, 
then at least line-of-battle ships should be saved? It is hard to come up with an answer. 
That the prevention of line-of-battle ships being sent to the Black Sea was the 
desire of the allied admirals is also confirmed by Mahmud Pasha in his evidence at his 
trial after the disaster of Sinop and his dismissal from his post.
346
   
In mid-November, Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha with his flotilla returned from 
Batum and saw the position of Patrona Osman Pasha and Riyale Hüseyin Pasha's flotilla 
at Sinop, which is closer to Sevastopol than to Istanbul. The Ottoman squadron in Sinop 
consisted of seven frigates (Avnillah (flagship, 50 guns), Nizamiye (second flag, 
commanded by Riyale (Mirliva) Hüseyin Pasha, 64 guns), Nesim-i Zafer (48 guns), 
Fazlullah (the former Russian frigate Rafail, captured in 1829, 48 guns), Navek-i Bahri 
(42 guns), Dimyat (42 guns) and Kaid-i Zafer (22 guns), three corvettes (Necm-i Efşan, 
Fevz-i Mâbud and Gül-i Sefid, 22 guns each) and two transports.347 They had 
encountered gales and lost each other. Then they had hardly reached the Sinop harbour. 
                                                 
346  BOA. Ġ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, written between 4 and 18 December 1853. 
347  Fevzi Kurtoğlu, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
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Mustafa Pasha also saw the danger of this flotilla's being exposed to a Russian attack, 
but he did not take any measures to prevent it. He left the two steamers the Taif and the 
Ereğli at Sinop and on 24 November came to Istanbul, where he reported the vulnerable 
position of the squadron and the insufficiency of the shore batteries of Sinop. Adolphus 
Slade interprets his conduct as a result of caution and fear of reprobation from the 
authorities and enemies or rivals in Istanbul in case the Russians did not attack. It is true 
that every pasha had enemies in Istanbul, ready to insinuate against him at the first 
opportunity. While many of the Ottoman pashas in general at that time had more 
cunning than merit, it was also true that working under a weak government open to all 
kinds of influence was not an easy task either. This uncertainty prevented them from 
taking any initiatives.  
On the Russian side, Prince Menshikov was still the Marine Minister and now 
also the Commander-in-Chief of all the land and naval forces in the Crimea. At the 
beginning of the war, the Russian Black Sea fleet was divided into two squadrons or 
divisions, commanded by two talented and prominent admirals, Chief of Staff Vice-
Admiral Vladimir Alekseyevich Kornilov (1806-1854) and Vice-Admiral Pavel 
Stepanovich Nahimov (1802-1855), both of them pupils of Admiral Lazarev (1788-
1851). Nahimov cruised the eastern part of the Black Sea from Sinop to Sohum and 
Kornilov cruised the western part of it. Nahimov‟s first duty was to transport the 
Russian 13
th
 division (16,393 persons, 824 horses and their load) from Sevastopol to 
Fort Anakra,
348
 which he completed successfully in September 1853.
349
  
Kornilov for his part came as close as the northern mouth of the Bosphorus at the 
beginning of November. Menshikov had given him instructions to engage in battle with 
any Ottoman warships. Kornilov cruised the western coasts of the Black Sea from 
Balchik, Varna, and Sizepol to Burgaz and he did not meet Ottoman battle ships. Finally 
he sent back most of his squadron to Sevastopol and himself remained on the steam 
frigate Vladimir. At that time the Ottoman-Egyptian steamer Pervaz-ı Bahri was sent to 
Ereğli for coal. On its way it fell in with the Vladimir on 17 November 1853. In the 
battle that followed, the Vladimir captured the Pervaz-ı Bahri, which lost 22 dead 
including the Egyptian captain Said Pasha and 18 wounded men and officers. The 
Russians lost two dead and two wounded, however, one of the dead was Lieutenant 
                                                 
348   Fort Anakra (Anakria, Anaklia) lies at the mouth of the river Ingur, on the border between Georgia 
and Abkhazia. See http://www.fallingrain.com/world/GG/0/Anaklia.html. (Retrieved in January 
2007). 
349 Yevgeny Viktorovich Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 294 and p. 371. 
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Zheleznov, Kornilov‟s aide-de-camp.350 The Russians returned to Sevastopol with their 
booty, which was renamed Kornilov. This small battle can be considered as the first 
battle in history between steamships. 
From 23 November onwards Osman Pasha knew that a Russian squadron of three 
line-of-battle ships (three deckers), two brigs and one steamer was nearby. However, he 
did not choose to accept battle in the sea and remained instead in port. According to the 
report of Yahya Bey, the captain of the Taif, submitted after it escaped the enemy and 
came to Istanbul, the Patrona Pasha gave the following instructions to all the captains:  
   The enemy‟s ships are at sea and we cannot cope with them. If we put out to sea 
we will be lost; the best thing is to fight them, if they come, so long as we have a 
gun left. If there be any danger of their capturing you, slip your cable, run your 
ships on shore and let fire to them.
351
  
 
Osman Pasha could fight this not powerful squadron or at least made a running 
fight towards Istanbul. However, he only sent an alarming report on 24 November to 
Istanbul asking for immediate help. Meanwhile Admiral Nahimov sent for 
reinforcement from Sevastopol. Prince Menshikov sent from Sevastopol another 
squadron of three galleons and two frigates under the command of Rear-Admiral 
Fyodor Mihailovich Novosilskiy. ReĢid Pasha in Istanbul informed the British and 
French embassies on 29 and 30 November, just before and on the day of the fateful 
battle, that a Russian squadron was cruising the waters of Sinop, Amasra and Bartın.352 
The ambassadors consulted their respective admirals in the Bosphorus and decided that 
it would not be recommendable to send their fleets into the Black Sea. In any case, they 
did not hurry for an answer. The Ottoman Admiralty had also sent some warnings to 
Osman Pasha just prior to the fateful battle. We shall see these letters after the battle, 
during the case against Mahmud Pasha.  
On 27 November the squadron of Novosilskiy joined Nahimov‟s squadron. Now 
Nahimov‟s power was more than necessary to destroy the Ottoman squadron, which 
                                                 
350  Plavanie eskadry chernomorskago flota i podrobnosti o vzyatii parohoda “Pervas-Bakhri” (Iz 
doneseniya General-Adyutanta Kornilova), V. Timm, Russkiy Khudozhestvenny Listok, no. 3, 20 
January (1 February) 1854. In an anonymous report written in Rumanian from Bucharest, dated 16 
(28) November 1853, it is stated that Menshikov had reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
(Russian) imperial troops (Gorchakov?) that the Vladimir had returned to Sevastopol on 7 (19) 
November with two ships. One of them was a passenger ship loaded with iron, the other was the 
Egyptian 10-gun steamer Pervaz-ı Bahri, which was taken only after a “strong resistance”. The 
report must be the work of Ottoman spies in Bucharest. See BOA. A. AMD. 51/1. I am indebted to 
Alexandru Balas for the translation of this document from Romanian. 
351  “Deposition of the Captain & Officers of the Turkish Steamer “Tayf” [sic], concerning the action 
at Sinope on Wednesday the 30 November, Constantinople, Dec. 6. 1853. Translation”. TNA. FO 
195/309. See Appendix 17.  
352  Official note of the Porte to the British and French embassies. BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/54, dated 28 
Safer 1270 (30 November 1853). See Appendix 15. 
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was still lying at the bay of Sinop. In the morning of 30 November Nahimov gave the 
order of attack to his squadron consisting now of six battleships: Imperatritsa Mariya 
(flag ship, 84 guns), Parizh, (2nd flag, 120) Tri Svyatitelya (120), Velikiy Knyaz 
Konstantin (120), Rostislav (84), Chesma (84), two frigates Kagul and Kulevchi and 
three steamers (Odessa, Krym and Khersones). These ships had definitely more guns 
with bigger calibres than those which the Ottoman ships had.
353
 The Ottoman guns fired 
shots of maximum 24 pounds, while the Russians had 68-pounders. Furthermore the 
Russian ships had 38 Paixhans guns that used explosive shells.
354
 These shells 
penetrated deep inside the wooden planking of the Ottoman ships, exploding and 
igniting the hulls. Although Paixhans guns had been used before, hitherto they were 
clumsy and dangerous to use on board ships. The Russian navy had developed an 
advanced design with a far greater explosive capacity and destructive force than before, 
sinking almost all the ships in the bay of Sinop. Cannon fire had rarely sunk ships 
before, but now the results of the explosive shells surprised the entire world. 
Although the Ottoman forces could make use of the shore batteries as well, the 
Ottoman squadron‟s position did not allow a full use of them because some of the 
batteries were covered by the squadron. In any case these batteries were of small 
calibre, firing shots of 14 to 19 pounds.
355
 It is also not clear why Osman Pasha did not 
use the guns on the other board of his ships as shore batteries. Zayonchkovskiy also 
argues that the Ottoman squadron could have shown better resistance if it had lied not 
along the city but to the south. Taking into consideration that Osman Pasha was an 
experienced sailor and a good admiral, Zayonchkovskiy can find no explanation for his 
incautiousness other than senility or the British hypnosis that the Russians could not 
attack fortified positions.
356
  
Osman Pasha‟s squadron was lying in crescent form at the bay. The Russian 
                                                 
353 The exact number of guns of the two sides is difficult to establish. Zayonchkovskiy gives 344 to 
237 guns on one board for Russian and Ottoman ships respectively (plus 26 Ottoman shore 
batteries), Tarle gives 358 to 236 (Saab quotes from him), Besbelli gives 327 to 199 guns, Özcan 
gives 337 to 196. Slade gives only the number of Ottoman guns as 215 on one board. In any case, 
if we consider the calibre of the guns as well, Russian firepower was three times bigger. Prof. 
Winfried Baumgart writes that the “Turks” had more guns (about 500 as against 359 guns) 
because there were a number of batteries on the shore, without however, reference to any source. 
See Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p. 97.  
354   Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914, London & NY: Routledge, 2001, p. 58. 
Sondhaus describes Ottoman guns at maximum 32 pounds. Besbelli and Özcan give 24 pounds. 
Cf. Besbelli, op. cit., p. 44, Özcan, op. cit., p. 110. 
355  Besbelli, ibid. 
356 Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., p. 275. Osman Pasha, like Nahimov, had participated in the battle of 
Navarin of 1827. He had served 21 years in the Egyptian navy and the last ten years in the 
Ottoman navy. 
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squadron entered the bay in two columns and demanded the surrender of the Ottoman 
squadron. Osman Pasha did not surrender but also vacillated about firing first. The 
Russian ships anchored at some 900 meters from the Ottoman squadron. The signal of 
Navek-i Bahri for leave to fire was disregarded. Then the Nizamiye first opened fire and 
others followed it.
357
 There began a devastating combat or rather cannonade between 
unequal forces. At first the Ottoman guns inflicted severe damage on the Russian ships 
during their manoeuvring. However soon the Russian ships took position and after a 
while started to make good hits. Then the effects of the explosive shells from 68 pound 
guns showed themselves. The Ottoman ships were burnt and blown up in a few hours 
(estimations range from one to six hours).  
Adolphus Slade, the Mushaver Pasha was on board the Taif. At the approach of 
the Russian ships, he took advantage of the high speed of this steamship and fled the 
battle scene. Nahimov had already ordered the Kagul and the Kulevchi to look after the 
Taif, but they could not take it over. The Taif made some shots and then turned towards 
Gerze to the east, then returned to the direction of Istanbul.  
At this time Admiral Kornilov arrived with his reinforcement and seeing the 
escape of the Taif, he tried to capture it, but the Taif managed to get through thanks to 
its higher speed. Kornilov was late; Nahimov had already devastated the whole 
squadron except the Taif. However, Nahimov did not cease fire even after all the ships 
were burning. The Muslim quarters of the city were also set ablaze and since the 
governor and the Muslim population had run away, there was no one to extinguish the 
fires. For this conduct Nahimov was later criticised for hitting civilian targets and he 
defended himself that it was because of the Ottoman fleet‟s position. After the 
bombardment stopped, Nahimov sent an envoy to the city but the envoy found no 
authorities or consuls. The only resident consul, the Austrian consul, had also fled. The 
envoy gave to the consulate Nahimov‟s explanations that he did not intend to harm the 
city but had come to destroy the Ottoman squadron which carried ammunition to 
Circassian insurgents.  
According to Slade, Ottoman losses were about 2,700 dead out of the 4,200 
personnel of the squadron. However, this figure seems a bit exaggerated for the capacity 
of the eleven ships that were present. According to the written statement of naval 
commander (Miralay) Mehmed Bey, who was a secretary of the commander at that 
                                                 
357  Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni confirms that the first fire was from Hüseyin Pasha‟s frigate. “Dedi Osman 
Paşa biraz duralım, Bakalım ne eder düşmen görelim. Şu denli geldi düşmen gördüler kim, 
Bunlara doğru bindirmek diler kim. Hüseyin Paşa dedi iş oldu gayrı, Bizi cümle esir etmek diler 
bu. Görünce bunu hep verdi kumanda, Cemî‟ ateş ettiler ser-â-pâ”. See Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 77. 
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time, given in a report in 1891 to the chronicler Lütfi Efendi, the number of naval 
personnel in Sinop was 2,989 men and the dead included Bozcaadalı Riyale Hüseyin 
Pasha, together with 56 officers and more than 1,000 men, while Patrona Osman Pasha 
together with 4 officers and some men was taken prisoner.
358
 Out of this number 
(2,989), only 958 men and officers turned up in Istanbul after the battle.
359
 More sailors 
from the Egyptian frigates had survived, probably because they swam well, while those 
sailors recruited from Anatolia did not.
360
  
According to the report of Patrona Osman Pasha, whom the Russians returned to 
the Porte towards October 1855 together with four other Ottoman officers from his 
squadron, 156 Ottoman prisoners of war (sailors) were still kept in a place near 
Sevastopol.
361
 If we add this number to the number above, then we get 1,114 survivors 
or rather those survivors who turned up, without counting the deserters. Thus the total 
number of Ottoman losses becomes 1,875. Patrona Osman Pasha was wounded in foot 
and taken prisoner. Riyale Bozcaadalı Hüseyin Pasha was among the dead. Ali Bey, the 
commander of Navek-i Bahri had blasted his frigate together with himself. Apart from 
Osman Pasha, the commanders of two frigates, Miralay Ali Mahir Bey (1820-?), 
commander of the frigate Fazlullah and Kaimmakam Ethem Bey, commander of the 
frigate Feyz-i Bari, the commander of one of the three corvettes, BinbaĢı Yalovalı 
Hasan Bey (1814-?) and Mülazım Halil Efendi, together with at least 156 sailors (as 
explained above) were taken prisoners.
362
 The Russians lost one officer and 33 to 36 
                                                 
358  Miralay Mehmed Bey‟s varaka, dated 31 Temmuz 1307 (12 August 1891). Lütfi, op. cit., p. 210. 
359 BOA. Ġ. DH. 18095, dated 23 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (23 January 1854), quoted by Özcan, op. cit., p. 
126. Özcan gives the number of Ottoman prisoners as 125. Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., p. 287) gives 
the number of Ottoman prisoners of war as more than 200 and the Russian loss as one officer and 
36 sailors. Tarle (op. cit, p. 379) argues that the “Turks” considered that about 3,000 were dead. 
Slade (op. cit., p. 144, 148) gives the Ottoman dead at 2700, with five officers and about 150 men 
prisoners and 110 wounded.  
360  Captain Fevzi Kurtoğlu (op. cit., p. 28, footnote 1), referring to some unidentified documents, 
writes that three kaimmakams (lieutenant-colonels or navy commanders), one binbaşı (navy 
commander), three kol ağası, 20 captains (yüzbaşı), four lieutenants and 186 men from the 
Egyptian frigate Dimyat had reached Istanbul. Cf. Slade, op. cit., p. 144; Özcan, op. cit., p. 116. 
361  Kapudan Pasha to the Grand vizier. BOA. HR. SYS. 1354/6, dated 17 Safer 1272 (29 October 
1855). These 156 sailors were from the following ships: 28 men from the Avnillah, 100 men from 
the Nesim-i Zafer, 22 men from the Fazlullah frigates and six men from the Necm-feşan corvette. 
In his petition the grand admiral asks these men to be exchanged with the 20 Russian POWs at the 
Tersane-i Amire. 
362  See “Kontrol‟naya kniga razmena russkikh i turetskikh voenno-plennykh”, RGVIA, fond 481, opis 
1, delo 695, 13 December 1856, Odessa. This register contains the names of 8,030 Ottoman 
prisoners of war, including Patrona Osman Pasha, Hasan Bey, Ali Bey and Ethem Bey from Sinop 
and Abdülkerim Pasha, Abdurrahman Pasha and Hafız Pasha from Kars together with their ages, 
seals and signatures. The above Russian register shows Ali Bey as a colonel, whereas Özcan (op. 
cit., pp. 121, 166-167) describes him as a kaimmakam (lieutenant-colonel), referring to a document 
from the DMA. Ali Bey‟s title is miralay (colonel) in another document. BOA. A. DVN. 109/40, 
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sailors.  
At this point a question arises naturally: Did Slade receive explicit orders from 
Osman Pasha “to get out to sea and carry to Constantinople the news of the imminent 
danger which menaced the Turkish squadron”?363 Alternatively, did he leave the battle 
scene at his own discretion? Slade himself is not clear on this question in his book.
364
 
Saab argues that the Taif “had been ordered to leave the harbour before the fighting 
commenced”, but she does not rely on any authority.365 Ottoman and Turkish historians 
do not even ask this question. For them, it seems a very normal action. Enver Ziya 
Karal, for example, writes that the Taif was sent to Istanbul by Osman Pasha. But he 
does not give any reference on this point. He simply repeats the Western secondary 
literature on this question, as he has done throughout his narrative of the Crimean 
War.
366
 
Russian historians, on the other hand, openly accuse Slade of abandoning his 
commander at the time of battle and running away. They suggest that had he chosen to 
do so, the Taif could have given great damage to the Russian squadron thanks to its high 
speed and greater capacity for manoeuvring. Tarle even argues that had Slade been a 
“Turk” instead of a British subject, he would certainly have been hung from a ship‟s 
mast. Then he further insists that the other Ottoman steamer, the Ereğli could also get 
away, but it did not do so, because it was commanded by a “Turk”.367 However, Ahmed 
Rıza Trabzoni writes that the “other steamer” could not escape because its engine was 
not ready due to lack of steam.
368
 Considering the certainty of destruction in the face of 
a powerful enemy, the question of whether the Taif received orders from the 
commander or not or whether it should have remained and fought with the enemy might 
seem to be rather a technical detail for some, while others may insist that it should have 
remained and fought. These interesting questions are difficult to answer. 
Nevertheless, the problem of punishment still exists. During the entire war, no 
                                                                                                                                               
29 Safer 1272 (10 November 1855). Özcan does not cite Kaimmakam Ethem Bey among the 
prisoners, apparently because his documents from the DMA do not give his name. 
363 “The State of the Continent. Russia and Turkey”, The Times, Issue 21616, London, 20 December 
1853, pg. 9. 
364 Slade, op. cit., p. 146. 
365  Saab, op. cit., p. 116. 
366  Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi V, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 235. 
367 See Tarle, op. cit., p. 377 and 379; Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., p. 277; R. N. Mordvinov, Sinopskiy 
Boy, Leningrad: Obshchestvo po rasprostraneniyu politicheskikh i nauchnykh znaniy, 1953, p. 17. 
368  “Mukaddem çün göründü fülki zahir, Ocağın yaktı vapur oldu hâzır. Öbür vapur dahi yakmış idi 
hem, Ve lâkin gelmedi islimi ol dem. Anınçün bulmadı kaçıp halâs, Büyük vapur bulup islimi hâs”. 
See Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 87. 
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Ottoman high ranking (above the rank of colonel, to be precise) officer seems to have 
been punished seriously, whatever the charges may have been against him. The most he 
received was a temporary exile or a short dismissal, after which he was usually restored 
to his former office or to another office. As we will see, the commanders of the 
Anatolian army are good examples. In the case of Sinop, Yahya Bey, the captain of the 
Taif, was dismissed from service but apparently this was not because of his retreat from 
battle. He had argued in Trabzon at a heated discussion that the employees of the 
foreign merchant steamers were informing the Russians.
369
 The question of the 
discipline of the Ottoman army and navy is itself an important question, but we shall 
take up this issue later.  
A contemporary critic, Friedrich Engels, in an anonymous leader published in the 
NYDT, argued that the battle of Sinop resulted from such an unparalleled series of 
blunders on the part of “the Turks, that the whole affair can only be explained by the 
mischievous interference of Western diplomacy or by the collusion with the Russians of 
some parties in Constantinople connected with the French and English embassies”. 
Engels then asked the obvious questions: 
   How it happened that a squadron of some three hundred guns, mostly of inferior 
calibre, was thus abandoned to the tender mercies of a fleet of three times its force 
and weight of metal, at that point of the Turkish shore which from its proximity to 
Sebastopol is most exposed to a Russian attack, while the main fleet was enjoying 
the tranquil ripple of the Bosphorus, we have yet to learn… How then it came to 
pass that the Turkish batteries were in such a bad trim, when a couple of days‟ 
labour might have done a great deal towards their repair? How did it happen that 
the Turkish vessels were at anchor in places where they obstructed the fire of the 
batteries, and were not shifted to moorings more fit to meet the threatened danger? 
There was time enough for all this…370  
 
However, Engels also argued that according to the report of the steamer Taif, “the 
Turks” were taken by surprise, which is not correct, as we have already seen that Osman 
Pasha knew the danger. Engels then like a naval expert suggested that 
   Considering the clumsiness of Russian naval manoeuvres, the bad position of 
the Turkish fleet in front, and in the line of fire, of their own batteries, and above 
all the absolute certainty of destruction, it would have perhaps been better if the 
whole Turkish squadron had got under weigh and borne down as far as the wind 
permitted upon the enemy. The ruin of some, which could by no means be 
                                                 
369 Ali Haydar Emir. “Kırım Harbinin Safahat-ı Bahriyesine Müteallik Vesaik-ı Resmiye”, Risale-i 
Mevkute-i Bahriye 4 (11-12), Eylül - TeĢrin-i Evvel 1334 [Sept. - Nov. 1918], p. 530. Despite this 
information, Besim Özcan, referring to the same article, argues (op. cit., p. 118) that Yahya Bey 
was dismissed because of not fighting in the battle. 
370  “Progress of the Turkish War”, Leader, NYDT, January 9, 1854. See Karl Marx. The Eastern 
Question. A reprint of letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War. 
London: Frank Cass, 1969, pp. 194-196. 
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avoided, might have saved at least a portion of the squadron. Of course the 
direction of the wind must have decided as to such a manoeuvre, but it seems 
doubtful whether Osman Pasha ever thought of such a step at all.
371
 [Italics in the 
original] 
 
Engels concluded that the victory of Sinop “has no glory for the Russians, while 
the Turks fought with almost unheard-of bravery, not a single ship having struck its flag 
during the whole action”. The defeat was entirely due to the “good offices” of Western 
diplomacy, “which prevented the Turkish fleet from standing out and protecting and 
fetching home the Sinope squadron”.372  
 From a military-technical point of view, the battle of Sinop was really no glory for 
the Russian fleet. A squadron consisting of line-of-battle ships with two to three times 
greater firepower against a squadron of frigates anchored in the bay was sure to win the 
battle. Had not the Ottoman squadron fired first, the Russian squadron could have been 
accused of breaching a naval point of honour that despised attacking frigates with first-
raters. There were almost no naval manoeuvres during the battle, so it was more like a 
siege bombardment. The Ottoman shore batteries were few, small and inefficiently 
positioned. Yet the battle lasted about two hours during which the Ottoman squadron 
was still active and the Russian squadron also received serious damage. A more 
efficient fleet (for example the British fleet) in the place of the Russian fleet in such a 
situation could win the battle in much less a time.
373
 Many historians admit that the 
Paixhans naval guns and explosive shells used by the Russian ships were very effective 
against the shot fire of the Ottoman squadron. Nevertheless, with such a sheer 
superiority of firepower, the Russian squadron could easily win the battle even with 
shot fire instead of the explosive shells.
374
  
The Ottoman squadron had fallen to a situation similar to that of the French fleet, 
which was destroyed by Admiral Nelson at the bay of Abukir on 1 August 1798. 
Napoleon III took special lessons from the battle of Sinop; he understood that the 
wooden ships were vulnerable against such shells and thus ordered armour-plated 
wooden floating batteries for the French fleet. These floating batteries would be used 
later in October 1855 in the seizure of Fort Kılburun (Kinburn), guarding the mouths of 
the rivers the Bug and the Dnieper in the Black Sea. 
                                                 
371  Marx, op. cit., p. 197. 
372  Ibid. 
373  I owe this comment to Prof. Andrew Lambert from a discussion with him. 
374   Andrew Lambert. The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853-56. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, p. 60.  
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Ivan Konstantinovich Aivazovskiy (Hovhannes Aivazian, 1817-1900), the famous 
Crimean Russian Armenian naval painter of the 19
th
 century, went to Sevastopol to talk 
to the Ottoman POWs Osman Pasha and Ali Bey and made a pencil portrait of them as 
well. When Aivazovskiy asked Osman Pasha why he did not take line-of-battle ships to 
Sinop, Osman Pasha replied: “With our sailors it would be the same”.375 Poor Osman 
Pasha had enough cause to deplore his mariners, he was badly injured at his foot in the 
battle and he had been robbed by his own crew while lying unconscious. He might be 
justified not to depend on his sailors for open sea operations, because at the beginning 
of October his experienced crew was given to Bahriye Feriki Mustafa Pasha, while he 
got newly recruited peasant boys from Anatolia. They had become seasick at their first 
voyage. 
The Taif reached Istanbul on 2 December
376
 and gave the gruesome news. 
Mahmud Pasha at once reproached the French and British governments for their 
delusive attitude. “They bade us arm”, he said, “resist Russia, and now in the hour of 
our need their fleets look calmly on!”377 It was necessary to go to Sinop and check out 
the situation there, but the naval pashas seemed unwilling for the mission. From the 
office of the Kapudan Pasha, Mushaver Pasha went to the French embassy where the 
two ambassadors were in conference with their admirals Dundas and Hamelin. The 
French ambassador Baraguey d‟Hilliers saw the event as a normal war incident. 
Stratford de Redcliffe and the admirals professed their ignorance till within a few days 
of an Ottoman squadron‟s presence out in the Black Sea. At this point Adolphus Slade 
bitterly observes that the squadron had sailed from Büyükdere in sight of Therapia and 
Beykoz, where Stratford and the admirals inhabited. The ambassadors objected to 
sending Ottoman steamers alone to Sinop for fear of further disaster, and they also 
objected to their accompanying the French and British steamers, because they thought 
that might compromise their governments. Nevertheless, they declared that two 
steamers, one British and one French, were ready to go to Sinop alone.
378
 
The news of Sinop was received by Emperor Nikolai with joy. He wrote to Prince 
Menshikov that he was happy to see that the ÇeĢme naval victory (of 1770) was not 
                                                 
375 “Otryvok pis‟ma iz Simferopolya, ot 24-go Dekabrya”, Vasiliy Timm, Russkiy Khudozhestvenny 
Listok 3, 20-go Yanvarya 1854 goda.  
376 Slade, op. cit., p. 146. The CH however gives the date as 4 December. See CH, no. 660, Istanbul, 9 
Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (10 December 1853). 
377 Slade, ibid, p. 146. 
378  Baraguey d‟Hilliers to ReĢid Pasha, 3 December 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 13. 
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forgotten in the Russian navy.
379
 
On 4 December ReĢid Pasha again applied to the British and French embassies, 
giving the news and this time asking the allied fleets to join the Ottoman fleet to go into 
the Black Sea.
380
 Although unaware of the full consequences of the battle, he rightly 
guessed that the defeat might be severe. Reminding the ambassadors that the reason for 
the presence of their fleets in the Bosphorus was to protect the coasts of the Sublime 
State, he now called them to the task. It was indeed a challenge by Russia and a task for 
the naval great powers now. The war had now definitely gone beyond a collision 
between Russia and the Porte. On that day the British steamship Retribution and the 
French steamship Mogador departed for Sinop.  
At Sinop they found disorder and confusion everywhere, with more than one 
hundred suffering wounded men scattered in cafes. Six days had passed without proper 
treatment for the wounded. The governor (kaimmakam) of Sinop and the population 
who had defected at the beginning of the battle had now returned to the city. There were 
10 officers, 3 doctors and about 120 seamen in town.
381
 Many officers and about 1000 
men had gone into the interior of the country. The governor tried to excuse his defection 
but to no avail. The steamers took 110 wounded with them and returned to Istanbul. At 
Tophane they were required to delay the landing of the wounded until evening so that 
they might not be seen. 
Summoned to the Porte next day to relate the details of the battle, Slade found the 
Ottoman ministers not affected at all from the incident: 
   Their cheerful cushioned apartment and sleek fur-robed persons deepened in 
imagination, by the force of contrast, the gloom of the dingy cafes of Sinope with 
their writhing occupants. They listened, apparently unconcerned, to the woful 
[sic] tale; they regarded composedly a panoramic view of the Bay of Sinope, 
taken a few days after the action by Lieutenant O‟Reilly of the Retribution. A 
stranger, ignorant of the nil admirari of Ottomans, would have fancied them 
listening to an account and looking at a picture of a disaster in Chinese waters. 
The mention, however, of the flight of the Pasha of Sinope elicited a spark of the 
old Turkish spirit. Redshid Pasha, in whose household he had formerly served, 
attempted to excuse his conduct: „He could not,‟ he naively remarked, „be 
expected to remain in the way of cannon balls.‟ On which Kiridli Mustafa Pasha 
                                                 
379   Emperor Nikolai I to Prince A. S. Menshikov in Sevastopol, 29 November (11 December) 1853. 
RGVIA. Fond 481, opis 1, delo 8, list 7. 
380 Note to the British and French embassies in Istanbul, dated 3 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (4 December 
1853). BOA. HR. SYS. 1189/55 and BOA. A. AMD. 50/30. See Appendix 16. 
381  Adolphus Slade to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. H.M.S. Retribution. Bay of Sinope. 7th 
December 1853. TNA. FO 195/309. See Appendix 18. 
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gave him a scowl pregnant with meaning.
382
   
 
On 11 December the grand vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha submitted to Sultan 
Abdülmecid the results of the investigations on the Sinop affair the remedies 
proposed.
383
 By this time he had received the reports of the Mushaver Pasha, the 
kaimmakam of Sinop and the vali of the province (eyalet) of Kastamonu with a mazbata 
from the meclis of the eyalet. The grand vizier informed the Sultan of the declaration of 
the Russian admiral given to the Austrian consulate in Sinop as explained above. 
However, he wrote, this was only a trick to appease France and Britain. Eventually this 
trick would not be valid for the European public opinion anyway. He observed that if 
the European states sent cash donations to the victims of fire who were left without 
shelter, this would have much harmful effects for the Sublime State (the Porte). 
Therefore the governor should immediately set out to determine the fire victims 
(harikzedegan) and to make appropriate payments to them. He should also take care of 
the wounded. 
The grand vizier also stated that the Sublime State should be able to protect its 
shores without aid from others, while this could be done in the long run, for the time 
being it needed to strengthen its navy by purchasing two two-deckers (kapak) and three 
frigates from the Americans or other places and to pay up the debt of the steamship 
which was still under construction in London. He pointed out that in a few weeks 
Namık Pasha in London was expected to contract the loan and then the steamer‟s cost 
could be paid. The Sultan approved the petition (tezkire) of the grand vizier after two 
days.   
Meanwhile a struggle was going on between the Kapudan Pasha and his officers. 
The Kapudan Pasha accused Ahmed Pasha and Mustafa Pasha as well as other officers 
of not taking necessary measures and swerving from duty. The pashas for their part 
forgot their animosities temporarily and united against the Kapudan Pasha. As Slade 
remarked, the Kapudan Pasha seems to have made the mistake of uniting his enemies 
against himself. In the end, most of the officers sided with he feriks. Kapudan Mahmud 
Pasha was dismissed from the admiralty on 18 December 1853 and later exiled to 
Bolu.
384
 He was replaced first by the former seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha (1809-1877), 
                                                 
382 Slade, ibid, p. 152-153. Slade also writes that some weeks after this scornful glance, ReĢid Pasha 
replaced Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha as grand vizier. However, his memory fails him utterly, for 
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383 Tezkire-i Senaveri. BOA. Ġ. HR. 105/5133 lef 5, dated 10 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (11 December 1853).  
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who would also be replaced by Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha (1813-1871) in February 
1854. The kaimmakam of Sinop Hüseyin Pasha was also dismissed from office, but 
according to Slade, he was reappointed to a “more lucrative” place next year.385 
Mahmud Pasha was also pardoned in 1857 and returned to Istanbul, where he died soon 
after.
386
 
Although Mahmud Pasha was apparently not fit as marine minister, the fault did 
not entirely lie with him. He seems rather to be chosen as a scapegoat. In his testimony 
given to the MVL during his trial after his dismissal, he showed his instructions to 
Osman and Hüseyin Pashas dated 26 and 27 November, where he had ordered them to 
leave Sinop immediately with all the ships and come to the vicinity of the Bosphorus.
387
 
At that time Mustafa Pasha had returned to Istanbul and reported the situation of the 
squadron of Osman Pasha in Sinop. Nevertheless, these orders probably never reached 
their destination. In any case the carelessness Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha must 
bear the brunt of the accusations. 
There are two documents written by Mahmud Pasha in his defence. One is a letter 
to the grand vizier some time before his dismissal on 18 December, the other is a report 
or formal statement (layiha) submitted to the Meclis-i Mahsus. However, both 
documents have been neglected even by those Turkish historians, who have done 
archival research on this topic and who must have seen them. Thus the voice of 
Mahmud Pasha, after being suppressed for more than 150 years, will echo here for the 
first time. Mahmud Pasha‟s defence statements show the tensions and rivalries within 
the Ottoman navy. He accuses Ferik Ahmed Pasha and Ferik Mustafa Pasha of long 
having hostile intentions against him and the desire to replace him. He argues that the 
two feriks had before complained of each other many times but now they had united 
against him, temporarily forgetting old quarrels between themselves. This account is in 
line with Adolphus Slade‟s observations.388  
In his letter to the grand vizier, Mahmud Pasha writes that upon reports of Russian 
                                                                                                                                               
153) gives the date of Mahmud Pasha‟s exile to Bolu as 3 Rebiyülevvel 1271 (24 November 
1853), referring to a document from the BOA. Most probably he misread the month of Rebiyülahir 
as Rebiyülevvel. Furthermore, he seems unaware of the obvious contradiction of sending Mahmud 
Pasha to exile before the disaster happened! 
385  Özcan, op. cit., p. 154. Slade, op. cit., p.  
386  Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 924.  
387 Kapudan Pasha to Patrona Osman and Mirliva Hüseyin Pashas, dated 25 and 26 Safer 1270 (27 
and 28 November 1853). BOA. Ġ. HR. 106/5182 lef 5, paragraph two and three. 
388  “The naval captains, seeing him [Mahmud Pasha] the doomed scapegoat, sided with the admirals 
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Mahmoud Pasha was dismissed..”. Slade, ibid. 
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ships being seen around Amasra, it was first decided to send the galleons to the Black 
Sea against the Russian ships. However, the French and British admirals prevented such 
ships from being sent, proposing instead sending the frigates. After that, Mahmud Pasha 
gathered his commanders on the galleon Mahmudiye, in their presence instructing 
Osman and Hüseyin Pashas to patrol the waters of Amasra and Ereğli in two separate 
squadrons but keeping close to each other. If they met Russian ships they would judge 
their chances of success and if they thought they could win, they should fight them. 
Otherwise they were to take care of themselves. They were authorised to return to the 
Bosphorus in case of bad weather or superior enemy.  
Mahmud Pasha then writes on the task of Mustafa Pasha‟s squadron. Mustafa 
Pasha had not visited Sokhumi as planned, excusing himself on bad weather. However, 
Mahmud Pasha had learned from captains that the weather was good and Mustafa Pasha 
acted rather timidly, not venturing to go as far as Sokhumi. He had returned to Sinop 
but not taken any measures other than leaving two steamers there. When Mahmud 
Pasha criticised Mustafa Pasha on his return to Istanbul for leaving those ships open to 
danger in such an unprotected place, Mustafa Pasha replied that the place was not open 
to danger and anyway he had strongly recommended them to return to Istanbul.  
Mahmud Pasha then directs his criticism to Ferik Ahmed Pasha, who allegedly 
swerved from going to Sinop with a squadron of five or six steamers to save the sail 
ships there from Russian attack. Ahmed Pasha reportedly replied to him: “You sent 
Mustafa Pasha and he returned without doing anything. Now you are sending me into 
danger”. To this Mahmud Pasha retorts:  
   You will go on board the steamers. If you perceive such a danger any time then 
you can return. Why do you speak like this, are you not ashamed? If you cannot 
go, then give me an official answer and I will go to the Porte and report the 
situation. Then God willing I shall go myself tomorrow on board the imperial 
steamships.
 389
 
 
Ahmed Pasha, sensing that now things would go bad for him, stated that he did not 
object to going to Sinop absolutely, but the matter should be discussed with naval 
commanders (ümera-i bahriye) in the naval council (Meclis-i Bahriye). Mahmud Pasha, 
again according to his statement, criticised Ahmed Pasha for trying to evade the task. 
“Are you going to take instructions from the commanders? Did you always ask their 
instructions before going out on an expedition?” Nevertheless, Ahmed Pasha insisted on 
the meeting of the council and the next day the council was convened.  
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At the council, Mahmud Pasha addressed all the officers as follows: 
   Hitherto there have been many conquests in Rumeli and Anatolia thanks to the 
prophet and the imperial majesty. But we as the navy have not achieved yet 
anything. I cannot go to visit any person and even if I go, I do not know what to 
do because of my embarrassment. Isn‟t this a disgrace [ayıp]? By imperial grace 
we received these ranks and orders but we did not do any job and whenever we 
want to send any of you on a mission, you present certain fallacies and 
demagogies [birtakım mugalata gösteriyorsunuz]. I officially state to you that if 
you won‟t be able to go and if you are afraid, then tell me, let me go to the 
Sublime Porte and express these circumstances. Tomorrow I will take from 
among you the reis pasha or another and go on board the imperial steamers.
390
 
 
Then the officers expressed their apprehensions. They told that going out with 
steamers alone would not be adequate in force against the multiple enemy ships. The 
galleons on the other hand would prove difficult to navigate in winter conditions. They 
also told that the allied admirals were of the same opinion. Even those frigates that went 
out last time (the frigates of Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha) met harsh weather and 
took shelter in the harbour of Sinop and they could not get out of there. Now it was 
difficult to go back to Istanbul after passing the waters off Amasra. True, the Russians 
were cruising along, but sailing from Sevastopol to Sinop and going back to Sevastopol 
or to Batum and Sohum was much easier than sailing from Istanbul to Sinop and 
coming back. Russian harbours were closer to those places. Nevertheless, the Russians 
could not bring their big ships near the Bosphorus. Because in the case of an adverse 
weather, they cannot go back and will be forced to enter the Bosphorus. 
Mahmud Pasha then argued that these officers were not reliable and it was 
necessary to make them sign their instructions every time, because they would distort 
his words after a while. He also argued that they always tried to blame their superiors 
and also dreamed of receiving the post of kapudan pasha for themselves. They were 
now spreading rumours among common people and servants (nas beyninde ve sair uşak 
makuleleri yanlarında) that the event of Sinop was due to the Kapudan Pasha.391 
The other document is Mahmud Pasha‟s statement (layiha) submitted to the 
Meclis-i Mahsus after his dismissal from office. At the beginning of his statement, 
Mahmud Pasha writes that when he was appointed to the office of the Kapudan Pasha, 
both the Padishah and the ministers knew that he was not versed in the naval art (deniz 
fennine malumat-ı acizanem bulunmadığını velinimetim efendimiz ve saniyen vükela-i 
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azam bildikleri surette).
392
 Thus by his own admission Mahmud Pasha confirms 
Abdülmecid‟s appointment of high officials without consideration of their capabilities. 
In this case Abdülmecid had been under the influence of his brother-in-law Damad 
Mehmed Ali Pasha or Mustafa ReĢid Pasha.393  
Mahmud Pasha further argues that since he was already dismissed, but the feriks 
remained at their posts, the officers of the navy and the shipyard (Tersane-i Amire) were 
intimidated to testify against the evidence of the ferik pashas. If these two pashas had 
also been removed from their posts, the officers might probably find the courage to tell 
the truth, he added. The ex-Kapudan Pasha then accuses Mustafa Pasha of not visiting 
all the places on the Circassian coast. Judging from the information he had gathered 
from the captains of the flotilla, Mahmud Pasha argues that although the weather was 
fine, Mustafa Pasha did not visit Sohum and did not capture a small Russian ship which 
he met. In fact, according to the Kapudan-ı Derya, the duty of Mustafa Pasha was to 
circumnavigate the whole Black Sea, patrolling the Crimean shores as well and 
returning to Istanbul from the Rumelian shores. Then Mustafa Pasha is accused of 
seeing the squadron of Osman Pasha undefended in Sinop and without taking any 
measures, slipping away to Istanbul. Mahmud Pasha asserts that he has not given any 
orders to lie at the bay of Sinop; instead he had given permission even to return to the 
Bosphorus in case of bad weather or superior enemy force.
394
   
Against the accusations of Mahmud Pasha, Mustafa Pasha defended himself with 
a layiha that was sealed by six other naval officers as well.
395
 He argued that although it 
was known that Sinop was not a safe harbour, Mahmud Pasha had ordered Osman and 
Hüseyin Pashas to patrol the coasts of Amasra, Ereğli and Sinop on 4 November 1853. 
In case of bad weather or going short of drinking water, they were not to return to 
Istanbul, but to go to Sinop. When Mustafa Pasha together with Ahmed Pasha expressed 
their concerns for this trip and volunteered instead to go themselves, the Kapudan Pasha 
rejected this offer, saying that it was not necessary for them to go.  
Five days later, Mustafa Pasha was ordered to deliver ammunition to the 
Circassians with four steamers (Feyz-i Bari, Saik-i Şadi, Taif and Ereğli). According to 
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Mustafa Pasha, his only duty was to deliver the ammunition and he was not authorised 
to give any commands to the squadrons of Osman Pasha and Hüseyin Pasha if he met 
them on his way. At Sinop, he took coal for his steamers and inspected the fortifications 
and shore batteries there. Having found them insufficient, he wrote to the Kapudan 
Pasha on their conditions and also informed him that he would send the Ereğli back to 
Istanbul from Trabzon with some news, because it was not in good order and might 
hamper his movement. Mustafa Pasha then refers to the secretary (mektubi) of the 
Tersane-i Amire as witness to the fact that his petition (ariza) had really reached 
Kapudan Pasha. After Sinop, he cruised the coasts of Trabzon, Batum and Çürüksu, and 
on his return to Sinop found Osman Pasha lying in the bay with five ships. He saw an 
order from the Kapudan Pasha to Osman Pasha to keep the Ereğli with himself on its 
return from Trabzon. He advised Osman Pasha to sail into open sea since the harbour 
was not safe. On his departure from Sinop, the squadron of Hüseyin Pasha also entered 
the bay. Hüseyin Pasha informed him that the Russian squadron had returned to 
Sevastopol due to bad weather. Mustafa Pasha advised him as well to keep away from 
Sinop harbour. Upon Hüseyin Pasha‟s request, he left the steamer Taif to him and 
returned to Istanbul, where he begged the kapudan pasha to call back the ships from 
Sinop. Mahmud Pasha, however, did not heed his precautions. Two days later, Mustafa 
Pasha repeated his request and this time Mahmud Pasha accepted his request.
396
 
Nevertheless, at that time, the Taif brought the bad news about Sinop. Now it was too 
late.  
Both Mahmud Pasha‟s and Mustafa Pasha‟s statements seem to contain some 
falsehoods and some calculated uncertainties. For example, since Hüseyin Pasha was 
dead and Osman Pasha a prisoner of the Russians, it was not possible to check what 
Mustafa Pasha really told them. It is not possible either to put the whole blame on one 
person. In any case, these documents give important information to us. 
The Ottoman foreign minister ReĢid Pasha in his notes to the French and British 
embassies dated 29 and 30 November and 4 December 1853 had expressed his hopes of 
assistance from their fleets lying in the Bosphorus. Lord Stratford in his reply to ReĢid 
Pasha dated 11 December 1853 informs him that “with sentiments of deep affliction” he 
learnt “the full extent of loss sustained by the Porte‟s flotilla in its late unfortunate 
conflict with a Russian force of disproportioned magnitude”. Stratford then argues that 
the destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, “if earlier attention had 
been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by 
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effective batteries on shore”. However he recommends not sending the Ottoman fleet 
and the allied fleets into the Black Sea:  
   It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador to assure 
Your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as the 
season may permit, and as circumstances may require for giving effect to the 
instructions, under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the 
protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression, but in the 
performance of that defensive duty they can not be expected to lose sight of those 
considerations which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to 
render their operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace 
as well as to the maintenance of the Sultan‟s rights.397  
 
It is remarkable that Stratford is still talking of “restoration of peace”. At that time 
the four great powers were preparing a note to Russia and the Porte for a ceasefire and 
peace.  
 The French ambassador General Baraguey d‟Hilliers also replied to ReĢid Pasha‟s 
note officially on 12 December.
398
 General d‟Hilliers expressed his regret over the 
incident but added that he would not accept any responsibility, as they had before 
warned of the dangers of sailing into the Black Sea with the Ottoman fleet in its 
material and military conditions. These dangers stemmed from the severity of weather 
and the possibility of meeting a numerically more powerful enemy squadron. The 
French ambassador then argued that apart from the political meaning of the presence of 
the allied fleets in Büyükdere, it also meant a moral assistance (müzaheret-i maneviye) 
in so far as hopes for a peaceful solution were not exhausted. Finally the ambassador 
stated that they would defend the Bosphorus in case of a Russian attack but did not 
specify how and when they can go into the Black Sea. 
 Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London, wrote to ReĢid Pasha that 
he found Lord Clarendon “très affecté”: 
   The news of the deplorable event of Sinope, received by a telegram from 
Vienna, produced here a most painful impression, a universal sadness and one can 
say an indignation against the inaction imposed on the fleets moored in the 
Bosphorus. This feeling of national self-esteem is shared by the Cabinet itself, 
whatever his efforts for the maintenance of peace. …  
I pointed out to him [to Clarendon] what he had said to me in time on the 
assistance that the two fleets would lend to the Sublime Porte, which would limit 
itself to help in the event of aggressive attacks on behalf of Russia, but by no 
means in an offensive war on our part. I remarked with His Highness that it was 
certainly in consequence of this promise of assistance that the Sublime Porte had 
                                                 
397 Stratford to ReĢid. BOA. HR. SYS. 903/2 lef 55-57, dated 11 December 1853. See Appendix 20. 
Translation of the note into Turkish is in HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 24. 
398  BOA. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 25, dated 12 December 1853. This is the translation of the French note. 
I could not find the original. See Appendix 21. 
126 
not sent, or perhaps had been advised not to send all its fleet into the Black Sea, 
convinced that such a promise would not have been given without a preliminary 
engagement of Russia towards the Powers in this respect.
399
 [My translation] 
 
Lord Stratford, in his despatch to the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, dated 17 December 1853, again put the blame on the Porte and its advisers. 
“They alone, or their professional advisers”, he wrote, “were cognizant of the miserable 
state of the land defences of Sinope”. They alone were answerable “for the obvious 
imprudence of leaving so long in helpless danger a squadron exposed to attacks from 
hostile ships of far superior force”.400 To these accusations, which certainly touched him 
as well, Slade replied with a Turkish proverb: 
   His Excellency did not think of his own glass-house while throwing those 
stones. The French and English fleets were more or less under the direction of 
their ambassadors at Constantinople; and it has not appeared that previous to the 
battle of Sinope a wish had been expressed by them for any French or English 
ships to enter the Black Sea. The state of the defences, not only at Sinope but in 
every part of the empire, ought to have been familiar to men who claimed the 
right to dictate to the Porte its war operations, deeming it superfluous to counsel 
preliminarily with any of its military or naval officers; and who, with consuls at 
outports and contingent service money, had ready means for obtaining special 
information. The Capitan Pasha, the Porte‟s professional adviser, had recommend-
ed sending line-of-battle ships into the Black Sea, to obviate the exposure of a 
squadron of frigates and corvettes „to attacks from hostile ships of far superior 
force;‟ and his recommendation, approved by the Porte, had been overruled.401 
 
The foreign office in London on the same date was instructing Lord Stratford to order 
the fleet into the Black Sea. However, there was a difference of opinion between the 
British and French admirals on the question of sailing to the Black Sea. They were quite 
reluctant to leave their picturesque anchorage at Beykoz. 
On 17-18 Rebiyyülevvel (18-19 December) the Ottoman grand council convened 
again, this time to consider the conditions for peace offered by the great powers on the 
basis of a modified Vienna note. The council voted for peace based on the evacuation of 
the Danubian principalities, recognition of the sovereign rights of the Porte and a 
guarantee from the four powers.
402
 ReĢid Pasha however had some difficulty in 
persuading the ulema. The softas again demonstrated against peace. On 21 December 
they started a boycott of classes. “If you want peace now, why did you declare war two 
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months ago?” was their question. The government published a notification in the semi-
official Ceride-i Havadis newspaper on 21 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (22 December 1853). 
Here is its translation published in the Times:  
   His powerful allies have made known to the Sublime Porte the pacific intentions 
which the Court of Russia never ceases to testify, and, also, in impelling the 
Imperial Government in that path, they have demanded what its intentions were 
on the subject. In consequence, on the 17
th
 and 18
th
 of the present month, the 
affair was submitted to the deliberations of the Grand Council, convoked 
immediately for that purpose, and composed of all the Ministers, Viziers, Ulemas, 
military Pashas of the army and navy, and other dignitaries of the empire. It 
unanimously decided on replying that, since the Sublime Porte has commenced 
hostilities to protect its rights and the integrity of its states [sic], it will not reject a 
peace calculated to guarantee them both for the present and the future. A fetva 
confirmative of  this decision has just been drawn up by the Sheik-ul-Islam, and 
an Imperial order has been published to that effect. Communication of what 
precedes has been made to the representatives of the four Powers. The affair at 
this moment only rests on a simple question and answer. The question is not now 
of peace, and even an armistice has not been declared. The state of war continues, 
and despatches announcing what has just taken place have been sent to the Pashas, 
and to the Generals of the armies of Rumelia and Anatolia, in order that the course 
of the military movements may not be interfered with…  
The above-mentioned decision having been come to unanimously, conformably to 
the glorious provisions of the fetva, emanating from the sacred law, any one who 
shall allow himself to speak against the foregoing shall be considered to have 
spoken against a decision come to unanimously, and be immediately subjected to 
the penalties which he will have incurred for this act.
403
  
 
Meanwhile rumours of a massacre of the Christians were spread in Istanbul. A 
wave of fanatism was expected and feared, causing some panic and confusion in the 
European quarters of the city, that is, Galata, Beyoğlu and Therapia. Lord Stratford 
invited all diplomats and their families to the British Palace. On behalf of the whole 
corps diplomatique Stratford wrote to ReĢid Pasha to stand firm against the softas.404 
The capital was menaced by une insurrection immédiate and Stratford believed that “the 
government will not hesitate, undoubtedly, to take the measures necessary to maintain 
order”. However, ReĢid Pasha, who was not known for personal courage, had resigned 
and was hiding in his son‟s house at BeĢiktaĢ. Stratford could not reach him. On 22 
December Stratford finally found ReĢid, but ReĢid Pasha did not promise firmness, even 
saying that the Sultan was indifferent.  
Stratford then went to see Abdülmecid and insisted on firm measures. 
Abdülmecid accepted the proposal and some steamers were brought from Beykoz up in 
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the Bosphorus near the Porte. Then the Sultan told the grand vizier, Mehmed Ali Pasha 
and the şeyhülislam that he would hold a council meeting at the Porte. Mehmed Ali got 
alarmed and tried to calm down the softas. The government this time did stand firm and 
about 170 softas were arrested.
405
 When they were asked to go the battlefront if they 
were so warlike, they replied that their duty was to preach, not to fight. Then they were 
shipped to Crete. The resistance was thus broken. Two days after Stratford‟s letter, 
ReĢid Pasha replied that the softas were exiled and order was restored in the capital.406 
On 26 December the grand vizier submitted the mazbata of the Kastamonu meclis 
on the details of the material damages and human losses in the city, dated 14 December 
and the letter of the vali Hamdi Pasha, dated 16 December.
407
 From the civilians, five 
Muslims became martyrs (şehid ve şehide) and sixteen non-Muslims simply died (reaya 
canibinden dahi on altı nefer fevt olmuş). Seven mescids, two schools, 247 houses and 
170 shops belonging to Muslims were destroyed and burnt, while the losses of the non-
Muslims were 50 shops and 40 to 50 houses. The mazbata was signed by the two non-
Muslim members (kocabaşı) of the meclis as well.  
The Battle of Sinop disturbed the European balance of power. It was a crying 
denial of Nikolai's assurances of his non-aggressive intentions, despite war being 
declared on both sides. However, from a military point of view, it was a brilliant 
operation of the Russian navy against a military target. From a legal point of view, it 
was a legitimate act of war except for its excessive bombardment and the civilian losses. 
For Britain and France, the most objectionable aspect of the affair was that it was a 
direct defiance to their fleets anchored in the Bosphorus. The Russians had destroyed a 
Turkish flotilla lying at anchor almost under the eyes of the great naval powers. This 
was too much indeed. Thus Admiral Nahimov by his very victory at Sinop had prepared 
the ruin of the Russian Black Sea fleet, which would be sunk later by the Russians 
themselves to block the entrance of Sevastopol. 
The repercussions of the battle of Sinop were different in Britain and France. 
While the British public opinion reacted to the event with much excitement, the French 
public opinion was in general calm. On the other hand, while Napoleon III was 
“determined to make an issue out of the incident”, the British cabinet took it as a matter 
of course.
408
 British newspapers in general described the battle of Sinop as a 
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“massacre”. Especially the damage to the city and its civilian inhabitants caused anger. 
The number of the dead was given as 4,000. Even the conservative, cautious and 
pacifist Times now turned belligerent. On 13 December 1853 it described a new phase 
in the war: 
   The war, hitherto confined to the occupation of the Danubian Principalities and 
to a few partial encounters of the hostile armies, appears to have assumed on the 
Black Sea the character of direct aggression, and the Emperor of RUSSIA has 
thrown down the gauntlet to the maritime Powers precisely on that element on 
which they are best prepared to meet him. We have thought it our duty to uphold 
and defend the cause of peace, as long as peace was compatible with the honour 
and dignity of the country, and we feel no regret that to the very last we have 
adhered to a course of policy which a just concern for the best interests of 
England and of the civilized world prescribed. Bu we have never concealed our 
opinion that the events occurring in the East might ere long compel us to meet by 
more resolute measures a sterner alternative; and we have repeatedly urged upon 
the Governments of England and France the necessity of being prepared with a 
plan of operations adapted to such an emergency. 
 
In many British cities and towns like London, Manchester, Derby, Hanley, 
Sheffield, Leicester, Paisley, Newcastle upon Tyne, Rochdale, Southampton and 
Stafford, meetings were held in the city halls in support of the Ottoman Empire. The 
well-known anti-Russian publicist David Urquhart participated in some of them. In 
Paisley he spoke two hours and a quarter and ended his words by declaring that “what 
the people of England have now to do is, to call on their Sovereign to require that either 
war shall be proclaimed against Russia, or the British squadron withdrawn from the 
Turkish waters”.409 Memorials likewise from many cities were being sent to the Queen, 
asking for a more active British policy. These memorials were usually published in the 
newspapers like the Times and Kostaki Musurus sent such articles with his despatches 
to the foreign ministry.
410
  
Napoleon III wanted to use the incident both to develop his alliance with Britain 
and to turn the attention of the French public towards foreign issues away from 
domestic problems. Therefore he proposed to the British that the two fleets enter the 
Black Sea and force the Russian navy back to its base. The French foreign minister even 
declared that if Britain did not enter, France would go alone. This declaration and the 
agitated British public opinion forced the British cabinet to agree to send the fleet into 
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the Black Sea. The Home Secretary Lord Palmerston,
411
 the symbol of the anti-Russian 
spirit and known for his support of the “Turks”, resigned in December 1853, but soon 
returned to office. The British public opinion was further excited by rumours of Prince 
Albert‟s being in league with the tsar. The allied fleets were ordered to enter the Black 
Sea towards the end of December 1853 but they could weigh anchor only on 4 January 
1854. However, after a short cruise along the Black Sea coast the allied fleets returned 
to Büyükdere. 
 The coverage of the defeat of Sinop was, as could be expected, minimal in the 
official newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi. On 8 December 1853, it announced that a Russian 
squadron of two three-deckers, four two-deckers, three frigates, three steamers and one 
navi had entered the Sinop bay in a foggy weather and signalled the Ottoman squadron 
of seven frigates, three corvettes and two steamers for surrender. It was stated that, 
although the magnitude of the Russian squadron was in such a degree that resistance 
was not possible, the imperial navy did not surrender and accepted the battle by virtue 
of its religious patriotism (hamiyyet-i diniyye) and bravery. The Takvim-i Vekayi further 
argued that although the Ottoman ships were destroyed, the Russian squadron was also 
severely damaged and lost a lot of men. While there was no mention of the number of 
Ottoman losses, it was stated that 110 wounded were brought to Istanbul.  
MüĢir Selim Pasha, the commander of the Batum army, reported to the Seraskier 
(the War Minister) that for the needs of current politics (politika-i cariye iktizası üzere) 
they would spread the news that the Russian ships were repulsed in defeat from 
Sinop.
412
  
We must mention here that in the Ottoman official correspondence the disaster or 
defeat of Sinop is mentioned usually as the “regrettable” or “sorrowful” event of Sinop 
(Sinop vaka-i müteellimesi or mükeddiresi).413 (The same adjectives were later used for 
the fall of Kars). But we do not see any equivalent of the expression of “the massacre of 
Sinop” which was much used in the European press, especially the British press. It 
seems that the Ottoman bureaucracy did not see it as a “massacre”, but something like a 
natural disaster or something regular that accompanied war. 
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3.4. The Caucasian Front in 1853 
 
 
The Ottoman Anatolian army was in a much neglected state in comparison with 
the Rumeli army. The Anatolian army was under the command of MüĢir Abdülkerim 
Nadir Pasha (better known as Çırpanlı Abdi Pasha, 1807-1883) and this army was 
deployed in Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan and Bayezid. Abdi Pasha‟s chief of staff was Ferik 
Tacirli Ahmed Pasha (?-1883)
414
 and their relations were not good.  
There was one division in Ardahan under the command of infantry division 
commander Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, and another division under the command of cavalry 
division commander Ferik Selim Pasha in Bayezid.
415
 Another army under MüĢir 
Haseki Mehmed Selim Pasha (who held the command of the Hassa army as well) was 
deployed in Batum. The usual dispersed deployment of troops and especially the 
separation of these two armies would prove to be detrimental to Ottoman war efforts. 
The headquarters of the Anatolian army was at first in Erzurum, and then it was moved 
to Kars.  
The fortress of Kars was an important stronghold but in the previous war of 1829 
the Russians had captured it (they had actually taken Erzurum as well). Therefore the 
memory of this was still fresh in the minds of both sides. For the Russians it meant 
confidence that they could conquer the area again. As for the Ottoman officers, their 
initial optimism was soon replaced by a lack of confidence, bordering on defeatism, 
after the first defeats. However, at the beginning of the war, greatest hopes were 
entertained of the Kars army, as expressed so well by the British doctor Humphrey 
                                                 
414  Necat Birinci in his biographical footnotes on Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha in Salih Hayri‟s 
Hayrabad gives completely wrong information. He mistakes Abdi Pasha for a certain Abbas Pasha 
and Ahmed Pasha for the other (Nazır) Ahmed Pasha of the Rumeli army. Thus he writes that 
Ahmed Pasha was executed in 1860 (op. cit., p. 100). See Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı 
Erkan ve Ricali (1839-1922), Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999, p. 39. Birinci also writes that Ahmed 
Pasha became a pasha after the victory of Çatana, which is illogical and impossible because 
Ahmed Pasha could not have been both in Kars and in Çatana (on the Danube) simultaneously. 
Apparently he mixes the two different Ahmed Pashas of the Anatolian and the Rumelian armies. 
But he is wrong even for the other, Nazır Ahmed Pasha, because that Ahmed Pasha became a 
müĢir and not a pasha afther the battle of Çatana. Mehmed Süreyya and S. Kuneralp record Ahmed 
Pasha‟s death as in 1883. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 1, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı 
Yayınları, 1996, p. 203 and Kuneralp, op. cit., p. 60. 
415   Russian military agent in Istanbul, Colonel Count Osten Saken had described Ali Rıza Pasha and 
Selim Pasha in his report on 24 March (5 April) 1852 as follows: “Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha: Been to 
St. Petersburg with Ahmed Fethi Pasha. Served in the navy and then appointed at once lieutenant-
general to the Anatolian army. Diligent but not talented. Ferik Selim Pasha: Originally an 
Armenian from Georgia, who converted to Islam. Islamist. Not talented, not remarkable. Passed all 
ranks in the Anatolian army from private to major-general. Promoted to lieutenant-general last 
year for his success in that year‟s recruitment”. [My translation] See “Donesenie russkogo 
voennogo agenta v Konstantinopole polkovnika Osten-Sakena o sostave i kvartirnom raspolo-
zhenii IV-go Anatoliys-kogo korpusa turetskoy armii.” RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 44. 
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Sandwith, who served in Kars: 
   “Here”, it was said, “you have the Turks posted on their own soil in the midst of 
a Mussulman population. At the summons of the fiery crescent thousands of 
warlike tribes will rush to the standard of Islam. It will be a holy war, and the 
enthusiasm of religious zeal will rouse the whole population, and amply atone for 
any deficiencies in tactics or military science”.416  
Events, however, proved that “tactics or military science” was not to be overruled by 
any “religious zeal”. 
The weakness of the Ottoman army was not expressed in numbers of men or 
weapons, at least at the beginning of the war. The Ottoman Anatolian army in 1853 and 
1854 had a definite superiority in size against the Russian army located along the 
Russo-Ottoman border, because the Russians had to keep a large portion of their army 
against the forces of Sheikh Shamil. Thus at the beginning of the war the Russians 
could raise against the Ottoman army only 20,000 to 30,000 men.
417
 The Anatolian 
army or the fourth army received reinforcements from other parts of the Ottoman 
Empire, from the Arabistan and Iraq armies. Although we do not have exact numbers, 
we can safely say that at the beginning of the war, there were at least about 30,000 men 
in Kars, 6,000 in Ardahan, 25,000 in Erzurum, 10,000 in Bayezid and 16,000 in Batum, 
altogether making 87,000 men.
418
 Nevertheless, the officers‟ corps, beginning right 
from the Commander-in-Chief, did not show themselves equal to the task, with a few 
exceptions. They did not have a war plan and neither were they supplied with one by the 
war ministry.  
Furthermore, there was much animosity and jealousy between the educated and 
uneducated officers within the army. The Commander-in-Chief MüĢir Abdi Pasha, who 
had received education in Vienna from 1835 to 1840, belonged to the former group, 
while his chief of staff (reis-i erkan-ı harbiye) Ferik Ahmed Pasha belonged to the 
latter. During his trial at the end of 1854 in Istanbul, Abdi Pasha would tell that he had 
to give oral instructions to Ahmed Pasha because Ahmed Pasha was illiterate (çünkü 
kendilerinin okuyup yazmaları olmadığından) and secret written messages would have 
                                                 
416  Humphrey Sandwith, A Narrative of the Siege of Kars, London: John Murray, 1856, p. 91. 
Sandwith had lived in Istanbul since 1849. During the war he served first on the Danube and in 
October 1854 was appointed to the staff of Colonel (General) Williams in Kars. He spoke Turkish 
as well. 
417
  Süer, op. cit., p. 42. 
418  See Süer, op. cit., p. 38. However, having given these numbers, the author somehow makes a total 
of 95,000 troops, instead of the mathematically correct sum of 87,000. Cevdet Pasha, on the other 
hand, mentions the figure of 70,000 men for the Anatolian army, but it is not clear which year he 
has in mind. See Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 100. 
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to be read by others.
419
 The illiteracy of Ahmed Pasha is confirmed by many other 
sources as well.
420
 Thus factional strife among officers started right from the top, to a 
much greater extent than in the Rumeli army. Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni also mentions this 
rivalry in his destan.
421
 In any case, the fact that an illiterate pasha had become the chief 
of staff of the second biggest Ottoman army during war time tells much about the 
officer quality in the Ottoman high command. 
There were many foreign officers in the service of the Padishah as well. In fact 
from the summer of 1853 many military adventurers had come to Istanbul to offer their 
services. The Seraskier Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha at first believed the testimonials of 
the applicants in good faith and bestowed commissions liberally. But when the new 
foreign officers began to apply for money for their preparations, he got alarmed. Hasan 
Rıza Pasha, who was considered as a French protégé, succeeded him in February 1854. 
While he was averse to the employment of foreign officers, much harm had already 
been done, because many worthless first-comer officers were employed and some really 
good late-comer officers were left unemployed.  
Apart from these adventurers, the Porte had a more reliable source of foreign 
officers. Many of the Hungarian and Polish officers who had sought refuge in the 
Ottoman Empire after Russia crushed the Hungarian revolution of 1848 were now 
serving in the Anatolian army and to a lesser extent in the Rumeli army. The 
Hungarians and Poles as a rule were not appointed to the Rumeli army so as not to have 
problems with Austria.
422
 There are a few exceptions such as the Polish officers Michal 
Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) and Count Antoni Ilinski (Iskender Bey). In fact 
there could have been a Polish Legion, because 799 Polish emigrants living in France 
                                                 
419   BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5, page 2.  
420  General George Klapka describes Ahmed Pasha as “a rough and ignorant Kurd”. See Klapka, The 
War in the East: From the Year 1853 till July 1855. London: Chapman and Hall, 1855, p. 43. 
Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) describes (op. cit., p. 74) him as “Ahmed Kurd Pasza”. 
Mehmed Süreyya (op. cit., p. 203) records him as “illiterate, simple-minded, brave, fierce and 
harsh”. The Russian military agent in Istanbul, Colonel Count Osten Saken in his report on the 
Anatolian army in 1852 also described the chief of staff Ahmed Pasha as illiterate and having bad 
relations with the mushir [Gözlüklü] ReĢid Pasha, the predecessor of Abdi Pasha, also well-
educated and well-read. See RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 44, list 2. 
421  Ahmed Rıza, op. cit., p. 61. “Umar idi o kim müşir olaydı, Bu işte nâm u şânı o alaydı...Müşir dahi 
kılardı vehmi andan, Müşirliği alır deyu elinden”. 
422   Ġlber Ortaylı writes that General Bem (Murat Pasha) was appointed commander of the forces on 
the right bank [south] of the Danube in 1849. See Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 
Istanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2001, p. 245. Ortaylı repeats the same claim in an article in 2006 
published in Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, Halil Ġnalcık (eds.), Tanzimat, Ankara: Phoenix, 2006, p. 
295. In reality, Bem was not appointed and might not have been appointed anywhere near the 
Danube due to Austrian and Russian pressures. Accordingly, he was sent to Aleppo, where he died 
in 1850. 
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had signed a petition authorizing General Wysocki to act as their representative to the 
Sultan for the formation a “Legion Polonaise”.423 However, this project was not 
accepted. 
Some of the foreign officers in the Ottoman armies were well-trained officers, but 
some of them were little or no training and some also engaged in intrigues. Few of them 
had accepted Islam, but in any case they were given Muslim names and the Ottoman 
soldiers were led to believe that these officers were Muslims. Nevertheless, these 
officers were not given command positions, but employed as staff officers. Among 
them were the Hungarian General György Kmety (Ġsmail Pasha, 1813-1865) and 
Colonel Kollman (Feyzi Bey), the Polish generals Feliks Klemens Breanski (ġahin 
Pasha, 1794-1884), Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Arslan Pasha, 1797-1878) and Polish 
colonels Gościmiński (Tufan Bey), Paczek (Yıldırım Bey), Zarzycki (Osman Bey), 
majors Grotowski (Sahil Bey), Jagmin, Antoni Wieruski (1804-1870), the Belgian 
Baron Schwarzenberg (Emir Bey). The Prussian General Maximilian Stein (Ferhad 
Pasha, 1811-1860) passed a few weeks in the Anatolian army, then we see him as Ömer 
Pasha‟s chief of staff in his Caucasian campaign.424 There were even two American 
officers, Major Bonfanti (Nevris Bey) and Major Tevis.
 
Although these officers were 
capable of giving good counsel, there were too many of them and they conflicted among 
themselves. At one time there were 23 staff officers in the Kars army. Therefore their 
total impact was not altogether healthy. More will be said later on this point. 
The Russian viceroy or vicegerent of the Caucasus (Namestnik na Kavkaze, in 
Turkish Tiflis Serdarı), General Prince Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov (1782-1856) 
was old and ill. He had already asked for his removal from his post at the beginning of 
1853 because of his health conditions and also because he was worried that he had few 
forces against the Ottomans. He constantly demanded reinforcements and even after 
receiving the 13
th
 division from the Crimea in September 1853, he was still worried. 
However, Nikolai I did not share his worries and at the beginning of October 1853 
wrote to him that now he should take Kars and Ardahan.
425
 Vorontsov was a cunning 
viceroy, from 1844 onwards in his fight against Imam Shamil he had pursued a subtle 
                                                 
423  Liste des Emigres Polonais qui ont donné, par leurs signatures ci-jointes, les pleins pouvoirs au 
Général Wysocki, de traiter avec le Gouvernement de S. M. I. Le Sultan à fin de obtenir la 
formation de la Légion Polonaise en Turquie. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1194/1 lef 1, dated 5 
November 1853. 
424  Czajkowski, op. cit., pp. 30-32, 75-77. These and other foreign officers are also mentioned by 
General Williams (in the PRMA), Charles Duncan, Humphry Sandwith, Atwell Lake and Zarif 
Pasha in their memoirs. 
425  Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 292-294. 
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policy of gaining the local feudal class, introducing Caucasian elites into tsarist service, 
paying attention to indigenous traditions, supporting the growth of education, literature, 
and journalism in the native languages.
426
 His deputy was General Nikolai Andreyevich 
Read (1792-1855). As we have seen in the previous chapter, there were very competent 
officers in the Russian Caucasian army. Thus we can say that both the Ottoman and the 
Russian commander-in-chief on the Caucasian front were cautious and did not have 
offensive plans. Events, however, would dismiss both of them soon from the front. 
 
 
3.4.1. Relations with Imam Shamil and the Circassians in 1853 
 
 
Imam Shamil or Shemuil
427
 (1797-1871), the third imam and leader of the anti-
Russian resistance of Dagestan and Chechnia, had been waging a guerrilla war against 
the occupying Russian army since 1834. Since he did not have a chance to win the war 
without the help of the Ottoman Empire, he appealed to the caliph several times 
beginning from 1839. However, the conjuncture was not favourable for him. By the 
Treaty of Edirne of 1829, the Ottoman Empire had relinquished all its claims on 
Circassia and Georgia to Russia. Russia had supported the Porte against Mehmed Ali of 
Egypt in 1833 and by the Treaty of Hünkar Ġskelesi the two states had become allies, 
albeit a half-hearted one for the Porte. Therefore the Porte, now at peace with the court 
of St. Petersburg, did not want to irritate it by helping Shamil. Furthermore, Shamil‟s 
relations with Mehmed Ali of Egypt, with the Halidi sheikhs in Kurdistan and other 
local notables who were opponents of the Tanzimat, the activity of his messengers in the 
sensitive north-eastern frontier made Shamil susceptible in the eyes of the Sublime 
Porte.
428
 When Shamil sent his messenger Hasan Hasbi to the region of Acara (Muslim 
Georgia in the vicinity of Batum and Çürüksu) to recruit volunteers in 1845, Russian 
                                                 
426  Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli writes that Vorontsov followed a “consistent policy of colonial 
Russification”. See Ibragimbeyli, Kavkaz v Krymskoi Voine 1853-1856 gg. i Mezhdunarodnye 
Otnosheniya, Moscow: Nauka, 1971, p. 120. 
427   Shamil himself always wrote his name as Shemuil. His signature in his hand written letters and in 
his seal is clearly readable as Shemuil. In the official correspondence in the BOA both versions are 
used. See Halat Omarov, 100 pisem Shamilya, Mahachkale: Dagestanskiy Nauchny Tsentr 
Rossiyskoi Akademii Nauk, 1997. A Turkish translation (without mentioning Omarov‟s name!) 
was published by Dr. Fikret Efe. Şeyh Şamil'in 100 Mektubu. Ġstanbul: ġule Yayınları, 2002. 
James Reid (op. cit., p. 140) has misread Shemuil, claiming that it is “spelled Shamvîl in 
documents”. 
428  See Moshe Gammer, “Shamil and the Ottomans: A Preliminary Overview”, V. Milletlerarası 
Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi. Tebliğler. İstanbul 21-25 Ağustos 1989. Ankara: TTK, 
1990, pp. 387-394. Gammer‟s article is a good introduction to the topic and it is well-documented 
except for Ottoman and Turkish sources.  
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embassy protested and the Porte exiled eight of the local notables, collaborators of 
Hasan Hasbi, to Salonica. Hasan Hasbi himself escaped.
429
 
With the deterioration of relations with Russia in 1853, the Porte had to modify its 
view of Shamil. The war with Russia could be very helpful for Shamil as well, because 
he had been lately pressed by the Russian army. He now had an opportunity to receive 
help from the Ottomans. A joint operation against the Russian army in the Caucasus 
would obviously pose a real threat to Russian dominance in the Caucasus. Shamil had 
already written a letter to Sultan Abdülmecid (as the Caliph) in March 1853, asking for 
help and informing him that they were now producing “cannons, gun powder and 
Congreve rockets”.430 He must have corresponded with the Anatolian army in Erzurum 
and with the governor of Erzurum, although contacts between Shamil and the Porte 
were not steady and many messages were being intercepted by the Russians, like the 
above letter.  
Zarif Mustafa Pasha (1816-1862), the governor of the province of Erzurum 
(which included Ardahan, Kars and Bayezid as well) sent a letter to the grand vizier on 
12 June 1853, stating that imperial decorations (commissions) and orders should be sent 
to Sheikh Shamil for him to cooperate with the Ottoman army. However, the grand 
vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, in his petition to Abdülmecid on 9 August 1853, did not 
approve of sending such orders to “such outside parties as that of Sheikh Shamil” (Şeyh 
Şamil gibi haricde bulunan takımlar içün) due to some previously mentioned obstacles. 
We do not know these obstacles or drawbacks, but we can guess that they are the results 
of the hopes of a diplomatic solution to the problem with Russia. The grand vizier wrote 
that in the future it might be reconsidered in accordance with the situation. Abdülmecid, 
as usual, approved the decision of the grand vizier.
431
 
In a document from July 1853, it is reported that Shamil had mustered a lot of 
troops and come to a place called Çar Kalesi. Shamil had seized the Russian mail on 16 
July 1853 on the road to Gence and confiscated a lot of money.
432
 
                                                 
429   See BOA. Ġ. MSM. 26/728, 729 and 739, dated 19 ġevval 1261 (21 October 1845), 29 Zilkade 
1261 (29 November 1845) and 23 ġevval 1261 (27 August 1845) respectively. 
430   See Shamil' - Stavlennik Sultanskoy Turtsii i Angliyskikh Kolonizatorov. Sbornik dokumental'nykh 
materialov. Pod redaktsiey Sh. V. Tsagareyshvili. Tbilisi: Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Gruzinskoi 
SSR, Gosizdat Gruzinskoi SSR, 1953, p. 367. Moshe Gammer quotes part of this letter, but he 
does not mention the production of cannons, etc. See Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the 
Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, London: Frank Cass, 1994, p. 267.   
431   These documents have been published by Mustafa Budak. See Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım Harbi 
BaĢlarında Doğu Anadolu-Kafkas Cephesi ve ġeyh ġamil”, Kafkas Araştırmaları 1, 1988, pp. 52-
58, transcriptions pp. 132-137, document photocopies pp. 236-243. 
432  BOA. A. DVN. 90/15, dated 16 ġevval 1269 / 23 July 1853. The signature is not readable. 
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On 5 September 1853, without waiting for a reply to his letter, Shamil appeared 
around Zakataly, close to Tiflis, with 10,000 men and 4 guns. However, he was too 
early, for the Ottomans had not yet declared war and therefore he did not hold too long, 
retreating to Dagestan. His deputy (naib) in Circassia Muhammed Emin also started to 
recruit volunteers from the Circassians and Abkhazians. Muhammed Emin made his 
intention to advance from Circassia in case of the beginning of war operations by the 
Ottomans known to the mutasarrıf of Lazistan, who reported to his superior governor of 
Trabzon. The governor of Trabzon then reported to the Porte on the situation, but the 
reply was that the army of Batum under the command of MüĢir Selim Pasha did not yet 
have sufficient strength and it would be reinforced by two battalions.
433
 A 
complimenting letter was sent to Muhammed Emin.
434
 
After the declaration of war by the Porte on 4 October 1853, the Porte at last 
decided to send a firman to Shamil. Abdülmecid called him to holy war for the defence 
of Islam, without however using the word jihad. The firman was conveyed through 
Halil and Ibrahim Beys, notables of Dagestan, Kolağası Hacı Hüseyin Bey and 
Mülazım Kasım. Russia‟s “obstinacy and persistence” (inad u ısrarı) in its demands 
was said to be “a kind of malevolence and insult” (bir nevi sui-kasd ve hakaret) to the 
millet of Islam. Shamil was instructed to subdue the khans and ümera of ġeki, Kuban, 
ġirvan, Karabağ, Derbend, ġemhal etc and to attack the Russian armies. He was also 
instructed to enter into correspondence and coordination with the commander of the 
Anatolian army Abdi Pasha. Shamil was also informed that all those who fought with 
good faith for the cause of Islam would be rewarded by the Sultan according to their 
rank and deeds.
435
 
On 17 October 1853, James Brant, the British consul in Erzurum, reported to the 
British foreign minister that Shamil sent “messengers to assure the Turks that they may 
depend on his cooperation and that as soon as he learns (that) they are prepared to attack 
the Russians, he will fall upon them on his side”.436 According to a news article in the 
Journal de Constantinople, Shamil had expressed to Abdi Pasha that he was ready with 
                                                 
433   See Masayuki Yamauchi, “Sheikh Shamil and the Ottoman Empire in the Period of the Crimean 
War. Enlightened by the ATASE Archives in Ankara”, Orient XXII, Tokio, 1986, pp. 144-145. 
434   BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 96/38, dated 21 Muharrem 1270 / 24 October 1853. 
435  BOA. Ġ. DH. 17605 and C. HR. 5454, dated 6 Muharrem 1270 / 9 October 1853. See Budak, op. 
cit., 1988, pp. 132-133, for the text of the firman. Halil Bey seems to have been made a pasha, for 
in an undated document the “müsteşar” (sadaret müsteşarı?) addresses him as “mir-i ümera 
Dağıstani Halil Paşa”. See BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 117/53, October ? 1853. In April 1854 he was 
definitely a pasha.  
436
   Gammer, op. cit., (1990), p. 390. 
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20,000 men to fight against the Russians.
437
 
Meanwhile Sefer Bey Zanuko (or Zanoğlu or Zanzade, “Zan‟s son”), a Circassian 
noble from Anapa who had fought in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-29 and had 
been subject to living in Edirne after the Treaty of Edirne in 1829, was now recalled to 
Istanbul together with Abdullah Ağa from his retinue in September 1853. For many 
years Sefer Bey had been a source of reference for British diplomats and agents going to 
Circassia, like David Urquhart, Captain Lyon, Mr Longworth, Mr Bell and others.  
In November, Sefer Bey and Behcet Efendi, also a Circassian from the Bureau of 
Translation, were given the rank of mirmiran with the title of pasha and appointed by 
the Porte to the task of organizing the Circassians and smuggling arms and ammunition 
to them. A certain Circassian Ġsmail Bey from former timariot officers was also given 
the rank of ıstabl-ı amire müdiri and included in the group. Ostensibly they would be 
appointed to the Rumeli, Anatolian and Batum armies but in reality they would have a 
special mission to Circassia.
438
 Sefer Pasha sent two of his agents, Mehmet Efendi and 
Ahmed Ağa to Trabzon to cross into Circassia. The governor of Trabzon and the 
commander of the Batum army MüĢir Selim Pasha were given instructions to assist 
them.
439
 
Shamil sent a letter to Abdi Pasha on 13 December 1853 apparently in reply to 
Abdi Pasha‟s letter. He seems to be unaware of the battle of BaĢgedikler of 1 December, 
which had ended with defeat for the Ottomans. In his letter Shamil writes that he heard 
that the Ottoman
440
 army had besieged the fortresses of Gümrü, Erivan and Üç Kilise 
(Echmiadzin) of the infidel (kefere-i mezbure). He further informs Abdi Pasha that he 
had come to Georgia with his Dagestani army and entered the “country of the tsar” after 
a violent battle. Nevertheless, rain and snow fell on the mountains and he was forced to 
retreat to Dagestan. Then Shamil warns of the deception of the Russians, who might 
                                                 
437   Journal de Constantinople, nr. 476, 19 October 1853, cited by Ömer Faruk Akün, Atsız Armağanı, 
Erol Güngör et al (eds.), Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1976, p. 34. 
438   Seraskier to the grand vizier and the grand vizier to the Sultan. BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/94, Sultan‟s 
irade is dated 22 Safer 1270 (24 November 1853). Sefer and Behcet Pasha were also assigned a 
salary of 12,500 piastres each with the rations of a brigadier general and 50,000 piastres each for 
travel expenses. Ġsmail Bey would receive a salary of 5,000 piastres and the same rations.  
439  Yamauchi, op. cit., pp. 146-148. However, Yamauchi gives the date of the letter of governor of 
Trabzon as 27 Muharrem (30 October). Either this date is wrong or Sefer Bey had already sent his 
agent before his official appointment. Also see Mustafa Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım SavaĢı'nda 
Osmanlı Devleti ile ġeyh ġamil Arasındaki ĠliĢkiler”, Tarih Boyunca Balkanlardan Kafkaslara 
Türk Dünyası Semineri, 29-31 Mayıs 1995. Bildiriler, Istanbul: Ġ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 
1996, p. 90. 
440   Mustafa Budak writes (op. cit., 1988, p. 56) that the Russians had besieged these fortresses, as if 
they might besiege their own fortresses! The argument goes into his unpublished PhD thesis (op. 
cit., 1993) and into his symposium paper/article, published eight years later. See Mustafa Budak, 
op. cit., 1996, p. 85. 
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offer peace.
441
   
This letter from Shamil was sent to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha only on 5 May 
1854 by the new commander of the Anatolian army Mustafa Zarif Pasha, a protégé of 
the seraskier.
442
 Probably it was lost somewhere and found by chance. The seraskier 
sent the letter to the grand vizier on 3 July 1854 and finally it was submitted to the 
sultan on 9 July 1854. This delay in correspondence is interesting in itself, but we do 
not know what caused it. What is more interesting is the fact that the commander of the 
Anatolian army, the seraskier and the grand vizier in their letters all pretend as if there 
were no unusual delays and they do not offer any explanations. This may also be result 
of their indifference to Shamil and to the Caucasus in general. 
 
 
3.4.2.  The Battle of Şekvetil 
 
 
Selim Pasha, the müşir of the Hassa army (the imperial guards in Istanbul) and 
also the newly appointed commander of the Ottoman army in Batum, made a plan to 
capture the Russian fortress of ġekvetil443 that lied to the north of Batum. This small 
fortress was defended by a small Russian force.
444
 Selim Pasha's superior forces, three 
or five battalions including the başıbozuks, commanded by Çürüksulu Hasan and Ali 
Beys and Dede Ağa, natives of Çürüksu, captured the post after a pitched battle on 25 
October 1853.
445
 According to Selim Pasha, more than one thousand Cossack cavalry 
men were killed and 80 men were taken prisoner in this battle.
446
 Ottoman losses were 
                                                 
441  The Imam of Dagestan, El Gazi Shemuil to Abdi Pasha, commander of the Anatolian army, dated 
12 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (13 December 1853).  BOA. Ġ. DH. 19277 lef 3. See Appendix 29. 
442   Budak writes that it was sent by Abdi Pasha (op. cit, 1988, p. 56). However, at that time Abdi 
Pasha and his successor Ahmed Pasha had already been dismissed and Mustafa Zarif Pasha had 
become the new commander. See BOA. Ġ. DH. 19277 lef 2, Zarif Pasha to the seraskier, dated 7 
ġaban 1270 (5 May 1854). 
443  The fortress was also called ġefketil in Turkish. The original name in Georgian was Shekvetili, the 
Russians gave it the name of Svyaty Nikolai and hence the English name Fort St Nicholas. While 
Zarif Pasha calls it ġevketli in his memoirs, this may also be a mistranslation.  
444  General Hikmer Süer (op. cit., p. 72) writes that ġekvetil was defended by a Russian force of two 
battalions of infantry, three companies of Cossack cavalry and one artillery battery. Tarle, (op. cit., 
vol. I, p. 294) on the other hand, argues that the Russian forces consisted only of two incomplete 
companies and two guns. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., 1999, p. 60, footnote 2) also write that the 
fort was held by two companies of infantry. 
445  This Ali Bey must be a Georgian Christian apostate. Georgian Soviet historian Yermolay 
Yevseevich Burchuladze calls him “Ali Bey Kobuletskiy (Tavdgiridze)”. See Burchuladze, 
“Krushenie Anglo-Turetskikh Zakhvatnicheskikh Planov v Gruzii v 1855-1856 godakh”, Voprosy 
Istorii 4, Moscow, 1952, p. 14. 
446  MüĢir Selim Pasha to Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 
1853) and the kaimmakam of Çıldır to the grand vizier, dated 2 Safer 1270 (4 November 1853). 
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32 dead and 59 wounded.
447
 It seems that Selim Pasha has rather exaggerated the 
number of the Russian dead in his letter to Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan. If we accept that, 
only two Russian cavalry companies and two or three guns were there, then their 
number cannot be more than one thousand. Prince Menshikov in his report to the tsar 
stated that the başıbozuk had committed grave atrocities, killing and torturing civilians, 
women and children.
448
 These baĢıbozuks and even some of the regular men and 
officers also took many boys and girls into slavery from the neighbouring Georgian 
villages. It was also alleged that even Selim Pasha did not consider it beneath his 
dignity to retain some of these slaves for himself, probably as bribes to be sent to 
Istanbul.
449
  
These acts naturally turned the Georgian population against the Porte, including 
even those Muslim Georgians who were at first well disposed. When Selim Pasha 
summoned all the Georgian notables to submit to Ottoman power, only one of them 
came to his headquarters. This was Demetrius, who stated the true feelings of the 
Georgians. Selim Pasha however, charged him with treachery and had him put to death. 
While the Porte, around one year later, at the urge of the allies, tried to regain the 
sympathy of the Georgians by returning the enslaved boys and girls, it was too late.
450
 
The Georgians had become staunch allies of Russia. We will dwell more on this topic in 
the sub-chapter on the Black Sea slave trade. We must record here the fact that this 
issue has never been dealt with in the Turkish historiography of the Crimean War. 
After the capture of ġekvetil by the Ottomans, the Russian forces in Ozurgeti tried 
to seize it back but they were defeated and forced back. Meanwhile Selim Pasha 
reinforced the fortress with the Tunisian contingent, consisting of 7,000 infantry, 2,000 
cavalry and 1,000 artillery men.
451
 The marshy coast of Batum and Çürüksu was fit for 
many diseases and Salih Hayri writes that 4,200 Tunisian troops had died of disease in 
Batum.
452
 
The Russians again attacked the fortress from the sea by four frigates on 18 
                                                                                                                                               
BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/53. Reply of the grand vizier at BOA. A. MKT. UM. 1963/63. Tarle gives 
the date of the battle as 28 October.  
447  Süer, op. cit., p. 73. 
448 Yevgeny Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 294. 
449  General George Klapka, op. cit., p. 50. 
450  See sub-chapter 5.4. The Prohibition of the Black Sea White Slave Trade. 
451  Slade, op. cit., p. 176. As we have seen, Kızıltoprak (op. cit., p. 49), writes that 7,000-8,000 troops 
came from Tunis. Salih Hayri (op. cit., p. 146) writes that Ahmed Pasha the govenor of Tunis sent 
three regiments.  
452   Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 146, p. 284.  
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November, but this attack was also repulsed like other attempts by the Russians. Thus 
the fortress became a formidable stronghold and remained in the hands of the Batum 
army until the end of the war. Nevertheless, the Ottomans could not make any efficient 
use of it to reach out to the Circassians. The Russians on their part started to evacuate 
the whole coast line from ġekvetil to Anapa.  
 
 
3.4.3.  The Battles of Ahısha, Bayındır and Başgedikler 
 
 
After the capture of ġekvetil, the Ottoman forces in Kars and Ardahan decided to 
move toward Ahılkelek, Ahısha and Gümrü. Nevertheless, there was no harmony 
among the high officers and officials such as MüĢir Abdi Pasha, the governor Zarif 
Pasha, Ferik Ahmed Pasha, Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha and the müsteşar (paymaster general) 
of the Anatolian army Rıza Efendi. From the accounts of Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs and 
other pashas‟ testimonies during their trials, it is understood that the müsteşar efendi 
was an influential figure and he interfered in military decisions and independently sent 
reports to the Porte on military affairs and his views on the pashas as well. While Abdi 
Pasha was cautious the others favored an engagement with the Russians. HurĢid Pasha 
and other European officers had not yet come to serve in the staff of the Anatolian army 
in the autumn of 1853. 
The Ottoman forces in Ardahan included 8 battalions of infantry, one regiment of 
cavalry, 12 cannons and the başıbozuks of Çıldır.453 Captain Fevzi gives this force as  
10,000 redif and 2,000 nizamiyye infantry with 13 cannons, one regiment of cavalry and 
about 6,000 başıbozuks.454 There were two brigadier-generals under Ferik Ali Rıza 
Pasha: Mirliva Ali Pasha and Mirliva Mustafa Pasha. The fact that the majority of the 
forces in Ardahan were redif troops would prove fatal for the Ottoman forces. Ferik Ali 
Rıza Pasha would later complain that he had asked Abdi Pasha for more nizamiye 
troops but he was not given such troops. To this accusation Abdi Pasha would reply that 
those redif troops were the choice of the redif from TaĢköprü and also that it was not 
possible to send more nizamiye troops to Ardahan because they were necessary 
elsewhere. Ali Rıza Pasha had also asked for an experienced, war-seen artillery major, 
                                                 
453  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80. 
454  Kurtoğlu, op. cit., p. 100. Kurtoğlu calls the redif “muavine askeri” and gives the number of guns 
as 3. According to Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 193) there were 8,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry with 13 
guns and 7,000 irregulars. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 61) write that there were about 18,000 
men in Ardahan, half of whom were Laz and other irregular formations.  
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but the müĢir had not given him such an officer. To this complaint, Abdi Pasha replied 
that the military meclis in Erzurum had sent Captain ġakir Ağa, promoting him to 
majors. All other officers were stationed elsewhere.
455
  
The Ottoman forces defeated the small Russian forces around Ahılkelek and 
Ahısha, capturing many villages of the region from 5 November to 25 November.456 
The governor of Erzurum Zarif Pasha, who had come to Kars from Erzurum with 2,000 
başıbozuks went to Ardahan together with these başıbozuks to encourage the troops and 
organize provisions.
457
 According to Abdi Pasha, Zarif Pasha and  MüsteĢar Rıza Efendi 
had urged the high ranking officers in Kars to attack the Russians. However, Abdi 
Pasha thought that winter had come and the war season was over, therefore no offensive 
operations could be made. Furthermore, the aim was to join forces with Sheikh Shamil 
and at this season this was impossible. Abdi Pasha also stressed in his statement to the 
military court that since he had received military education, he based all his actions on 
the military sciences (fünun-ı harbiye) of strategy and tactics (istrateji ve taktik 
fenlerine). Thereby he implied that his chief of staff Ahmed Pasha did not possess such 
education, mentioning at the same time Ahmed Pasha was illiterate.  
The newly appointed müsteşar Rıza Efendi had interfered in military matters by 
giving instructions to Ferik Abdülkerim Pasha whom he met in Yeniköy (between Kars 
and Erzurum) while he was coming to Kars. He had asked Abdülkerim Pasha not to go 
to Erzurum but wait in Yeniköy because Rıza Efendi would have him summoned back 
to Kars. Arriving at Kars, the müsteşar started urging the officers for action, arguing 
that there had been successive victories in Rumeli and the Anatolian army was lagging 
behind (hakikat-i hali anlamaksızın Rumeli tarafında fütuhat-ı mütevâliye vuku 
bulmakta ve Anadolu tarafında ağır davranılmakta olduğuna dair tefevvühat ile 
teşvikata başlayıp). Abdi Pasha stressed that although the müsteşar was kind, honest 
and hardworking, he was like a foolish friend in military questions because he was 
unversed in the military science (kendüleri fenn-i harbden bi-behre bulunmaları cihetle 
bu babda akılsız dost hükmünde olup) and therefore the müsteşar interpreted Abdi 
Pasha‟s caution as cowardice. According to Ahmed Pasha, Zarif Pasha had reprimanded 
him (Ahmed Pasha) in front of other officers for not going to war, to which Ahmed 
Pasha answered that he had his superior commander, meaning the commander Abdi 
                                                 
455  Ali Rıza Pasha‟s statement at the military court in Istanbul. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See 
Appendix 79. 
456  Budak, op. cit., pp. 51-53. 
457  Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs, see Karal, op. cit., (1940), pp. 477-478. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 53. 
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Pasha. Rıza Efendi had even told Abdi Pasha that if Abdi Pasha did not go against the 
enemy, he would summon the population by towncriers and go himself. Upon this 
declaration Abdi Pasha asked the müsteşar: “If things go bad, will your word save me?” 
Rıza Efendi replied yes, but Abdi Pasha was not satisfied. Abdi Pasha added that even 
those officers who thought that the war season was over could not say so openly for fear 
of being considered a coward. Later during the interrogation of the pashas in Istanbul by 
a military commission at the war ministry, Abdi Pasha complained that Rıza Efendi had 
“changed the minds of everybody” in favour of battle, while it became apparent from a 
letter of Rıza Efendi dated 27 November 1853 that Rıza Efendi had charged Abdi Pasha 
with “laxity and hesitancy” (gevşeklik ve tereddüt).458 Finally the warlike attitude 
affected the rank and file as well and Abdi Pasha was forced to take some action. 
Meanwhile the weather also improved a bit and Abdi Pasha decided to engage in what 
he called petit guerre, using the original French term.
459
 
Ferik Veli Pasha was posted as avant garde in the Subatan village to the east of 
Kars with 5 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and a sufficient number of 
irregular cavalry. Abdi Pasha sent his chief of staff (erkan-ı harb reisi) Ferik Ahmed 
Pasha with 6 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and the remaining asakir-i 
muvazzafa together with the forces under Veli Pasha to BaĢ ġüregel (15 km from 
Gümrü), which was opposite the Bayındır (Bayandur) village (10 km from Gümrü). 
Mirliva Mustafa Pasha from the Arabistan army was sent to BaĢ ġüregel with 4 infantry 
battalions, 5 cavalry squadrons and 4 guns. Başıbozuk troops stationed in the villages of 
the kazas of ġüregel and ZarĢat were also ordered to come to BaĢ ġüregel. According to 
Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha‟s task was to deploy the regular troops behind the hill there 
and to drive away the Russian irregular cavalry in Bayındır with his own irregular 
cavalry. Ahmed Pasha was allegedly instructed not to cross the river Arpaçay that 
formed the border with Russia. However, Ahmed Pasha stated that the instructions 
given him did not mention the hill or the ban on crossing the Arpaçay. According to 
him, Abdi Pasha had just instructed him to go to fight in order to shut up the mouth of 
the population who wanted war.
460
  
Thus Ahmed Pasha came to Bayındır on 13 November and easily captured the 
village, driving away the Russian Karapapak irregular cavalry (more than 2,000 men) 
                                                 
458  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6. See Appendix 82. 
459  Abdi Pasha‟s statement and answers to questions together with Ahmed Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha. 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80. 
460  Ibid. 
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under the command of TaĢtimur.461 Although Ahmed Pasha also stated that his 
başıbozuks chased the enemy until Gümrü and also defeated a Russian cavalry regiment 
there and forced them to enter the fortress of Gümrü, this seems doubtful. In the opinion 
of Abdi Pasha, removing a small Russian unit (şirzime-i kalile) had emboldened Ahmed 
Pasha. Some 1,000 başıbozuks under the command of Meded Bey the müdir of the kaza 
of ġüregel were sent to the Russian village of Tuhaber (or Tukaber?) where some 300 
Cossack cavalry was reported. These başıbozuks brought 20 prisoners later.  
Meanwhile the Russian Armenian commander in Gümrü, General-Lieutenant 
Prince Vasiliy Osipovich Bebutov (1791-1858) had sent a force of 7 battalions of 
infantry, 4 squadrons
462
 of cavalry with 28 guns and more than 1,000 Muslim 
Azerbaijani (or Karapapak) irregular cavalry under the command of General-Major 
Prince Iliko (Ilya) Orbeliani towards Bayındır for reconnaissance and for the protection 
of Armenian villages from the Kurds and other başıbozuks.463 Ahmed Pasha, however, 
argued that the enemy had 10 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry with 40 guns 
and more than 2,000 Karapapak irregular cavalry on the battle field.
464
 Orbeliani‟s 
forces were met by a surprise fire from the Ottoman guns deployed on the heights of the 
village Bayındır on 14 November 1853.465 Orbeliani had fallen into a dangerous 
position: He could neither attack the strong Ottoman positions nor retreat without risk of 
being attacked by the Ottoman cavalry and the başıbozuks. In this battle Orbeliani lost 
about 1,000 men but Ahmed Pasha did not show any further initiative. Ottoman losses 
included 23 dead, 47 wounded among the regular troops and about this amount from the 
başıbozuks, according to Ahmed Pasha.  
Towards evening Prince Bebutov came to help Orbeliani from Gümrü with the 
remains of the Russian army there (3 battalions of infantry, 6 squadrons of dragoons and 
12 guns).
466
 Abdi Pasha had also come as far as BaĢ ġüregel with 6 battalions of 
infantry, one regiment of cavalry and 12 guns to help Ahmed Pasha. Although Abdi 
                                                 
461  Ahmed Pasha‟s statement, BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. Budak (op. cit., pp. 56-
57) has named this skirmish as the “Battle of Bayındır”, and the battle next day as the “Battle of 
Gümrü”. However, I agree with the Russian historians who accept only the next as the Battle of 
Bayındır. 
462  Usually 6 squadrons make up a cavalry regiment. 
463  Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 390. Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 112) does not mention 
Orbeliani‟s guns and the 4 squadrons.  
464  Ahmed Pasha‟s statement, BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. 
465  Zayonchkovskiy, ibid. Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 295. The TV of 7 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (8 December 
1853) gives the date of the battle as 13 Safer 1270 (15 November 1853). Hikmet Süer (op. cit., p. 
78) also gives the date as 13 Safer 1270 but erroneously converts it into 16 November.  
466  Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 390-391. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 114. 
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Pasha argues that his forces went into battle, it is not certain to what extent they 
participated in this battle. Ahmed Pasha argues that Abdi Pasha did not immediately 
send help to him and did not encourage the troops by appearing in the battle field. Both 
sides retreated after the sunset. In any case, the Ottoman army as usual did not follow 
up the defeated enemy, being content with the initial success of the artillery only. In fact 
artillery was the only efficient Ottoman class of arms. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff 
justly observe that  
   Bebutov had been lucky in extricating the ineffectual Orbeliani from a very 
dangerous situation, and Abdi Pasha had missed the opportunity of destroying the 
principal Russian field force in Transcaucasia at one blow in the first week of the 
campaign. Never was the inadequacy of the Turkish high command at this period 
more dramatically demonstrated.
467
 
 
Prince Vorontsov reported the battle of Bayındır as a victory to Nikolai I and the 
Russian emperor even conferred the order of Stanislav‟s first rank upon General 
Orbeliani.
468
  
After the battle, Abdi Pasha did not retreat because he feared that the Russians, as 
a technically well-informed (fen-aşina) enemy might guess that his army had run out of 
ammunition and follow him up. Therefore he waited in Bayındır for 12 days by building 
fortifications and asked for ammunition from Kars. Meanwhile one battalion and 2 guns 
came from Subatan, 3 battalions of redif and one battalion of nizamiye under the 
command of Mirliva Hafız Pasha also joined the forces in Bayındır. On 21 November 
the şeşhane battalion of the Hassa army came to Bayındır. Thus according to Ahmed 
Pasha, their forces in Bayındır reached 22 infantry battalions, 2.5 regiments of cavalry, 
800 artillery men with 38 guns and more than 3,000 irregular cavalry. Abdi Pasha also 
states that the Ottoman army in Bayındır (including his forces) consisted of 22 or 23 
infantry battalions, 3 cavalry regiments and more than 30 guns.
469
 During the 12 days in 
Bayındır, Ahmed Pasha urged Abdi Pasha for three different options of actions against 
the Russians in Gümrü or Ahısha, but Abdi Pasha did not accept them. Abdi Pasha 
accepts this and even adds that more than three variants were discussed but in the end 
none of them seemed useful.
470
  
Since the Russian army did not appear during these 12 days, Abdi Pasha decided 
                                                 
467  Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 63. 
468  Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 115. 
469  Abdi Pasha, ibid. Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 391) and Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 
113) describe the strength of the Ottoman army in Bayındır as 30,000 men with 40 guns.  
However, Ibragimbeyli a few pages later (p. 115) gives the number as 40,000 men. This must be a 
typing mistake.  
470  Ahmed Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. 
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to retreat towards Kars because in his opinion he did not have enough troops, 
provisions, ammunition and means of transport for an offensive. He moved to the 
village BaĢgedikler on 25 November while Veli Pasha with his forces was posted again 
to the village Subatan as avant garde.
471
  
Meanwhile the Ottoman forces were holding small victories against small Russian 
forces near Ahısha and Ahılkelek and took positions in the villages near Ahısha. 
Miralay (Colonel) Hasan Bey was sent as avant garde with two squadrons of regular 
cavalry and about 2,000 irregular cavalry (asakir-i muvazzafa). These baĢıbozuks had 
taken some prisoners and decapitated five to ten persons. Ali Rıza Pasha states that 
since the orders not to cut off heads and ears had not yet reached them, he sent the 
decapitated heads and ears together with the prisoners of war to the müĢir.472 While Ali 
Rıza Pasha does not state whether he rewarded these başıbozuks for the heads and ears 
brought to him, most probably he did so, because this was the custom.  
Since Ali Rıza Pasha did not have siege artillery to attack the fortress of Ahısha, 
he asked for two battalions of infantry and some guns from Abdi Pasha but Abdi Pasha 
sent them very late. On 26 November 1853 the Russian forces of the Ahısha fortress 
received a reinforcement of 5 battalions of infantry, one squadron of cavalry and 7 
guns
473
 from the 13th division in Ozurgeti under the command of Lieutenant-General 
Prince Ivan Malkhazovich Andronikov or Andronikashvili (1798-1868).
474
 General 
Andronikov attacked the forces of Mirliva Ali Pasha around the village Suflis with a 
force of 7.5 battalions of infantry with 14 guns, 9 Cossack squadrons and about 2,000 
Georgian and Ossetian irregular cavalry early in the morning on 27 November 1853.
475
 
Mirliva Mustafa Pasha commanded the Ottoman right wing in the village Ab (or 
Abashi) including 3 infantry battalions with 5 guns and more than 1,000 başıbozuks and 
Mirliva Ali Pasha commanded the left wing in Suflis, consisting of 3 infantry battalions 
with 7 guns and one cavalry regiment. 2 infantry battalions and about 2,000 baĢıbozuks 
were deployed in neighbouring villages around Suflis at a distance of a quarter of hour. 
                                                 
471  Abdi Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80. 
472  Ali Rıza Pasha‟s testimony at the MVL in Istanbul. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See Appendix 79. 
473   Ali Rıza Pasha, ibid. 
474  Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 195) writes (like some other Soviet sources) that General Andronikashvili 
was an ethnic Georgian. An article in the Times, however, tells that the Greeks took pride in his 
being a Greek from Odessa, “who has changed the final “kos” of his name into “koff”. See The 
Times, London, 19 August 1854, Issue 21824, p. 8. The Crimean Armenian historian V. E. 
Grigoryants, on the other hand, argues that Andronikov was of Armenian origins from a princely 
family at the court of the last Georgian king. See Grigoryants, “Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) voina i 
armyane”, Istoricheskoe Nasledie Kryma 6-7, Simferopol, 2004, p. 136. 
475  Ali Rıza Pasha, ibid. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 195. Ibragimbeyli gives the date of the battle as 14 
November, which corresponds to 26 November according to the Western calendar. 
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Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha remained behind in the village Yemak somewhere in the middle at 
the distance of one quarter hour. This traditional scattered deployment of troops 
contributed to the Ottoman defeat in this battle. The distance of a quarter of an hour 
among these villages seems to be an understatement even without any knowledge of the 
territory, because Ali Rıza Pasha tries to justify his deployment of troops and argues 
that it was not scattered. In fact, the military meclis in Erzurum in reply to Inspector 
Hayreddin Pasha‟s questions stated this distance as half an hour to three quarters.476 
Furthermore, during his trial together with Ahmed Pasha, Zarif Pasha and Ali Rıza 
Pasha at the MVL and the DġA, MüĢir Abdi Pasha also stated that Ali Rıza Pasha had 
dispersed his forces in villages contrary to the rules of warfare (asakir-i muvazzafa 
kaide-i harbiyeye muğayir perakende olarak karyelere tefrik olunduğu anlaşılmış).477 
Abdi Pasha added that although Ali Rıza Pasha acted against his orders and against 
precautions of Zarif Pasha, he (Abdi Pasha) could not think of such a disaster because 
according to his intelligence the Russians had only 5 battalions there, while Ali Rıza 
Pasha had 8 battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and the irregular cavalry of 
Çıldır and those with Zarif Pasha, so that it exceeded the Russian forces far beyond. To 
this comment Ali Rıza Pasha replied that although his forces were distributed to villages 
they all came together when the battle began. He also argued that he made all his moves 
with the approval of Abdi Pasha and he did not receive any help from Zarif Pasha.
478
 
According to Ali Rıza Pasha‟s own statement, the Ottoman forces on the 
battlefield included 6 battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry with 7 guns. In 
addition, 2 battalions of infantry and 5 guns remained on the reserve. The cannonade of 
the two sides lasted four hours.
479
 Then the sides attacked each other. While the 
Russians shouted “Ura!” the Ottomans shouted “Padişahım çok yaşa!” (Long live the 
Padishah!). The redif battalions and the başıbozuks in the army of Ali Rıza Pasha could 
not resist the massive attack of the Russian regular troops and the Ottoman artillery 
alone fought to the end. Ali Rıza Pasha also stated that he saw some of the redif troops 
from Harput retreating. He ordered to prevent their retreat but the officers were unable 
to stop the retreat. Then he ordered to beat the order to gather (toplanma tranpetesini 
urdurdum). Nevertheless, the officers were again unable to gather the troops. He 
shouted at those redif soldiers 100 steps away from him fleeing towards a mountain: 
“You have read the law. Why are you fleeing? Return and come back!”. However, the 
                                                 
476  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3. See Appendix 83. 
477  Abdi Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. See Appendix 80. 
478  Ibid. 
479  Ali Rıza Pasha, ibid. 
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soldiers did not listen to him. Ali Rıza Pasha shouted at the başıbozuks as well: “You 
have come voluntarily and why do you flee now? You have also affected the (regular) 
troops, I will shoot you!”. He then fired a shot towards them and said: “If you do not 
return, I will let the artillery fire on you”. However, the başıbozuks did not listen to him 
either. Then he was informed that Mirliva Ali Pasha was wounded. Then Ali Rıza Pasha 
took Ali Pasha to the village Bamık (Yemak ?) in order to conceal him from the view of 
the troops and then returned to the battlefield.  
However, by this statement alone, Ali Rıza Pasha puts himself under suspicion: 
Why should he himself go with the wounded Ali Pasha and leave the troops without 
command at the very high moment of the battle? Unfortunately, no such questions 
(which seem obvious) are recorded in the interrogations. Ali Rıza Pasha then states that 
he rejects the accusations from HurĢid Pasha that he fled at the beginning of the 
battle.
480
 However, there are other sources that accuse him of fleeing the battle field. 
According to a report from the French consulate in Erzurum to the French 
embassy in Istanbul, Ferik Ali (Rıza) Pasha had retreated from the battle on 27 
November with five battalions, instead of coming to the help of Hüseyin Bey who 
commanded three battalions of regular infantry and the başıbozuk. The French consul 
stated that Ali Rıza Pasha not only gave the order to retreat but he himself deserted, 
leaving the troops alone. When it was heard that the commander had gone, the soldiers 
retreated in panic and disorder.
481
 The French consul added that although Mirliva Veli 
Pasha had fought bravely and tried to resist, he had been unable to control the troops 
and he was also forced to retreat. However, he seems to have mixed the battle of 
BaĢgedikler with the battle of Ahısha, because Veli Pasha was in Kars. The report also 
stated that the Ottoman troops had abandoned not only 14 guns, but also all provisions 
and other things in order to run away as fast as possible. Consequently, it was stated that 
the Russian force, consisting of 6 battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, had 
completely routed the Ottoman army corps of 15,000 men (regular and irregular 
togeher) within two hours.  Ardahan and its villages were now left left to the mercy of 
the enemy. Furthermore, the report told of another deed of Ferik Ali Pasha. He had sent 
his servants together with the treasury of the army to the village Badele and joined them 
two hours before the defeat of the Ottoman troops. Some soldiers came to the said 
village and when he asked them why they had come, they answered that they hastened 
                                                 
480  Ibid. 
481   Translation of a report from the French consulate in Erzurum to the French embassy in Istanbul, 
dated 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1853 (10 or 22 December 1853), forwarded to the Ottoman foreign 
ministry on 30 December 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 14. 
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together with other troops to catch up with their ferik. Upon this answer, Ferik Ali 
Pasha took out his pistols and fired at them, killing two and severely wounding five of 
them. In another village near Badele, a müdir of a kaza came up to him and asked him 
to take measure to protect the Ottoman villages on the border from the Russians. Ali 
Pasha however answered that this was not possible and he should go to the army 
headquarters. The müdir then said that it was not appropriate to abandon one‟s religious 
brethren in Islam. This answer angered the pasha, who again took out his pistol and shot 
the müdir in the chest. The report then stated that Zarif Pasha had come to Erzurum on 
the date of the report with about 2,000 troops that he could collect in Ardahan. The 
sadness of the soldiers affected the people of Erzurum as well. The report also covered 
the battle of BaĢgedikler which we will see later.  
In any case, the defeat of the Ottoman forces was so decisive that the event was 
called the “Ahısha rout” (Ahısha bozgunu).482 Ottoman losses included 1,500 dead, 
2,000 wounded and 120 prisoners with 11 guns and ammunition, while the Russians lost 
one officer and 51 men dead, 311 wounded.
483
 
The anonymous military analyst of the NYDT (Friedrich Engels), wrote the 
following on the Russian victory in Ahısha in the same article where he discussed the 
battle of Sinop: 
   The Russians declare that with about 10,000 men they have routed 18,000 
Turks. Of course we cannot rely upon such statements, but must confess that the 
great number of irregulars in the Turkish Anatolian army and the almost total 
absence of European officers, particularly in the higher commands and on the 
staff, must make them but a poor match for an equal number of Russians… [The 
Russians] confess they have made only 120 prisoners. This amounts to a 
confession that they have massacred almost all the wounded on the field of battle, 
they being necessarily left in their hands. Besides, they prove that their measures 
for pursuit and intercepting the retreat of at least part of the enemy, must have 
been wretchedly planned. They had plenty of cavalry; a bold charge in the midst 
of the fugitives would have cut off whole battalions…484  
 
Khadji Murat Ibragimbeyli refers to the same article of Engels, but he quotes only 
the last two sentences from the passage above. Although he is very critical of the tsarist 
policies in general and particularly in the Caucasus, he does not quote from Engels that 
which is not good for the reputation of the Russian army. This is a rather typical attitude 
                                                 
482  Kırzıoğlu, op. cit., p. 70. 
483  Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 196. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., 1999, p. 62) give similar numbers. 
Mustafa Budak, who had access to the ATASE, also refers to Allen and Muratoff on this question 
in his PhD dissertation (p. 55). There are references to some detailed tables of Ottoman losses in 
the evidences of Abdi, Ahmed and Ali Rıza Pashas, however, I could not find these tables in the 
BOA. 
484  Engels, article cited above. See also Marx, op. cit., p. 199. 
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of the Soviet historians after Pokrovskiy. We may assume that if the Russians 
massacred the wounded Ottoman soldiers, most likely it was the work of the Georgian 
başıbozuks, the militia or the druzhina, who must have been particularly enraged by the 
acts of the Ottoman başıbozuks in ġekvetil and their kidnappings of Georgian children 
into slavery from Georgian villages. As Ibragimbeyli tells us, there were about 2,000 
sabres of Georgian and Ossetian cavalry druzhina and 900 Cossacks in the army of 
General Andronikashvili.
485
 
At Bayındır, towards the end of November, Abdi Pasha heard that the Russians 
were coming. He sent Miralay Ġsmail Bey for reconnaissance and the said colonel 
brought the information that a Russian army of 12 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of 
cavalry and some irregular troops passed the Arpaçay and was coming closer. Abdi 
PaĢa then states that the advent of Russians in such a composition was a rare 
opportunity for them (Rusyalu‟nun bu hal ile gelişi aranıp bulunamayacak bir keyfiyet 
olduğundan) and he took preparations to meet them. Veli Pasha and Abdülkerim 
Pasha‟s forces were also summoned. However, the Russian forces did not appear. 
Meanwhile on 29 November, Abdi Pasha received the news of the defeat of Ali Rıza 
Pasha in Ahısha. He had also heard that Rıza Efendi had written to the Porte blaming 
his retreat from Bayındır for the disaster in Ahısha. According to Ahmed Pasha, Abdi 
Pasha told him:  
   We left Bayındır on Friday [25 November] and the defeat at Ahısha is reported 
to happen on Saturday. How could it be possible that the Russians in Ahısha 
learnt so quickly of our departure from Bayındır that the defeat might be 
attributed to it?
486
 [My translation] 
 
At this point Abdi Pasha argues that Ahmed Pasha urged him to go to Kars 
because he was needed there and also assured him that he (Ahmed Pasha) would inform 
him immediately if anything happens. Therefore Abdi Pasha asserts that he went to 
Kars, instructing Ahmed Pasha to bring the army to Subatan in a few days after him. 
Ahmed Pasha, on the contrary, argues that he told Abdi Pasha that the enemy was there, 
it had not gone away and Abdi Pasha should not leave the army. Ahmed Pasha then 
produces some letters from başıbozuk commanders (sergerdes) about the presence of 
the Russian army in the vicinity and a letter from Abdi Pasha on Tuesday instructing 
him to wait until Thursday. Abdi Pasha does not answer these arguments and it seems 
that Ahmed Pasha was right on this issue. In any case, Abdi Pasha decided to go to 
                                                 
485  Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 197.  
486  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5. 
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Kars. Abdi Pasha in his statement also asserts that he had instructed Ahmed Pasha to 
send him news four times a day normally and immediately at an event. According to 
Abdi Pasha, Ahmed Pasha did not send him news when the Russians were seen coming, 
because Ahmed Pasha wanted to show himself and to gain a victory by himself alone. 
As we saw above, the Ottoman army corps at BaĢgedikler and around it included 
22 infantry battalions, two and a half cavalry regiments, 800 artillerists with 38 guns 
and more than 3,000 irregular cavalry in neighbouring villages.
487
 However, not all of 
these troops and guns were actually used in the battle, because some of them were in the 
neighbouring villages. Most of the başıbozuks had fled towards Kars even before the 
battle. Ahmed Pasha detached 3 infantry battalions with 6 guns under the command of 
Mirliva Hafız Pasha as reserve troops. Then he detached 5 infantry battalions (including 
2 chasseurs companies), one regiment of cavalry, 6 guns and 500 irregular cavalry 
under the command of Veli Pasha to the neighbouring village on the left as the left 
wing. 5 battalions (including 6 companies of chasseurs) out of the remaining 13 
battalions together with one regiment of cavalry with 8 guns and the irregular cavalry of 
Hasan Yazıcı were detached as the right wing under the command of Mirliva Hüseyin 
Pasha. Finally 5 battalions (including 6 companies of chasseurs) with 8 guns were 
commanded by Mirliva Mustafa Pasha somewhat to the right. Totally there were 32 
guns in the battle field. Ahmed Pasha also states that since staff officers had gone to 
Kars and he could not receive help from them and deployed the guns in a hurry. To this 
statement Abdi Pasha commented that in any case there was only one staff officer in the 
army who was expert in this question (Faik Bey) and he did not know where Faik Bey 
was at that time. To this comment Ahmed Pasha replied that Faik Bey had gone to Kars.  
In any case, however, the Ottoman army exceeded the Russian army in numbers, 
even though Abdi Pasha would later argue that he had only 17,000-18,000 troops, 
regular and irregular, when he was asked why he did not send two battalions and some 
guns to Ali Rıza Pasha in Ardahan.488 The irregulars were the başıbozuks under the 
                                                 
487  Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 63) give the total number as 36,000 men, including 20,000 regular 
infantry and one brigade of cavalry, the rest being “baĢıbozuks and Kurds of doubtful value”. Cf. 
Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 58. General Bebutov reported after the battle to Prince Vorontsov that 
the Ottoman forces included 20,000 infantry, 4,000 regular cavalry with 42-46 guns and more than 
12,000 Kurdish and other “militia”. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 297. Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 198) 
cites 27 battalions of regular infantry. Averyanov (op. cit., 1900, pp. 87-88; op. cit., 1995, p. 52) 
mentions 20,000 regular infantry, 3,000 regular cavalry with 46 guns and 14,000 irregulars, 
including 4,000 Kurds. 
488  In the interrogation of Abdi Pasha, Ali Rıza Pasha and Ahmed Pasha, the müsteşar of the 
Anatolian army produces a document where the forces before Gümrü are described as more than 
40,000 men including both regulars and irregulars. Abdi Pasha, however, argues that he had only 
17,000 to 18,000 men and he even argues that the number of troops at that time around Gümrü can 
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command of Hasan Yazıcı of Damascus and the nomadic Kurds under the command of 
their tribal chiefs, who were more interested in pillaging Armenian villages than in the 
war. The number of these başıbozuks seems to be exaggerated by Russian sources. 
Ahmed Pasha states that when he asked Hasan Yazıcı how many cavalry he had, Hasan 
Yazıcı answered he had 2,000 men. Upon a close view of them, however, Ahmed Pasha 
found out that there were only about 800 horsemen, of which more than half were 
youngsters and riff raff (çoluk çocuk).489 It is certain that these sergerdes as well as the 
pashas were engaged in the muster roll fraud, receiving pay and rations for more troops 
than was in reality. We will see more on this matter. 
On the Russian side, upon the news of the success of Andronikov, Bebutov 
decided to attack the Ottoman army, even with a force of 10.5 battalions of infantry 
(7,000 bayonets), 10 squadrons of cavalry and 15 irregular cavalry hundreds (sotnya) 
(together 2,800 sabres) and 32 guns.
490
 Ahmed Pasha, however, during his trial in 
Istanbul, gave much exaggerated figures for the Russian army at BaĢgedikler: 24 
battalions of infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, about 3,000 irregular cavalry and 60 guns. 
Of these, he further argued, 6 battalions were behind near their wagons, the rest in front 
of the Ottoman army, with one regiment of cavalry and 4 guns against Veli Pasha. Abdi 
Pasha on the other hand stated that he heard the Russians had 12 battalions.
491
 
On 1 December 1853, when the Russians advanced from ġüregel towards 
BaĢgedikler, Ahmed Pasha also decided to attack them, relying upon his numerical 
superiority, notwithstanding his later understatement of his forces and overstatement of 
Russian forces. The problem was that an open field battle requiring high manoeuvre 
capacity and coordination of infantry, cavalry and artillery was apparently beyond the 
competence of the Ottoman army. Furthermore, Ahmed Pasha did not have a battle 
plan, therefore the officers under his command did not receive any orders as to how to 
begin the battle, what to do and where to retreat if the enemy proves stronger and a 
retreat becomes necessary.
492
 The military meclis in Erzurum also stated that Ahmed 
                                                                                                                                               
be found in the reports to the seraskerlik. I could not find such reports in the BOA and I do not 
have access to the ATASE archive. Budak seems to have used the ATASE archive extensively, but 
he does not mention any such reports or Abdi Pasha‟s claim. See BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6, dated 
17 December 1854. Cf. Budak, ibid.  
489  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. 
490  Zayonchkovskiy, (2002), vol. II, part I, p. 404. Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 297.  
491  Ahmed Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2. See Appendix 81. 
492  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3, answers to question [13]. See Appendix 83. Budak shortly 
mentions this document, but does not quote from it. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 58. In fact, 
Budak has devoted, somewhat surprisingly, very meager space (1.5 pages) to this battle, in 
comparison with his coverage of other less important battles.  
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Pasha had hidden behind a rock during the battle and had not issued proper commands. 
Many soldiers were absent from the battalions, because they had been sent after barley, 
hay and tezek and for washing clothes. Thus even the 19 infantry battalions and 10 
cavalry squadrons that actually participated in the battle were not complete and they 
were formed into one line without the second line and the reserve. Ahmed Pasha in fact 
confesses that he did not give specific instructions to his troops. He himself states that 
he had collected the pashas and told them: “Here is the enemy in front of you. It is high 
time to serve our religion and community. Let everybody act accordingly and take care 
of his own command!”.493 Ahmed Pasha did not accept other charges and found it 
harmful to announce beforehand where to retreat in case of defeat because this would 
discourage the troops. 
In this battle the Ottoman army was routed and turned into a disorderly retreat 
towards Kars, with heavy losses. Ahmed Pasha tells that at one point there were no 
Ottoman officers on the field above the captain. Hafız Pasha and his reserve battalions 
and guns also fled. Ottomans lost 24 guns and a total of 6,000 (8,000?) men, of whom 
about 1,500 men including 8 officers were killed and the rest were wounded or taken 
prisoner. Russian losses amounted to about 1,300 men, including 9 officers killed.
494
 
General-Major Iliko Orbeliani died of his wounds soon after the battle.
495
 According to 
Ahmed Pasha, Ottoman losses included more than 500 dead, more than 700 wounded 
and 7 prisoners, while the Russians lost about 3,000 dead (of which 120 were officers 
from leiutenant to general), more than 4,000 wounded and 5 prisoners. Obviously these 
figures have nothing to do with reality: One can hardly believe that the Russians drove 
away the Ottoman army and captured 24 guns although they suffered about 6 times 
more losses! The Kurdish başıbozuks plundered the Ottoman headquarters during their 
retreat and dispersed to their homes. On the relations of Kurds with the Russians, more 
will be said in Chapter 5.5.1 on the revolt of Yezdan ġer. The başıbozuks of Hasan 
Yazıcı also did not participate in the battle.496 
                                                 
493  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, page 3, answers to question [13]. See Appendix 83. 
494  Despite his research in the ATASE and the BOA, Budak (op. cit., p. 59) does not provide Ottoman 
figures for losses in this battle. Instead he quotes from John Curtiss. Thus he claims that Ottoman 
losses included 26 guns and 8,000 dead, while the Russian commander Bebutov reported Ottoman 
losses as 24 guns and more than 6,000 men. See Tarle, ibid. Although there is reference to certain 
detailed tables of losses in the interrogation of Abdi and Ahmed Pashas, I could not find them in 
the BOA. Zayonchkovskiy (op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 414) gives total Ottoman losses as 8,000 men, 
including more than 1,500 dead in the field, a certain Ibrahim Pasha, 2 regimental and 5 battalion 
commanders.  
495  Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., (1971), p. 200. 
496  Salih Hayri, op. cit., pp. 102-103. Salih Hayri gives the Ottoman losses in this battle as 1,200 dead 
and wounded with 24 guns and provisions. He blames Ahmed Pasha for the defeat. Ahmed Rıza 
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According to the French consul in Erzurum, wounded soldiers from the battle of 
BaĢgedikler who had been brought o Erzurum told that there were about 1,200 wounded 
in the hospitals of Kars. It was also reported that the Russian army had captured 28 guns 
and 500 to 600 prisoners. It had occupied the villages between Kars and Arpaçay. The 
troops of the Anatolian army had been demoralized and they were deserting every day 
in groups. The consul added that Zarif Pasha had returned to Erzurum and asked him to 
request the French ambassador to help dismiss the current army commander and to find 
an able person for the job. Zarif Pasha even said that since it was difficult to save the 
Anatolian army without the help of the French, it was desirable that the French emperor 
appoint a general or at least a few high-ranking officers to the Anatolian army.
497
 
On the next day after the destruction of the Ottoman squadron in Sinop, the 
Ottoman army now suffered a great defeat on land as well. These Russian victories 
more than compensated for early Ottoman victories on the Danubian and the Caucasian 
fronts. According to Russian military reports, the Ottoman army had shown progress in 
comparison with last time, especially the artillery was worthy of praise. Artillery 
officers and soldiers did their duty very well. The infantry also showed signs of being 
well trained in movements but in the open field it was not steady. The cavalry was the 
worst part of the Ottoman army.
498
 
The news of Sinop, Ahısha and BaĢgedikler quickly changed the initial 
impressions on the capabilities of the Ottoman army. Now France and Britain were 
definitely convinced that the Porte needed help, otherwise it would be defeated. The 
Russians had now control of the Caucasian theatre of war. The Ottoman army had lost 
much confidence and had become demoralised. From then on, desertions from the army 
in Kars increased. The müşir and his feriks accused each other. Ahmed Pasha was 
indeed in a difficult situation, because he had disobeyed his commanding officer and 
had been defeated. However, Ahmed Pasha had enough money to bribe the authorities 
in Istanbul. He sent his agents to Istanbul with a lot of money and became the winner of 
this struggle.
499
 Abdi Pasha was recalled to Istanbul and Ahmed Pasha took his place, 
                                                                                                                                               
Trabzoni also blames the command of the army: “Kumanda olmayınca n‟etsin asker, Kumandasız 
ne yana gitsin asker.. Sabahtan geldi düşmen aldı gitti, Bizim paşa başını aldı yitti… Fenâ fikr ü 
fesâda erdi bunlar, Hıyânet ettiler başta olanlar”. See Trabzoni, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
497  BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 14. 
498   See Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part I, p. 415. One year later, the British Vice-Consul in 
Trabzon would also report of the inferiorty of the Ottoman cavalry in his report on the Battle of 
Kürekdere. See Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Trebizond, August 12, 1854. 
PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 7, p. 6.  
499   Sandwith, op. cit., pp. 93-94. Mehmed Süreyya (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 202)  in his biographic entry on 
Ahmed Pasha interestingly notes that he had become a mirliva (brigadier general) in a short time 
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with Ali Pasha as chief of staff.  
Ahmed Pasha‟s command was probably the worst that the Anatolian army had 
ever seen during this war. He was also probably the most corrupt and venal of the 
pashas at that post. Doctor Sandwith has the following to say of him: 
   The fate of the miserable army under Ahmed Pasha is among the darkest records 
of war. His whole faculties were bent upon making money. He had in the first 
place to recover the sums he had already expended in bribes at Constantinople, 
and he had, besides, to make his fortune. I could not exaggerate the horrors the 
poor men suffered under his command, for no chief can plunder without allowing 
a considerable license to his subordinates, so that the poor soldier was fleeced by 
every officer higher than the Major.
500
  
 
Ahmed Pasha‟s intrigues and corruption are confirmed by Russian sources as 
well. Ibragimbeyli, referring to some documents in the Georgian archives, writes that  
Ahmed Pasha made intrigues against Abdi Pasha in Istanbul to receive the command 
and that he robbed the army to such an extent that it was ruined by misery, hunger and 
mass diseases.
501
 The British consul in Erzurum James Brant also reported to Stratford 
de Redcliffe on Ahmed Pasha‟s rule. Stratford forwarded this report to Lord Clarendon, 
who in turn wrote a strong worded letter to Lord Stratford, intended for the consumption 
of ReĢid Pasha. Clarendon made it clear that the “rapacity, ignorance and neglect of 
Ahmed Pasha” were not to be tolerated, adding that 
   If the Turkish government has not the will or the the [sic] power to punish this 
man, and to make him refund the wealth which he has amassed by defrauding the 
soldiers, others will follow his criminal example, and the Allied Armies will look 
in vain for that support from the Turkish Troops that they have a right to expect 
while engaged in defending the Sultan‟s cause.502 
 
Abdi Pasha‟s evidence in Istanbul also worked against Ahmed Pasha and in 
February 1854, Ahmed Pasha was also replaced in his post by Zarif Mustafa Pasha, the 
governor of Erzurum.
503
 Zarif Pasha arrived at Kars to take over the command of the 
army on 6 March 1854.
504
 Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha‟s trials in Istanbul would start 
only at the end of 1854 upon pressure from Lord Stratford. Abdi Pasha was finally 
                                                                                                                                               
and also earned a lot of money in Trablusgarb (Libya) before 1846. He does not specify how he 
earned so much money, but in any case it must be certain that he was rich. Doctor Sandwith (op. 
cit., p. 93) also writes that Ahmed Pasha had formerly enriched himself by plunder in the Kurdish 
campaign. This is very much likely, because Ahmed Pasha was appointed to the Anatolian army in 
1846, at the time of the insurrection of the Kurdish Bedirhan Bey. 
500   Sandwith, op. cit., p. 94. 
501   Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 202. 
502  Clarendon to Statford de Redcliffe,  dated 11 April 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 222/27. 
503  Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 484. 
504  Hayreddin Pasha to the Seraskier, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1270 / 8 March 1854. BOA. Ġ. DH. 18801. 
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acquitted in 1855. Ahmed Pasha was found guilty and first exiled to Cyprus in 1855. 
However, like so many other Ottoman pashas, he was pardoned after conviction and a 
period of unemployment. Thus we see that in December 1859, he was made the 
mutasarrıf of Adana with the rank of mirmiran. His last office is recorded as 
governorship of Yemen from 1967 to 1869.
505
 
Karl Marx‟s article in the NYDT, published on 15 November 1853, had described 
the future prospects of the Anatolian army prophetically: 
   A short time ago it might have been believed that the Turks, if weaker in 
Europe, enjoyed a decided superiority in Asia. Abdi Pasha, who commands the 
Asiatic army, was said to have collected 60,000 or 80,000, nay 120,000 men, and 
swarms of Bedouins, Kurds, and other warlike irregulars were reported to flock 
daily to his standard. Arms and ammunitions were said to be in store for the 
Caucasian insurgents; and as soon as war was declared, an advance was to be 
made into the very heart of these centres of resistance to Russia. It may, however, 
be as well to observe that Abdi Pasha cannot possibly have more than about 
30,000 regular troops, and that before the Caucasus is reached, with these, and 
with these alone, he will have to encounter the stubborn resistance of Russian 
battalions. His Bedouins and Kurdish horsemen may be capital for mountain 
warfare, for forcing the Russians to detach largely and to weaken their main body; 
they may do a great deal of damage to the Georgian and Colonist villages in the 
Russian Territory, and even open some sort of an underhand communication with 
the Caucasian mountaineers. But unless Abdi Pasha‟s regulars are capable of 
blocking up the road from Batum to Erzurum, and can defeat whatever nucleus of 
an active army the Russians may be enabled to bring together, the success of the 
irregulars will be of a very ephemeral nature… In 1829 the Russian forces in Asia 
amounted, before Erzerum, to 18,000 men only, and considering the improve-
ments that have since then taken place in the Turkish army (although that of Asia 
has least participated in them), we should say the Russians would have a fair 
chance of success if they could unite 30,000 men in a body before the same place 
now.
506
   
 
Indeed the Russian army would take Kars again when its number reached this figure. By 
then the Ottoman army would fall behind in numbers. 
Thus the year 1853 ended on the Caucasian front with a Russian superiority. The 
Ottoman army had suffered a powerful blow to its self-confidence at the battles of 
Ahısha and BaĢgedikler. Disorganised and demoralised, its high command no longer 
thought of any attack or advance. The need for a remedy in the Anatolian army was 
obvious for the allies as well. The British embassy had been urging the Porte to send the 
Hungarian refugee general of British (Scottish or Irish) origin Richard Debaufre Guyon 
(1813-1856), who lived under his new Ottoman name HurĢid Pasha in Damascus. In 
fact, HurĢid Pasha himself had already applied to the Porte to serve in the Rumelian or 
                                                 
505   Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 202-203. Kuneralp, op. cit., p. 60. 
506  “The Holy War”, NYDT, Leader, November 15, 1853. See Karl Marx, op. cit., pp. 155-156. 
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Anatolian army even before the declaration of war and he was ordered to go to Erzurum 
soon after the declaration of war.
507
 (As was said before, the Porte did not want to send 
Hungarian refugee officers to the Danubian front due to Austrian pressure). The order 
of appointment of HurĢid Pasha to the Anatolian army did not, however, specify his 
position. From the wording of the tezkire, it seems that he was meant to serve on the 
staff of the army in Erzurum (Erzurum ordusu maiyetine gönderilmesi). But it is not 
clear on the basis of the above mentioned document whether he was just a staff officer 
or the chief of staff.  
HurĢid Pasha arrived at Erzurum in early December. According to a British 
consular report from Erzurum, dated 23 December 1853, HurĢid Pasha had reportedly 
said to the müşir (the Commander-in-Chief or the governor?) and to the members of the 
meclis of the city, that he had an imperial order to take up matters in the Anatolian army 
and if his advices went unheeded, he would lose no time to return to Istanbul and tell 
the matters to the Porte. Thereupon the governor and the meclis assured him that his 
advices would be listened to. Again according to this report, he inspected the 
fortifications of the city and ordered new ones to be built. He also inspected the military 
hospitals, provisions and the troops. He found out that the salaries of the soldiers were 
twelve to eighteen months in arrears, while the pashas usually one month or in some 
cases three months in arrears of pay.  Then he reproached the pashas for not caring for 
the men under their command while protecting their own comfort very well. He told 
them that they could have given up their salaries for one year instead of leaving the 
soldiers without salary and this would not be a great burden for them. Then he ordered 
the payment of two months‟ salaries to the soldiers. The consular report also states that 
HurĢid Pasha had thus gained much popularity (makbuliyet) among the soldiers and 
they pledged to him to go with him down to the last step.
508
 This is an interesting 
information, but unfortunately we do not have a confirmation from another source, 
preferably an Ottoman source. Moreover, this consular report is somewhat in 
contradiction with a letter from HurĢid Pasha from Kars, dated 9 December 1853. (See 
below). Nevertheless, if the contents of this report are true, then we can be safe to 
assume that the seeds of dissension between HurĢid Pasha and some pashas had already 
been sown by this act. Indeed, we will see later that HurĢid Pasha will not get along well 
                                                 
507  Sultan‟s irade, dated 10 Muharrem 1270 / 13 October 1853. See BOA. Ġ. DH. 17617. Also see 
instructions (tezkire) from the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 13 Muharrem 1270 / 16 October 
1853. BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 95 /82. 
508  Translation of an extract from a report from the British consulate in Erzurum to the British 
embassy. BOA. HR. TO. 219/84, dated 23 December 1853. See Appendix 24. 
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with Zarif Pasha, the former governor and the new Commander-in-Chief of the 
Anatolian army beginning from March 1854. 
According to HurĢid Pasha‟s own letter from Kars, dated 27 December 1853, he 
departed from Damascus and arrived at Kars on 9 December 1853. In this letter, he does 
not mention Erzurum at all. HurĢid Pasha writes that he could have arrived earlier had 
he not been kept two weeks for receiving his travel money (harcırah). He would be 
soon appointed chief of staff of the Anatolian army, but from his first letter from Kars it 
seems that he did not know his exact position in the army yet (hizmet ve memuriyet-i 
bendeganemin ne olacağını katiyyen bilmekliği arzu etmekteyim).509 The tone of this 
letter does not coincide with the consular report mentioned above, where he boldly 
states to all pashas and other officials in Erzurum that he holds an imperial order and his 
advices should be kept. Stratford de Redcliffe wanted him to practically command the 
army. Nevertheless, HurĢid Pasha would face the opposition of both the Ottoman and 
the Polish parties in the Anatolian army. 
In his letter HurĢid Pasha stated his opinion on the causes of the defeats of the 
Anatolian army. First, he wrote that the artillery had ammunition enough for only 200 
shots for each cannon whereas it was 400 shots before. Secondly, he argued, two corps 
had been detached from the Kars army to Ahısha and Bayezid, however, as these places 
were far away from Kars, they did not receive help from Kars and they were put into 
danger in vain. Thirdly, it was a mistake to march with 28,000 men upon such a well 
fortified fortress as Gümrü. The army should instead march upon Tiflis. Furthermore, he 
argued that, at the battle of Bayındır, the Russian army was half the size of the Ottoman 
army and thus it provided a good opportunity for the Ottoman army. Although the 
Russians suffered big losses, the battle consisted only of 4.5 hours of cannonade and 
neither the Ottoman cavalry nor the infantry were sent against the enemy, even the 
retreating way of the enemy towards the fortress (of Gümrü) was not cut off. Fourth, in 
the battle of Ahısha, the Russian forces were equal to Ottoman forces in number, 
however the Ottoman battalions were separated from each other, therefore the compact 
Russian forces were superior to the Ottoman battalions. Furthermore, the commander 
Ferik Ali Pasha had himself “retreated” from the battle scene, leaving the troops to 
                                                 
509  Translation of Ferik HurĢid Pasha‟s letter from Kars to the Ottoman foreign minister ReĢid Pasha, 
dated 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (27 December 1853). BOA. HR. MKT. 68/42. See Appendix 25. 
HurĢid Pasha  gives the date of his arrival at Kars as 9 Kanun-ı Evvel, which by the Julian calendar 
corresponds to 21 December. However, from other dates in his letter, it seems that by Kanun-ı 
Evvel he means the Western (Gregorian) month of December. Likewise he gives the date of the 
battle of Bayındır as 13 Teşrin-i Sani (13 November), again using this Julian month as a Gregorian 
month. 
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disorder and total defeat with the loss of 14 cannons. Fifth, in the battle of 
BaĢgedikler,510 the Reis (Chief of Staff) Ahmed Pasha should have orderly retreated 
towards Kars, waiting for the 8 battalions of infantry, 18 cannons and 3 regiments of 
cavalry from the Arabistan army in Kars, then the Ottoman forces would have a definite 
superiority against the Russians. HurĢid Pasha asserted that the Ottoman losses in this 
battle were not only 26 cannons but also demoralisation of the army, which retreated 
disorderly, deserted and showed signs of distrust to its commanders. HurĢid Pasha 
suggested that by the next spring the number of the Anatolian army should be increased 
up to 50 to 60 thousand and the number of cannons up to 100 to 130. Then the army 
should leave a corps around Gümrü and march against Tiflis, trying to urge the Russian 
Muslims to insurgence and to meet with the forces of “Shamil Bey”, meaning Sheikh 
Shamil, the Imam of Dagestan. HurĢid Pasha also observed that the Anatolian army did 
not have any proper maps of the region. He suggested that the French ministry of war 
had a good map of the Caucasus in Paris, the grand vizier might ask the French for a 
copy. Finally HurĢid Pasha wanted more money allowance for the spies and better 
administration of the provisions. 
 
 
3.5.  The Danubian Front in 1854 and the Declaration of War by France and 
Britain 
 
 
The year 1854 was opened with another Ottoman victory on the Danubian front. 
The commander of the Ottoman forces in Kalafat (across Vidin), Ferik Çerkes Ġsmail 
Pasha attacked the Russian forces near the village Çatana (Cetate or Citate) to the north 
of Kalafat on 31 December with a few thousand cavalry and infantry. The attack was 
repulsed, but on 6 January, on the day of the Orthodox Christmas day, a big Ottoman 
force of about 18,000 men attacked a smaller Russian force under the command of 
Colonel Aleksandr Baumgarten near Çatana. Another small Russian force was in a 
nearby village under the command of Brigadier General Belgard. Thus the total number 
of these two units (according to Tarle and other Russian sources) was about 7,000.
511
 
On the other hand, according to the report of the Ottoman Commander-in-Chief MüĢir 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha, the Ottoman force that took part in this battle consisted of 11 infantry 
battalions, 4 batteries (24 guns) and 3 cavalry regiments, while the Russian forces 
                                                 
510   HurĢid Pasha gives the names of “Başgedi, Ortagedi and Kolveren (?)” as the places of this battle. 
The words “gedi” here must be the distorted forms of “gedik” or “gedikli” or “gedikler”. See ibid. 
511   Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 289. 
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included 15 infantry battalions, 24 guns and 3 cavalry regiments, that is to say, the 
Russians had 4 battalions more of infantry.
512
  
These Russian units were under the command of General Anrep, who stayed in 
Boloeshti, not far from Çatana. In this battle, the Russians lost about 2,300 men and 
officers, killed and wounded, according to Tarle.
513
 According to Ömer Pasha, Ottoman 
losses were 300 dead and 700 wounded, while the Russians lost about 4,000 dead and 
many wounded. He also wrote that the Ottoman soldiers had bayoneted a lot of Russian 
prisoners of war because of their rage and anger, bringing only a few of them alive to 
Kalafat (Rusyalu‟dan hayy olarak hayli esir tutulmuş ise de asakir-i şahane kemal-i 
hiddet ü şiddetinden sağ bırakmayıp kaffesini süngüden geçirerek yalnız birkaç neferi 
hayyen Kalafat‟a getirmişdir).514  
Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha, however, in his report to Grand Vizier Mustafa 
Naili Pasha, wrote that, although it was stated that this bayoneting of live prisoners was 
a result of the soldiers‟ rage and although it was understood that they were reprimanded 
for this act, in fact this was not an act of spontaneous fury (hemen oracıkda hasıl olmuş 
hiddet ü şiddetten olmayıp) as stated by Ömer Pasha, but it was the result of the 
soldiers‟ awareness of Russian atrocities during the battle of Sinop, when the Russians 
had continued to fire shell and grapeshot even on those sailors who had jumped into the 
sea trying to reach the shore and fired about one thousand cannon shots on the corpses 
on the shore. Thus the seraskier continued that he had heard that the soldiers had 
intentionally killed the prisoners and the wounded. Nevertheless, he argues that this act 
is indeed illegitimate and in itself a harmful thing (ancak bu hareket filhakika na-meşru 
ve hadd-i zatında muzırr şey olarak), being also contrary to earlier directions, it was 
necessary to announce and to confirm once again that such actions were not to be 
repeated.
515
 
At the battle of Çatana, the Russians had captured two cannons from the Ottomans 
due to the desertion of some squadrons from the 4
th
 cavalry regiment. For this reason, 
Kaimmakam (Lieutenant-Colonel) Sadık Bey and BinbaĢı (Major) Ahmed Bey of the 
said 4
th
 cavalry regiment were later found guilty of desertion and expelled from the 
                                                 
512   Ömer Pasha to the Seraskier, from ġumnu, 13 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (13 January 1854). BOA. Ġ. HR. 
114/5554-09 lef 1. See Appendix 33. 
513  Tarle, ibid. 
514   Ömer Pasha, ibid. 
515  Seraskier Pasha to the grand vizier, 22 Rebiyyülahir 1270 (22 January 1854). BOA. Ġ. DH. 18116. 
However, the grand vizier in his petition (arz tezkiresi) does not relate this event to the Sultan. The 
seraskier pasha mentions three attached letters from Ömer Pasha, dated 11, 15 and 17 Rebiyyülahir 
1270 (January 1854). However, these letters are not found in this gömlek. 
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army by decision of the Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askerî (military tribunal).516 However, Ömer 
Pasha does not mention this fact in his first report above, neither does he seem to have 
reported in his three other reports during January 1854.
517
 In any case, this is just 
another example showing that the regular cavalry was really the least efficient arm in 
the Ottoman army, just as the irregular cavalry.  
On the Russian side, most Russian sources (both tsarist military historians and 
Soviet historians) accuse General Anrep of not coming to the help of his units, although 
the cannonade was heard in Boloeshti as well. They also argue that due to the 
incompetence of General Gorchakov, the small Russian forces in Little Walachia were 
sacrificed to the Ottoman army.
518
  
Thus the Ottomans closed the winter campaign on the Danube with victory. In his 
report dated 14 January 1854, Ömer Pasha informed the seraskier that Cetate would 
indeed remain as the biggest battle on the Danube front. However, the Ottomans did not 
follow the enemy and retreated to Kalafat. On both cases they had luck on their side, 
while the Russian command was inefficient. Overall, like so many battles of the 
Crimean War, this was an unfinished and indecisive battle.  
The rest of January and February was quiet on the Danubian front. Sultan 
Abdülmecid conferred on Mushir Ömer Pasha the title of Serdar-ı Ekrem (Commander-
in-Chief or generalissimo) on 15 February 1854. Ömer Pasha also retained his post of 
the commander of the Rumeli army.
519
  
While these battles took place, diplomatic missions continued their work. During 
this time, both Russian and Western diplomacy tried to gain Austria and Prussia to their 
side. Towards the end of January Nikolai sent Count Aleksey Orlov to the young 
Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph (1830-1916), whom he saw like a son and almost like a 
vassal. Orlov was one of the favourites of Nikolai and unlike Menshikov, had the 
reputation of a good diplomat. Although he was the brother of Mikhail Orlov, one of the 
leaders of the Decembrist (Dekabrist) revolt in 1825, his behaviour as the commander 
of cavalry regiment during the revolt had made him a favourite of the tsar. According to 
Tarle, Orlov did not believe that he could come to an agreement with Franz Joseph and 
                                                 
516  BOA. Ġ. DH. 21265, 17 Zilhicce 1271 (31 August 1855). 
517   BOA. Ġ. DH. 18116. 
518  For example, see Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 284-290. Also see Modest Ivanovich Bogdanovich, 
Vostochnaya Voina 1853-1856 godov. St. Petersburg: Tip. M. Stasiulievicha, 1877, Glava VII, 
available online at http://history.scps.ru/crimea/bogdan07.htm (Retrieved August 2006). Winfried 
Baumgart gives the Russian losses as 831 dead and 1,190 wounded. See Baumgart, op. cit., p. 96. 
519  BOA. Ġ. DH. 18072. Also see Lütfi, op. cit., p. 211-212. 
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his foreign minister Count Ferdinand Buol.
520
 However, he could not object to Nikolai. 
So he went to Vienna. His task was to convince Franz Joseph to be neutral, but go into 
war on the side of Russia if France and Britain started war against Russia. In return he 
was promised Russian help against all enemies and internal revolutions, and Russia also 
promised not to decide anything on the fate of the Ottoman Empire without agreement 
with Austria. In Vienna however, the pro-Russian party had lost ground. Franz Joseph 
and Buol did not want to commit themselves to the policy of Nikolai. Thus the mission 
of Orlov was unsuccessful.
521
 
Towards the end of January 1854 Napoleon III wrote a letter to Nikolai I, which 
was published in the French official newspaper Le Moniteur Universel and the St 
Peterburgskie Vedomosti together with Nikolai‟s reply on 9 February. The French 
emperor stated that “Notre attitude vis avis de la Turquie était protective mais 
passive”.522 Napoleon proposed the withdrawal of the French and British fleets from the 
Black Sea and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldavia and Wallachia. Nikolai 
in return proposed that the Franco-British fleets should only prevent the Ottomans from 
carrying weapons and ammunition to Russian coasts and the Porte should send its 
representative to St Petersburg for negotiations on the basis of the his conditions. 
Diplomatic relations between Russia and France and Britain were severed in February 
1854. The Russian ambassadors Count Kiselev in Paris and Brunnov in London left for 
Russia. The British and French ambassadors in St. Petersburg also returned home.
523
  
Towards the end of February 1854, Britain and France gave an ultimatum to 
Emperor Nikolai to withdraw from the principalities. Nikolai did not give an official 
answer and unofficially told that he had no answer to such an ultimatum. Therefore 
Britain and France concluded an agreement of alliance with the Porte on 12 March 
1854. On 27 March, France and Britain finally declared war on Russia. On 31 March 
the first French and then British troops landed in Gallipoli. By this time Lord Aberdeen 
dealt another blow to Nikolai: He approved of the publication of Sir Hamilton 
Seymour‟s conversations with Nikolai in January-February 1853. The publication of 
these conversations were especially harmful for Russo-Austrian relations, because 
Franz Joseph and Count Buol were indignant at Nikolai‟s disrespect towards Austria, by 
                                                 
520   Tarle, op. cit., vol. I, p. 409. 
521   The details of this mission are to be found in Tarle, “Missiya grafa Alekseya Orlova k Frantsu-
Iosifu i pozitsiya Avstrii pered perekhodom russkikh voysk cherez Dunai”, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 405-
428. 
522  A copy of this letter is at BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 82. 
523   Paris Ambassador Veli Pasha to the Ottoman foreign ministry, 10 February 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 
905/1 lef 97.  
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learning that Nikolai had shown a disrespectful and patronizing attitude towards Austria 
in his talks with the British envoy, assuming that Austria needed not to be considered as 
an independent actor and taking Austrian consent for granted. The Russian 
government‟s objections were published in Russian newspapers, stating that Seymour 
had misunderstood Nikolai. “The Emperor has never thought of any partition, he 
directed attention to the future and not to the present, he had in mind only future 
possibilities”, it was announced.524 But these excuses of course were not convincing for 
the European diplomacy and public opinion.  
On the other hand, it would be interesting to know whether the Porte knew of the 
Nikolai - Seymour conversations before their publication. It seems that it did not. 
Kostaki Musurus‟s despatch dated 17 March 1854 mentions the intention of the British 
cabinet to disclose these conversations, but very interestingly he argues that the 
Petersburg cabinet itself had disclosed in a Petersburg newspaper the offers of Nikolai I 
to the Queen on the partition of Ottoman Empire with the purpose of setting France and 
Britain against each other.
525
  
Thus the efforts of the Russian ambassador in Vienna Baron Peter von 
Meyendorff to gain Austria became fruitless. The French and British ambassadors in 
Vienna finally managed to sign a protocol of four points with Count Buol.
526
 This 
protocol became famous as the “four points” (“mevadd-ı erbaa” or “nikat-i erbaa” in 
Ottoman diplomatic language). The first point stated that the Russian protectorate over 
Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia should be ended and these principalities should be 
placed under the guarantee of the great powers. Secondly, the mouths of the Danube 
should be free for navigation. The third and probably the most important but also the 
vaguest point stipulated that the Straits Treaty of 1841 should be revised “in the interest 
of the European balance of power”. The fourth point was the only point related to the 
immediate cause of the war: Russia should abandon its claim to protect the Orthodox 
population of the Ottoman Empire and the Christians of the Ottoman Empire should be 
placed under the protection of the great powers, without violating sovereign rights of 
the Sultan. A secret fifth point, agreed between France and Britain only, specified the 
third point to some extent: Russia should give up its “preponderance” in the Black Sea, 
                                                 
524  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 494. 
525   Translation of Kostaki Bey‟s despatch to ReĢid Pasha, dated 17 March 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 
52/59. 
526   Gavin Henderson has called this event and the consequent alienation of Austria from Russia as a 
diplomatic revolution in the Concert of Europe. However, he claimed that the four points came 
into being in July 1854. See “The Diplomatic Revolution of 1854: I The Four Points”, The 
American Historical Review 43(1), October 1937, p. 27. 
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by reducing its navy to four ships of war and by demolishing and not re-establishing the 
Sevastopol naval base.
527
  
Meyendorff, who was a brother-in-law of Buol, tried to obtain the text of this 
protocol but he was rejected. He then almost threatened Count Buol: “Remember that 
Russia has a 700,000-strong army and it should not be approached as a second-rate 
state”.528 Nevertheless he had gained some unofficial and vague information about the 
protocol. According to what he heard, they were about maintaining the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, evacuation of the principalities by Russia and the improving the status 
of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire.
529
 It seems that he did not manage to learn the 
full contents of all the four points. He also observed that prices in the Vienna stock 
exchange had risen. The stock exchange thought that the more the enemies of Russia, 
the more chances for a peace. On 20 April, Austria also signed a “defensive and 
offensive” agreement with Prussia.530  
Meanwhile the first clash between the allies and Russia happened at Odessa. On 9 
April the British frigate Furious came to Odessa to take the British consul there. A 
sloop was detached from the frigate with a white flag. Then the authorities told the 
officer in the sloop that the consul had already left, and the sloop was returning to the 
Furious. At that time, or some time before, the Russian port battery fired a few shots 
which were not aimed at the sloop or the frigate. The Russian authorities later claimed it 
was a warning only. They argued that the frigate had come too close to the shore. In any 
case no damage was done. As Adolphus Slade remarked, a boat with truce flag should 
wait at a distance, until another boat meets it from the shore.
531
 But the allied admirals 
took offence and sent a squadron of sail ships of the line and steamers to demand the 
release of neutral and surrender of all British, French and Russian ships at anchor in the 
port as reparation for the breach of international law. The governor of Odessa, Count 
Osten-Sacken released the neutral ships but refused to give the Russian ships. Then the 
allied fleet on 22 April bombarded the harbour and its facilities. Although they claimed 
that they did not aim at the city and the civilians, the city was also damaged. Slade is 
very critical of such acts, arguing that “war is never aided by needless severity or 
destruction of domestic property”.532 Though this was a skirmish, the allied navies now 
                                                 
527   Baumgart, op. cit., p. 19. 
528  Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part one, p. 511. 
529   Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part one, p. 510-511. 
530  Ibid. 
531  Slade, op. cit., p. 215. 
532  Slade, op. cit., p. 218. 
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sent a clear message that they were the masters in the Black Sea.  
Austria continued its armed neutrality; mobilizing its army and practically 
becoming more and more anti-Russian. It even declared to Russia that if it crossed the 
Danube then Austria would send its armies. For fear of a Serbian uprising, that would 
upset its own Serbs, Austria concentrated troops on the Serbian frontier. Emperor 
Nikolai I was still undaunted, he thought he could still go on with his plans without 
Austria. The Greeks had revolted in Thessaly and Epirus. Nikolai now harboured the 
illusion that the Serbs and Bulgarians would also rise against the “Turkish yoke”. The 
Greek government secretly supported the insurgents, while the Greek newspapers 
openly called for an uprising. However, in April and May the Greek insurrection was 
suppressed by the Ottoman army under the command of Fuad Efendi with the help of 
the allied fleets threatening Athens and Piraeus.
533
   
Nikolai‟s plans for the spring campaign included crossing of the Danube from 
Vidin, Rusçuk and Silistria and the siege of these cities together with Galatz and Brailov 
in the north. Russian troops in accordance with this plan occupied the whole Dobruca 
region from 23 to 29 March. The Russian army across the Danube numbered 45,000 
men under the command of General Aleksandr Lüders.534 For Nikolai, Silistria was to 
be the stronghold from which to attack the allied expeditionary force which he thought 
would be landed at Varna. Indeed his expectation would come true.  
In Silistria there was an Ottoman force of 12,000 men under the command of 
Ferik Musa Hulusi Pasha (?-1854). There were also about six British officers in 
Silistria, among whom Captain James Butler and Lieutenant Charles Nasmyth are best 
remembered.
535
 In the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-29, the Ottoman army in Silistria 
had held out against Russians for six months. From then on the fortress was fortified by 
outer forts. Russian siege works began on 5 April. The commander of the siege forces 
was the aged General Karl Andreyevich Schilder (1785-1854), who had taken Silistria 
in 1829 by mining operations. One of his aides was military engineer Lieutenant-
Colonel Eduard Ivanovich Totleben (1818-84) responsible for fortification and sapper 
works. Totleben would later undertake the fortification of Sevastopol. Meanwhile Field 
                                                 
533  See Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 40-Tetimme, p. 67-68. Interestingly, Fuad Efendi signs a letter to 
Cevdet Pasha as “Ceneral-i orduy-ı Yanya ve Narda”. This is probably because he had become 
temporarily a general but not a pasha. Also see Besbelli, op. cit., p. 59, Reid, op. cit., pp. 248-253. 
534  Baumgart, op. cit., p. 99. 
535   Both had served in the East India Company army. Butler has left a “journal”. These six British 
officers received the Mecidiye order. See BOA. Ġ. DH. 19455, dated 14 August 1854. However, as 
we have seen in the introductory chapter, Lane-Poole has quite exaggerated their role, arguing that 
without them “the garrison might have surrendered”.  
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Marshal Paskevich came from Warsaw to Bucharest to take direct command of the 
occupation army. Paskevich arrived at Bucharest on 22 April. Ottoman reinforcements 
also began to arrive at Silistria. By May, the garrison muster-roll rose to 18,000 troops 
of all types.
536
  
Paskevich had only grown more sceptic of the Danubian campaign. He was 
worried by the concentration of Austrian troops (said to reach 280,000 men) along the 
borders of Wallachia and Moldavia.
537
 They posed a real threat as Austria had already 
warned Russia not to cross the Danube. Paskevich now tried to convince Nikolai to 
evacuate the principalities. He said that the Bulgarians and the Serbians were not to be 
expected to rise. By evacuation of the principalities, Paskevich argued, Russia would 
gain time, which would work against the allies. Meanwhile Russia could reinforce its 
armies. But Nikolai did not heed his advice.
538
 It was indeed one of the biggest mistakes 
of Nikolai to continue with Paskevich, who simply did not believe in Nikolai‟s plans.  
By May 1854, the Russian forces around Silistria had reached 90,000 men with 
266 cannons.
539
 This was the biggest Russian siege force against an Ottoman fortress 
until then. It soon started siege works around the fortress and the Russian bombardment 
of Silistria began in the middle of May.
540
 But Paskevich hesitated to make a decisive 
assault on the fortifications while Ferik Musa Pasha energetically continued to improve 
fortifications. On 4 May, Paskevich wrote a second letter to Nikolai, this time more 
clearly proposing to retreat. He wrote that surrounded by the French and the “Turks” 
from the front, and by Austria from the rear, they did not have a chance. Upon receipt of 
this letter on 11 May, Nikolai felt offended and angry. After all their efforts, losses and 
expenses, now his Commander-in-Chief was suggesting to leave the principalities with 
shame! On the next day he wrote his reply, stating that he received his letter with 
“extreme grief and no less astonishment” and he would not accept his proposals because 
they were “shameful” for him. He emphasized that Austria could not enter the war 
                                                 
536  Reid, op. cit., p. 256. 
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538  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 486-487. 
539   Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 2, p. 272. Tarle gives 210 cannons. Cf. Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, 
p. 500. 
540  Nafiz Efendi, who was an Ottoman artillery sergeant-major at that time, gives the date of the 
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May. See Reid, op. cit., p. 256. 
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against Russia, that there was no reason to be afraid of the allies.
541
 
Meanwhile on 18 May, the allied commanders Marshal Saint Arnaud
542
 and 
General Lord Raglan
543
 together with Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha came to Varna from 
Istanbul and on 19 May they held a war council with Ömer Pasha who had also come 
from ġumnu. Ömer Pasha was very worried about the Russian siege and offensive. His 
hope was in the allied troops. The allied commanders agreed with Ömer Pasha‟s request 
to bring their troops to Varna as soon as possible. St Arnaud promised to send 55,000 
troops. However, these troops would not arrive at Varna before June and before they 
were ready for help, the Russians would raise the siege of Silistria.
544
 
Ömer Pasha remained in ġumnu with 40,000 to 45,000 troops, but he hesitated to 
come to the rescue of Silistria or to make a diversion operation. In fact he did not want 
any open field encounter with a big Russian army. All he did was to send the Cossack 
regiment of Sadık Pasha and some other 5,000 irregulars from Razgrad to take positions 
at some distance around Russian forces. He also allowed Behram Pasha (General 
Cannon) to make a manoeuvre before the city with a brigade of infantry.
545
  
On 28 May the Russians made an assault on the Arab Tabia in Silistria, but they 
were repulsed, losing 22 officers (dead and wounded) and 315 dead and 596 wounded 
rank and file.
546
 General Selvan was among the dead. Ottoman losses were about 68 
dead, 121 wounded.
547
 On 2 June Musa Pasha was killed by a piece of shell while 
preparing for prayers. His heroic death further increased the spirit of the defenders.
548
 
                                                 
541  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 488-489. 
542   Marshal Armand-Jacques Leroy de Saint Arnaud (1801-1854) had distinguished himself in 
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56. Also see Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 502. 
545  Gürel has taken General “Kannon” and “General Behram” for two different persons. See Gürel, 
op. cit., p. 66. 
546  See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 505. 
547   Bogdanovich, op. cit., vol. II, glava XIII, footnote 17.  
548  See YüzbaĢı Fevzi, op. cit., p. 43. Captain Fevzi Kurtoğlu writes that Musa Pasha was killed when 
he got out of his room to make ablution (abdest) before the noon prayers and while he was talking 
with an officer. However, Slade argues that Musa Pasha was killed while he was stepping on to his 
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Hüseyin Rıfat Pasha came from ġumnu to take the command of the defence. He also 
brought from Ömer Pasha the news that Silistria should not expect relief for about two 
weeks until the allies arrived.
549
 Meanwhile the provisions of the city were at their end. 
The Russians made a few further indecisive attacks without result. Paskevich in his 
reports to Nikolai stated that the Ottomans were defending the city with much energy 
and good strategical knowledge, assisted by foreign officers. However, he might as well 
be covering his own indecision and vacillation.
550
 The French General Pierre F. J. 
Bosquet also found it strange and wrote that he did not understand what paralysed the 
Russian army: “This is strange and I feel reluctant to explain it by the impotence of the 
Russians. There is another thing, like a demoralization, a concern, I do not know what, 
which paralyses this army”.551  
On 9 June Paskevich suffered a real or pretended contusion and left the command 
of operations again to Gorchakov, himself returning to Jassy. On 13 June General 
Schilder was severely wounded and died shortly afterwards. On 21 June the Russian 
army was to storm the main fortress. At this point, hours before the commencement of 
storming, Gorchakov received an order from Paskevich to raise the siege and retreat to 
the left of the Danube. Thus the Russian army retreated but the Ottoman army as usual 
did not follow.
552
 The reason for Paskevich‟s order of retreat was Austria‟s menacing 
position and the concentration of allied forces in Varna. On 3 June Austria demanded 
Russia to evacuate the principalities otherwise it would join the allies to force Russia 
out.
553
  
On 14 June, the Porte and Austria signed the convention of Boyacıköy, whereby 
Austria received the right to occupy the principalities temporarily.
554
 Thus Nikolai took 
alarm and decided to retreat. Nesselrode finally answered the Austrian summons to 
retreat on 29 June. The Russians began to evacuate Dobrudja. There were skirmishes 
between Russian and Ottoman forces at Yergöğü (Giurgevo) on 5-7 July, but the 
Russians continued to retreat. In order to save face Russia called its retreat a strategic 
                                                                                                                                               
seccade (small carpet) for the evening prayers. Slade also writes that the death of Musa Pasha sent 
“a fervid thrill through Islam”. See Slade, op. cit., p. 251. 
549  Captain Butler‟s journal, quoted by Reid, op. cit., p. 257. 
550  Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
551   “Ceci est étrange et je répugne à me l‟expliquer par l‟impuissance des russes. Il y a autre chose, 
comme une démoralisation, une préoccupation, je ne sais quoi, qui paralyse cette armée”. Quoted 
by Zayonchkovskiy, op. cit., vol. II, part 2, p. 290.  
552  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 515-516. 
553   Baumgart, op. cit., p. 101. 
554  BOA. Ġ. HR. 111/5445. 
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withdrawal. On 1 August the Russian army left Bucharest. The Ottoman army entered 
Bucharest on 8 August under the command of Halim Pasha and on 22 August Ömer 
Pasha came to the city.
555
 The Austrians and the Ottomans started to occupy the 
principalities. The Austrians were cautious not to meet the retreating Russians. On 7 
September the principalities were totally evacuated by the Russian army.  
At the beginning of July the allies decided to embark their armies to the Crimea. 
They wanted to destroy the Russian navy at Sevastopol. According to Slade, Austria 
sent a military envoy to Varna to urge the allied generals for a joint campaign in 
Bessarabia, while Cevdet Pasha on the contrary argues that the allies later admitted their 
mistake and said that they were misled by the Austrians. Cevdet Pasha also writes that 
the proposal for a campaign in Bessarabia came from Ömer Pasha.556 In any case, 
France and Britain, too confident of their military might and not wanting to share their 
victory with anybody, even with the Ottoman Empire, started preparations for 
embarkation from Varna on 14 August. They counted on their steam frigates and screw-
propelled line-of-battle ships for defying the distance, facilitating logistic support and 
destroying the Russian fleet. They had planned to finish the Crimean campaign by 
Christmas. 
The allied fleets had come to Varna and anchored off Balçık. However they did 
not want the Ottoman fleet to have any active role in the Black Sea. They wanted it to 
protect the Bosphorus and cruise between  Varna and Istanbul. While the Ottomans and 
the allies could not or did not want to conquer Bessarabia, a brave Russian war steamer 
called the Bessarabia left Sevastopol on 19 July and steamed among hostile steamers 
across the Black Sea up to the north-western cost of Anatolia, capturing two Ottoman 
merchant vessels, one off Kerempe, the other off Amasra, laden with maize and coal. 
The Bessarabia then took the coal for itself, burned the vessels, disembarked their crew 
at Ereğli, retaining only their captains and scribes as evidence and then returned to 
Sevastopol. When the kaimmakam of Ereğli reported the situation to Istanbul, it was 
met with suspicion. The Russian navy had once again showed contempt for the allied 
fleets.
557
 
Varna had become a hot spot full with ships, troops, stores of provisions and 
ammunition. The best houses and private shops had been occupied by the allies without 
                                                 
555  Baumgart, op. cit., p. 104. 
556   Slade, op. cit., p. 253. Cf. Cevdet PaĢa, op. cit., p. 28.  
557   Besbelli, op. cit., p. 66. Özcan (op. cit., 1990, p. 93) mentions only one merchant vessel, Medar-ı 
Ticaret and states that the steamer Şehper was attacked off Kerempe by Russian pirates but 
managed to come to the harbour of Sinop intact. 
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any payment to the owners. A year later these owners, Muslim and non-Muslim, were 
sending petitions to the Porte, complaining that they had not received any rent.
558
 
Foreign residents alone were exempt from this free quartering. The inhabitants were 
also irritated by the drunkenness of the allied soldiers. One day French soldiers went to 
a Muslim café and demanded wine. When they were told wine was not sold there a 
quarrel ensued and consequently one person was killed  and several wounded.
559
 On 10 
August a fire broke out and lasted six hours burning many wooden houses, the bazaar 
and military stores. Slade then remarks: “As on other occasions when honour or loot 
was to be obtained, the Turkish soldiers and sailors were not invited to join: they neither 
robbed nor rioted”.560  
The city meclis held a stormy meeting after the fire. Many notables were angry 
against the allies, even comparing the Russian siege of Varna in 1828 favourably with 
them. “The Muscovites”, they said, 
   came to Varna after the irritation of a double siege; they remained there two 
years, gave nobody reason to lament their conduct, and left the town better than 
they had found it. The Franks have scarcely been at Varna three months; they 
have taken our dwellings and store-houses compulsorily, have covered us with 
opprobrium, and now the place is ruined by their carelessness.
561
 
 
The governor of Varna and the military commandant said that they had warned the 
allies of fire. They also complained that the allied generals were like sultans, it was 
difficult to obtain an audience with them. They did not answer their letters either.
562
  
Meanwhile cholera had started to ravage the allied troops and fleets from the 
beginning of July 1854. For this reason the embarkation was constantly being delayed. 
The French made an incursion into Dobruca in August, but they lost nearly 7,000 men 
from cholera, fever, drought and heat. The British also lost about 700 men from 
diseases. Furthermore 12,000 to 15,000 French and about 1,900 British troops were 
hospitalized.
563
 Sanitary and logistics problems now made themselves strongly felt and 
they did not cease to be felt during the war. At last the departure for the Crimea was set 
on 2 September, but it was again delayed until 7 September. The formidable armada 
                                                 
558   BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/12 lef 1-8, dated Şevval-Zilkade 1271 (June-July 1855). Osman Nuri Bey, 
head of the “Varna commission”, also reported to the Porte several times on this point. See BOA. 
HR. SYS. 1356/8, dated 12 Receb 1271 / 31 March 1855, HR. SYS. 1353/73, dated 22 Zilhicce 
1271 (5 September 1855) and HR. SYS. 1354/46 lef 4, dated 24 Safer 1272 (5 November 1855). 
559  Slade, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 
560  Slade, op. cit., p. 261. 
561  Slade, op. cit., p. 262. Tarle has also quoted this passage obviously with much pleasure. See Tarle, 
op. cit., vol. 2, p. 27.  
562  Slade, ibid. 
563  Calthorpe, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 122-123. 
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consisted of 350 ships carrying 30,000 (24,000?) French, 25,000 (27,000?) British and 
about 5,000 or 6,000 Ottoman troops (10 infantry battalions).
564
 Another 11,000 French 
troops were to follow later. Among the Ottoman troops, 8 battalions were selected from 
the esnan, that is, those who did not draw the lot but were liable to service during 13 
years and the remaining two battalions from the redif, that is the reserve, those middle-
aged soldiers with families to be worried about. The esnan had received only three 
months of drilling in Üsküdar. They had with them only three weeks of provisions, 
afterwards the Allies were to feed them. The Ottoman commander chosen for the 
expedition, Mirliva Süleyman Pasha, was not a distinguished officer either; he had spent 
the last 12 years of his life as the superintendent of Beykoz tannery. To encourage him 
for the mission, he had been promoted from colonel to the rank of mirliva. Other 
officers had shunned the mission for reasons of expected neglect from the Allies.
565
 
Events proved that they were right to think so. 
 
 
3.6.  The Caucasian Front in 1854-1855 
 
 
After the defeat of BaĢgedikler, the Porte sent the minister of the police (Zaptiye 
Müşiri) Mehmed Hayreddin Pasha (?-1869) in January 1854 to inspect the Anatolian 
and Batum armies and to enquire into the deeds of Abdi Pasha and Ahmed Pasha. Upon 
arrival at Erzurum and then at Kars, Hayreddin Pasha reported the guilt of both pashas 
in robbing the soldiers and they were recalled to Istanbul for trial.
566
  
The Ottoman armies in Kars, Erzurum and Batum spent the winter of 1853-54 in 
very unhealthy conditions. They were fed and clothed scarcely and quartered in poorly 
heated, unventilated, filthy, crowded khans or houses with all conditions for the spread 
of contagious diseases like typhus. Therefore a total of 18,000 to 20,000 soldiers died 
from diseases and malnutrition.
567
 Zarif Pasha confirms this situation and states that 
when he took over the command of the Anatolian army in March 1854, there were 
                                                 
564  Calthorpe, op. cit., vol. I, p. 122. Calthorpe gives the number of Ottoman troops as 6,000. While 
Slade argues (op. cit., p. 273) that the Ottoman force consisted of 10 battalions of 800 men each 
more or less, totaling 8,000 men, Besbelli (op. cit., p. 71) gives the number as 5,000. The grand 
vizier had written to the seraskier that 10,000 regular troops should be given to Marshal St. Arnaud 
and Lord Raglan by 15 August 1854. See BOA. Ġ. MMS. 2/61, dated 3 August 1854. 
565  Slade, op. cit., p. 274.  
566  Duncan, op. cit., vol. I, p. 111. 
567  Clarendon to Redcliffe, 29 November 1854. PRMA, No. 54, p. 51. 
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17,000 troops in Kars, of which 11,000 were in hospitals.
568
 On the day of his arrival at 
Kars, 50 soldiers died of diseases. When he asked the doctors what was to be done, they 
wanted some of the troops to be sent to villages to leave more room to others, opening 
holes in the barracks for better ventilation and supplying the hospitals with clothing, 
beds and linen. The daily death-toll fell to half of this number afterwards, he writes. The 
Batum army was also reduced to a few thousands. However, reinforcements were begun 
to be sent as early as February 1854. Thus two steamers under the command of Bahriye 
Feriki Mustafa Pasha, escorted by an allied squadron, brought 5,000 troops to Trabzon 
(for the Anatolian army) on 10 February and 3,000 men to Batum on 11 February 
1854.
569
 While the Russian fleet still cruised the coasts, it did not dare to meet the allied 
fleet. 
Likewise, Doctor Humphrey Sandwith writes that during the winter of 1853-54, 
some 20,000 men had died of disease and hunger, being deprived of proper food and 
clothing, and “crowded into the dark, ill-ventilated hovels” of Kars. The great 
mortalities from diseases were not reported in the muster-rolls sent to Istanbul, “for the 
pay, food and appointments of dead men went to fill the coffers of the Pasha and his 
myrmidons”.570 Sandwith also writes that Abdi Pasha was a “poor and honest man”, but 
then he tells of a curious story related to Abdi Pasha‟s journey from Kars to Istanbul, 
when he was removed from his post and called back to Istanbul. According to the story, 
on the road between Erzurum and Trabzon, one of the mules of Abdi Pasha‟s large-train 
of heavily laden baggage-mules slipped and fell over a precipice, the load was smashed 
and a treasure of gold and silver rolled out, which was plundered by the muleteers and 
the peasantry.
571
  
At the beginning of 1854, Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha lost the office of the 
Seraskier and Hasan Rıza Pasha replaced him. The new seraskier did not like the 
existence of so many foreign officers in the Ottoman armies. He was effective in the 
appointment of the new commander of the Anatolian army. Thus with Hasan Pasha‟s 
                                                 
568  See Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs, Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 485. Also see Zarif Pasha‟s answers to 
questions in the MVL. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, paragraph 2 (See Appendix 85). The second 
part of Zarif Pasha‟s memoirs, related to the period of his command of the Anatolian army is also 
available at BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10. Zarif Pasha had submitted it as part of his evidence 
during his trial. 
569  Tezkire of Kapudan-ı Derya, 21 February 1854, BOA. Ġ. DH. 18414 lef 1, quoted by Budak, op. 
cit., (1993), p. 68. Budak writes that the tezkire belonged to Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha. 
However, Mahmud Pasha was at that time dismissed. Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha had become 
the grand admiral. See Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 40-Tetimme, p. 67. 
570  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 48. 
571  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 47 and p. 49.  
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backing, the governor of Erzurum Mustafa Zarif Pasha was appointed the mushir of the 
Anatolian army in February 1854. But this would prove the second most unfortunate 
appointment after Ahmed Pasha. Although Zarif Pasha had been successful as the 
governor of Erzurum, he was unfit for the post of the Commander-in-Chief, because he 
had never commanded an army or even a regiment. As seen from his memoirs, his army 
life had been spent chiefly in the capacity of a regimental secretary. Actually Zarif 
Pasha had already sensed the possibility of this post being offered to him as early as 
December 1853, when he reported on the incompetence of Abdi Pasha.
572
 In his letter to 
the grand vizier he had then asked to be saved from such responsibility, and then he was 
saved by the appointment of Ahmed Pasha. However this time he could not evade the 
appointment. He also writes in his memoirs that he had not wanted to be appointed 
mushir. 
The post of the governor of Erzurum was given to the kaimmakam of Çıldır, Zaim 
Feyzullah Pasha. Lütfi Efendi, the official chronicler makes one of his rare criticisms in 
his chronicle on these three appointments. Of Ahmed Pasha he writes that he knows 
little, but he says that Ahmed is famous for his bravery. However, he argues, bravery 
alone is not enough for a commander. As for Zarif Pasha, he has no compliments and 
sees him as incompetent (piyade ve racil) while he cannot conceal his contempt for 
Feyzullah Pasha, (koca Erzurum eyaletinin dahi ağavatdan bir şahsa ihalesi) and 
altogether he considers their appointments in such a delicate time as belonging to 
strange affairs.
573
 But Lütfi could better tell us whether any prominent pashas were 
willing to take the governorship of Erzurum upon themselves. We must note that poor 
Feyzullah worked more energetically in his post than his predecessors. 
Zarif Pasha is indeed a typical non-slave
574
 origin Ottoman pasha and governor of 
the mid-19
th
 century. Since he has left his memoirs, albeit a very scanty one, we have 
                                                 
572   Governor of Erzurum Mustafa Zarif Pasha to the grand vizier, dated 10 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (11 
December 1853). BOA. HR. MKT. 68/46. 
573   Lütfi, op. cit., p. 93. While Lütfi calls Feyzullah an ağa, he is called a pasha in the documents. For 
example Zarif Pasha calls him pasha in his memoirs: See Enver Ziya Karal, “Zarif PaĢa‟nın 
Hatıratı”, Belleten  IV, 1940, pp. 480-481. The grand vizier in a letter dated 25 November 1853 to 
the seraskier also calls him a pasha. See BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 104/28. Feyzullah himself signs his 
letters as “an mirmiran, kaimmakam-ı liva-i Çıldır” and his seal reads as “Es Seyyid Feyzullah”. 
See BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/53. 
574   Charles Duncan, the British war correspondent for the newspaper Morning Chronicle in the Kars 
army, argues that Zarif Pasha “passed in early youth through that imperial road to success in 
Turkey – the slave market”. Duncan seems to have taken a stereotype for granted. See A 
Campaign with the Turks in Asia, vol. I, London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1855, p. 180. He must 
have read Captain Charles White‟s book Three Years in Constantinople (1846). Nevertheless, 
there were other pashas of slave origins, such as Vasıf Pasha, who became the commander of the 
Anatolian army in 1855. 
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more information about him than about many of his contemporaries. Therefore we 
could dwell at some length on his memoirs to understand the mentality and world view 
of the pashas. Nevertheless, the problem arises exactly at this point: Zarif Pasha in his 
memoirs, written for his children and not for publication, does not comment on the 
political and social events of his time, which was indeed an interesting time of the 
Tanzimat reforms. Therefore these memoirs create a deep disappointment, as indeed 
pointed out by Enver Ziya Karal, their editor. Instead the memoirs are full of personal 
details, with a lot of information on how much money he earned and where he put his 
money. Thus, as the Turkish saying goes, he relates his peculation as if it was an 
accomplishment or bravery.
575
  
Zarif Mustafa was given by his father to an accounting office in the ministry of 
finance as a scribe at the age of 12. Two years later, at 14, he became by chance a 
secretary to a regiment in lieu of the son of an accountant, Hamdi Bey, who was just 
promoted from a secretary to the rank of major in the army. From Zarif‟s account, it 
appears that this Hamdi Bey received his brevet rank just out of blue, without military 
training or education. Then Zarif himself becomes both a secretary and a lieutenant and 
even a deputy captain at the age of 16. He was also shown to Sultan Mahmud II. This is 
interesting because it shows both the degree of Mahmud II‟s interest in his new army, 
and also the degree of liberty in the distribution of military ranks. Afterwards Mustafa 
Zarif is appointed to many campaigns as regimental secretary and quickly grows in 
ranks. His narrative of his colonels reveals much ignorance and gambling on their part. 
However, some of them “give” a lot of money to our Zarif (for what?) and he mentions 
them with gratitude, while a certain ġerif Pasha still owes him forty to fifty thousand 
piastres. 
Mustafa Zarif becomes a ferik (division general) in 1845 at the age of 29 without 
commanding any units in battle. He works first at the head of some military production 
then in the military tribunal. At all steps he records his salary and his side earnings. 
Thus we learn that as a ferik, he receives a salary of 25,000 piastres, which is more than 
the usual salary of a ferik. Then in 1847 he is appointed mutasarrıf of Jerusalem, with a 
salary of 27,500 piastres. A British doctor is beaten there for entering the great mosque 
by some Arabs. When the British authorities insist on the punishment of the culprits, 
Zarif Pasha temporizes with them, eventually returning to Istanbul under pressure. At 
that time Stratford Canning was again the British ambassador in Istanbul. (Thus when 
Zarif Pasha was arrested in 1854 for his misconduct of the Anatolian army, he would 
                                                 
575  Şecaat arzederken merd-i Kıpti sirkatin söyler. 
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see this as the work of the British ambassador). In 1852 Zarif Mustafa Pasha was 
appointed governor of Erzurum.  
Mustafa Zarif Pasha in his memoirs tries to tell all his services as governor and as 
commander of the army. He claims that in the present war he spent 2,000 purses
576
 from 
his own pocket for the sake of the state. But then the question arises naturally: Where 
did he get this money from? (2,000 purses were equal to 40 months of a ferik‟s pay). 
During his interrogation at the MVL, Zarif Pasha again says that he gave more than 
100,000 piastres (200 purses) as bahşiş to soldiers who worked in the construction of 
fortifications.
577
 Salih Hayri in his zafername states that Zarif Pasha had “hoarded” 
much money for his own benefit.
578
 Likewise, Charles Duncan argues that Zarif Pasha 
had appropriated 15,000 purses when he was a still a bey in the civil administration of 
an army.
579
 Thus, according to Charles Duncan, at that time Zarif Pasha had been 
removed from his post for this act. He had also repaid some portion of the embezzled 
money. However, the current seraskier Hazan Rıza Pasha protected him and soon he 
returned to state services.
580
 While we do not know the accuracy of this specific 
information, it is perfectly possible, because we know that many corrupt pashas, even 
those convicted ones returned to their posts after a while. Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha is 
the best known example of this.  
While the new campaign season was nearing, the Porte tried to reinforce its 
armies, including the Anatolian army which had been greatly reduced during the winter 
by deaths from diseases and desertions of especially the başıbozuk and the redif. New 
forces of recruits, redifs, and baĢıbozuks were pouring from Arabistan and Anatolia to 
Erzurum. Provisions and ammunition were being sent from Istanbul to the port of 
Trabzon, but from then onwards it was a very difficult journey on mules and camels. 
The Russian army was also receiving reinforcements since the allied fleets had not yet 
blockaded the Black Sea. 
                                                 
576   See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 472. 2,000 purses make 10,000 Ottoman pounds, equal to about 
8,000 pounds sterling at that time, which is approximately 480,000 pounds sterling at current 
prices. The Sicill-i Osmani records Zarif Mustafa Pasha as “possessor of great wealth”. See 
Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 1706. 
577  Zarif Mustafa Pasha‟s answers to questions in the MVL. February 1855. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 
9. See Appendix 85. 
578  “Kendi nef‟ın gözetip hem-vâre, İdhâr eyledi hayli pâre”. Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 150. The editor 
has mistransliterated the word “iddihâr” as “idhâr”. 
579   Duncan, op. cit., p. 182. 
580  In April 1857 Zarif Pasha was entitled to a salary of unemployment (mezuliyet maaşı) of 15,000 
piastres. See BOA. Ġ. HR. 375/24803, 21 April 1857 and BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 223/65, 3 May 
1857. Then, in October 1857, he became president of the Dâr-ı Şûra-yı Askerî. See Mehmed 
Süreyya, ibid. 
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The allied fleets finally entered the eastern part of the Black Sea in April. The 
Russians had evacuated all the coast line from Anapa down to Redutkale,
581
 because 
they had no chance against the combined allied fleets. Towards the end of May, the 
commander of the British fleet Admiral Dundas informed his Ottoman colleague 
Ahmed Pasha that “from Kertch to Batoum the only fortresses in the possession of 
Russia are Anapa and Soujak”.582 Soon these two fortresses were also captured by the 
allies. 
While the Porte wanted to attack Russia in the Caucasus, the allies were not 
interested as much. Both Britain and France had as a primary aim the destruction of the 
Russian Black Sea fleet and the naval base at Sevastopol. Any other targets were 
secondary for them. Nevertheless they had sent officers to Batum, Circassia, Trabzon, 
Erzurum and Kars. The prospects of a combined Ottoman-Circassian-Shamil offensive 
did not look bright to them. As we have seen above, the Ottoman armies had 
experienced a harsh winter and nearly half of the troops in Kars and Batum had died of 
diseases like typhus and malaria. The Circassians were divided among themselves and 
the murids of Shamil were easily kept at bay by the Russians. The Christian population 
of most of Georgia was united under the Russian command.
583
 
 
 
3.6.1.  Relations with Shamil and the Circassians in 1854-55 
 
 
By the beginning of the 1854 campaign season, Shamil had accomplished the task 
given to him by the caliph, namely the task of uniting and subduing most of the khans 
and ümera of the Caucasus in the name of the Ottoman cause. According to the 
testimony of Mahmud Efendi, who had been sent to Shamil by the former seraskier 
Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha and returned to Istanbul in April 1854, Shamil stated that he 
had secured the loyalty of many Caucasian Muslim khans to the Porte. They were 
Major-General Cemedi (?) Khan, General Ebuselim Shemkhal Khan, General Ağalar 
Khan, General Yusuf Khan, General Hasay Khan and General Danyal Sultan. These 
khans, who were all given the rank of general by Russia, all stated their loyalty to the 
caliph and readiness for joint action against Russia. However, unless the Anatolian 
                                                 
581   The word redut is from redoubt and kale is a fortress. 
582   Vice-Admiral Dundas to Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha, the Britannia off Baljik [Balçık], 25 May 
1854.  BOA. HR. SYS. 1348/73 lef 1. 
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army attacked and took the fortress of Gümrü, they would not feel safe and would not 
openly declare their support for the Porte. Therefore they had not yet declared their 
support of the Porte and they were waiting the action of the Ottoman army. Otherwise 
they would be vulnerable in the face of Russian vengeance if the Ottoman army did not 
move against Gümrü and Tiflis.584  
Meanwhile Halil Pasha of Dagestan had also returned from Dagestan. He 
suggested conferring some ranks to these khans of Dagestan. Consequently, a 
provisional council (Meclis-i Muvakkat) convened on 15 May 1854 and proposed to 
give the following ranks and titles: Sheikh Shemuil Efendi would receive the rank of 
vizier and the title of Dağıstan Serdar-ı Ekremi (Commander-in-Chief of Dagestan), his 
son Gazi Muhammed would be Mirliva (Brigadier-General), Ebu Selim Shemkhal Khan 
the rank of Ferik (Lieutenant-General), Cemed (?) Khan, Hasay (?) Khan, Danyal 
Sultan and Ġsmail Pasha would also become Mirlivas. These appointments would be 
kept secret for the time being. The grand vizier then submitted the decision to the Sultan 
on 24 May 1854 and the appointments were approved on the next day.
585
 
Nevertheless, apart from distributing ranks and titles to Circassian and Dagestani 
notables, the Porte practically did little. Shamil‟s naib in Circassia, Muhammed Emin, 
in a letter written in Arabic, dated 21 May 1854, complained that six months passed 
after receiving some gunpowder but nothing came from the sea (that is, from the 
Porte).
586
 He had received orders from Shamil
587
 to march towards Georgia with the 
forces of the Abzeh tribe. Shamil informed him that he would also march in that 
direction and they would meet if possible. Muhammed Emin also complained of not 
receiving instructions from the Porte: 
   We need to know the aim of the Sublime State and also what to do and how to 
be here and what news to send to Sheikh Shemuil. However no orders have 
appeared from your grand vizirial Excellency except for only conferment of 
reward and favour and expressions of affection [“taltif ve ibraz-ı muhabbet”]. 
When I contemplate on the situation I wish the Sublime State had sent some 
troops here, more or less. Then I have thought in my inadequate mind that a great 
victory would have been gained. Because, although there is a distance of one 
month between Anapa and Temürkapu from the mountains, it is less by way of 
                                                 
584   See Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 56-57, transcription of the document is at p. 134. However, the 
transcription contains several errors, for example, reading “taraf-ı mugayir” instead of “turuk ve 
meabir”. The date of the document is also mistransliterated as 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1270, whereas it 
should be 22 Receb 1270, therefore it corresponds to 20 April 1854, and not to 20 February 1854. 
585   BOA. Ġ. DH. 19040. Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 134-135.  
586   BOA. Ġ. DH. 19234, dated 23 ġaban 1270 (21 May 1854). For the text of the translation of this 
letter, see Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 135-137. The date of the letter, however, is mistransliterated 
as 23 Ramazan 1270 (19 June 1854). 
587   In the original Arabic letter, the name is Shemuil, but the translator has turned it into Shamil. 
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plains. Since the population of the mountains is from old times brave and warlike, 
if they had seen some regular imperial troops with us, then the population of the 
places under Russian rule would hasten to submit to our rule. Thanks to the 
majority of the Circassian population, the affairs of the mountains would have 
been completed and the Russians‟ road to Tiflis would be cut in the vicinity of the 
Abzeh tribe. Then the Russians would leave Tiflis by their own will, or it would 
be attacked from all sides by the mountain population down to children. They 
would not know what to do since they would have to deal with both the Danube 
and the mountains and then they could not have found enough troops to cope with 
all.
588
 [My simplified translation] 
 
The allied fleets sent a steam squadron to the Circassian coasts in May 1854. The 
Ottoman fleet (including the Egyptian squadron) with Sefer and Behcet Pashas and 
many Circassian notables with their families as well as gifts from the Sultan for 
Circassian chiefs also wanted to join the allies off Sevastopol and go to Circassia. The 
fleet would make Sohum a base for its operations and embark 4,000 troops at Batum to 
transfer to the Circassian coast. The Kapudan Pasha had already informed the allied 
admirals by letter and by verbal message of the sailing of the Ottoman squadron to the 
same destination. The appearance of the Ottoman fleet and troops was intended to 
encourage the Circassians to rise against the Russians. The fleet was commanded by 
Ferik Kayserili Ahmed Pasha and it also included 12 European officers to instruct the 
Circassian militia, artillery officers, ammunition and small arms. Thus it was composed 
of 8 line-of-battle ships, 3 frigates, 4 corvettes and brigs, 5 steam frigates and 3 steam 
corvettes mounting 1,100 guns sailed from the Bosphorus on 6 May 1854.
589
 
The Ottoman fleet went to Varna where it found a rather offensive letter from 
Vice-Admiral Dundas to Ahmed Pasha, in which Admiral Dundas informed Ahmed 
Pasha that he had received Kapudan Pasha‟s letter, but his and Admiral Hamelin‟s 
opinion was that the Ottoman fleet should “cruise along the coasts of Bulgaria and 
Roumelia, between the Danube and the Bosphorus, until the return of Rear-Admiral 
Lyons from the coast of Circassia and the arrival of the combined squadrons at 
Varna”.590 Thus the British admiral slighted Kapudan Pasha and gave directions to the 
Ottoman fleet without even consulting him! Mushaver Pasha bitterly observed that, if 
Ahmed Pasha had any sense of dignity, he would have given an appropriate answer and 
steered for Batum without the company of the allied fleet. But Ahmed Pasha did not 
want to offend the allied admirals. He feared that the Porte would not support him in 
case of complaint on his part. We must note that he was right in his prediction. Thus he 
                                                 
588   BOA. Ġ. DH. 19234 lef 2. Cf. Budak, op. cit., 1988, pp. 135-137. 
589   Slade, op. cit., p. 224. 
590   Slade, op. cit., p. 225. 
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acted like a typical career-building Ottoman pasha. The Ottoman system promoted 
people like him, who thought of their selfish interests and career more than any 
concerns of dignity.  
As a way out Ahmed Pasha requested Mushaver Pasha to go to Sevastopol to 
negotiate with the allied admirals. Mushaver Pasha found the allied fleet off Sevastopol 
on 11 May. He had noted down a memorandum for the admirals, explaining the 
importance of the mission. The memorandum read in part as follows:   
   With orders to proceed to the coast of Circassia, after consultation with the 
allied admirals, the Turkish fleet has left the Bosphorus. Sefer Pasha and Behchet 
Pasha with 300 of their countrymen, and several European officers to act as 
talimgis (instructors), are embarked in it. Those pashas bear the Sultan‟s firman, 
empowering them to act in his name, and are carrying nishans of merit and berats 
of rank to influential chieftains. In their opinion, unless the Caucasians operate 
timely in concert and with strategy, the Russian advance in Asia will be certain. 
There are embarked in the fleet a battery complete with artillery officers and 300 
rounds for each gun, 500 barrels of gunpowder, 500 cases of musket cartridges, 
400 cases of muskets, 2,000 pistols, 20 cases of cutlasses, 10,000 moulds of lead 
... It is anticipated that with the aid of 4,000 regular troops, the marines of the 
fleet, European military instructors, field-pieces, and other named munitions of 
war, the Circassians will be able to act offensively on the enemy‟s territory.591 
 
Mushaver Pasha added that the Circassians were already expecting the Ottoman 
fleet as the signal for their gathering and it if did not soon appear off their coast, then 
doubts would arise in their minds of the Porte‟s sincerity. However, Admiral Dundas 
met this proposal very coldly. He was astonished that his directions to the Ottoman fleet 
had been disregarded because he said that fleet had been placed under his orders. 
Mushaver Pasha then visited Admiral Hamelin. Hamelin admitted the importance of the 
Circassian mission but he was worried that the Russian fleet might pursue the Ottoman 
fleet and another disaster might happen. Mushaver Pasha said that if the Russian fleet 
dared to move from Sevastopol then it would be all the worse for it and a good 
opportunity for the allied fleets. The Ottoman fleet was also in a much better position 
now. Yet Admiral Hamelin was of the opinion that if the Ottoman fleet went to 
Circassia then the allies should remain off Sevastopol, which was out of question. He 
also said that he had already been blamed for the Sinop disaster and now did not want to 
risk a repetition. Two days later, Admiral Dundas gave his and Admiral Hamelin‟s 
collective answer in a message to Ahmed Pasha, which was now even insulting. The 
admirals simply repeated their request laconically and added that future 
communications should be made in writing, “as verbal messages may lead to serious 
                                                 
591   Slade, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 
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inconveniences and mistakes”.592 The allied admirals had treated the Ottoman 
Commander-in-Chief very lowly and described a mission entrusted by him to a flag 
officer as a verbal message. Furthermore, they themselves had given a verbal message 
for the Ottoman fleet to leave Balçık exclusively for the anchorage of the allied fleets. 
When Mushaver Pasha brought the news to Varna the Circassian pashas were 
desperate. Ahmet Pasha however did not take much offence. After several days of 
counselling, he finally signed a letter to the allied admirals, where he tried to 
reemphasise the importance of the mission and the reasons for sending Mushaver Pasha 
to them.
593
 He also wrote that in compliance of their wish, he had anchored at Kavarna, 
leaving Balçık for the allies. The allied fleets came to Balçık after a week. As they 
passed Kavarna, the Ottoman fleet saluted them and showed all signs of respect. The 
admirals informed Ahmet Pasha that next time he should come to visit them without 
Mushaver Pasha, thus showing their anger with him. They even conspicuously did not 
invite Mushaver Pasha to an official dinner on 24 May in honour of the Queen‟s 
birthday, while inviting all the pashas and one bey from the Ottoman fleet. Ironically, it 
was a British officer who defended Ottoman interests to the extent of inflicting the 
scorn of the allied admirals on himself, while the Ottoman commander complied 
obediently with all the wishes of the allies. 
Meanwhile the French steamer Mogador brought the first news from the 
Circassian expedition of the Anglo-French squadron. The Russians had evacuated the 
coast from Anapa to Redutkale. Sohumkale was in the hands of Circassians. The allied 
squadron had embarked an Ottoman battalion from Batum to occupy Redutkale, which 
was then being evacuated by the Russians. The allied admirals then ordered the 
Ottoman pashas whom they had invited to dinner, to hastily transfer their passengers 
and ammunition intended for Circassia to an English screw line-of-battle ship (the Sans 
Pareil) and two Ottoman steam frigates to depart that very evening to Sohumkale and 
Redutkale. The Ottoman sail ships were to remain in Kavarna. The Ottomans proposed 
to take four steam frigates to tow four line-of-battle ships, but the admirals would not 
hear of it. Thus they wanted to turn the Ottoman expedition to Circassia into a 
consignment. Instead of an Ottoman squadron appearing at the Circassian coast with all 
pomp and ceremony, disembarking its envoys with dignity, the Ottoman Circassian 
                                                 
592   Slade, op. cit., p. 235. 
593   The letter is given by Slade in its original French together with an English translation. Ahmed 
Pasha in his letter also mentions the envoyé of Shamil among the passengers.  However, as we 
have seen from the above letter of Muhammed Emin dated 21 May 1854, this cannot be 
Muhammed Emin. See Slade, op. cit., pp. 446-448. 
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pashas with their retinue, families and goods would be cast into the coast of Circassia 
like ordinary passengers or adventurers from crowded transports. As Slade observes, 
this would not fail to diminish the importance of the Porte in the eyes of the Circassians. 
The allied admirals did not even accept a delay until next forenoon. Thus the Ottoman 
pashas returned to their ships without dinner. They had again obeyed an insulting order. 
Pashas, military instructors, traders, women, children, field-pieces, small arms, 
gunpowder, provisions etc were transferred in five hours from a dozen vessels into three 
steamers with much natural confusion and damage. The European instructors swore 
loudly at the admirals.
594
 
Four days after the Mogador, the British Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons also 
arrived from the coast of Circassia. Sir Edmund reported that the Circassians were 
divided among themselves and requesting troops for action against the Russians.
595
 But 
he was opposed to the expedition of the Ottoman fleet to Circassian coasts. Upon this 
the allied admirals now totally disapproved of an Ottoman expedition. Then they asked 
Ahmed Pasha to write to the seraskier to request troops to be sent to Circassia. The 
Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha replied that they gave the fleet with orders to take 4,000 
troops from Batum and the Allies‟ admirals had detained it at Kavarna. The reason for 
the allied admirals‟ desire to keep the Ottoman fleet idle nearby was, as Slade remarks, 
to prevent its activity in the Circassian coasts as compared to their inactivity at Balçık, 
thus being subject to the criticism of public opinion.  
Then these “gallant admirals” spent all the summer lying at Balçık until 
September, from time to time sending a few steamers to inspect Sevastopol. While this 
was of course not an effective blockade, the renown of the British fleet was enough to 
keep the Russian fleet unmoved in the harbour of Sevastopol. If the Russians could have 
guessed this allied inactivity, they could have done much harm. But in this war such 
blunders and such lost opportunities on all sides were numerous. The allied fleets did 
not do much and did not allow the Ottomans do anything with regard to Circassia. They 
apparently did not want the Ottomans to be strong in Circassia. 
About the middle of June, the Ottoman fleet was allowed to come to Balçık. When 
the Ottomans wanted to cruise the Anatolian coasts, the allies were again opposed, 
fearful of letting the Ottoman fleet out of their reach, for it might go to Circassia. When 
they ordered it to go and lie at Varna, the Ottoman admirals finally lost patience and 
gathered enough courage to ask kindly why they were being held idle at Varna. The 
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allies replied that were waiting for an answer from their embassies. Finally the Porte 
decided to recall its fleet (except for two line-of-battle ships) to Istanbul, because there 
was no sense to keep it in Varna if it was not to do anything. The Ottoman fleet 
anchored in the Bosphorus on 3 July 1854.
596
 
Thus the allied admirals had prevented the Ottoman expedition to Circassia. 
However, why did not the Ottoman admirals simply go to Circassia on their own? 
Wasn‟t it clear that the Russian fleet would not dare to get out of Sevastopol, when the 
allied fleets had shown themselves off Sevastopol? The only reasonable explanation 
seems to be in the lack of leadership together with the atmosphere of distrust in the 
Porte. Nobody wanted to take responsibility for anything, always passing the buck and 
always trying to depend on the authority of some other body. 
Sefer Pasha, Behcet Pasha and other Circassians of rank landed in this way on the 
shore, without honours from an Ottoman fleet, did not of course produce a big 
impression on the Circassians. They had returned like refugees. Furthermore the 
presents remained in the hands of those who brought them. Behcet Pasha was involved 
in his personal affairs and Sefer Pasha could not regain his old influence. The military 
instructors were left unguided and unattended to. The Circassians felt betrayed by the 
Porte, because they had expected the Ottoman fleet to come with Ottoman troops.
597
 
In mid-July 1854, Shamil made his second and last attack on the Russian positions 
in Georgia for the rest of the war, attempting to reach the Ottoman army. With a force 
of about 15,000 cavalry and infantry, he advanced towards Tiflis, coming as near as 
Shildi 60 kilometres north-east of Tiflis. While Shamil camped on Mount Pakhalis-
Tavi, he sent a force of 10,000 infantry and cavalry into the Alazan valley under the 
command of his son Gazi Muhammed and Danyal Sultan (or Daniel Bek?). They were 
about to break the Russian line but the native Georgian population, the Kakhetians, 
resisted his forces with determination. After three days of fighting in the Alazan valley, 
Russian reinforcements under the command of Prince David Chavchavadze arrived and 
dispersed the murid force. Shamil retreated to Dagestan on 22 July.
598
 Meanwhile, a 
detachment commanded by his son Gazi Muhammed raided Prince Chavchavadze‟s 
summer house in Tsinondali and brought many prisoners and much booty. Among the 
                                                 
596  Besbelli, op. cit., p. 65. 
597  Slade, op. cit., p. 243. Besbelli, op. cit., p. 63. 
598  Major Prince Baratov, “Opisanie nashestviya skopisch‟ Shamilya na Kakhetiyu v 1854 godu”, 
Kavkavskiy Sbornik, tom I, Tiflis, 1876, pp. 237-267. Budak (op. cit., 1993, pp. 88-90) also gives 
Shamil‟s force as 15,000 men, referring to the newspaper CH and Gammer‟s unpublished 
dissertation of 1989. Gammer (op. cit., 1994, p. 270), however, gives Shamil‟s force as consisting 
of 7,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. Cf. Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 178-179.  
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prisoners were Princess Anna, the wife of Prince David Chavchavadze and Princess 
Varvara, the widow of Prince Iliko Orbeliani (granddaughters of the last Georgian king) 
with their children and their French governess Madame Anna Drancy. Shamil hoped to 
exchange them for his son Jemaleddin who was a captive in the court of St. 
Petersburg.
599
 
However, the news of the capture of these women caused quite a sensation.
600
 The 
French embassy demanded an order to be given to Mustafa Pasha the commander of the 
Batum army to search in cooperation with the French consul in Batum Mr Steyert for 
Madame Drancy, daughter of French postal employee Mr Lemaire.
601
 Accordingly an 
order was sent to Mustafa Pasha.
602
 For Lord Stratford it was also an outrage, because 
the information he received was that two young ladies and their French governess were 
murdered. Therefore he urged the Porte to apply to the Sultan to write to Shamil or 
cause a letter to be written to him to release the surviving women and children and to 
condemn strongly the murdering and kidnapping of women and children. On 23 
September 1854 Stratford gave instructions to his head dragoman to be conveyed to 
ReĢid Pasha: 
   I brought verbally under Reshid Pasha's notice some days ago an occurrence 
which has been stated in the public prints. It appears from the published 
statement, to which I allude, that an act of barbarous atrocity has been committed 
in Georgia by a party of soldiers, - it may be presumed, irregulars, detached from 
Sheik Shamyl's army. These practical marauders are described as having attacked 
the country house of some person of wealth and official distinction in Georgia. 
The owner was absent. No resistance was made. Two young ladies and their 
French governess were, nevertheless, murdered by them in the house. The 
proprietor's wife, a lady of rank and education, was carried off to the mountains 
with several female friends, her guests at the time. I need not remark to you that 
these are circumstances which shock every feeling of humanity. They are not the 
acts of soldiers, but of assassins. Honorable war rejects them, and honorable men 
can have no sympathy with the perpetrators.
603
 
 
Stratford stated that an officer from the Kars army together with a British officer should 
                                                 
599   For a romanticized story of their captivity, see Lesley Blanch. The Sabres of Paradise. NY: Carroll 
& Graf Publishers, 1995. 
600   See Journal de Constantinople, nr. 536, 29 Aout 1854, nr. 537, 4 Septembre 1854, Ceride-i 
Havadis, nr. 704, 9 Zilhicce 1270 (2 September 1854). Budak argues that one of the results of this 
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602   BOA. HR. MKT. 91/14. 
603   Stratford de Redcliffe‟s instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, Therapia, 23 September 
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HR. 114/5577. 
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be detached to present the letter to Shamil and bring the ladies back. “No expense need 
be incurred by the Porte for the object of benevolence”, wrote Stratford, adding insult to 
injury. It is interesting that the wording of Stratford‟s note is much more severe than the 
French note. 
 Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha applied to the Sultan on 12 October 1854, 
stating that some başıbozuks from the army of Shamil had perpetrated atrocities, killing 
two young ladies and their governess and kidnapping women of from a notable 
family.
604
 Thus the grand vizier repeated the wrong information concerning the murder 
of women. He asked for a letter of advice and warning to be sent to Shamil, advising 
him to punish the culprits and prevent the happening of such events in the future. The 
letter was to be sent with Dagestani Enis Efendi from the Bureau of Translation. He 
would be given verbal instructions as well. His travel allowance would also be given. 
The draft of the letter was attached. The Sultan approved it. 
 The letter to Shamil first began with praising him for his brave war for the cause 
of Islam. Then the news of the murder and kidnapping of women was related. It was 
stated that a groups of baĢıbozuks had attacked innocent children and women. Although 
it was certain that Shamil as a pious man would punish such an act contrary to the 
sheriat, it was necessary to carry out the punishment of those responsible for this 
deplorable act because Shamil‟s name could be defamed. Therefore Shamil was 
required to punish the culprits and to return the women to their families. Furthermore, 
Russian prisoners of war should be kept well according to international rules. In general 
the tone of the letter was not offensive, but certainly it would not please Shamil.
605
  
 Stratford had also written to the British military commissioner in the Anatolian 
army Colonel William Fenwick Williams (1800-1883) in Kars, requesting him to 
exercise his influence with Sheikh Shamil to get the women released. Williams wrote a 
letter to Shamil, but the letter seems to have reached Shamil rather late, after Shamil 
exchanged the ladies for his son Jemaleddin and 40,000 silver roubles on 22 March 
1855.
606
 Shamil‟s reply to Williams, dated 12 Receb 1271 (31 March 1855), written in 
Arabic and translated by Williams‟ secretary for Ottoman, Henry Churchill, reads in 
part as follows: 
   We thank you for the notice you take of our dignity and honour, and for giving 
us a place amongst worthy men; and though we may not be that in truth and 
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reality, God forbid that we should do anything which might be considered 
disgraceful by the Mohammedan laws or by the exalted government [the Sublime 
Porte?]. We had liberated the women before the arrival of your letter, and had you 
been acquainted with the true circumstances you would not have found fault with 
us; for everybody knows that we are always humane; that we expend our breath in 
reciting the holy words of the Lord of the Creation, and scorn the enmity of the 
infidels our foes.
607
 
 
A Russian account from 1860, when Shamil was already in captivity in Kaluga, 
gives his narrative of this event: 
   At the very beginning of the war he [Shamil] received an offer to prepare to 
meet the allied forces at Imereti. Expressing his agreement Shamil immediately 
took steps to carry out his plan… In the spring of 1854 he marched towards the 
district of Chartalah… He intended to march on Tiflis, but in order to act more 
freely, he sent to inform the Ottoman commanders in Kars and in Abkhazeti of his 
intentions. Awaiting an answer, he sent his son with all the cavalry and some 
infantry into Kakheti, while he himself with the rest of his force camped near one 
of our forts… Soon he received an answer, the contents of which were extremely 
insulting. Instead of being grateful for his expressed readiness to cooperate with 
the plans of the allies and for the speed with which he had carried out his promise, 
he was reproached and told off as a common subject.
608
 
 
After this event, Shamil remained on the defence. In any case he and his followers must 
have felt great disappointment from the Ottoman defeats by the Russians. Nevertheless 
he continued to seek the favour of the caliph and use this favour to enhance his political 
standing. 
Shamil‟s naib in Circassia Muhammed Emin was made a pasha with the rank of 
mirmiran in May 1854.
609
 He came to Istanbul with seventy notables of Circassia in 
July 1854 for negotiations. In August Ferik Alyanak Mustafa Pasha (?-1884) from the 
Rumeli army, although unsuccessful against the Russians in the Babadağ region, was 
promoted the rank of müĢir and sent to Batum to replace Mehmed Selim Pasha as the 
commander of the Batum army. Alyanak Mustafa Pasha was apparently chosen because 
of his Circassian origins. Ömer Pasha had also recommended him.610 On the request of 
Mustafa Pasha, Muhammed Emin and his notables received monetary rewards (atıyye-i 
seniyye) before leaving Istanbul.
611
 We do not know, however, what instructions he 
received.  
                                                 
607   See Colonel Atwell Lake, Kars and Our Captivity in Russia, London: Richard Bentley, 1856, pp. 
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MüĢir Alyanak Mustafa Pasha in Batum tried to gain the sympathy of the 
Circassian, Abkhazian and Georgian notables. He sent them gifts and letters inviting 
them to join the Ottoman side. Especially he tried to win the Abkhazian Prince Hamid 
(or Abdülhamid) Bey, whose Russian or Christian name was Mikhail Shervashidze.612 
In his letter to Hamid Bey, dated 4 October 1854, Mustafa Pasha promised him on 
behalf of the Sultan all titles and ranks and rewards that Russia had given him. He 
argued that all states had now joined the Ottoman Empire and Russia was soon going to 
collapse (yakın vakitte bütün bütün altı üstüne gelecektir). Now by this war the Porte 
would no longer leave those territories and its population to Russia. Therefore Mustafa 
Pasha had now been appointed as the commander of the Batum army and muhafız of all 
Abkhazia and Circassia with a lot of troops and preparations. He continued his message 
as follows: 
   You have passed over to the Russian side since long and remained there, leaving 
your country, land and state. However since you belong to a great dynasty here 
and since you are an outstanding, intelligent bey, I don‟t believe that you would 
leave this place and prefer our enemies the Muscovites. I have even heard when I 
came to Sohum that you intended to join the Sublime State and serve it. Therefore 
I guess that the reason for your remaining there is that perhaps you are with us 
from inside and Russian only in appearance and your real intention and effort is to 
understand the conditions and weak side of the Russians? For nothing is 
impossible in the world.. Did some improper people come to you and stir your 
mind by some lies? Or did they do anything to offend you, hitherto being unable 
to tell you properly how kind and affectionate the Sublime State will be to such 
worthy beys as you? Your stay there is of course for one of these reasons. In any 
case, such things are possible.
613
 [My translation] 
 
Mustafa Pasha then invited him to the Ottoman side with all honours, addressing 
him as “fellow countryman” since Mustafa Pasha was from Anapa (Ey hemşerim 
işitmişsinizdir ki ben dahi Anapa‟dan çıkmış olduğumdan buralı demek olurum). 
Hamid Bey was now in a difficult situation. He had to choose between Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire with its allies. Yet the Porte did not impart much confidence and 
the allies were not clear in their intentions for Abkhazia and Circassia. Did they plan an 
independent Abkhazia and Circassia? Did they want to annex these countries to the 
Ottoman Empire? What protection did they offer against Russia after the war? 
Naturally, he was afraid of being left to Russian hands if he sided with the allies and if 
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the allies were not permanent in Circassia. So he chose a way between, trying to 
appease both sides. Meanwhile Mustafa Pasha had been authorized by the sultan to 
distribute salaries and ranks from lieutenant to ferik to influential and willing 
notables.
614
 
In 1855, the allies, instead of depending on the expertise of the Porte on relations 
with the Circassians, quite independently sent their agents to Circassia to organize the 
Circassian tribes.
615
 The British sent Mr Longworth as “civil commissioner” and the 
French sent Mr Champoiseau as consul to Redutkale.
616
 Lord Stratford asked the Porte 
to issue orders to Mustafa Pasha at Batum to assist these agents in every way.
617
 There 
is no doubt that the orders were issued. These agents, however, would achieve very 
little. Furthermore the allies tried to check and supervise all operations of the Porte by 
attaching military commissioners to its armies.  
The British former Secretary of State for War, the Duke of Newcastle
618
 made a 
six weeks tour of Circassia and the northern part of Georgia in the autumn of 1855. 
There he saw Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin as well. His impressions and his 
opinions in his letter to the British foreign minister reflect the opinion of at least part of 
the British government:  
   I had most unusually good opportunities of seeing the two principal Mahometan 
Magnates of Circassia – Sefer Pacha and the Naib – indeed as regards the latter 
very remarkable man I doubt if anybody has seen so much. Sefer is an effete old 
rogue and robber – just the man whom you might expect to find as deriving his 
authority from the Sultan and of course thwarting every English view of policy. 
He must be recalled by the Porte but nobody ought to be sent in his stead - 
anybody she so sent will be just as bad and the Porte has no right to send anybody. 
                                                 
614  Grand vizier‟s petition and the Sultan‟s irade, 20-21 Safer 1271 (12-13 November 1854). BOA. Ġ. 
MMS. 3/97 lef 3, cited by Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 88. See Appendix 75. Budak states that 
“Abdülhamid Bey” was given a salary of 2,000 piastres and the rank of mirmiran. However, the 
document mentions not him but a certain “Mağan Kasi” to be rewarded with this rank and salary. 
This person was an Abkhazian notable from Samurzakan, Katsi Marganiya, who held the rank of 
lieutenant-general in the Russian army. See K. Borozdin, Omer Pasha v Mingrelii, St Petersburg, 
1873, p. 29. 
615  Lord Redcliffe‟s instructions to head dragoman Pisani, 27 May 1855. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/166, cited 
by Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 148. Budak gives the name of the French official as “Champassaur”. 
616   John Augustus Longworth (?-1875) was one of David Urquhart‟s agents to Circassia in the 1840s 
and British consul in Monastir in 1851-60. From April 1855 he was sent with special mission to 
Circassia. Charles François Noël Champoiseau (1830-1909) was French vice consul in Redutkale 
in 1855-1857. MüĢir Mustafa Pasha wrote to the Porte on 20 May 1855 on Champoiseau‟s mission 
to Redutkale. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/54. It seems that both of them were in Sohum at the time 
of Ömer Pasha‟s campaign. Laurence Oliphant writes that “during my stay at Souchoum I was 
hospitably entertained by Mons. Champoiseau, the French consul”. This was in the first week of 
October 1855. Oliphant notes that Mr Longworth was also there. See Oliphant, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
617  Stratford‟s instructions to Pisani, to be read to Fuad Pasha, 27 May 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 
1352/64. 
618  Henry Pelham Pelham-Clinton, 5th Duke of Newcastle-under-Lyne, (1811-1864). Secretary of 
State for War and the Colonies, 1852-1854, Secretary of State for War 1854 - 30 January 1855. 
188 
Turkey never had any real possession of the Country – her rights in Anapa were 
just like ours in Gibraltar and whatever rights she had she resigned by the treaty of 
Adrianople. She has not recovered them by conquest. English & French Arms 
have set free the littoral of Circassia, and it is monstrous to see the Turkish flag 
flying in every deserted Russian fort & to witness attempts to establish Turkish 
government in the Country. Omer Pacha quite concurs in this view and he has 
removed some of the scoundrels whom he found feathering their nests at 
Soukoum Kaleh, Bathum, and other places, - but even he can hardly make head 
against this system of complicated iniquity.
619
 
 
Newcastle added that Ömer Pasha was now aware of the dangers of sending a Muslim 
army into a Christian country. Newcastle also wrote that Ömer Pasha told him that an 
English or French army ought to be where he is and he ought to be on the Kuban. 
Newcastle reminded Clarendon that Britain ought to declare to the Circassians and the 
Georgians their future plans for their country and give guarantees for their liberty after 
they make peace with Russia. Finally Newcastle told Clarendon that his agent in 
Circassia Mr Longworth was unfit for the job.  
The power struggle between Sefer Pasha and Muhammed Emin in Circassia 
finally resulted in an armed conflict between them. A letter from Muhammed Emin, 
dated 30 December 1855, informs the grand vizier that Sefer Pasha had attacked 
Muhammed Emin‟s men and himself while he was residing at the courthouse built with 
the approval of Serdar-ı Ekrem Ömer Pasha and Sefer Pasha in ġapsuğ region.620 
Muhammed Emin writes that Sefer Pasha‟s attack was repulsed but again he gathered 
some regular troops with three guns and some bandits and attacked from Anapa into 
Abkhazia, plundering Muslim property. They again fought and Sefer Pasha retreated. 
The naib pasha adds that cavalry Brigadier-General (Mirliva) Ali Pasha has also 
organized conspiracies among the Circassians against him. Finally he expressed his 
concerns on the fate of Islam in the region. 
There are basically two approaches in Ottoman and Turkish historiography to 
Shamil‟s role in the Crimean War. The first one is represented by Cevdet Pasha, who 
accused Shamil of remaining silent as if he had made an agreement with the Russians. 
His evaluation of the attitudes of Shamil and the Circassians to the war is interesting 
and worth quoting at some length here: 
   Unfortunately, Sheikh Shamil of Dagestan, having grappled with the Russians 
in Dagestan for so many years, did not show the action expected of him during the 
Crimean War. He retreated to an onlooker‟s position as if he had concluded an 
                                                 
619  Newcastle to Clarendon, Sinop, 3 November 1855. AGKK, Englische Akten zur Geschichte des 
Krimkriegs, Band 4, Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988, p. 284. 
620  Translation of an Arabic letter from Muhammed Emin to the grand vizier, dated 20 Rebiyyülahir 
1271 (30 December 1855). BOA. HR. TO. 424/37 lef 2. See Appendix 105. 
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armistice with Russia and while the coasts from Batum to Anapa were captured 
by the allied states, the Abkhazian and Circassian tribes also remained like 
neutral. Actually the cold attitude of the Circassians was also caused by the errors 
of this [our] side. Because those sent by the Sublime State to summon these tribes 
were of slave origins. But the Circassians did not trust the slaves whom they had 
sold. They did not esteem at all the titles and addresses of pasha and bey which 
we had given. The British for their part, as soon as they approached those coasts, 
advised first the prohibition of the sale of male and female slaves. But if the 
Circassians were to abandon their old customs and habits, then for them there was 
no difference between the Russians and the English. In short, the reasons and 
means used by both the Sublime Porte and the Europeans to gain the tribes of the 
Caucasus caused their hate and therefore the desired aims were not attained.
621
 
[My translation] 
 
The second approach is to accuse the Ottoman Empire for not having rendered 
enough assistance to the Caucasian peoples. The representatives of this approach are 
usually the Caucasian Ottomans or Turkish citizens of Caucasian origins.
622
 I find this 
position closer to reality. Because the Circassians and Shamil, having no regular troops 
or gun power could not be expected to fight the Russians in their field without help 
from the Porte. It was the Ottoman Empire that should come to their help. By his 
presence alone and by his two raids towards Tiflis, Shamil had already rendered 
invaluable service to the Porte, because he had kept a significant number of Russian 
troops away from the Russo-Ottoman front. The Porte, however, weak and dependent 
upon the allies with different aims, could not give a strong assurance to the Circassians 
and the Dagestanis, because rumours of peace were always present during the war, and 
the Circassians were rightly afraid of Russia‟s vengeance in case of their commitment 
and the abandonment of the Porte and its allies.
623
 
 
 
3.6.2. The Campaign of Summer 1854 and the Battle of Kürekdere 
 
 
The campaign season of 1854 in the Caucasus opened somewhat late in June. The 
                                                 
621   Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 90. Cf. Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 
1800-1909, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 106. Lütfi Efendi also writes that the Circassians 
did not esteem people who are not noble and free by birth (kişi-zâde ve hürrü‟l-asl). See Lütfi, op. 
cit., p. 91. 
622   See for example Ġsmail Berkok, Tarihte Kafkasya, Istanbul: Ġstanbul Matbaası, 1958. Aytek 
Kundukh, Kafkasya Müridizmi: Gazavat Tarihi, Haz. Tarık Cemal Kutlu, Istanbul: Gözde Kitaplar 
Yayınevi, 1987.  
623   Mustafa Budak argues that both positions are wrong. See Budak, “1853-1856 Kırım SavaĢı'nda 
Osmanlı Devleti ile ġeyh ġamil Arasındaki ĠliĢkiler”, Tarih Boyunca Balkanlardan Kafkaslara 
Türk Dünyası Semineri, 29-31 Mayıs 1995. Bildiriler, Istanbul: Ġ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 
1996, pp. 79-92. He finds the policy of the Porte simply “cautious” (ihtiyatlı). 
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Russian army was now on the offensive. General Prince Andronikov‟s forces in Guria, 
around Kutaisi consisted of two infantry regiments, one Cossack regiment, two 
battalions and the Gurian and Imeretian militia, making up approximately 9,000 men 
and 10 guns. On 8 June, a Russian force under the command of Colonel Prince Eristov 
was attacked by the Laz başıbozuks under the command of Hasan Bey. The Laz were 
repulsed and lost 200 men. On 15 June, General Andronikov attacked Selim Pasha‟s 
forces along the river Çolok between Ozurgeti and Çürüksu (Kobuleti or Kapulet). 
Selim Pasha lost 4,000 men and all his guns, and retired to Batum. The Russians lost 
1,500 men.
624
  
At the end of June 1854, Lieutenant-General Baron K. K. Vrangel‟s forces 
consisting of 5,000 men with 12 guns advanced towards the Çengel pass near Karabulak 
village between Iğdır and Bayezid. The pass was occupied by Ferik Selim Pasha‟s 
forces consisting of 8,000 regular infantry with 8 guns and 7,000 to 10,000 başıbozuks, 
half of which were Kurdish. In mid-July Vrangel, reinforced with 5,000 more troops, 
attacked this force and dispersed it. The Ottomans lost about 2,000 men dead and 
wounded with 370 prisoners and 4 guns, while the Russian losses were 400.
625
 The 
Kurdish baĢıbozuks fled to their villages.626 On 31 July Vrangel occupied Bayezid 
without battle, where he captured a lot of provisions. Bayezid was on the commercial 
road from Tehran to Trabzon, thus the Russians were now in a position to control the 
caravan trade from Iran to Trabzon, which was as much important for Britain as for the 
Ottoman Empire. According to Colonel Mikhail Likhutin of the Erivan corps, Selim 
Pasha had accused his chief of staff, a Polish émigré and a “renegade”, for the decision 
to accept battle with the Russians. Consequently, the chief of staff was recalled to 
Istanbul. But Ferik Selim Pasha was also recalled to Istanbul at the end of 1854.
627
  
While these battles took place on the left and right flanks of the front, the decisive 
                                                 
624  Tarle, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 516. Cf. Budak, op. cit., (1993), pp. 81-82. Budak, referring to CH, gives 
quite different numbers in favour of the Ottoman army, but adds that “although the Ottoman side 
claimed victory in this battle, General Andronikov brought his main forces to Ozurgeti on 15 June 
1854”.    
625   Budak, op. cit., p. 96. Cf. Ibragimbeyli (op. cit., p. 224) also gives the number of Ottoman forces 
around Bayezid as 18,000 men. According to Ibragimbeyli, Vrangel‟s forces included about 1,000 
Azerbaijanian, 150 Armenian and 150 Kurdish irregular cavalry. 
626   Budak, quoting from YüzbaĢı Fevzi Kurtoğlu, argues that Selim Pasha of Batum had come to help. 
However, MüĢir Selim Pasha did not and could not come to help from as far as Batum to Bayezid, 
while even those nearer Ottoman forces at Kars, Erzurum and Van did not come. Kurtoğlu is 
simply unaware of the second MüĢir Selim Pasha other than the one at Batum, namely Ferik Selim 
Pasha at Bayezid.  
627
   See General-Mayor M. Likhutin, Russkie v Aziatskoy Turtsii v 1854 i 1855 godakh, St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiya tovarischestva “Obschestvennaya Pol'za”, 1863, p. 188.  
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battle of the 1854 campaign would be in the middle of the front, between Kars and 
Gümrü, near a village called Kürekdere,628 where the main forces confronted each other 
in an open field battle. On the Ottoman side, Mustafa Zarif Pasha had reinforced his 
forces to cover the winter losses and now commanded 35,000 regular infantry, four 
cavalry regiments, 6,000 artillery men with 80 field pieces, and up to 14,000 mainly 
Kurdish başıbozuks. The best regiments were from the Arabistan army, but this had 
nothing intrinsical to do with Arabistan. It was simply the result of good command, 
namely able colonels, in whom the soldiers had confidence.
629
 But there was also a kind 
of embarrassment of riches in the Anatolian army. There were more than 20 Ottoman 
pashas and also more than 20 European staff officers, with HurĢid Pasha (General 
Guyon) as their chief, some of them being reputed generals of the Hungarian revolution 
of 1848, as we have seen above. Count de Melfray had recently joined them as first 
aide-de-camp to the mushir.
630
 
However, relations between Guyon and the mushir and among these staff officers 
must have been restrained and full of intricacies. Mustafa Zarif Pasha did not like 
HurĢid Pasha and favoured instead Miralay Feyzi Bey (Colonel Kollman), who had 
converted to Islam and spoke Turkish well.
631
 Zarif Pasha found him best in terms of 
military and engineering talents. He also praised the Polish generals Mirliva Arslan 
Pasha (Bystrzonowski) and ġahin Pasha (Breanski) and the Hungarian Ġsmail Pasha 
(General Kmety). At the beginning of June 1854, Zarif Pasha wrote to the seraskier that 
HurĢid Pasha was a short-tempered person (tiz-meşrep, acul bir zat), who did not 
respect other people‟s opinions and who did not possess enough knowledge of the area 
and of the military science.
632
 In another letter of the same date, he recommended Feyzi 
Bey to be promoted to the rank of mirliva and appointed chief of staff. He also added 
                                                 
628  This place is also called and spelled as Kurudere, Kurukdere, Kuruckdereh, Ġncedere, Gökdere. In 
his book, published in 1855, Charles Duncan gives a wonderfully correct spelling, exactly the 
same as the modern Turkish one: “Kürekdere”! (See Duncan, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 189). Russian 
sources spell it as Kyuryuk-Dar or Kyuruk-Dar. This place was later called Mavrik Çay during the 
Russo-Ottoman War of 1877. 
629   These few Arabistan regiments were commanded by able colonels like Çerkes Hüseyin Bey, 
trusted by their troops. Thus the soldiers fully displayed their military capacity. See Duncan, op. 
cit., p. 188. Russian sources confirm the distinguished character of these Arabistan regiments and 
the hassa or Dersaadet regiments. See for example Blokada Karsa. Pis'ma ochevidtsev o pokhode 
1855 goda v Aziatskuyu Turtsiyu. Tiflis: Tipografiya kantselyarii namestnika Kavkazskago, 1856, 
p. 113.  
630   Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 486 and p. 491. 
631  Budak writes that HurĢid Pasha and Zarif Pasha did not get along well, but he does not explain 
why. See Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. ??? 
632   Commander-in-chief of the Anatolian army Zarif Pasha to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha, dated 6 
Ramazan 1270 / 2 June 1854. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 2/52 lef 7. 
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that when Feyzi Bey was a colonel in the Hungarian army, HurĢid Pasha was at that 
time a major under him.
633
 Infantry Brigadier-General (Mirliva) Mustafa RaĢid Pasha 
from his station at the village of Hacıveli near Kars also reported to Zarif Pasha that 
HurĢid Pasha had said that Silistria was captured by the Russians, despite the official 
news to the contrary.
634
 It seems highly doubtable that HurĢid Pasha would spread such 
rumours when there was no need or basis for it. Why should he do so? In any case, 
HurĢid Pasha was of British origin and had the support of the British ambassador. 
Therefore the Porte did not want to disturb its relations Britain and HurĢid Pasha 
remained in his post until 1855 when he was called to Istanbul to stand trial together 
with Zarif Pasha.  
Polish officers in general did not like HurĢid Pasha. While British sources in 
general praise HurĢid Pasha as a good officer, Sadık Pasha is highly critical of him, 
calling him an “emptier of bottles”. Since Sadık Pasha was in Rumeli, he must have 
gained his opinion of HurĢid Pasha from those Polish staff officers who served under 
HurĢid Pasha. Sadık Pasha describes Zarif Pasha as a “talented administrator and 
officer, although better as administrator, than commander”. This characterization also 
seems to come from the Polish officers whom Zarif Pasha favoured, as we have seen. 
Sadık Pasha is also very critical of Stratford de Redcliffe, whom he calls “Little Sultan” 
and argues that Stratford wanted HurĢid Pasha to command in practice and Zarif Pasha 
only nominally. Sadık Pasha writes that HurĢid Pasha gave “Lew” Pasha the task of 
reading newspapers and taking notes, appointed “Potop” Bey master of bakery and 
“Piorun” Bey master of trumpets as examples of his contempt for the Polish officers.635 
Sadık Pasha argues that although “among Polish officers there was disorder, 
disagreement, jealousy, intrigues and gossip”, there were also such talented and brave 
officers among them as Breanski, Bystrzonowski, Zarzycki, Grotowski, Jagmin and 
Wieruski, who were “a hundred times better than the English and Italian officers”.636 
This is in sharp contrast to the characterizations of the Polish officers in the memoirs of 
                                                 
633   Zarif Pasha to Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha, dated 6 Ramazan 1270 / 2 June 1854. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 
2/52 lef 8. 
634   BOA. Ġ. MMS. 2/52 lef 11, dated 16 June 1854.  
635   Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadyk Pasza), op. cit., 1962, p. 75. Interestingly, Czajkowski calls 
the Polish officers by the Polish equivalents of their Ottoman-Turkish names. Thus he writes Lew 
Pasha instead of Arslan Pasha, Potop Bey instead of Tufan Bey, Piorun Bey instead of Yıldırım 
Bey and  Sokol Pasha instead of ġahin Pasha. 
636  Czajkowski, op. cit, p. 77. I am grateful to Joanna Blaszkowska for help in translating these 
passages from Polish. 
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the British officers, doctors and journalists who have been with the Anatolian army.
637
  
On the Russian side, Prince Bebutov had about 13,000 infantry, 3,000 regular 
cavalry and 4,000 irregular cavalry with 68 or 76 guns. According to Zarif Pasha, the 
Russians had 76 guns while the Ottomans had 84 guns. The Ottoman army was  
stronger numerically as well.
638
 The Russians, being numerically inferior, however, had 
a weighty counterbalance: the 8 grenadier battalions and 16 squadrons of the dragoon 
brigade were superior in quality than any of the Ottoman troops, perhaps even the best 
regiments from the Arabistan army or the rifles (şeşhaneci) battalions. This army 
included formations of irregular cavalry from Azerbaijan, Kabardia, Georgia, Karabakh, 
under the command of Colonel Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov, Colonel 
Andronikashvili and Lieutenant-Colonel Kundukhov. Both Ottoman and Russian 
commanders however had doubts for a battle and kept observing each other until 
August. At the beginning of August, Bebutov had taken a position between the 
Kürekdere and Paldırvan villages. After receiving the news of the Russian victory in 
Bayezid, Bebutov planned an attack on 5 August.
639
  
The Anatolian army had taken a position near Hacı Veli Köy. By his own account, 
Zarif Pasha was not enthusiastic about an attack, referring to orders from the seraskeriat 
for defensive operations (tahaffuzi hareket). However, he maintained that HurĢid Pasha 
and the European staff officers all wanted war. The başıbozuks had also started 
grumbling: why did we gather here if we are not going to fight? The regular soldiers 
and officers as well wanted war. In these conditions, Zarif Pasha writes that in order to 
deceive and appease them (iğfal ve iskat), he was suggesting all kinds of different 
operation plans and temporizing with them.
640
 When he received the news of the defeat 
of Bayezid on 3 August, Zarif Pasha wanted to send some troops there. But HurĢid 
Pasha opposed this plan and instead proposed to attack first Bebutov immediately at the 
dawn of 4 August, while he was relatively weak and then to attack Vrangel‟s forces that 
were advancing towards Erzurum. Most of the officers supported this plan. As for the 
orders to be on the defensive, the war council decided that since they were operating on 
Ottoman territory and trying drive the enemy away from Ottoman territory, they should 
be considered acting on the defensive (çünkü biz Rusya memaliki tarafına gitmeyip anı 
                                                 
637  These are Atwell Lake, Humphrey Sandwith and Charles Duncan. 
638  Zarif Pasha‟s evidence, BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, answer 5. See Appendix 85. 
639   Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 253. 
640   See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 492. Cf. Zarif Pasha‟s evidence, BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9. See 
Appendix 85.  
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memalik-i Osmaniye‟den def‟ edeceğiz. Hareket-i tahaffüzi ve tedafüi bu demektir).641 
HurĢid PaĢa‟s plan was accepted, but according to the Times corespondent, who was 
presnt at the battle, Zarif Pasha said that the fourth and fifth days were unlucky days so 
the attack was delayed until 6 August.
642
 Meanwhile Bebutov learned of the attack from 
spies and accordingly he also gathered all his forces together for an attack.  
According to Ferik RaĢid PaĢa‟s statement, although HurĢid Pasha‟s plan was 
accepted, Zarif Pasha did not execute it properly. When the army was to march early in 
the morning, HurĢid Pasha urged Zarif Pasha to go but Zarif Pasha replied him: “I am 
the commander of the army. I know when to set out”.643 Thus they quarreled and the 
march began only after evening in the dark. Then the second division set out late and 
came to the battle field very late. RaĢid Pasha added that due to lack of water on the 
battle field, the Ottoman troops suffered from thirst. 
On 6 August
644
 1854, the two armies met in Kürekdere. HurĢid Pasha had divided 
the Ottoman army into three parts. Ferik Abdülkerim Pasha (?-1863), better known as 
Kerim Pasha and called Baba Kerim, that is, “Father Kerim” by soldiers, commanded 
the right wing or the first division.
645
 Zarif Pasha with HurĢid Pasha was in the centre 
and Ferik Veli Pasha with General Kmety
646
 (Ġsmail Pasha) commanded the left wing. 
However, HurĢid Pasha‟s plan, though well prepared, required a well-trained army 
capable of skillful manoeuvring and coordination in order to execute it. The Ottoman 
army lacked such qualities. As Allen and Muratoff observed, the Ottoman army was 
divided into three widely sepatared groups, therefore, before one group came into action 
the other would face the whole Russian force.
647
 Then there was the problem of jealousy 
among the officers. HurĢid had his enemies as well, both European and Ottoman. In any 
case, he was only the chief of staff and did not command any units; thus at critical 
moments, commanders of divisions or regiments would be at liberty not to obey his 
orders without confirmation from the Commander-in-Chief, who was not to be found 
                                                 
641  Interrogation of Zarif Pasha. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, paragraph (answer) 5. See Appendix 85. 
642  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 101. 
643  Mazbata of the MVL on the trial of Zarif Pasha and HurĢid Pasha, 23 Receb 1271 (11 April 1855). 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2. See Appendix 96. 
644   Russian sources in general give the day of this battle as 24 July (5 August). See for example Tarle, 
op. cit., vol. II, p. 517; Bestuzhev, op. cit., p. 75; Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 258.  
645  Interrogation of Zarif Pasha. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, answer 7. See Appendix 85. 
646  Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., p. 76) call him Colonel Kmety, which is not correct. Kmety had the 
rank of mirliva, which corresponded to a brigadier-general. Budak (op. cit., 1993, p. 99) repeats 
this mistake by quoting from them. Furthermore, Allen and Muratoff do not mention Veli Pasha in 
this battle.  
647  Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 77. 
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during the battle.
648
  
The battle lasted four to seven hours. The Ottoman regular cavalry proved utterly 
useless. Artillery and part of the infantry fought well. The başıbozuks were also useless. 
However, the Ottoman army thanks to its size could still have won the battle had it not 
been for the lack of proper (or any) leadership or inefficiency of some of the officers. 
Thus the Ottoman army was defeated by an army half or a third of its size. Salih Hayri 
maintains that there were more than 50,000 Ottoman troops and the Russians were half 
that number. He also argues that the Ottoman army was defeated due to lack of 
command.
649
 According to Ibragimbeyli, Ottomans lost 2,820 dead, about 2,000 
wounded and 86 officers and 1,932 soldiers taken prisoner.
650
 The başıbozuks dispersed 
to villages. The Russian loss included 21 officers and 568 soldiers dead, more than 
2,000 wounded.
651
 While the Ottoman army retreated disorderly towards Kars, the 
Russian army did not follow it.
652
 Bebutov‟s caution played a role here. If he had 
followed the Ottoman army, the Ottoman losses would be much higher and Kars might 
have been captured.  
The Times correspondent was a witness of the battle and wrote a lengthy article 
about it, blaming the Ottoman officers: 
   With a vivid impression of the whole engagement, from the first cannonshot to 
the last straggling discharges of musketry, I can use no language too strong to 
express my reprobation of the conduct of nearly four-fifths of the Turkish officers 
present. In accounting for the defeat of an army numbering nearly 40,000 men of 
all arms by a hostile force of less than one-half that number, it is not sufficient to 
say that the management of the whole battle on the side of the Turks was a series 
of blunders from first to last; strategical errors might have protracted the 
engagement, and have added to the cost of a victory, but downright cowardice 
alone – which no generalship could have redeemed – gave the day to the 
Russians. One arm, and one only, behaved well – the artillery – which with its 
commander, Tahir Pasha, acted worthily of any army in Europe. Of the whole 40 
battalions of infantry two regiments – the 5th Anatolian and 4th Desardet653 – alone 
                                                 
648  “The War in Asia. (From Our Own Correspondent). Kars, Aug. 7”, The Times, Issue 21844, 
London, 12 September 1854, p. 9. Cf. Sandwith, op. cit., p. 105. Sandwith writes that the Times 
correspondent was an eye-witness of the battle. 
649  Salih Hayri, op. cit., p. 153. “Bir kumandan olayıdı ol gün, Düşmeni eyler idi mahv u zebûn. Zâbit 
olmazsa ne yapsın neferât, Olamaz başsız ayakta harekât”. 
650   Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 259. 
651  Tarle writes that according to Bebutov‟s report, Russian dead and wounded numbered 3,054, 
which more or less coincides with the above account. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 517. 
652   Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Erzeroom, August 10, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 4 in 
No. 7, p. 7. Tarle (op. cit., vol. 2, p. 517) writes that the Russian cavalry under the command of 
General Baggovut chased the Ottoman army almost to the walls of Kars, which is not confirmed 
by other sources.  
653  The correct spelling is Dersaadet, that is, Istanbul army (the second army). 
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stood their ground and resisted cavalry. Three successive times did three 
squadrons of Russian dragoons bear down upon these exceptionally brave 
regiments with a force before which many better disciplined troops would have 
yielded… Than the conduct of the rest of  the infantry, nothing could well be 
worse, except that of the entire cavalry, which would have disgraced the rawest 
Bashi-Bazouks. If such, however, was the conduct of the men, that, as I have said, 
of the great majority of the superior officers was still more infamous. An hour 
after the action began, there was hardly a Bunbashi (major) or Murallai
654
 
(colonel) to be seen; almost to a man they had deserted their regiments, and fled 
back to the camp to secure their baggage and send it off to Kars.
655
  
 
The Times correspondent further wrote that after the battle, Zarif Pasha collected his 
pashas and secured their seals to a petition to the seraskier that it was HurĢid Pasha‟s 
fault alone to have hazarded an engagement. He added that the returns represented the 
losses as 1,200 killed, 1,800 wounded and 8,000 missing (of which last 2,000 prisoners 
and the rest deserters, chiefly redif). 
Although the mushir Zarif Pasha states that the attack was HurĢid Pasha‟s plan, he 
does not blame him for defeat in this battle but Mirliva Abdurrahman Pasha, who did 
not come to the help of his comrades, keeping 5 battalions and one battery (six guns) 
out of battle. Ferik RaĢid Pasha confirms Zarif Pasha in this matter, stating that the said 
pasha with his 5 battalions, 6 guns and 3,000 baĢıbozuks did not come to help although 
Kerim Pasha, commander of the first division twice sent orders to him.
656
 RaĢid Pasha, 
however, also maintains that the retreat was not in an orderly way as claimed by Zarif 
Pasha, since there was confusion and Zarif Pasha could not have counted enemy losses. 
Of the battle‟s result in general, Zarif Pasha gives quite a different account, as if he had 
not been defeated. He even argues that the result of the battle was useful for the 
Ottoman Empire and discouraging for the Russian army.
657
 This has, of course, nothing 
to do with the truth. 
HurĢid Pasha, for his part, told the MVL that originally he was not a supporter of 
an offensive action. Instead he had suggested to strengthen fortifications in Kars and 
Hacı [Hacı Veli?] Köy. He had even experienced some tension for this with Zarif Pasha 
                                                 
654   The correct modern Turkish spellings are Binbaşı and Miralay. 
655   “The War in Asia. (From Our Own Correspondent). Kars, Aug. 7”, The Times, Issue 21844, 
London, 12 September 1854, p. 9. Cf. Sandwith, op. cit., pp. 107-108. 
656  Mazbata of the MVL on the trial of Zarif Pasha and HurĢid Pasha, 23 Receb 1271 (11 April 1855). 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2. 
657  See Karal, op. cit., (1940), p. 494: “İşbu muharebenin neticesi devleti aliyeye [sic] ne suretle faide 
vermiş olduğu ve Rusyaluya bilakis ne veçhile mazarrat ve askerine gayretsizlik ve dehşet verdiği 
gün gibi aşikardır”. Cf. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 10: “İşbu muharebenin neticesi Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye ne 
suretde faide vermiş ve Rusyalu‟ya dahi bilakis ne vechile mazarratı mucib olmuş olduğu gün gibi 
aşikardır”. 
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and gone way for reconnaissance. When he returned the army was moving towards the 
village Vezin. When he asked Zarif Pasha the reasons for this move, Zarif Pasha gave 
him a peremptory answer: “I am the müşir”. However, at Subatan, Zarif Pasha asked his 
opinion on going to battle with the Russians. Although his original opinion was against 
such a move, taking into consideration the present deployment of troops and the 
intelligence on the numerical inferiority of the Russian army, he said if the intention is 
battle, then it was just the right time, therefore, immediate action was necessary before 
the Russians could receive reinforcement. However, Zarif Pasha did not think it was 
lucky time because the moon was in the sign of the scorpion.
658
 Thus HurĢid Pasha 
argued that many days passed there uselessly.  
The British consuls in Erzurum and Trabzon sent reports to Istanbul about the 
battle of Kürekdere. Extracts from these reports were given by the British embassy to 
the Porte as well. These reports contained some details of the battle and even a “list of 
the well and ill-behaved officers at the battle of Kuruckdereh” and a list of “Ottoman 
officers accused of being addicted to drinking”. Another list included the above 
Abdurrahman Pasha of the Arabistan army, together with Vanlı Mehmed Pasha, as the 
officers “whose conduct is most reprehensible in refusing to charge when ordered”. It 
was also noted that Vanlı Mehmed Pasha “purchased his rank for 60,000 piastres from 
the Mushir”.659 
By the battle of Kürekdere, the Russian army now demonstrated its ability to hold 
the Caucasus. Shamil and the Circassians were further disappointed by the Porte‟s 
military inability. Thus the Caucasus front remained silent until the next campaign 
season. 
 
 
3.6.3.  The Siege and Fall of Kars and the Caucasian Campaign of Ömer 
Pasha in 1855 
 
 
 The British consul in Erzurum James Brant was reporting on the state of 
disorganization of the Anatolian army. The British cabinet wanted to send a military 
commissioner there to get information on the real state of affairs in the army. Three 
days before the battle of Kürekdere, Lieutenant-Colonel William Fenwick Williams of 
                                                 
658  HurĢid Pasha‟s evidence is in harmony with the account of the Times correspondent. The only 
difference is that the Times correspondent gives the unlucky sign as the Ram or Crab. See 
Sandwith, op. cit., p. 101. 
659  BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 73-76. These lists are anonymous and undated. Most probably they 
were written either by Colonel Williams or by another British officer at Kars.  
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the Royal Artillery was informed by Clarendon that he had been selected as the officer 
to attend, as Her Majesty's Commissioner, the head-quarters of the “Turkish” army in 
Asia, under the orders of Lord Raglan.
660
 Williams was chosen for his knowledge of 
Eastern Anatolia, where he had served as the British representative in the international 
border commission on the Ottoman-Iranian border from 1842 to 1852.
661
 Williams 
arrived in Istanbul in August 1854 and after visiting Lord Stratford there and the 
Commander-in-Chief Lord Raglan in Varna, he departed to Trebizond on 31 August 
1854, from there reaching Bayburt on 10 September and Erzurum on 14 September. He 
was received with high honours by the governor-general of the province, Ġsmail Pasha. 
After two days in Erzurum, Williams headed for Kars.
662
  
Williams would be promoted to the rank of ferik (lieutenant-general, however, his 
British rank was brigadier-general) by the Porte upon the request of the British 
ambassador in December 1854 within three months of his arrival in Erzurum and Kars. 
From Governor Ismail Pasha‟s letter to the grand vizier we learn that the British consul 
in Erzurum James Brant had already informed Ġsmail Pasha that Williams held the rank 
of ferik even at the time of Williams‟ arrival at Erzurum. Ġsmail Pasha also states that he 
honoured Williams and allowed him to visit the army barracks and hospitals in 
accordance with the statement of the British consul although Williams did not produce 
an order from the grand vizier or the seraskier.
663
 
Eventually General Williams played a role greater than any other officer in the 
Anatolian army, Ottoman or foreigner. This role however was not altogether positive 
and helpful for the Ottoman war effort. Because of his temperament, Williams mixed in 
his behaviour and reports the most justified complaints on frauds and on corruption with 
the most fanciful and vainglorious claims of alleged disrespect towards himself. 
Therefore one needs to distinguish in his reports the real and the imagined items. As 
noted by James Reid, “Victorian British commentators might have made harsh 
judgments about Ottoman corruption, but they addressed certain realities that impartial 
                                                 
660 The Earl of Clarendon to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. Foreign Office, August 2, 1854. PRMA, 
No. 1, p. 1. 
661  See Robert Curzon, Armenia: A Year at Erzeroom, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey, and 
Persia, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1854, pp. VII-VIII. The author was at that time private 
secretary to the British ambassador Sir Stratford Canning and also served in this commission until 
1847. 
662   Colonel Williams to Ġsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum, 16 September 1854. BOA. HR. MKT. 
94/56 lef 6. Cf. PRMA, p. 21. 
663  Ġsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum to the grand vizier, 3 Muharrem 1271 (26 September 
1854). BOA. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 3. See Appendix 59. 
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observers cannot deny”.664 The fact that a certain European observer uses an 
Orientalistic discourse or shows some prejudices against the Ottomans does not 
necessarily mean that all his claims are based on fiction. This is especially true in the 
case of General Williams, who has made very detailed and concrete accusations and 
revelations of corruption and schemes of embezzlement, based upon rigorous 
investigations. We will see some of these. 
 After the Battle of Kürekdere, the Commander-in-Chief Zarif Pasha fell from 
grace and was dismissed from his post in September 1854. Ġsmail Pasha, the chief of 
staff of the Rumelian army was supposed to take the command of the Anatolian army at 
Kars in September 1854. Meanwhile, in the words of Clarendon, “a foreign general of 
distinction and said to possess great military talent” was on the spot and willing to take 
the command of Kars. His appointment was recommended by the allied commanders-
in-chief, by the British ambassador and by all the Ottoman ministers except ReĢid Pasha 
the Grand Vizier. The British foreign minister protested this “disregard of the Sultan's 
interests”, and the fact that “against all this weight of authority his [the Grand Vizier's] 
decision is allowed to prevail”. Clarendon further instructed Lord Stratford to request 
from ReĢid Pasha to instruct the newly appointed Ġsmail Pasha “to defer to the advice of 
Colonel Williams, who is thoroughly acquainted with the people and the country, and 
who ought to have a high Turkish rank given to him in order to insure respect for his 
authority”.665 On 27 September, Clarendon wrote to Lord Stratford: 
   I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have little 
doubt that a deep rooted jealousy of foreigners is, as you suppose, the main cause 
of the neglect of the army in Asia; but the suicidal indulgence of that feeling ill 
becomes a Government whose very existence depends upon the support of 
foreigners.
666
 
 
Clarendon also required Stratford to give a copy of his despatch to ReĢid Pasha.  
 In his first reports from Erzurum, Colonel Williams found the winter-quarters of 
the army satisfactory but needing repair, the military hospitals clean but the apothecary's 
department in need of surgical instruments and medicine. As we have already 
mentioned, he wrote that last winter 18,000 soldiers had died due to insufficient housing 
                                                 
664  Reid, op. cit., (2000), p. 89. 
665  The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Foreign Office, September 22, 1854. 
PRMA, No. 11, p. 10. By the “foreign general of distinction”, Clarendon meant General George 
Klapka. 
666 Clarendon to Stratford, 27 September 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 54, Turkish translation at 
lef 55. See Appendix 65. The PRMA (No. 13, p. 10) gives a smaller extract from this despatch. 
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and care.
667
 A week later, Williams would report from Kars that during last winter 
owing to the want of medicines, food, fuel, bedding and light, nearly 12,000 men 
perished in the hospitals of Kars.
668
 The troops in Erzurum were 15 to 19 months in 
arrears of pay. They had received only one month's pay before the last “Bairam”. 
Although 10,000 purses (kese) were sent lately, nearly two-thirds of it was in paper. 
More money in specie was needed. Winter clothing had not been sent yet.
669
 In his reply 
to the representation of Lord Stratford, ReĢid Pasha told that supplies were being sent to 
Erzurum. As regards the payment of the arrears, he said that this point could not be 
settled until the “financial” (loan) commission sits, and “the sooner they meet the 
better”. Meanwhile 5,000 purses (2,500,000 piastres, about 20,000 pounds) in specie 
were being prepared for transmission to Erzurum for the pay of the soldiers. ReĢid 
Pasha also asked Lord Stratford to give the name of the British commissioner in the 
financial commission for the purpose of setting the commission to work at once.
670
 
However, even in the case of money in specie (gold and silver) being sent from Istanbul 
to the army, it is unlikely that it reached the soldiers because the müĢir, pashas, the 
müsteşar (paymaster-general) and the defterdar (accountant-general) kept the specie to 
themselves and distributed paper money to the colonels, other officers and soldiers. The 
colonels in turn, receving paper money which circulated only with a 20 per cent 
discount, were induced to swelling the returns of their regiments to get some extra 
rations. They would then resell these rations (food items, etc) to the army.
671
 The 
soldiers, if they got paid at all, could change their money notes to buy tobacco and 
coffee for example only at the discount of 20 per cent.
672
  
 Meanwhile, as we have seen, the Russians had occupied the town of Bayezid 
which stood on the great commercial road between Persia and the Black Sea port of 
Trabzon. This was alarming news from a military and commercial point of view 
because this occupation also threatened the trade of the British manufacturers with 
Persia. Ferik Selim Pasha had fled at the approach of the Russian army. Some 
baĢıbozuk and redif troops from the Kars army fought the Russians but could not stop 
                                                 
667  Colonel Williams to Ġsmail Pasha Governor of Erzurum, 16 September 1854. BOA. HR. MKT. 
94/56 lef 6. The same letter is available at PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 20, p. 21.   
668  Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon, Camp near Kars, September 24, 1854. PRMA, No. 28, 
p. 26. 
669 From Stratford's instruction to Pisani to be read to Reshid Pasha. Therapia, October 1, 1854. 
PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 17, p. 13. 
670 Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Pera, October 3, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 17, p. 14.  
671  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 125. 
672  PRMA, Inclosure in No. 48, September-October 1854, p. 46. Duncan, op. cit., vol. II, p. 11. 
Edouard Engelhardt, Türkiye ve Tanzimat Hareketleri, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, p. 83. 
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them. The Russians, however, in order to strengthen the Erivan army, withdrew from 
Bayezid towards in November 1854, taking the Armenians with themselves. 600 
Karapapaks of ġuregel (or ġüregel) and 300 Kurds under Kasım Ağa had also joined the 
Russians.
673
 
 In Kars, Colonel Williams was also received with military honours and attention 
by Zarif Mustafa Pasha. Together with his aide-de-camp Lieutenant Teesdale and 
Doctor Sandwith, Williams inspected the troops. Soldiers were in need of many things, 
like clothing and provisions, yet their healthy and soldier-like mien struck Williams. 
The great portion of the infantry was armed with flint firelocks, but three battalions of 
chasseurs (şeşhaneci) were armed with the Minié rifle (which the Russian army did not 
have) and seven battalions of infantry had detonating muskets.
674
 However, the sabres 
of the cavalry were too short. (After Williams‟s report, new sabres would be imported 
from Britain). Cavalry was indeed the worst part of the Ottoman army, while the 
artillery was the best.  
All in all, the Ottoman army was not armed worse than the Russian army, which 
did not have Minié rifles at all. But the management of the Ottoman army was very 
corrupt and awfully abusive of the soldiers. Williams soon found out huge discrepancies 
between the actual counted number of troops and the muster-rolls, thus revealing the 
embezzlement of the mushir and his subordinates, who pocketed the pay and rations of 
the missing soldiers. The army at Kars that was supposed to be 40,000-strong, actually 
consisted of altogether 18,340 men including infantry, cavalry, artillery and some 
irregulars. The başıbozuks were also stated as amounting to 10,000 in the muster-rolls, 
when in reality there were not more than 6,000 of them.
675
 Even after Williams's count 
of the troops, Zarif Mustafa Pasha was seen reporting to Istanbul the muster-roll with a 
                                                 
673 Lieutenant Teesdale to Colonel Williams. Kars, November 26, 1854. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 
78, p. 73. 
674 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, September 26, 1854. PRMA, No. 30, 
p. 29. The dictionary of Ferit Devellioğlu, under the second meaning of meniyye (first meaning 
“death” in Arabic) gives the information that the meniyye rifles were introduced into the Ottoman 
army under Sultan Abdülaziz. (Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat, Ankara, 2002, p. 615).  
However, Minié has nothing to do with meniyye, it is the surname of the French officer who 
invented these rifles and bullets before 1850. Secondly, as seen above, Minié rifles were already 
being used in the Ottoman armies during the Crimean War. See PRMA, pp. 102, 333, 335. 
Laurence Oliphant (op. cit., p. 100, 205) records their use by Ömer Pasha's army during his 
Caucasian campaign as well in the autumn of 1855, which is confirmed by Borozdin (op. cit., p. 
29). Adolphus Slade also confirms the exclusive possession of Minié rifles by the allies. See Slade, 
op. cit., p. 99.  
675   Report of the Military Board to the Seraskier on the Corps d‟Armée of Kars in September and 
October, 1854. (Translation). PRMA, Inclosure 3 in No. 119, p. 116. Budak (op. cit., (1993), p. 
105) gives these last numbers about the baĢıbozuks, and other similar cases, referring to another 
British archival document. 
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total number of 27,538 effective of all arms, whereas in the opinion of Williams only 
14,000 effective men were present.
676
 Williams also learnt from the “Vakeel” (vekil, 
deputy) of the defterdar that rations for 33,000 men were being issued daily.
677
  
It is certain that this practise of muster-roll fraud was known and tolerated by the 
Porte, because it was the widespread and usual practise. An irrefutable proof for this is 
found in the words of the grand vizier himself. In November 1854 the army of Batum 
was weakened due to deaths from diseases and desertions and it needed reinforcements. 
It was decided to send the Tunis army and to levy 1,000 asakir-i muvazzafa from the 
sancak of Lazistan. The grand vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha in his tezkire to the 
sultan wrote that the Porte allowed the levy of the 1,000 men, however, he warned that 
this levy should not be done as it is done in most places by officers, that is, by 
registering for example 100 men but employing only 60 or 70 of them and then taking 
the pay and rations of the remaining men (bu misillu asakir-i muvazzafanın ekser 
mahallerde tertibi faraza yüz nefer olduğu halde zabitleri altmış yetmiş nefer istihdam 
ederek küsurunun yalnız maaş ve tayinatlarını almakta olduğundan işbu celb olunacak 
neferat-ı muvazzafanın nüfusu adedine muvafık olmasına).678 The grand vizier also 
warned the local authorities that measures must be taken to prevent these recruits from 
oppressing anyone. From these words and from the whole of the tezkire, it is certain that 
the grand vizier is trying to prevent a customary practise of fraud due to the necessities 
of the war.  
Another irrefutable proof of the fact that the Porte knew and tolerated the muster-
roll fraud is the non-existence of any concrete questions on this matter to the three 
successive commanders of the Anatolian army (Abdi, Ahmed and Zarif Pashas) during 
their trial in Istanbul from November 1854 to June 1855. Despite the many reports of 
Williams on concrete cases of fraud that were forwarded to the Porte by the British 
embassy, none of these pashas is asked directly about the muster-roll fraud or invited to 
prove that the numbers of troops were in confirmity with reality. The questions about 
corruption in the administration of the army are too general, as if corruption was just a 
rumour. It is also remarkable that while Abdi and Ahmed Pasha argue against each 
other and accuse each other on many military issues, they never accuse each other of 
                                                 
676 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 11, 1854. PRMA, No. 42, p. 
39. 
677 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 25, 1854. PRMA, No. 49, p. 
47. 
678  Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to the Sultan, 21 Safer 1271 (12 November 1854). 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/97 lef 3. See Appendix 75. 
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corruption. On the contrary, they firmly confirm each other in this question.
679
   
 According to the reports of Colonel Williams and the narratives of Doctor 
Sandwith, Colonel Lake and the Morning Chronicle correspondent Charles Duncan, 
apart from the muster-roll fraud, the governors, pashas and colonels used every 
opportunity for peculation and did many other evil things. They bought wheat and 
barley from producers and then sold it to the army at heightened prices, instead of 
allowing the producers to bring their produce to the army stores and get payment. 
Pashas took bribes from all kinds of purchases for the army, or simply embezzled the 
money without making any purchases at all. For example, they did not give the soldiers 
their ration of rice twice a week. This theft alone brought them £30,000. The pashas and 
colonels also dealt in kaimes (paper money). They collaborated with greedy contractors 
who sold low quality goods and provisions to the army at enormous profits. For 
example, a Greek baker named Kozma mixed the flour with hay, barley and other things 
and gave very coarse, hardly edible crumbs at the price of best quality loaves of wheat-
flour. Kozma was protected by Ahmed Pasha.
680
 In another instance pashas and 
colonels bought old horses worth 3 to 6 pounds each for the cavalry and charged the 
government 10 to 12 pounds for each horse, thus pocketing the difference. They made 
the soldiers work for commercial purposes. In general, the pashas lived in luxury 
together with their large harems and did not care for the well-being of the soldiers at all. 
For example, some of the pashas appropriated houses with accommodation enough for 
250 men, while the soldiers were packed tightly into overcrowded rooms. When 
soldiers were quartered in any place, the pashas took bribes from the rich not to use 
their houses while the poor were forced to evacuate their homes. Thus it was the poorest 
villages of Erzurum and Kars that were forced to billet soldiers in their houses. Many 
pashas added drunkenness to their vices. 
 Another problem was the hostility of the uneducated old officers towards young 
officers brought up the military schools of the Sultan or in Europe. Williams reported: 
                                                 
679  For the interrogation and statements of these pashas, see BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 and 5/170. See 
Appendices 79-83, 85, 96. 
680   Duncan writes that the inspector Hayreddin Pasha had made “Kosmo” (Kozma) eat the “bread” of 
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argued that other bakers could not provide bread at the same price as Kozma, who had great 
capital and experience in this business. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9, question 15. See Appendix 85. 
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   Several months ago fourteen of these young men, after completing their studies 
at the Galata Serai, were sent to this army; they found themselves exposed to 
every description of insult and degradation; not one of them received a paid 
appointment in the Etat-Major, and several have, in consequence, disappeared 
altogether from this army; I believe only four remain, and those subsist on the 
bounty of such superior officers as may find it to their own interest to employ 
them: in short, the officers at present in command, as well as those in subordinate 
posts, will always endeavour to keep the young cadets out of employ in order that 
their own promotion may secure for them those illicit sources of peculation on 
which they at present fatten, at the expense of the unfed and badly-clothed 
soldier.
681
  
 
Sandwith is also of the opinion that especially against these young, educated 
“Turkish” officers, “a system of persecution” was pursued:   
   This mean and spiteful conduct towards these unfortunate young Turks was 
observable in all their superior officers, from the mushir downwards, and was 
shown in a variety of ways. No tents, pay or rations were given them, and they 
prowled about the camp in rags, fed by the charity of those who pitied their sad 
condition.
682
 
 
The new mushir of the Anatolian army Ġsmail Pasha was in no hurry to proceed 
from Istanbul to Erzurum, because of his eye infection which threatened his sight. 
Whether this was a real problem or an excuse in order not to spend the winter in 
Erzurum is open to question. Meanwhile Kerim Pasha acted as his deputy for a short 
time but then ġükrü PaĢa from the Rumeli army was appointed as the acting 
Commander-in-Chief. His chief of staff was Hüseyin Pasha. ġükrü Pasha arrived at 
Erzurum toward the end of October. Before ġükrü Pasha arrived at Kars on 12 
November, General Williams had already received from the British consul Brant in 
Erzurum the information that at an evening meeting Zarif Pasha had excited ġükrü 
Pasha against Williams and ġükrü Pasha had said that Williams should not be allowed 
to interfere in the affairs of the army.
683
 Williams quickly reported the situation to 
Stratford de Redcliffe and to Lord Clarendon. Williams also reported happily that the 
new chief of staff Hüseyin Pasha had “taken the young staff-students under his special 
protection, provided them quarters, claimed their long arrears of pay”.684  
Meanwhile Zarif Pasha was recalled to Istanbul in November 1854 and he was 
                                                 
681 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, October 23, 1854. PRMA, No. 46, p. 
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soon arrested
685
 in December 1854 after strong demands from Lord Stratford, who gave 
an official note to the Ottoman foreign minister Âli Pasha on 28 November 1854, 
demanding the punishment of Zarif Pasha together with his two predecessors MüĢir 
Ahmed Pasha, MüĢir Ahmed Pasha and Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha.686 In fact even Abdi 
Pasha, the predecessor of Ahmed Pasha had not yet been tried. The trial of the three 
successive commanders of the Anatolian army, Abdi, Ahmed and Zarif Pashas, together 
with that of Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, is, however, very important as an indicator of the 
attitude of the Ottoman elite toward charges of corruption against high officials, as in 
the case of Kapudan Mahmud Pasha. The difference is that in this case the allies, 
especially the British pressed for the punishment of Zarif Pasha and others.  
There were two basic charges against Zarif Pasha. The first was strictly military in 
character: He was accused of taking an offensive action by the battle of Kürekdere (and 
thereby playing into the hand of the Russians) when his orders were to be on the 
defensive. The second charge was about corruption in the administration of the 
Anatolian army. On the first charge the DġA decided that since the battle took place on 
Ottoman territory it should be seen as a defensive (tahaffuzî or tedafüî) operation.687 
This decision was approved by the MVL and the Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Vükela) 
as well. On the second charge, Zarif Pasha said that he was not informed and it must be 
asked from the müsteşar, the defterdar and other officials. He added that on the 
question of the exchange of coins for paper money he would pretend not to know. When 
he was asked to clarify, he said that it was perpetrated by the veznedar (teller) sent by 
the treasury and he had sent the veznedar to the former müsteĢar Rıza Efendi. However, 
Rıza Efendi had only imprisoned the culprit for a short term. RaĢid PaĢa and HurĢid 
PaĢa said that they had heard some acts like stealing from the cavalry fodder and buying 
grain at increased prices but they were not able to prove them. Then the MVL reached 
the conclusion that there had not been so much corruption in purchases and 
expenditures under Zarif Pasha as under his predecessors and that rations to the army 
had been allocated properly. While it was not denied that some local officials had 
committed embezzlement, it was not possible to investigate these cases from Istanbul, 
therefore, Vasıf Pasha and his defterdar Vehab Efendi should be asked. 
                                                 
685  Grand vizier‟s petition and the Sultan‟s irade, 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (17 December 1854). BOA. 
Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 7. The irade called for an accelaration of the trial of Abdi, Ahmed and Ferik Ali 
(Rıza) Pashas as well as Zarif Pasha. 
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Consequently, Zarif Pasha‟s arrest and unemployment did not last long, as was the 
rule among the Ottoman elite at that time. His trial lasted until June 1855, then he was 
finally acquitted and released in July 1855.
688
 Within two years, at the end of 1856, 
Hasan Rıza Pasha was again appointed seraskier and he again managed to take Zarif 
Pasha into state service, this time as president of the DġA.689 As we have seen, only 
Ahmed Pasha from the Anatolian army was found guilty and exiled to Cyprus for 5 
years. 
On 8 December 1854, Colonel Williams complained to Lord Stratford that he had 
not received any correspondence from him since 23 September. He was disappointed at 
his demands being not complied with. Williams observed, among other things, that in 
such a case, he would fail to preserve the power which he had “seized” “unaided”.690 
Meanwhile, at the demand of the British cabinet, the Porte accepted to confer upon 
Colonel Williams the rank of ferik (division general or lieutenant-general) towards the 
end of December 1854. This was his “local” rank, for the British army, the new rank of 
Colonel Williams was Brigadier-General. 
 Lord Stratford in his despatch to Clarendon on the complaints of Colonel 
Williams remarked that Williams had decided in a hasty manner that he was neglected 
by the British ambassador. “Winter, distance, roads scarcely passable, want of funds, 
the extent of evil to be cured, the scarcity of trustworthy officers, the greater interest of 
operations elsewhere, the illness of Ismail Pasha” were to blame. He also blamed the 
“corruption, ignorance, prejudice, want of public spirit and the instincts of selfishness” 
of the “Turkish” ministers. But then he added remarkably: 
   Has England itself been always without a taint? Have we never heard of Bacon, 
or of Marlborough? Have we forgotten the Memoirs of Pepys, the profligacies of 
his day and the one claim of an exiled Sovereign to the gratitude of his country? 
Are not the denunciations Burke still ringing in our ears? Place, time, and 
circumstances vary altogether; but the disease differs only in degree. In Turkey it 
has reached the stage of extreme virulence; in Christendom, generally, it is in 
abeyance, or shows itself only under mild forms; in Russia it mingles with the 
system of administration, and would no doubt fulfil its mission there as  
elsewhere, if the power and energy of Government did not maintain a 
counteracting vitality.
691
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Lord Stratford also wrote that he had learnt from a “Turkish” minister, on whom he 
could rely in this instance, that the real cause of the poverty of the Asian army last year 
was the jealousy of Mehmed Ali Pasha, grand vizier and then seraskier, towards 
Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha, then the mushir of the hassa army, who seemed to be his rival. 
Furthermore, the present Seraskier (Hasan Rıza Pasha) and Ömer Pasha had long been 
at variance with each other. While the Seraskier asserted that he had sent ample supplies 
to the army in Rumeli, the Generalissimo complained of being neglected.
692
 
To those historical allusions concerning England, forwarded by Stratford to 
Williams as well, the response of Williams is also worth mentioning here: 
   although the crimes of Bacon, Pepys, and Marlborough were parallel and 
identical with those which now brand the characters of the greatest and least of the 
public men in Turkey, the circumstances which relate to the repression and 
punishment of them are by no means so; for, if we take the last and greatest of 
these guilty Englishmen above-mentioned, we find his glory and his avarice 
associated with the history and fortunes of the greatest nation upon earth. England 
was not then supported in the arms, as it were, of France and Turkey, and could 
not have been peremptorily called by great patrons and allies to put her house in 
order and repress corruption, as Turkey now is by France and England; and had 
this warning voice been heard, and responded to, we should have been spared this 
desperate struggle.
693
 
 
Williams added that those “base” (implying ġükrü Pasha), “despicable” (referring to 
many of the commanding officers), “drunken” (openly accusing Liva Ahmed Pasha) 
Ottoman officers were still at the head of various departments and corps of the 
Anatolian army.  
 On the other hand, Stratford was pressing the Porte for the trial and punishment of 
Abdi, Ahmed and Ali Rıza Pashas from the Anatolian army for the corruption and other 
charges. In December 1854, an important change in office made things easier for 
Stratford: ReĢid Pasha once again became grand vizier. Nevertheless, ReĢid Pasha was 
no longer the champion of reform, and even if he were so, his office did not mean 
everything, the whims of the Sultan and the intrigues of the rivals had also to be taken 
into account. Lord Stratford was growing weary of the complaints of Williams and the 
constant pressure of Clarendon. Williams had sent the cover of a letter addressed to him 
by ġükrü Pasha as an instance of the disrespect shown him by the Ottoman authorities. 
Yet upon an exact translation of the superscription in question, Lord Stratford found 
that its terms, “far from being disrespectful, rather err on the side of compliment”. Lord 
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Stratford observed that the “Queen's Ambassador and personal representative” had no 
more of the titles.
694
 
 Indeed this despatch of Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon, dated 21 January 1855, 
revealed a very curious and important fact: Stratford admitted that there existed no 
record of his having applied in writing for a formal recognition of Colonel Williams as 
Her Majesty‟s Commissioner to the army of Kars. Stratford was “really at a loss to 
discover how it happened” that he omitted “so obvious a formality”. As he noted, “the 
very facilities” of his “position with respect to the Turkish ministers” had betrayed him 
into an inadvertency, but this was of so little practical importance since Williams's own 
correspondence had shown the honours and attentions with which he was received in 
Erzurum and Kars. Therefore, Stratford very rightly observed that, “surely there are no 
symptoms here of any disrespect to Her Majesty's Commissioner, who at that time in 
military rank was a simple Lieutenant-Colonel”. Then, very interestingly, it appears that 
the Ottoman pashas had in fact shown unduly respect to an unknown British lieutenant-
colonel without proper documents testifying his appointment and they had even allowed 
him to search into almost all the details of the army.  
 In January 1855, Mehmed Vasıf Pasha (?-1865), the former commander of the 
Arabistan army, was appointed as the provisional commander-in-chief of the Anatolian 
army until Ġsmail Pasha could take over his responsibilities. Ġsmail Pasha himself was 
sent to the Danube to replace Ömer Pasha, who was now sent to the Crimea. Vasıf 
Pasha was known to be an honest commander; since he had an independent revenue, he 
was not engaged in peculation.
695
 Therefore he was chosen to command the Anatolian 
army. Vasıf Pasha was given instructions from the Seraskier Rıza Pasha and the Grand 
Vizier ReĢid Pasha. The Seraskier instructed Vasıf Pasha to be on the defensive against 
the Russians, and in the case of a Russian attack he should consult with Ferik Williams 
Pasha and other commanders to repel the enemy. ReĢid Pasha's instructions put more 
emphasis on the need to fight corruption and to follow the advice of Ferik Williams 
                                                 
694 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. Constantinople, January 21, 1855. PRMA, 
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governor of NiĢ, Salonica, Vidin and Trabzon.  
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Pasha.
696
 According to Sadık Pasha, Redcliffe told Vasıf Pasha that he demanded 
“absolute obediance” to Colonel Williams and then Vasıf could count on Redcliffe‟s 
support. Sadık Pasha even claims that Vasıf Pasha kissed the coat of Redcliffe, which 
no “Turk” had done before. He adds that Vasıf Pasha was no “Turk”, but a Georgian of 
Slave origin.
697
  
 Meanwhile the firman conferring on Williams the rank of ferik was read in 
Erzurum on 25 January 1855 in the presence of military and civil authorities. This 
ceremony was a novelty in that probably for the first time such a high rank was 
bestowed upon a Christian, without changing his name into a Muslim name. As 
Williams noted, this innovation was calculated to do much good, “for, hitherto, the 
Turks have forced Europeans to take an Osmanli designation and the soldier was made 
to believe that the officer in question had embraced his religion also; and this inferred 
that no Christian was worthy of holding high rank in the armies of the Sultan”.698 
 By February 1855, Lord Stratford came into conflict with the demands of the 
Brigadier-General Williams, and this time he complained to the Earl of Clarendon. 
Even Stratford did not approve of Williams's tone towards the Ottoman command. 
Finally Lord Stratford asked the question which the Ottoman pashas in Erzurum and 
Kars should have asked from the beginning: What exactly are the position and powers 
of Williams? That he was assuming the powers of the Commander-in-Chief was clear 
from his demands and even Stratford was not prepared to press upon the Porte for all 
the demands of Williams. Therefore Stratford wrote that “he should be made acquainted 
with extent of his powers on the spot, with the degree to which he is independent of the 
Commander-in-chief”. He further remarked: 
   It appears that the Commissioner asserts in practise a right of being obeyed 
without hesitation, whether the object of his suggestion be the punishment or 
removal of an officer accused by him, the correction of an abuse, the introduction 
of an improvement, or the direction of a military operation. If such are his powers 
I know not in what he differs from a Commander-in-chief, except that he is not 
charged with taking the field in person, and directing the whole of the operations 
on his single responsibility. The Porte most certainly does not put this 
construction on the authority with which he is invested, nor have I so read my 
instructions as to ask for more on his behalf than a fair reliance on his judgement 
in matters affecting the administration of an army, a respectful attention to his 
advice and suggestions for the promotion of its efficiency, and that amount of 
                                                 
696 Instructions to be delivered to Vassif Pasha, dated January 28, 1855 (Translation). The Grand 
Vizier's addition to the Instructions to Vassif Pasha. (Translation). PRMA, Inclosure 1 and 2 in 
No. 119, p. 107-110.  
697  Czajkowski, op. cit., p. 77. 
698 Brigadier-General Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Erzeroom, January 26, 1855. PRMA, 
Inclosure in No. 138, p. 133-134. 
210 
confidence as to military movements and plans which ought to be inspired by the 
intimate relations subsisting between the respective Governments.  
Observing in your Lordship's instruction to General Williams that he is directed to 
maintain the most friendly relations with the Turkish officers, I venture to ask 
whether the tone which he has assumed towards them, the abruptness of his 
charges, the violence of his threats, the dictatorial spirit which, according to his 
own account, has generally characterized his proceedings, can be said to 
correspond with that intention, or to favour those dispositions to reform which it is 
our object to produce no less at Kars than throughout the Turkish Empire. 
We should be inconsistent with ourselves if we sought to trample down what 
remains of Turkish independence…699  
 
Stratford then pointed out the inconsistency of Williams' pretensions to such a high 
position due to his “ignorance of the native languages, and of practical experience in the 
field”. 
Adolphus Slade is also critical of the conduct of General Williams, arguing that 
his unfavourable estimate of the Turks, formed while employed on the delimitation of 
the Ottoman-Iranian border, was  
   the inevitable consequence of his dependence on interpreters, drawn from 
classes prone from infancy to exaggerate in disfavour of the ruling class, and who 
when conflicting opinions respecting them are deducible, invariably deduce the 
least flattering. He had seen the Turks with their rayas‟ eyes, he had heard about 
them from their rayas‟ lips, and had passed judgement accordingly. As well might 
an Algerine‟s sketch of the French, or a Hindoo‟s colouring of the English, be 
accepted as genuine representation. 
Thus impressed, the commissioner, face to face with proud susceptible men, 
unconsciously passed the faint line of demarcation between counsel and 
dictation... he fancied, in the professional jealousy excited by his visitorial 
character, disrespect for his position: - singular hallucination, in days when the 
humblest individual in French or English uniform was caressed!
700
      
 
An author by the name of S. de Zaklitschine, who seems to be a French staff 
officer in the Kars army published a book in 1856 in response to the British “blue book” 
(the PRMA). There he wote that  
   The reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams on the battle of Ġncedere testify, if 
not its credulity, at least of its provisions premeditated to blame all that had been 
done in Anatolia until his arrival. They do not speak in favour of his calm and 
cold judgement, neither of his view as a man of war nor of his impartiality as a 
critique.
701
 [My translation] 
 
Sadık Pasha in his turn, writes that Colonel Williams, “like most of the English 
officers who bought their ranks and did not deserve by service and merit, treated his 
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officers like Negroes”.702  
In February 1855, Vasıf Pasha became the mushir of the Anatolian army. He was 
given clear instructions to follow the advice of General Williams. Ferik Halim Pasha 
was also appointed to his staff. The chronicler Lütfi went to his house before his 
departure from Istanbul. Vasıf Pasha was sitting with Ferik Halim Pasha, who was 
complaining that having changed the old muskets with capsule rifles, what they were 
going to do if the French do not give them the capsules and if they did not have money 
for the capsules. Vasıf Pasha kept silent, smoking his nargile and pretending not to 
hear.
703
  
 Meanwhile General Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyov (1794-1866), appointed at 
the end of 1854, came to Tiflis at the beginning of March as the new viceroy of the 
Caucasus. He was not known and he did not belong to the tsar‟s circle of favourites, but 
he was an energetic and able officer. His appointment must have appeared as a surprise 
to generals like Bebutov, Baryatinskiy and Baklanov, who might have felt some 
jealousy towards him. Muravyov had been to Istanbul and Egypt in 1833 during the 
Russian help to the Porte against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. He spoke Russian, 
French, English, German and Turkish fluently.
704
  
At the beginning of June 1855, Muravyov advanced towards the front with 21,200 
infantry, 6,000 Cossack and Dragoon cavalry, 88 guns and some militia.
705
 His plan was 
to besiege Kars from all sides, cutting all ways of communication with Erzurum and 
other places and thus forcing the fortress to surrender. Vasıf and Williams Pashas on the 
other hand, knowing very well the hazards of an open field battle with the Russian 
army, gave all their energy to fortifying the city. Colonel Lake in Williams‟s staff was 
an expert on fortification.  
Cossack cavalry General Yakov Petrovich Baklanov (1808-1873) crossed the 
border at the end of May for reconnaissance. Towards end of June he recommended the 
storm of Kars to Muravyov, but Muravyov was hesitant. General Muravyov wrote to the 
Russian war minister that if he had some 15,000 troops more, he could have stormed the 
city.
706
 Instead he strengthened the blockade of Kars, taking away or destroying all 
sources of provisions for the army at Kars. Soon Kars was suffering from hunger. An 
Ottoman force under Ali Pasha sent from Erzurum was defeated by General Pyotr 
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Petrovich Kovalevskiy (1808-1855) in Penek on 31 August. Ali Pasha himself was 
taken prisoner.  
The peasants around Kars were now subjected to submit their tithe to the Russian 
army. Nevertheless, Muravyov in his memoirs writes that for living stock bought from 
the population, he ordered to pay them by money in gold, not by some doubtful 
promissory notes, as did the Ottoman army.
707
 Muravyov issued an appeal to the 
population of Kars on 28 June. The appeal proclaimed that now the Russian army was 
emcamped near villages but “not one ear of their harvest” had been trodden by Russian 
horses, while Istanbul had showered them with taxes, violence and unpaid transport 
services. It is worth to quote more from this proclamation to see the arguments of 
Russian propaganda: (I am using here the word propaganda in a neutral sense) 
   When 22 years ago Mehmed Ali Pasha betrayed the Sultan and your present 
friends England and France sacrificed Istanbul to Mehmed Ali, while Turkey was 
being ruined and everybody watched cool heartedly, who gave you the hand of 
help? The late Emperor Nikolai, enemy of rebellion and malice. He ordered his 
army to cross the sea and defend Istanbul by breast. At that time our troops were 
in the Bosphorus and Nikolai could demand any reward from Turkey. But the 
Great Sovereign did not make a trade of his friendship. He saved his ally and 
withdrew his army after the danger was past. Did Turkey have a right not to trust 
Nikolai‟s word? But Sultan Mahmud died and around Sultan Abdülmecid there 
appeared men who valued more their personal interests than the peace of the 
nation. Now the English and the French give orders.. while the executers of these 
orders are Muslims… When a French captain appears beside a pasha at the head 
of his army, who gives the orders? The French captain! Foreigners have occupied 
your country, there are foreign troops even in the palace. Open your eyes and 
know well who is your real friend and who is your enemy!
708
 [My translation]  
 
Meanwhile the situation in Kars had become unbearable for the soldiers and for 
the civilians. MüĢir Vasıf Pasha was sending letter after letter to the Porte informing 
that the Russians were about to attack the city and asking for reinforcements. In his 
letter on 20 June 1855, he wrote that a Russian army of 40,000 to 50,000 men had come 
to the south of Kars preparing for an attack. Vasıf Pasha added that it would be difficult 
to oppose this Russian force because most of the troops in Kars were redif troops and 
they had been demoralized by earlier defeats (burada olan kuvve-i mevcude birkaç kere 
muharebe görüp rabbim bir daha göstermesün vuku‟a gelmiş olan halet-i müteellime 
cihetiyle askerin gözü yılmış ve ekserisi dahi redif bulunmuş olduğundan).709 Every day 
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many soldiers were dying and many of them deserting. Some civilians helped these 
deserters and some civilians (both Muslim and Christian, namely Armenian) spied for 
the Russians. Vasıf and Williams had to resort to executions to stop the desertions and 
spies but even this measure did not stop the deserters and spies totally.
710
  
While Kars was thus under siege, the Porte and the allies were discussing on 
various methods of relief for the Kars army. While the allies‟ top priority was the 
conquest of Sevastopol, the Porte was naturally more interested in Kars. Brigadier-
General Mansfield had come from Britain as Stratford‟s military advisor. There were in 
general two plans: landing an army at Trabzon and advancing towards Erzurum and 
Kars or landing the army at Redutkale and advancing towards Kutaisi and Tiflis.
711
 
Both plans had their advantages and disadvantages but the Porte favoured the latter. 
Towards the end of June 1855 a meeting was held in Sadrazam Âli Pasha‟s konak on 
the Bosphorus with the participation of Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, Seraskier 
Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha (1811-1882), Lord Stratford, General W. R. Mansfield and 
Dragoman Stephen Pisani. We do not know why the French did not participate in this 
meeting. Were they uninvited or disinterested? The second alternative seems more 
likely.  
After counselling with the seraskier, General Mansfield prepared a memorandum 
for landing at Redutkale. The command of the campaign was proposed to be given to 
Lieutenant-General R. J. H. Vivian, the commander of the “Turkish Contingent”. 
Vivian‟s contingent (20,000 men, half of which was in Istanbul) was to be reinforced 
with forces from Batum and Rumelia, Egypt and Tunis, reaching a total of about 43,400 
troops.
712
 Nevertheless, Vivian was not enthusiastic about the plan stating that the 
“Turkish Contingent” was not fit for the service, that he must have exact details, and 
then demanding a whole list of facilities of transport and supplies. The list included, 
among others, 170 transport ships and 15,000 horses for a proposed corps of 25,000 
men.
713
  
The decision was of course to be taken by the British government and the Porte. 
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Stratford immediately despatched the plan to Clarendon asking whether a diversion 
operation from Redutkale was approved by the government. On 14 July, Clarendon 
replied by telegraph that the plan is disapproved, adding that “Trebizond ought to be the 
base of operations”.714 The British Secretary of State for War Lord Panmure715 agreed 
with Lord Clarendon and warned General Vivian about undertaking “any expedition of 
a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte” and “risking the 
honour of the British name and your own reputation”.716 Thus began a long series of 
discussions which delayed the proposed campaign and did much harm to its result. With 
the French generals and admirals hostile to the plan and the British hesitant, it was left 
to Ömer Pasha‟s efforts. 
Starting from 23 June Ömer Pasha was warning the allied commanders about the 
situation of the army of Kars and of the necessity of a diversion operation from 
Redutkale. On 7 July he sent a memorandum to the British and French generals and 
admirals in chief, wherein he stated that the Kars army “to the number of 10,000 men, 
blockaded in the entrenched camp of Kars by a superior Russian force”, might 
capitulate because of hunger if not from some other cause. The commander of the Kars 
army, finding that his communications with Erzurum were cut off, had required on 23 
June reinforcements and a powerful diversion on the side of Redutkale. Then Ömer 
Pasha proposed: 
   The proposal which I wish to make is, that I should throw myself, with the part 
of my army which is here and at Kertch, 25,000 Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry from 
Eupatoria, and a proportion of Artillery, upon some point of the coast of Circassia, 
and by menacing from thence the communication of the Russians, oblige them to 
abandon the siege of Kars.
717
   
 
Ömer Pasha added that this force and that under Mustafa Pasha at Batum was enough 
for the operation and he only needed assistance in the transport of his troops. He then 
wanted a war council to assemble to decide upon the operation.  
The conference of the generals and admirals took place on 14 July with the 
participation of the French Commander-in-Chief General Aimable Jean Jacques 
Pélissier (1794-1864), the British Commander-in-Chief General James Simpson (1792-
1868), the Sardinian Commander-in-Chief General Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora (1804 
                                                 
714   The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, July 14, 1855. PRMA, no. 249, p. 226. 
Clarendon‟s detailed dispatch was sent on 13 July. See PRMA, no. 248, p. 225. 
715   Fox Maule-Ramsay (1801-1874), known as The Earl of Dalhousie after 1860. British Secretary of 
State for War from February 1855 until February 1858. See www.wikipedia.org. 
716   Lord Panmure to Lieutenant-General Vivian. War Department, July 14, 1855. PRMA, Inclosure in 
no. 353, p. 234-235. 
717  PRMA, translation of the Inclosure 3 in no. 270, p. 251. 
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-1878), the Commander of the French Fleet in the Black Sea Vice-Admiral Armand 
Joseph Bruat (1796-19 November 1855), the Commander of the British Fleet in the 
Black Sea Vice-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons and Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart (1791-
1875). Ömer Pasha told the conference that a superior Russian force of 48,000 men of 
whom 10,000 were cavalry, advanced upon Kars, with other Russian forces taking 
Bayezid and Toprak Kale on the way to Erzurum. The generals said they could issue no 
opinion without information from their embassies. Upon this Ömer Pasha informed the 
conference that he would go to Istanbul for a few days to confer with his government 
and next day he left for Istanbul in the British steamer Valorous. On General Vivian‟s 
contingent, Ömer Pasha had informed the General Simpson that sending General 
Vivian‟s contingent would be risky, as the men were not yet acquainted with their 
officers, the officers did not speak their language, and the contingent is too small for 
this operation. He argued that he was well known in Asia where he had made several 
campaigns and possessed the confidence of the “Turks” and therefore was “more likely 
to gain the sympathies and assistance of the inhabitants in provisioning, in gaining 
information, etc”.718  
 Ömer Pasha arrived at Istanbul on 17 July 1855 and visited the seraskier and then 
Sultan Abdülmecid. He complained of the neglect of the allies, saying they were 
keeping the best Ottoman troops in the Crimea uselessly and did not care for Kars at all. 
This made him for a while the hero of Istanbul. All the resources were placed at his 
disposal. He chose his officers. The Sultan gave him an estate from the inheritance of 
Hüsrev Pasha who had died last year at the age of 97. He was also invested with the 
Order of the Bath by the British ambassador.
719
 
Ömer Pasha was definitely in favour of a landing at Redutkale instead of Trabzon. 
According to Slade, he argued that 
   From Trebizond to Erzeroom the movement would be of long duration, and 
difficult, from the distance and the mountainous nature of the country; which is 
only traversed by mule roads, rendering the passage of artillery a work of great 
labour and of slow process.
720
 
 
Probably what gave more weight to Ömer Pasha‟s plan was a metaphor probably 
originating from Seraskier Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha, as the Ottomans liked to use 
figurative language. Thus he said that the operation was like striking the snake at its tail 
                                                 
718   Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lieutenant-General Simpson, camp near Kamara, July 12, 1855. 
PRMA, Inclosure 3 in no. 268, p. 247. Simmons was attached to the head-quarters of Ömer Pasha. 
719   Slade argues that Ömer Pasha went from his ship immediately to the palace and accused the Porte 
to the Sultan of negligence and incapacity in regard of military matters. See Slade, op. cit., p. 426.  
720   Slade, ibid. 
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in order to turn its head to the rear. When Ömer Pasha‟s campaign ended in failure, 
Rifat Pasha the former president of the MVL would say “we have given Kars for the 
sake of a metaphor” (Biz bir teşbih uğruna Kars‟ı verdik).721 
Colonel Simmons and Colonel Vico too had come to Istanbul with Ömer Pasha. 
The latter had brought General Simpson‟s letter to Lord Stratford. Simpson informed 
the ambassador that Ömer Pasha‟s arguments had failed to convince the members of the 
conference, “who all, without exception, entertain the strongest objection to the 
withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea”.722 Therefore, Simpson begged Lord 
Stratford to use his “powerful influence” with the Porte to prevent Ömer Pasha‟s 
proposal‟s acceptance. On 19 July, Stratford was writing to Clarendon on the sudden 
arrival of Ömer Pasha and his proposal, having learnt everything from General Simpson 
and Colonel Simmons. Stratford wrote that through Pisani he had learnt that the arrival 
of the Generalissimo without orders from the government had created “some feelings of 
dissatisfaction” and that he had explained his conduct by referring to “the perilous 
nature of the emergency, and the inutility, as he thought, of his presence near 
Sebastopol under present circumstances”.723  
 Stratford and Clarendon were not categorically against the plan. Their objection 
was rather to the use of the “Turkish Contingent”. Meanwhile Ömer Pasha was received 
well by the Sultan. He was also on very good terms with the new seraskier Mehmed 
RüĢdi Pasha, unlike the former Hasan Rıza Pasha, with whom he had been at variance. 
On 2 August 1855, the Porte gave an official note to the British embassy, asserting that 
the best way to save Kars was to march with a 45,000-strong army from Redutkale 
toward Tiflis via Kutais. Since the British had objected to the use of the “Turkish 
Contingent” in this operation, the Porte proposed, as Ömer Pasha had said, to send the 
Contingent to the Crimea and to take instead 20,000 Ottoman troops from there. The 
remaning troops for the operation would be taken from Rumeli and Batum. The note 
also argued that a march from Trabzon to Erzurum with cannons and ammunition could 
take three to four months, by which time Kars would be gone; whereas the road from 
Redutkale to Tiflis via Kutais was plain and convenient for the transport of cannons.
724
 
By this time, the French government also accepted the plan provided that the numbers 
                                                 
721   Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 61. 
722    General Simpson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, before Sevastopol, July 16, 1855. PRMA, 
Inclosure 1 in no. 270, p. 249. As Simpson wrote, this letter was brought by Colonel Vico on the 
same ship with Ömer Pasha, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring his health. 
723  Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, Therapia, 19 July 1855. PRMA, No. 270, pp. 
248-49. 
724  OBKS, No. 49, pp. 161-165. 
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of Ottoman troops before Sevastopol are not diminished. The void could be filled by the 
“Turkish Contingent”. On 9 August, Clarendon informed Stratford by telegraph that 
General Vivian‟s contingent was to go immediately to Gözleve and the Ottoman troops 
there, 10,000 or 12,000, to go with Ömer Pasha to Redutkale. The Ottoman troops at 
Balaklava and Kerç were also not to be diminished in number.725  
 Ömer Pasha spent too much time in Istanbul apparently for preparations but 
certainly having some leisure time and as in the words of Slade, “enjoying a long 
ovation”.726 He departed for Sevastopol only on the 1st or 2nd September 1855, calling 
shortly on Süzebolu on the Bulgarian coast.727 In Süzebolu he met Abdi Pasha the 
former commander of the Anatolian army and talked with him on the campaign.  
Ömer Pasha together with Ferik Ahmed Pasha arrived on 4 September at the bay 
of KamıĢ, south of Sevastopol, where the French fleet lied. Ömer Pasha now had to 
struggle with the allied commanders to get his troops. The admirals said they had sent 
all the transport ships to France to bring troops and they could be given with the 
approval of the Commander-in-Chief when they arrived. However, Ömer Pasha noticed 
signs of despair (asar-ı meyusiyyet) in the admirals. Next he visited General Pelissier 
and General Simpson and felt the same mood in them as well. On 6 September 1855 a 
meeting of the generals and admirals was held. The meeting rejected the idea of any 
troops leaving Sevastopol. Especially General Pelissier was opposed to Ömer Pasha‟s 
plan, saying that Kars was not important at all and the campaign season had already 
passed.
728
 Meanwhile they were executing the sixth bombardment of the city that started 
on 5 September and they were planning an assault on the Malakoff bastion, which was 
the main bastion defending the city. Therefore they asked Ömer Pasha to participate in 
the assault. However, Ömer Pasha did not believe in the success of the assault and 
declined the honour by saying that he had an urgent duty. He left Sevastopol on board 
the steamer Şehper for Trabzon on 6 September, two days before the fall of the 
                                                 
725  The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 9 August 1855. PRMA, No. 278, p. 255. 
726   Slade, op. cit., p. 426. 
727   Ahmed Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha, Gözleve, 27 Zilhicce 1271 / 10 September 1855. 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 6/196 lef 4. However, Ahmed Pasha gives the date of their departure from Istanbul 
as Saturday, 19 Zilhicce, which corresponds to Sunday. Slade gives the date of Ömer Pasha‟s 
departure as 1 September (op. cit., p. 428). Budak assigns the Bulgarian port of Süzebolu 
(Sizepolis, according to Budak, “Sözebolu”) to the Crimea (op. cit., 1993, p. 167). 
728  Ömer Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha, Trabzon, 28 Zilhicce 1271 / 11 September 1855. 
BOA. Ġ. MMS. 6/196 lef 3, quoted by Budak, op. cit., p. . 
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Malakoff.
729
 Ferik Ahmed Pasha and Osman Pasha remained in Sevastopol to organise 
the transfer of 10 Ottoman infantry battalions to the orders of the allies. According to 
Slade, however, Ömer Pasha forbade the Ottoman troops before Sevastopol to take part 
in the assault.
730
 
 In the end, however, after so many efforts, Ömer Pasha would neither participate 
in the conquest of Sevastopol nor succeed in his diversion operation against the Russian 
army at Kars. But at that time he still had some time to come to the relief of the Kars 
army. He arrived at Trabzon on 11 September after being delayed by a gale. From 
Trabzon he wrote to Seraskier Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha and explained the above. Next day 
he proceeded to Batum. After the fall of Sevastopol, General Pelissier softened his 
position and allowed 3 battalions of chasseurs with Minié rifles under the command of 
Colonel Archibald Ballard to go to Batum.
731
 But still more troops were needed and 
these were sent finally by mid-October 1855.  
 Meanwhile Muravyov was restless before Kars. He had a very effective blockade 
around Kars and the city was about to capitulate in short time, but Sevastopol had fallen 
and Ömer Pasha was about to advance into Georgia. Russia needed an urgent gain to 
compensate for Sevastopol. Therefore Muravyov wanted to storm and take Kars before 
Ömer Pasha‟s forces made any advance. This time General Baklanov was against 
storming, however, Muravyov did not listen to him.
732
 Thus on the morning of 29 
September 1855 the Russian forces made an all-out attack on the bastions of Kars, 
mainly on the Tahmasb Tabya. The Ottoman army, although much emasculated by 
hunger and diseases, fought very well behind fortifications. General Kmety had sensed 
the Russian attack beforehand and therefore it was not a surprise attack. The Ottoman 
artillery was very effective. The Russian army lost about 7,500 to 8,000 men dead and 
wounded on this day, including General Pyotr Kovalevskiy among the dead.
733
 Ottoman 
losses were insignificant, less than 1,000, including about 100 to 150 civilians from 
                                                 
729   “The Turkish Army in the Crimea”, Camp of the Allied Armies on the Tchernaya, Sept. 7, The 
Times, London, 21 September 1855, Issue 22165, p. 8. Also see Oliphant, op. cit., p. 32; Budak, 
op. cit., p. 169. 
730   Budak, op. cit., pp. 169-170. Cf. Slade, op. cit., p. 428. 
731  Budak, op. cit., p. 171. 
732  Tarle, op. cit., vol. II, p. 525, 528. 
733  According to the official report of General Muravyov after the battle, Russian losses (dead and 
wounded) totaled 252 officers and 7,274 men. See Bogdanovich, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 345-346. 
Tarle (op. cit., vol. 2, p. 528) also quoting from Muravyov, gives the same figure for officers but a 
slightly different figure for men: 7,226. The Ottoman semi-official newpaper CH had increased the 
Russian loss up to 15,000 men and 300 officers. See Budak, op. cit., (1993), p. 131. Budak, 
however, also takes for granted the news from the CH, that Russian generals “Berimerof” 
(Brimmer) and “Baklonof” (Baklanov) were among the losses (p. 131). In reality, among Russian 
Generals only Kovalevskiy died of wounds from this battle. See Bogdanovich and Tarle, above.  
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Kars.
734
 The Ottomans army had no cavalry to follow up the retreating Russians.
735
 
The news of the victory at Kars created great happiness in Istanbul. Ferik 
Williams Pasha and Ferik Kerim Pasha were promoted to the rank of müĢir and 
decorated with the order of Mecidiye. A medal of Kars was struck and distributed. The 
population of Kars was exempted from taxes for three years.
736
  
 Muravyov had now suffered a terrible defeat. But he had still enough forces to 
continue with the blockade and he made a very correct decision after the ill-
contemplated attack: He simply continued the siege without moving from his place, as 
many expected him to turn to Tiflis. Hunger reached such dimensions that many 
Ottoman soldiers deserted every day. These deserters were usually captured by Russian 
patrols all around the city. Vasıf Pasha and Williams announced death penalty for 
deserters but even this did not stop them. The civilian population of Kars was also 
suffering from hunger. Women were bringing their children to General Williams‟s 
house and leaving there. Without horses, the army could not make a sortie either.
737
 In 
fact on the orders of Williams, the horses were secretly being slaughtered and their meat 
given to the hospital kitchen. The Russian troops were comfortably hutted and well 
supplied.
738
  
 The former commander of Batum army Hassa MüĢiri Mehmed Selim Pasha had 
now become the commander of the forces in Erzurum. However, he did not advance 
beyond Köprüköy in the direction of Kars and soon it became clear that no help or 
diversion operation would come from his side. It should be mentioned here that the 
British consul in Erzurum James Brant had a very low opinion of Selim Pasha, accusing 
him of cowardice in his despatches to Lord Clarendon and Lord Stratford. (Tired of 
pressure and threats from the British consul and British officers, Selim Pasha would 
finally send his petition to the Porte in February 1856 to be removed from Erzurum to 
another place).
739
 Meanwhile the army in Kars was again under heavy siege and had no 
hope other than Ömer Pasha‟s advance. Yet Ömer Pasha was too slow.  
Ömer Pasha changed his mind probably at Batum and instead of Redutkale, now 
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735  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 284. 
736  Kırzıoğlu, op. cit., pp. 174-196. Budak, op. cit., p. 133. 
737  Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 94. 
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1355/28. See Appendix 108. 
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chose Sohum as the port of landing. However, since Sohum was to the north of 
Redutkale, this only further delayed the advance towards Kutaisi. It is indeed hard to 
explain why Ömer Pasha chose Sohum, if he had in mind the urgent liberation of Kars. 
Probably he thought that his incursion into Georgia would be enough to force Muravyov 
to release the siege of Kars and rush to the help of Tiflis. Another reason is suggested 
by Allen and Muratoff, who argue that Ömer Pasha had no cavalry except some (less 
than 1,000) Polish refugees and Ottoman Cossacks (Nekrasovtsy) and he hoped to find 
plenty of irregular cavalry among the Circassians. As Allen and Muratoff pointed out, 
his hopes proved to be unrealistic.
740
 
Ömer Pasha also wrote to the Seraskier that the Circassians wanted an Ottoman 
officer in Circassia and therefore he would send them Mustafa Pasha the commander of 
Batum army. Grand vizier Âli Pasha, however, wrote to Seraskier Mehmed Pasha that 
the status of Circassia was under negotiation with the embassies of the allied states and 
for the time being Mustafa Pasha should not be sent.
741
  
Ömer Pasha started his march from Sohum in the middle of October 1855. His 
army numbered about 40,000, which included three well-trained rifles (şeşhaneci) 
battalions armed with Minié rifles (about 2,000 men) commanded by Colonel 
Ballard.
742
 Ömer Pasha‟s chief of staff was Ferhad Pasha (Stein). Abdi Pasha (the 
former commander of the Anatolian army?) and a certain Osman Pasha also 
commanded infantry brigades. But half of the army was stationed at Sohum, Çamçıra 
and then at Zugdidi, leaving 20,000 for advance.
743
 Some Abkhazian and Circassian 
irregular cavalry accompanied Ömer Pasha‟s army. The territory was indeed marshy 
and densely forested. Laurence Oliphant, the British journalist who accompanied Ömer 
Pasha‟s army noted that “everything was paid for regularly, and the property of the 
country-people in Abkhasia was scrupulously respected by the Turkish army during its 
onward progress through the country”.744  
From Sohum, Ömer Pasha reached the river Ingur at the beginning of November 
in 16 days covering approximately 75 kilometers.
745
 On 6 November Ömer Pasha 
defeated the Russian forces and the local militia commanded by General Prince Ivane 
                                                 
740  Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., pp. 95-96. 
741   Grand Vizier Âli Pasha to Seraskier Mehmed RüĢdi Pasha, 25 Muharrem 1272 (7 October 1855). 
BOA. Ġ. DH. 21447, quoted by Budak, op. cit., 1993, p. 172.  
742   Oliphant, op. cit., p. 83-84. 
743  Bogdanovich, op. cit., vol. II, p. 346. Cf. Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 326. 
744  Oliphant, op. cit., p. 83. 
745  Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 16. Burchuladze gives the distance in versts. Allen and Muratoff (op. cit., 
p. 97), however, argue that Ömer Pasha covered 50 miles (which is close to 75 km) in 20 days.  
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Konstantinovich Bagration-Mukhranskiy on the banks of the river Ingur.
746
 From the 
Ottoman side 16 battalions of infantry and 3 battalions of rifles took part in the battle. 
General Bagration-Mukhranskiy on the other hand had a total of 9,000 regular infantry, 
700 Cossacks and about 10,000 irregular infantry and cavalry (militsiya).
747
 Russian 
prisoners of war reported that 8 infantry battalions (about 5,000 men) with 8 guns, 3,000 
Georgian militia and 7,000 volunteers had participated in the battle, but the volunteers 
had deserted just after the first fire. Oliphant gives the Russian losses as about 1,200 
killed and wounded and the Ottoman losses as less than 400. He also writes that “it is 
impossible to speak too highly of the gallantry which the Turkish soldiers displayed 
throughout the action”.748 On losses, Burchuladze claims the opposite, that is, the 
Russians lost more than 500 but the Ottoman losses were “several times bigger”.749 
Tarle gives the Russian losses as 450 men. Ibragimbeyli on the other hand describes the 
battle as if it ended undecidedly, claiming that the Russians “firmly resisted the 
onslaught of the numerically overwhelming enemy”, and not mentioning losses at all.750 
After the battle of Ingur, the Russian forces retreated to the left bank of the river 
Tskhenis-tskhali (or Skeniskal, River “Horse”), leaving Mingrelia and Guria. On 9 
November Ömer Pasha came to Zugdidi (capital of Mingrelia) and spent five days 
there. He behaved as if he had no hurry. According to Laurence Oliphant, the local 
population was in general in terror and hostile to the Ottoman army. Despite Ömer 
Pasha‟s efforts to prevent pillage and to reassure the local people, principally the 
Abkhazian irregular cavalry (about 200 men) started pillaging villages and kidnapping 
children to sell as slaves.
751
 Ömer Pasha then sent the Abkhazian militia back to their 
homes. Towards the end of November it started to rain heavily for days. Under such 
rains it had become extremely difficult to advance. On 8 December, after receiving the 
news of the fall of Kars on 27 November, Ömer Pasha gave the order to retreat. The 
retreat was however conducted disorderly. The Ottoman army was demoralized and the 
Georgian militia emboldened. Oliphant writes that Ömer Pasha said that  
                                                 
746  Op. cit., pp. 97-113.  
747  Burchuladze, op. cit., p. 16. Ibragimbeyli‟s numbers are almost identical (op. cit., p. 329). Tarle 
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748  Oliphant, op. cit., p. 112-113. 
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   he had good reason to know that the country-people were assisting the enemy by 
every means in their power, and expressed his determination to deal with them 
accordingly. He seemed, not unnaturally, in low spirits at the unfortunate issue of 
the campaign, in which his usual luck seemed to have deserted him.
752
 
 
Slade has very aptly expressed Ömer Pasha‟s failure: “Too often in the East, 
administration sacrifices a general: this time the general failed the administration”.753 
Tarle has also argued that Ömer Pasha, being an average general, had gained 
undeserved reputation on the Danube under favourable conditions and by self-
advertisement and now, when he had a superior army, he did not use the results of this 
victory at the battle of Ingur and did not do anything to save Kars.
754
  
On Ömer Pasha‟s far-fetched campaign, Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni makes an 
interesting point in his destan. Trabzoni writes that he went to Kerç and talked to some 
Ottoman officers. There Ahmed Rıza asked a major why Kars was left to starvation and 
why Ömer Pasha landed at Sohum, which is far away and full of marshes difficult to 
pass. The officer answered him that the intention was to give Kars to the Russians so as 
to make a peace! (O Rus‟a Kars‟ı vermektir meramlar). The fall of Kars would be an 
opportunity for peace (Verilip Kars olacak sulha rağbet, Vesile olacak sulha bu 
elbet).
755
 While we cannot of course take this information for granted, it does not seem 
to be altogether illogical. At least it means that there were such rumours among officers. 
Indeed, after the fall of Sevastopol, Russia badly needed to gain something, in order to 
save face and thus be willing to make peace.  
While Ömer Pasha lost precious time in Mingrelia and MüĢir Mehmed Selim 
Pasha did not move from Erzurum, Kars was forced to capitulate finally on 27 
November 1855. With the approval of MüĢir Vasıf Pasha, General Williams sent his 
aide-de-camp Major Teesdale to General Muravyov on 24 November to negotiate the 
terms of capitulation. Muravyov treated him well. Meanwhile General Kmety and 
General Kollman, having been formally sentenced to death by the Austrian government, 
did not expect mercy at the hands of the Russians. Therefore they applied to General 
Williams to accept their resignation. Williams accepted and they escaped the siege by 
night and reached Erzurum.  
According to the terms of capitulation, agreed between Williams and Muravyov, 
the fortress of Kars would be delivered up intact. The Garrison of Kars would march out 
                                                 
752  Oliphant, op. cit., pp. 182-183. 
753   Slade, op. cit., p. 439. 
754  Tarle, op. cit., vol. II, p. 531. 
755  Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 254-255.  
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and become prisoners. Muravyov appreciated the gallantry of the officers and allowed 
them to retain their swords. The redif, başıbozuk, Laz soldiers and the non-combatants 
(doctors, secretaries etc) would be allowed to return to their homes. General Williams 
would give a list of certain Hungarian and European officers, who would also be 
allowed to return to their homes. Private property, public buildings and monuments 
would be respected. Thus about 5,000 to 8,000 regular (nizam) troops became prisoners 
while about 6,000 irregulars marched towards their homes.
756
  
Immediately after the surrender, General Muravyov sent provisions to the city 
population. He talked with Vasıf Pasha and reminded him that they had met in Istanbul 
in 1833, when Muravyov had come with the Russian military mission. At that time 
Vasıf Pasha was a division general, Kerim Pasha was a lieutenant-colonel in the guards 
(Hassa?) cavalry regiment of Avni Bey and Ömer Pasha (the Generalissimo) was then 
appointed by the Seraskier as interpreter to Muravyov.
757
 Kerim Pasha is said to have 
told Russian officer Daniil Aryutinov that if Ömer Pasha was defeated, he deserved it 
because he contemplated manoeuvring instead of urgent help to Kars, and now they had 
to surrender because of him.
758
 
 
 
3.7.  The “Turkish Contingent”, the “Osmanli Irregular Cavalry”  
and the “Spahis d’Orient” 
 
 
The so-called “Turkish Contingent” and the başıbozuk formations under the 
command of the British and the French belong to the interesting and little known 
subjects of the Crimean War, especially in the Turkish historiography.
759
 The fact that 
                                                 
756   Trabzoni (op. cit., p. 256) gives the number as “five to six thousand”, while Salih Hayri (op. cit., p. 
245) gives as small a number as four thousand. On the testimony of Captain Thomson‟s Hungarian 
interpreter, who returned to Erzurum after the surrender, the Times correspondent in Erzurum 
gives the number of nizam soldiers at Kars taken prisoner by the Russians as 5,000. See “The 
Surrender of Kars. Erzeroum Dec. 11”, The Times, London, 3 January 1856, Issue 22254, p. 8. 
This might be true, but if we add up the number of deserters who had fallen into Russian hands, 
then the number is again about 8,000. Blokada Karsa (p. 114) gives the number of deserters as 
3,000. At the end of the war there were about 7,900 prisoners of war from Kars in Russian hands. 
The list of Ottoman prisoners of war in Odessa, as of end of 1856, numbered 8030, with only 
about 200 from Sinop and other places and the rest from Kars. See “Kontrol‟naya kniga razmena 
russkikh i turetskikh voenno-plennykh”, RGVIA, fond 481, opis 1, delo 695. This notebook 
contains the names of all the Ottoman prisoners of war. 
757  Blokada Karsa, p. 113, 118. 
758   Blokada Karsa, p. 109. 
759   To the best of my knowledge, the only article in Turkish on this topic is by Cezmi Karasu, “Kırım 
SavaĢı‟nda Kontenjan Askeri”, Yedinci Askeri Tarih Semineri Bildirileri I, Ankara: Genelkurmay 
ATASE Yayınları, 2000, pp. 15-27. Nevertheless, this article is rather superficial and contains 
some major and many minor errors, beginning right from the first sentence, which states that the 
Crimean War happened in 1854-55! 
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they were left to oblivion is understandable because many Ottomans would not like to 
remember them. The “Turkish Contingent” was an army of 20,000 Ottoman soldiers 
hired by the British, to be paid, fed, clothed and officered by the British and returned to 
the Porte at the end of the war. In Turkish it was called kontenjan (kontencan) askeri or 
simply designated as troops given to the order of the British army. Although the Turkish 
general staff‟s History of the Turkish Armed Forces calls it Türk-İngiliz Mukavemet 
Ordusu, that is, “Turco-English Resistance Army”,760 I have not come across this 
expression or anything remotely like it anywhere in the BOA. Whatever name we give 
it, it was indeed a breaking point in the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, for it 
provided Muslim soldiers to fight under Christian officers in the pay of a Christian state, 
even if it was an ally. This was probably an unprecedented event. One can hardly find a 
similar practise in military history. That is why we study it here in some detail, because, 
from a military point of view, it did not play any role in the outcome of the war (or 
rather did not have enough time to play any).  
As usual in such cases, the need for the “Turkish Contingent” arose from 
necessity. The number of British soldiers in the Crimea was very small in comparison 
with the French army. At the beginning of 1855, the number of British troops in the 
Crimea was around 13,000, while the French had less than 70,000 troops. Because of 
this disparity between the two armies, British commanders could not take the initiative 
in matters of strategy and tactics in the Crimea. This could not help but be reflected in 
the influence over the Porte as well.  
Lord Stratford was also anxious because his own influence with the Porte had 
deteriorated. Something had to be done by the British to sustain the balance. According 
to Stratford‟s biographer, 
   It galled his national pride to see the French outnumbering the British troops in 
the proportion of at least four to one. Not only was the disparity injurious to the 
success of the siege, inasmuch as our men were numerically incapable of working 
and holding the wide extent of front which was allotted to them, without undue 
and consequently injurious physical strain; but the comparative insignificance of 
the British army brought the credit and prestige of England so low that her 
commanders found themselves compelled to give way to the superior influence of 
the French, even when there was no doubt that the latter were in the wrong.
761
 
 
Thus it was probably first in the mind of Stratford that the idea of forming a 
separate large regular army from hired Ottoman soldiers took place. Unable to feed its 
                                                 
760 See TC Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi BaĢkanlığı, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, III. Cilt, 5. Kısım, 
Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1978, p. 463. The book gives no references to any source on this 
point. 
761   Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 408. 
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own armies, the Porte too accepted the proposal. Stratford obtained the Sultan‟s 
approval in December 1854. The agreement was signed on 3 February 1855 in 
Istanbul.
762
  
The agreement contained nine articles. The first article stated that Her Britannic 
Majesty engaged to take into her service a body of “Turkish” regular troops, to consist 
of twenty thousand men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these men were to be detached 
from the regular troops serving in the armies of the Sultan and the remaining five 
thousand were to be taken from the redifs, either serving or in the reserve. All officers 
above the rank of sergeant were to be British, while the appointment of subaltern 
officers was left to the Ottoman government, with a few drill sergeants reserved for the 
nomination of the British commanders.
763
 Major-General Robert John Vivian,
764
 an East 
Indian Company officer, was selected to command the contingent.
765
 
The troops designated for the contingent would be handed over with their arms 
and ammunition. The men and officers in the contingent would receive the same pay 
and rations as in the Ottoman army. However, this rule seems to have been violated and 
higher salaries were offered, as will be shown below. The troops were to be at liberty in 
performing their religious rites and ceremonies.  
Adolphus Slade argues that the Porte at first thought that the troops to be 
furnished were intended for immediate active service and reluctantly accepted the 
demand. Then the Porte repented, but did not have the firmness to state its reasons. As 
Slade observed, raising an army after the Indian model was not easy in the Ottoman 
Empire. Slade argued that the officers chosen for the contingent from India were not fit 
for the service because “Indian officers, accustomed to rule haughtily a subject race, 
were not the men (with few exceptions) to act judiciously with a dominant race, imbued 
with traditions of military renown”. Those selected came with exclusive ideas “fostered 
by brevet rank, high expectations and a double pay”.766  
As for the baĢıbozuk formations, they were inspired by the colonial army models 
of the British in India and of the French in Algeria. Both France and Britain used local 
                                                 
762 BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 2-8, dated 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1271 (3 February 1855). The agreement 
is in French, with English and Turkish translations. The original text in French uses the term “un 
corps de troupes régulières turques”. See lef 3. The Ottoman Turkish text, however, does not use 
the word “Turkish”. 
763 Stratford's memorandum to the Porte, dated 3 February 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 9. See 
Appendix 86. 
764   Karasu has written General Vivian‟s name as “Wivien”. See Karasu, op. cit., (2000), p. 19, 22. 
765   The ILN described him as “an able East Indian officer” and “the scion of an old military house”. 
See “The Turkish Contingent”, ILN, 23 June 1855, p. 630. 
766   Slade, op. cit., p. 380. 
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irregular cavalry in their colonies. The French Commander-in Chief Marshal St. Arnaud 
gave the task of forming an Ottoman irregular cavalry corps to General Yusuf, who was 
renowned for his spahis (sipahi, the old Persian/Ottoman word for light horseman) in 
Algeria. While Lord Raglan did not like much such irregular troops, Lord Stratford 
supported the idea of Colonel William F. Beatson. Therefore, even before the Turkish 
Contingent, the first attempt of the British was to propose to form an irregular 
(başıbozuk) cavalry division under the command of Colonel Beatson.767 Like many 
officers of the “Turkish Contingent”, Colonel Beatson made his career in India, where 
he had formed a similar irregular cavalry unit (the Bundelkund Legion) from Indian 
natives.
768
 Beatson had offered his services to Lord Clarendon and he was accepted. 
Promoted to the rank of general and accordingly a pasha in the Ottoman army, Beatson 
was to form an irregular cavalry division of about 4,000 men in Bulgaria (called the 
“Osmanli irregular cavalry” or shortly “Beatson‟s Horse”). The formation of this unit 
was accepted in 1854, but its execution coincided with that of the Turkish Contingent. 
The irregular cavalry was at first under the orders of the Foreign Office and Lord 
Stratford, that is not attached to Lord Raglan, however, in September 1855 it was 
attached to the “Turkish Contingent”. According to Captain Edward Money, who served 
in this irregular cavalry from July 1855 until July 1856, by August 1855, only about 
1,500 of the proposed 5,000 men (8 regiments) had been recruited.
769
 These troops were 
stationed in Çanakkale (Dardanelles). We will see the problems created by them in 
Chapter 5.5.3.  
On the date of the signing of the agreement on the “Turkish Contingent”, Lord 
Stratford gave another note demanding proper steps to be taken for raising the separate 
“Ottoman Irregular Cavalry” (in official translation başıbozuk süvari askeri) with 
necessary orders being issued to provincial authorities. Stratford warned that the orders 
should contain necessary information especially as regards the pay and rations of the 
soldiers: 
   The success of this important experiment depends so much upon the manner and 
spirit in which it is begun that the undersigned in addressing Aali Pasha on the 
subject cannot too strongly impress His Highness with the necessity of having the 
Vizirial letters, which he solicits, drawn up in the clearest and most stringent 
terms. It is, in particular, desirable that the men to be enrolled should know from 
the outset that in point of military service, pay, and rations they are to stand in 
                                                 
767 Translation of the note of the British embassy. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 1, 15 Safer 1271 (7 
November 1854). See Appendix 74. 
768  See [Calthorpe], op. cit., p. 47 and Reid, op. cit., p. 271.  
769  Edward Money, Twelve Months with the Bashi-Bazouks, London: Chapman and Hall, 1857, p. 32. 
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direct connection with British officers and the Queen's Government. It is also 
essential that strict precautions should be taken to secure the peaceable inhabitants 
from any acts of plunder or violence in which the volunteers, if left entirely to 
themselves, might be tempted to indulge, while passing from their respective 
homes to the place of their destination.
770
  
 
Accordingly, orders were sent to all Ottoman provinces from Vidin to Damascus. 
The commander of the Osmanli irregular cavalry General Beatson sent Colonel 
Frederick Walpole and Colonel Bruce to Syria to recruit troops in March 1855.
771
 Other 
officers were also sent Anatolia and Rumelia. As Captain Money has noted, the recruits 
were offered pay and rations at a “most liberal rate”.772 Captain Money gives the rates 
of pay for officers and troopers and these rates are indeed much higher than in the 
Ottoman regular and irregular troops. The nefer (private or trooper) received 24 piastres 
per month plus rations and forage in the regular cavalry, while the irregular cavalry men 
were paid 70 piastres per month including rations and forage. On the other hand, the 
British now paid the nefers 1 pound 13 shillings 4 pence per month (equal to about 200 
piastres) plus rations of bread and forage to horses.
773
 Colonel Walpole came to 
Damascus in March 1855.
774
 However, these regular and irregular levies created in 
some places the same kind of atrocities and disorders as the başıbozuks of the Ottoman 
armies were creating. We will see some of them in Chapter 5.5.3. 
The Porte‟s regret and unwillingness is confirmed by its slowness in the collection 
of troops for the Contingent. In the middle of April, General Vivian came to Istanbul 
and at once made inquiries to the Porte about the forces to be given to his command. 
However, there was very little preparation. Stratford de Redcliffe gave a note dated 19 
April 1855 to Saffet Efendi the acting foreign minister. The British ambassador 
expressed his regret that “so very imperfect a preparation” was observed for that 
purpose at Constantinople, “notwithstanding the representations addressed repeatedly 
by him to the proper authorities, and the specific assurances received in reply”. Then he 
                                                 
770 Stratford's memorandum to the Porte, dated 3 February 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 10. See 
Appendix 87. 
771  Reid, op. cit., p. 275. However, Reid argues that these officers began their activities there in 
August 1855, which is refuted by the letters of Mehmed Ġzzet Pasha and Ġsmail Rahmi Pasha dated 
May 1855. See below.  
772  Captain Money, op. cit., p. 31. 
773  Money, op. cit., p. 31 and 49. Money claimed that the troops in the regular Ottoman army received 
18 piastres or two shillings. However, this is not true, as we have seen, infantry troops received 20 
piastres and cavalry 24 piastres. On the other hand, at the rate of pound sterling to piastres which 
was prevalent at that time, 18 piastres would make slightly less than 3 shillings.  
774  Chief of staff of the Arabistan army Mehmed Ġzzet Pasha to the seraskier, Damascus, 29 ġaban 
1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/51. Colonel Walpole‟s actual rank in the British army 
was major. See James Henry Skene, With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War, London: Richard 
Bentley and Son, 1883, p. 59. 
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requested that   
   the Troops, which are to compose the Corps in question may be collected, and 
that such part of them as are at Constantinople, may be at once detached from the 
remainder of the Garrison, and reviewed in presence of the British General, to the 
amount of at least six thousand infantry, with two regiments of Cavalry and two 
or three batteries of Field Artillery. The season for operations in the field is 
rapidly coming on, and it is most desirable that the Turkish Corps in the Queen of 
England‟s pay should be prepared, with all practicable expedition and good effect, 
for taking part in them. 
The Undersigned must remind the Ottoman Secretary of State that he is entitled to 
expect the number of troops agreed upon from the several places already 
designated by the Porte, namely, the Danube, Constantinople and Bosnia, or in 
failure of the required numbers in those quarters from other more convenient 
sources. He begs to observe at the same time, that according to his advices from 
the Crimea, there is no probability of any portion of the force in question being 
sent by Omer Pasha, since it appears beyond a doubt, that His Highness is not in a 
condition to weaken his army with any degree of prudence, and that he is 
employing the troops commanded by him, in strict agreement with the 
Commanders in Chief of the Allied Forces.
775
 
 
The governor of Aleppo Ġsmail Rahmi Pasha in his letter dated 20 May 1855 
informs the Porte that until then 430 soldiers of cavalry out of the desired 500 have 
already been recruited and the rest will soon be found.
776
 He adds that although there 
was great enthusiasm at the beginning, the recruitment had slowed down somehow. He 
also anticipates that the “Kolonel Bey”, meaning the British colonel (Walpole or 
Bruce?) charged with the task, being a stranger to the local affairs, may express some 
complaints because of the delays, but the troops must be recruited by encouragement 
(teşvik ve terğib ile tertib olunmak).  
It seems that the province of Baghdad was also charged to recruit 500 or more 
cavalry. Towards the end of June 1855, Mehmed ReĢid Pasha, governor of Baghdad and 
commander of the Iraq army, sent a complaint to the Porte. He wrote that Hilmi Pasha 
the mutasarrıf of Mosul had informed him that the British consul in Mosul was 
recruiting cavalry troops with a monthly pay of 150 piastres excluding rations and 
forage under the command of Sergerde Laz Osman Ağa and several officers, who had 
come from the Anatolian army. It was heard that the British authorities would recruit 
troops from Baghdad as well.  
Mehmed ReĢid Pasha wrote that while the purpose of this act was fair and 
beneficent, it was also well known to the grand vizier that this area was not like 
Rumelia and Anatolia in that it was not possible to employ local troops there. The 
                                                 
775  Stratford de Redcliffe to His Excellency Saffet Efendi. Pera, 19 April 1855. BOA. HR. SYS. 
1192/2 lef 15-16. See Appendix 99. 
776 Ġsmail Rahmi Pasha to the Porte, 3 Ramazan 1271 (20 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/56. 
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troops there had been brought with much difficulty from Anatolia and Rumelia and up 
to then they were given a monthly salary of 70 piastres including rations and forage. 
Mehmed ReĢid Pasha then warned that if now they were offered twice and three times 
more pay with the prospect of being sent to the side of “Rum”, towards their own 
country, then no Turkish soldiers would remain in Baghdad, leaving the area open to 
danger from the Russians and Iranians (şu aralık ol suretle iki üç kat ziyade maaş 
verildiği ve memleketleri olan Rum tarafına sevk olunacaklarını anladıkları gibi burada 
bir nefer Türk olarak asker kalmayıp cümleten asker yazılarak gidecekleri cihetle). 777 
It is remarkable that the governor uses exactly the words “Turkish soldiers” for 
soldiers from Anatolia and Rumeli to distinguish them from local (Arabic, Kurdish, etc) 
soldiers; because Ottoman documents at that time very rarely used the term “Turkish”. 
Sending exclusively Anatolian or Rumelian recruits to the Arabic provinces was indeed 
a time-honoured practice of the Porte. The logic behind this measure was that local 
troops would be inefficient towards their kinsmen, while the Anatolian or Rumelian 
recruits would not feel sympathy to the local people. Experience had confirmed the 
correctness of this practice. Even the Russian consul in Beirut had noticed this fact 
about the Arabistan army in Damascus.
778
 
On the other hand, the situation of the Kars army in the summer of 1855 forced 
the Porte to try to recruit irregular infantry and cavalry from Anatolia at somewhat 
raised rates of pay. MüĢir Vasıf Pasha asked for 3,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry to be 
sent urgently to Kars. Thus infantry troops were offered 70 piastres per month plus 
rations and cavalry troops were offered 100 piastres per month plus rations and forage. 
Nevertheless, it was not possible to find so many soldiers.
779
  
On 28 August 1855, General Vivian (already promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-
General) submitted to the Ottoman seraskier a nominal roll of officers of the 
Contingent, recommended for “Turkish” rank, which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had 
approved in consultation with his military adviser General Mansfield. The “Turkish” 
rank for British officers usually meant the promotion of one or two or even more steps 
up in rank with regard to the Ottoman officers, thus equalling a British captain with an 
                                                 
777   BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/15 lef 2, dated 13 ġevval 1271 (29 June 1855). See Appendix 104. 
778    “Zametili, chto voinstvenny dukh usilivaetsya v Turetskom soldate kogda on sluzhit vne predelov 
svoego otechestva, razumitsya otechestvom ne Imperiyu Ottomanskuyu, kotoraya dlya Musulman 
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ponimayut eto plemena sostavlyayushchiya imperiyu”. [Italics underlined in the original]. See 
“Doneseniye russkogo voennogo agenta v Konstantinopole generalnogo shtaba grafa Osten-
Sakena. 4/16 Fevralya 1852”. RGVIA. Fond 450, opis 1, delo 47, list 16. 
779  Budak, op. cit., 1993, p. 110. 
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Ottoman major or colonel, and so on. The memorandum from Lord Stratford stressed 
the fact that these officers would continue to be in the pay of the British government 
and receive no salaries or rations from the Porte. Their pay and rations would be the 
same as in the Ottoman army. 
General Vivian was first made a ferik, but then Lord Stratford seems not quite 
satisfied with this promotion and demanded the rank of mushir for him. Accordingly 
General Vivian was made mushir (full general), 5 officers were given the rank of ferik 
(division general or lieutenant-general), 8 officers received the rank of mirliva or shortly 
liva (brigadier general), 9 officers became miralay (colonels) and finally there were 42 
kaimakams (lieutenant-colonels).
780
 The commander was given the authority to make 
provisional appointments to fill possible vacancies during the war, subject to later 
approval from the Porte. If the commander wanted to promote an Ottoman binbaşı 
(major) to the rank of kaimakam, then the Ottoman officer would receive from the 
British government the pay equal to this rank in the Ottoman army. 
The “Turkish Contingent” was planned to be sent to Gözleve to replace the 
Ottoman troops to be detached for the Caucasian campaign of Ömer Pasha, intended to 
save Kars from the siege of the Russian army. Indeed at first the command of the 
projected 45,000-strong relief army to be gathered in Redut Kale was offered to 
Lieutenant-General Vivian on 1 July 1855, as we have seen in Chapter 3. In his report 
to Lord Stratford, Vivian stated that there are some material questions that must be 
settled before a serious consideration. He had apprehensions as regards the sea and land 
transports of the troops and the animals and the supplies of ordnance and commissariat 
(provisions) on enemy territory. Finally he wanted to have “authority to act 
independently” and a guaranteed flow of money for the operations. “Unless all these 
points can be satisfactorily arranged”, asserted Vivian, “I think it would be useless to 
discuss the measure”.781  
 On 11 July, General Mansfield sent a letter to General Vivian, forwarding him the 
minutes of his conversation with the Ottoman ministers on the matter. Lord Stratford 
had asked for Vivian‟s views. Vivian again pointed out so many deficiencies, being 
quite unwilling for the campaign. Transport was not sufficient and temporary, so the 
army landed at Redut Kale would be left “without shipping to fall back upon in case of 
a reverse”. Vivian further ventured to give his opinion that “as the interests of France 
                                                 
780 BOA. Ġ. HR. 123/6166, dated 22 Zilhicce 1271 (5 September 1855).  
781 Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Turkish Contingent Head-Quarters, 
Büyükdere, July 2, 1855. Supplementary PRMA, Inclosure in No. 2, p. 2-3. 
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and England are centered in Sebastopol, all our means should be directed to that 
quarter”. He pointed out that the officers of the Contingent had to employ interpreters to 
talk to the soldiers and if these interpreters deserted in action great confusion would 
ensue and this would damage the prestige of the “English” officers. Vivian then 
expressed his suspicions:  
   Thirty thousand English troops, with all the appliances of money and shipping, 
with the whole aid of England, were unsupplied before Sebastopol. What would it 
be with a Turkish army of 40,000, in an enemy‟s country, some 50 or 100 miles 
from the sea, its base of operation being an open roadstead?
782
   
 
Vivian then suggested that for the relief of Kars, Batum might be chosen as the base of 
landing and operations might be directed against Ahısha (“Achalziche”).   
The “Turkish Contingent” went from Büyükdere to Varna and from there to the 
Crimea in September. General Vivian, commandant du Contingent Turc met the Sultan 
together with his retinue before going to the Crimea.
783
 
After so much preparation, the “Turkish Contingent” with its privileged officers 
and soldiers was wanted neither by Ömer Pasha, nor by Williams in Kars. Finally it was 
decided to send them to Kerç. After the fall of Sevastopol to the allies and Kars to the 
Russians, peace talks started again in the winter of 1855. Stratford was not happy with 
the abrupt end of the war and the “premature” peace negotiations, because, among other 
reasons, the “Turkish Contingent” had not yet shown itself in battle. He wrote in his 
memoirs: 
   The war came to so early a close that the troops in our pay had no opportunity of 
shewing their prowess, but neither did they afford any grounds of complaint. Even 
the irregulars submitted with good will to the command of Christian officers and 
to a degree of discipline which they had not previously undergone. On returning 
to their respective provinces they expressed so much satisfaction with the good 
treatment they had experienced in our service that when the Indian mutiny broke 
out it would have been easy to raise an auxiliary force from among the population 
of their creed.
784
 
 
Our trader and destan writer Ahmed Rıza had been to Kerç at that time and he 
gives the number of Ottoman troops in Kertch as 30,000, obviously with some 
exaggeration. He writes that their commander was English but the English had a right to 
it.
785
  
                                                 
782 General-Lieutenant Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Turkish Contingent Head-Quarters, 
Büyükdere, July 14, 1855. Supplementary PRMA, No. 3, p. 4. 
783 BOA. Ġ. HR. 123/6184, dated 28 Zilhicce 1271 / 11 September 1855. 
784   Lane-Poole, op. cit., vol. II, p. 410. 
785  “Leşker-i İslâmiyâna ol zaman, Baş kumandan İngiliz oldu revân. Sonradan geldi alaylardan çeri, 
Tam otuz bin oldu İslâm leşkeri”. Trabzoni, op. cit., p. 198. 
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3.8.  Battles in the Crimea and the Siege of Sevastopol 
 
 
The battles in the Crimea and the siege of Sevastopol are probably the best related 
parts of the Western and Russian historiography of the Crimean War. Here in this 
subchapter we will only briefly deal with these events, focusing as always on the 
Ottoman side.  
On 4 September 1854, Nikolai wrote to Menshikov, that he had at his disposal 52 
battalions, 16 squadrons, 8 infantry and 2 cavalry batteries and 3 Cossack regiments, 
besides the fleet and the local garrison. Therefore, he added that he considers these 
forces enough to repulse the enemy.
786
 According to Albert Seaton, Menshikov had 
38,000 troops and 18,000 seamen plus 12,000 troops between Kefe (Feodosia) and 
Kertch, which more or less corresponds to the above figures.
787
 
The allies landed at Eskihisar (Old Fort), between Alma and Gözleve in the 
Crimea on 13 September 1854. Prince Menshikov had not taken measures to prevent the 
allied landing. However, it must be admitted that he could not know where the landing 
would take place and even if he did know, he could not be certain whether it was a 
decoy for landing somewhere else or not. Thus the allies advanced towards Alma on 
their way to Sevastopol.  
The first battle between the allies and the Russian forces took place in Alma on 20 
September 1854. On that day a Russian army of 33,000 to 40,000 met the allied army of 
about 60,000 men. Mirliva Süleyman Pasha‟s forces were incorporated into the division 
of the French General Bosquet. The French had the advantage of their Minié rifles. The 
Russian army was turned into retreat, but the allies did not follow it. If they had, they 
could have even taken Sevastopol. The Russians lost about 1,800 killed, 3,900 wounded 
and missing. The French casualties included 140 to 250 killed and 1,200 to 1,400 
wounded. The British loss is put at 362 killed and more than 1,500 wounded.
788
 There is 
no indication of the Ottoman losses in the existing literature. Most probably they are 
                                                 
786   Emperor Nikolai I to Prince Menshikov in Sevastopol, 23 August (2 September) 1854. RGVIA. 
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787   Albert Seaton. The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle. New York, London:  St. Martin's Press, 
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included among the French casualties. The Ottoman commander Mirliva Süleyman 
Pasha did not report on his casualties in his letter to the Porte either.
789
 
The allies restarted marching towards Sevastopol on 23 September. Meanwhile 
the Russians had scuttled seven of their ships to block to entrance to the bay of 
Sevastopol. The allies then made the decision not to attack Sevastopol from the 
northwest side, but to attack instead from the southeast side. However, this was another 
blunder by the allies, because on the northwest side the city was poorly fortified and 
defended by only some 5,000 men. Menshikov with his army had gone out of the city to 
take the road to Bahçesaray and the city was left to the local garrison and the sailors. 
We must note that both the Russians and the Allies lacked proper reconnaissance 
services. Meanwhile Marshal St Arnaud died and General Canrobert took the French 
command.  
The allied commanders did not want to risk attacking the city before 
reinforcements from Varna reached. This was still another blunder. In October the 
French forces reached 42,000 and the British 23,000, while the Ottoman forces before 
Sevastopol remained the same.
790
 The Ottoman contingent was kept as reserve. Thus 
while the allies lost precious time, the Russians improved their fortifications under the 
supervision of Colonel Totleben and the admirals Nakhimov, Kornilov and others. 
Some of Menshikov‟s army also entered the city, raising the total number of defenders 
to 25,000.  
On 17 October the allies began the bombardment of Sevastopol. During the 
bombardment they made a big damage in the defences but again they were not 
foresighted enough to begin the assault. Thus they missed another opportunity. 
Bombardment was also begun from the sea side. The Ottoman fleet with its line-of-
battle ships like the Mahmudiye and the Teşrifiye also took part in the bombardment. 
But the wooden ships proved useless against stone fortifications. The ships got heavy 
damages and casualties while the Russian damages were smaller. 12 sailors from the 
Mahmudiye were also wounded. The Mahmudiye and three ships from the Egyptian 
squadron had to be sent to Istanbul for repairs. On their way, two Egyptian ships went 
aground after a gale and about 1,000 sailors were drowned, including the commander of 
                                                 
789   Seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha to the grand vizier, 13 Muharrem 1271 (6 October 1854). BOA. Ġ. 
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this number must be about 6,000 to 7,000.  
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the Egyptian division (squadron) Hasan Pasha.
791
 The bombardment of Sevastopol from 
the sea was another lesson which would be used in the construction of ironclads later. 
The bombardment continued until 25 October but achieved nothing. Admiral Kornilov 
died on the first day of the bombardment. Thus began the 349 days of siege and trench 
warfare in Sevastopol.  
Menshikov‟s army, now reinforced up to 65,000, decided to attack the allied 
positions at Balaklava on 25 October. Part of the Ottoman contingent consisting of 
little-trained redif or esnan troops was deployed in the four or five lightly constructed 
artillery earthworks to the north of Balaklava, with 250 men in each. Lieutenant-
General Pavel Petrovich Liprandi (1796-1864) made a surprise attack with a force of 
25,000 men on this side early at dawn. The 1,000-strong Ottoman troops, overwhelmed 
by the far superior enemy, after a resistance of two hours during which 150 to 170 of 
them were killed, retreated. The Takvim-i Vekayi wrote that the Ottoman troops in the 
first tabya (redoubt) were attacked by 8 Russian battalions with 12 guns and their 
resistance lasted two hours.
792
 Slade depicted the situation as follows: 
   This exposed and dangerous post, above 2,000 yards away from any support, 
requiring the staunchest troops of the army to hold, if worth holding, was 
entrusted to men under depressing influences; men not long enrolled, and never in 
action. Ignorant and suspicious, in a strange army, they may have fancied 
themselves placed there by the “infidel” to be sacrificed.793  
 
According to the Times correspondent William Howard Russell,  
   For some mysterious reason or other the Turkish government sent instead of the 
veterans who fought under Omar Pasha, a body of soldiers of only two years‟ 
service, the latest levies of the Porte, many belonging to the non-belligerent class 
of barbers, tailors, and small shopkeepers. Still they were patient, hardy, and 
strong…794  
 
However, it does not seem mysterious that the Ottoman commander should have 
given not his best troops, when Lord Raglan wanted some Ottoman troops to dig up 
earthworks for the defence of British troops. Why should he give his best troops for 
such a task? Apparently Russell arrived together with Lord Raglan about 8 o‟clock. 
Russell then writes that 
                                                 
791  Besbelli, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
792   See Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65. 
793   Slade, op. cit., p. 327. 
794   Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea, Rev. Ed., London: G. Routledge & Co., 1858, p. 
175. Tarle also gives the number of troops in each redoubt at 250. See Tarle, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 169. 
According to the TV, each of these four tabyas had half a battalion Ottoman troops (asakir-i 
şahane). The esnan battalions usually numbered about 500. See TV, 27 Safer 1261 (19 November 
1854). Also see Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65. Balaklava is depicted as Balıklı in the TV. 
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   It was soon evident that no reliance was to be placed on the Turkish infantry or 
artillerymen. All the stories we had heard about their bravery behind stone walls 
and earthworks proved how differently the same or similar people fight under 
different circumstances. When the Russians advanced, the Turks fired a few 
rounds at them, got frightened at the distance of their supports in the rear, looked 
round, received a few shots and shell, then “bolted,” and fled with an agility quite 
at variance with common-place notions of Oriental deportment on the battle-
field... Meantime the enemy advanced his cavalry rapidly. To our inexpressible 
disgust we saw the Turks in redoubt No. 2 fly at their approach...
795
 
 
Lord Raglan‟s nephew and aide-de-camp Colonel Somerset Calthorpe wrote in 
the same vein with Russell:  
   A few moments after our arrival the Russians established a battery of field 
artillery.. and opened fire on No. 1 Redoubt; at the same time a column of infantry 
(some 1,200) men advanced up to it, the Turkish garrison firing on them in a 
desultory sort of way with small arms, but without attempting to serve their heavy 
guns. To our intense disgust, in a few moments we saw a little stream of men 
issue from the rear of the redoubt and run down the hill side towards our 
lines…796  
 
Yet these eyewitnesses do not mention the fact that these few Ottoman troops had 
been under artillery fire for about two hours before the arrival of the British forces. The 
Russian superior forces (three columns, commanded by major generals Levutskiy, 
Semyakin and Gribbe) had stormed Redoubt No. 1 about 7 o‟clock a.m. after a strong 
cannonade concentrated on this redoubt. The Russians took the Redoubt No. 1 at 7:30, 
although the “Turks” fought very stubbornly (ves‟ma uporno) and left 170 dead.797 Lord 
Raglan came to observe the battlefield shortly before 8 a.m. General Canrobert came 
thereafter. When he looked from the Chersonese Plateau, Raglan saw only the retreating 
Ottoman troops. As Michael Hargreave Mawson observed on Calthorpe‟s narrative:  
   The evidence in this passage is most unreliable; the author writing not only from 
a viewpoint nearly three miles from the action, but also with the specific intention 
of defending the memory of a beloved commander and uncle – Raglan. The fact 
that Raglan was two hours or more late for the battle has been carefully glossed 
over with the claim that the Russian Artillery only opened fire once Raglan and 
the staff were watching, and that the infantry charge was simultaneous. It is 
contrary to the usages of war to shell a position whilst your own infantry is 
attempting to capture it. The figure of 1,200 Russian infantry can be taken as 
                                                 
795   Russell, op. cit., p. 184-185. The same passage is available in Andrew Lambert and Stephen 
Badsey (eds.), The War Correspondents. The Crimean War, Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1994, 
pp. 106-108. Relying upon the depiction of this battle by Russell and Kinglake and distrusting 
George Buchanan‟s observations, Reid (op. cit, p. 268) uses the same argument with the same 
phrase (“the Ottoman troops bolted and fled”). Reid even argues that the Ottoman “battalions” fled 
“even before shots were fired by either side”) 
796   [Colonel Somerset Calthorpe], op. cit., pp. 302-303. 
797  Nikolai Fyodorovich Dubrovin, Istoriya Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolya, Vol. II, St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiya tovarischestva “Obschestvennaya Pol'za”, 1900, pp. 127-130. 
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deliberately under-estimated.
798
 
 
Nevertheless, from that time on, the French and the British officers and soldiers in the 
Crimea started to treat the Ottoman soldiers (“the Turks”) as despicable cowards. On 
the other hand, according to Oleg Shkedya, the evaluations of Russian researchers and 
participants of the war about the Ottoman troops in this battle were more balanced. The 
“Turks” had defended the first redoubt as long as possible, and if it was taken by the 
Russians they were not to be blamed. Shkedya also wrote that Russian sources in 
general were of the opinion that the allies commanded everything and the Ottoman 
generals were in a not-enviable position.
799
  
James Reid‟s interpretation of the conduct of the Ottoman troops in this battle is 
very deficient, one-sided and biased due to his reliance on Russell and Kinglake only. 
He writes that 
   All optimism about the Ottoman reformed army evaporated with the disgraceful 
performance of the Ottoman battalions at the battle of Balaklava. Here, Ottoman 
infantry battalions stationed on hill redoubts in the advance of the entire allied 
army broke and ran, even before shots were fired by either side. The sight of 
massive Russian cavalry formations bearing down upon them in their isolated 
forward positions provoked such fear and panic, that to a man, the Ottoman troops 
bolted and fled.
800
   
 
Had Reid read other sources as well, such as Adolphus Slade, he could have 
formed a more balanced view. First, he would see that these were esnan and redif 
troops. Second, he would understand that these troops did not “bolt” immediately, but 
resisted a much stronger enemy for more than an hour. Reid‟s treatment of this episode 
gives the impression that he does not try to understand what happened, but instead he 
only tries to find support to what he already “knows” about what could have happened. 
On the other hand, this is not to say that the Ottoman soldiers would not “bolt” in any 
case. They might have fled, and they did in many cases, like soldiers in any other army. 
However, one need not distort facts in order to prove that the Ottoman army was not 
reformed. There are other ways of showing the extent of the effects of reform in the 
Ottoman army. The point here is to try to understand first what actually happened and 
then why it happened that way.  
After the capture of the redoubts by the Russians, a battle of cavalry followed, 
                                                 
798  Michael Hargreave Mawson, The True Heroes of Balaclava, Kent, Bedford, London: Crimean 
War Research Society Publications, spiral-bound printout, 1996, p. 13.  
799  Oleg P. Shkedya, “Turetskaya armiya v Krymskoi kampanii”, Vostochnaya (Krymskaya) Voina 
1853-1856 godov: Novye materialy i novoe osmyslenie, vol. 1, Simferopol: Krymskiy Arkhiv, 
2005, p. 80. 
800  Reid, op. cit., p. 268. 
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with the famous “charge of the light brigade” of the British upon Russian fortified 
positions, which is still a point of discussion in the British historiography. We will not 
go into the details of this battle. The British lost from the light cavalry brigade 118 to 
134 killed and more than 200 wounded. The Russian loss was 550, of which 238 were 
killed.
801
 The TV described the folly of the British charge of the light brigade as 
“demontration of bravery at the extreme level” (aşırı mertebe ibraz-ı merdane-i 
şecaat).802 
The battle‟s result was insignificant from a military point of view, but the 
Ottoman troops from then on were subjected to all kinds of misery and humiliation. As 
Robert Edgerton describes, they were “cursed at, spat upon, kicked, and slapped, their 
only duties to carry supplies, maintain roads, and stay out of sight”.803 According to 
Tarle, the allies did not sit at the table for dinner even with the Ottoman officers.
804
 
Depending on the allies for their food, the Ottoman troops were also left to starvation. 
Then they started stealing some food, for which they were flogged.  
Soon the Ottoman soldiers started dying from cold, hunger, filth and disease. 
According to the Russian military historian Nikolai Dubrovin, old and torn tents did not 
protect the Ottoman soldiers from the cold and sometimes up to 300 men died in one 
day.
805
 They were deprived of all necessities: poorly fed, clothed, and sheltered, without 
bed and linen, morally depressed, disdained and insulted. They had no money either. 
Furthermore, they had no press, no Ottoman correspondents to write about their plight. 
Everyday they buried their comrades and the dogs dug up the dead bodies and devoured 
them. There was a “hospital”, a building or a hovel where previously Russian prisoners 
were kept. After they all died of cholera, the building was given to the Ottomans, but 
the dirt had never been cleaned. About 400 men were strewed on the damp mud floors 
of its rooms, the doors and windows closed to exclude cold air.
806
 The Ottoman surgeon 
in charge of the “hospital”, who had been trained in London, told the British war 
correspondent N. A. Woods: “The deadly fetid air which issued from this charnel-house 
made me involuntarily shrink back from the door with loathing”. He further 
                                                 
801  Baumgart, op. cit., p. 130. These are, I think, the most up to date numbers. However, there are 
various numbers on this account. Dubrovin (op. cit., p. 141) gives the British loss as 400 dead, 60 
wounded and 22 prisoners. According to the TV, Russian casualties were more than 1,500; 
Ottomans lost 150 and the British 400 in dead and wounded. See Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65. 
802  Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 65. 
803   Robert B. Edgerton, Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War, Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999, p. 169. 
804   Tarle, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 169. 
805  Dubrovin, op. cit., vol. II, p. 381. 
806   Slade, op. cit., p. 331. Cf. Dubrovin, op. cit., p. 382. 
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commented: “None of those poor fellows will come out alive. I have not saved a single 
man who entered that fatal building”.807 When Woods asked whether he had enough 
medicine, the surgeon said he had plenty, but they were useless against hunger.  
Mushaver Pasha took a steamer to transport the Ottoman sick to Istanbul. 75 out 
of the 158 invalids died on the way. He then wrote to the naval council in Istanbul for 
two hospital ships to be sent to Balaklava and KamıĢ. A frigate was then turned into 
hospital with all the personnel and equipment and sent to KamıĢ in February. But the 
British fleet could not find a place for it: “the hospital frigate remained ten days in the 
offing of Kamiesh, waiting the pleasure of the British authorities, and was then sent 
back to Constantinople by order of the naval commander-in-chief, on the plea of want 
of room for her either at Kamiesh or Balaclava. Large vessels were then lying in those 
harbours for the accommodation of a few officers..”.808 
Slade was an eye-witness of the deprivations of the Ottoman army in the Crimea, 
thanks to whom we have an idea of their miserable conditions: 
   One day the pasha in command at Kadykeuy
809
 spoke to the author about the 
slender rations issued to his troops: each man he said, received a daily allowance 
only of biscuit and rice, without butter to cook the latter into pilaf, and fresh meat 
about once a week. Had he represented the case in the right quarter, I asked. He 
had not: he declined doing so; and the tenor of his remarks showed an 
indisposition, in common with other pashas serving the Allies, to say or do aught 
likely, in his opinion, to make him seem troublesome. The loss of a thousand men 
was not to be named in the same breath with the loss of the English general‟s 
smile.
810
 
 
Once again, as in the army of Anatolia, we see that the Ottoman officers take little 
care of their troops. The problem was that the Muslim soldiers did not accept pork and 
rum and for this they were issued only an additional half pound of biscuit. As Slade 
observes, the Ottoman soldiers in the Crimea were theoretically equal with the British 
soldiers, but not in practice. Interestingly, as Slade observes, the Muslims were not 
cunning enough to accept the pork and rum and then sell or give it to their European 
comrades, who would perhaps then regard them with more respect.  
   Tea, coffee, sugar, etc. – appropriate articles – always abounding in store, were 
never regularly issued to the Turks; who were more dependent, with their pay in 
arrears, than others with silver in their pockets, on the commissariat for comforts. 
The hucksters in the Crimea, unlike the bakkals of Constantinople, gave no credit. 
                                                 
807   Quoted by Edgerton, op. cit., p. 170. 
808  Slade, op. cit, p. 334. 
809   This Kadıköy was a Tatar village near Balaklava, in the Crimea. Not to be confused with the 
Kadıköy of Istanbul. 
810  Slade, ibid. 
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Whence arose this indifference about the Turks is difficult to say; unless one 
might trace it to the habitual bearing of Anglo-Saxons towards an “inferior 
race”.811 
 
James Henry Skene, the British consul at the Dardanelles also wrote that the 
Ottoman troops in the Crimea were so badly paid and so irregularly paid that they 
begged the British and French soldiers for scraps of food. Skene further described their 
misery:  
   When English sailors went from their ships to the Naval Brigade at the front, 
they would capture three Turkish soldiers apiece, ride on the shoulders of one, and 
drive the others before them with a long whip, to relieve the first when he should 
get tired. The poor Turks would then get a few biscuits as payment of their eight 
miles‟ stage, and return to Balaclava perfectly satisfied.812 
 
Meanwhile Ömer Pasha was planning to occupy Bessarabia in November 1854 
but in December he was also ordered to go to the Crimea. He was to base himself at 
Gözleve and not to participate in the siege of Sevastopol. From December 1854 to 
February 1855, three divisions (one of which Egyptian) totalling some 35,000 men with 
horses and artillery were transported from Varna and Süzebolu to Gözleve.  
 After the indecisive battle of Balaklava, the Russian and allied armies fought 
again in Inkerman on 5 November 1854. Nikolai was getting nervous, he sent his two 
sons, Grand Dukes Mikhail and Nikolai to the Crimea to urge Menshikov for action. 
Meanwhile Menshikov had received further reinforcements and now commanded 
107,000 men inside and outside Sevastopol, excluding the sailors, while the allies had 
about 70,000 men. For action on 5 November, Menshikov had detached 57,000 troops. 
But he gave the overall command of the operation to General Dannenberg, who had 
come from Bessarabia and had no knowledge of the terrain. On the day of the battle of 
Inkerman, the weather was foggy. Fighting passed in great confusion for both sides. 
Overall, the battle ended with victory for the allies. This was an infantry battle or a 
“soldiers‟ battle”, as it came to be called later, because the soldiers had fought without 
much command from officers. Russian massed bayonet attacks proved useless against 
the longer-range Minié rifles, for which the Russians muskets were no match.813 
Russian losses were enormous: about 11,000 in dead and wounded. Allied losses in 
general were around 4,500 dead and wounded.  
 A terrible gale broke out on 14 November. The Allies lost about 30 ships, 
                                                 
811  Slade, op. cit, p. 335.   
812   Skene, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
813  Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 137-138. 
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including two frigates from the Ottoman fleet. Human losses were around 500. Thus its 
effect was almost like a lost battle. It became clear that this winter neither the allies 
could take Sevastopol nor the Russians could drive them away. War had begun in 
earnest. The ensuing rigorous winter brought all the deficiencies of the armies to the 
fore. The Times correspondent William Howard Russell delivered detailed reports on 
the disorganization and misery of the British army. These reports were read by a 
concerned public. This had a revolutionary effect in Britain, now Lord Raglan, his 
commissariat officials and government ministers were blamed. Soon Aberdeen‟s 
government gave way to Lord Palmerston‟s government. Marx and Engels also wrote in 
the NYDT on the mismanagement of the British war system.
814
  
The Russians too had a supply problem. There were no railways south of 
Moscow. The Russians could not solve this problem to the end of the war. In the end it 
played a big role in their defeat, because they ran out of ammunition and could not 
replenish it easily. The French were the best organized, while nothing equalled the 
misery of the Ottoman troops. 
 The concentration of a large Ottoman force at Gözleve menaced the Russian 
supply way through Or Kapusu (Perekop). Emperor Nikolai I ordered an attack on 
them. Prince Menshikov gave the task to General Stepan Khrulev, who attacked the 
Ottoman forces with an army of 29,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry with 80 guns on 17 
February 1855.
815
 The Ottoman forces commanded by Ömer Pasha repulsed the 
Russians, who lost about 700 men.
816
 Ottoman losses (including some French and 
civilians) were 103 dead, 296 wounded. Ferik Selim Pasha and Miralay Rüstem Bey 
from the Egyptian troops were among the dead. Lord Raglan reported the battle to the 
Duke of Newcastle (copy to Lord Stratford), praising the “gallant and determined 
conduct” of the Ottoman troops and testifying the “serious nature of the attack which 
was made upon them”.817 After this unsuccessful attack Nikolai removed Menshikov 
from his post and appointed General Gorchakov as Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea. 
Emperor Nikolai I died soon afterwards on 2 March 1855 and his son Aleksandr II 
                                                 
814   “British Disaster in the Crimea – The British War System”, anonymous leading article (“leader”), 
NYDT, January 22, 1855. See Marx, op. cit., pp. 506-512. 
815   See the TV, 11 Receb 1271 (30 March 1855). Yapıcı, op. cit., p. 73. Baumgart however gives the 
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3,000 dead and as much wounded. See Tezâkir 1-12, p. 29. This seems an exaggerated account. 
817  Lord Raglan to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle. Before Sevastopol, 20 February 1855. BOA. 
HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 35. Copy to Lord Stratford, lef 34. See Appendices 92-93. 
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ascended the throne.
818
  
 The death of Nikolai I increased hopes for a diplomatic solution. In mid-March 
1855, a new conference for peace among the ambassadors of France (Bourqueney), 
Britain (Lord Westmoreland), the Porte (Arif Efendi), Russia (Prince Aleksandr 
Gorchakov) and foreign minister Count Buol of Austria was opened in Vienna. Russia 
had accepted negotiations on the basis of the “four points”. Since Arif Efendi did not 
know French, Rıza Bey from the Tercüme Odası was later sent to Vienna.819 Ali Fuat 
Türkgeldi is highly critical of the Porte‟s conduct of keeping such an ambassador in 
Vienna and allowing him at first to participate in the conference but not to speak up, “as 
if the negotiations concerned not us but China”. He also asks why Âli Pasha was not 
sent immediately. He attributes this to the manipulations of Stratford Canning. 
However, Türkgeldi is mistaken. Stratford does not seem responsible for this. The 
problem was that at the beginning of the Vienna conference the Porte did not know 
what to do with regard to the four points, especially the fourth point, that is the question 
of the rights and privileges of non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. This question was 
discussed among 21 Ottoman statesmen in a Meclis-i Meşveret which was held on 24-
26 March 1955. Türkgeldi does not mention this important meeting and its resolution 
(mazbata), although it is mentioned as an attachment to Âli Pasha‟s instructions, 
published by Türkgeldi.820 We will take up this issue in subchapter 5.3. 
Towards the end of March 1855, Foreign Minister Âli Pasha was appointed as 
extraordinary delegate to the Vienna conference and he first participated in the 
conference together with French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys on 9 April 1855.
821
 
The British had also sent Lord John Russell to the conference. After ReĢid Pasha‟s 
resignation from sadaret, Âli Pasha became the new sadrazam while he was in Vienna 
in May 1855. Fuad Pasha became the new foreign minister. The conference negotiations 
were stopped (or officially speaking, deferred) at the beginning of June. The conference 
could not reach an agreement mainly because of the third point, that is, the Straits 
regime and the constraints on the Russian navy in the Black Sea. During the conference, 
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Âli Pasha proposed the following important formulation on 19 April 1855: 
   The Contracting Powers, wishing to demonstrate the importance they attach to 
assuring that the Ottoman Empire participate in the advantages of the concert 
established by public law among the different European States, declare that they 
henceforth consider that empire as an integral part of the concert and engage 
themselves to respect its territorial integrity and its independence as an essential 
condition of the general balance of power.
822
  
  
This formulation would later be re-formulated into the Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, 
without, however, reference to the European balance of power.
823
 
 The allies continued with the siege and bombardment of Sevastopol. Sardinia-
Piedmont joined the allies with 15,000 troops. In April 20,000 Ottoman troops came 
from Gözleve to take positions outside the siege. Then began a second duel of artillery. 
The allied forces had a clear fire superiority. During 9 to 19 April, the allies made 
165,000 cannon shots, while the Russian responded with only 89,000 shots.
824
 
Meanwhile the allied fleets took an expedition to Kerç and occupied it along with Kefe 
and Yenikale. By June the allies totaled 224,000 men. Ottoman forces in the Crimea 
reached 55,000, stationed at Gözleve, Sevastopol and Yenikale. The French forces 
amounted to 120,000, the British 32,000. The allies now reached a degree of 
unprecedented fire concentration in a siege war. They could fire 75,000 rounds per day, 
whereas the Russians had to economize on ammunition and could reply by only one 
fourth of this number.
825
 In the end, the result of the siege was determined by the 
amount of guns and ammunition. Russia simply could not produce and deliver to its 
troops as much ammunition as did the allies. 
 On 8 September 1855, after an infernal bombardment of three days in which both 
British and French troops took part, the French finally took the Malakoff. The fire 
density of the bombardment was really unprecedented. Indeed, as early as January 1855, 
General Canrobert had written to the then Seraskier Rıza Pasha that they would open “a 
fire which has no precedent in the history of the battles of siege”.826 The Russian forces 
evacuated the southern part of the city and passed to the north side. The allies entered 
the city on 12 September. The casualties on both sides were heavy. The Russian side 
lost about 13,000 men and the allies about 10,000 men. The Ottoman troops were not 
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among the storming troops; they were stationed on the Chernaya (Karasu) river. Ömer 
Pasha by then had left the Crimea for his Caucasian campaign. Nevertheless, he did not 
appoint a deputy for himself. He was criticised of having caused the Ottomans' non-
participation in the final victory in Sevastopol. Cevdet Pasha wrote that Ömer Pasha had 
quarrelled with the French Commander-in-Chief General Pelissier and when he came to 
Istanbul in July 1855, he had told that “Malakoff cannot be taken this year… Sevastopol 
can be taken in two or three years. The allies may even be defeated. But they have their 
ships to pull out their troops and may abandon us there”.827 Cevdet Pasha also criticises 
Ömer Pasha‟s behaviour in Istanbul, arguing that he debased himself in the eyes of the 
elite and the common people by using his influence to bring back Damad Mehmed Ali 
Pasha into the fore (meaning the latter‟s appointment as Kapudan Pasha) and also 
appearing in public promenades and having relations with some women of ill-repute.  
In fact Cevdet Pasha finds fault in his command of the Rumelian army as well. 
Cevdet Pasha argues that Ömer Pasha could not manage the başıbozuks and caused their 
dispersal and being forced to pillaging. While the Russians passed the Danube along a 
long line, being vulnerable to attack at any point, he did not have courage to attack the 
Russians. Cevdet Pasha even argues that Ömer Pasha was about to surrender Silistria to 
the Russians but local people led by Ġbrahim Ağa organized the defence. In the Crimea, 
he passed his days idly in Gözleve instead of participating in the siege and storm of 
Sevastopol. Then, according to Cevdet Pasha, Pelissier had told him to wait for one 
more day and promised to give all the fleet for the transport of Ömer Pasha‟s troops to 
Anatolia, but Ömer Pasha had not accepted. Then, instead of marching directly from 
Batum through Ardahan, he preferred a far away route, leaving Kars to fall into the 
hands of the Russians.
828
 
The Crimean War was not confined to the Crimea and the territory of the Ottoman 
Empire. The allies also sent a fleet to the Baltic Sea and the British to the White Sea and 
to Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula. The battles fought there were not 
decisive or at least did not affect Ottoman troops and therefore do not require much 
attention for the purposes of this dissertation.
829
 
After the capture of the south part of Sevastopol, there arose a disunity on aims 
between France and Great Britain. Napoleon III was basically content with having won 
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244 
a victory in the Crimea and now did not want to continue the war. The British on the 
other hand were not as content. The Russian army had not been beaten yet. Britain had 
also plans for the independence of Circassia. But there was little to do in the Crimea. 
The allied armies did not want to go into Russian territory, away from the coast line. 
The French were then persuaded for a campaign against the fortress of Kılburun. The 
allied fleets bombarded the fortress and it was surrendered. As we have noted before, 
here for the first time ironclad floating batteries were used.  
As we have seen, the number of Ottoman troops changed during the process of 
war. However, what was the highest number of Ottoman regular troops involved in 
war? Probably the best figure is given by a financial report, prepared in October 1855 to 
be submitted to the loan control commission (more on this will be said in Chapter 4). 
According to this report, total effective number of Ottoman land troops (infantry, 
guards, cavalry, fortress and field artillery) was 199,152 men, excluding the 10,000 men 
of the “Turkish Contingent” on the pay of the British government, the 23,931 men of 
the Egyptian army, 2,000 Ottoman Cossacks and 485 Tatar cavalry.
830
 If we add them 
up, then the figure reaches 235,568 men, of which approximately half was redif 
soldiers. (To the best of my knowledge, this figure is used here for the first time). 
Furthermore, 77 per cent of the Ottoman troops were infantry and the rest were cavalry 
and artillery according to this report. As for the navy, it must be within the range of 
several thousands. 
 
 
3.9.  The End of the War and the Treaty of Paris  
 
 
While the allied and the Russian armies watched each other from the two sides of 
Sevastopol, on 28 December 1855 the Austrian ambassador at St Petersburg, Esterhazy, 
submitted an ultimatum to Russia to accept peace negotiations on the basis of the “four 
points”.831 Otherwise Austria would join the allies. Meanwhile Sweden made a 
defensive agreement with the allies. The King of Prussia too appealed to his nephew to 
make peace.
832
 After some hesitation, Emperor Aleksandr II accepted the terms in 
January 1856.  
Peace negotiations began in February 1856 in Paris. The Ottoman Empire was 
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represented by grand vizier Âli Pasha and Mehmed Cemil Bey, ambassador in Paris and 
Sardinia, son of ReĢid Pasha. France was represented by Count Alexandre Colonna-
Walewski, the new foreign minister and Baron François-Adolphe de Bourqueney, 
ambassador in Vienna. Russia sent Count Aleksey Orlov and Baron Filip de Brunnov, 
the former London ambassador. The British representatives were Lord Clarendon the 
foreign minister and Baron Henry Richard Charles Cowley, the Paris ambassador. 
Austrian representatives were Prime Minister Charles-Ferdinand Buol-Schauenstein and 
Paris ambassador Baron Joseph-Alexandre de Hübner. The kingdom of Sardinia-
Piedmont was represented by Count Camille Benso Cavour the prime minister and de 
Villamarina. Finally Prussia was represented by Baron Othon de Manteuffel, prime 
minister and foreign minister and Count de Hatzfeldt, ambassador in Paris. 
The war was ended but it was rather the wish of France than Britain, because for 
Britain (and for Stratford) it was an unfinished war. Britain had spent much money for 
the “Turkish Contingent” and the “Osmanli irregular cavalry” yet just when they were 
ready to do service, the war had ended. The victory in Sevastopol was generally seen as 
a French victory, so the British needed another campaign to gain victory for itself and to 
destroy Russian military might. Lord Palmerston had rigorously strengthened Britain‟s 
navy and army since he became prime minister in early 1855, replacing Lord Aberdeen. 
However, Palmerston could not do much because France and Austria had agreed to end 
the war.  
Napoleon III, on the other hand, had already received what he hoped from the 
war: prestige and glory to his dynasty and to France and the disruption of the Russian-
Austrian-Prussian bloc. Why should he fight any more? The French public opinion also 
favoured an end to the war because the war had now come to be seen more in the 
interests of Britain. Therefore, the policy of France was now very mild towards Russia, 
considering that France would need Russian support in the future. In fact the Paris 
Congress marked the beginning of a Franco-Russian rapprochement.
833
 It also marked 
the end of the Russian-Austrian-Prussian alliance in European politics. While Austria 
lost the friendship of both Russia and Britain and even of France, Prussia benefited most 
from the new balance of power in Europe. Prussia would defeat France in 1871 and this 
would encourage Russia to denounce the neutrality of the Black Sea, while the other 
powers would accept the new situation.  
Before the congress, Abdülmecid issued his Edict of Reforms (Islahat Fermanı) 
on 18 February 1856. The edict promised equality before law for all the subjects of the 
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Porte, reform of the police, taxation, etc. We will deal with it in subchapter 5.3.  
The Treaty of Paris provided for the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and put it under the guarantee of the great powers. The allies and 
Russia returned to each other all captured cities and territory, except some Russian 
territory in south Bessarabia (Budjak) that went to Moldavia. Thus Russia was removed 
from control of the mouth of the Danube. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte. None of the powers would exercise 
exclusive protection over these principalities. All prisoners of war were to be returned. 
The Black Sea was declared neutral and free of any war ships except for a limited 
amount of small ships. No fortifications would be built or held on its coasts. It would be 
open to all merchants ships. All commercial navigation on the Danube was also set free 
for all nations. Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalites was abolished. The 
principalities together with Serbia would be under the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
Empire and the collective guarantee of the great powers. Serbia would continue to be 
free in its internal affairs but the Porte would have a garrison in Belgrade as before. 
While Britian would like to press for the independence or autonomy of the Circassians, 
even the Porte did not seem enthusiastic about this project. Therefore the congress did 
not bring any regulation for Circassia. 
For the Porte, the most important result was the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire 
into the Concert of Europe. On the question of the rights of the Christian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire, Âli Pasha and the Porte tried hard to prevent any article that could be 
used for interference in the internal affairs of the Porte. First they did not want the 
Islahat Fermanı to be mentioned in the treaty. When they could not prevent it, the Porte 
objected to the expression that the contracting powers “take note” (prendre acte) of it, 
because the ministers looked up dictionaries and found out that the word “acte” meant 
“sened”! For the Porte, this would mean that the firman was accepted as a 
convention.
834
 Finally Âli Pasha was able to get through the expression “the contracting 
Powers note the high value of this communication” (Les Puissances constatent la haute 
valeur de cette communication). The same article (Article 9) also stated that the firman 
would not be used as an excuse for the Great Powers either collectively or separately to 
interfere with the relations of the Sultan with his subjects. 
During the Paris congress and afterwards, Napoleon III ardently espoused the 
“nationality principle”. The most immediate and urgent manifestation of this principle 
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was the cause of the unification of the Danubian principalities. Napoleon III had reason 
to oppose the 1815 settlement which disregarded nationalities. Therefore he urged for a 
united Rumania under a foreign prince. Sardinia naturally supported the nationalities 
principle. Austria was against, fearing that a united Rumania would be attractive for her 
Rumanian subjects. The Porte was naturally against because it rightly considered 
unification as a step towards full independence. Britain wavered, while Russia was 
Napoleon‟s chief ally in this question. Russia wanted to gain the goodwill of the 
Rumanian people and to widen the rift between France and Britain.
835
 The principalities 
were finally united in 1859 under Colonel Alexander Cuza. 
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CHAPTER 4:  FINANCING THE WAR 
 
 
 
 
 4.1.  Ottoman Financial Crisis before the War 
 
 
Even in the middle of the 19
th
 century, the Ottoman bureaucracy did not possess 
any economic theory or idea going beyond the immediate necessities of financing the 
state apparatus. There were no independent economists and very few works on 
economics in general, even in the form of a translation.
836
 The only concern of the 
bureaucracy was the collection of taxes, and as long as they continued to receive their 
salaries, they did not care about increasing the national product and thus the tax 
revenues of the country. Stratford Canning, the British ambassador at the Porte, wrote to 
Lord Palmerston in October 1851, telling of a conversation about finance with ReĢid 
Pasha, that “the Grand Vezir … disclaims all knowledge of the subject himself”. 
Likewise, according to Canning, the finance minister (his fifth term in office was from 
August 1851 to November 1852)
837
 Abdurrahman Nafiz Pasha (?-1853), although “able 
and honest”, was “altogether destitute of European knowledge”. Similarly, the British 
charge d‟affaires in Istanbul, Colonel Hugh Rose, commented in October 1852: “Only 
two Turks, Fuad Effendi and Safetti [Safveti] Pasha, know even the commonest 
European details as to banks, funds, bills etc and no Pasha keeps an account book, or 
                                                 
836  According to Ġlber Ortaylı, the first Ottoman book on economics is a manuscript titled Risale-i 
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knows his own accounts”.838 There is a certain exaggeration here, because the pashas 
had their kethüdas (stewards) who kept an account book, nevertheless, it is generally 
true that they were not much informed or interested in financial affairs. 
The tithe on agricultural products (öşür) still formed the biggest item among all 
tax revenues of the Porte (about one fourth of total revenues).
839
 This implied that a bad 
harvest meant a serious decrease in tax revenues. Another important source of revenue 
was internal and external customs duties, but these duties, especially the import duties 
were very low. In fact, it was here that the strangest economic policy in the world 
showed itself, for the Ottomans charged more duties in exports than in imports, contrary 
to the practise of such industrialising countries as the USA, the German Confederation, 
and Russia that protected their domestic industries.
840
  
The Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 16 August 1838 (Treaty of Balta 
Limanı) had set import duty at 5 per cent, while export duty and internal customs duty 
were 12 per cent ad valorem for all goods. These rates were not to be changed even in 
time of war. (Whereas in Britain, import duties averaged about 20 per cent).
841
 The 
treaty also removed the system of state appointed monopolies (yed-i vahit) on export 
and import. After this, other great powers concluded similar treaties with the Porte. 
Thus a British merchant (or any merchant who claimed protection from any one of the 
great powers) could sell his goods in all the provinces of the empire after paying the 5 
per cent tax, whereas the Ottoman merchant had to pay 12 per cent internal customs 
duty within the empire.
842
 Referring to ReĢat Kasaba, Gülten Kazgan writes that the 
terms of the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, dictated by Britain to China after the First Opium 
War, were not as comprehensive as the terms of the Balta Limanı Treaty. This policy 
was imposed upon the Ottoman Empire first by Britain and then other powers partly for 
the purpose of suppressing the insurgent Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt by taking away a 
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big source of his revenues.
843
 However, it fitted the Ottoman bureaucracy as well, for in 
its opinion export goods should be taxed heavier, because exports raised the price of 
goods to the detriment of the chief internal buyer, the government.
844
  
That Britain became the champion of free trade (especially after the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846) by the time of the Crimean War is well understandable, because it 
had excess manufactured goods and sought new markets for its products, but that the 
Ottoman Empire was probably the most liberal country in the world in terms of customs 
duties is not easily explainable. In addition to a very unfavourable balance of trade with 
the West, the Ottoman state also faced the problems of a debased coinage and currency 
inflation.
845
 Constant wars with Russia and internal troubles from 1768 to 1840 had 
weakened the treasury very much. The heavy indemnity to be paid to Russia by the 
Treaty of Edirne of 1829 and the costs of the war against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt in 
the 1830s had also undermined the finances of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 
reform meant additional financial burdens for the treasury. First of all, the establishment 
and maintenance of a modernized army was expensive. The expanded size of the central 
and provincial bureaucracy, the new judicial system, educational institutions, public 
works, the services of foreign experts, etc were all new sources of expense, while the 
state revenues did not rise so fast.  
It was a commonly shared conviction among European contemporary observers 
that peculation and corruption in the Ottoman bureaucracy was the rule, honesty being 
the exception. It was difficult for an honest person to rise to high rank or to maintain his 
position without getting involved in the general system of bribery. The great reformer 
Mustafa ReĢid Pasha was, at least before the 1850‟s, personally not involved in the 
corrupt practises of the pashas, thanks to Sultan Abdülmecid‟s monetary gifts (atiyye) to 
him. Nevertheless, he did not or could not prevent those around him from doing so. On 
the other hand, even without the corruption and bribery, the Ottoman pashas received 
very high salaries and rations, which also formed an important burden on the treasury. 
Those pashas who held the rank of vizier received from 60,000 to 100,000 piastres 
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monthly in salary and ration.
846
 This was equal to 545 to 909 pounds sterling, which at 
the present time approximately corresponds to 33,000 to 55,000 pounds sterling.  
Taxes were numerous, irregular and unequal, despite the Tanzimat principles of 
standardization, regularization and simplification of taxes.
847
 In addition to regular 
taxes, some extraordinary taxes were imposed on the population (like the iane-i 
umumiye)
848
 and these taxes in time became permanent. The rich paid relatively less 
taxes while the poor peasants bore the brunt of the tax burden.
849
 The rich could also 
bribe corrupt government officials to avoid some taxes or obligations including the 
military conscription. For example, when some units of the Anatolian army were 
quartered in villages around Erzurum, the richer villages paid some bribe and the troops 
were quartered in the houses of the poorer villages.
850
 The population of Istanbul was 
exempt from many taxes and from military conscription.
851
 Furthermore, in Anatolia, 
some Kurdish tribes exacted various tributes from non-Muslim villages, mainly the 
Armenians. The iltizam system (farming out tax revenues) meant that a big portion of 
the taxes went to intermediaries and pashas before ever reaching the state budget. 
Furthermore, the high bureaucrats received enormous commissions from the sale of 
these iltizam tenders. The mültezims borrowed from the sarrafs, who also reaped their 
profits in the form of interest. The Ottoman chronicler Cevdet Pasha writes that while 
ReĢid Pasha and his followers claimed to be working for the prevention of corruption 
and progress in civilization and education, their practise of selling the tenders caused a 
change in the public opinion about them.
852
  
After the Tanzimat Edict of 1839, the state tried to collect the taxes by its own 
officials (muhassıls) but this system encountered great resistance and was abandoned. In 
this, as in all reform moves, Abdülmecid was not firm. Budget deficits became chronic 
in the 1840s. These deficits were being covered by government borrowing in various 
forms, mainly from the Galata bankers or sarrafs. These bankers, mainly Greeks, 
                                                 
846  Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 1-12, yayınlayan Cavid Baysun, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 18. 
847  See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, op. cit., pp. 95-105. The authors, however, argue (op. 
cit., p. 96) that the new taxes of the Tanzimat protected the peasants from injustice far more than 
before. 
848  For a good account of the iane-i umumiye see Ali Akyıldız, Osmanlı Finans Sisteminde Dönüm 
Noktası. Kağıt Para ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Etkileri, Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1996, pp. 51-64. Shaw 
and Shaw (op. cit., p. 97) present the iane-i umumiye as government “bonds”. They seem to have 
confused it with the esham-ı umumiye that were issued later. 
849  On tax injustice in the Ottoman Empire, see for example Abdüllatif ġener, Tanzimat Dönemi 
Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi, Ankara: ĠĢaret, 1990, p. 231. Also see Sandwith, op. cit., pp. 173-176. 
850  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 97. 
851  ġener, op. cit., p. 109. Sandwith, op. cit., p. 176. 
852   Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 20. 
252 
Armenians, Jews and Europeans, had direct links with foreign banking houses in Paris, 
London and elsewhere.
853
  
On 22 August 1850, being aware of the financial difficulties of the Porte, the 
British ambassador Stratford Canning personally submitted to the Sultan a long 
memorandum on reform.
854
 He suggested a foreign loan of five to six million pounds 
sterling, which, he argued, could be secured at four per cent interest, repayable over a 
period of 25 years. This was not accepted. Many Ottoman bureaucrats were reluctant to 
apply for foreign loans, fearing that they would fall into the trap of never ending loans 
and thus Europe would control them tightly. Abdülmecid‟s attitude towards foreign 
loans was negative in general, at times he said it was better to curb expenditures than to 
borrow from abroad.
855
 Yet as usual he contradicted himself and continued his own 
luxury expenditures.  
The Ottoman treasury finally went bankrupt in 1851. The last two years had seen 
poor harvests and the insurrection in Bosnia had increased military spending. In April 
1851, Lord Stratford reported that in the previous year expenditure had exceeded 
income by 1 million pounds sterling or 1.1 million Ottoman pounds and a deficit of 
770,000 Ottoman pounds was expected in the current year. He believed that the 
government needed about 7.5 million pounds or 8.25 million Ottoman pounds to clear 
its financial obligations completely. This amount was, as he observed, more than a 
year‟s average income of the Porte. Stratford re-emphasized that the only solution was a 
long-term foreign loan. Stratford feared that the financial crisis might ruin the reform 
movement.
856
 
When the finance minister Nafiz Pasha told the divan that next month's salaries 
would be delayed, all ministers were shocked. In fact for the ministers the financial 
crisis had come so suddenly that even there was no counterpart in Ottoman Turkish of 
the French word “crise”. Cevdet Pasha tells how they finally agreed upon the word 
“buhran” as an equivalent for it.857  
Although the first foreign loan was made in 1854, the idea had been expressed 
first in 1783, when Russia occupied the Crimea and war seemed inevitable.
858
 During 
Abdülmecid's reign, the first attempt had come in 1841, with a proposal to set up a 
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national bank as well. This did not work because the Ottomans did not want to give the 
guarantees and immunities under either an Anglo-Ottoman treaty or a treaty between all 
great powers and the Ottoman Empire. At that time this had an important role in the 
swing of the Porte toward reaction.
859
 Some time later, in 1849, the Dersaadet Bankası 
(Bank of Constantinople) was set up by foreign merchants. The duty of this “bank” was 
to provide for the stability of the Ottoman currency against European currencies, 
especially the sterling. 
 
 
4.2.  The Abortive Loan of 1852 
 
 
In March 1852, the Dersaadet Bankası and the Porte sent Monsieur Couturier, an 
Izmir merchant, to Paris to find credit for the repayment of the debt of the bank to 
European markets. In August 1852 Couturier was empowered together with Paris 
ambassador Kalimaki Bey or London ambassador Kostaki Bey to sign a contract for 40 
million francs repayable in 10 years at 6 % interest and 2 % commission fee. The Porte 
put as lien the tributes of Egypt, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia. On 7 September 
1852, a contract for a loan of 50 million francs (equal to 2 million pounds sterling) was 
signed for 23 years at six per cent interest and a two per cent commission in Paris.
860
 
Afterwards, bonds for 20 million francs were sold. However, Sultan Abdülmecid had 
given his consent, even reluctantly, for a term of ten years at most. The grand vizier 
Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha did not bother to tell Abdülmecid the terms of the loan. 
Therefore Âli Pasha‟s rival Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha learned of the terms and then 
informed Abdülmecid. Mehmed Ali succeeded in persuading the Sultan to reject the 
loan, arguing that his father had never accepted a foreign loan. Abdülmecid was 
reluctant because he feared foreign intervention in case of any default in repayments. 
Abdülmecid dismissed Âli Pasha and replaced him with Mehmed Ali at the 
beginning of October 1852. Paris ambassador Kalimaki Bey was also dismissed and 
replaced by Veli (Veliyüddin) Pasha. The ministers had to collect among themselves an 
indemnity of 2.1 million francs to be paid to the creditors. As Olive Anderson remarked, 
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this was a “disastrous début” for the Ottoman Empire in the Western money market. 
This cancelled transaction made it “almost impossible for her to borrow on her own 
credit alone”.861  
 
 
4.3.  Ottoman War Expenses 
 
 
Military expenses in the period from 1841 to 1853 consumed on the average 
approximately 40 per cent of the state “budget”. During the Crimean War, this 
proportion went up to 67 per cent of all actual state expenditures.
862
 Most of the 
ammunition and weapons was being imported. But military imports were not confined 
to steam ships and fire weapons and ammunition like Minié rifles and Paixhans shells. 
Even such items as sabres, harnesses (like saddles) and boots had to be imported from 
Britain and France.
863
  
According to a military report, total salary and rations of the regular land troops 
(asakir-i nizamiye) for the financial (Julian) year 1266 (13 March 1850 to 12 March 
1851) constituted 129,231,778 piastres.
864
 This is equal to roughly 1.12 million pounds 
sterling at the exchange rate of 110 piastres per pound, which was prevalent at that time. 
In that year the muster-roll was 77,096 for the five armies. Thus we can conclude that at 
the beginning of the war the salaries and rations alone of the army should have cost 
almost three times as much, since the army (excluding the başıbozuks) had reached 
around 200,000 men towards the end of 1855, according to a report by the Ottoman 
finance ministry submitted to the loan control commission in October 1855. This report 
was also published in the French official newspaper Le Moniteur Universel on 8 
January 1856.
865
 According to the report, the total war expenses of the three 
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Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, immediately sent a copy of the newspaper to Istanbul. 
The document is titled “Rapport du Ministre des Finances a la Commission de Contrôle”. A. du 
Velay also refers to this report. See A. du Velay, Türkiye Mali Tarihi, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 1978, p. 82. A copy of the first page of the report was published by Sinan Kuneralp, 
“The Thorny Road to Modernization: The Ottoman Empire and the Crimean War”, in Kırım 
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departments of army, navy, and artillery of the Ottoman Empire for the period from 27 
May 1853 to 27 September 1855 (28 months) amounted to 3,015,588 purses
866
 or 11.2 
million pounds sterling (exchange rate now 135 piastres per pound). This gives us a 
yearly average total military expense of 4.8 million pounds, which seems rather small 
when we consider that the pay and rations alone of the soldiers and officers must have 
constituted at least 3.36 million pounds as we saw above. According to the same report, 
the total budget deficit during this period reached 5.8 million pounds.  
This figure seems in line with Dr. Tevfik Güran‟s study based on Ottoman fiscal 
documents from the BOA, provided we take into account the length of the period, 
because the war lasted more than two years (almost three years including war 
preparations) for the Ottoman Empire. Tevfik Güran's study gives us a total of actual 
military expenditures of 1,782,737,764 piastres for the fiscal (Julian) years 1269-1271, 
corresponding to the period from 13 March 1853 to 12 March 1856, that is, a period of 
three years. (See Table 1). If we divide this amount by an average exchange rate of 125 
piastres per pound, then we get an approximate amount of 14.26 million pounds sterling 
for this period.
867
  
 
Table 1: Distribution of State Payments among Various Expense Items (thousand piastres)
868
 
Fiscal Year Military 
Spending 
Sultan‟s 
Spending 
Salaries Admin. 
Spending 
Transfer 
Payments 
Total 
1269/1853-4 430,372.7 147,485.8 119,180.9 116,437.1 135,416.0 948,892.3 
1270/1854-5 601,744.1 57,138.6 119,759.9 90,330.5 31,324.6 900,298.0 
1271/1855-6 750,620.8 72,279.1 115,404.7 129,721.7 53,740.8 1,121,767.3 
Total 1,782,737.7 276,903.5 354,345.5 336,489.3 220,481.4 2,970,957.6 
 
 
These numbers become more meaningful in comparison with actual state revenues 
including budgetary (mukarrer) and non-budgetary (gayri-mukarrer) revenues for the 
same period. These revenues amount to 2,970,960,465 piastres, roughly equal to 22.8 
million pounds for the period or 7.6 million pounds per year on the average. (See Table 
2). During this period non-budgetary or extra-budgetary revenues and their share in total 
revenues increased considerably. The extra budget revenues consisted of internal 
                                                                                                                                               
Savaşı‟nın 150nci Yılı / 150th Anniversary of the Crimean War, Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı 
Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, December 2006, p. 61.  
866   One purse (kise or kese) was equal to 500 piastres (kuruş) or 5 Ottoman pounds. 
867 Approximately equal to 855 million pounds of today. The exchange rate of pound vacillated 
between 110 piastres at the beginning and 140 piastres towards the end of the war. Other exchange 
rates were as follows: 1 pound sterling = 25 francs = 6 silver roubles = 24 marks = 12 florins. 
868 See Güran, Table 8 A, op. cit., p. 36. I have made some necessary calculations and simplifications. 
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borrowing from the Galata bankers (sarrafs) and merchants, issue of paper money 
(kaime-i nakdiye-i mutebere, shortly kaime or in plural kavaim), and bonds (esham), 
special taxes in the form of donations (iane-i harbiyye) and finally the two foreign loans 
of 1854 and 1855. The Galata sarrafs lent money at the annual interest rate of 12 per 
cent, while it was around 4 to 6 percent in Europe.
869
 While such extra budget revenues 
formed one-digit percentages of total revenues before the war, they increased up to 51.5 
per cent during the war.
870
 Among the extra-budget revenues of the period, foreign 
loans make up roughly 7.5 million pounds sterling.
871
 Internal borrowing during the war 
on the other hand, according to Ali Akyıldız, reached 5,129,790 Ottoman pounds or 
4,706,229 pounds sterling at the official exchange rate of 109 piastres per pound 
sterling.
872
 
If we accept the above mentioned figure of 14.26 million pounds as total war 
expenses, then we must conclude that approximately half of the actual Ottoman war 
expenditures was financed by foreign loans.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of state revenues between budgetary and non-budgetary revenues (piastres)
873
 
Fiscal Year 
Budget 
Revenues 
(%) 
Non-Budget 
Revenues 
(%) 
Total 
Revenues 
1269 / 1853-54 799,490,710 84.3 149,279,126 15.7 948,769,836 
1270 / 1854-55 487,522,395 54.1 412,966,967 45.9 900,489,362 
1271 / 1855-56 543,988,645 48.5 577,712,622 51.5 1,121,701,267 
Total 1,831,001,750  1,139,958,715  2,970,960,465 
 
 
Paul Kennedy, in his table of military expenditures of the warring states, for the 
Ottoman Empire (“Turkey”) gives only the figures of 2.8 million pounds for 1852 and 3 
million pounds for the year 1855, putting a question mark for 1853, 1854 and 1856.
874
 
The 3 million pounds here seem to have been reckoned from the first Ottoman loan of 
1854, yet Kennedy could be wiser if he had discounted this amount by the issue price of 
                                                 
869  Ali Akyıldız, “Osmanlı Devleti‟nin Kırım SavaĢı‟nı Finansmanı: Ġç ve DıĢ Borçlanmalar”, 
symposium paper in Savaştan Barışa, 2007, p. 14. 
870 Güran, ibid, p. 30. 
871 Of this sum, 2.4 millions come from the revenue from the first loan of 1854 (nominal value 3 
millions) and 5.1 millions from the revenue from the second loan of 1855 (nominal value 5 
millions). 
872  Akyıldız, op. cit., (2007), p. 18. 
873 Güran, ibid, p. 30. 
874 Paul Kennedy.  The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict 
from 1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage, 1989, p. 176. Turkish translation (1990), p. 207. 
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80 per cent (which reduced the actual amount received to 2.4 millions) and added at 
least the second Ottoman loan of 1855, amounting to 5.1 million pounds. In any case 
these two loans of course were not the whole amount of the Ottoman war spending. 
However, in any case, as seen from Table 3, the military spending of the Ottoman 
Empire was very modest in comparison with any of the three great powers. 
Nevertheless, if we take into consideration the revenues of the Ottoman Empire, it 
seems that it felt the financial burden of the war more acutely than other states.  
 
Table 3: Military expenditures of the warring states (million pounds sterling)
875
 
 1853 1854 1855 1856 Total 
Russia
876
 19.9 31.3 39.8 37.9 128.9 
France 17.5 30.3 43.8 36.3 127.9 
Britain 9.1 76.3 36.5 32.3 282.1 
Ottoman Empire 3.5? 4.6? 6.0? 3.2? 17.3 
Sardinia 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.5 7.5 
 
 
The Ottoman official chronicler of the period Ahmed Lutfi Efendi gives the figure 
of 7 million Ottoman pounds or pounds sterling (liret)
877
 as the total extraordinary war 
expenses of the Ottoman Empire for the 28 months of war. Of this amount, he writes, 3 
millions come from foreign loan, and he remaining 4 millions is obtained through 
internal borrowing, issue of kaime (kaime) and the iane-i cihadiye.
878
 Yet obviously 
(and as another proof of his incompetence for his task) he omits the 1855 loan of 5 
million pounds. His figures are not reliable at all. 
While the war meant expenses for the state and new taxes for its subjects, it 
brought some benefits as well, especially for the shopkeepers and merchants. The allies 
also spent significant sums for the provisions of their armies and navies. They had their 
agents sent everywhere in Anatolia and the Rumelia to buy horses, food, fodder and 
other items for them. It seems that due to lack of any proper roads and railways in the 
                                                 
875 Figures are from Kennedy, except those for the Ottoman Empire, which I prepared from Güran‟s 
study with some modifications. 
876
  Alexis Troubetzkoy gives the total Russian war expenditure as 142 million pounds sterling, “a 
mere 15 per cent less than France and Britain together”. However, he does not cite any source. See 
Troubetzkoy, A Brief History of the Crimean War, New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006, p. 300.  
877   Liret appears rather strange here. Most probably it is lira, meaning Ottoman pounds. But it could 
be pounds sterling as well. 
878 See Lütfi Efendi, Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, c. IX, Yayınlayan Münir Aktepe, 
Ġstanbul: ĠÜ Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984, p. 117. 
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Ottoman Empire, these purchases were made mainly from coastal areas close to ports in 
order to transport the goods by sea. According to the British economist Nassau William 
Senior (1790-1864), who visited Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha at his mansion in 
Istanbul on 4 October 1857, the pasha told him that although the late war was 
“enormously expensive” to the government, because it raised 300,000 men, it had also 
profited and “Turkey” was the only country that did so. Mehmed Pasha added that 30 
millions sterling or more were spent in Istanbul and if they had had “the means of 
tranport” (meaning roads) they could have sold twice or three times as much to the 
allies.
879
 
 
 
4.4.  Conspicuous Consumption of Palace Women  
 
 
Palace women‟s conspicuous consumption seems to have played a considerable 
part in the Ottoman financial crisis. Cevdet Pasha has written in some detail about the 
extravagance of the palace women. He seems to put the main blame on them for the 
deficits in state budget. He argues that the palace women came under the influence of 
Europeans and Egyptian ladies and started spending enormous sums for luxury items 
like jewellery, furniture and clothing. They also borrowed from the sarrafs of Galata at 
very high interest rates, going up to 45 per cent. While there might be a certain element 
of exaggeration in the figures given by Cevdet Pasha, they are, in any case, 
impressive.
880
 These ladies, mainly the sisters, daughters and harem favourites of the 
Sultan are said to have incurred in the year 1855 a debt of 288,000 purses 
(approximately 1.15 million pounds sterling); of which, one of the favourites of the 
Sultan, Serfiraz Hanım alone was responsible for 125,000 purses (approximately 
500,000 pounds sterling).
881
 For comparison, Cevdet Pasha writes that during the reign 
of Sultan Mahmud II, the expenses of the whole palace did not exceed 1,000 purses 
while under Sultan Abdülmecid it had reached 20,000 purses.882 
                                                 
879  See Senior, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
880 See Ali Akyıldız, Mümin ve Müsrif Bir Padişah Kızı: Refia Sultan, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt 
Yayınları, 1998, p. 1-5, 67-74. 
881 Cevdet Pasha, Tezakir 13-20, p. 4. Cevdet Pasha gives this amount as 120,000 purses elsewhere 
(p. 8). 
882  Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 8. 
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Melek Hanım, the Christian wife of Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha 
confirms the conspicious consumption of the palace women under the influence of 
European and Egyptian ladies: 
   The Sultan‟s love for his wives – and numerous they were – was ruining the 
country. They contrived at once to gratify their caprices, whatever might be their 
object. They availed themselves of it to obtain from him the most costly presents. 
Covered with diamonds, and attended by numerous slaves, almost as sumptuously 
attired as their mistresses, they drove out in carriages, each of which, with its 
equipments, cost about 900,000 piastres (£8000). Their apartments were 
constantly replenished with new furniture. In the space of two years the seraglio 
was furnished about four times over… Frequently the favors of one of the 
Sultan‟s wives, or odalisques, were attended with bounties and presents big 
enough to make the fortune of him who received it. In fact, these women were 
utterly regardless of the costliness of what they bestowed; it was a regular case of 
pillage.
883
 
 
When Abdülmecid‟s daughter Refia Sultan‟s debts reached 60,000 purses 
(240,000 pounds sterling), her kethüda (chamberlain) EĢref Efendi was dismissed and 
put under house arrest in August 1858.
884
 These sums must be compared with the deficit 
of the state budget for 1851, which was around one million pounds.
885
 A commission 
consisting of Mehmet, ġekib, Safveti and Rıfat Pashas calculated the deficit of 1853 as 
300,000 purses (nearly 1.38 million pounds). When war broke out, the Ottoman treasury 
first tried to borrow from the sarrafs of Galata and from internal merchants in general. 
Yet only 20,000 purses (roughly 92,000 pounds) out of the planned sum of 30,000 
purses could be borrowed from them, secured on the Egyptian tribute for the Muslim 
fiscal year 1271 (March 1855 – March 1856).886  
 
 
4.5.  The Mission of Namık Pasha  
 
 
The beginning of the war changed the position of the Sultan on borrowing from 
Europe. When internal borrowing became impossible, international borrowing became a 
necessity. At the beginning of October 1853 or some time earlier, the Ottoman council 
of ministers, by the approval of the Sultan, decided to send the Minister of Commerce 
and Public Works Mehmed Namık Pasha (1804-1892) to Paris and London to contract a 
                                                 
883  Melek Hanım, Thirty Years in the Harem, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2005, p. 41. (First published in 
London, 1872). 
884   Akyıldız, op. cit., (1998), p. 67. 
885 Frederick Stanley Rodkey, “Ottoman Concern about Western Economic Penetration in the Levant, 
1849-1856”, Journal of Modern History 30(4), December 1958, p. 3. 
886 Cezmi Karasu, op. cit., p. 120. 
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loan.
887
 ReĢid Pasha wrote on 5 October 1853 to Mr Rothschild, the well-known banker 
of Paris and London, requesting him to assist Namık Pasha.888 Namık Pasha‟s 
instructions were prepared towards the end of October. His son Major Halil Bey was 
also appointed to his mission as first secretary and Mustafa Fahreddin Bey from the 
foreign ministry as second secretary.
889
  
Namık Pasha‟s instructions were to contract a loan for 500,000 kese (2.5 million 
Ottoman pounds or around 2.27 million pounds sterling) in favourable terms. In his 
memorandum, the grand vizier stated that the securities for the loan should not be in the 
form of a monopoly (inhisar) and should not appear as a kind of rehin (pledge or pawn 
or mortgage lien) in the opinion of the foreigners. The tribute of Egypt and the customs 
revenues of Syria and Izmir should also be avoided to be assigned as security. The aşar 
on the olive oil and the revenue of the province of Hudavendigar (Bursa) could be 
safely deposited as security. The loan money would be insured for safe arrival at 
Istanbul. Exchange bills, drafts and notes were not to be accepted; only gold and silver 
money was to be accepted. For the secrecy of telegraph communications, ciphers would 
be given to the secretaries.
890
 Finally the grand vizier added that instructions on the 
terms of the loan should be kept very secret and would be given separately in a secret 
instruction.
891
 
Soon the confidential letter of instructions or regulations (talimatname) was also 
prepared and given to Namık Pasha. It was kept secret from the extended council of 
ministers (Meclis-i Mahsus) and was known only among six trusted members of the 
inner circle of the grand vizier (beyn el havass) who sealed it. The reason for this 
secrecy was to prevent the limits of the loan terms from being known to the Galata 
bankers, and through them to the European bankers, who would then have insider 
information and thus ask a higher price. The first item to be decided was the interest 
rate. It was stated that according to news from Paris, an interest rate of four to four and 
                                                 
887 See Lütfi (op. cit., pp. 214-215). The firman is dated Evail-i Cemaziyelevvel 1270, that is, 
beginning of February 1854. Namık Pasha gives the same date in his autobiography (tercüme-i 
hal). See Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, Şeyhül Vüzera Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa, Istanbul: Yenilik 
Basımevi, 1987, p. 280. However, this firman was issued as a matter of formality when Namık 
Pasha was already in London. Sinaplı (op. cit., p. 159) erroneously gives the date of the firman as 
the date of Namık Pasha‟s travel to Paris and London. 
888  However, Rothschild replied only on 25 February 1854. See BOA. Ġ. HR. 332/21357 lef 2. See 
Appendix 37. 
889  BOA. Ġ. HR. 103/5028, dated 21 Muharrem 1270 (24 October 1853). 
890  Telegraph lines in the Ottoman Empire at that time were available only in Belgrade. From 
Belgrade the telegraph was sent to Istanbul via the Danube. In 1855 a telegraph line was built from 
Sevastopol to Varna and Istanbul. 
891   Tezkire-i Samiye müsveddesi. BOA. A. AMD. 49/90, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 
1853). See Appendix 8. 
261 
a half per cent was the going market rate. Namık Pasha was allowed up to six per cent. 
The second item was the payback period. Namık Pasha was instructed to try to keep it at 
10 years, and at most 15 years. Third and last, the issue price should not be lower than 
95 per cent, allowing a maximum five per cent discount. The document was sealed by 
Musa Safveti Pasha (finance minister), Sadık Rifat Pasha (President of the MVL), 
Damad Ali Fethi Pasha (Tophane-i Amire müĢiri), Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha 
(Serasker), Mustafa ReĢid Pasha (foreign minister), Ahmed Arif Efendi (the 
şeyhülislam) and the grand vizier Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha.892  
Thus in the middle of November 1853 Namık Pasha set out for Paris. He arrived 
there somewhat late in 15 days on 27 November.
893
 The Ottoman ambassador in Paris 
was Veliyüddin Rifat Pasha, known as Veli Pasha, son of the Grand Vizier Giritli 
Mustafa Naili Pasha. On the day of his arrival, Namık and Veli Pasha went to visit the 
French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys. Namık Pasha asked for assistance in 
concluding a loan agreement. Namık also told him that the Porte did not want war, but 
Russia had again put its expansion plan into action, and it had occupied all the northern 
shores of the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire was not equal to Russia in force, 
therefore if (God forbid) the Russians occupied their country, then Europe would inherit 
the problems of the Porte. Drouyn de Lhuys
894
 replied himself that he also thought so 
but his companions did not agree with him. Then he suggested that they should talk to 
the Emperor as well. On the question of the loan, he promised that he would urge 
bankers for the loan.  
Namık Pasha talked with Mr Rothschild and some other bankers in Paris. They 
replied that they could give an answer in seven to eight days after consulting their 
partners. Namık Pasha comments that this delay was due to their expectations for the 
outcome of the diplomatic efforts by European cabinets to restore peace. The bankers 
had also said that due the current situation the market rate of interest was six per cent 
and a discount of ten per cent in the issue price. Namık Pasha had also written to 
Kostaki Musurus, the Ottoman ambassador in London.  
                                                 
892   Instructions to Namık Pasha. Attachment to the petition of the grand vizier to the Sultan. BOA. Ġ. 
HR. 103/5039 lef 1, dated 28 Muharrem 1270 (31 October 1853). Also available at BOA. A. 
DVN. MHM. 10/89-2, dated 6 November 1853. See Appendix 9. 
893   Namık Pasha to foreign minister ReĢid Pasha, dated 27 Safer 1270 (29 November 1853). BOA. Ġ. 
HR. 333/21335 lef 1. 
894 Lütfi, op. cit., p. 216. Münir Aktepe, the editor of Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, transliterates Drouyn 
de Lhuys as “Verone (?) de Louis” [question mark in the original]. Ahmet Nuri Sinaplı, in his turn, 
gives the following three variants in his consecutive pages: “Derin Dölives”, “Doroin Dolayı” and 
“Dinin de Lhinyi”. We must admit that it is not possible to read and spell this French name 
correctly from the Ottoman script, without referring to works in the Latin script. 
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A few days later Namık and Veli Pashas were invited to the Tuileries Palace to be 
received by Napoleon III.
895
 The Emperor however, neither rejected nor approved of 
Namık's words. On 2 December Namık and Veli revisited Drouyn de Lhuys. In his 
report dated 10 December, Namık Pasha first pointed out that Musurus had replied that 
the London bankers were not inclined positively to the Ottoman loan and even some 
Russian intrigues were involved. Then he described his second meeting with Drouyn de 
Lhuys. 
When de Lhuys asked about the loan, Namık replied that until then some petty 
bankers and commissioners (ufak tefek bankir ve simsar takımları) had come to him and 
made some “excessive and cold” (fahiş ve barid) offers like eight to nine per cent 
interest rate and 80 per cent issue price for the bonds. Having started the business here 
in Paris, added Namık, we must conclude it here, otherwise if we go to London then 
there they will tell that we could not achieve anything here and therefore they will 
create more problems. For this reason Namık asked for the help of the French foreign 
minister. Thereupon Drouyn de Lhuys said that the revenue of France was just equal to 
its expense and he did not have the right to tell the bankers where to give their money, 
since it was their money. Then he asked whether the Pasha had any instructions or 
authority to ask for the guarantee of the French government. To this Namık replied 
categorically that he did not have any such permission  either for a guarantee or for a 
direct loan from the French government. He added that as a friend and ally of the 
Ottoman Empire, France and Britain should assist it in obtaining the loan at reasonable 
conditions. The loan issue had been subjected to the intrigues of Russia and the avarice 
of the bankers, he said. Drouyn de Lhuys promised to talk to the emperor to find a 
solution.
896
 
Napoleon III then urged his finance minister, who in his turn urged both 
Rothschild and its arch rival, the Crédit mobilier and a third group of bankers to sign a 
three-sided contract with a reasonable interest rate. Namık Pasha also tells that the news 
of Ottoman victories had also been received well for the facility of the loan. 
Remarkably he does not mention the news of the destruction of the Ottoman squadron 
in Sinop, which should have reached Paris by then. The bankers first had an eye on the 
tribute of Egypt as a guarantee, but they gave up the idea. They had also agreed on the 
                                                 
895 Veli Pasha to ReĢid Pasha the foreign minister. BOA. HR. MKT. 68/21, dated 9 December 1853. 
Namık Pasha calls the French emperor as Napoleon the Second (İkinci Napoleon). See Lütfi, ibid., 
p. 216. 
896  Namık Pasha from Paris to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, dated 9 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (10 
December 1853). BOA. Ġ. HR. 333/21335 lef 4. 
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duration of the loan. However, the interest rate and the commission were not determined 
yet. While Namık offered five per cent, the French finance minister said a seven per 
cent interest should be seen normal. Nevertheless, Namık reported that they were still 
trying to include other bankers to increase competition and to decrease the interest rate. 
From this report it seems as if everything was normal and soon the loan would be 
concluded at a normal price. However, this would not be the case, because at this time 
diplomatic negotiations had been resumed and it was not certain whether the war would 
be continued or not. The bankers did not want to commit themselves without having 
first ascertained the result of these talks. 
The reports of Namık and Veli Pashas were discussed at the council of ministers 
on 28 December 1853. Nevertheless, the ministers could not come up with a solution or 
clear instructions. Namık Pasha was expected to somehow finish the contracting of the 
loan without parting from his original instructions. The grand vizier Giritli Mustafa 
Naili Pasha reported the decision of the council to the Sultan next day.
897
  
In the meantime the Porte was very hard pressed for want of money. It had almost 
exhausted all ways of borrowing other than the foreign loan. The amount of the loan 
was increased up to five million pounds sterling. Thus Namık Pasha was to negotiate a 
loan of five million pounds sterling in Paris and London. Since money was needed 
urgently, the French and British governments were also asked to advance 10 million 
francs each (equal to 400,000 pounds sterling) to be paid with interest out of the loan.
898
  
The Ottoman official chronicler Ahmed Lütfi Efendi applied to Namık Pasha 
around the year or some time before 1892, asking him to give information on his 
mission. The aged Şeyh ül Vüzera, in his reply, written years after the event, with the 
hindsight of the experience of the Düyun-ı Umumiye İdaresi (Public Debt 
Administration), which from 1881 onwards controlled the collection of many of the 
Ottoman taxes for the repayment of the Ottoman debt, emphasizes his unwillingness at 
that time to sign a foreign loan. Yet we must allow that his story could be genuine, 
because fear of a foreign loan was really dominant among some part of the bureaucracy 
at that time. Apparently his “heart did not wish to be the instrument of the first foreign 
                                                 
897   Grand vizier to the secretary of the Sultan, dated 28 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (29 December 1853). 
BOA. Ġ. HR. 333/21335 lef 5. Sultan‟s approval is on 29 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (30 December 
1853). 
898 O. Anderson (op. cit., p. 48) also writes that “after Sinope, France advanced 10 million francs”, 
however, France advanced only 5 million francs in instalments, the first of which, 1 million francs, 
was received in January 1854 and the last towards October 1854. See BOA. A. AMD. 50/50, dated 
14 January 1854 and BOA. Ġ. HR. 114/5469, dated 9 October 1854. This amount of 5 million 
francs was paid back from the loan money together with its five per cent interest. 
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loan, for until then the Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye) did not owe an akçe to the 
foreigners”.899  
In his layiha given to Lütfi, Namık Pasha further added that since he did not think 
that the Russians could be stopped by money alone, he asked the council of ministers 
for permission to invite the British and the French governments to an alliance, trying to 
persuade them by explaining the dangers to Europe in the case of a Russian victory. 
According to him, the Ottoman council of ministers gave him this authority without 
much hope of gaining the support of the European great powers.  
From Paris, Namık Pasha went to London on 17 December 1853.900 This was his 
third visit to London. Namık Pasha had first been to London in 1832 during Sultan 
Mahmud II‟s reign as special envoy to seek help against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. 
His second embassy to London was in 1834, therefore he knew some of the ministers. 
The British public was well disposed towards the Ottomans and hostile to Russia. 
Namık relates how he and the Ottoman ambassador Kostaki Musurus were greeted by 
the people shouting “Brave Turks! Don‟t worry over Sinop!” (Aferin maşallah Türkler 
muzaffer olunuz Sinop vakasına esef etmeyiniz deyu çağrışarak) on their way to the 
parliament to hear the inaugural speech of the Queen.
901
 Together with Musurus, he 
went to Lord Palmerston, whom he had met before. Palmerston was known for his anti-
Russian stand. From the 1830‟s onwards the defence of the Ottoman Empire against 
Russia had become a important policy objective for him.
902
 Therefore Palmerston 
received Namık well, and said he agreed with him on the necessity of checking the 
Russian expansion, but the Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Finance Minister) William Gladstone
903
 were opposed to him. Namık Pasha 
                                                 
899 For Namık Pasha‟s report (layiha) on his mission see Lütfi, op. cit., numara 18, pp. 215-217. 
Translations are mine. 
900  BOA. Ġ. HR. 114 / 5554/08, dated 23 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (24 December 1853). Cf. Ahmet Nuri 
Sinaplı, op. cit., p. 159. Sinaplı gives the date as Rebiyyülahir, instead of Rebiyyülevvel. Sinaplı 
also makes many mistakes in transliteration, for example reads Musurus as “mösyö Roz”. See ibid, 
p. 159, 160. 
901  Namık Pasha to ReĢid Pasha. BOA. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 86, dated 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (31 
January 1854). See Appendix 34. Lef 108 contains the printed leaflet “Her Majesty's Most 
Gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament, on Tuesday, January 31, 1854”.  
902  See Rodkey, “Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41”, Part I, The Journal of 
Modern History 1 (4), December 1929, pp. 570-593; Part II, The Journal of Modern History 2 (2), 
June 1930, pp. 193-225.   
903   William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898). British Liberal Party statesman, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66, 1873-74, 1880-82) and Prime Minister (1868–1874, 1880–1885, 
1886 and 1892–1894). 
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also relates that the British Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen quite rudely stated: “Besides 
spending its money, should Britain shed its blood as well for you?”904 
In his letter to ReĢid Pasha, dated 21 February 1854, Namık Pasha confirms 
receipt of the instructions from ReĢid Pasha dated 29 January 1854 and the attached 
firman of the Sultan, in reply to his letter dated 28 December 1853. Apparently he had 
asked for permission to make the contract on an agency basis with a fixed commission 
(emanet suretiyle komisyon ile bankirlere havale), and this was not accepted, because it 
was argued that this way the Porte would incur a permanent risk while the bankers 
would safely receive their commission. Namık Pasha states that up to that time he could 
not find any banker who would undertake the loan at his own risk, at a fixed price. Even 
on an agency basis, no banker was willing to contract the loan within the limits of 
Namık Pasha‟s instructions. Then he argues against ReĢid Pasha that if the loan was 
contracted to a banker on an agency basis and the desired amount was received, then the 
Sublime Porte would not incur any losses or profits from the sale and purchase of the 
loan bonds among the bankers. The risk or drawback (mahzur) in this case would be 
that the banker would not put money from his own pocket if the bonds were not sold.
905
 
Namık Pasha added that the British cabinet was making some efforts and the 
banker Rothschild was visiting him, making, however, such an “exorbitant” offer as 70 
per cent issue price and 5 percent interest rate, while Namık offered at 90 percent and 5 
percent interest. The British secretary of state for foreign affairs Lord Clarendon and the 
home secretary Lord Palmerston on the other hand insisted upon Namık that since his 
government needed money urgently he should not look at the price but try to get the 
money as soon as possible. To these words Namık replies that his instructions do not 
allow such an excessive price and he would not accept it even if it was allowed. Then 
they advised him to consult the “minister for Indian affairs” Charles Wood906, who was 
competent in these affairs and could assist him informally. Palmerston had given Namık 
                                                 
904 Lütfi, op. cit., p. 216-217. Cf. Sinaplı, p. 169-170, where Namık says he was friendly with 
Palmerston, who was expected to become the prime minister. Namık Pasha calls Musurus a 
“pasha”, although Musurus was just Kostaki Bey at that time. Namık Pasha's memory again fails 
him, for he makes Lord Palmerston foreign minister, while Palmerston was home secretary at that 
time. Sinaplı also quotes an interview of Namık Pasha to an unidentified French journalist in 1883, 
where Namık mentions Lord “Alberti” (read Aberdeen) as foreign minister (Sinaplı, ibid, p. 171). 
At that time the foreign minister was Lord Clarendon. In the interview Namık also says that 
Palmerston had expressed his inability to help him, while the French emperor and ministers were 
willing to help. 
905  Namık Pasha from London to ReĢid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (21 February 1854). 
BOA. Ġ. HR. 332/21357 lef 4. 
906  Sir Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax (1800-1885). Wood‟s official title was the President of the 
Board of Control, which was a cabinet level position overseeing the British East India Company. 
Wood served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord John Russell's government (1846-1852). 
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Pasha a note in French, where he urged him to conclude the loan and argued that “it was 
a nonsense to want to fix in Constantinople the price at which the capitalists of London 
and Paris would like to lend their money”.907 Namık Pasha attached this note to his 
letter, adding that he had not yet received an answer from Sir Charles. He concluded by 
saying that since it was not possible to find money within the conditions of his 
instructions, he would rather return to Istanbul than stay there in vain. 
In another letter of the same date, Namık Pasha reports to ReĢid Pasha on the 
political situation. He states that since the Russian emperor gave a negative answer to 
the open letter of the French emperor, France and Britain no longer find it possible to 
come to a peaceful agreement with Russia and war now seems imminent. Prussia and 
Austria are also now closer to France and Britain than to Russia. Lord Palmerston told 
him that Russia should be driven further north from the mouth of the Danube and 
Georgia and Circassia must belong to the Ottoman Empire. Palmerston also told him 
that all old treaties with Russia must be annulled and new ones serving the 
independence and prosperity of the Porte must be instituted instead. Namık Pasha 
commented that while the British public in general seemed to favour the Porte, most 
these people were motivated by religious fanaticism (taassubat-ı diniye) who were also 
in some ways opposed to it and therefore should not be seen as reliable. The situation 
was, according to Namık Pasha, getting closer to turning into a “general war” 
(muharebe-i umumiye).
908
 
Stratford and the British ministers blamed Namık Pasha of delaying the loan by 
insisting on unrealistic conditions. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote privately from 
Istanbul to the British secretary of state for foreign affairs Lord Clarendon that the 
Sultan had told him that he had consented to a foreign loan in time of war to stand out in 
time of peace. The “Great Elchi” added, “In this, as in other matters, necessity is the 
only lever against Islamism”. Clarendon replied to Stratford on 13 March 1854 that 
“any man of ordinary experience or capacity would have got the money long ago, but he 
has insisted on having the same terms as England might make a loan in times of 
profound peace”.909 Anderson also writes that Namık Pasha “was ill-chosen for such a 
                                                 
907  Lord Palmerston to Namık Pasha in London, dated 19 February 1854. BOA. Ġ. HR. 332/21357 lef 
3. See Appendix 36. 
908  Namık Pasha to ReĢid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (21 February 1854). BOA. Ġ. HR. 
108/5293 lef 8. 
909 Stratford to Clarendon, 7 April 1854. Anderson, op. cit., p. 48. 
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mission, and he insisted on abiding by his quite unrealistic instructions not to borrow 
below an issue price of 95”.910  
The testimony of Namık Pasha, however, confirmed by the correspondence of 
Musurus, indicates that he did not quite stick to his instructions and he did sign a 
contract with Rothschild
911
 on 24 April 1854.
912
 Namık Pasha signed an agreement for 
five million pounds with the London banker Rothschild at six
913
 per cent interest rate at 
the issue price of 85 per cent. These were indeed relatively good conditions for the loan, 
because Rothschild would go down to 60 per cent in his offers and the loan would 
finally be contracted at 80 per cent.  
Accordingly, in London and Paris stock exchanges, Ottoman six per cent bonds 
were issued at 85 per cent issue price, with a two-percent brokerage fee including 
expenses. The loan was to be collected in four months and to be paid back in 15 years. 
But the problem was that the demand for them was low due to the bad memory of the 
cancelled loan of 1852 and due to general lack of confidence in the Porte's financial and 
administrative affairs. Only 1.1 million pounds were subscribed to in London, while the 
amount of subscription in Paris was not known.
914
  
On 23 March (the same day as the date of Namık Pasha‟s despatch), Musurus also 
wrote to ReĢid Pasha that Aberdeen said that he and the other ministers found the price 
of 75 per cent and the interest rate of 5 per cent offered previously by Rothschild 
agreable and recommended them to sign it. However, he and Namık Pasha had 
negotiated with Mr Goldsmid and Mr Palmer and then Rothschild had agreed to 85 per 
cent issue price with 6 per cent interest. Musurus wrote that the terms of the loan were 
similar to those of the 1852 abortive loan, even better than it because it had a 23 years‟ 
term while the new one was only for 15 years. The terms could be better if it had been 
                                                 
910 O. Anderson, ibid. 
911  Rothschild‟s name has twice been left blank in Lütfi, ibid, p. 217. I could not check whether the 
blank space is in the original Arabic-letter edition or manuscript of Lütfi, or is the result of the 
inability of Lütfi‟s editor to transliterate the name of Rothschild from the Ottoman script. Most 
probably, the fault lies with the editor, who also does not transliterate the name of Prime Minister 
Aberdeen in the same page. While the Ottoman text is troublesome, the editor has no excuse 
because he could easily find out the name of the British prime minister at that time by simply 
looking it up in an encyclopedia. 
912   Namık Pasha telegraphed the news of the agreement on 24 March 1854 from London to Istanbul 
via Belgrad. BOA. Ġ. HR. 107/5272 lef 3. See Appendix 42. 
913   In his layiha to the chronicler Lütfi Efendi, written about 1892, Namık Pasha writes “four per cent 
interest and one per cent sinking fund” (yüzde dört faiz ile bir amortisman). See Lütfi, op. cit., p. 
217. This is another inaccuracy from Namık Pasha, as the above telegraph testifies. 
914 Namık Pasha from London to ReĢid Pasha, dated 23 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (23 March 1854). BOA. 
Ġ. HR. 107/5283, lef 1. Sinaplı (op. cit, p. 160-162) gives a simplified transliteration (with many 
mistakes) of this letter. Cf. Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 5. Akar and Al do not mention 
Sinaplı‟s work at all. 
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contracted several months ago. But still these were good conditions because the prices 
of all other loans were lower. Musurus was certain that the business of loan was over 
now.
915
 
However, within a week, on 28 March 1854, Great Britain and France declared 
war against Russia, and this changed the market conditions drastically.
916
 The issue 
prices of all loans went down. Upon this development, Rothschild gave up the loan, and 
his obligation was given back without demanding any indemnity as a result of the 
“imperial generosity of the Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye namına âlî-cenâblık)”. Namık 
Pasha later boasted that he had told Rothschild “Thank God, you are dealing with a 
Turk” (işiniz elhamdülillah bir Türk iledir) upon which Rothschild had become much 
satisfied and pleased. It would be interesting to know whether Namık actually told him 
that he was a Turk or an Ottoman or a Muslim.  
Namık Pasha finishes his layiha to the chronicler Lutfi Efendi by saying that on 
his return, Abdülmecid Han approved of his not concluding the loan agreement and 
despite this the loan was contracted through Veliyüddin Rifat and Kostaki Musurus. He 
boasts that Abdülmecid told him “if it were another person, he would give importance 
to the loan. But you have proved that you are the right and honourable man as I have 
known you from childhood”. Namık Pasha's account, given in his very old age, 
however, is not clear enough, and cannot be taken for granted. He does not give the 
details, and even if he wanted to, his memory would most probably be inaccurate as he 
had already made some mistakes. He is furthermore an interested party at an actual 
question at the time of his writing; therefore his evidence cannot be objective. It must be 
verified by other sources and above all with his own reports in the BOA that are 
certainly more reliable.  
Meanwhile, the Porte resorted to another way of financing the war expenses by 
issuing bonds or share certificates (esham-ı mümtaze) on the customs revenues of 
Istanbul. The esham was preferred to kaime because the value of kaime had fallen 
much. It was a temporary measure until the receipt of the foreign loan. In February 
1854, esham at the value of 60,000 kese were issued at 10 per cent interest for three 
years.
917
 
                                                 
915  Musurus to ReĢid Pasha, dated 23 March 1854. BOA. HR. TO. 52/50. See Appendix 40. 
916  Namık Pasha in his interview again errs in some details. He says that people protested the prime 
minister Aberdeen by breaking the window glasses of his house and upon this Lord Aberdeen 
resigned and Lord Palmerston replaced him and then war was declared. In reality, Aberdeen was 
replaced by Palmerston nearly one year later on 29 January 1855. 
917 Akyıldız, op. cit, (1996), p. 46. 
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On 3 April 1854, Musurus wrote to the Ottoman foreign minister ReĢid Pasha that 
the British parliament approved the declaration of war on Russia on 31 March. On the 
question of the 10 million franc advance money, Musurus had pressed again Lord 
Clarendon, who said that the cabinet did not approve of it. He explained that according 
to the constitution
918
 of Great Britain such advances must be approved by the parliament 
and there the opposition members of the government would bring it down. He added 
that the cabinet was of the opinion that the Ottoman bonds should be issued at a lower 
price than that contracted with Rothschild. Rothschild himself told Musurus that the 
ministers did not want to give the 10 million franc advance money or a guarantee for the 
“Turkish loan”. The only way for the Ottoman government to raise money was to offer 
the loan bonds to the public at favourable conditions. On the question of the guarantee, 
Musurus makes the following remark:  
   Although I did not make even an allusion to any guarantee for our loan, the 
abstention of the British cabinet from this guarantee is, in my humble opinion, not 
to be regretted. On the contrary, it would be regrettable if (God forbid) the 
Sublime Empire were compelled to apply to foreign states in order to contract a 
loan in Europe. Because in that case the reputation and credibility of the Sublime 
State would be reduced to the degree of states like Greece...
919
 [My translation] 
 
Indeed the Porte would soon be forced to ask for foreign guarantees. Musurus 
adds that two or three months ago he believed they could make the loan on better 
conditions than those later agreed upon with Rothschild, and now although they (he and 
Namık) did not achieve this goal, he was still hopeful to do it with Rothschild at the first 
opportunity (müsait bir vesile zuhurunda) on the same or a more convenient conditions 
without any foreign guarantees. Musurus then argues against the British cabinet, trying 
to refute their argument that the conditions of the “Turkish loan” were not acceptable to 
the public and therefore that its price should be reduced. He writes that if this had been 
so, then their bonds would not have attracted customers to the amount of 1.1 million 
pounds on the day of its announcement and the price would not go up two per cent and 
finally Mr. Rothschild, being an expert in these affairs, would not take upon himself the 
brokerage of the loan. The change in the attitude of the public to the Ottoman loan 
occurred in one day after the news of the tsar's refusal to accept the British and French 
ultimatum leading to the declaration of war by France and Britain on 29 March 1854. 
Had this news reached five days later, or had they signed the contract with Rothschild 
five days earlier, argues Musurus, they would have succeeded in getting the loan, which 
                                                 
918 Musurus uses exactly the word “konstitüsyon”. 
919 Translation (from French into Turkish) of the despatch of Musurus to foreign minister ReĢid 
Pasha. BOA. HR. TO. 52/60, dated 3 April 1854. See Appendix 43. 
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was more favourable to the public than the bonds of other states. The real reason for the 
failure of the loan was the decrease in the price of all government bonds due to the 
declaration of war. Since the capital of the public was invested in these bonds, in order 
to buy the Ottoman bonds they needed to sell their bonds in other bonds, but these being 
now devalued, they faced incurring serious losses. Thus Britain‟s declaration of war in 
defence of the Ottoman Empire ironically worked against the Ottoman loan. 
Namık Pasha, on the other hand, in his letter to ReĢid Pasha, the day after the 
despatch of Musurus, writes that in his earlier letter he had already pointed out the 
necessity of British and French assistance, because the loan brokered by Rothschild had 
got stuck at the amount of only 1.1 million pounds of subscription in London. 
Furthermore most of those who subscribed to the loan in London were not financially 
solvent. Therefore Rothschild had expressed his conviction to the British foreign 
minister and the French ambassador that the loan was impossible without the guarantee 
of the British and the French governments. Namık Pasha then writes that he had no 
authority as to demand a guarantee, whose disadvantages were obvious (mahzuru dahi 
aşikar idüğünden), he went up to Clarendon simply to ask for their help in getting the 
loan and in urgently sending the advance money of ten million francs, because the 
Sublime Porte had an acute need for cash in the ongoing war. To this Clarendon is said 
to reply as follows: 
   You have dragged the loan along for so long (istikrazı bunca vakit süründürüp 
yapmadınız) and even now you asked such a high price that nobody wanted to 
buy. Now that we are in war, we have incurred countless costs and increased 
people‟s taxes. You spend money in so many inappropriate ways and if we were 
to submit to parliament such matters as giving taxpayers‟ money to you or giving 
guarantees on your behalf, they will not accept it in any way and we will be 
unable to answer their questions. We can give neither money nor guarantee. Do as 
you know best.
920
 [My translation].
 
 
 
Namık Pasha tried to argue that the price of the Ottoman bonds was very low for 
the public and very expensive for the Ottoman government, that people indeed wanted 
to buy them, but they could not sell their existing bonds, that the Porte needed money in 
this war and the help of the allies was essential in this matter as well. Nevertheless, he 
was not successful in persuading him. Upon this Namık said that he must therefore go 
to Paris and if unsuccessful there as well, then return to Istanbul. Clarendon agreed with 
him. Meanwhile Lord Palmerston also enters Clarendon‟s house and agrees with his 
words on this question. Despite this the two obstinate Ottomans go to Palmerston as 
                                                 
920 Namık Pasha to ReĢid Pasha. BOA. Ġ. HR. 108/5309, dated 5 Receb 1270 (4 April 1854), quoted 
by Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 5. See Appendix 44 for the whole text of this letter. 
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well on the following day. However, Palmerston speaks in even more accusing and 
humiliating tones: 
   When all the people of Britain knows that you collect taxes in a corrupt way and 
squander the money in so many needless things, it is impossible for us to give the 
money collected from them to you or to act as your guarantor. Even passing the 
stormy sea is easier. If you need money, then go to the public, they may want to 
lend their money at the price of fifty to sixty, with seven to eight per cent interest. 
Try to persuade them as best as you can...
921
 [My translation] 
 
Meanwhile the French ambassador in London stated that they were ready to give a 
guarantee for the Porte‟s loan, if Britain agreed as well. The British and the French also 
recommended assigning the tribute of Egypt as security, but Namık replied that he had 
no authority to dispose of the tribute of Egypt. Having been unable to get the loan from 
London, poor Namık Pasha concludes at the end of his letter that if nothing comes out 
of Paris as well, then the only solution would be rather to issue paper money (kavaim-i 
nakdiye) than to make such an expensive loan. He then suggests waiting for a better 
moment to borrow from Europe at better conditions and then removing the kavaim from 
the market. 
Namık Pasha and Musurus were disappointed when the British cabinet did not use 
its influence in the City. Gladstone argued that “the wishes of the Ministry weigh 
exactly nothing in regard to a question of lending money to a Foreign State”.922 
Furthermore he was following at the time a policy of financing the war by taxation and 
not loans.  
Having attained no results in London, Namık Pasha returned to Paris. There he 
went again to the French foreign minister together with Veli Pasha. He explained to the 
minister the situation. When the minister asked him whether he was authorised to 
contract the loan at a higher price than that with Rothschild and to assign the tribute of 
Egypt for the loan and finally to ask for the guarantee of the allied governments, he said 
that he had already taken the responsibility upon himself of signing a contract at a price 
beyond his authority, yet still he was not successful. He could not go down from the 
price of 85 and the up from the interest of six per cent. He had no authority on the 
Egyptian tribute. Finally, in Istanbul there had not been any discussion of foreign 
guarantees because it had not occurred to them that it might be necessary. Drouyn de 
Lhuys answered that the question would be discussed by the cabinet under the 
supervision of Napoleon III. After that, when Namık and Veli Pasha again visited the 
                                                 
921 Ibid. In the original, there is the expression “yelli denizi içmek”, which does not make sense, there 
must be a writing error here, logically it must be “yelli denizi geçmek”. 
922 O. Anderson, ibid.  
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minister, he told them that the decision was that they could not give guarantee 
unilaterally without Britain. If the Porte accepted the assignment of the tribute of Egypt 
as security for the loan and if it accepted whatever price was available in the market, 
then the French cabinet would do its best to assist the contract of the loan.
923
 
Drouyn de Lhuys also wrote to the Ottoman foreign ministry that he regretted 
Namık Pasha‟s not having attained the desired result in the loan affair. He suggested 
that the reason was not the inherent difficulties of the business, but the strictness of the 
instructions given to Namık Pasha. Therefore he urged his Ottoman colleague to give 
sufficient independence and licence to the person who would be authorized to negotiate 
the loan.
924
 
Eventually Namık Pasha abandoned further hopes and left Paris for Istanbul 
towards end of April. Meanwhile Veli Pasha wrote from Paris to his father the grand 
vizier, who would soon lose his office, confirming that Namık Pasha could not have 
attained the loan in conformity with his instructions. Veli Pasha saw two alternatives for 
the contracting of the loan; either a guarantee from the allied governments or putting the 
Egyptian tribute as security for the loan. He declared that he would execute whichever 
of the alternatives would be assigned to him. He also wrote that Rothschild had told that 
the Galata bankers Baltazzi and Alleon were intriguing through their partners in Paris 
and London.
925
 
Namık Pasha arrived at Istanbul on 13 May 1854. He was received by the Sultan 
on 16 May.
926
 We do not know what passed between them, although Namık Pasha later 
argued that Abdülmecid was glad that he did not strive for the loan. Namık Pasha‟s 
narrative of his role in the alliance of France and Britain with the Porte is of course too 
much exeggerated. He did not and could not have a role here. British and French 
policies were determined by their cabinets, parliaments and to a considerable degree, 
the public opinion. In fact British and French governments did not discuss political 
matters with the Ottoman ambassadors or envoys in London and Paris, rightly thinking 
                                                 
923  Namık Pasha to ReĢid Pasha. BOA. Ġ. HR. 5348, dated 11 ġaban 1270 (9 May 1854). Cf. Sinaplı, 
op. cit., p. 167-169.  
924  Drouyn de Lhuys to ReĢid Pasha, dated 28 April 1854. BOA. Ġ. DH. 18893 lef 3. 
925   Paris ambassador Veli Pasha to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, Gurre-i ġaban 1270 / 29 
April 1854. BOA. Ġ. DH. 18893 lef 2. Theodore Baltazzi, alias Baltacı Todoraki (1788-1860) 
belonged to the prominent Levantine family of Baltazzi, bankers to the Sultan. In 1847, together 
with the French banker Jacques Alleon, he had founded the Bank-ı Dersaadet (Bank de 
Constantinople) which was forced to close in 1852.  
926  BOA. Ġ. DH. 18966, dated 18 ġaban 1270 (16 May 1854). 
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that this was a loss of time.
927
 They had their ambassadors in Istanbul, who also thought 
it was a waste of time to discuss important political matters with the foreign minister, 
and sometimes even with the grand vizier. At that time, the Ottoman ambassadors in 
European capitals in many cases would hear the decision of their governments first from 
foreigners. 
It had become very clear that the Porte would not be able to borrow without the 
guarantees of the allied governments. Thus it was rather the Porte‟s instructions, the 
international conjuncture, problems with the credibility of the Porte and attitudes of the 
British ministers that had really prevented the loan's materialization rather than Namık 
Pasha's “amateurishness” and unwillingness. Under such conditions, anyone in his place 
could be equally unsuccessful.  
On the day after Namık Pasha‟s visit to the Sultan, the finance minister Musa 
Safveti Pasha gave his report on the financial situation of the Ottoman Empire to the 
grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha. He wrote that from the beginning of the current 
question, an amount of more than 300,000 purses (1.5 million Ottoman pounds or 
around 1.36 million pounds sterling) was assigned to extraordinary expenses (mesarif-i 
fevkalade) until October 1853. After that kavaim-i nakdiye at the amount of 100,000 
purses (500,000 Ottoman pounds) were also assigned to the extraordinary (war) 
expenses. The revenues of the new financial year beginning from 13 March 1854 hardly 
make up for the debts. The treasury had borrowed 320,000 Ottoman pounds secured 
against the  tribute of Egypt for the fiscal year 1270 from some merchants and bankers, 
plus 100,000 Ottoman pounds from Baltacı Todoraki. Furthermore esham bonds at 10 
per cent interest rate at the amount of 300,000 Ottoman pounds were being issued. 
Nevertheless, the needs of the armies were increasing day by day and the revenues of 
the provinces were directed to these armies. The provinces of Yanya and Tırhala needed 
assistance from the centre. Now that Namık Pasha had also returned from Europe 
“empty handed”, it was necessary to take urgent measures, because the treasury could 
only survive two months more. The finance minister ended his report by warning that he 
had stated the facts and passed his responsibility in advance.
928
 Money was needed 
urgently from Europe. 
 
 
                                                 
927   Sinan Kuneralp refers to Lord Salisbury on this point. See “Bir Osmanlı Diplomatı Kostaki 
Musurus PaĢa 1807-1891”, Belleten XXXIV / 135, Temmuz 1970, p. 422.  
928   Finance minister Musa Safveti Pasha to grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha, 19 ġaban 1270 (17 May 
1854). BOA. Ġ. DH. 18893 lef 1. See Appendix 47. 
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4.6.  The Mission of Black and Durand and the First Foreign Loan of 1854 
 
 
Since the Porte needed money urgently, this time it sent instead two foreign 
merchant bankers of Galata, Messrs J. N. Black and Pierre Durand in June 1854. The 
first was close to the British and the second to the French embassy. Now they were 
ready to pay the market price. Furthermore they were authorised to offer as securities 
the Egyptian tribute and the customs revenues of Izmir (Smyrna) and Syria, which were 
sold to a banker company for a yearly amount of 30 million piastres or 270,000 pounds 
sterling for four years. Although not mentioned in the instructions, Olive Anderson also 
cites as a security the deposit of the firman for the loan at the Bank of England.
929
 Black 
and Durand still had instructions not to ask for the guarantee of the allied governments 
unless all independent efforts utterly failed (comme un “moyen extrême”).930 Their 
commission fees were to depend on the terms of the loan, the better the terms, the more 
the commission.
931
  
Meanwhile the French government suggested to the British that only by a 
guarantee could the allies control the spending of the loan. According to Lord Cowley, 
the British ambassador in Paris, the aim of the French was to interfere with the revenues 
of Egypt. Gladstone thought that Britain's “immense” war efforts gave her the right to 
interfere anyway.
932
 Yet the discussion between the allies about how to control the 
expenditure of the loan leaked out, and the Ottomans were naturally indignant. 
However, by the end of July 1854, they agreed to any controls by the allies in return for 
their guarantee. On 8 August 1854, the companies of two London bankers, Baron Sir 
Isaac Lyon Goldsmid
933
 and John Horsley Palmer offered to raise a six per cent loan of 
three million pounds sterling at the issue price of 80, with a payback period of 33 years, 
on the condition that Clarendon certifies the full authority of the negotiators and the 
honouring of the terms. The British cabinet was averse to guarantees, while the French 
were interested and tried to hinder the loan unless their guarantee was accepted. Finally 
the London firm became the sole contractors for the loan and subscriptions opened. The 
                                                 
929 Anderson, op. cit., p. 50. 
930 Instructions to Black and Durand (in French and in Ottoman Turkish), BOA. HR. MKT. 78/51, 
dated 11 Ramazan 1270 / 6 June 1854. Since 11 Ramazan corresponds to 7 June, one of these two 
dates must be wrong by one day. 
931 BOA. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 11 Ramazan 1270 / 6 June 1854. See the above footnote for 
explanation on date. See Appendix 48. 
932 Anderson, op. cit., p. 50.  
933 Goldsmid‟s name is usually misspelled as Goldschmid, Goldschmidt or Goldsmith in so many 
sources. See for example, Anderson, op. cit., p. 51; Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), pp. 8, 17. 
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Egyptian tribute was deposited as security. ReĢid Pasha approved the loan with the right 
of reserving the two
934
 millions out of the five at the Porte's discretion. However, time 
had been lost and the issue of the Sultan's firman approving the loan was delayed, which 
dealt another blow to Ottoman credibility.  
Stratford de Redcliffe was anxious to have a mixed control commission for the 
expenditures of the loan. With Clarendon's support he set out to form a committee of 
three Ottomans, one Briton and one Frenchman to pay out the loan money and to 
superintend its application. The Ottoman view would prevail in this committee but it 
would be independent of the Ottoman government. The Ottoman representatives were 
Mehmed Nazif Bey (member of the MVL), Kabuli Efendi (the president) and ReĢid Bey 
(controller of the finance ministry). Later Mehmed Nazif Bey was replaced by Kâni 
Pasha. The British representative was Demetrius Revelaky and the French nominated 
David Glavany.  The Ottomans did not like the idea of a loan commission and accepted 
it rather grudgingly.  
The distribution of the loan money can be seen at Table 4. The effective interest 
rate is 7.5 per cent excluding costs and commissions. The first problem of the loan 
commission was the exchange rate of pound to piastres, which was officially 110 
piastres per pound, but the market rate was 125 piastres in September 1854 and 137 
piastres in January 1855. The commission chose to apply the existing market rates at the 
time of actual payments. Thus the average rate of exchange for the all transactions until 
February 1855 was 130. 
After preliminary deductions and payments, there remained little more than 2 
million pounds, as can be seen from Table 4. More than half of the balance of the loan 
money remained in London at the Bank of England for bills of exchange drawn on 
European banks or persons. Only 829,000 pounds were received in cash, equal to 
109,199,000 piastres. However, after a net currency exchange loss, only 104,751,000 
piastres
935
 actually entered the Ottoman treasury.  
Until 20 February 1855, a total of 239,463,000 piastres was demanded for the 
needs of the Ottoman armies and the loan control commission released 205,053,000 
piastres from that amount. In the work of the commission up to 20 February 1855, the 
biggest reduced item (and the most outstanding enigma) was the salaries of the 
Anatolian army which were 15 months in arrears. The commission approved only 7.5 
                                                 
934 Anderson gives this amount as three millions (op. cit., p. 52) but this must be an error.  
935 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 17. 
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million piastres out of the proposed 21.6 million piastres.
936
 Next came the reduction in 
the allocation of the Batum army, from 12.5 million to 5 million piastres. It would be 
interesting to know on what basis these amounts were reduced, because the commission 
was supposed to make sure the loan went to the needs of the army, especially the 
soldiers. This was most probably due to the reports of Colonel (General) Williams, who 
found out that the payroll of the Anatolian army was greatly swollen by the pashas for 
purposes of embezzlement, as we have seen in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 4: Distribution of the Loan of 1854 (pounds sterling)
937
 
Amount of the loan 3,000,000 
Deduction of 20 per cent because of the issue price of 80 per cent 600,000 
Brokerage fee of Goldsmid and Palmer (two per cent of 2,400,000) 48,000 
Commission fee of Black and Durand
938
 18,800 
Insurance and other costs payable to the Bank of England 8,088 
Six months interest payment to the Bank of England (half of the 6 per cent of 3,000,000) 90,000 
Payment to Mr Hanson
939
 for the purchase of gunpowder  20,000 
Return of the advance (5 million francs) from the French Govt. with 5 percent interest 205,439 
Balance 2,009,673 
 
 
 
4.7.  The İane-i Harbiye 
 
 
As we have seen above, one of the methods of financing the war expenses was the 
iane-i harbiye or iane-i cihadiye or iane-i seferiye
940
 (war assistance or donation or 
benevolence), which was not truly a voluntary donation but rather a compulsory tax. 
While there was a certain element of enthusiasm especially in the provinces at the 
beginning of the war, it must have waned in time because there are reports of iane 
                                                 
936 Op. cit., Ek 3, p. 35. 
937 BOA. HR. MKT. 92/78, dated 29 Safer 1271 / 21 November 1854. Cf. Akar and Al (op. cit., 2003, 
p. 16), who refer to another document, BOA. Ġ. MM. 133, dated 20 February 1855. 
938 Akar and Al give the commission fee of Black and Durand as £9,628, however, this is only the 
amount paid in London. Their full commission is £18,800 by contract. The rest they had already 
received in Istanbul. See the contract, BOA. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 6 June 1854. Also see the 
documents submitted to Âli Pasha by Black and Durand, BOA. HR. TO.  419/31, dated 29 
Ramazan 1273 (23 May 1857). 
939  Charles S. Hanson. British merchant in Istanbul. Akar and Al (op. cit., 2003, p. 17) have 
transliterated his name as “Hallinsot (?)” (Question mark in the original). 
940 Not to be mixed with the iane-i umumiye, this was another extraordinary tax and was being 
collected before the war. 
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arrears even after the war. These arrears seem to have been prosecuted like ordinary tax 
arrears. Even a cursory look at the list of these “donations” reveals the surprising 
similarities among the amounts given by governors and kaimmakams or provinces and 
districts so far away from each other. It is clear that these amounts were predetermined 
from the centre. Yet some governors may have slightly exceeded their quota. 
While Namık Pasha was negotiating a loan in London and Paris, the extended 
council of 121 statesmen under Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha discussed on 27 
March 1854 the question of raising the iane-i harbiye. It was decided that all dignitaries 
and persons of power (erbab-ı iktidar ve itibar) should contribute a certain amount of 
money to the war efforts, since the holy duty of jihad (emr-i mefruz-ı cihad) could be 
fulfilled bodily or financially (bedenen ve bedelen). Despite this Islamic discourse, 
however, not only Muslims but also non-Muslims paid the iane. In 1855, the tax paid by 
non-Muslim subjects, the cizye, was first changed into iane-i askeriye and then it was 
named bedel-i askeriye. We will deal with this issue in subchapter 5.3. 
The highest officials set the example by paying predetermined sums according to 
rank. These “donations” began to be published in the official newspaper Takvim-i 
Vekayi on 19 April 1854.
941
 Thus the grand vizier, the foreign minister (ReĢid Pasha), 
and the former Seraskier Mehmed Ali Pasha gave 300,000 piastres each, while the 
others gave sums in descending order.
942
 It is indeed very interesting to look at these 
lists of “donations” by persons and by provinces because they are really good indicators 
of their economic power and wealth, though not without exceptions. While the governor 
of Tunis, Ahmed Pasha (1806-1855) gave the biggest amount (5,700,000 piastres), the 
governor of Egypt, Abbas Pasha (1813-15.7.1854), being equal in rank to the grand 
vizier and his son Ġlhami Pasha gave 4,000,000 piastres and 1,000,000 piastres 
respectively, totalling 50,000 Ottoman pounds.
943
  
It is indeed not surprising that the Egyptian governor or his son alone contributed 
more than the total sum collected from all the bureaucrats and traders (esnaf) of Istanbul 
                                                 
941 Besim Özcan. Kırım Savaşı'nda Mali Durum ve Teb'anın Harb Siyaseti (1853-1856). Erzurum: 
Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997, p. 34. Özcan, however, argues that the iane was really a 
donation.  
942  The chronicler Lütfi however asks the question: Were these sums all paid out? His answer is that it 
is only known to the financial records (orasın defter-i maliyenin erkamı bilür). He seems to allude 
that not all of these sums were paid out. Lütfi, op. cit., p. 94. 
943  Lütfi writes that Abbas Pasha donated 8,000 kese and his son Ġlhami Pasha 12,000 kese akçe, 
which totalled 50,000 Ottoman pounds. Ġlhami Pasha was given the hand of Abdülmecid‟s 
daughter Münire Sultan and their wedding took place in the Baltalimanı sahilhane on 16 Zilkade 
1270 (10 August 1854). Abdülmecid married his other daughters likewise to the sons of his pashas 
(op. cit., p. 98). 
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until October 1854, which was only 3,944,242 piastres.
944
 If we take into consideration 
the salary of the şeyhülislam which was (around 100,000 piastres) close to that of the 
grand vizier, it comes a bit surprising that the ex-şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Beyefendi 
and the recently appointed Arif Efendi gave so little amounts (30,000 piastres and 
20,000 piastres respectively) in comparison with other grandees. That the new 
şeyhülislam paid less than the former one seems normal because the change in office 
took place only on 11 March 1854, therefore the newcomer could not have amassed 
enough wealth. We must also take into account the fact that at that time the high 
bureaucrats were receiving their salaries not in full, but only one third or one fifth of it. 
Among the provincial (eyalet) governors, after Tunis and Egypt, the governor of 
Baghdad ReĢid Pasha paid the highest amount at 147,000 piastres. He was followed by 
Asfer Ali Pasha, the governor of Damascus (100,000 piastres) and Mehmed Pasha, the 
governor of Crete (98,000 piastres). 
Adolphus Slade writes the following on this subject: 
   a council of Ulema and dignitaries was convened for the purpose of raising a 
“benevolence” from the civil, military, and naval authorities of the state above the 
rank of colonel, and from the wealthy denizens of the capital. Hitherto 
Constantinople had escaped this test of patriotism, while warmly applauding 
provincial liberality. Although termed voluntary, the gifts were often involuntary. 
Lists of names were circulated by authority, and no one ventured to signalize 
himself by writing down less than the expected sum; which, in the case of officers 
and employees, amounted to about ten days' pay... Certain districts, remiss in 
responding to the appeal, were long afterwards invited to pay up arrears. 
Gradually, as enthusiasm waned, benevolence degenerated into requisition.
945
   
 
According to the calculations of Besim Özcan, who seems to have made a 
thorough research on the iane-i harbiye in the Ottoman archives, the sum total of cash 
“donations” from all state officials and the people of the Empire reached 44,074,742 
piastres.
946
 This would be equal to around 352,598 pounds at the average exchange rate 
of 125 piastres per pound during the war. If we compare this amount with the alleged 
debt of Serfiraz Hanım (500,000 pounds) it becomes an insignificant sum. It is 
remarkable that the three Ottoman Arab dependencies of Tunis, Egypt and West Tripoli 
accounted for more than half of the total iane. It is also remarkable that the province of 
Tunis contributed more than Egypt, which was certainly more prosperous. On the other 
                                                 
944 Özcan, p. 46. Özcan gives this information but makes no comments on it. 
945 Adolphus Slade, op. cit., p. 197. Turkish translation (1943), p. 122. Özcan quotes from Slade on 
the enthusiasm of the provinces for war efforts, (Özcan, ibid, p. 37) but ignores this passage. 
946 Özcan, op. cit., p. 86.  
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hand, “donations” in kind and services are not so easily calculable but they must also 
constitute a considerable sum, as much as the cash contribution.  
Özcan gives the cash “donations” of the non-Muslims at 1,477,734 piastres 
(11,821 pounds), although it is not clear whether this sum is included in the former sum. 
Slade in his turn writes that during 1854-55, “the inhabitants of a part of Turkey” gave 
about 1.5 million pounds in money and an equal amount in kind, as supplies to the 
army, “under the head of iani umoumie”.947 However, it is not clear whether this is the 
same iane-i harbiye or the iane-i umumiye of previous years. 
 
 
4.8.  The Guaranteed Loan of 1855 
 
 
By the spring of 1855, little remained of the loan of 1854, yet the needs of the 
Ottoman armies were still growing. It was necessary to claim the remaining two 
millions of the first loan. By this time it was also clear to the allies that the capture of 
Sevastopol was not going to be as quick as they thought. In Britain the cabinet of Lord 
Aberdeen resigned on 29 January 1855 and Lord Palmerston set up the new cabinet, 
which was determined to win the war at any cost. On 5 April 1855 the Ottoman 
ambassadors asked the French and the British governments to guarantee one million 
sterling each. The British government was still reluctant. Clarendon wrote  to Stratford 
on 9 April 1855 that “we, or rather the House of Commons, object to all guarantees and 
subsidies”, but then added “the Cabinet will I suppose agree to it if it must be”.948 
Meanwhile the peace negotiations at Vienna had collapsed. War was the order of the 
day everywhere. On 2 May 1855, Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha took over the government 
from ReĢid Pasha, Âli becoming the grand vizier and Fuad receiving the foreign 
ministry. They now demanded a totally new loan at the amount of five million pounds 
sterling. This time it was indisputable that the loan was impossible without a guarantee 
from the British and French governments. While the French wanted a joint guarantee, 
the British wanted separate guarantees for each government. The British government 
also wanted to include an article of the control of the expenditures of the loan, to which 
Musurus objected because it would “touch upon the dignity of the state” (namus-ı 
aliyeye dokunacağı).949  
                                                 
947 Slade, ibid. 
948 Anderson, op. cit., p. 54. Italics in the original. 
949 Kostaki Musurus to Fuad Pasha, 23 June 1855, BOA. Ġ. HR. 122/6055. Also see Akar and Al, op. 
cit., (2003), p. 11. 
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Finally the French view was accepted. On 27 June 1855 an agreement was signed 
between France and Britain (subject to approval by their parliaments) on the guarantee 
of the payment of the interest of the five million pound loan to the Porte. While the 
French parliament approved the agreement without problem, the British parliament 
passed the resolution by a very slight majority on 20 July 1855. There were heated 
debates against the guarantee. According to Olive Anderson, these were the result of 
“dominance inside Parliament of ancient prejudices, financial, constitutional and 
diplomatic”.950 Indeed the British public opinion was more inclined towards the 
guarantee and towards continuing the war than the House of Commons. Although 
Stratford again did not want to miss the opportunity to control Ottoman war finance 
affairs by means of a loan control commission, the Ottomans again dragged their feet, 
using the conflicts between the British and the French. This was so obvious that the 
regulations of the new control commission were accepted only in January 1856, when 
war was practically ended.  
The loan of 5 million pounds sterling at four per cent interest was negotiated with 
the London house of the N. M. Rothschild & Sons. In addition to the interest of four per 
cent, a sinking fund of one per cent was to be applied as well. Thus in practise the loan's 
interest rate was five per cent. Article 4 of the Agreement between His Excellency C. 
Musurus Bey on behalf of the Ottoman Government and Messrs. N. M. Rothschild & 
Sons as contractors, dated 15 August 1855, was as follows: 
   The interest and sinking fund are made a charge on the whole tribute of Egypt 
which remains over and above the part thereof already appropriated to the loan of 
£3,000,000 negotiated on the 24th August 1854 and moreover on the Customs of 
Smyrna and Syria.
951
.  
 
This time the guarantee of the British and French governments on the interest of the 
loan highly raised the issue price of the loan, which became 102.62 per cent. Thus the 
terms of the 1855 loan were very advantageous and much better than the previous 
one.
952
 The actual proceeds from the loan were 5,131,250 pounds sterling.  
 
 
 
                                                 
950 Anderson, ibid, p. 56. 
951 Agreement as to Ottoman Loan of 1855, 15 August 1855, The Rothschild Archive (London), 
reference no. 401b015. I am grateful to the Rothschild Archive and personally to Caroline Shaw 
for sending me this and other documents. 
952 Edhem Eldem considers both loans contracted at favourable conditions. See his article, “Ottoman 
financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt”, 
European Review 13 (3), 2005, p. 434. 
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4.9.  The Loan Control Commission of 1855 
 
 
Although this time the allies were more seriously bent to control the spending of 
the loan, they could not get a detailed plan of control simultaneously with the guarantee. 
Stratford was anxious for this omission. He tried to press for a news three-party 
commission with more powers but the Ottoman government resisted. Meanwhile both 
governments appointed official loan control commissioners to Istanbul. For Clarendon, 
this was a chance for the Ottomans “to learn how to introduce something like order and 
regularity into Turkish finance”.953  
The British loan commissioner Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby (1825-1896) arrived 
at Istanbul on 8 September 1855 together with his wife, who wrote afterwards her 
memoirs of Istanbul. The French had sent A. Cadrossi.
954
 The Ottoman side was to be 
represented by Kâni Pasha. Instructions for the work of the control commission 
prepared by the French and British embassies were not accepted by the Ottoman 
government, saying that it contained articles contrary to the dignity of the Sublime State 
(şan-ı ali-i Saltanat-ı Seniye). Then began a long process of negotiations. The Ottoman 
side resented and resisted the work of the commission for reasons of “pocket and 
pride”.955 A draft instructions (constitution) of 12 articles was prepared on 10 December 
1855.
956
 Finally a compromise was reached on 17 January
957
 1856, when war was 
practically over.  
One of the biggest issues was the tenders of military purchases. While the foreign 
commissioners wanted to control all big purchases, the Ottoman government argued 
that this would cause delays that might jeopardize the armies. The sides agreed on 
subjecting purchases worth more than 600,000 piastres to the approval of the 
                                                 
953  Anderson, op. cit., p. 58. 
954 BOA. Ġ. HR. 6390, dated 3 December 1855. Also see Sir Edmund Hornby. An Autobiography, 
London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929, pp. 75-81. A. du Velay and many others quoting from him 
send instead Lord Hobart on the British side and Marquis de Ploeuc on the French side. In fact, 
these gentlemen came later. See A. du Velay, (op. cit., 1978), p. 83. Donald C. Blaisdell, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu'nda Avrupa Mali Denetimi, Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1979, p. 32. Emine 
Kıray, Osmanlı'da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar, Istanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 1993, p. 29. Sait 
Açba, Osmanlı Devletinin Dış Borçlanması (1854-1915), Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi 
Ġktisadi ve Ġdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1995, p. 42. Cezmi Karasu, “Kırım SavaĢı Sırasında 
Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1853-1856)”, unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 1998, p. 123. 
Edhem Eldem, Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p. 26. André 
Autheman, Bank-ı Osmani-i Şahane, Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası ArĢiv ve AraĢtırma Merkezi, 
2002, p. 18. Anderson, Akar and Al are correct on this point. 
955  Anderson, op. cit., p. 60. 
956  BOA. Ġ. HR. 6356, dated 10 December 1855. 
957   Anderson (op. cit., p. 58) gives 14 January 1856. 
282 
commission.
958
 In any case the ministry of finance was to submit monthly reports of the 
use of the loan funds. 
The practical result of the inability to get the commission working was the delay 
in the release of the loan money. Thus the Ottoman armies were again without money 
when they needed it most. According to Akar and Al‟s excerpts from Ottoman fiscal 
records, the first instalment of 500,000 pounds came only on 3 December 1855 and 
second one of 400,000 pounds reached the treasury at the end of January 1856.
959
 Thus 
by the beginning of February 1856 only 900,000 pounds in cash had been received and 
no bills had yet been drawn on the Bank of England. However, Anderson refers to a 
British document according to which, by 6 February, £1,891,919.6 of the loan had been 
sent out.  The big difference is not easily explainable. Lady Hornby, in her letter, dated 
10 November 1855, writes that an English merchant speaking Turkish, told them that  
   there is a great feeling of anger among the Turks about the Commission; that 
they are bent (three or four of them especially, who are furious at the idea of not 
being able to finger some thousands for their own private purse) on getting the 
whole of the loan into their own hands; that they declare they will never consent 
to disgrace the Ottoman government by asking foreign Commissioners‟ consent to 
their spending their own money, and that they are resolved to tire their patience 
out. How all this will end remains to be seen. Of course they well know that it was 
only on the solemn agreement that England and France should direct the disburse-
ment of the money, that is was lent. There are five millions here in gold now. 
Edmund is going to send a dispatch begging that that no more instalments should 
be sent out...
960
 
 
Lady Hornby is not right on the question of the “solemn agreement”. There was 
no such binding written agreement. That there were five millions (either in pounds 
sterling or Ottoman pounds) in November 1855 in Istanbul is also doubtful. In any case, 
this money had not yet been disbursed, because the loan control commission had not yet 
started working. It seems that the Porte took an advance money of 600,000 pounds 
sterling from the Rothschilds.
961
 On the other hand, it was strongly probable that 
without some kind of foreign control, part of the loan money would go into private 
pockets.  
Thus most of the loan money was still lying at the Bank of England in London 
and this was sure to cause indignation even in London. On 4 January, Clarendon wrote 
                                                 
958 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 19. 
959  Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), Ek 5, Ek 6, pp. 42-45. 
960 Lady [Emilia Bithynia] Hornby. Constantinople during the Crimean War. London: Richard 
Bentley, 1863, p. 91. 
961
  See the financial report mentioned above. Le Moniteur Universel, 8 janvier 1856. BOA. HR. SYS. 
1355/3 lef 2. 
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to Stratford that “some of the Tory and Radical papers are already crying out about the 
injustice done to the Turks and are attributing the fall of Kars solely to our withholding 
from the Turks the means necessary for relieving the place”.962  
Until 12 June 1856, a total of 4,666,976 pounds sterling was spent from the loan. 
Of this amount 3,705,000 pounds were paid in cash and the remaining 592,025 was 
drafted on the Bank of England. The exchange rate fluctuated between 116 and 144.5 
piastres per pound. The average exchange rate was 128 piastres during this time.
963
 Of 
the 3,705,000 pounds cash payment to the treasury, 2,113,137 pounds were spent on the 
regular army (Nizamiye), 721,332 pounds on the navy yards (Tersane), 197,958 on the 
arsenal (Tophane) and 672,575 pounds by the finance ministry.
964
 By September 1856 
all loan money was spent and the Commission finished its work. 
Sir Edmund Hornby gives some information about the work of the loan 
commission in his autobiography written in old age. According to him, corruption was 
rampant in the Ottoman army among officers above the rank of major: 
   It soon became evident that “pay lists”, commissariat lists, etc., whether 
receipted or not, or even vouched for by the War Department, were not to be 
depended on. It was necessary to count the corps and ask the rank and file if they 
had been paid and find out what pay was in arrears. Clothing, provisions, 
ammunition had to be similarly checked. The officers were not to be trusted either 
in the field or out of it, and not once, but dozens of times, I had to get officers of 
rank suspended for embezzlement and malversation.  
From this censure I except the “Uzbashis and Bim-bashis,” what we should call 
non-commissioned officers. These were really splendid fellows, selected from the 
ranks for their courage and knowledge of regimental duty..
965
 
 
On another occasion, some Ottoman officers had sold the fresh vegetables sent to 
save the Ottoman soldiers from scurvy to the French and bagged the cash. Nevertheless, 
Hornby argues that, of the loan money of five million pounds sterling, “not more than 
half a million was misapplied”.966 Some part of this “misapplied” money was simply 
stolen. Hornby remembers that on one occasion one of the cash bags at the Treasury, 
which ought to have held £20,000 in gold sovereigns, was found full of copper coins. 
The thief was not found out. When the Sultan conferred upon Hornby the order of the 
Mecidiye and a snuff-box in brilliants, he thought that he did not deserve it, because he 
“had only kept him [the Sultan] from squandering his own money”. Hornby then 
                                                 
962  Anderson, op. cit., p. 69 
963 Calculated from data given by Akar and Al, ibid, p. 25. 
964 Akar and Al, op. cit., (2003), p. 44. 
965 Hornby, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 
966 Hornby, op. cit., p. 77. 
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remarks that had they been led by the temptation, he and his French colleague could 
have made a small fortune out of the loan money. “All we had to do was to shut our 
eyes a little to what the real owners of the money wanted to do with it”.967 Hornby also 
recollects the incident of the Armenian banker Theodore “Batazzi”968 trying to give him 
and Cadrossi a cheque for £1,250 each as commission for the business they brought to 
him. Hornby refused. His French colleague, on learning of the incident from him, had 
also felt himself terribly insulted. But for Baltazzi it was business as usual. 
After these two first foreign loans, what some Ottoman bureaucrats feared much 
about the foreign loans all along became true: The Porte got used to foreign loans and 
finally they reached uncontrollable amounts, leading thus to direct foreign control over 
Ottoman tax revenues. Damad Ali Fethi Pasha‟s prophetic remark in 1852 had become 
true: “But I know that, if this state borrows five piastres, it will go bankrupt. For if once 
it gets used to borrowing, then there will be no end to it. It will be drowned in debts”.969  
The Ottoman loans of 1854 and 1855 were later collectively referred to as the 
tribute loans (with reference to the Egyptian tribute), while that of 1855 was also called 
the guaranteed loan. When the Ottoman government defaulted on the interest payments 
on its, by then, huge foreign debt in October 1875, the guarantee of the British and 
French governments caused a lot of trouble. As it is well known, the final result of the 
Ottoman financial crisis was the establishment of the Public Debt Administration 
(Düyun-ı Umumiye İdaresi) in 1881.970 This was the clearest sign of the semi-colonial 
status of the Ottoman Empire. While this was the culminating point, the seeds were 
sown by the loans of the Crimean War period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
967 Ibid. 
968 Hornby, op. cit., p. 78. The banker‟s name must be Baltazzi. See footnote 925. 
969  “Lâkin bilirim ki bu devlet beş kuruş borç ederse batar. Zira bir kerre borca alışırsa sonra önü 
alınmaz. Düyuna müstağrak olup gider”. See Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 1-12, p. 22. 
970  See Donald C. Blaisdell, op. cit. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON OTTOMAN SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Contacts with the Europeans 
 
 
One of the arguments of this dissertation is that the Crimean War has an important 
place in Ottoman modernization. The war introduced many social novelties and 
practices into the life of first Istanbul high society and then society at large. While these 
changes are not always tangible or quantifiable, they are still perceivable. In this chapter 
we will try to assess the social impact of the war on Ottoman state and society. 
The first practical impact of the war was the increase in the number of visitors to 
Istanbul and in the contacts between Europeans and Ottomans at all levels. During the 
war years many people came to Istanbul from Europe: soldiers, officers, nuns, 
diplomats and their families, traders, tourists, engineers, etc. Ottoman Empire and 
Istanbul also received wide coverage in European newspapers. The appearance of 
British, French and Sardinian soldiers and officers in Istanbul as allies had a mixed 
impact on the minds of ordinary people. For example thousands of British soldiers, 
officers and their wives lived for a while in Üsküdar. This left some impressions on the 
local people. On the one hand, for the first time people saw the “giaour” soldiers as real 
allies who had come to shed their blood for the security of the Ottoman Empire. They 
were suffering and dying for the security and integrity of the Ottoman state and people. 
Thus people were able to see this for themselves.  
On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that the Europeans produced an 
altogether positive impression upon the inhabitants of Istanbul. In fact soon they began 
to worry why the allied troops remained so long in the capital and why they did not 
advance to Varna and Silistria. Many houses on the Bosphorus were given to the allied 
officers, the owners being forced to evacuate their homes. While in most cases the Porte 
paid the rent, there were cases when the owners did not get rent at all.
971
 The Allies, 
                                                 
971   For example, Halil Efendi‟s sahilhane in Fındıklı was rented by the Porte for Admiral Boxer. Its 
monthly rent (3,000 piastres or 24 pounds sterling, equivalent of 1,440 pounds at current prices). 
See BOA. Ġ. HR. 114/5607, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). In another case, 91,100 
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especially the French had also occupied so many public buildings, including military, 
naval, medical schools for barracks and hospitals, leaving generously two buildings to 
the Ottomans. The French were quartered in the barracks of DavutpaĢa, Maltepe, 
Ramizçiftlik, TaĢkıĢla, GümüĢsuyu and Gülhane, in the Russian embassy in the centre 
of Pera and they also occupied the military, medical and naval schools.
972
 Furthermore 
they encamped at Maslak and also settled in the quarter of St. Sophia. The British were 
quartered at the Selimiye barracks in Scutari. 
Adolphus Slade‟s observations of Istanbul towards the end of 1854 are worth 
quoting at full length here: 
   The Turks, in stupor, were drinking the bitter waters of humiliation, were 
expiating the sins of their ancestors. Frank soldiers lounged in the mosques during 
prayers, ogled licentiously veiled ladies, poisoned the street dogs, part and parcel 
of the desultory bizarre existence of the East, shot the gulls in the harbour and the 
pigeons in the streets, …, mocked the muezzins chanting ezzan from the minarets, 
and jocosely broke up carved tombstones for pavement… The Turks had heard of 
civilization: they now saw it, as they thought, with amazement. Robbery, 
drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution revelled under the glare of an eastern sun, 
or did mild penance in the shadow of a dozen legations: to each of whom the 
withdrawal of a rascal from the station-house was a duty, the shielding of a 
miscreant from punishment was a triumph. The Sultan still sat in his palace but 
his power was in abeyance… The Allies‟ troops had possession of the capital, the 
English on the Asiatic the French on the European side of the Bosphorus; and 
their guards patrolled Pera and Galata - sanctuary for hybrid swarm from all parts 
of the Mediterranean, whose avocations the police were cautious in interfering 
with, for fear of drawing on themselves the wrath of some legation, by 
confounding an Ionian with a Hellenist, a Genoese with Sicilian, or a Javanese 
with a Hindoo.
973
 
 
Slade then goes on to criticise the capitulations. He argues that the capitulations, 
instituted in the 16
th
 century for the protection of a few European traders, restrained and 
responsible for the conduct of their servants, had now become a protector of murderers 
and unscrupulous profit seekers, as its strict enforcement in favour of 50,000 Europeans 
of various nationalities and professions in Istanbul and twice as much in the provinces 
was a disgrace to “Turkey” and a reproach to Europe. He even argues that “probed to 
their source, the occasional outbreaks in Turkey called fanatical would be seen to be the 
                                                                                                                                               
piastres were paid by the Porte for 6 months‟ rent for 8 houses in Scutari rented for British 
officers. See BOA. HR. SYS. 1337/7, dated 24 Receb 1271 (12 April 1855). The owners of 
storehouses in Varna had also demanded rent for their stores occupied by the Allies troops. See 
BOA. HR. SYS. 1356/8, dated 12 January 1855. 
972  Besbelli, op. cit., p. 77. 
973   Slade, op. cit., pp. 355-356. 
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natural reaction against the overbearings and insolence of foreigners and protected 
natives”.974  
In fact, there are many records of the frictions of the allied troops with the local 
people. For example, French soldiers who were quartered in the DavudpaĢa barracks 
were going and returning from the French centre in Galata and sometimes especially in 
nights they used to lose their way and enter Muslim quarters making noise and other 
drunken demonstrations. It was decided then to put warning signs in French and Turkish 
on the roads. There were also cases of drunken allied soldiers‟ attacking the Ottoman 
police officers. There also happened some fights between Egyptian and French troops in 
Galata. Some shopkeepers also complained of the behaviour of the French soldiers. In 
another case local people did not want to rent their houses even to French doctors; 
however the houses were given to the French doctors. In Büyükdere, about 200 British 
soldiers started a fight among themselves but a Croat passer-by accidentally received a 
slap. Then the fight turned into a fight between Croats and the British. The police 
arrived and the fight ended.
975
 Most of these events seem to be simple and not serious 
cases of personal fights. The Ottoman participants of these rows also seem to be rather 
non-Turkish, like Albanians, Croats, Egyptians and Tunisians. There are also other 
events of a social and religious character related to the behaviour of some of the allied 
soldiers. For example, as early as May 1854, it was decided to prepare a warning in 
French to prevent French soldiers from entering mosques with shoes on.
976
 
Economically, the impact of the Westerners was to boost the prices of many items 
in Istanbul. For example, the price of Yenice tobacco went from sixty kuruş (piastres) to 
three hundred piastres. House rents soared and it became very difficult to find a house 
in the Bosphorus for rent.
977
  
The most well-known English-Turkish dictionary of Sir James Redhouse is also a 
product of the Crimean War. First published in the spring of 1855 under the title of 
“Vade-mecum of Ottoman Colloquial Language”, it was intended for the use of the 
British army and navy.
978
 Fifty copies of the dictionary were bought for the Sublime 
Porte, army headquarters and the Translation Office. The author was given a gift box 
                                                 
974   Slade, op. cit., pp. 356. 
975  Fatih Akyüz, “Müttefik Askerlerinin Ġstanbul‟da Neden Olduğu Bazı Olaylar Üzerine Gözlemler”, 
symposium paper in Savaştan Barışa, p. 180. 
976  BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/5, dated 21 May 1854. 
977   Cevdet Pasha, Ma‟rûzât, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınevi, 1980, pp. 8-9. 
978 See Sir James W. Redhouse. A Turkish and English Lexicon. Preface. Constantinople, 1890. New 
Edition. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1996.  
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worth ten thousand piastres, equal to about eighty to ninety pounds sterling at that 
time.
979
 
The personality of the Sultan himself has played an important role in the 
transformations. Sultan Abdülmecid was probably not fit as a political or military ruler, 
but he was quite open to novelties. His character was, in the words of Stratford de 
Redcliffe, “gentle, understanding, responsible, modest and humane”. Sultan 
Abdülmecid introduced many novelties into Ottoman social life. Increased contacts with 
Europe also meant changes in the attitudes of the Sultan and state officials towards 
European diplomats. These changes in the Ottoman diplomacy that had began with the 
Tanzimat now accelerated with so many novelties. Before Sultan Abdülmecid, the 
Ottoman sultan and the grand vizier did not discuss political matters with foreign 
ambassadors. The şeyhülislam, head of the Islamic clergy, did not meet them at all. 
During the Crimean War, we witness for the first time the reception of foreign 
ambassadors by the şeyhülislam and the reception of foreign orders by the sultan.  
The French ambassador Edouard-Antoine de Thouvenel first succeeded in having 
Abdülmecid accept the order of Legion d'Honneur. Other ambassadors had also offered 
orders to the sultan but he had refused them. After the French order, Lord Stratford lost 
no time in offering the Order of the Garter. However, negotiations on the details of the 
ceremony took much time of Lord Stratford, because the Sultan had apprehensions of 
losing something from his dignity in receiving an order from a Christian. He also had an 
aversion to being touched. Stanley Lane-Poole gives a lively description of 
Abdülmecid's reception of the order: 
   Sultan Abdu-l-Mejid was invested by Lord Stratford, as the Queen's 
representative, with the most exclusive order of knighthood in the world. Assisted 
by the King of Arms, the Elchi made his Majesty a Knight of the Garter. Did the 
Sultan know what the stately ambassador was saying, as he placed the George and 
Riband round his neck? ... When a Sultan submits to be enjoined to emulate the 
career of a Martyr and Soldier of Christ, who shall say that the fanaticism of Islam 
is inextinguishable?
980
  
 
In February 1856, after the end of the war, Sultan Abdülmecid honoured two balls 
in three days first at the British embassy on 2 February and then at the French Embassy 
                                                 
979 BOA. Ġ. HR. 139/7219, 8 Cemaziyelevvel 1273 (4 January 1857). 80 pounds sterling of 1857 are 
worth approximately 4,800 pounds today. I had slightly erred in this calculation in an earlier 
article. Cf. Candan Badem, “Kırım SavaĢı'nın Osmanlı Toplumsal YaĢamına Etkileri”, Toplumsal 
Tarih 133, Istanbul, January 2005, p. 65. 
980 Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning. London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1888, vol. II, p. 444. Cf. Necdet Sakaoğlu, Nuri Akbayar. A Milestone on Turkey‟s 
Path of Westernization. Sultan Abdülmecid. Istanbul: Creative Yayıncılık, 2002, p. 99. This is in 
fact a back translation from the Turkish translation into English.  
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on the fourth.
981
 The first ball at the British embassy was given by Lady Stratford de 
Redcliffe. The sultan came to the costume ball wearing his Order of the Garter. Lady 
Emilia Hornby, the wife of Sir Edmund Hornby, the British loan commissioner, gives a 
detailed description:  
   The Sultan had, with very good taste, left his own Guard at the Galata Serai, and 
was escorted thence to the palace by a company English Lancers, every other man 
carrying a torch. Lord Stratford and his Staff, of course, met him at the carriage-
door, and as he alighted, a communication by means of galvanic wires was made 
to the fleet, who saluted him with prolonged salvos of cannon. Lady Stratford and 
her daughters received him at the head of the staircase... It would take me a day to 
enumerate half the costumes. But every one who had been to the Queen‟s bals 
costumés agreed that they did not approach this one in magnificence; for besides 
the gathering of French, Sardinian and English officers, the people of the country 
appeared in their own superb and varied costumes; and the groups were beyond 
all description beautiful. The Greek Patriarch, the American Archbishop, the 
Jewish High Priest, were there in their robes of state. Real Persians, Albanians, 
Kourds, Servians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Austrians, Sardinians, Italians, and 
Spaniards were there in their different dresses, and many wore their jewelled 
arms. There were … and Turkish ladies without their veils… Abdul Medjid 
quietly walked up the ball-room with Lord and Lady Stratford, their daughters, 
and a gorgeous array of Pashas in the rear. He paused with evident delight and 
pleasure at the really beautiful scene before him, bowing on both sides, and 
smiling as he went… Pashas.. drink vast quantities of champagne, of which they 
pretend not to know the exact genus, and slyly call it “eau gazeuse”.982  
 
Stanley Lane Poole's biography of Stratford Canning also describes the incident as 
a great success of the British ambassador and as the first ball of Abdülmecid, but it does 
not give the exact date of the ball in February 1856:  
   One evening the ambassador and his staff are standing in front of the embassy. 
It is the month of February, in year 1856. Over the entrance, the names of 
Abdülmecid and Victoria are written by colored light bulbs. Then the British 
lancer riders move towards the outer gate to meet the Sultan. As the Sultan steps 
over the threshold, thorough an electrical wire tied to the guns, the British Navy 
salutes the sultan with forty-one cannon shots. In the meantime, the Embassy band 
is playing 'God Save the Queen'. For the first time in the history of the Ottoman 
Empire, a Sultan becomes a guest to a Christian ambassador. Lady Stratford is 
holding a costume ball and the Sultan is honouring this ball with his presence. The 
uniforms of the British, French and Sardinian officers seem lusterless compared to 
the attire of the Armenian, Kurdish, Persian, Greek and Turkish dignitaries. On 
one side is the Greek Patriarch, on the other side the Armenian Archbishop, with 
the Chief Rabbi next to him. Abdülmecid could have believed he was Harun 
Reshid as he walked up the staircase into the great ballroom that shone as a scene 
                                                 
981   Cezmi Karasu mentions only the French ball as the first appearance of the Sultan in a ball. 
However, this is not true. See Karasu, op. cit., (1998), p. 184. 
982 Lady Hornby, Constantinople during the Crimean War, London: Richard Bentley, 1863, pp. 205-
208. Cf. Sakaoğlu and Akbayar, op. cit., pp. 104-105. The latter is again a curious back translation, 
because the book was not translated into Turkish at that time. Probably it is from another 
(French?) translation. 
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out of the 'Tales of One Thousand and One Nights'. The Sultan enjoyed his first 
ball very much and as the ambassador took him by the hand to lead him to the 
armchair prepared for the Sultan among the British officers, the onlookers knew 
that the barriers around the Sultan had been knocked down and that a Moslem and 
a Christian could meet in equal conditions. If there was an initiator in this event, 
that was Ambassador Lord Stratford.
983 
 
 
On the other hand, the official Ottoman historian of the time and a member of the 
councils of the Tanzimat and of Education, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, who was among the 
invited, confirms this event in his Tezakir but his tone is rather disapproving of such 
practices. He gives a first hand account of the confusion created by the invitation of the 
British embassy. The Ģeyhülislam did not accept it and offered his apologies. When 
Cevdet Pasha asked the grand vizier whether he should go to the ball or not, he said: 
“Ask the Ģeyhülislam!” But the Ģeyhülislam told him: “The grand vizier knows best”. 
Thus Cevdet Pasha could not get an answer to his question and decided not to go.
984
 He 
tells us that before even grand viziers did not visit foreign embassies but since last year 
they started visiting embassies and now the Sultan himself visited a foreign embassy. 
Cevdet Pasha gives us the date of the ball as 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1272, which is 2 
February 1856. Interestingly, however, Cevdet Pasha does not record the ball at the 
French embassy. 
Enver Ziya Karal mentions only the French embassy's ball on 4 February and does 
not mention the ball at the British embassy.
985
 Necdet Sakaoğlu and Nuri Akbayar in 
their book on Sultan Abdülmecid also maintain that Abdülmecid visited the French 
embassy's ball on 4 February 1856 (which is correct) and that of the British embassy on 
9 February 1856 (which is wrong). Sakaoğlu and Akbayar write that  
   three days after the victory, on 4 February 1856 Saturday, Abdülmecid 
honoured the ball at the French embassy, wearing his jewelled Legion d'Honneur 
order. He did the same on 9 February Monday and participated at the ball at the 
English embassy given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. At his appearance at the 
French embassy's ball, Abdülmecid was saluted by the Court and Marine 
subdivisions as well as the French army divisions which were present in Istanbul 
at the time. French army bands played the Ottoman march and the night was 
illuminated by the embassy's lights.
986
 
  
The Sultan talked to ambassador Thouvenel and gave him a jewelled Mecidiye order 
and a portrait of himself. He then met Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, other high officials and 
                                                 
983 Ibid, p. 99. For the Turkish translation, see Stanley Lane Poole. Lord Stratford Canning'in Türkiye 
Anıları. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, p. 196. 
984 Cevdet PaĢa, Tezâkir 1-12, pp. 61-62.  
985 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. VI, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 104. 
986 Necdet Sakaoğlu & Nuri Akbayar, op. cit., p. 103. 
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all other ambassadors and their spouses. He then went on to the main ball room and 
watched the dances.  
 
 
5.2.  The Status of Women 
 
 
An important aspect of social change concerned attitudes towards women. Sultan 
Abdülmecid had said to his private physician Dr. Spitzer:  
   I find European women's dresses very attractive. I prefer them very much over 
our women's dresses. If socializing with these ladies is like their outer appearance, 
then I certainly envy you Europeans' free social relations with the womankind... I 
understand that social relations with polite, well-bred women will grant a touch of 
nobility and refinement to the rough nature of men".
987
  
 
However, he ended up saying "my wives and daughters are the cause of my ruin". 
Palace women and high officials' wives had become too pompous in their conspicuous 
consumption as we have seen in the chapter on finances. The appearance of European 
and Egyptian ladies (wives of officers, nuns, nurses) in the streets of Istanbul had 
produced a new fashion and Ottoman ladies were quick to follow this fashion. Palace 
women had become the avant garde of Westernization and conspicuous consumption. 
Ahmet Cevdet Pasha has described this process with some detail in his works Tezakir 
and Maruzat. He writes: "For one and a half year, palace women started strolling here 
and there, making excursions in public places. They made a lot of scandals".
988
 As we 
have seen in the chapter on finances, Cevdet Pasha charges them with bringing a heavy 
debt to the treasury, nearly equal to one thirds of the annual war expenses of the state. 
However, unless supported by other sources this must be held under suspicion. Cevdet 
Pasha may have used the palace women as scapegoats for his criticism of Abdülmecid 
himself. 
Women came to be more visible in the daily urban life. Like today's Islamist elite 
women, the ladies of the time developed new ways of reconciling the traditional style 
with a modern touch; wearing for example, silk capes (ferace) and transparent veils 
(yaşmak). Palace ladies began to appear before the public in their promenade boats in 
the Bosphorus. Contacts between men and women in public places also found new 
ways. Ladies travelled in carriages and gallant men tried to make a contact with them by 
gestures. For example, a lady would drop her handkerchief for a man if she liked him. 
                                                 
987 Karal, op. cit. (1995), p. 99. Dr. Spitzer was an Austrian.  
988 Ahmet Cevdet PaĢa, Tezâkir  13-20, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 3. 
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Ahmet Cevdet Pasha in his Maruzat tells us how Turkish men changed their attitude 
toward love affairs and how they came to see pederasty as a perversion:  
   Fans of women (zen-dostlar) increased and beloved boys (mahbublar) decreased 
in number … Love and affection, which had been felt toward boys for ages, were 
now transferred to girls, in conformity with natural conditions. Visits to 
Kağıthane, known from the time of Sultan Ahmed III, became very popular. There 
and in Beyazıt the practice of flirts by gestures towards carriages became 
widespread… Âli Pasha was also trying to hide his pederasty (gulampareliğini) to 
avoid the objections of the foreigners.
989
 [My translation] 
 
We do not know how widespread pederasty was, but here we note that an 
Ottoman conservative statesman now sees it unnatural. Cevdet Pasha even goes so far 
as to give names of famous pashas known for their inclination to pederasty, such as 
Kâmil and Âli Pashas. He also tells that Âli Pasha tried to hide his pederasty because he 
was wary of foreigners' objections.  
Beside the attitudes toward women, clothing, furniture and eating habits also 
started to change. New table manners, new crockery and cutlery sets became 
fashionable. Thus a distinction came to be made between a la Turca and a la Franca 
styles. Fashion started from the palace and quickly expanded into the common folk, as 
in the case of the “corset revolution”. Marie de Melfort, the niece of the French 
ambassador Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel and the future Baroness Durand de 
Fontmagne, tells us that Sultan Abdülmecid ordered all palace ladies to wear corsets for 
a wedding and all tailors in Beyoğlu were busy preparing these corsets. The young 
French lady narrates how the city was full of talks about this extraordinary event. She 
wrote her memoirs in 1902. In the preface of the book, she says that Sultan Mahmud II 
ended the characteristic inertia of the Orient and as a result there remained no fabulous 
Turkey of the letters of Lady Montague from the 1717s. She maintains that the Turks 
have not gained much from his reforms but their mode of life has become simplified, 
with fewer horses, less slaves and less wives. "Instead of the silk from India and China 
they now wear woollen clothings from Germany and Britain. Their famous turbans have 
given way to the red fez". But still she adds that she was lucky enough to see Turkey 
"while there were still genuine Turks around".
990
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
989 Ahmet Cevdet PaĢa, Ma'rûzât, Ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p. 9. 
990  Durand de Fontmagne, op. cit., preface. 
293 
5.3.  The Question of the Equality of Muslims and Non-Muslims in the 
Vienna Conference and in the Islahat Fermanı  
 
 
As we have already seen, the question of the rights and privileges of the non-
Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been one of the important questions of the 
diplomatic efforts to end the war. The fourth point of the famous “four points” 
concerned this issue. Because of the war, Ottoman statesmen were now in an especially 
vulnerable position towards reform demands and pressure from the European great 
powers. The allies helped the Porte in its war against Russia, but they too demanded 
some improvements for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. While this process 
resulted in the famous Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) of 18 February 1856, the 
Ottomans had already tackled this question one year before, at the beginning of the 
Vienna Conference in March 1855. 
On 24 and 26 March 1855, about one week after the opening of the Vienna 
Conference, a council of 21 ministers and some other bureaucrats (Meclis-i Meşveret) 
was convened to discuss the instructions to be given to the Ottoman delegate to the 
conference.
991
 The council focused on the fourth point, which it defined as “the 
complete removal of the empty claim of Russia on the protection of the Greek Orthodox 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the repeal of all former treaties, especially of the 
treaty of Kaynarca, whose misinterpretation caused war, as well as entrusting the 
reforms desired by Europe for all the Christian subjects (umûm tebe‟a-i „Îseviyyesi) of 
the Sublime State to the grace of the Sultan”.992 Interestingly, throughout the document, 
only Christians are mentioned, omitting Jews. For practical purposes, however, 
Christian subjects can be considered to cover all non-Muslim subjects here. The 
mazbata of the meclis then recorded that although Britain and France joined war as 
allies of the Porte, because they were Christian states they had also promised to their 
subjects and to other states to recommend to the Porte measures for the well-being of 
the Christian subjects of the Porte, which had been desired for a long time by Europe. 
Furthermore, it stated that a different to some extent treatment (bazı mertebe cari olan 
muamele-i farkıyye) of the Christian subjects was offensive to Europe and there had 
been remonstrations since long before. Until then such demands were delayed by 
sometimes temporizing and sometimes yielding a little bit, however, now the time was 
                                                 
991  See Mehmet Yıldız, “1856 Islahat Fermanına Giden Yolda MeĢruiyet ArayıĢları (Uluslararası 
Baskılar ve Cizye Sorununa Bulunan Çözümün Ġslami Temelleri)”, Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri 
Dergisi 7, Istanbul, Güz 2002, pp. 75-114. The mazbata of the meclis is on pp. 100-108. 
992  Yıldız, op. cit., p. 100. 
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different (nasılsa gâh oyalandırılarak ve gâhîce biraz şey yapılarak vakit geçirilmiş ise 
de şimdi vakit başkalaşmış olduğundan) and if Europe was not satisfied, then the Porte 
would be subject to their persistent pressure and this would cause the danger of leading 
them to other thoughts.  
The mazbata argued that while Europe‟s disappointment with the Ottoman 
Empire would be a great danger for the Porte, doing things on the demand of Europe 
and allowing this to become a responsibility of a treaty was also very dangerous, 
because in that case the Christian subjects would be grateful to Europe and not to the 
Porte. Russia on the other hand, might consider itself as morally victorious for serving 
the Christian cause even if it loses much by the first three points of the four points. The 
Ottoman ambassador had written from London that Lord Palmerston had stated that if 
the Porte granted some rights to the Christian subjects, then it would do a great service 
both for the allies and for itself, otherwise the great powers would have to compel it. 
While some improvements had already been done, and not all of these were known to 
Europe, there remained some issues of moral treatment. Therefore the ministers thought 
that if they could complete the deficiencies to some extent and “sell them sweetly” (bir 
tatlıca satılır ise) to Europe, saying “this and that has been done by the Porte for its 
subjects”, then Europe would be satisfied.993  
The question of the non-admission of Christian evidence (against Muslims) in 
courts was also a “thorn in the eye of Europe”, said the mazbata, but internal and 
external objections had now been eliminated by setting up commissions of investigation 
(tahkik meclisleri). These commissions were now to be further improved and 
incorporated into the new laws. It was also recommended to employ more Christians in 
state service and even in the land army. It was noted that although some ranks were 
being given to Christian subjects they were not addressed according to their rank. For 
example, if addressing a Christian as “saadetlu efendim” or “izzetlu beyefendi” was to 
be considered unbecoming in the eyes of Muslims, then general titles and forms of 
address could be found to suit all subjects. Then it was recommended that it could be 
announced to Europe that in principle Christian subjects could rise up to the rank of ûlâ, 
but there was no need to announce this inside the country. It was necessary also to show 
that Christian subjects were already being employed in embassies. As for the military 
service, this was not an issue for the satisfaction of Europe or Christian subjects only, 
but an important issue for the state, because Muslims alone carried the brunt of war and 
therefore their population was decreasing while the population of Christians was 
                                                 
993  Yıldız, op. cit., (2002), p. 103. 
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increasing. At present, Christian subjects were being employed in the navy and it was 
necessary to find ways to employ them in the army as well. It would be wise to 
announce to Europe that Christian subjects would be taken into the army and they could 
rise up to the rank of colonel.  
The mazbata mentioned the question of the freedom of restoration and building of 
churches for Christian subjects as well. Since Christian subjects sometimes used caves 
in mountains as churches because they did not have a place for religious rituals, it was 
necessary to allow them to some extent to build some new churches. Finally the poll-tax 
(cizye) paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte  was being considered as an insult 
to Christians and now it was impossible to evade Europe‟s persistence. Therefore it was 
necessary to find a way out. For some time, cizye had been collected on a millet basis 
instead of direct collection and this had gained some time but what Europe wanted was 
to remove this name of cizye (Avrupa‟nın muradı bu olmayıp şu nâmın kaldırılması 
sureti olmağla). Although collection of the cizye from Christians was a necessity by 
şeriat, it was a great danger to oppose the 250 million-strong Christian nations. At this 
point the meeting was adjourned for the şeyhülislam to study the matter.  
On 26 March the council met again. In the meantime the şeyhülislam had searched 
for a solution in Islamic law. The only example was that of Caliph Ömer‟s agreement 
with the Christian Arabic tribe of Beni Tağlib. The latter had expressed their readiness 
to pay twice more tax but provided that it would not be termed cizye, since they found it 
unacceptable. Ömer had accepted this saying it was cizye whatever others might call it. 
Another way for a fetva was to refer to a kind of force major or necessity (zaruret) in 
Islamic law. But such a fetva would mean the proclamation of the weak state of the 
Ottoman Empire to friend and foe. Therefore it was better to collect the cizye under the 
name of iane-i askeriyye than to issue such a fetva. The British ambassador (Stratford de 
Redcliffe) had reportedly told the grand vizier: “If the Porte does not do what is 
required by Europe now, it certainly will be subject to many bad things and great 
dangers”. He had even said “the Porte will do these things by force of treaty”. The 
Vienna embassy too had reported Lord John Russell saying “if the Porte had done what 
was recommended before on behalf of Christians, then it would have been possible to 
ward off these issues in this conference by saying „these have already been done‟”. Such 
words from the representative of Britain were like the beginning of what the Ottomans 
feared much. The ambassador had also reported that one day the representatives had 
met without the Ottoman ambassador and when he complained they had told him off by 
saying it was about the general affairs of Europe. Nevertheless, it was possible that they 
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made an agreement among themselves on the conditions of the Christian subjects of the 
Porte and maybe they would bring it out signed up later. In view of these and other 
reports from embassies and the negotiations in Vienna, it was therefore decided 
unanimously to ward off (savuşturmak) this issue by turning the name of cizye into 
iane-i askeriyye. If some unaware ulema were to object, they would be informed 
confidentially about the situation. If some still continued talking against this, then these 
would be reprimanded and punished, because such kind of people are only those 
without patriotism and without religious honour (hubb-ı vatan ve hamiyyet-i diniyye).994 
In cases when the Ottoman bureaucracy was squeezed between the şeriat and 
European pressure, it chose a pragmatic way out of the situation, as in the case of the 
slave trade discussions, which started earlier and which we will also discuss in this 
chapter. The pragmatism of the Ottoman bureaucracy is best expressed in the two verbs 
of oyalamak (to temporize) and savuşturmak (to ward off). Thus cizye came to be 
known as iane-i askeriyye or bedel-i askeriyye. The fact that a tax was called iane 
confirms our view that the iane-i harbiyye which we discussed in Chapter 4 was a tax as 
well. Actually we have reason to think that non-Muslims in general (except for the 
poorest of them) would also prefer paying the tax to serving in the Ottoman army. 
However, as we have seen in the above mazbata, it is certain that even if they had 
shown much eagerness to serve in the army, the Porte would not accept this. Because 
then they would not pay the iane-i askeriyye, which is the cizye, and this was contrary to 
the şeriat. Nevertheless, Mehmet Yıldız argues that the decision on the conscription of 
non-Muslims into the army was not applied because non-Muslims themselves did not 
want to serve.
995
  
The question of the recruitment of the non-Muslims into the army continued to be 
a hard question long after the Crimean War. There were very practical reasons working 
against a mixed Ottoman army. Cevdet Pasha was a member of a commission set up to 
solve this question in the early 1860s. He writes how he argued in this commission 
against the inclusion of non-Muslims into the army. He told the commission that if non-
Muslims were to be admitted into the army, then every battalion would need a priest as 
well as an imam. If there were only one priest, there would be no problem, he said. 
However, there were Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian, Protestant and other confessions. 
Furthermore, even Orthodox Bulgarians would not accept Orthodox Greek priests. 
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These confessions would all demand different priests. The Jews in turn would want 
their rabbis. Thus a battalion would have many religious personnel. Then the Muslims 
and non-Muslims have different fasts. It would be difficult to administer such a mixed 
body. Finally Cevdet Pasha touched upon the most important question. He wrote that an 
Ottoman commander used religious feelings and martyrdom for Islam to encourage his 
soldiers into action. What would the major of a mixed battalion say to urge his soldiers? 
The Europeans, Cevdet Pasha added, used patriotism (gayret-i vataniyye). However, he 
argued, vatan meant for the Ottoman soldiers only some squares in their villages. It 
could not replace religious motifs. Futhermore, Muslim soldiers endured all hardships 
while the non-Muslims would not. Therefore the state could be subjected to European 
interference, if non-Muslim soldiers complained of not receiving their pay or rations.
996
    
While the Ottoman council of ministers thus tried to “ward off” the issues related 
to Christian subjects by some improvements, we see that the British government 
increased its pressure for reforms. During the Vienna conference, on 24 April 1855, 
Lord Clarendon sent a despatch to the British ambassador in Vienna the Earl of 
Westmoreland, instructing him to give a copy to Âli Pasha as well. This despatch  
contains important demands indeed and they are not limited to the questions of military 
service and evidence of Christians. Lord Clarendon asserted that although Christian 
evidence was admitted in criminal courts, the judges were still “exclusively” Muslims, 
the only mixed tribunals being the commercial courts. He maintained that Christian 
evidence was still inadmissible in civil cases and since civil injuries like robbery 
perpetrated against Christians were oftener than murder, the inadmissibility of Christian 
evidence in civil cases was a “severe and daily felt grievance”. Therefore he wrote that 
there ought to be an equal number of Muslim and Christian judges in both criminal and 
civil cases. Furthermore, Clarendon wrote that all the local authorities in the provinces 
were Muslims and this led to “endless oppression and injustice committed and connived 
at towards Christians”. Therefore, he concluded, there ought to be a Christian officer of 
suitable rank attached to each governor and this officer should have the right to appeal 
to Istanbul on behalf of injured Christians.
997
  
Clarendon then argued that “Christians ought to be allowed to rise to any rank in 
the military and civil services, and their advancement should not form an exception to 
the rule by which they are excluded from the higher ranks of their profession”. The 
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British foreign secretary then suggested a reform of schools by establishing mixed 
primary schools throughout the empire for Muslim and Christian children. Finally the 
secretary expressed his government‟s confidence in the “enlightened views and 
benevolent intentions” of the Sultan, blaming the bureaucrats for not being “animated 
by his [the Sultan‟s] spirit”.998  
About this time, Sadık Pasha, commander of the Cossack regiment was ordered 
by the Porte to prepare a project on the conscription of Christians into military service. 
Sadık Pasha submitted a project to the grand vizier about places where Christian 
volunteers could be recruited for the army. He wrote that cavalry troops could be 
recruited from Tırnova, NiĢ, Yeni Pazar and Saraybosna and infantry could be recruited 
from Mostar, ĠĢkodra, Janina, Salonica.999 Sadık Pasha writes in his memoirs that the 
Sultan wanted the project to be discussed with the representatives of the European great 
powers.
1000
 However, according to Sadık Pasha, they did not like the idea. Lord 
Stratford de Redcliffe even told him that this should not be allowed because within a 
few years the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire would have a full army, well 
trained and capable of fighting. This is not our aim, Lord Stratford allegedly told 
him.
1001
 Austria was of the same opinion and it feared the appearance of a military spirit 
among the Ottoman Slavs. Thus according to Sadık Pasha, the Porte met opposition 
from all sides and eventually the Western powers did not permit it to make this reform. 
The decision to enrol soldiers from non-Muslim subjects was proclaimed in the 
Takvim-i Vekayi in May 1855. Cizye was abolished and all male subjects would now 
serve in the army. Those who could not serve in the army, would pay the iane-i 
askeriyye in return.
1002
 Nevertheless, it was not easy to apply this decision in practice. 
Attempts to levy troops from the non-Muslim areas of Rumeli led to the dispersal of 
population to mountains and neighbouring countries.
1003
 In the province of Trabzon, 
governor Hafız Pasha mustered troops from Muslims and non-Muslims for the aid of 
Erzurum in the summer of 1855. However, the administrators (müdir) of districts (kaza) 
abused this decision and caused a lot of mistreatment of both Muslims and non-
Muslims. They also collected a lot of money as iane-i askeriyye and embezzled most of 
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it. The Porte sent Kabuli Efendi to investigate into these affairs.
1004
 On his return from 
Trabzon, Kabuli Efendi submitted his report to the MVL. The mazbata of the MVL 
stated that the governor had left the task of recruitment to “men who were used to 
oppress poor common people as they liked before the introduction of the province into 
the procedure of justice of the auspicious Tanzimat” (havali-i merkumenin Tanzimat-ı 
Hayriye usul-i ma‟delet-şümulüne idhalinden evvel fukarayı istedikleri gibi cebr ü 
tazyıka alışmış olan ademlerin ellerine).1005 
The question of the transformation of cizye into iane-i askeriyye and military 
service of the non-Muslims was discussed in the Meclis-i Âli-i Tanzimat as well in 
November 1855. (This time the expression was exactly non-Muslim subjects (tebea-i 
gayri Müslime), as opposed to the mazbata of the meclis of 26 March 1855). Then a 
special council (meclis-i mahsus) discussed the resolution of the said meclis.
1006
 The 
council determined the amount of the iane as 50 gold liras (5,000 piastres). About this 
time a commission including Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, ġeyhülislam Arif Efendi and 
some Western ambassadors was set up to work out a new formula.
1007
 At that time Âli 
Pasha was the sadrazam and Fuad Pasha the foreign minister. ReĢid Pasha was deposed 
and did not hold any office although his influence was still considerable. The Reform 
Edict of 18 February 1856 was the work of this commission.  
While the Gülhane Edict of Tanzimat of 1839 was an important step for the 
guarantees of the subjects against the arbitrariness of the Sultan, it had not clearly 
stipulated equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The 
firman of 18 Februrary 1856, however, radically declared them equal. At the popular 
level, this was understood as "now we will not call the giaours as giaours".
1008
 
Christians would no longer be degraded in the official parlance. For example, the pope 
would no longer be called a pig. Since the grand vizier Âli Pasha had departed for Paris 
to take part in the peace congress, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha was the acting grand 
vizier during the proclamation of the firman, although the tradition required the foreign 
minister Fuad Pasha to be his kaimmakam. According to Cevdet Pasha, Kıbrıslı was 
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chosen because he was not known as a westernizer and therefore he might be a shield of 
curse against Muslim reaction.
1009
 
There is no doubt that Lord Stratford did more pressure on the Porte than other 
ambassadors for reforms for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. Lord Palmerston told 
parliament on 1 May 1856 that, when the government changed in 1846, Lord Stratford 
had accepted the embassy in Istanbul on one condition:  
  It was, that he should be supported by government at home, … to obtain that 
equality between Christians and Mahomedans, which has at last (1856) crowned 
the efforts of his life. It was that honourable ambition which induced Sir Stratford 
Canning to continue so long in a post which, under other circumstances, perhaps, 
he would have been reluctant to occupy 
1010
  
 
 However, by the end of the war both Britain‟s and Lord Stratford‟s influence 
decreased a bit, while that of France increased. At the beginning of January 1856, 
Clarendon wrote to Stratford that the Ottoman (“Turkish”) government had asked three 
times Stratford‟s recall:  
   They did full justice of course to your eminent talents and goodwill towards 
Turkey, but declared they could no longer get on with you, as you required, that 
your influence should be so paramount and notorious that they were lowered in 
the eyes of the people, and that you would not allows the Sultan to corégner with 
you (that was Aali‟s expression).1011 
 
Yet the Sultan honoured Stratford‟s ball first as we have seen. In fact Stratford would 
still hold out for some time. He continued to affect the discussions on the reform packet. 
On 25 January 1856, he sent a new memorandum and an official note on administrative 
reforms and religious persecutions to the Porte, together with his instructions to head 
dragoman Mr Pisani. He advised the admission of “all classes” into state service and 
councils (meclises), arguing that in the current state of the things, it was the “union 
alone of the classes” which could return to the Empire the force which it lacked “in the 
interior”, and without this measure any real union was an impossibility. As for the 
foreigners, Staratford asserted that while he was supposed to attach less importance than 
the representatives of France and of Austria to the question of the foreigners‟ right to 
possess (purchase) real estate in the Ottoman Empire, this assumption was completely 
erroneous. He was convinced, on the contrary, that the “cordial rapprochement” of  
“Turkey” with Europe was essential for the wellbeing and the maintenance of the 
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Ottoman Empire, and that the most effective measure in this direction would not be 
other than the right assured to foreigners to possess any kind of real estate there.
1012
 
 Cevdet Pasha‟s treatment of the question of equality of the non-Muslim subjects is 
interesting. He seems to try to conceal his feelings, he gives the opinions for and 
against, but he himself does not make a clearly binding statement for himself. He was 
also the member of a commission (together with Fuad Pasha and Afif Bey) set up to 
change the forms of address (elkab) of the firmans. He writes that Fuad Pasha was fond 
of creating such novelties, however, since the proclamation of the Islahat Fermanı 
would already offend Muslims (ehl-i islâma ziyade dokunacağından), it was not 
appropriate at that time to be engaged in changing the elkab of firmans. Then he notes 
that according to the firman,  
   Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were now to be equal in all rights. But this 
quite offended the Muslims. Before one of the four points that was accepted as the 
base of negotiations was the question of the privileges (imtiyazat) of Christians, 
provided that sovereignty (istiklal-i hükümet) was not sacrificed. But now the 
question of privileges was left behind, non-Muslim subjects were considered 
equal to Muslims in all rights of government (bil-cümle hukuk-ı hükümette). 1013     
 
According to Cevdet Pasha, the non-Muslim subjects rejoiced at the reading of the 
firman. Not all of them, however, were pleased. For example the Greek patriarchate was 
not happy with being equal to the Jews, while before the Islahat Fermanı they used to 
come before all other non-Muslim millets.  
Cevdet Pasha concludes that Muslims were discontented with the Islahat Fermanı 
and reproached the ministers for this. According to him, the şeyhülislam also lost 
favour. He also argues that people started talking that if ReĢid Pasha and the former 
Ģeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Beyefendi had been in office, the result would have been 
different. Since Stratford de Redcliffe had striven to pass the equality of the Christian 
subjects more than any other diplomat, he and Britain also lost favour. Cevdet Pasha 
writes that the French were happy with this result. The French ambassador even told 
that the Ottoman government had given too much compromise, and he would have 
helped if they had resisted Stratford a little. But Cevdet considers these words 
calculated to further vilify the British embassy. ReĢid Pasha then seized the opportunity 
to criticise his rivals and gain the confidence of the Islamist circles. Therefore he took a 
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stand against the Islahat Fermanı. He even wrote a layiha to the Sultan stating his 
reasons.
1014
 
Shortly after the treaty of Paris, the Ottoman Greeks Kostaki Musurus Bey and 
Kalimaki Bey were promoted to the rank of ambassador (büyükelçi).1015 Musurus had 
been minister plenipotentiary (ortaelçi).  
During the war, the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in general, 
except for the Greek insurrection in Thessaly and Epirus, supported the war effort of the 
state. As we have already seen, some Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks even applied 
to government to serve in the army. Nevertheless, there were still some fanatical 
Muslim attacks on non-Muslims in some places like Damascus. We will see them in 
subchapter 5.5.  
One of the visible signs of the improved status of the non-Muslims was the 
increase in the number of their churches and synagogues. During the war and just 
afterwards (from 1853 to end of 1857), many churches and synagogues were repaired 
and some new ones were built. We must note that the building of new churches and 
synagogues and the repair of existing ones in the Ottoman Empire were dependent upon 
the Sultan‟s license (ruhsat). During the war, there was a noticeable increase in the 
number of such licenses. For example, Greek churches in Midilli, Ġzmit, Büyükada, 
Mihalıç, Salonica, Vidin, NiĢ, Tırnova and other places (cities, towns and villages) were 
repaired.
1016
 Three villages in Filibe (Plovdiv) and one village in Yenice also received 
licenses to build churches, while the church of the town of Vize was allowed to be built 
again.
1017
 New Greek churches were built in Jerusalem, Erzurum, Filibe and other 
places.
1018
 Armenian churches in KasımpaĢa, Rumeli Hisarı, Harput, Erzurum, Van, 
MuĢ, Diyarbekir, Trabzon and some other places were allowed to be repaired and new 
ones were allowed to be built in Diyarbekir, Karahisar-ı ġarki, MuĢ, Harput, Erzurum, 
Sivas and other places (in cities, towns and villages).
1019
 New Catholic churches were 
allowed to be built in Varna, Rusçuk, Drac, ĠĢkodra, Samatya, Büyükada (Prinkipo), 
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Erzurum and other places.
1020
 For the repair of the Catholic church in Sinop, that was 
burnt during the battle of Sinop, the government sent 15,000 piastres.
1021
 Two Catholic 
churches in ĠĢkodra‟s districts were repaired.1022 Synagogues in Salonica and Ruse 
(Rusçuk) were allowed to be repaired.1023 A Protestant church was allowed to be built in 
Ortaköy, another one was built in the Bahçecik village in Ġzmit and a land allotment 
near the Mekteb-i Tıbbiye was given to the British embassy for building a church.1024 
Various churches were also built and repaired in Sofia, Erdek, Limni, Ġzmir, Mostar, 
Ereğli, Salonica, Vidin, YeniĢehir-i Fener, Hersek and other places.1025 
The Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı) among other things stipulated equal 
opportunity for all Ottoman subjects for admission into civil and military schools and 
also recognized the right of every religious community to establish their own schools, 
however, under state supervision. Armenians, Bulgarians and the Greeks made good use 
of this point and opened many schools. This in turn urged the Sublime Porte to develop 
an all-Ottoman, empire-wide public school system more rapidly. In 1856 a new 
educational body, the Mixed Council of Education, (Meclis-i Muhtelit-i Maarif) was 
established in order to coordinate Muslim and non-Muslim schools. Its six members 
consisted of Muslim, Greek-Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Catholic, Protestant and 
Jewish representatives. This council had the authority to determine the quality and 
curricula of the schools and the selection of teachers.1026 Education was at three levels. 
At the primary level (sıbyan mektebleri), the language of instruction was determined by 
each religious community separately. At the secondary level (rüşdiye schools) education 
was in Ottoman Turkish, because the graduates of these schools were counted as 
potential civil servants. At the third level, that is, in the professional schools, the 
language of instruction was in conformity with the taught art or science. Schools at the 
secondary and higher levels offered mixed education.  
The quality of education was also enhanced by including natural science in the 
curricula of secondary and higher schools. Students had to wear uniforms, which also 
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contributed to the process of secularization. This policy of mixed education for Muslims 
and non-Muslims confirmed the intent of the government to include non-Muslims in 
government services. After one year, the council of public education and the mixed 
council of education were merged to form the ministry of public education (Maarif-i 
Umumiye Nezareti) in 1857. The new ministry had more authority and a more 
autonomous structure. The former directorate of public schools was formed into an 
under-secretariat (müsteşarlık) of the new ministry. Thus the Sublime Porte proved its 
serious intentions towards the modernization of the educational system.  
 
 
5.4.  The Prohibition of the Black Sea White Slave Trade 
 
 
Slavery was an issue of controversy between the Ottomans and the European 
states and even Russia during the Crimean War. By the time of the Crimean War, 
slavery and slave trade were already illegal in Europe. However, slavery was still a 
legal status and institution in the Ottoman Empire and as such it was never abolished in 
the Ottoman Empire.
1027
 The most important source of white slaves for the Ottoman 
Empire was the Circassian shores of the Black Sea.
1028
 Secondly Sub Saharan Africa 
provided black slaves. There was a demand for beautiful boys and girls as domestic 
servants for the households (konaks) of high bureaucrats and the Sultan's palace. Until 
1846 these slaves were sold openly and the most famous slave market was in 
ÇemberlitaĢ near the grand bazaar. In 1846 Abdülmecid decided to close the open slave 
market. We do not know whether he did it on his own initiative or upon the 
remonstrations of foreigners (especially Stratford de Redcliffe). It seems that he has 
done this on his own behalf. In any case this did not mean prohibition of slave trade, but 
only that the public exposure of the slaves was brought to an end.   
Russia was also trying to prevent the slave trade from Circassia, which was given 
to Russia by the treaty of Edirne in 1829. However, Russian rule was nominal in 
Circassia, where local rulers continued to have a significant autonomy. The Circassian 
tribes were not easy to control either. These tribes had a caste system whereby a part of 
the society consisted of slaves. The sale of these slaves was a lucrative business for the 
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Circassian nobles and notables. There was also a contraband slave trade from the 
Georgian coasts by Ottoman subjects.  
When Prince Menshikov appeared in Istanbul in the spring of 1853, one of his 
demands concerned the prohibition of this slave trade from Georgian and Circassian 
coasts. In his instructions to Argyropoulo, the head dragoman of the Russian embassy, 
Menshikov stated on 18 April 1853 that a certain HurĢid Reis from Arhavi was engaged 
in Georgian and Circassian slave trade. The Russian consulate in Trabzon had reported 
that more than a hundred boys and girls from Georgia had been brought to Giresun. 
Around 20 of these, under the guidance of two Georgians or Circassians, being Russian 
subjects, were brought to Trabzon secretly at night to embark on the Ottoman steamer 
Vasıta-i Ticaret going to Istanbul via Giresun and Samsun, where HurĢid Reis would 
embark other slaves. Sarım Pasha the governor of Trabzon was also accused to be 
involved in this trade.
1029
 
The Ottomans were ready to suppress the slave trade to save face against the 
Europeans, but not to abolish slavery as an institution. When France and Britain became 
indispensable allies of the Porte in the war against Russia, they acquired additional 
bargaining power in the Ottoman Empire. The influential British ambassador had been 
putting pressure upon the Ottoman government to abolish slave trade, but the Sublime 
Porte was rather unwilling to completely abolish white slave trade in the Black Sea. 
Because the Ottoman elite used slaves as domestic servants and also frequently chose 
their wives from among them. Thus they were dependent upon the supply of slaves, 
especially white slaves. On the other hand, they had to appease their allies somehow.
1030
  
Towards the end of August 1854 the allies decided to take action to prevent the 
slave trade going on from the Georgian and Circassian coasts. The British ambassador 
Startford de Redcliffe and the French chargé d‟affaires Vincent Benedetti gave official 
notes to the Porte through their dragomen to prohibit the slave trade from Georgian and 
Circassian coasts and the sale of these slaves in the Ottoman Empire.
1031
 Lord 
Stratford‟s note, dated 29 August 1854, stated that enslavement of Christian Georgians 
was offensive to the allies, and enslavement of Muslim Circassians was not legal from 
an Islamic point of view. He had received authentic information that Georgian children 
were brought to Constantinople as slaves in an Austrian steamer, and submitted to “a 
                                                 
1029   Copie d‟une Instruction adressée à Mr. Argyropoulo, en date du 6/18 Avril 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 
1345/10. 
1030  Erdem, “Kırım SavaĢı‟nda Karadeniz Beyaz Köle Ticareti”, symposium paper in Savaştan Barışa, 
2007, pp. 86-87.  
1031  Toledano, op. cit., p. 117. Erdem, op. cit., (1996), p. 102. 
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person high in the Turkish employment”. Stratford warned that the allies, “without 
whose cooperation the very existence of the Turkish Empire would be endangered”, 
could in no way be expected to assist such “outrages” and “atrocities”. Such “barbarous 
practices” were incredible, 
   when viewed as public transactions occurring at Constantinople under the reign 
of so benevolent a Sovereign as the present Sultan. Brought to notice at a time 
when Christian Powers have sent their armies and squadrons into Turkey for its 
defence, and when those armies and squadrons composed of Christians, are 
fighting side by side with Mussulmans, and confounding all differences of 
religion in the common cause of humanity and national independence, they set at 
nought every calculation and excite the most unqualified disgust.
1032
 
 
Stratford then admitted that slavery in the Ottoman Empire was different from 
African-American slavery. Nevertheless, he argued, the vices of slavery were still there. 
Stratford went on to say that a “total relaxation” of the enthusiasm for the Sultan's cause 
could be produced “throughout Christian Europe”, if the Ottoman authorities did not 
stop this trade. He did not forget to add that a move against slavery would definitely 
increase the popularity of the Sultan in Europe: 
   Such being the case, it is not too much to expect that in its own interest, as well 
as from consideration for its allies, the Porte will exert itself to check the 
barbarous and shameful practise which I have described. Let preventive measures 
be applied to three stages of the traffic, to purchase, to conveyance, and to sale. 
Let a firman declare the Sultan's pleasure in these respects. Let peremptory 
instructions prohibiting the purchase of slaves be sent to the commanders of His 
Majesty's forces. Let the conveyance of slaves be treated as contraband on the 
responsibility of all concerned. Let their sale within the Sultan's dominions be 
strictly prevented by the police, and every transgression be visited with 
punishment on buyer and seller alike. 
So long as the trade is permitted or connived at, so long as preventive measures, 
capable of enforcement, are loosely or not at all, employed, the Turkish 
authorities will justly be opened to censure, and incur, to their peril, the charge of 
acting upon principles inconsistent in spirit and effect with the existing alliances. 
Let them beware of producing throughout Christian Europe a total relaxation of 
that enthusiasm for the Sultan's cause, which has hitherto saved his empire from 
the grasp of Russia.
1033
 [Italics are underlined in the original] 
 
The Ottoman Council of Ministers discussed the issue on 18 September 1854. 
According to the report of the Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to the Sultan, 
there was certainly an increase in the volume of the Black Sea white slave trade. The 
Grand Vizier pointed out that the total prohibition of Georgian and Circassian slave 
                                                 
1032  Lord Stratford‟s instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, 29 August 1854, cited by Erdem, 
op. cit., (2007), pp. 87-94. Erdem compares the original with the official Ottoman Turkish 
translation and points out that the translation is somewhat simplified. The same document is also 
available at BOA. HR. TO. 220/45. See Appendix 56. 
1033   Ibid. The last paragraph is quoted by Toledano, op. cit., p. 117. 
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trade was not desirable, but they never could afford to leave the gate wholly open to the 
traders. If they ignored the question, that too would cause troubles. Consequently, it was 
necessary to take some measures which would limit the subject of slavery to its pre-war 
low level and it seemed possible to ward off (savuşturmak) this issue by making such 
measures public. If they did nothing, then things would compel them to abolish the 
white slave trade totally. Thus, they had to find a solution by which they would be able 
to show, with a new proof, to the two allies that the Ottoman Empire abides by the 
principles of humanity and in this way they would be able to secure their goodwill as 
well as that of the Georgian people.1034  
For the Porte, the problem was not the slave trade per se, but the explicit way in 
which it was conducted. The grand vizier further remarked in his petition to the Sultan 
that slaves were sold and bought openly even in Galata and Beyoğlu (the districts of 
Istanbul where mainly the Europeans live). This was not a good scene before the eyes of 
the “civilized world”. Therefore it was essential to reduce the slave trade into its pre-
war state of seclusion in houses. The Grand Vizier proposed to send two orders to 
Mustafa Pasha the commander of Batum, prohibiting the Georgian and Circassian slave 
trade from the posts of the Black Sea. The embassies would be informed. The police 
and the customs authorities were also to be instructed to suppress the slave trade into 
secrecy, away from the eyes of the foreigners (şu aleniyet maddesinin def'iyle şu bey' ve 
şiranın haneler derununda bir mesturiyet halinde cereyan etmesi).1035 
Consequently, Abdülmecid issued two firmans in October 1854 to the 
Commander of the Imperial Army at Batum, Mustafa Pasha, one for the Georgians (to 
be announced in Batum and Çürüksu) and the other to be publicized in Circassia. Since 
Christian Georgians and Muslim Circassians were treated differently, the wording of the 
two firmans also differed. The Circassians, who were an independent-minded Muslim 
people fighting against the Russians, were to be admonished that selling ones relatives 
into slavery was not humanly, whereas the Georgian slave trade was prohibited outright. 
                                                 
1034 Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha to Sultan Abdülmecid. BOA. Ġ. HR. 114/5553, dated 
28 Zilhicce 1270 (21 September 1854), cited in Erdem, op. cit., (1996), pp. 102-103 and op. cit., 
(2007), pp. 94-98. See Appendix 62 for the whole text of this document. Abdullah Saydam also 
cites this document but first he converts the above Hicrî date very strangely into 21 April 1856 and 
then he mistransliterates several words (such as rakkiyet instead of rıkkiyet) from the document 
which he quotes partly. See Abdullah Saydam, Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856-1876), Ankara: 
TTK, 1997, p. 195. 
1035  Saydam, op. cit., p. 196. Erdem, op. cit., (2007), p. 98. 
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Because, while the Circassians sold their relatives themselves, the Georgians did not 
engage in such a trade, and their children were kidnapped by slave dealers.
1036
  
The Porte notified the French and British embassies that the enslavement of 
Georgian women and children had never been endorsed by the Ottoman government. 
Orders had been sent before but regretfully violated. The Georgians who had been 
brought in as slaves would be immediately manumitted and sent to their families if they 
wanted. But there was no mention of the Circassians. Orders were also issued to the 
police and the customs authorities to prevent the open trade of slaves. On the same day 
orders were sent to the governors of Trabzon, Lazistan and Canik prohibiting Georgian 
slave trade. The Austrian embassy was also notified that Lloyd company ships should 
be warned not to accept slaves on board.
1037
 
In December 1854 new orders were sent to the müşir of Batum and the governor 
of Trabzon, reminding them of the presence of the British and French fleets in the Black 
Sea and their duty to prevent slave trade. The commander and the governor were to 
assist the allies in all efforts to prevent the slave trade.  
At the beginning of December 1854, the commander of Batum army and the 
governor of Trabzon were instructed to prevent the export of slaves from Georgia and 
the Circassians‟ sale of their own children, relatives and servants.1038 Towards the end 
of December 1854, Grand Vizier ReĢid Pasha sent new instructions to the governors of 
Trabzon, Erzurum and Lazistan and to the commanders of the armies of Batum and 
Anatolia. They were reminded that during the battles of last year near ġekvetil and 
Ahısha, some children were kidnapped and sold into slavery and also some young men 
who came to Ottoman territory to become Ottoman subjects were somehow enslaved. It 
was pointed out that some officials and officers were engaged in this “inhuman” trade 
and this had become a great capital for the Russian propaganda, disinclining the 
population from the Ottoman state and being the cause of bad rumours about the whole 
Ottoman millet. Therefore all such slaves were to be returned. Those boys who accepted 
Islam and who were willing could be taken into military service. Those boys who were 
not yet circumscribed and wanted to go home should be sent home. Children should be 
                                                 
1036  Erdem, op. cit., (1996), pp. 104-105. I am grateful to my supervisor Hakan Erdem for giving me 
the copies of these and other documents on Ottoman slavery from the TNA. 
1037   
Toledano, op. cit., pp. 119-121
. Saydam, op. cit., p. 196. 
Erdem, op. cit., (2007), pp. 99-103
.  
1038   BOA. HR. MKT. 93/93, 1 December 1854. See Appendix 77. 
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deposed at safe hands, to be turned over to their families. Girls of age who accepted 
Islam could be married off.
1039
 
When the head of the police Hayreddin Pasha was sent by the Porte as inspector 
to the Anatolian and Batum armies in January 1854, one of the questions he directed to 
the military meclis in Erzurum was about the slave trade that he had heard about the 
commander in Ahısha, namely Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha. It was rumored that he had taken 
some slaves (boys and girls) for sale and then distributed some and retained some of 
them. The meclis did not confirm this information and replied that Ali Rıza Pasha had 
bought three Georgian slaves (two girls and one boy) from the müdir of ġavĢat Selim 
Bey and his brother ġakir Bey (ġavĢat is close to Batum). Ali Rıza Pasha also rejected 
having taken slaves, saying that he had only bought three months before the beginning 
of the war one Circassian boy and one Circassian girl who had been bought as children 
and raised by the said brothers.  
It seems that as late as February 1855, the slave trade was still being practised by 
the officers of Kars army. An extract from a report of the British consulate in Erzurum, 
probably written by General Williams or by one of the British officers in his staff, was 
given to the Ottoman foreign ministry: 
   The buying and selling of slaves by the officers of the Kars army is as notorious 
as any other malpractices on their part. Boys [köle] are preferred by these brutes, 
and the girls [cariye] are sent as bribes to Constantinople; and until the allied 
consuls are authorized to demand the restitution of these victims to Turkish 
Sensuality [bu biçare köle ve cariyeleri Osmanlunun sui hırsından kurtarmak], 
and are provided with funds to send them back to their families in Georgia; and 
until the Porte is bound by treaty to send the culprits so detected to the galleys for 
a certain specified time, this infamous traffic will flourish, and all which has been 
said or may be written about abolitionary firmans simply adds mockery to crime 
and woe.
1040
 [Words in brackets are from the official Ottoman translation]  
 
Furthermore, Sultan‟s firman on the prohibition of the slave trade had not yet 
reached Sohum by the end of December 1854. Lord John Hay from the British navy 
reported on his visit to Sohum(kale) and Çürüksu: 
   On the 28 December 1854 I visited the Mushir at Choorooksou: having 
expressed my surprise  that the Pacha at Soukoumkale had not received orders 
relative to the suppression of the Slave Trade the Mushir informed me that he was 
most anxious to give effect to the Sultan's Firman, but although he had received 
the Firman 6 weeks previously, no opportunity had as yet presented itself of 
communicating with Soukoumkale. Indeed the country boats passing were liable 
                                                 
1039  BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 63/41 and HR. MKT. 96/99 and 97/16, dated 5 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (26 
December 1854). See Appendix 84. 
1040  BOA. HR. TO. 221/6, dated 6 February 1855. Extract from a consular report from the British 
consulate in Ezurum. See Appendix 88. 
310 
to capture by the enemy's gun boats out of the rivers at Poti and Anakria, and the 
only steamer at his disposal was merely sufficient to bring provisions from 
Trebisonde for the use of the army. Proceeded to and arrived at Trebisonde on 29
th
 
Dec. 1854. The Pacha was absent when I visited him. I however learnt from Mr. 
Stevens, Vice Consul, that Two Boats laden with Circassian slaves had arrived at 
this Port a few days previous. The Pacha did not clearly see how he could give 
effect to the Firman of the Sultan not knowing how to define whether the people 
were slaves or not.  
I recommended that Mr Stevens' advice should be acted on and that the Boats and 
people should be detained on suspicion.  
Altogether I think there does not appear to exist among the Turkish officials any 
excessive anxiety to put a stop to the Circassian and Georgian Slave Trade.
1041
 
 
About this time, Clarendon was giving clear instructions to Stratford to request 
the Porte to take effective measures to prevent the Black Sea slave trade:  
   The Turkish authorities in the Porte of the Black Sea have shewn no willingness 
to give effect to the Sultan‟s Firman prohibiting the traffic in Circassian and 
Georgian slaves; and that when two boats laden with Circassian slaves arrived at 
Trebizond about the 26 of December last, the Pasha's excuse for not detaining 
them was that he could not define whether they were slaves or not.  
I have to instruct Your Excellency to communicate the enclosed extract to the 
Ottoman Govt and to request that clear and stringent Instructions may be sent to 
the proper authorities in the Ports of the Black Sea, pointing out to them that there 
can be no difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the Circassians and Georgians 
brought to those ports are intended for sale; and that the Pashas must be held 
strictly responsible for the punctual execution of the Sultan's order declaring that 
this traffic is to cease.
1042
  
 
The Ottoman statesmen also tried to convince the Europeans that the conditions of 
slavery in Turkey were somewhat different from others and that the Ottoman slavery 
was idiosyncratic. Let us give an anecdotal example. In 1856, Fuad Pasha invited Mme 
Thouvenel and Marie de Melfort to his harem. There he introduced a young lady and 
said: “this lady is my bride. Originally she was a Circassian. We bought and brought her 
up to marry with our son. You see, our conception of slavery is different from 
yours”.1043 When urged again by the British to end the white slave trade in 1857, the 
Foreign Minister Âli Pasha also replied that “the so-called slaves are no slaves as most 
of them come to Constantinople of their own accord”.1044  
Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the most violent reaction to the prohibitions on 
the slave trade came (as could be expected) from a religiously sensitive area. This was 
                                                 
1041   Extract of a dispatch from Lord John Hay to Sir Edmund Lyons dated 8 January 1855, inclosed in 
a letter from Admiralty dated January 29
th
 1855. BOA. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 2. See Appendix 90. 
1042   Clarendon to Stratford, date unknown, translated 26 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (16 March 1855). BOA. 
HR. TO. 221/13 lef 4. See Appendix 89. 
1043 Baronne Durand de Fontmagne, op. cit., (1977), p. 255. 
1044 Erdem, op. cit., (1996), p. 51. 
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Hijaz, which included the two holy cities of Islam and which was ruled semi-
autonomously by emirs, appointed by the Sultan from among the descendants of  
prophet Muhammad (şerifs). Although Hijaz was excluded from the prohibition of 
black slave trade, the religious notables of Arabistan were disturbed. The emir of Mecca 
ġerif Abdülmuttalib Efendi was not in good relations with the governor of Jidda Kamil 
Pasha. Fearing his deposition, Abdülmuttalib seems to have wanted to use the 
discontent of the notables of Jidda, Mecca and Medina to get rid of Ottoman supremacy. 
Therefore he urged some notables of Jidda to write a letter to some şerifs and ulema of 
Mecca. They wrote the letter on 13 Receb 1271 (1 April 1855) in which they criticised 
what they saw as the recent concessions given to the Europeans. They argued that 
besides the prohibition on slave trade, the Porte had sent orders to governors permitting 
the non-Muslims to build any edifices in the Arab peninsula, letting non-Muslims 
women free to marry Muslim women, and not allowing interference with women‟s 
dress, etc. They urged them to petition the emir of Mecca to petition the Sultan.  
Meanwhile the Porte had already been suspicious of Abdulmuttalib‟s behaviour 
and in August 1855 sent Ferik RaĢid Pasha with confidential orders to depose 
Abdulmuttalib and appoint ġerif Muhammed bin Avn if necessary. Cevdet Pasha writes 
that by that time, grand vizirial orders (evamir-i aliyye) prohibiting black slave trade 
had been sent to governors in order to feign or dissimulate friendship (müdara) to 
European states.
1045
 In any case, it implies the temporary character of the orders due to 
the necessities of war. 
Cevdet Pasha writes that according to the investigations of Ferik RaĢid Pasha it 
was established that the letter of the notables of Jidda was the product of a secret order 
from Abdülmuttalib, who was at that time in Taif.1046 According to Cevdet, 
Abdulmuttalib then invites ġeyh Cemal Efendi, the head of the ulema (reis-ül ulema) 
from Mecca to Taif and tells him: 
   The consequence of the present war will be grave for the Sublime State. It 
cannot overcome this. Even if this war were to end in some way, it cannot survive 
its debt and it will be crushed. What is more, the Turks have become apostates 
[Hem de Türkler mürted oldular] and though they are concealing their apostasy 
for the time being, obviously they will declare it later. This time of war is an 
opportunity for us. We can obtain the power of government which was our right 
from old time and the prohibition of slavery [read slave trade] can serve as an 
excuse. Although it has not come here yet but it has been exercised elsewhere. 
Soon it will be executed here as well. We must wait until the season of pilgrimage 
passes, for during pilgrimage there will be many troops around. Thereafter we 
                                                 
1045  Cevdet Pasha, Tezâkir 1-12, p. 102. 
1046  Cevdet Pasha, op. cit., p. 103. 
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must take care of our affairs. However, it is already necessary to take 
measures.
1047
 [My translation] 
 
The governor Kamil Pasha tried to carry out the orders of the central government 
to stop the importation and sale of slaves. In Jidda he ordered the public reading of the 
order on the prohibition of the slave trade, while the Meccan ulema, supported by ġerif 
Abdülmuttalip, declared the order contrary to the şeriat. Widespread rioting broke out. 
Houses belonging to French and English protégés were looted. The ulema and the 
rioting mobs demanded complete expulsion of all Christians (including consuls) from 
the Hijaz.
1048
  
RaĢid Pasha reached Jidda on 28 October 1855. On 15 November 1855, the order 
appointing ġerif Muhammed ibn Avn as the new emir was read in Jidda.1049 But 
Abdülmuttalib refused to accept his deposition. He tried to urge the Beduin chiefs of the 
desert Arabs (urban) to rebellion as well. 600-700 urban led by some Ģerifs sent by 
Abdülmuttalib attacked Ottoman troops in Bahre, between Jidda and Mecca, but they 
were repulsed. After a few days, Abdülmuttalib sent again about 2,000 urban against the 
Ottoman forces in Bahre but these were also repulsed.
1050
 While there were riots in 
Mecca and Jidda, Madina was relatively quiet.
1051
 While Abdülmuttalib continued to 
revolt and fight, ġeyhülislam Arif Efendi sent a letter dated 11 January 1856 to all the 
religious dignitaries of Mecca, trying to explain that the rules of şeriat were not 
violated. Among such rules or bases of he cited the sale of slaves, giving women the 
right to divorce and receving help from non-Muslims as well. Defending the 
rightfulness of receiving help from non-Muslims, the Ģeyhülislam gave the example of 
the prophet Muhammad‟s asking the Jews of Beni Kaynaka for help against the tribe of 
Beni Kureyza. The şeyhülislam further argued that the Ottoman caliphs were always  
guided by the Ģeriat and they would not prohibit the rights of legitimate possessions 
belonging to Muslims. By these possessions he meant slaves.
1052
 The revolt of 
                                                 
1047  Ibid. 
1048  William Ochsenwald, “Muslim-European Conflict in the Hijaz: The Slave Trade Controversy, 
1840-1895”, Middle Eastern Studies 16, 1980, p. 119. Reprinted in Religion, Economy, and State 
in Ottoman-Arab History, Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1998, p. 83. 
1049  Cevdet Pasha (Tezâkir 1-12, 1991, p. 121) gives the date as 3 Rebiyyülevvel 1272 Thursday, 
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Abdülmuttalib was ended in 1856 when he was captured and brought to Istanbul. He 
was not punished however, he was simply required to live in Istanbul. The tensions 
however  between the Hijaz notables, dignitaries and owners of slaves on the one hand 
and the European consuls and the Porte on the other continued, which led to a massacre 
of consuls in Jidda in 1858.  
We can conclude that European pressure did not bring much change on the 
Circassian slave trade. However, the breaking point of the measures against slave trade 
came in 1857 when black slave trade was totally prohibited by a firman of the Sultan. 
Again it was not black slavery per se that was prohibited; it was the trade, that is, the 
import and export of black slaves that was prohibited. That meant the existing slaves 
would not be freed. Nevertheless, this was an important decision for the Ottoman 
Empire, even if it was not applied for a long time. As argued by Erdem, practically, the 
Porte could ban slave trade, and prevent all supply of slaves, but it could not challenge 
the legal status of a category sanctioned by Islamic law, that is şeriat. Even the Sultan 
could not do it, because he would need a fetva from the şeyhülislam.  
After the war and the prohibition of the black slave trade, Ottoman officials were 
not interested any more in preventing the Circassian white slave trade in the Black Sea. 
Âli Pasha told the British dragoman Simmons in August 1857 that “had Circassia been 
given over to Turkey [in the Paris Peace Congress] they would have managed to alter 
things”.1053 But these words come strangely from Âli Pasha, because according to 
Cevdet Pasha, he did not want to do anything for Circassia during the peace congress in 
March 1856. Cevdet Pasha writes that he heard that Lord Clarendon and the British 
ambassador in Paris (Lord Cowley), the two British representatives, had asked Âli 
Pasha to present jointly to the congress a motion for a new arrangement for Caucasia, 
but Âli Pasha had replied them: “For us those places are not so much important, we 
have only some disputed area around Çürüksu, we will be content with saving that 
area”.1054 Again according to Cevdet Pasha, the British representatives were surprised 
and Lord Clarendon later said: “I cannot be more Turkish than a Turk”. Therefore, 
either what Cevdet Pasha heard was wrong, or Âli Pasha forgot in August 1857 (or 
rather did not want to remember) what he had said during the Paris Congress. 
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314 
5.5.  Law and Order in the Provinces 
 
 
During the Crimean War several revolts broke out in various parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. These were either directly related to the causes of the war, like the revolt of the 
Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus, or indirect results of the general lack of authority in the 
provinces due to the concentration of troops in the fronts, like the revolt of the Kurdish 
beys. Then there were those revolts which were mainly a reaction to the alliance of the 
caliph with Christian powers, like the revolt of the Arabs in Hijaz. The disturbances in 
Damascus were also a reaction of some Muslims to the equality of the Christian 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire.  
After the declaration of war, some fanatical Muslims had attacked Christian 
subjects of the Porte and foreigners. Therefore Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha sent 
an order to the governors of Damascus and Jerusalem in December 1853 to prevent 
such treatment of the Christians. He wrote that the Christian subjects of the Sublime 
State were by heart and soul together with Muslims in the current war against Russia 
(Hıristiyan tebaa-i Devlet-i Aliyye ise bu muharebede velinimet-i bi-minnet padişahımız 
efendimiz hazretlerinin uğur-ı şahanelerinde ez dil u can ehl-i İslam ile birlikte 
olarak).
1055
 It was very unbecoming to look with suspicion and hostility at such loyal 
subjects (tebaa-i sadıka) who had been showing their loyalty and righteoussness. The 
perpetrators of such acts of violence against them were “certain fanatics and 
featherbrains, who cannot distinguish between good and evil and who cannot tell friends 
from enemies” (nik ve bedi fark etmez ve dostunu düşmanını bilmez bir takım 
mutaassıban ve sebükmağzan).   
Apart from the revolts, the most disturbing internal source of disorder was the 
infamous bands of irregular soldiers, the so called başıbozuks. These volunteers proved 
more of a trouble than of help to the war effort of the Ottoman state. While they 
attacked and robbed both Muslims and non-Muslims on their way, the chief victims 
were nevertheless the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Meanwhile banditry in 
general also increased in the entire Empire. Some nomadic Kurdish tribes in Anatolia 
were engaged in robbing non-Muslim villages, caravans and merchants. Nomadic Arab 
sheiks (urban meşayihi) also warred among themselves. We will analyse here in some 
detail the revolt of the Kurdish emirs or beys in Kurdistan and the problems related to 
the actions of the başıbozuks.  
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5.5.1. The Insurrection of Yezdan Şer 
 
 
Towards the middle of the 19
th
 century, Kurdistan
1056
 was one of the places where 
central authority of the Porte was weakest and that of the local lords highest. Although 
Sultan Mahmud II had done a lot to reduce the power of these local notables, in remote 
and traditionally autonomous areas like Kurdistan, local beys, emirs, khans, still swayed 
power. Especially due to the turmoil caused by Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt in Anatolia 
in the 1830s, Kurdish beys tried to make use of the situation in order to develop their 
power bases. They did not want to share their power with the Sultan, though 
recognizing him as the caliph of the (Sunnite) Muslims. In particular they did not want 
to share taxes and to allow military recruitment. Indeed, the Prussian military adviser 
Helmuth von Moltke, who served in Mahmud‟s army in its campaign against the 
Egyptian forces in 1838-39, writes in his letters that the two biggest problems for the 
people were taxes and military conscription. Taxes were very arbitrary and the military 
service too long (15 years in theory, but practically lifelong). If only these were 
reformed, he advised, the state could enjoy the support of the local people.
1057
 However, 
reform was not easy because it was harmful for so many vested interests. Corrupt 
pashas and governors (valis) paid bribes to get appointed to their provinces and then 
tried hard to squeeze out the amount they paid (often borrowed on interest from the 
sarrafs of Constantinople) from the local people as soon as possible, because they knew 
that their term of office would be short. Other pashas were engaged in all kinds of 
intrigues in Istanbul against them to get those provinces for themselves. Thus these 
governors looked upon their offices as short term opportunities to fill their purses. 
Therefore they did not embark upon any long term project.  
On the other hand, the local beys, while equally corrupt and tyrannous, were still 
better for the local people because these beys saw the provinces as their permanent 
home, as hereditary property and they cared relatively more for the local people. One of 
these Kurdish beys, Bedirhan Bey, bearing the traditional title of the emir of Botan (or 
Bohtan) and the Ottoman title of mütesellim (deputy of a governor in a sancak or kaza) 
                                                 
1056 Kurdistan was the name of a region from Diyarbekir to Van and to Mosul where mostly Kurds 
lived. From 1847 to 1867, it was the name of an Ottoman province (eyalet) centred in Harput, and 
then in Diyarbekir. ġemseddin Sami, author of the Kamus ül A'lam, the first encyclopaedia in 
Turkish, defines Kurdistan as follows: “Asya-i garbîde kısm-ı âzâmı Memalik-i Osmaniye‟de ve 
bir kısmı İran‟a tabi büyük bir memleket olup, ekseriyet üzere ahalisi bulunan Kürd kavminin 
ismiyle tesmiye olunmuştur”. See Kamus ül A'lam, vol. 5, Istanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1896, p. 
3840. Cf. M. Emin Bozarslan, Tarihteki İlk Türkçe Ansiklopedide Kürdistan ve Kürdler, Istanbul: 
Deng Yayınları, 2001, p. 45. 
1057 See Moltke‟nin Türkiye Mektupları, Ġstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1999, p. 238. 
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of Cizre, became the actual ruler of this area in the beginning of the 1840s, subduing all 
other Kurdish and Armenian notables in the region. Moltke writes that Bedirhan 
participated in the war against Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt (son of Mehmed Ali) and he was 
given the rank of colonel. According to some ethnic Kurdish authors, Bedirhan Bey 
struck out coins in his own name, sent students to Europe for education, established 
manufacturing of gunpowder and weapons.
1058
 However, this is not confirmed by other 
sources and seems doubtful. Bedirhan had first served in the Ottoman army's campaign 
against some rebel Kurdish chiefs in 1838. Now he had become a powerful chief 
himself revolting against the Ottomans. According to the Soviet Kurdish historian 
Naftula Halfin, Bedirhan Bey had become the de facto ruler of a vast area extending 
from Lake Van to Diyarbekir to Baghdad while these provinces belonged to the 
Ottoman Empire in theory.1059 While Halfin and some other ethnic Kurdish writers 
consider the revolt of Bedirhan as a national (liberation) movement, it seems rather a 
conflict of power of the local feudal notables with the modernizing central authorities, 
without an apparent nationalist ideology.
1060
 Bedirhan was finally besieged by Ottoman 
troops in the castle of Evreh in 1847.
1061
 While he still held out, Yezdan ġer1062, who 
was the grandson of his uncle and his left wing commander, betrayed him and joined 
the Ottoman forces in return for promised rank and position. Bedirhan Bey was forced 
to surrender, then he was brought to Istanbul and later exiled to Crete (to the fortress of 
Kandiye) together with his retinue and with some other insurgent Kurdish beys.
1063
 
                                                 
1058 See for example Celile Celil. XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kürtler, Istanbul: Özge 
Yayınları, 1992, pp. 127-135. Kemal Burkay. Geçmişten Bugüne Kürtler ve Kürdistan. Cilt 1. 
Ġstanbul: Deng Yayınları, 1997, pp. 355. 
1059 Bor'ba za Kurdistan. (Kurdskiy vopros v mejdunarodnyh otnosheniyakh XIX veka). Moscow, 
1963. Turkish translation: 19. Yüzyılda Kürdistan Üzerine Mücadele.  Ankara: Komal Yay., 1976, 
pp. 62-63. Second edition: Ġstanbul: Komal Yayınevi, 1992.  
1060 For example, Kemal Burkay considers Bedirhan‟s movement a “national movement”. Burkay has 
also written that Bedirhan was not an Ottoman pasha. See Burkay, op. cit., p. 306. However, it is 
well known that Bedirhan Bey was later pardoned and the title of pasha together with the order of 
Mecidiye was conferred upon him for his services in Crete in reconciling the Muslims and 
Christians of the island. He died in Damascus. 
1061 See Malmîsanij, Cızira Botanlı Bedirhaniler. Ġstanbul: Avesta Yayınevi, 2000, p. 57. Malmîsanij 
gives the alternative spelling of Ewrex. As he has pointed out, Nazmi Sevgen and Ġbrahim Alaattin 
Gövsa have misread this fortress as “Orak” or “Oruh”. Cf. Nazmi Sevgen, Doğu ve Güneydoğu 
Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri. Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü 
AraĢtırma Enstitüsü, 1982, p. 99, p. 104. Ġbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi, 
vol. 1, Istanbul: Yedigün NeĢriyat, undated, pp. 67-68. Sinan Hakan on the other hand writes that 
the castle is called “Erwex” in Kurdish. See Hakan, Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Kürtler ve Kürt 
Direnişleri (1817-1867), Istanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 2007, p. 226.  
1062  Yezdan ġer‟s name passes as Ġzzeddin ġir in Ottoman official documents. Sinan Hakan uses the 
spelling of “Êzdin ġêr”.  
1063  Sevgen, op. cit., p. 103. Sevgen or his editors have supplied wrong dates so many times throughout 
the text. It seems that he thinks or they think that the hicri year fully coincides with the Gregorian 
years. Thus for example they have equated the Muslim year 1263 with the Gregorian year 1846. 
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Thus Ottoman authorities were able to abolish autonomous Kurdish beyliks and started 
ruling the area directly.  
After the suppression of the revolt of Bedirhan, Kurdistan was in a way 
“conquered anew” in 1847 in the words of the then grand vizier Mustafa ReĢid 
Pasha.
1064
 A new eyalet (province) of Kurdistan was created, including the eyalet of 
Diyarbekir, the sancaks of Van, MuĢ and Hakkâri; and the kazas of Cizre, Botan and 
Mardin. Here and elsewhere, we see the most favourable tactic or method of the Porte in 
dealing with local insurgents. It consisted in trying to appeal to some of the beys or 
relatives of the leaders within the revolting group by way of promises of good office, 
title and pay. Thus the revolt would be suppressed with help from inside. Another 
method was to provide amnesty (rey ve aman tezkiresi or buyruldusu) for the leader(s) 
and thus deprive the revolt of leadership. A study of the archival documents concerning 
Kurdish revolt of the time of Bedirhan and Yezdan ġer reveals some frequently used 
formulas in the official discourse. Many documents depict the Kurds as “those ill-
natured Kurds who have long been well known for insurgence and rebellion” (öteden 
berü bağy ü isyan ile meluf olan ekrad-ı bednihad).1065 It was necessary to bring into 
them into the “circle of obedience” (daire-i itaat). They were to be both frightened by 
force and assured by pledges of good treatment after submission (te'min ve terhib). 
Promises of rank and pay could be given provided that these should be taken back at the 
first opportunity. 
For his services in the supression of Bedirhan Bey, Yezdan ġer was first given 
Bedirhan‟s title of the mütesellim of Cizre with a salary of 3,500 piastres, but soon he 
was dismissed.
1066
 Cizre was now to be administered by an Ottoman kaimmakam, 
Mustafa Pasha. Nevertheless, the Porte did not dare to cut Yezdan ġer‟s salary as well 
or to completely alienate him. He was given secondary jobs and temporised. Thus we 
read in a petition of the grand vizier to the Sultan that Yezdan ġer should not be 
alienated from the state, although he was quite useless for any government office 
                                                 
1064  Sevgen, op. cit., p. 106. Hakan, op. cit., pp. 253-258. Sevgen or his editors again give a wrong 
Gregorian year. They indicate the date of ReĢid Pasha‟s petition as “20 Cemaziyelevvel 1263 
(1846)”. However, in reality this date corresponds to 6 May 1247. As the title of his work 
suggests, Sevgen considers Kurds as Turks. He even takes issue with the Porte, arguing that “by a 
very wrong understanding and expression”, a certain “territory” [arazi] in the “East” was officially 
called Kurdistan. Then he argues that “in reality there is not and there cannot be such a region and 
such a division” [My translation]. See Sevgen, op. cit., p. 105. 
1065 See for example BOA. Ġ. MSM. 69/2015 lef 2 or A. AMD. 49/76, quoted in my symposium paper 
“Kırım SavaĢı Sırasında Ġsyanlar ve AsayiĢ Sorunları (1853-1856)”, in Savaştan Barışa, p. 289.  
1066  Hakan, op. cit., pp. 283-285. Quoting from Kendal [Nezan?], James Reid (op. cit., p. 299) writes 
that Yezdan ġer became the “governor of Hakkârî province” after the fall of Bedirhan. This is not 
supported by archival evidence. 
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because he did not have an understanding of the workings of the government (henüz 
usul-i Devlet-i Aliyye ve idare-i umur-ı mülkiyeyi bilemiyeceğinden).1067 Thus he was 
first sent to Istanbul in March 1849 and then sent back to Mosul in the same year. He 
was not allowed to return to Cizre.
1068
 This he must have resented, for he revolted at the 
first opportunity during the Crimean War.  
Meanwhile, the Tanzimat had begun to be applied in earnest in Kurdistan. The 
state started collecting military levies and taxes. An example of the new taxes was the 
iane-i umumiye which was a kind of temporary tax installed in 1852. According to the 
table of allocations, for example, the sancak of Diyarbekir was to pay 19,093 purses and 
460 piastres, Dersim 554 purses and 60 piastres, MuĢ 1,363 purses and 100 piastres, 
Hakkâri 415 purses, Cizre 458 purses and 240 piastres, etc.1069 However, these amounts 
must have been reduced later, because in a resolution of the MVL, dated 31 July 1853, 
we read that only 6,000 purses (300,000 piastres) out of the 12,400 purses (620,000 
piastres) allocated to the province (eyalet) of Kurdistan (which included at that time the 
sancaks of Diyarbekir, Dersim, Siird and MuĢ) were collectible, that is, assigned to the 
male population. It was stated that the local authorities had petitioned that if the 
remaining part were also collected, then the population would become scattered and 
miserable (müteferrik ve perişan).1070 Therefore they had asked for the cancellation of 
this part. The council stated that the population of the region had just been saved from 
the oppressions (mezalim ve teaddiyat) they had been subjected before, and they were 
really in poor conditions. However, the council decided that since cancellation would 
serve as a bad example for similar places (bazı emsaline sirayet edeceğinden) and since 
the amount was recorded as revenue in the budget, it could only be deferred for some 
time (bir müddet imhâli). The Sultan endorsed this decision.1071 On the other hand, the 
kaimmakam of Hakkâri Ġsmail Kâmil Pasha had visited the districts and villages of the 
sancak and explained the temporary character of the tax. He had also distributed gifts to 
sheikhs and other local notables. He had been able to register an additional male 
population of 12,418 persons, thus raising the total iane of the sancak up to 911 purses 
360 piastres. The difference stemmed from unregistered nomadic tribes who frequently 
                                                 
1067 BOA. A. AMD. 13/79, dated 1265 (1849), quoted in my paper in Savaştan Barışa, p. 300. Sinan 
Hakan (op. cit., p. 283) refers to a mazbata of the MVL on this point.  
1068  Hakan, op. cit., p. 285. 
1069  See Akyıldız, op. cit., (1996), p. 54. 
1070 BOA. Ġ. MVL. 280/10958, 24 ġevval 1269 (31 July 1853). 
1071  Sultan‟s irade, 4 Zilkade 1269 (9 August 1853). BOA. Ġ. MVL. 280/10958 lef 1. Cf. Akyıldız, op. 
cit., (1996), p. 57. Akyıldız mentions the mazbata but he does not quote from it. 
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passed in and out of the Iranian border.
1072
 As we have seen in Chapter 4, another 
extraordinary tax (iane-i harbiye or iane-i cihadiye) was also levied during the Crimean 
War.  
We have seen in Chapter 3 that several battles took place between the Ottoman 
and the Russian armies at the eastern frontier near Kars in the autumn of 1853. 
Although the Ottomans won one of these battles, they faced a heavy defeat in the Battle 
of BaĢgedikler in December 1853. In this battle there were around 15,000 to 16,000 
Kurdish irregular cavalry. But they dispersed very soon after the first shots. From then 
on Kurdish başıbozuks were not eager to go to war against Russian regular forces. In 
fact most of these irregulars came from borderline Kurdish nomadic tribes who were 
inclined towards plunder and robbery even in peace time. Even before the war, they had 
been engaged even in plunder and slave trade from Russian territory. The Russian 
embassy had given many protest notes on account of these intrusions into the Russian 
territory.
1073
  
The British consul in Erzurum, in a letter to the British embassy in Istanbul, dated 
25 June 1853, wrote that “in every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged 
in robbing, both on the high roads and in the villages”. He stated that if the country was 
left “at the mercy of the Koords”, then “incalculable injury to the cultivator” would 
ensue. He further stated: 
   The militia has been called out, and altogether the forces to be collected here 
will, it is said, amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an 
imposing force the Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack 
on Georgia, as from the want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be 
much hope of success. But if Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as 
to disable her from succouring Georgia, and if an [sic] European force were 
landed in that country to cooperate with the Turkish force, then indeed a forward 
movement, combined with an attack on the part of the Caucasian tribes would not 
fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they would find few friends among 
the natives, were they to experience a reverse.
1074
 
 
We must add that the Russians too had their own baĢıbozuks (militsiya) from their 
Kurds and also some Ottoman Kurds who joined them. These Kurds formed two 
cavalry regiments of 1,500 men each, one under the command of Ahmet Ağa and the 
                                                 
1072  Akyıldız, ibid. 
1073 See Dr. Hasan ġahin, “Kırım Harbi (1853-1856) öncesinde Erzurum vilayetinde ve Doğu Anadolu 
Kafkas sınırında meydana gelen karıĢıklıklar”, Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları 
Enstitüsü Dergisi 9, Erzurum, 1998, pp. 159-164. 
1074  BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 8, dated 25 June 1853. From the British consulate in Erzurum. See 
Appendix 3. 
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other under Cafer Ağa.1075 While both Ottomans and Russians tried to attract these 
frontiers Kurds to their side, they were in general not devoted to any side, trying to 
appease both of them. They tried to ascertain who will be the victor and side with him 
just to avoid the results of having joined the wrong side. Furthermore they were more of 
a nuisance to any side than real help because they were given to all the vices of the 
başıbozuks in general. They did not even hesitate to plunder their own army quarters in 
the event of a defeat or retreat. They robbed Armenian villages and caravans coming 
from Iran as well.  
 After the Battle of BaĢgedikler in December 1853, some 14 of the Kurdish chiefs 
at the border went to the Russian quarters at Gümrü (Aleksandropol) to reach an 
agreement with the Russian army. The task of developing relations with the Kurds was 
given to Colonel Loris-Melikov. Loris-Melikov also met Ahmet Ağa of the Zilanlı tribe 
(aşiret) in March 1854. Then in November he succeeded in gaining to the Russian side 
the powerful Kurdish chief Kasım Khan or Kasım Ağa who held the rank of kapucubaĢı 
in the Ottoman service. Kasım Ağa was given the rank of colonel and a salary 
accordingly. Other chiefs also received valuable gifts from the Russians. According to 
Colonel Williams, Kasım Ağa‟s 300 Kurds (“Koords”) received 6 silver roubles each 
from the Russians.
1076
 If we compare this amount (equal to about one pound or 125 
piastres) with the pay of the Ottoman soldier (20 piastres and not paid regularly at all) 
and of the başıbozuk cavalry (80 piastres including rations) then it becomes clear that 
the Russians paid much better. 
Nevertheless, these Kurds were not yet entirely out of control of the Ottoman 
forces. Thus Kasım Ağa had to obey the order of the governor of Erzurum and 
commander of the Anatolian army Zarif Mustafa Pasha to provide a cavalry force for 
the Ottoman army. But Kasım Ağa supplied only 200 of them. According to Russian 
military intelligence officer Pyotr Averyanov, although the Kurds could not openly 
depart from the Ottomans, every day their chiefs visited the Russian camp near Gümrü, 
promising that they would join Russian forces at the first retreat of the Turks towards 
Kars and that at the first Russian victory they would abandon openly the Turkish 
government.
1077
 In April 1855, General Muravyov reported to Russian war minister 
                                                 
1075  Ibragimbeyli, op. cit., p. 280. 
1076  Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Erzurum, 7 December 1854. PRMA, No. 79, p. 74. 
1077 Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 93. Turkish translation is at Averyanov, op. cit., 1995, p. 54. This 
Turkish translation of Averyanov‟s important work is full of translation errors and misspellings. 
Beginning with the name of the author himself (turned into Avyarov) almost all Russian proper 
names have been misspelled.  
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Prince Dolgorukov that Prince General Bebutov had reported his relations with the 
Kurdish chieftains. Bebutov had sent a Cossack regiment and the regiment of Colonel 
Loris-Melikov to the village of Kızıl Kilise in Kağızman. Loris-Melikov‟s task was to 
meet Kasım Khan and to force him to make his position known, to meet the heads of the 
11 Armenian and Karapapak villages on the frontier and to see how many irregular 
cavalry could be recruited from the Kurds.
1078
 Thus those Kurds who had hoped easy 
plunder by joining the Ottoman army at the beginning of the war were now very 
cautious of going against the Russians. They fled the Ottoman army. In fact their 
number had now fallen to 500 at the battle of Kürekdere on 5 or 6 August 1854. This 
battle proved devastating for the Ottoman army: an 18,000-strong Russian army had 
utterly defeated the 40,000-strong Ottoman army in an open field battle. From then on, 
few Kurds fought against the Russians in the Crimean War. A certain Russian colonel 
(Suslov?), commander of Russian forces in Erivan, sent a letter dated 20 August [1 
September] 1854 to Yezdan ġer.1079 In his letter the Russian commander warned 
YezdanĢer not to participate in the Russo-Ottoman war.  
At this time the situation was indeed very conducive for a revolt in Kurdistan. 
Ottoman forces were concentrated in Erzurum and Kars against the Russian army. Few 
regular troops remained in the countryside. For this reason some Kurdish tribes were 
now pillaging villages. For example, the Kurdish tribes of Abbas UĢağı and Pilvenkli in 
the sancak of  Dersim belonging to the province of Harput had revolted and they were 
involved in banditry due to lack of troops there. The governor of the Harput reported in 
July 1854 that the revolting “ill-natured Kurds” had been subdued.1080  
Yezdan ġer was ordered to recruit Kurdish infantry and cavalry for the Ottoman 
army from Cizre and Botan. He came to Cizre from Mosul with 200 cavalry and 
recruited 900 troops. However, soon he came into conflict with Ottoman pashas over 
the amount of money for his recruitment activities.
1081
 In the autumn of 1854, Yezdan 
ġer gave first signs of disobedience. While it is not clear exactly at what point in time 
and how he rebelled, we might begin it from November 1854, because his salary was 
                                                 
1078  General Muravyov to Prince Dolgorukov, dated 21 Mart (2 April) 1855. See AKAK, vol. XI, 
Tiflis, 1888, p. 79. 
1079  Averyanov, op. cit., 109. An Ottoman Turkish translation of this letter is at BOA. Ġ. MVL. 
353/15435, translated into modern Turkish by Hakan, op. cit., p. 287, p. 379. The date of the letter 
here is 24 August [5 September] 1854. Hakan has transliterated the Russian colonel‟s name as 
“Suçifirt”, but I could not find such a name in Russian sources.  
1080   From the governor of Harput to the grand vizier. BOA. A. MKT. UM. 163/35, dated 23 ġevval 
1270 (19 July 1854), full transcription is in my paper in Savaştan Barışa, pp. 305-306. 
1081  Hakan, op. cit., p. 286. 
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cut as of end of the financial month of Teşrin-i Evvel 1270, which corresponds to 11 
November 1854.
1082
 Lieutenant-Colonel (Kaimmakam) Salih Bey from the Anatolian 
army was sent to him for negotiation. There are some petitions of Yezdan ġer in the 
Ottoman archives, probably given to Salih Bey, written at various dates from November 
1854 to January 1855. In these petitions, Yezdan ġer complains of the wrongdoings of 
some local officials (especially Osman Pasha, the kaimmakam of Mardin) towards him, 
trying to excuse himself, maintaining that his actions are not intended for a revolt. 
Nevertheless, there are other letters as well, by him and his brother Mansur Bey to some 
administrators of districts (kaza müdürleri), written in Arabic and Persian and captured 
by the Ottomans, where they urge these müdirs, most probably Kurdish notables 
themselves, who were given such little titles in return for their hereditary fiefs (yurtluk 
and ocaklık) to join his forces. Therefore the Porte did not of course believe in Yezdan 
ġer's words.1083  
In one of his letters, dated 17 November 1854, Yezdan ġer writes that Hacı 
Süleyman Ağa and Molla Sadık were engaged in conspiracy against him and the 
kaimmakam of Mardin Osman Pasha did not pay him the rations of the one thousand 
infantry and two hundred cavalry troops that he mustered. Angered by this, he seizes 
these two conspirators and punishes them accordingly (he does not specify how). Then 
he argues that if he had intentions of rebellion, he would have brought his family to his 
side and as a further proof of his obedience he offers to send his son or his kethüda 
(steward) as hostage.
1084
  
Yezdan ġer offers his terms for dispersing his troops and surrendering in a letter 
from Siirt, dated 7 January 1855. First, his family in Mosul must be allowed to come to 
Cizre. Second, the administration of the districts of Cizre and Botan must be given to 
him and the district of Hacı Behram to his brother Mansur Bey. Both of them should be 
issued orders of amnesty (rey ve aman buyruldusu). Third, Said Bey of ġirvan, who 
holds the rank of kapucubaĢı, should also receive that district and amnesty. Fourth, 
troops garrisoned at Garzan and Midyat should be removed from there. Fifth, his men, 
who were prisoners of war in Garzan, Midyat and Cizre should be released. He still 
argues that he came to Siirt on order to levy 1500 soldiers in order to join the Anatolian 
                                                 
1082  Finance minister to the grand vizier, 25 Zilkade 1271 (9 August 1855). BOA. Ġ. DH. 21234. 
1083  See the tezkire of the grand vizier, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (21 February 1855). BOA. Ġ. 
MMS. 4/135 lef 75. See Appendix 94. 
1084 BOA. Ġ. MMS. 4/135 lef 62. See Appendix 76. 
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army in spring time. He was apprehensive due to the plots of some persons and would 
continue in good service if these plots and conspiracies against him were removed.
1085
 
No matter what he wrote in his letters, Yezdan ġer captured Bitlis with a force of 
two thousand horsemen in January or February 1855. Then in the middle of February 
1855, he attacked the town of Midyat and plundered it. The British consul in Diyarbekir 
reported this event as follows:  
   Ezdeen shir Bey has lately attacked the district of Mediat which he has 
plundered and almost totally ruined. The Government troops, consisting solely of 
Bashi Bozuk, under a certain Abdullah Bey made little or no resistance, a portion 
returned to Mardin, and Abdullah Bey with the rest retired to his native village 
Sour between Mediat and Mardin, plundering all the villages on his way. He then 
tendered his resignation of his command which was accepted by Osman Pasha, 
Caimakam of Mardin without any kind of enquiry into his conduct... Troops, sent 
from Baghdad to Mosul to the amount of about three thousand regulars and four 
thousands bashi bozuk, are now said to be on their march towards Jezireh. His 
movement has caused Ezdeen shir Bey to withdraw from Mediat towards that 
place, and has prevented a threatened attack on Mardin.
1086
  
 
It was also reported that Yezdan ġer was on friendly terms with the Arabs in the 
vicinity of Mardin by sending them rich presents. His successes had greatly encouraged 
him, and it was believed that if he could disperse the government troops now on their 
way to Cizre, the Arabs would unite with him to attack and pillage Mosul.
1087
 Yezdan 
ġer then subordinated Musul, Siirt and Van. Meanwhile the rebellion grew in size. 
Apart from Kurds, many Arabs, Nasturians and Greeks joined his forces. While 
Averyanov and some Kurdish historians write that the number of rebel forces reached 
60,000 and even 100,000 according to another source, these figures are obviously much 
exaggerated.
1088
 Nevertheless, the number of participants in this revolt was probably 
higher than that of Bedirhan. Some Ottoman sources as well confirm that the revolt of 
“Ġzzeddin ġir” was a bigger problem. For example the kaimmakam of the sancak of 
Zaho (that included Cizre, Hacı Behram and Bohtan as well) reported that it was by far 
bigger than that of Bedirhan, with an unheard of union and alliance among the Kurds 
from the time of the conquest of Kurdistan by the Ottomans and with unequalled violent 
                                                 
1085 BOA. Ġ. MMS. 4/135 lef 67, dated 17 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (7 January 1855). For the full 
transcription of this document, see my paper in Savaştan Barışa, pp. 309-311. 
1086 BOA. HR. TO. 221/14, 15 February 1855. This report was sent to the British embassy in 
Constantinople and from there it was forwarded to the Ottoman foreign ministry. See my paper in 
Savaştan Barışa, pp. 311-312 for the original and Appendix 91 for its official translation into 
Ottoman Turkish. 
1087  Ibid. 
1088 Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 149. Celile Celil (op. cit., p. 164) agrees with him. 
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battles.
1089
 However, these expressions must also be viewed with some caution because 
the kaimmakam of Zaho is interested in exaggerating the number of insurgents so that 
his services be better appreciated. 
Yezdan ġer had also written letters to the Russian army command for a joint 
operation. He thought the Russian army to be in Bayezid, but it army had retreated to 
Erivan to spend winter there. Thus his letters most probably did not reach Russian 
command.
1090
 But it is doubtful whether the Russian army would take a initiative even if 
the letters had arrived, because at that time Prince Bebutov was very cautious or had 
received orders not to move too far beyond Erivan.  
 
 
5.5.2.  British Interference and the Supression of the Rebellion 
 
 
Meanwhile the allies of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France began to be 
worried about the growth of this rebellion and weakening of the eastern front. 
Especially Britain was anxious to prevent the revolt from enlarging. So the British 
consul in Musul was given the task of negotiating between Yezdan ġer and Ottoman 
authorities. On the other hand, the British military commissioner at the Anatolian army, 
General Williams, had met Yezdan ġer in Cizre (Jezire) in 1849, then as Lieutenant-
Colonel Williams, British representative in a commission
1091
 for the resolution of a 
border issue between the Porte and Iran. Williams decided to give him a guarantee on 
his life and property if he takes refuge at the British consulate in Musul. According to 
Adolphus Slade, Williams “had been led to believe him [Yezdan ġer] an oppressed 
man”.1092 Williams had, in his report to Clarendon, dated 12 December 1854, 
interpreted the news of the revolt as follows: 
   Sinister rumours of the insurrection of the Koords at Sert [Siirt], and in the 
direction of Bitlis, have reached me: this is the natural result of the robbery of the 
Bashi-Bozouks' pay by Zarif Mustafa Pasha, and Hassan Yaziji of Damascus. 
                                                 
1089 Mazhar (memorial or petition) of the sancak of Zaho, dated 15 January 1854. BOA. A. MKT. UM. 
150/86. See Appendix 35. 
1090  Averyanov, op. cit., 1900, p. 109. Halfin, op. cit., p. 59. Celil, op. cit., p. 165. 
1091 The commission included Ferik DerviĢ Pasha from the Ottoman side, Mirza Cafer Han from Iran 
and Russian Colonel E. I. Chirikov as well. See Celile Celil, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 
1092
 
Slade, op. cit., pp. 423-24. The Turkish translator of this work has simply put a question mark after 
the spelling of the name of Ġzzeddin ġir (or Yezdan ġer) by Slade (“Isdinshir”), thereby showing 
his unawareness of Yezdan ġer. See Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi. Ġstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, Gnkur. X. 
ġ., 1943, pp. 250-51. 
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These men returned to their camps full of discontent and vengeance against those 
who, instead of robbing them, should have led them against the enemy...
1093
   
 
General Williams did not want any detachments from the Anatolian army to be 
sent to supress the revolt, because he was worried that this would weaken its position 
against the Russians. Therefore he wrote to Lord Stratford to urge the Porte not to use 
any part of the Anatolian army against this revolt.
1094
 Lord Stratford accordingly 
advised the Porte not to send a detachment from the army at Kars against Yezdan ġer, 
but to use instead troops from Constantinople, joined by others from Syria (Halep).
1095
 
The Porte seemed to have accepted this proposal and decided to use troops from Bagdad 
as well. Nevertheless, Williams reported to Stratford that upon orders from Istanbul, 
ġükrü (Shukri) Pasha, the acting commander-in-chief of the Anatolian army, had 
ordered a regiment of infantry, a regiment of cavalry and a battery of six guns to leave 
Toprak Kale to advance upon Siirt and Cizre. Therefore Stratford gave a written 
instruction to the head dragoman Stephen Pisani, to be read to Grand Vezir ReĢid Pasha, 
which reads in part as follows: 
   Besides the contradiction which is thus shown to exist between fact and 
assurance, it appears that, Toprak-Kaleh is the most important outpost of the Kars 
army, that the detachment could never reach its destination, owing to the deep 
snow and intense cold, and finally, that so hazardous a measure as the one in 
question was adopted without reference to the opinion of the British 
commissioner and by orders transmitted from Constantinople. 
You will read what precedes to Reshid Pasha, and you will express the deep 
concern with which I contemplate this inconsistency of conduct on the part of 
Government, over which he presides. You will prepare him for the impression 
which will be made in England by a knowledge of the circumstances, and you will 
observe how impossible it is for the allies to act with any confidence of success, 
or to provide for their own responsibility, if the principal functionaries of the 
Porte exhibit so lamentable a want of fair dealing and common prudence.
1096
 
 
According to Pisani‟s report, ReĢid Pasha did not accept “the charge of having 
dealt inconsistently and unfairly with Her Majesty‟s Embassy”. He said that the order to 
ġükrü Pasha was made long before Stratford‟s representation to the Porte. Upon 
Stratford‟s suggestions, the Seraskier had sent a counter-order to abstain from detaching 
any of the troops under his command, informing him that the Porte had adopted other 
measures to quell the disturbances. Pisani also reported the ReĢid Pasha had given 
                                                 
1093 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Erzeroom, December 12, 1854. PRMA, No. 72, p. 68. 
1094  Lord Stratford de Recliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, 19 February 1855. PRMA, No. 136, p. 130. 
1095  Lord Stratford de Recliffe to M. E. Pisani, 17 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 136, p. 
131. 
1096  Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani, 17 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 1 in No. 136, p. 
131. 
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verbal instructions to the new commander-in-chief (Vasıf Pasha), two days prior to his 
departure, to prevent any of the troops of the army at Kars or Erzurum leaving their 
posts. As to the non-reference to the opinion of the British Commissioner, ReĢid Pasha  
   observed that Shukri Pasha was not bound to do so, because the orders he 
received from his superiors were peremptory, and consequently could on no 
account disregard them without swerving from his duty. The British 
Commissioner, added he, has a right to be consulted on matters immediately 
connected with the army in general, but not to interfere with orders issued direct 
from the Porte to its own officers on internal questions.
1097
 
 
Lord Stratford sent to the Earl of Clarendon, the British foreign minister, copies of 
his instruction to Pisani and Pisani‟s report of ReĢid Pasha‟s reply, expressing his regret 
in a higly patronizing tone: 
   It is a matter of regret that Reshid Pasha allowed so important a step as the 
withdrawal of a portion, however comparatively small, of the army at Kars from 
the defensive positions which it occupies, to be taken without the knowledge of 
Her Majesty‟s Embassy, and I intend to apprize him in becoming language of my 
opinion in that respect.
1098
 
 
Meanwhile Williams decided to act on his own and he sent to Yezdan ġer a 
messenger, a certain Major Mahmud Ağa or Efendi, a Polish convert in the Anatolian 
army in Kars, who had come to Erzurum on duty. According to the reports of Hamdi 
PaĢa, the ex-governor of Diyarbekir1099 (now of Kastamonu), Osman PaĢa, the 
kaimmakam of Mardin, and Kenan PaĢa, the kaimmakam of Siirt, this Mahmud “Ağa”, 
went directly to the side of Yezdan ġer, without ever visiting the commander of the 
Ottoman forces surrounding him.
1100
 In his letter to Yezdan ġer, dated 28 January 1855, 
Williams told him that they were aware of his correspondence with Kurdish chiefs in 
Van, Bitlis and MuĢ. In his capacity as the special commissioner of Britain, holding the 
rank of ferik from the Sultan, Williams warned Yezdan ġer not to go against three 
states. Williams guaranteed life and property to Yezdan ġer on behalf of Britian and 
France, if he surrendered on his own.
1101
 
                                                 
1097  M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Pera, 18 February 1855. PRMA, Inclosure 2 in No. 
136, p. 131. 
1098  Stratford to Clarendon, 19 February 1855. PRMA, No. 136, p. 130. 
1099 Although that province (eyalet) was formally known as the province of Kurdistan at that time, we 
see in grand vezir ReĢid Pasha's petition to Sultan Abdülmecid the expression of “Diyarbekir 
eyaleti” as well. This suggests that both names were being used interchangeably. 
1100 BOA. Ġ. DH. 20545. March 1855. See my paper in Savaştan Barışa, pp. 313-314. Sinan Hakan 
(op. cit., pp. 296-299) seems to be unaware that this Mahmud Efendi and Mahmud Ağa are the 
same person. Hakan guesses that Mahmud Efendi was probably the famous “Mele Mahmud-i 
Bazidi”, which is not correct. Hakan (op. cit., pp. 299-300) also mentions the “King” of Britain 
(İngiliz Kralı) twice as guarantor. However, at that time Queen Victoria sat on the British throne. 
1101  BOA. Ġ. MVL. 353/15435, quoted in simplified form by Hakan, op. cit., pp. 295-296. 
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British doctor Humphry Sandwith, the medical inspector in the Anatolian army 
under General Williams, on the other hand, writes in his memoirs that Mahmud 
“Efendi” visited first the Ottoman commander Kavaklı Mehmed PaĢa, who on learning 
his mission arrested him, believing that he would already capture Yezdan ġer. However, 
for fear of the influence of General Williams, Mehmed PaĢa later released Mahmud, and 
Mahmud went to Yezdan ġer, giving him the letters (or word?) from Williams.1102 
Yezdan ġer accepts Williams's offer of terms and promises to go to the British consulate 
in Musul to surrender together with his brother Mansur Bey and his retinue. Mahmud 
believed in the promise of Yezdan ġer and wrote to Ferik (Lieutenant-General) Veli 
PaĢa of the Anatolian army that there was no need for his coming. Finally Yezdan ġer, 
his brother Mansur Bey, ġirvanlı Said Bey and Ġbrahim Bey, son of Said Bey of Hacı 
Behram went to Musul together with Major Mahmud and took refuge in the British 
consulate. Sandwith fully endorses the initiative of Williams as a “bold and prompt 
measure”, that “effected in a few days what it would have taken a larger Turkish army 
than that under Mehemed Cavakli Pasha as many months to accomplish”. Arguing that 
Williams probably saved the southern half of Turkey in Asia, Sandwith writes in 
unmistakeably Orientalist, arrogant tones: 
   The word of an Englishman has such magic power in the East, that this rebel, 
when he had ascertained the validity of Mahmoud Effendi's mission, at once chose 
rather to deliver himself up to the safekeeping of the Consul at Mosul, than run the 
risk of a hazardous mountain campaign, with followers difficult to manage, and 
ready to desert their colours on the least reverse. Not all the promises of all the 
viziers and pashas of the Turkish Empire could have enticed this wary chief into 
their power, since he well knew the faithlessness of such men.
1103
 
 
Comparing the account of Sandwith and Williams with those of Hamdi, Osman and 
Kenan Pashas, it is not easy to establish the truth. If Williams had not interfered, would 
Yezdan ġer still be captured or forced to surrender by the forces of Kavaklı Mehmed 
Pasha? We can only speculate on this question. Williams, on the other hand, defending 
his action in his reply to Ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe, stated that he had obtained 
the consent of the Ottoman pashas and he had not assumed a right or an authority to 
make proposals to the rebel chief, but he had “entirely thrown himself on the favourable 
interpretation of Her Majesty's Government”, and also on that of His Excellency (the 
Ambassador). He begged to remark: 
                                                 
1102 Humphry Sandwith. A Narrative of the Siege of Kars. London: John Murray, 1856, 3rd edition, p. 
213. 
1103 Ibid, pp. 214-215. 
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1) That Mahmoud Effendi the officer in question was desired by Kherim Pasha, the 
officer in command at Kars to wait on me to put into my hands the letters of the 
traitor's correspondence with the enemy and to follow my directions. I therefore 
inclosed those letters to Your Excellency, and detained Mahmoud Effendi to 
fulfill the mission to the rebel Kurdish chief. 
2) Before drawing up these letters, I consulted with the Governor General of this 
province, and also with Shukri Pasha, who pronounced the project as one worthy 
of being tried to save the flames of rebellion from spreading throughout 
Kurdistan. 
3) The Governor's secretary wrote these letters for me, by the permission of His 
Excellency.  
4) The Defterdar of the Army supplied Mahmoud Effendi with the necessary funds 
for prosecuting his journey; and the Governor General gave that officer orders 
for Horses etc. 
5) My having made the personal acquaintance of the rebel at Jezireh in 1849, 
induced us all to hope that he would not turn a deaf ear to my appeal.
1104
 
 
If these are correct then it becomes evident that Williams did not act on his own. 
Nevertheless, this may also show the helplessness of the pashas in Erzurum before him. 
When Major Mahmud and the Kurdish chiefs arrived in Mosul, the Ottoman pasha 
residing there tried to get them into his disposal. Nevertheless, the French consul did not 
give them away even in absence of the British consul. So Yezdan ġer and his associates 
in rebellion remained in Mosul until September 1855 and then sent to Constantinople 
via Diyarbekir under heavy security measures.  
After the surrender of Yezdan ġer, his brother Mansur and some other chiefs, the 
rebel forces dispersed very quickly. The Russian army, on the other hand, during all the 
revolt of Yezdan ġer, remained too cautious and lost a very favourable opportunity to 
bring the Ottoman army between two fires by coordinating with the Kurdish rebels. 
Averyanov also argues in the same manner that had Yezdan ġer postponed his revolt 
until spring, when the newly appointed Russian commander in chief and governor 
general of the Caucasus (Namestnik Kavkazskiy) Nikolai Muravyov arrived; he could 
have received help from the Russians. But Prince Bebutov, the commander of the 
Russian army in Erivan, opposed all proposals to attack Van and to join the Kurds.
1105
    
Yezdan ġer, Mansur and their retinue were imprisoned in Istanbul, where they 
remained until April 1856 and then they were exiled to Vidin. In the meantime the 
MVL had tried and found him guilty of killing sixty civilians in addition to his crimes 
against the state. Nevertheless, on learning of the exile of Yezdan ġer and his retinue to 
                                                 
1104 BOA. HR. TO. 221/18, dated 4 March 1855. An extract from Williams' letter to Stratford was 
presented to the Ottoman foreign ministry, bearing the title of “Excuses for and explanations of his 
reason for sending Mahmoud Effendi to Yez-di-sheer Bey”. See my paper in Savaştan Barışa, p. 
312. 
1105 Averyanov, op. cit. p. 87. 
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Vidin without prior agreement with him, Stratford de Redcliffe protested in an official 
note to Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha on 17 April 1856. Stratford reminded Fuad Pasha 
that while he (Stratford) was “unwilling to interfere in a matter of internal concern”, 
nevertheless, Yezdan ġer and his retinue had surrendered to a British Officer and he 
(Stratford) had handed over them to the authority of the Porte provided that “their lives 
and properties being spared, they should be tried by the Supreme Council, and on 
conviction be disposed of according to what should be agreed upon between the Porte 
and Her Majesty's Embassy”. Stratford maintained that “the offenders” remained at the 
department of the Seraskier several months without trial. Stratford then wrote that, three 
days ago, his 
   attention was drawn to the unexpected circumstance of their having been sent 
away from Constantinople without any previous communication of the 
proceedings instituted against them, or any preconcerted arrangement for their 
ultimate disposal. This negligence is the more to be regretted as questions of 
property were at issue, and Her Majesty's Government in sanctioning the promise 
given to Yez-di-sheer Bey, that his property as well as his life should be spared 
did not lose sight of the circumstances which throw a suspicion on his manner of 
acquiring that property, and give a presumptive claim upon part of it, at least, to 
those whom his violence and cruelty had despoiled. 
The Undersigned remembers that when he had the honor of being received in 
private by Fuad Pasha more than a fortnight since, His Excellency spoke 
incidentally of the Porte's inclination to send the above mentioned rebels into 
exile, to which he could have seen no objection, if the concerted engagements had 
been previously fulfilled, and his Government duly apprized of the intended 
decision. 
On learning the real state of the case from Mr. Pisani, the Undersigned conveyed 
to Fuad Pasha his expectation that the rebels, who had surrendered to a British 
officer, and been transferred under agreement to the Porte, should be brought back 
to Constantinople as the only effective way of correcting the error which had been 
committed, and enabling the Porte to redeem the pledge which it had previously 
given to Her Majesty's Embassy. 
The Undersigned formed an additional cause of surprise in learning from His 
Excellency that the required measure would be deemed a disparagement of the 
Sovereign's dignity. Surely no movements, however inconvenient to himself, of a 
rebel in custody of the Porte's officers, could have such an effect. The only point 
of view, in which the interpretation can be admitted, is that of the change being 
occasioned by foreign interference. But in the present case there was a previous 
agreement, founded on very peculiar circumstances, between the Porte and the 
Embassy, and, if there were really any question of disparagement, it could only 
result from the neglect of that agreement.
1106
 
 
Upon this note, Fuad Pasha replied first verbally that the matter had already been 
agreed upon between them and then in an official, carefully worded note, explained how 
                                                 
1106 Stratford de Redcliffe to Fuad Pasha, 17 April 1856. BOA. HR. TO. 222/59. Official translation 
into Turkish is in BOA. Ġ. HR. 131/6698 lef 1, dated 3 June 1856. See my paper in Savaştan 
Barışa, pp. 317-320. 
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the Sublime Porte amnestied a savage criminal, deserving capital punishment under any 
law, just out of respect to its ally and enclosed a list of the crimes committed by the 
rebel against the population.
1107
 
Yezdan ġer and his associates fled to Bosnia in January 1858, but they were 
captured and returned to their exile in Vidin in April 1858.
1108
 A year later his family 
was allowed to join him in exile.
1109
 Furthermore, his receivables from some Kurdish 
notables were also collected and sent to him.
1110
 In 1865 the brothers apply for an 
appointment in state service. In reply, it was said that they were now free within the 
vilayet of Tuna (the Danube), but they still had to wait for some time to get appointed to 
state service.
1111
 Finally Yezdan ġer was appointed as the administrator of the district of 
Adliye within the province of Tuna, and then in 1868 became the mutasarrıf of 
Janina.
1112
 He probably died in this post, in the 1870s.
1113
 
 
 
5.5.3.  Desertions and the Başıbozuk Troops as a Source of Disorder 
 
 
Desertions from the Ottoman army had started even before the war. Especially the 
reserve troops (redif), who were middle aged, married men with a family to feed, tended 
to desert at the first opportunity. For example, in August 1853, 500 redif soldiers on 
their way to Erzurum had deserted in the vicinity of Sivas and Tokat, becoming outlaws 
and robbing caravans and passengers. They had also killed a Greek on the way to 
Amasya.
1114
 During the Crimean War, Ottoman recruits were caught and delivered from 
the villages, by way of arresting anyone who happened to be eligible and there, without 
subjecting them to the draft. This was especially so for the Anatolian army. The levies 
from Egypt were collected likewise. According to Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha, 30 redif 
soldiers deserted on their way from Kars to Ardahan in October 1853.
1115
 According to 
                                                 
1107 BOA. Ġ. HR. 131/6698 lef 2. See my paper in Savaştan Barışa, pp. 321-323. 
1108 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 130/74. Cf. Hakan, op. cit., pp. 304-305. Hakan refers to another document 
from the BOA. 
1109 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 374/53.  
1110 BOA. A. MKT. UM. 387/29 ve A. MKT. UM. 396/68.  
1111 BOA. Ġ. MVL. 24032. 
1112 BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 407/76.  
1113 Mehmed Süreyya, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 845.  
1114  Grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 25 Zilkade 1269 (30 August 1853). BOA. A. MKT. NZD. 
88/46. For the transcription of this document, see my paper in Savaştan Barışa, 2007, p. 301.  
1115  Ali Rıza Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4. See Appendix 79. On desertions from the 
Anatolian army before and during the war, also see, BOA. A. MKT. UM. 162/53, dated 9 August 
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Doctor Sandwith, early in 1855, “desertions had become so numerous that it was well-
known the province of Sivas alone contained 10,000 men who had left their 
colours”.1116 
Some of the soldiers who deserted from the Kars army during the siege of Kars in 
1855 were taken prisoner by the Russians and returned during the exchange of prisoners 
of war after the end of the war. Upon their return to Istanbul by ships, these deserters 
were tried at the military court (Divan-ı Harb) presided by Ferik Hafız Pasha. Thus we 
have the opportunity to “hear” soldiers‟ voices as recorded in the court records. One of 
them, Sergeant Said of MuĢ from the 8th company of the 3rd battalion of the 4th regular 
infantry regiment of the Anatolian army said during his interrogation that although he 
had been proposed for promotion to the rank of lieutenant, he received a sergeant‟s 
salary for two years during his service in Kars and he became indebted (borçlu düştüm). 
His children in his hometown were left starving (Vilayetimde çoluk çocuğum aç kaldı). 
Said then says that he decided to go to Erzurum and told the doctor (Tabip Ahmed 
Efendi) about his intention, whereupon the doctor urged him to take his (doctor‟s) horse 
as well. He fled during the night and he was caught by the Russians. Said repeatedly 
told that the reason for his desertion was debt and hunger (Gider ve borçtan ve açlıktan 
ziyade sıkıldım firar ettim). Nevertheless he had re-married in Kars. To the question of 
why he left his wife in Kars, he answered that his wife‟s father could take care of her 
and he fled because one‟s life is dearer than everything (Can cümleden akdem 
olduğundan kendimi kurtarırım hülyasıyla kaçtım).1117  
Another deserter, Sergeant Osman of Istanbul (Asitane), from the 7
th
 company of 
the 1
st
 battalion of the 2
nd
 regular infantry regiment of the Anatolian army also answered 
that his desertion was due to hunger (açlıktan dolayı). When he was asked whether he 
received less rations than others, he said that they all received equal rations but he could 
not endure hunger any more (Lakin ben açlığa sabır ve tahammül edemedim ve biraz 
daha kalsam idi açlıktan telef olacak idim. Anın içün kaçtım). Sergeant Osman had 
deserted 45 days after the Battle of Tahmas (meaning the Battle of Kars on 29 
September 1855, Tahmas was one of the bastions of Kars) and 7 days before the fall of 
Kars in his own words. The interrogators of Osman questioned Corporal Halil and 
                                                                                                                                               
1854, from the governor of Sivas on desertions after the battle of Ġncedere (Kürekdere). Also see 
Veysel ġimĢek, Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853, MA Thesis, Bilkent 
University, Ankara, 2005, pp. 74-79 and Colonel Atwell Lake, Narrative of the Defence of Kars. 
London: Richard Bentley, 1857, p. 132. 
1116  Sandwith, op. cit., p. 229. 
1117  Mazbata of the Divan-ı Harb, BOA. Ġ. DH. 362/23964, dated 12 Safer 1273 (12 October 1856). 
See Appendix 112. 
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Captain Ġbrahim Ağa as well about Osman‟s desertion. Captain Ġbrahim told that there 
were five soldiers together with Sergeant Osman who deserted during their night duty. 
Corporal Halil told that Sergeant Osman had taken him and Corporal Hasan for duty. 
They told him that they would desert and asked him to go with them. However, Halil 
did not accept, while the two deserted.  
The başıbozuk troops or the asakir-i muvazzafa as they were called interchange-
ably and more officially, had always been a source of trouble.
1118
 They robbed and 
killed civilians wherever they passed or stayed. While they committed crimes against all 
population, the non-Muslims were affected more because being unarmed they were 
more vulnerable. During the Crimean War the başıbozuks continued their atrocities and 
plunder. However, this time their activities were exposed to the attention of the Ottoman 
authorities more energetically due to the presence of the allied armies and allied officers 
in Ottoman armies. Now that the British and French embassies were in an excellent 
position to dictate policy to the Porte, they pressurized the Porte to bring the başıbozuk 
into order and to prevent their atrocities. In this respect Stratford de Redcliffe really 
stands out among ambassadors. It seems that there are simply more official notes 
submitted by him to the Porte than all other ambassadors put together. Aided by the net 
of British consuls spread out all over the Ottoman Empire, the British ambassador was 
well-informed of many events even before Ottoman ministers heard of them and 
energetically pressed for measures.  
The Hariciye Siyasi and Hariciye Tercüme Odası collections of the BOA contain 
many extracts of from British consular reports submitted to the Sublime Porte. These 
reports include complaints about başıbozuks and also about the pashas who were 
supposed to bring the başıbozuks under order. Such complaints about local officials are 
also sent by individuals and local meclises but these councils were in most cases in the 
hands of the governor who dictated his will. Non-Muslim members of these local 
councils, the primates (kocabaşı) were not in a position to influence its decisions either. 
It is even doubtful that they understood fully what was written in the mazbata 
(resolution or round robin of the council) to which they put their seals. Among the non-
Muslims, the representative of the Greek millet (Rum kocabaşı) came first. Then came 
the Armenian and Jewish kocabaşıs. 
                                                 
1118  James Reid (op. cit., p. 270) argues that they were also called muâvine asker (auxiliary troops), 
probably referring to Mahmud Nedim Pasha during his governorship of Beyrut. However, my 
research in the BOA has shown that he words asakir-i muâvine meant the allied troops in the 
context of the Crimean War.   
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The mobilization of the başıbozuk troops started in the summer of 1853 and the 
reports of British consulates started to come in at this time as well. The first reports 
seem to come from places like Amasya, Thessaly, Salonica and Damascus, where 
Muslims and Christians lived close to each other. Thessaly and Salonica were sensitive 
areas of Greek nationalism and later insurgence, where some Albanian and other 
baĢıbozuk troops were concentrated. As early as 15 June 1853, a British consular report 
probably from Trabzon stated that the redif troops had committed “excesses” towards 
Christians in Amasya.
1119
 Lord Stratford immediately sent a note to ReĢid Pasha, 
protesting the “insults and offenses” against “persons under British protection”.1120 This 
suggests that these Christians were probably Protestants. Then we have the following 
report in July 1853 from the British consulate in Salonica: 
   By the last accounts up to the 19
th
 instant, which I have received from Volo and 
Larissa, the alarm still continues both in consequence of the conduct of the 
irregular troops and the number of other Albanians in that vicinity, who have 
come to Thessaly in the hopes of being employed by the several chiefs. The 
irregulars are also clamorous for the pay which is due to them…  
The Archbishop of Salonica has received intelligence of the Greek monastery on 
Mount Olympus having been plundered of every thing, and that the monks were 
afterwards tormented in the, I may say, now usual Thessalian way; viz, with drops 
of boiling oil upon their chests, because they did not confess where the money of 
the monastery was secreted. There is also advice that another monastery in the 
vicinity Cosnia has been plundered and the monks tormented in the same way 
with drops of boiling oil. These sacrileges are supposed to have been committed 
by the disbanded Derbent troops of Haggi Hussein Pasha. There can be no doubt 
but that the Christians will suffer in certain districts during the passage of the 
irregular troops to their homes, in the event of present differences being arranged 
without coming to hostilities, unless indeed the Porte provide for the safety of the 
people either by the escort of each corps of irregulars by a troop of cavalry, or 
conveying them by steamers to the coast of Albania. These irregulars enlist more 
for plunder than patriotism.
1121
 
 
The consul also suggested that an “active military man of rank” with some troops 
should be appointed to command all irregular chiefs from his head quarters in 
Larissa.
1122
 
 Another report from the British consulate in Damascus at about the same time 
stated that a certain Resul Ağa's “300 Koordish irregular horsemen” had robbed and 
killed 12 persons at RaĢiye (Rasheya).1123 
                                                 
1119    Extrait d‟une lettre d‟Amasia. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 3, dated 15 June 1853. See Appendix 6. 
1120   Stratford à Monsieur Etienne Pisani. BOA. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 1, dated 22 June 1853. See 
Appendix 7. 
1121  Extract from the report of the British consulate in Salonica to the British embassy in Istanbul, July 
1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 2. See Appendix 11. 
1122  Salonica, July 11 1853. BOA. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 1. See Appendix 11. 
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 The grand vizier wrote orders (tahrirat-ı samiye) to the commander of the Rumeli 
army Ömer Lütfi Pasha and to the governor of Tırhala on 29 October 1853. In the 
instructions to Ömer Pasha, the translation of a report submitted to the Sublime Porte on 
the disorders (uygunsuzluklar) of the baĢıbozuk troops in some places, is said to have 
been attached. (This is most probably another British or French consular report). The 
grand vizier wrote that needless to say, it was necessary in those troublesome (gaileli) 
days to satisfy all subjects of the state more than ever and not to offend them in any way 
(umum tebaa ve zirdestanı her vakitden ziyade hoş tutup hiçbir suretle incitmemek) and 
to protect their property and honour (emniyet-i maliye ve namusiyelerini muhafaza 
etmek). However, the grand vizier stated, the başıbozuk troops were perpetrating all 
kinds of cruel and indecent treatment (muamelat-ı zalimane ve bi-edebane) towards 
some wretched people and other subjects (birtakım aceze ve tebaa). Then the grand 
vizier reminds of the recently issued imperial order (irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i padişahi) 
and the grand vizirial orders (evamir-i aliyye) sent to all the commanders, demanding 
the prevention of such actions.
1124
  
 The order to the governor of Tırhala also mentioned an enclosure, a letter from 
YeniĢehir-i Fenar (it is not indicated from whom) about the atrocities (muamelat-ı 
zalimane ve gaddaraneleri) of the baĢıbozuks employed in that region. Such actions 
were very harmful and causing all kinds of evil in that critical time, if those things that 
were stated to influence the opinion of the people were also correct (bu muameleden 
dolayı efkâr-ı ahaliye arız olacağı beyan olunan şeyler dahi sahih ise şu nazik vakitde 
gayet muzırr ve dürlü fenalığı müntic olacağına).1125 The governor was accordingly 
ordered to prevent these atrocities. 
 We have seen that başıbozuk troops committed atrocities in ġekvetil, Ahısha and 
around Gümrü in Armenian villages. They also decapitated some enemy troops or 
civilians in order to receive cash rewards. At Bayındır, in the battle of the irregular 
cavalry about 100 severed heads were brought to Ahmed Pasha who gave 50 piastres 
each to those who brought them, officially registering their names (defter tanzimiyle). 
Then he had them loaded into carts and sent to Kars to the müşir.1126 Ahmed Pasha had 
also sent the müdir of the kaza of ġüregel Meded Bey together with chiefs of Kurdish 
                                                                                                                                               
1123  Extract from the report of the British consulate in Damascus. BOA. HR. TO. 219/50, dated 16 July 
and 1 August 1853. 
1124  Tahrirat-ı Samiye to Ömer Pasha and to the governor of Tırhala. BOA. HR. SYS. 1345/41, 29 
October 1853. 
1125  Ibid. 
1126  BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, question 15. See Appendix 83. 
335 
tribes such as Kasım Ağa of the Zilanlı tribe, Beto (Tebo?) and Hasan Beys of the 
Kaskan tribe, Serhenk Ağa of the Cemedanlı tribe and the like to a Cossack village 
called Tuhaber (?) on the Russian side. They had plundered the village and taken some 
prisoners as slaves. While the military meclis in Erzurum stated that they heard that 
Ahmed Pasha had taken one of the slave girls as odalık for himself but Abdi Pasha had 
had him release her. Other slaves had remained in the hands of the Kurdish chiefs. 
Inspector Hayreddin Pasha also asked the meclis about 10,200 cattle and horses, 29,838 
sheep, 2,760 somars (about 550 tons) of barley and 3,280 somars (about 650 tons) of 
wheat that was said to have been plundered from some ten villages. The Erzurum meclis 
stated that such acts of plunder were committed by the local tribes and voluntary troops 
with the approval of Ahmed Pasha but regular and irregular troops were not sent. Abdi 
Pasha said that it was rumored that the Revan tribe had plundered some Russian villages 
and returned to Ottoman territory and probably this news had taken such a form.
1127
  
 At the beginning of March 1854, the Armenian Patriach and the meclis of the 
Armenian millet applied to the grand vizier, complaining about the atrocities and 
plundering of the başıbozuk volunteers going to the Anatolian army (to Erzurum and 
Kars). According to the petition of the Armenian patriarch and the meclis, these 
başıbozuks had collected by force 5,000 to 10,000 piastres each for their chiefs (başbuğ) 
and 40 to 50 piastres for each başıbozuk as well as horses from the reaya in the villages 
of the districts of Eğin, Arapkir, Kuruçay, ÇemiĢkezek and Divriği in the provinces of 
Harput and Sivas. They had severely beaten those who could not pay this amount, 
entered houses, demanded food and even dishonoured women (ırzlarına tasallut). They 
had also closed churches during Easter for 15 days in some places. Therefore the 
patriarch and the meclis asked for orders to be sent to the administrators of the region to 
prevent these outrages.
1128
 The grand vizier sent orders to the governors of Harput and 
Sivas and to other governors and mutasarrıfs.1129  
 In March 1854, there were reports from the British consuls in Varna, Edirne and 
Erzurum as well on pillaging, outrages and other disorders by the başıbozuks. The 
British consul at Varna reported to Lord Stratford on 12 March 1854 on the outrages 
and disorders perpetrated by “Turkish irregular troops” in the vicinity of Rahova 
(Rassova) on the Danube. According to him, 
                                                 
1127  Ibid, question 19. See Appendix 83. 
1128  BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 1, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (2 March 1854). See Appendix 38. 
1129  BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 2. 
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   A party of Mokans (Transylvanian shepherds) driven by the concentration of 
Russian troops in Wallachia, sought refuge with their flocks on an island situated 
opposite Rassova. The Turkish irregular troops appear to have gone over to the 
island and although the Mokans stated that they were Austrian subjects and 
occupied the island for no hostile purpose and urged in proof of this statement that 
they were unarmed thirty of their number were decapitated on the spot and six or 
seven thousand sheep were carried off by the Bashi Bozuks. One of the Mokans 
who escaped has arrived in Varna, and the depositions he has made upon this 
event form the subject of a report which the Austrian Vice-Consul here has 
addressed by this occasion to the Internuncio.
1130
 
 
The consul added that similar and still greater atrocities had been committed by 
the başıbozuks upon the inhabitants of the village of Keserler, five hours distant from 
Rahova. The women were dishonored and many of the men and children killed. Those 
who managed to escape, had fled to the woods. 
 Thanks to regular steamship mails between Varna and Istanbul, the report reached 
Istanbul quickly and Stratford lost no time in remonstrating against the Porte, although 
the shepherds were Austrian subjects. The tone of his instructions to his head dragoman, 
to be read to ReĢid Pasha, was indignant and even vehement: 
   Not many days have elapsed since I reported the crimes which had been 
perpetrated by the Bashi-Bosooks at Eski-Zaara and other places in that 
neighbourhood and the Turkish minister promised to redress by adequate 
measures the wrongs of which I complained.  
The steamer from Varna has brought in this morning a fresh catalogue of crimes 
perpetrated by the same people. I inclose Consul Neale's dispatch describing the 
disorderly and atrocious acts which he so justly reprobates. The places where 
these acts occurred are an island on the Danube near Russova and Kesserler five 
hours distant from that place. The decapitation of thirty shepherds and the plunder 
of their numerous flocks are circumstances which, standing in connection with 
each other exhibit at once the sanguinary character of the Bashi-Boosooks and 
motive of their cold blooded cruelty. Such outrages on humanity are a dishonor to 
the country where they occur and to the army which allows their perpetrators to 
cooperate with it. Measures must be adopted to check them, or it will ultimately 
be found impossible for Christian Powers to act in concert with the Turkish 
Authorities… 
There is no excuse to be found for this shameful indifference either in religion or 
in policy. True religion cannot possibly warrant such horrors. The professors of a 
religion acting with such barbarous inhumanity would deserve to be treated as the 
enemies of mankind. As for policy, the true policy of the Porte is to obtain the 
sympathies of Christendom and to maintain discipline in its armies. The Bashi-
Boozooks are notorious cowards in presence of the enemy. All their prowess is 
exhausted in ravaging their Sovereign's country, and slaughtering his peaceful 
subjects. They are worse than useless. Their disorders unsettle the regular army; 
their example disheartens the good soldier.  
                                                 
1130   British consul in Varna Lt. Col. Edward St. John Neale to Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 12 March 
1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 125. See Appendix 39. 
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I repeat that means must be found to put down so intolerable a scandal, and I call 
upon the Porte to acquaint me with its intentions in this respect.
1131
 [Italics 
underlined in the original] 
 
 Within a few days the consul in Erzurum also wrote on the plundering of the 
helpless peasants in the neighbouring villages by the baĢıbozuk troops. He added that he 
heard that the infamous baĢıbzouk chief Hasan Yazıcı had been arrested by Selim Pasha 
in Bayezid.
1132
 Another consular report from Edirne stated that the baĢıbozuks from 
MaraĢ and Ankara had committed atrocities on their way to ġumnu.1133 Another British 
consular report stated that the Muslim and non-Muslim notables of YeniĢehir-i Fenar 
were demanding regular troops to be sent to disperse the başıbozuks. These inhabitants 
also stated that if the Sublime Porte did not send troops, then they would apply to the 
insurgents (usat) who were already offering their services to free the people from the 
tyranny of the baĢıbozuks.1134  
 British chief engineer General Sir John Burgoyne wrote from Varna to Lord 
Stratford that some inhabitants of villages around ġumnu and Varna addressed to him 
complaints about the insults made on them and their wives and their daughters, by the 
başıbozuks, who crossed the country. According to him, the inhabitants were ready to 
provide residences, provisions and horse fodder to these people and even to make 
expenditures for them; but they asked only for personal protection for themselves and 
their families. Burgoyne suggested to have small detachments of regular cavalry troops 
or mounted gendarmes, who would go round the villages, obtain necessary information, 
and have the authority to punish culprits in a summary way.
1135
 At the beginning of 
April 1854 Stratford again applied to the Porte about the disorders of the Albanian 
başıbozuks under the command of Nureddin Ağa.1136 Another complaint on the irregular 
trops came from the Prussian embassy, which stated that the oppressions of Christian 
subjects at the hands of these quite worthless irregular troops could turn the European 
public opinion against the Porte.
1137
 
                                                 
1131  Lord Stratford's instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani, 14 March 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 
904/1 lef 130-131. 
1132  BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/21 and HR. TO. 220/18, dated 16 March 1854. 
1133  BOA. HR. TO. 220/16, dated 16 March 1854. 
1134  BOA. HR. SYS. 1347/28 lef 2, dated 21 March 1854. 
1135  Extrait d‟une lettre du Général Burgoyne à Lord Stratford en date du 23 Mars 1854. BOA. HR. 
SYS. 904/1 lef 142. See Appendix 41. A translation of this letter into Ottoman Turkish is in BOA. 
HR. SYS. 1347/28 lef 1. The translator indicates the date of the original letter as 3 March but this 
must be a typing error. 
1136  BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 170, dated 9 April 1954.  
1137  BOA. HR. SYS. 1336/3 lef 1, dated 19 April 1854. 
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 The British officer George Palmer Evelyn noted that the başıbozuk cavalry in 
Ömer Pasha‟s army committed “great ravages and atrocities, violating and murdering 
women, and burning villages” during the retreat of the Ottoman army from Machin in 
April 1854.
1138
  
 On 18 April 1854 Sultan Abdülmecid issued a firman on the punishment of the 
unlawful acts of the başıbozuks.1139 The firman was published on 7 May 1854 in the 
Takvim-i Vekayi as well.
1140
 It declared that some persons of the asakir-i muvazzafa, 
known by the name of başıbozuk, who were unable to distinguish between good and 
evil, perpetrated acts of violence and plunder against the life, property and honour of the 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Such actions and behaviour was to be 
punished severely. The perpetrators were to be arrested and sent to army commanders 
and müşirs, whose military courts were authorized to pass capital punishment on the 
perpetrators. However, this firman and other orders from the Porte seem not to have 
changed much. Reports and complaints from various parts of the empire and from 
British and French consuls continued to come in.   
 The Greek insurgence in Thessaly and Epirus increased complaints of the conduct 
of the başıbozuks. For example, the British Acting Consul in Salonica Henry Razy 
reported the following on 9 May 1854 to the British ambassador Lord Stratford:  
   A body of the insurgents who landed at “Seikia” proceeded to “Poleiros” and 
endeavoured to excite the inhabitants to rise. Their efforts were ineffectual, the 
Primates on the 14/26 April sent off intelligence to Galatesta, about 5 hours 
distant, where Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey were at the head of 800 Bashee-
Bozouks entreating them to come to their assistance and drive out the invaders 
who were only 200 strong and tormented them. The Bashee-Bozouks of 4 times 
that force, however, hesitated and it was only after repeated requests personally 
made by the Primates that they at last consented to set out. This was on the 20/2 
May. While on the march and near “Votenia” they encountered a poor woodcutter 
about 55 years of age upon whom they alleged to have found papers proving a 
connection with the insurgents, him they beheaded instantly. This was but the 
preliminary to more horrible excesses. Arrived within about 10 minutes walk of 
Poleiros, they were met by two of the Primates and conducted to the outskirts of 
the village where the rest of the Primates 23 in number received them with all 
cordiality; the 200 insurgents having some days previously decamped. For a few 
minutes the best understanding seemed to be established between the leaders of 
the Bashee-Bozooks and the Primates, and it is even said that the customary cup 
of coffee had been served, when the former exclaimed pointing to the mountains, 
“who are these people approaching”, nothing was visible but some flocks of goats 
                                                 
1138  George Palmer Evelyn, A Diary of the Crimea, London, 1954, p. 54, quoted by Reid, op. cit., p. 
246. 
1139 BOA. Ġ. DH. 18680, dated 20 Receb 1270. The language of this firman is full of Arabic and 
Persian words and not understandable for the başıbozuks themselves. Nevertheless, this did not 
really matter because they were illiterate anyway. 
1140  TV, 9 ġaban 1270. For its transliteration, see Yapıcı, op. cit., pp. 40-44. 
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and the Primates replied, of course, in that sense. Presently a Bashee-Bozook was 
dispatched as if to reconnoitre. In a few minutes, a preconcerted signal was heard, 
a shot was grin(?) by the bidette (?) the chiefs of the irregulars at once exclaimed 
“cut them down” an order you may well supposed promptly responded to by their 
followers. The work of slaughter commenced and the 23 primates soon 
succumbed under the edge of the yatagan, nor were their lifeless corpses 
unmolested, but were hacked and mutilated in such a manner as to become 
unrecognisable – nor was this all. 4 or 5 of the Kirajis actually employed by the 
troops in carrying their ammunition were at the same time indiscriminately 
massacred.  
That this sanguinary scene was not an act of insubordination on the part of the 
soldiers, but one of deliberate resolve on the part of Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey 
is quite clear. The troops on subsequent entering the village committed no 
excesses whatever; that the act was a premeditated one is evident, for previous to 
this butchery the Bulak-Bashis ordered the “Kirajis” about a hundred in number 
who accompanied the expedition, to keep close to their horses – the 4 or 5 
unfortunate individuals who fell in the massacre it appears had unhappily not 
heeded the injunction.  
All these victims were personally and well known to Hassan Aga and Mahmut 
Bey, what may have been their motive, it not easy to divine! Let the cause be what 
it may the effects stand before us as an incontestable fact and while it makes our 
best feelings revolt and cause the blood of Christian men to boil with indignation, 
it must ever stamp all concerned in the diabolical atrocity and most of all the 
Master fiends Hassan Aga and Mahmut Bey with undying infamy”.1141    
 
 Upon receiving this report Lord Stratford again applied to Grand Vizier ReĢid 
Pasha to demand justice in very strong words: 
   His Highness will find in Mr. Razy‟s dispatch an ample confirmation of the 
massacre previously denounced to him. The discrepancies of detail are few and 
unimportant. We have in both reports the butchery without provocation or 
resistance, of about thirty Christians, more than twenty of whom were primates of 
district, by a band of irregular troops, or Bashee-Bozooks, [underlined in the 
original] summoned from Salonica to protect them against the Hellenic 
marauders, who had vainly endeavoured to seduce them from allegiance, and 
acting by command of two Turkish leaders, whose names are given identically in 
both accounts. 
No words of horror and indignation, however natural, no cries for vengeance, 
however just, can give any additional weight to simple statement of facts like 
these. We have at once in view of the cruel, cowardly, calculated butchers, 
together with the innocent, unarmed, unsuspecting victims, - the former betraying 
the honor of their Sovereign, the latter sacrificed by their submission to his 
authority. In every heart not rendered callous by brutal passion or senseless 
fanaticism there is what calls for judgement on the one and sympathy with the 
other. I will not insult the Turkish Ministers by supposing it otherwise with them. 
Indeed I am assured by you that they are alive to the requirements of justice in this 
case, and to the obligation of punishing with exemplary rigour an outrage which is 
                                                 
1141 BOA. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 213-214, dated 9 May 1854. 
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no less treasonable towards the Porte, than disgraceful to humanity, and ruinous to 
the Empire. It is enough therefore, I hope for me to repeat.
1142
  
 
 The French ambassador Baraguey d‟Hilliers also made a representation to the 
Porte in June on the atrocities committed by the başıbozuks in Thessaly. Baraguey 
d‟Hilliers stated that the government had raised 5,000 baĢıbozuks, but with the consent 
of the pasha of Larissa their number had risen to more than 20,000 and they were doing 
all kinds of repressions against Christians. He maintained that,  
   Thessaly and its inhabitants are treated by them like a conquered territory and an 
enemy population. The cries of the Christians, victims of these disorders, will 
resound soon in all the capitals of Europe, and the public opinion, moved, 
irritated, will accuse the Ottoman government and its allies of improvidence or 
partiality.
1143
 [My translation]
  
 
Another consular report from Salonica stated that the depredations committed by the 
Albanians were increasing daily. The baĢıbozuk should be recalled from the interior to 
Salonica. Mehmet Pasha was weak and timid against them
1144
. 
 After the concentration of French and British troops in Varna, reports started to 
come from Bulgaria on the disorders there. Towards the end of July 1854, Stratford had 
“again to perform the painful duty of bringing to the knowledge of the Ottoman 
secretary of state a barbarous outrage committed by one class of the Sultan's subjects 
upon another” in the immediate vicinity of the British camp in Bulgaria. Stratford wrote 
that according to the report of General Sir de Lacy Evans, the Christian inhabitants of a 
village had been “turned out of their homes by a band of Mussulman strangers”, and 
“forced to seek shelter from worse violence in the neighboring forest”.1145 Shortly 
afterwards on 12 August Stratford again had to complain of the wrongful treatment of 
Bulgarian peasants in the purchase of provisions for the army.
1146
 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the British tried to reinforce their army in the 
Crimea by hiring regular and irregular Ottoman troops. Thus in the spring of 1855 
British recruitment officers were sent to some provinces for this purpose, including 
                                                 
1142 Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions to head dragoman Pisani to be read to ReĢid Pasha. BOA. HR. 
SYS. 904/1 lef 215-216, dated 14 May 1854. See Appendix 46. 
1143 “La Thessalie et les habitants sont traités par eux comme une terre conquise et une population 
ennemie. Les cris des chrétiens, victimes de ces désordres, retentiront avant peu dans toutes les 
capitales de l'Europe, et l'opinion publique, émue, irritée, accusera le gouvernement ottoman et 
ses alliés d'imprévoyance ou de partialité.” BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 34, dated 11 June 1854. 
1144  BOA. HR. TO. 220/35, dated 15 June 1854. 
1145  Redcliffe to ReĢid Pasha. BOA. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 42, dated 29 July 1854. See my paper in 
Savaştan Barışa, pp. 306-307. 
1146  Redcliffe to ReĢid Pasha, 12 August 1854. BOA. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 24-25. See See my paper in 
Savaştan Barışa, p. 307. 
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Colonel Walpole who was sent to Damascus (ġam-ı ġerif). With the help of local 
authorities Walpole started recruiting irregular cavalry there in March 1855 and the 
number of his troops reached about 500 hundred by mid May. However, according to 
reports from the governor, the city meclis and the chief of staff of the Arabistan army 
Mehmed Ġzzet Pasha, he recruited his men from disreputable and ignorant persons who 
wanted to take revenge from some persons. These levies also started molesting women 
and the shopkeepers in the city. Colonel Walpole himself had an Ottoman soldier from 
the second infantry regiment arrested at the gate of the idadiye school and taken his 
konak where he had him beaten, because the soldier had not saluted him.
1147
 It seems 
that these levies increased their acts of violence against the population to such an extent 
that signs of serious mass violence became evident in the city (asakir-i muvazzafadan 
bazı cühela takımının meşhud olan hareketleri üzerine bayağı ihtilal emaresi runüma 
olduğu halde).1148 Therefore the governor Vamık Pasha sent an official note to Colonel 
Walpole and kindly requested him either to take the troops out of the city or to take 
measures that they went about unarmed and did not molest anybody.
1149
  
Next day the meclis of Damascus convened and discussed the matter together with 
all the foreign consuls in the city except for the British consul Mr Wood, who was in 
Beyrut at that time. A mazbata (round robin) signed by Governor Vamık Pasha and 
other members of the council of the province (eyalet meclisi), including the 
representatives of the Greek, Catholic and Jewish communities, was sent to the Porte 
complaining of the misdeeds of the British officer and his recruits.
1150
 First it confirmed 
the receipt of the relevant order from the Porte, dated 17 February 1855, on the 
recruitment of irregular cavalry for the British army. (The order seems to have reached 
Damascus rather late, on 7 April 1855). The order was read in the council of the 
province. The mazbata further stated that the British officer sent for the recruitment 
paid no attention to the Ottoman authorities, did not consult them and recruited around 
500 soldiers for cavalry and infantry from among the riff raff (süfeha ve erazil takımı) 
of Damascus. Yet these ruffians (haşerat, literally “insects”) enjoying the liberties given 
to them by the British officer, started committing outrages, molesting women and taking 
                                                 
1147  Mehmed Ġzzet Pasha to the Seraskier, 29 ġaban 1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/51. 
1148  Mehmed Ġzzet Pasha to the Seraskier, 7 Ramazan 1271 (24 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 1352/61.  
1149  Vamık Pasha to Colonel Walpole, 28 ġaban 1271 / 15 May 1855. (Copy). BOA. HR. SYS. 
1352/71. Both Julian and Muslim dates are shown in the original, however, there is an error: 28 
ġaban corresponds to 16 May. 
1150 Mazbata of the meclis of Damascus, Selh-i [29] ġaban 1271 (17 May 1855). BOA. HR. SYS. 
1352/49. See Appendix 97. 
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revenge on people against whom they had old grievances. The British officer was 
kindly requested to put a stop these acts but he apparently did not accept it.  
After that the irregular troops of Colonel Walpole became more impudent and 
increased their violence. The shopkeepers shut up their magazines and came to the 
governor‟s office to make a complaint. Therefore a special council consisting of the 
chief of staff and the Defterdar of the Arabistan army, Molla Efendi, some members of 
the grand council of the province, the consuls of France, Austria, Sardinia and Iran, the 
dragomans of the consulates of Britain and Prussia convened and decided that the troops 
in question should be sent to Hama or to the village of Kıbbe (Kıyye?) near Damascus 
or if these are not accepted then allowed to go around disarmed, otherwise there would 
no other solution than applying the law against them. Then Colonel Walpole took 
offense and moved to the village Dum (?) with his troops in protesting mode. The 
meclis then sent deputies to invite him back to Damascus. 
It seems remarkable that the British military commissioner (Colonel Walpole) 
apparently defied Ottoman authority by arresting an Ottoman soldier in daylight and the 
governor or the chief of staff of the Ottoman Arabistan army cannot not do anything 
against him, except apply to the foreign consuls resident in the city. The British 
commissioner seems to have acted in total disregard for the local authorities.  
 One of the main problems with the başıbozuks was that the başıbozuks were 
themselves robbed by the pashas of their rations and secondly, they were in most cases 
collected from unreliable elements, who looked upon the war as a means of getting 
booty or who were fanatically anti-Christian. In any case, unable to receive food for 
themselves and for their horses, they resorted to pillaging the population. Even the 
regular soldiers did not receive any pay for months and years. General Williams 
reported that in the Anatolian army in Erzurum there were soldiers who had not 
received any pay for the last 15 to 22 months.
1151
 These payments did not reach them 
even if they were sent. The command of the army, beginning right from the müşir down 
to regimental commanders was involved in embezzlement. Nevertheless, even if these 
pashas were not corrupt, they were under constant pressure because there were constant 
conspiracies in Constantinople against them from people who wanted to get their 
positions. During the war, the müşir of the Anatolian army was changed five times.   
 The Morning Chronicle correspondent Charles Duncan met a başıbozuk chieftain, 
who admitted their despised situation but complained thus: 
                                                 
1151 Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon. Camp near Kars, September 26, 1854. PRMA, No. 31, 
p. 30. 
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   But see how we are treated. We leave our homes with a formal engagement with 
our government, and we are promised eighty piastres the month (about fourteen 
shillings), provided we bring our horse, our arms, and that we feed ourselves. 
Now, look at our condition, and say if we are not rather to be pitied than 
condemned. Government has not paid us; we have spent the little money we 
possessed and many have sold their arms; then, when abandoned to starvation, can 
my men be blamed if they help themselves at the villages they may pass to 
whatever they may meet?
1152
  
 
 Abdi Pasha, the former commander of the Anatolian army who was under arrest 
together with his successors Ahmed Pasha and Zarif Mustafa Pasha in Istanbul for 
charges of corruption and mismanagement, during his interrogation was asked why he 
did not prevent the baĢıbozuk chiefs (sergerdes) from unbecoming acts (harekât-ı gayri 
layıka). Abdi Pasha answered that among the başıbozuk sergerdes a certain Ġnce Arab 
was said to have committed much evil on his way from Damascus to Kars. He was 
appointed to Bayezid but he committed some mischief (biraz fenalığı) there as well and 
he was imprisoned. Abdi Pasha then gave the following answer to the question of why 
he did not prevent the Kurdish başıbozuks from plundering villages around Erzurum: 
   The başıbozuk troops from the neighbouring villages asked for permission to go 
to their villages in order to complete some affairs of theirs and to get [buy?] food 
and fodder from the villages and from the bazar. It is probable that they might 
have dared to commit such deplorable acts during their trips there and back, but it 
is also doubtless that it is impossible to prohibit them from this way.
1153
 [My 
translation] 
 
 As it is seen from the above, the müşir admits his powerlessness in preventing the 
başıbozuk from plundering (bunların bu yoldan men‟ olunmaları dahi mertebe-i 
imkânda olmadığı şübhesizdir). The başıbozuk cavalry commanders in the Kars army, 
especially Hasan Yazıcı and Ġnce Arap from Damascus had also been notorious for their 
many outrages. They had not shown themselves in the battles and since they did not get 
paid they started pillaging (nehb ü garet). General Williams and the British consulate in 
Erzurum repeatedly wrote complaints to the British embassy and finally managed to get 
them arrested. One of these documents is sent from Erzurum, dated 4 January 1855 
(author not specified). It is stated that the başıbozuk cavalry under the command of 
Hasan Yazıcı had not been of use against the Russians last year. This year they were 
again expected to oppose the başıbozuk cavalry of the enemy, that had occupied and 
looted the Ottoman villages in the line of Kars-Gümrü. However, it was also stated that 
                                                 
1152    Duncan, op. cit., vol. I, p. 277. 
1153   Abdi Pasha‟s statement. BOA. Ġ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6. See Appendix 82. 
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some Ottoman subjects from Kars to Bayezid had also accepted service in the irregular 
cavalry and infantry of the enemy, who knew how to make use of money.  
 From the British embassy an extract of the letter was given to the grand vizier and 
the grand vizier wrote to the seraskier to look into the matter on 14 March 1855. The 
seraskier replied on 21 March that the commander in chief of the Anatolian army was 
instructed to make an interrogation into the behaviour of these sergerdes.
1154
 
 The irregular Arab, Albanian other troops recruited for the British army and 
camped in Kala-i Sultaniye (Çanakkale) under the command of General Beatson were 
also a constant source of disorder. As noted by Skene and Money, Beatson had been too 
mild with these başıbozuks and he was unable to discipline them. They looted the bazar, 
and used all kinds of violence including rape and murder against the population and 
even wounding an Ottoman officer and attacking French soldiers. When the governor of 
the province remonstrated to General Beatson, the general either defended his troops or 
made a feeble effort to top stop them.
1155
 Finally the Ottoman governor collected all the 
consuls, negotiated with them and decided to ask for help from Istanbul in July 1855. 
Therefore the Porte sent a punitive force of three companies of infantry with artillery 
from the Hassa army in Istanbul under the command of Miralay Muhiddin Bey.
1156
 
According to Captain Money, this force consisted of 500 infantry, 250 cavalry, 250 
artillery and 8 field pieces.
1157
 Only after this show of force did the başıbozuks agree to 
go unarmed in the town. 
 By September 1855, the Porte decided to send special punitive missions to the 
Balkans and Thessaly. Thus Midhat Bey, second secretary of the MVL and 
Mühendishane-i Hümayun Feriki (Engineer General) Selim Pasha were appointed to 
special missions each, the former to Varna and its environment and the latter to the left 
(south) side of Rumelia until Janina. Their duty was to inspect the administrators and 
punish the culprits of the atrocities and disorders.  
 In the instructions to Midhat Bey (the future famous Midhat Pasha) it was stated 
that the army commanders were naturally too involved in the current affairs of the war 
                                                 
1154  HR. SYS. 1336/57 lef 1, dated 4 January 1855. Translation of an extract from a letter from the 
British consulate in Erzurum. Lef 2: From the grand vizier to the seraskier, dated 24 
Cemaziyelahir 1271 (14 March 1855); and the reply of the seraskier, dated 2 Receb 1271 (21 
March 1855).  
1155  Money, op. cit., pp. 103-105; Skene, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Cf. Reid, op. cit., pp. 274-276. 
1156  BOA. HR. SYS. 1337/35, dated 19 July 1855, HR. SYS. 1353/33, dated 26 July 1855 and HR. 
SYS. 1353/34, dated 29 July 1855. Also see Skene, op. cit., pp. 48-50; Money, op. cit., pp. 103-
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1157  Money, op. cit., p. 103. 
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to give time to such disorders and the governors were also very much busy, so the small 
administrators had shown indifference in their duties to prevent the various oppressions 
and barbarian treatment (teaddiyat ve barbarca muamelat) to Muslim and Christian 
subjects. Then the victims are more specifically described as some helpless Bulgarians 
(bazı biçare Bulgarlar). Midhat Bey was empowered with special authority to deal with 
the issue on the spot, to go directly to the places of atrocities and try to capture the 
perpetrators and to punish them according to law and regulations. He would also punish 
indifferent administrators according to the degree of their crimes.
1158
 Instructions to 
Selim Pasha were similar. The perpetrators of the inhuman actions were to be punished 
severely (mücazat-ı şedide).1159  
 
 
5.6. Municipal Matters in Istanbul  
 
 
Galata was the European section of Istanbul with its embassies and the European 
and native non-Muslim population enjoying the protection of capitulations which meant 
that Ottoman laws were not applicable to them, and only their own laws as applied by 
their consulates. These protected and privileged communities included foreign 
merchants and bankers and some Ottoman Greeks, Jews and Armenians who had 
connections with the embassies and acquired their protection. Although the number of 
these Europeans and protected Ottomans of Galata is not accurate, we can assume that it 
was about 50,000.
1160
 During the war trade increased manifold and some of these 
enjoyed an immense increase in their wealth. As we have seen in the chapter on 
finances, some of them became as powerful as being commissioned to negotiate a 
foreign loan for the Porte in Europe. During the war and after the victory the Christian 
inhabitants increased their cultural and political influence.  
As everywhere in Istanbul, the influx of foreigners had increased rents in Galata 
as well. It was also as filthy as others sections of the city. Many travellers have noted 
the filth of the streets of Pera. Colonel Atwell Lake for example writes that “of all the 
filthy dens I ever beheld in the course of my experience Pera is the filthiest… You are 
obliged to walk about Pera in jack boots, to keep you out of the mud and dirt”.1161 
                                                 
1158  Draft of instructions to Midhat Efendi, second secretary of the MVL. BOA. HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 
1, 12 September 1855. See Appendix 102. 
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1160   Slade, op. cit., p. 356. 
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346 
Crime in the suburb had also increased considerably. The perpetrators of crime 
were often the Greeks and Armenians under foreign protection. The Ottoman police was 
helpless against them because only their consuls could judge them.  
New cafes were built along the Grand Rue de Pera (today‟s İstiklal Caddesi) and a 
French restaurant was opened right beside the Mevlevi tekke of Galata.
1162
 Rich 
Ottomans were attracted by the European goods and style of the Galata shops. The poor 
and traditional Muslims most probably saw Galata or Pera as an infidel place where 
women went unveiled.  
The city had no municipal organization and some municipal functions were 
executed by the ihtisab nezareti that regulated the provisions of the city and the daily 
affairs were handled by Islamic judges, the kadıs, who mainly regulated prices and the 
markets. However this traditional structure, was almost unchanged from the time of the 
conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror. The Crimean War brought to 
the fore the inadequacies of this traditional structure. Especially the enlarged foreign 
community of Galata and the allies now demanded new services. The Ottomans also felt 
ashamed of the filth of the streets before the foreigners. Thus it is no surprise that the 
first municipal organization was founded during the war. Even before the foundation of 
that organization there were attempts to make urban development in Western lines. One 
of the first novelties in city life was naming the streets and numbering the houses.
1163
 
The ihtisab nezareti was abolished and a new body called Şehir Emaneti was 
instituted instead in June 1855. The regulations (nizamname) of the Ģehremaneti were 
published in the TV on 16 August 1855.
1164
 The Şehir Emaneti was modelled after the 
French préfecture de ville. It was responsible for the procuring of necessary provisions 
(staple goods) for the people of Istanbul, guild and market supervision, the regulation of 
prices, building of roads, pavements and their repairs, the cleanliness and 
embellishment of the city, and the general assurance of the good condition of the streets 
and bazaars, control of price, weight, quality, measure as well as the collection of taxes 
and dues collected before by the ihtisab nezareti to be submitted to the general 
treasury.
1165
 
The Şehir Emini (like the Préfet) was to be assisted by a municipal council of 12 
persons elected by the Porte and the work of the şehir emaneti would be supervised by 
                                                 
1162   Steven Rosenthal, “Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul: 1855-1865”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 11(2), April 1980, pp. 229.  
1163   BOA. HR. TO. 419/7, dated 5 February 1855. The decision was sent to the Nafia Nezareti for consideration. 
1164   Ġlber Ortaylı, Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878), Ankara: Türkiye ve Ortadoğu 
Amme Ġdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1974, pp. 116-117. 
1165   Ortaylı, ibid. Cf. Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 231. 
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the MVL. The first council of the emanet consisted solely of Muslims and Salih Pasha 
the former mutasarrıf of Amasya was appointed as the first emin. However, this first 
body did not perform anything other than the traditional functions and in three months 
Salih Pasha was dismissed and superseded by Hacı Hüssam Efendi, who was more 
experienced. However, he lacked personnel to function properly. 
 The şehremaneti was not successful because its members did not have 
competence or influence. Therefore a new commission, the İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu 
(Commission Municipale) was formed through the initiative of Emin Muhlis Efendi, a 
member of the MVL who had seen for a while the working of the municipality of 
Vienna. This time the commission consisted mainly of influential Christians and Jews 
like Antoine Alleon, Avram (Abraham) Behor Camondo and David Revelaki.
1166
 The 
commission worked out a set of rules for regularizing the street network and 
straightening, widening and paving the main roads of Istanbul, especially Pera, Galata 
and Tophane, where the commission members owned many buildings or parts of 
buildings. These members of the commission also lent money for a renewal project and 
for the building of new hans in Karaköy. They (especially Camondo) also used the 
municipal information for their future investments on real estate.
1167
 
 
 
5.7.  Public Opinion and Patriotism 
 
 
In the introductory chapter, we have seen that there are many destans and 
zafernames on the Crimean War. Only two of these give useful information for the 
historian: Salih Hayri‟s Hayrabat and Ahmed Rıza Trabzoni‟s Manzume-i Sivastopol. 
We have already seen them to some extent in Chapter 3. The rest of the destans are 
rather pure literary works imbued with religious heroism and valour. We have also seen 
that among these poets Yusuf Halis Efendi stood out with his patriotism. His Vatan 
Kasidesi and Destan-ı Askeri exalt love of homeland (hubb-ül vatan). The former poem 
is also remarkable for its Turkish nationalism. Halis Efendi criticised the former poets 
of Arabs, Anatolia and Iran (şuara-i Arab u Rum ü Acem) for not being patriotic poets. 
He also accused them of cloaking Turkish with Arabic and Persian expressions. The 
following verses exemplify this: 
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Giydirüp maşlahı Urban ü Acem kalpağın  
Sanki pek çıplak idi Türkî-i zibây-i vatan 
Mustalahdan kaba Türkçe yolu güç hem dardır 
Zahiren gerçi kolaydır reh-i mecray-ı vatan1168 
 
The fact that the writer of these lines is a translator from the Translation Bureau gives 
the impression that he might have been influenced by European concepts of nationality.  
According to Captain Fevzi Kurtoğlu, during the battle of Oltenitsa (4 November 
1853), the Ottoman army band in Tutrakan across the Danube played an army march 
which included the expression “lion-hearted Turks” in its repeat:  
Başlar kesilüp ser-be-ser dehşetli toplar patlasun,  
Arslan yürekli Türkleri görsün de düşmen çatlasun. 
 
This is very interesting, but unfortunately Kurtoğlu does not give any reference to his 
sources, so we are not certain as to the authenticity of this information.
1169
 
 It is well known that Europeans and Russians called the Ottoman Empire Turkey 
for short, while the Ottoman official language used other names. In 1855, Sultan 
Abdülmecid‟s official title included the word “Türkistan” in the ratification of the 
agreement on the guarantee of the Ottoman loan by Britian and France (Biz ki bi-lütfihi 
Teala Türkistan ve Türkistan‟ın şâmil olduğu nice memalik ve büldanın padişahı).1170 
This was probably the first time when an Ottoman Sultan used the word Türkistan (a 
translation of the French word Turquie) in his title. In the ratification of the Treaty of 
Paris in 1856, Sultan Abdülmecid again defined himself as “by the grace of God, we the 
Padişah of Türkistan and the countries and territories which it encompasses”.1171  
Ottoman press life was also enriched by the Crimean War with the appearance of 
European newspapers in Istanbul. These newspapers were publishing very recent news 
of war by the standards of the time. In the Ottoman press there was the official Takvim-i 
Vekayi and the semi-official Ceride-i Havadis. Ottoman newspapers started quoting 
from European newspapers. In the 1860s Ottoman press life became enriched with the 
appearance of the first independent newspapers like the Tercüman-ı Ahval of ġinasi and 
Agâh Efendi in 1860 and especially the Tasvir-i Efkâr of ġinasi, Ahmet Vefik Pasha 
and Namık Kemal in 1862. Thus criticism towards the government increased. These 
years were also the formative years of an Ottoman public opinion.  
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The notion of public opinion (efkâr-ı umumiye) itself was a novelty and it soon 
became a high-frequency word in the vocabulary of the new intelligentsia that came to 
be known as the Young Ottomans, such as ġinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya PaĢa, Ali Suavi 
etc. ġinasi had been excluded from membership of the Encümen-i Daniş, the Ottoman 
“Academy of Sciences” in 1856, because he had shaved his beard. The ulema thought 
that a learned man of letters should bear a beard1172. On close examination, however, it 
turned out that he had shaved his beard due to reasons of health. Other popular words of 
the new intelligentsia included vatan (fatherland or la patrie), millet (nation) and 
hürriyet (liberty). Actually these words gained new meanings. Originally vatan meant 
one's birth place, on a local level. Millet mainly meant religious community, and only 
gradually came to mean nation. Finally hürriyet originally would just mean the state of 
not being a slave and it did not imply political freedom or freedom of opinion. All these 
words began to acquire their modern meanings in these years. The government reacted 
by setting up censorship offices and issuing a press law (Matbuat Nizamnamesi) that 
prohibited any criticism of the government in 1864.  
Muslim reactions to the Islahat Fermanı and to the extravagance of the Sultan 
gave way to a conspiracy in Istanbul in 1859. The event was later called Kuleli Vakası 
(Kuleli Incident) because the arrested conspirators were tried in the barracks of Kuleli. 
The leader of the conspiratorial organization or the secret society was a certain ġeyh 
Ahmed of Süleymaniye, a medrese teacher at the Sultan Bayezid Mosque. ġeyh Ahmed 
had participated in the Crimean War in Kars. Prominent members of the organization 
included Cafer Dem Pasha, Ferik Çerkez Hüseyin Daim Pasha, Major Rasim Bey and 
Arif Efendi, a secretary of the Tophane-i Amire.
1173
 The conspiracy was betrayed by an 
officer in September 1859. The aims of the conspirators are not clear and there are two 
basic approaches among historians. Some consider it as the first constitutonal 
movement. Others find it merely an Islamic, anti-Western movement in opposition to 
Sultan Abdülmecid‟s way of life. According to Davison, “the basic motif of the 
conspirators was opposition to westernization”.1174 As Davison has noted, while the 
general dissatisfaction might have arisen from economic difficulties, excessive spending 
of the palace and arrears of pay in the army; it took the shape of a religious fanatism and 
hostility to equality of the non-Muslims. However, the religious character of the 
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conspiracy is not surprising, in the Ottoman Empire most reactions to the government 
usually took a religious character, probably for the lack of other ideologies. 
Although only 41 persons were arrested, it was certain that many members of the 
ulema were involved. The Russian military agent in Istanbul, Captain Frankini reported 
the event to St Petersburg as a conspiracy against Sultan Abdülmecid and in favor of 
Sultan Abdülaziz.1175 Frankini noted that the causes were the dissatisfaction of the 
people because of financial problems and the carelessness of the Sultan. The report also 
stated that “the benefits of some foreigners, the luxury and the richnesses exhibited by 
the Turkish dignitaries, the venality of their entourage and the administrators, the 
feeling of complete dependence in which place since the last war, Turkey finds itself 
with respect to Europe” had caused a major resentment in the Muslim population. 
Interestingly the report also noted that Cafer Dem Pasha had been “particularly 
protected by Lord Redcliffe who had even obtained the rank of the general of division 
for him”. Abdülmecid forgave the organizators and lessened their punishments, turning 
death sentences into life-long imprisonment. This leniency was interpreted by the 
Russian agent as weakness. 
Finally let us note that the first patriotic Ottoman theatre play was inspired by the 
Crimean War: Namık Kemal's Vatan yahut Silistre (Homeland or Silistria) took its 
subject from the defence of Silistria. Namık Kemal seems to have taken the names of 
his heroes from real people, because the two prominent heroes of his play, Islam Bey 
and Abdullah ÇavuĢ are the names of an officer and a sergeant who have served in the 
Rumeli army. There is a Colonel (Miralay) Ġslam Bey mentioned with praise by Ömer 
Pasha in the correspondence of the war ministry.
1176
 Abdullah ÇavuĢ is an orderly 
sergeant (emir çavuşu) serving under the command of Ġsmail Pasha in the Rumeli army. 
Together with a certain Süleyman Ağa, he was nominated by Ġsmail Pasha and then 
Seraskier Rıza Pasha and accordingly decorated with the Mecidiye order for his bravery 
during the battle of Çatana (Cetate).1177 Namık Kemal had probably read or their names 
from the lists of decorations, probably published in the TV or CH or heard from people. 
The play ends with the words “Long live the homeland (vatan)! Long live Ottomans!”. 
The topic of another play by Namık Kemal (Akif Bey) is taken from the naval 
battle of Sinop. The hero of the drama is the commander of a frigate from the Ottoman 
squadron in Sinop, which was attacked and burnt by a Russian squadron under the 
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command of Vice-Admiral Pavel Nakhimov. Akif Bey survives the battle, is taken 
prisoner by the Russians, but flees from prison and returns to Batum only to find his 
wife married to another person. We must also note that Namık Kemal came to Kars 
when he was 13-14 years old and spent one year (from June 1853 to July 1854) there 
during his grandfather Abdüllatif Pasha‟s office term as the governor (kaimmakam) of 
Kars. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu argues that the young Namık Kemal was influenced by the 
“moral atmosphere” and folk literature traditions of Kars.1178   
Another social impact of the Crimean War on the Ottoman Empire was the 
acceleration of immigration of many Crimean Tatars, Circassians and Nogays of the 
Kuban into the Ottoman Empire. After the peace with Russia, the Crimean Tatars had 
been left to their destiny by the allies and the Porte. Many of them immigrated to the 
Ottoman Empire. Although immigration had started in 1853, the big wave did not come 
immediately after the war, but it came only in 1860.
1179
 This suggests that the war did 
not have an immediate effect of mass exodus for the Crimean Tatars. But then what 
caused their mass emigration in 1860? Unfortunately, Kazas does not provide us a 
sufficient answer and the topic goes beyond the scope of research of this dissertation. 
Neither does Saydam give an answer. Saydam writes that big increases took place in the 
number of immigrants from the Crimea from 1859 onwards but does not explain 
why.
1180
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
We have seen that the Crimean War was not given much attention in Ottoman and 
Turkish historiography although it ended with victory for the Ottoman Empire and its 
allies. One of the reasons for the lack of monographs on the involvement of the 
Ottoman Empire is the lack of personal narratives and memoirs by Ottoman statesmen, 
officers, journalists, doctors, intellectuals, etc. Although there are many documents 
related to the Crimean War in the BOA, these are mostly official correspondence and as 
such they do not show the motives and struggles behind many decisions or acts. 
Unfortunately Ottoman officers did not leave memoirs or such memoirs did not survive. 
Nevertheless, I found the statements of the Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha, Bahriye 
Feriki Mustafa Pasha, MüĢir Abdi Pasha, MüĢir Ahmed Pasha, MüĢir Zarif Pasha and 
Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha at the MVL. Thus for the first time the lost voices of some officers 
have been recovered here. This could be regarded as one of the contributions of this 
dissertation to the existing literature. These statements give us an idea of the elite 
struggles among the Ottoman pashas. The statements also help us clarify some details of 
some battles and how the military commanders led the war.  
The present study was not primarily interested in the reasons for the breakout of 
the war, it was rather about the process of the war itself and its impact and outcomes for 
the Ottomans. In the narrative of the war, I have endeavoured to present a non-biased, 
balanced and comparative view of the strengths and weaknesses of the warring sides. I 
have also tried to find out the reasons for the defeats of the Ottoman armies, examining 
the Ottoman method of waging war or the Ottoman warfare as well. 
From a political point of view, the results of the war were not altogether beneficial 
for the Ottoman bureaucracy, especially from a conservative point of view. Victory in 
this war did not bring any significant material gain for the Ottomans, not even a war 
indemnity for their losses, whereas the Ottoman treasury was nearly bankrupted due to 
war expenses which were solely because of the Russian occupation of Ottoman 
territory, without any provocation from the Ottoman side. The Ottoman Empire did not 
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gain any significant territory except some areas in Bessarabia. Like many of the other 
guarantees and stipulations of the Paris Treaty of 1856, this gain would also be nullified 
soon, because the war gave impetus to the union of the Danubian principalities and 
ultimately to their independence. The Ottoman Empire became a European protectorate 
in reality, although in theory it had become a member of the European Concert or the 
European state system. Although it was on the side of the winners, the Porte also lost 
the right to have a navy in the Black Sea together with Russia. Actually the Ottoman 
Empire had become a part of the European Concert, but not an actor in the European 
balance of power. Thus it was not recognized as a great power that could claim 
compensation in case of territorial gain by another member of the system. By the 
beginning of the 1870s, after the defeat of France by Prussia, the European balance of 
power was changed and Russia took advantage of the new situation by declaring the 
neutrality of the Black Sea void.  
The war brought about the Islahat Fermanı, which is one of the most important 
documents of the 19
th
 century Ottoman history. This firman was meant to prevent 
European interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of its Christian 
subjects. The Porte wanted to make some improvements for its non-Muslim subjects in 
order to prevent the question from being included in an international treaty. It rightly 
feared that if rights were given by an international treaty and not by the grace of the 
Sultan, then the non-Muslim subjects would feel gratitude towards the great powers and 
not to the Sultan. The Porte did not want the firman even to be mentioned in the treaty 
but it could not prevent its mention.  
We have seen that some historians consider the alliance of the Porte with France 
and Britain and the result of the Paris Treaty a success of Ottoman diplomacy. I do not 
find this position tenable. The alliance was dictated by the interests of the ruling classes 
of France and Britain. In fact the great powers tried to solve the problem among 
themselves with little reference to the Porte. On one occasion they even did not forward 
the note of the Porte from Vienna to St Petersburg, finding it unacceptable on behalf of 
Russia. During the war, Vienna was the centre for diplomatic negotiations and the 
Ottoman ambassador in Vienna Arif Efendi did not know French and had limited 
relations with the corps diplomatique. Nevertheless, ReĢid Pasha and the Porte were not 
just passive onlookers. ReĢid Pasha showed much diplomatic skill in handling the 
question. The Porte even rejected the Vienna Note which all the Great Powers pressed 
for admission. 
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Relations between the Porte and the allies during the war were not full of accord 
either. There is no doubt that the allies fought not for the sake of the Porte, but for their 
own ends, namely the containment of Russia. For one thing, the allies did not want the 
Porte to gain territory, especially Christian territory. Thus for example they did not want 
to put the Christians of Georgia under Ottoman sovereignty. As for the Muslim 
Circassians, the allies (especially the French) were not interested much in their 
independence or annexation into the Ottoman Empire either. The British former 
Secretary of State for War, the Duke of Newcastle even remarked that it was 
“monstrous to see the Turkish flag flying” in Circassia and “to witness attempts to 
establish Turkish government in the Country”. In the summer of 1854, the allies 
effectively blocked an Ottoman fleet to appear on the Circassian coasts with agents and 
war material. On the other hand, the Porte could not coordinate its actions with Shamil 
on the Caucasian front. The defeats of the Ottomans on this front forced Shamil to 
remain passive. Nevertheless, even his passive stand led Russia to detach many troops 
away from the front to keep him at bay. Thus it was rather the Ottomans‟ fault not to 
seek an effective alliance with Shamil. The issue of Shamil‟s kidnapping of some 
women including a French governess also did much harm to relations between Shamil 
and the Porte. 
The equality of the non-Muslim subjects with Muslims was imposed upon the 
Porte and the Islamist or conservative sections of society and the bureaucracy did not 
like it, although even those statesmen who opposed it were aware of the necessity of 
such reforms. The question was rather about the pace of reforms. For some statesmen 
like Mustafa ReĢid Pasha the political equality of non-Muslims was too fast and too 
radical a reform. The war indeed made the Porte very sensitive towards the demands of 
its allies Britain and France. We have seen that the basic Ottoman approach in the 
question of reforms was the method of dissimulation and temporizing towards Europe. 
The Ottoman elite was also in a dilemma between religious (şer‟î) rules and the 
necessities of the time. This was especially sharply felt in the issues of slavery and the 
cizye. In such issues, the Porte chose to ward off the objections of Europe by issuing 
many edicts and orders. However, the application of these orders went very slowly. We 
also see that practical necessity rather than a planned activity was the real force behind 
the Ottoman reforms. 
The Ottoman elite lost a great opportunity by not being serious in accepting the 
non-Muslim subjects into the army. Many non-Muslims indeed showed eagerness to 
serve their country during this war. If non-Muslims were accepted into the army (not 
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just as rank and file of course, including the right to become officers as well) and if they 
were given equal opportunities in other state services perhaps the eventually failed 
project of Ottoman citizenship might have had a better chance. Nevertheless, we must 
not forget that the great powers did not favour Christian conscription, neither did the 
non-Muslim communities. Military service was not popular among neither Muslims nor 
non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. The people had good reasons for this, because it 
lasted too long and the poor soldiers were much abused in every way, without receiving 
pay for months and being subject to all kinds of diseases because of malnutrition and ill-
treatment. More soldiers died of diseases than of battles in the Crimean War. 
With retrospect, Nikolai I seems to be simply more outspoken among the other 
imperialists to seek the partition of the Ottoman Empire. However, he began and 
conducted the war in an indecisive way. As Friedrich Engels noted at that time, he 
ought to have known that Europe would not allow him to destroy or subdue the 
Ottoman Empire.
1181
 Engels then argued that once Nikolai decided war, he should have 
crossed the Pruth with a much larger force, reaching across the Balkans before the 
Ottomans gathered forces. This indeed seems possible. What Engels did not take into 
account, however, was that not all of Nikolai‟s generals, including Field Marshal 
Paskevich, believed or favoured such a plan. In fact Nikolai did give orders to act more 
firmly than his generals actually did, but he had not chosen the right commanders for 
this task. The best examples are Paskevich, Gorchakov and Menshikov who all proved 
ineffective. In most of the battles where the Russian army was successful, it did not 
fully utilize its success by following the Ottoman army and dealing a decisive blow. For 
example, after the battles of BaĢgedikler and Kürekdere, even if not immediately after, 
but some time later, General Bebutov could have captured Kars, had he followed the 
scattered Ottoman army. Muravyov was successful before Kars but he achieved it at an 
enormous cost for Russia by his unsuccessful storming of Kars. Nevertheless, even if 
Nikolai had appointed more effective generals and even if his armies had taken Edirne 
and Kars as in 1829, it is very doubtful that they could go farther or sign a treaty similar 
to the Treaty of Edirne of 1829. Because then Russian armies would have been 
projected too far and their supplies would most probably fail as in 1829. The allies 
would certainly defend Istanbul and then Russia might have faced a heavier defeat. Yet 
one is tempted to ask another speculative question: What would have happened if 
Russia had attacked the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasian frontier only, as 
                                                 
1181  “The Russian Failure”, NYDT, 11 July 1854, in Marx, op. cit., p. 398. 
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Menshikov had once advised, instead of occupying the principalities? Probably Britain 
would still be willing to oppose Russian expansion towards India, but would Napoleon 
III still be as much interested? 
In the end, Russia was not defeated in a strict sense even in the Crimea. The 
Russian army had evacuated the southern part of Sevastopol but it was still there and 
ready to fight. The allies could not afford to go deep into Russian territory. In fact they 
had to stick to the shore for a constant flow of supplies. On the other hand, Russia had 
now firmly entrenched itself in the Caucasus showing that even the alliance of the most 
powerful naval states with the Porte could not drive it away from the Caucasus. Thus 
within three years after the end of the war, Russia captured Shamil and ended the long 
Caucasian war. (We must also take into account the discontent of much of the 
population from Shamil‟s or his naibs‟ already corrupt rule). In fact the new post-Soviet 
Russian orthodox nationalism considers that Russia was not defeated in the Crimean 
war, rejecting most of what Tarle and other Soviet historians said on the topic. These 
“new Russians” do not accept the backwardness of Russia at that time either.1182 
Britain later tacitly accepted the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Around twenty 
years later, when Russia again attacked the Ottomans, Britain only took advantage by 
seizing Cyprus in 1878. This time the British public opinion was not pro-Ottoman 
because of the default on Ottoman debts and the “Bulgarian horrors” of 1876. A good 
example of the change in the attitude of the British can be observed in the person of 
Doctor Humphry Sandwith, who, as we have seen, was attached to the Anatolian army 
in Erzurum and Kars during the war and wrote his memoirs after the war. Sandwith was 
also one of those few British men who spoke Turkish. In his book on the Crimean War, 
which was published in 1856, he mentioned the Ottoman Armenians only negatively. 
But in 1878 he wrote an article in which he was much anti-Ottoman.
1183
 He had also 
mentioned the atrocities of the başıbozuks before, but now he made a direct link 
between the başıbozuks and the plight of the Ottoman Armenians. Actually the 
precedents of the British attitudes in the 1870s about the Ottoman Christian subjects can 
                                                 
1182   These arguments were expressed in a conference in Moscow on 7-8 November 2006 under the title 
of “The Crimean War in the Cultural Memory of the Peoples of Russia and the World” 
(Krymskaya Voina v kul‟turnoy pamyati narodov Rossii i mira), organized by the Tsentr 
Natsionalnoy Slavy Rossii (Centre for the National Glory of Russia, an endowment close to 
President Putin). Prof. Vitaliy Sheremet has also participated in this conference and read a paper. 
For papers presented in this conference, see http://www.cnsr.ru/projects.php?id=10 (Retrieved in 
November 2006). Also see my news article, “UnutulmuĢ Bir Hikaye: Kırım SavaĢı”, Toplumsal 
Tarih 156, Istanbul, December 2006, p. 6. 
1183   See James Reid‟s article in Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), Armenian Karin / Erzerum, Costa Mesa, 
CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003, pp. 147-187. 
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be found in some British reports about the disorders of the başıbozuks during the 
Crimean War. A few of these reports are in the appendices. Later, in World War I, those 
very allies who fought Russia in the Crimean War in order to prevent the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire finally reached an agreement with Russia (the Sykes-Picot secret 
agreement) on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. 
I have also shown that the Ottomans did not consider the defeat in Sinop as a 
“massacre”. They called it as the deplorable (müteellime), or distressing (mükeddire), or 
heart-rending (dil-sûz) event, as if it was a natural disaster, but I did not see any 
reference to a massacre in the documents that I saw in the BOA. Kostaki Musurus, the 
Ottoman ambassador in London, uses a similar expression (déplorable événement).1184 
We have seen that actually the disorders, atrocities and plunders of the başıbozuks 
were mostly because of their being deprived of pay and rations by the governors and 
pashas. Unable to feed themselves, the başıbozuks then attacked civilians. The 
başıbozuk troops contained some roots of the Armenian question of the last quarter of 
the 19
th
 century. By 1876 European and especially British public opinion had turned 
against the Ottoman Empire because of the Bulgarian and Armenian events.  
Economically, the war accelerated the process of the entry of the Ottoman Empire 
into the European financial system. The two foreign debts contracted during the war 
were followed by other loans until the Ottoman Empire defaulted on its loans. The Porte 
actually never recovered from these first loans. These loans and others were not used for 
productive ends but rather for consumption and debt servicing. We have also seen that 
the interests of the London financial circles, (the City) were paramount in British policy. 
With regard to Namık Pasha‟s loan mission to Paris and London, I have argued, pace 
Anderson, Akar and Al, that the failure of Namık Pasha was not a result of his 
amateurishness, but a result of the financial conjuncture at that time. With regard to the 
iane-i harbiye, I have shown that it was not a donation but a war tax. 
Culturally, the Crimean War has been a period of close contacts with Europeans 
and some improvements for non-Muslims along with some fanatical attacks on them. 
The war also presented material for a kind of Ottoman Muslim patriotism and even 
Turkish nationalism. Namık Kemal‟s theatre plays and the destans of Ahmed Rıza, 
Salih Hayri and many others are good examples of this spirit. The war has also shown 
the importance of public opinion, and contributed to the spread of the notion of public 
opinion among the Ottomans. The war has also contributed to the formation of the 
future “Young Ottomans”. 
                                                 
1184  Musurus to ReĢid Pasha. Londres, le 15 Décembre 1853. BOA. Ġ. HR. 105/5151 lef 37. 
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From a military-technical point of view, the war showed that the Ottoman army 
was not like a modern European army. As the Russian General Prince Mikhail 
Gorchakov noted, the Ottomans had destroyed the old army, but they had not yet built a 
new regular army in a European sense. Except for a few units, the army was poorly 
trained, poorly armed, poorly clothed. We have seen that the soldiers‟ pay was in arrears 
for many months. There was much corruption in the army and the poor soldiers did not 
receive proper rations, clothes, shelters, etc. I have demonstrated by quoting a letter of 
the grand vezir that the practise of muster-roll fraud in the army was well known to the 
Ottoman dignitaries. The fact that this fraud was not rigorously investigated by the 
MVL during the trial of the former commanders of the Anatolian army is another proof 
of the involvement and complacency of the military and civil authorities in this act. As 
James Reid has pointed out, the Ottoman strategy of piecemeal deployment of troops is 
among the causes of Ottoman defeats in the Caucasian front. However, we must not 
forget that even the scattered Ottoman forces were in most cases still equal or superior 
in numbers to the Russian forces that opposed them. Thus the real reasons for the defeat 
were rather in the low quality of the officer class and lack of training of the troops. The 
Ottoman regular and irregular cavalry were especially very useless. Ottomans had also 
much difficulty in the provisioning of the troops. More troops died of diseases, 
malnutrition, cold and lack of proper housing than of participation in the battles. 
Ottoman troops had no press to relate their depravations and their bravery. They 
were unqualified to engage in the open field due to lack of discipline, lack of training 
and most important of all, lack of confidence in their officers. The high ranking officer 
class, with few exceptions, proved inefficient. The system of promotion prevented 
honest and talented officers from ever being promoted to a rank higher than the major. 
The Ottoman army was also paralyzed by personal rivalries and corruption. Especially 
in the Anatolian army there was much factional strife, jealousy, and lack of discipline. 
Many foreign and refugee officers from Europe (Hungarian, Polish, Italian, British, 
French, etc) and even from America served in this war in the Ottoman army. Some of 
these officers were really good officers. Yet their use was also limited and cancelled off 
because of rivalries and jealousies. 
Very few of the guilty officers were punished. In fact many of the accused pashas 
were rehabilitated. The most notorious is Mustafa Zarif Pasha who was made a member 
of the Meclis-i Tanzimat just two years after his dismissal. Other commanders of the 
Anatolian army also returned to official posts. On the other hand, the British military 
commissioner Williams Pasha‟s accusations against Zarif Pasha are a mixture of right 
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and wrong. For example, he accused Zarif Pasha of making an open field attack upon 
the Russian army in Kürekdere. However, as we have seen, Zarif Pasha himself accused 
Guyon and other generals, pashas and staff officers on this account. Williams also made 
false accusations of disrespect by some Ottoman officers towards himself, when he had 
in fact been respected more than was necessitated by his rank. However, such faults of 
Williams, and even his Orientalist views on the Ottomans do not necessarily refute his 
concrete accusations of corruption.  
The Marxist notion of “uneven and combined development” refers to the 
coexistence of most modern modes of production with pre-capitalist modes in 
underdeveloped countries in the age of imperialism. It also describes regional or 
sectoral inequalities or irregularities of the capitalist mode of production. I think this 
model can be applied to Ottoman military reform in the 19
th
 century. The Ottoman army 
during the Crimean War is an interesting case from this point of view. On the one hand, 
some of its units, such as the artillery or the chasseurs had the most modern weapons of 
the time such as rifle carbines or Minié rifles. These units were also recognized by 
many European observers as worthy of the best armies in Europe. On the other hand, 
the Ottoman army had ignorant and even illiterate commanders (even an army chief of 
staff), irregular troops with archaic weapons and tactics, archaic methods of provisions 
and archaic systems of fortifications. The Rumeli army in general was better organized 
than the Anatolian army. Within these armies some regiments or battalions were better 
than others. Overall, however, the backward side of the army weighed decisive. As 
noted by James Reid, the Ottoman generals did not demonstrate a sufficient 
understanding of European warfare. 
The military contributions of Egypt and Tunis were important in the war. We have 
seen that these dependencies were still part of the Ottoman Empire and sent troops to 
the war accordingly. In the case of Egypt, there was also some sort of bargaining 
between the Porte and the governor of Egypt Abbas Pasha and later Said Pasha. These 
governors were then trying to conclude a contract with the French on the Suez Canal 
and another contract with the British for a railway line. In both cases, the Porte asserted 
its right of approval for such plans, while the Egyptian pashas thought it was their 
internal affair. So by sending troops, they planned to get the approval of the Porte as 
well. Another subject for bargaining was the expenses of the Egyptian troops in Istanbul 
and the Crimea. In the end, the Porte agreed to pay them from its treasury. 
Ottoman high officers, ministers and governors did not want to take personal 
responsibility. Even in battle operations, a single hierarchical line of authority and 
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responsibility was not favourable for them to maintain. If anything went wrong, all put 
the blame on others, while the commander in chief also did not take responsibility. All 
pashas had their representatives and also enemies in the capital. In the provinces they 
had to take into consideration the local notables. Then there were the numerous councils 
in the capital and provinces (meclis), a novelty of the Tanzimat. Although they were 
intended to prevent personal arbitrariness, these councils did not function properly. 
They took away personal responsibility from many officials but did not give results in 
turn. In most cases, they were in the hands of the governor.  
Abdülmecid seemed to be a weak Sultan to many observers. During the time 
period of this dissertation, there is hardly any original sentence, important decision, or 
thought that can be attributed to him. He was fully indulged in women and drinking. 
Nevertheless, he was believed by some Western diplomats to be holding some 
“enlightened” views about such topics as slavery and the rights of Christian subjects. 
Whether he really held such enlightened views or he was engaged in the same kind of 
dissimulation and temporizing just as his subordinates is difficult to answer. But one 
thing is certain: he was mild in character and did not like bloodshed. He even pardoned 
those who plotted to assassinate him in 1859. 
There was little unity among the Ottoman statesmen at the top. Many pashas were 
jealous of their superiors and waited for an opportunity to replace them. The system of 
promotion in the bureaucracy was not based upon merit at all. Damad Mehmed Ali 
Pasha, ReĢid Pasha, Ali Pasha and Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha all had their grudges 
against each other. The seraskier Hasan Rıza Pasha and commander in chief Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha did not get along well. A harmful side effect of the reforms and Westernization 
was that the Ottoman ruling class lost its dignity, as admitted by Cevdet Pasha. They 
swallowed so many insults and slights from the allies. On the other hand, the 
xenophobic discourse that claims that the Ottoman Empire or Turkey had no friends is 
also problematic. For in this war almost the whole of Europe was behind the Ottoman 
Empire. True, the allies had their own interests, but this does not change the fact that 
they were allies and defended the independence of the Porte by arms. Such a discourse 
cannot take (and does not want to take) lessons from history, because it too readily 
assigns the role of the injured party to the Porte in every case, even in cases when it is 
rather the injuring party.  
I have also argued that there is no clear cut, permanent dichotomy among 
Ottoman statesmen as “reformers” versus “conservatives”. Most of the Ottoman 
statesmen were pragmatists. Their positions and views on many issues depended upon 
361 
their being in office or deposed. Reshid Pasha also showed himself on the downslide of 
his influence and reforming energy, despite his last two terms of grand viziership. He 
opposed the reform edict and the political equality of the non-Muslim subjects of the 
empire.  
While some aspects of the war and its effects require further research, the present 
study has hopefully presented a fair view of the “Ottoman Crimean War”.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendices are given in chronological order. Numbers in brackets refer to line 
numbers. Numbers separated by slash in the references to the BOA indicate 
Dosya/Gömlek numbers. Editorial notes are given in brackets. All documents, including 
copies of Western documents, are from the BOA, unless otherwise indicated.  
 
 
Appendix 1: HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 11, dated 4 June 1853. Stratford de Redcliffe to 
the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs on the export duty on Wallachian grain.  
 
It being generally understood that the Government of Wallachia intended to increase the 
duty on grain destined for exportation to a degree which would contravene the 
Commercial Treaty of 1838, the Undersigned received Instructions from his 
Government to enter his Protest against any such departure from the engagements 
subsisting between the Two Governments.  
 
In execution of those instructions the undersigned now protests in the customary form 
against this supposed infraction of Treaty, and holds the Porte responsible for any losses 
which may accrue therefrom to any subject or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty. 
 
Stratford de Redcliffe 
Pera, June 4, 1853. 
 
Appendix 2. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 1, dated 22 June 1853. Stratford à Monsieur 
Etienne Pisani.  
 
Therapia, le 22 Juin 1853. 
Monsieur, 
 J‟ai en occasion plus d‟une fois de une fois de me plaindre des injures, reçues par 
des persons sous la protection Britannique de la part des soldats aux services de la Porte 
Ottomane. Nos Consuls en cherchant satisfaction ont trouvé une disposition dans les 
officiers qui les commandent de servir au bien de corriger le mal dont on se plaint, et les 
Gouverneurs civiles sont trop souvent inclines de sympathiser avec les commandant 
militaires, plutôt que d‟insister à la punition des coupables. Maintenant que les Rediffs 
sont appelés de plusieurs provinces de l‟Empire sous des circonstances qui tendent à 
exciter un esprit de fanatisme, il est probable que des offenses dont il a été question 
seront commises plus souvent, et peu être d‟une nature plus grave pour ceux qui en 
souffriront. En effet, des plaintes me sont déjà parvenues et je vous transmets ci-joint 
une pièce contenant des faits d‟une mauvais traitement nonteux [ ?] dernièrement subi 
par quelques Chrétiens à Amasia. Afin d‟écarter un mal qui ne demande que l‟occasion 
et l‟impunité pour augmenter dans des proportions formidables, je fais un appel officiel 
à S. E. Reshid Pasha [sic] et à ses Collègues. Comme serviteurs de la Porte, ils sont 
grandement intéressés au maintien de la discipline militaire et à la cultivation des 
sentiments amicaux entre les Chrétiens et les Mussulmans. Des insultes et des offenses 
ne peuvent pas être commises par des soldats portant l‟uniforme du Sultan, soit sur les 
sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté ou sur des sujets des Puissances Chrétiennes, sans 
déshonneur au Gouvernement Ottoman et des embarras sérieux. Il est fort à désirer pour 
cela que des mesures promptes soient prises pour réprimer l‟esprit de licence et 
d‟animosité antichrétienne dont font parade ceux qui sont appelés en service actif, non 
pour la propagation de leur foi mais pour la défense de leur Souverain et de leur Empire. 
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Tout ce qui est exigé n‟est que de mettre en vigueur la discipline militaire, et des 
instructions à S. E. le Seraskier Pasha [sic] de transmettre aux Commandants des 
Rediffs et des troupes régulières tels explications qui pourraient les mettre à même 
d‟introduire un meilleur esprit parmi les hommes qu‟ils commandent. 
 Devant à l‟incident qui est arrivé à Amasia, j‟espère que la Porte ne manquera pas 
de blâmer immédiatement le Gouverneur de cette ville pour sa nonchalance à protéger 
les Grecs et leur Clergé des insultes et que les coupables reçoivent une leçon pour leur 
conduite à l‟avenir. 
 Vous lirez cette instruction à S. E. Reshid Pasha [sic] et vous lui en donnerez une 
traduction. 
  [Signé] Stratford de Redcliffe 
 
Appendix 3. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 8, dated 25 June 1853. From the British consulate 
in Erzurum. “the Koords are actively engaged in robbing” 
 
Erzurum, 25
th
 June 1853. 
 
In every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged in robbing, both on the 
high roads and in the villages. 
 
It is said that within a few days about 7 battalions will have come in from Harpood; and 
some time since seventy pieces of artillery set out on its way hither by a circuitous 
route, as the direct one was not practicable for guns. The detachments in the various out 
stations have been called in, but I trust some troops may be left there as the country will 
be at the mercy of the Koords, and incalculable injury to the cultivator will ensue. The 
militia has been called out, and altogether the forces to be collected here will, it is said, 
amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an imposing force the 
Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack on Georgia, as from the 
want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be much hope of success. But if 
Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as to disable her from succouring 
Georgia, and if an [sic] European force were landed in that country to cooperate with 
the Turkish force, then indeed a forward movement, combined with an attack on the 
part of the Caucasian tribes would not fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they 
would find few friends among the natives, were they to experience a reverse. 
 
Appendix 4. HR. SYS. 1928/14 lef 1, dated 11 July 1853. From the British consul in 
Salonica to the British embassy in Istanbul. Extract. Salonica, July 11
th
 1853.  
 
Selanik taraflarında bulunan başıbozuk asakiri üzerinde bir büyük zabitin nasb ve tayin 
olunması lüzumuna ve asakir-i mezkure bir iki manastırı yağma ettiklerine dair 
İngiltere sefaretine gelen tahrirattan iki kıta hulasası 
 
 “To appoint some active military man of rank, with only a few regular troops, say, 
100 cavalry and 100 infantry, and that such an officer have his headquarters at Larissa, 
but invested with the command of all their several chiefs and their irregulars.  
 I believe that some of the chiefs are well-intentioned men, particularly Ismael Bey 
and Abbas Agha, still, from what I know of most of these chiefs, generally speaking, 
they have neither the intellect nor the judgement required to be entrusted with the 
command in the vicinity of  the Hellenic Frontiers. 
 “The appointment of some superior officer over these several Albanian chiefs, to 
prevent any unhappy collision between their men – collisions which are not unfrequent 
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when different Albanian clans (as I may term them) are employed upon the same 
service”. 
 
Lef 2. Extract. Salonica, July 1853.  
 
 By the last accounts up to the 19
th
 instant, which I have received from Volo 
[Volos?] and Larissa, the alarm still continues both in consequence of the conduct of the 
irregular troops and the number of other Albanians in that vicinity, who have come to 
Thessaly in the hopes of being employed by the several chiefs. The irregulars are also 
clamorous for the pay which is due to them. In consequence of a misunderstanding 
between the new Ismail Bey and Noureddin Bey they have been obliged to separate to 
prevent a collision. A few days since Vassif Pasha arrested two Albanians who were 
intoxicated, but afterwards released them owing to the menacing aspect of the rest of 
irregulars. 
 The Archbishop of Salonica has received intelligence of the Greek monastery on 
Mount Olympus having been plundered of every thing, and that the monks were 
afterwards tormented in the, I may say, now usual Thessalian way; viz, with drops of 
boiling oil upon their chests, because they did not confess where the money of the 
monastery was secreted. There is also advice that another monastery in the vicinity 
Cosnia has been plundered and the monks tormented in the same way with drops of 
boiling oil. These sacrileges are supposed to have been committed by the disbanded 
Derbent troops of Haggi Hussein Pasha. There can be no doubt but that the Christians 
will suffer in certain districts during the passage of the irregular troops to their homes, 
in the event of present differences being arranged without coming to hostilities, unless 
indeed the Porte provide for the safety of the people either by the escort of each corps of 
irregulars by a troop of cavalry, or conveying them by steamers to the coast of Albania. 
These irregulars enlist more for plunder than patriotism. 
 
Appendix 5. İ. MVL. 26350 lef 2, dated 7 Zilhicce 1269 (11 September 1853). 
Mazbata of the Meclis-i Meşveret on the petition of some hoca efendis. 
 
Rusyalu‟nun tekalif-i vakıasından ve memalik-i Ģahaneye tecavüz ile nakz-ı ahd 
eylemesinden bahisle nas?let-i cihadı mübeyyin bazı ulema tarafından bu kere Meclis-i 
Vâlâ‟ya getirilip rehin [?] olan arzuhal Ģehr-i carinin altıncı Cuma günü havass-ı vükela-
i [2] fihamdan mürekkeb olarak sahilhane-i sadaretde akd olunan Meclis-i MeĢveret‟de 
kıraat edilerek iktiza-i halin müzakeratına ibtidar olundukda bu meselede Devlet-i 
Aliyye‟nin tutmuĢ olduğu usulün ve mecalis-i umumide cümle ittifakıyla verilen kararın 
[3] ez ser nev Ģerh ve izahıyla hukuk-ı saltanat ve istiklal-i hükümete dokunur Ģeyleri 
maazallahu teala tecviz etmeklik velinimetimizin nimet-i celili ile mütenaim ve 
perverde olan hiçbir bende-i sadakatkârın iĢi ve Ģu meselede beka-i sulh ile beraber 
muhafaza-i hukuk [4] ve istiklal kabil olduğu halde asayiĢ-i umumiyi bozmak ve bila 
mucib muharebe gibi mechul-ül akıbet bir Ģeyin kapusunu dahi açmak kâr-ı akil 
olmamasıyla beraber bu yolda husul-i matlub mümkün olmadığı takdire göre dahi her 
Ģey göze aldırılıp [5] ve kat‟a fedakârlık edilmeyip [sic] cümleten muharebeye 
duruĢmak ve bu yolda büyük ve küçük hepimiz kanlarımızı dökmek emr-i tabii olup 
bidayet-i meselede kuvve-i berriye ve bahriyece meydanda hiçbir tedarikat olamaması 
ve tedarikat ve ve istihkamatın meydana gelmesi dahi [6] vakte muhtaç bulunması 
cihetle devletlerin kuvve-i muavenelerini calib olmak üzere cümle ittifakıyla bir 
tarafdan icra olunan tedabir-i politikiye arasında saye-i Ģevket-vaye-i hazret-i Ģahanede 
Rumeli ve Anadolu taraflarında teĢkil olunan orduy-ı hümayunların kuvve-i [7] 
askeriyesi ve kıla‟-i Ģahanenin istihkamatı ve gerek kuvve-i bahriye mertebe-i hazıraya 
isal olunarak Ģimdiye kadar muharebeye Ģuru‟ olunmaması dahi Rusyalu 
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Memleketeyn‟e girmezden evvel ve gerek sonra bahis buna geldikçe kuvve-i 
müctemianın henüz rütbe-i [8] kâfiye vasıl olamadığı memurin-i kiramı hazeratı 
tarafından vaki olan ifadata mebni bulunup hatta devletlu Ömer PaĢa hazretleri canibine 
gönderilen istilamnameye cevaben bundan evvelce vürud eden tahriratda dahi karĢuya 
geçmek kuvve-i mevcudeye [9] daha kırk bin asakir-i nizamiye ilavesine ve ancak 
birkaç mah müddetde meydana gelebilecek köprülerin dahi hazırlanmasına mütevakkıf 
olacağı yazılmıĢ ve Anadolu tarafından hududu tecavüz etmek Tuna‟yı geçmeğe 
nisbetle daha suhuletlice ise de bunun [10] içün dahi ol canibdeki orduyu Ģimdikinden 
ziyade kuvvetlendirmek lazım geleceği ve bunun dahi biraz zamana tavakkuf edeceği 
kaziyesi dahi bugünkü meclisde canib-i cenab-ı sipehsalariden dermiyan buyurulmuĢ 
idüğünden ve Ģimdiye kadar mecalis-i meĢveretde zat-ı vâlâ-i meĢihatpenahi ve bazı 
sudur-ı izam hazeratı dahi bulundukları cihetle meselenin cihet-i Ģeriyesini tedkik anlara 
ait olduğu halde her ne yapılmıĢ ise cümlenin ittifakıyla olarak hepimizin baĢı Ģer‟-i 
Ģerife bağlu [12] olduğu halde canib-i Ģeriat-ı garradan ilan-ı muharebeye hükm 
olunmuĢ olsa idi hiç kimsenin bir Ģey diyemiyeceği dahi derkâr olup devletler ile 
Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin muamelat ve münasebatı ve hususat-ı cesimede vesatet ve ittifak 
keyfiyatı [13] beriki Ģey olmayarak ezman-ı kadimeden berü cari olmuĢ Ģeyler olduğu 
halde bu defa anların kuvve-i muavenelerini calib olmak üzere tutulan usul dahi 
mücerred bir istiane ve öte tarafla husul-i ittifakları halinde müsellem olan mehazir-i 
adideyi [14] vaki tedabir-i hekime ve dûrendiĢaneden madud olarak istiane ise muvafık-
ı Ģer‟-i Ģerif olmasıyla buna kimsenin itiraz edemiyeceği bu meclisde dahi ityan olunup 
bunda asıl teessüf edilecek ve nazar-ı dikkati celb eyleyecek madde [15] halkın mesalih-
i devlete müdahaleye cüret ve cesareti olup böyle Ģeyler ezman-ı salifede dürlü vukuat-ı 
müdhiĢeyi müntic olduğu halde bi-tevfik-i teala saye-i kudretvaye-i cenab-ı mülukânede 
pek çok vakitlerden beri görülmemiĢ bir hareket [16] olarak bunun önü alınması pek 
ehemm ve elzem görünmesiyle ve kuvve-i mevcude kâfi göründüğünün ihbarı üzerine 
muharebeye Ģer‟an hüküm olunduğu halde devletlerin muavenetlerine bakılmayarak 
hemen ilan-ı harb edilmesinde dahi nakz-ı ahdin öte tarafdan [17] vukuuna ve gösterilen 
haheĢ ve arzuya bakılınca usulce kat‟a beis olamayacağı irad olunmasıyla taraf-ı sami-i 
meĢihatpenahiden dahi bu babda hükm-i Ģer‟iyi mutazammın verilecek fetva-i Ģerife 
kuvve-i mevcudenin kâfi olup olmadığının [18] bilinmesine mütevakkıf olduğu beyan 
olunarak anın üzerine memurin-i kiramı hazeratı tarafından sual olundukta zikr 
olunduğu vechile orduların kuvvetce bazı noksanı olduğundan harbin tahakkuku halinde 
kuvve-i berriye ve bahriyece lüzumu görünen [19] noksanın ikmali biraz vakte daha 
muhtac olduğu cevab verilerek ol babda cereyan eden ebhas ve mütalaatın neticesinde 
ilan-ı harbe hükm-i Ģer‟i kuvve-i mevcudenin kâfi olup olmadığının bilinmesine 
mütevakkıf olduğu misillü [20] esbab-ı mukabelenin daha noksanı olduğu dahi beyan 
olunup eğerçi ilan-ı harb olunduğu halde bunun dahi istikmaline çalıĢılacağı ve Ģimdiki 
kuvve-i mevcudenin hal-i hazırı hükm-i Ģer‟i ül hakk olduğu halde tehire sebeb [21] 
olamayacağı cihetle burası bais-i tereddüd olmaz ise de Viyana‟dan alınan habere göre 
Viyana müsveddesine cümle ittifakıyla istenilen tağyirat hakkında Viyana‟ca müĢkilat 
gösterilmeyip Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin tashihatın kabulü sureti dahi [22] Petersburğ‟a 
yazılmıĢ olduğundan Ģayed istenilen tağyirat Petersburğ‟ca kabul olunur ise kazanılacak 
muzafferiyet-i politikiye velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padiĢahımız efendimizin enzar-ı 
alemde bir kat daha i‟tilâ‟-i Ģan ve Ģevket-i mülukanelerini müstelzem olacağından [23] 
ve bil-cümle vükela-i fiham ve ulema-i i‟lam ile mecalis-i umumide bil-ittifak karargir 
olan bir sureti böyle netice-i hali derk ve i‟zana muktedir olabilenlerin efkârı üzerine 
tağyir etmekliği dahi kat‟a zihinler kabul edemeyip ve Petersburğ‟dan [24] muntazar 
olan cevab dahi nihayet sekiz on güne kadar gelebileceği irad olunduğundan ve eğerçi 
adem-i kabul cevabı gelür ise ol halde karĢu durulmak dahi evvelki karar iktizasından 
bulunduğundan hasıl olacak neticeye intizaren usul-i mukarrere [25] ve müttehidenin 
tağyiri bir vechile tecviz edilemiyeceği dahi cümleten beyan olunduktan sonra bahis bu 
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hale göre iĢbu arzuhali veren hoca efendilere ne denilmesi ve nasıl muamele olunması 
lazım geleceğine intikal ederek bunların iĢbu hareketleri doğrusu [26] pek yolsuz ve 
uygunsuz bir Ģey olduğuna ve cümle ittifakıyla geçende neĢr ü ilan olunan tenbihata 
muğayir ve bayağı hükümeti istihkaf demek olacağına ve bu itirazat yalnız heyet-i 
devlete olmayıp en büyük hissesi canib-i meĢihat-i Ġslamiyeye [27] ve sudur-ı kirama ait 
olacağı cihetle bunda namus-ı celil-i Ģeriat-ı garranın dahi gözedilmesi lazım geleceğine 
nazaran bu harekete cüret edenlerin tedibi levazım-ı hükümdariye muvafık göründüğü 
misillü Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin bunları ikta‟ ve ilzama [28] kat‟a ihtiyacı olmadığı dahi 
bedihi olup Ģu kadar ki bunların Ģu hareketleri mücerred adem-i vukuf ve noksani-i 
mülahazadan ve ihtimal ki bazı kendüyi bilmezlerin ikval-i gayr-i makulelerinden neĢet 
eylediğinden ve her ne kadar Vidinli Hoca Efendi‟nin [28] böyle arzuhal takdimi 
tasmimine dair bazı ifadatı vuku bulmuĢ ise de taraf-ı hazret-i meĢihatpenahiden vaki 
olan tenbihe mebni arzuhali temhir etmediği anlaĢılmıĢ ve bu takım Hoca Behi [?] 
Efendi‟ye müracat etmiĢler ise de muvafakat görmediklerinden baĢka [30] muamele-i 
tevbihiyeye mazhar oldukları dahi iĢidilmiĢ olup her ne ise bunda meĢahir-i ulemadan 
hiç kimsenin mühür ve imzası bulunmadığına nazaran Ģimdi bu arzuhal takdim edenlere 
taraf-ı vâlâ-i Ģeyhülislamiden bizzat beyan-ı hal edilmek [31] münasip olamayacağından 
zat-ı vâlâ-i fetvapenahi bazı sudur-ı izam hazeratı hazır oldukları halde meĢhur ve 
muğber hocaefendiler ve huzur-ı hümayun dersinde mukarrer olan efendilerin 
güzidelerini iĢbu Pazar günü bab-ı fetvapenahiye [32] celb ile mesele-i halide tutulan 
usulün evvel ve ahiri ve hal-i hazırı kendülerine ifade ve tefhim olunarak anlar kani 
oldukları halde kendülerinden sened alınarak sonra anların vesatetiyle dahi iĢbu arzuhali 
veren ve gerek anların emsali [33] olanların ilzam ve iskat ve hareket-i vakıalarından 
dolayı kendülerine lisan-ı Ģer‟i ile bazı tenbihat ve tevbihat icra edilmesi zımnında 
keyfiyetin canib-i cenab-ı fetvapenahiye havalesi ve biraz vakitden berü Dersaadet‟ce 
ve taĢralarca ahalinin efkârında [34] galeyan hasıl olduğu dahi irad ve ityan olunmasıyla 
iĢbu tenbihatın ve gerek alınacak senedin ahalinin efkârınca dahi tesiratı olacağı misillü 
iĢbu arzuhalin tertib ve tanzimine hayli günlerden berü teĢebbüs olunmuĢ olduğu 
rivayet-i vakıadan [35] tebeyyün ederek ta ki bunun takdimine kadar polis memurları 
tarafından bir guna ifadat vuku bulmaması emr-i tahkikatda adem-i takayyüde mahmul 
ve böyle nazik vakitlerde her Ģeyden ziyade polis memurlarının mütebassır ve muktedir 
bulunması esas-ı [36] mesalih-i mühimmeden madud olmasıyla ahalinin ikval ve 
if‟aline hasr-ı nazar-ı dikkat ve itina edilerek bir guna uygunsuzluk vukua getürülme-
mesi esbabının istihsaline bakılması suretinin dahi iktiza edenlere ve zabıta müĢiri 
devletlu paĢa hazretlerine [37] kaviyyen tenbih olunması suretleri dahi müttehiden 
tansip olunmuĢ ise de iray-ı aciz-i intiha-yı bendeganın mükemmeli olan emr ü ferman-ı 
keramet-beyan-ı hazret-i padiĢahi her ne vechile Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise mehakim-i 
hayr ü isabet-i mantuk-ı celil-i elham- adliyenin [38] icrasında olacağı ve salif üz zikr 
arzuhal dahi meĢmul-i negah-ı dakayık-ı iktibah-ı cenab-ı cihanbani buyurulmak içün 
takdim kılındığı rehin-i ilm-i ali buyuruldukta her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül 
emrindir. Fi 7 Z sene 69. 
 
[Seals from right to left] ġevket, Mehmed Arif, Mehmed, Mahmud, Rifat, Ali Fethi, 
Mehmed Ali, Mustafa ReĢid, Rauf, Esseyyid Ahmed Arif, Mustafa Naili. 
 
Appendix 6. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 8, dated 16 October 1853. Stratford to Reshid on 
bringing the fleet to the Bosphorus. 
 
Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Teşrin-i Evvel‟inin on altısı tarihiyle 
müverrahan Dersaadet‟de mukim İngiltere devleti büyükelçisi Lord Stratford de 
Redcliffe tarafından gönderilen takririn suret-i tercümesidir. 
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Zirde muharrer-i imza Ġngiltere devleti büyükelçisi Rusya‟nın harekat-ı vakıası cihetiyle 
Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin ilan-ı harbe karar vermeğe mecbur olduğuna ve bu babda Prens 
Gorçakof‟a yazılan mektubda tayin olunmuĢ olan müddetin inkızasından evvelce 
harekat-ı hasmanenin vukua gelebilmesi melhuz ve muhtemel bulunduğuna mebni el 
haleti hazihi Çanak Kalesi kurbünde lengerendaz-ı ikamet olan Ġngiltere donanmasının 
bir miktarının Boğaz‟dan içerü girmesi davetini havi nazır-ı umur-ı hariciye-i Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye übbehetlu devletlu ReĢid PaĢa hazretleri tarafından irsal olunan takrir-i resmiyi 
ahz eylediğinin arz ve ifadesiyle beraber ahval-i mezkureyi ve ba husus harekat-ı 
hasmane müddet-i muayyenenin inkızasından mukaddemce vukua gelebilmesi madde-
sini kemaliyle halisane sencide-i mizan-ı tefekkür eyledikten sonra tebliğat ve tedarikat-
ı lazıme icra olunduğu gibi zat-ı hazret-i mülukânenin arzusuna muvafakat etmeğe hazır 
bulunduğunu arz ve iĢar ile kesb-i fahr eder. ġu kadar ki mevsimin ilerlemekte bulundu-
ğuna binaen donanma-i mezkurdan lazım geldiği kadarını Dersaadet‟e celb ederek 
kalanlarının dahi Çanak Kalesi‟nin berü tarafında barınmak üzere içeriye girmeleri 
hususunun münasip görüldüğünü dahi ihtaren beyan eyler. Binaberin ol babda iktiza 
eden feramin-i aliyenin ısdar ve Çanak Kalesi canibine irsali hususunu nazır-ı müĢarün-
ileyhden rica eylediği beyanını derkar olan hürmet-i faikasının tecdidine vesile ittihaz 
etmiĢdir. 
 
Appendix 7. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 9, dated 16 October 1853. French ambassador 
Edmond de la Cour to Reshid on bringing the fleet to the Bosphorus. 
 
Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Teşrin-i Evvel‟inin on altısı tarihiyle 
müverrahan Fransa sefiri Mösyö de la Cour tarafından takdim olunan bir kıta takrir-i 
resmînin tercümesidir. 
 
BeĢike‟lerde lenger-endaz-ı ikamet olan Fransa donanmasının bir mikdarının Bahr-i 
Sefid boğazından içerü girmesini davet eylemeğe Saltanat-ı Seniyye karar vererek iĢbu 
kararın tebliğini mutazammın ba irade-i hazret-i padiĢahi taraf-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i nezaret-
penahiden Fransa sefaretine irsal buyurulan takrir-i resmiyi muharrer-i imza ahz 
eylemiĢdir. Takrir-i resmi-i mezkurda beyan olunduğu üzere Prens Gorçakof‟a yazılan 
mektubda tayin olunan müddetden evvelce bile asakir-i Ģahane ile memleketeynde 
bulunan Rusya asakiri beyninde harekat-ı hasmaneye mübaĢeret olunması melhuz 
bulunduğundan Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin bu defa kendisinden vaki olan iltimasına bila 
ikate-i vakt muvafakat eylediği halde metbu-i mufahhamı olan imparator hazretlerinin 
niyatına mutabık hareket etmiĢ olacağında muharrer-i imzanın itimadı vardır ve çünkü 
Saltanat-ı Seniyye kendüsinin temami-i mülkünden olan eyalata Rusya asakirinin 
giriĢinden dolayı Boğazlara dair olan hukukunu ber vech-i serbesti tamamen icrasına 
kesb-i istihkak etmiĢ olduğuna ve Fransa donanması Devlet-i Aliye‟nin talebi üzerine 
Bahr-i Sefid boğazından içeri girmesiyle uhud-ı meriyeye bir gûna halel iras eylemeye-
ceğine binaen muharrer-i imza devlet-i metbuasının Saltanat-ı Seniyye hakkında derkar 
olan efkar-ı hayırhahına ve dostanesine bir delil ibraz etmek içün iĢbu vesileyi bil-
müsaraa ittihaza kendüsini mezun addeder. Kaldı ki mevsimin haline nazaran bütün 
donanmanın Boğaz‟ın içeri tarafında barınmaları pek arzu olunacak mevaddan idüğini 
ihtar ile beraber muharrer-i imza kendüsinden Bab-ı Ali namına olarak  vaki olan talep 
ve iltimasa muvafakata hazır bulunduğu ve bunun icrasına muvafakat etmek içün Fransa 
donanmasının Akdeniz boğazından içerü giriĢinden evvel canib-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟den 
ittihazı lazım gelen tedabire taraf-ı alisinden dahi teĢebbüs buyurulduğunun haberine 
muntazır olduğunun beyanı zaten derkar olan ihtiramat-ı faikasının tekrir-i teminatına 
vesile-i hasene ittihaz kılınmıĢdır. 
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Appendix 8. A. AMD. 49/90, dated 24 Muharrem 1270 (27 October 1853). Tezkire-i 
samiye [draft]. On instructions to Namık Pasha concerning the loan. 
 
Ahval-i hazıradan dolayı lüzumu tahmin olunan beĢ yüz bin kise akçenin tedariki ve 
celbi memuriyetleriyle Avrupa canibine tayin kılınan Ticaret Nazırı devletlu Namık 
PaĢa hazretlerine verilmesi lazım gelen talimat mahsusca bir komisyonda müzakere 
olunarak kararının arz ve istizan kılınması müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulan emr ü 
irade-i seniyye-i cenab-ı cihanbani muktezay-ı celilinden olduğu Reis-i Meclis-i Vâlâ ve 
Maliye Nazırı devletlu paĢalar ve müĢarünileyh Namık PaĢa hazeratı beynlerinde bil-
müzakere ol babda tanzim olunan bir kıta müzekkere Ģehr-i carinin yirmi ikinci Salı 
gününde akd olunmuĢ olan Meclis-i Mahsus'da led el-kırae mevadd-ı mündericesi 
yolunda ve muvafık-ı hal ve maslahat olup mukaddemce dahi arz ve beyan olunduğu 
vechile bunda asıl gözedilecek Ģey bu akçeye karĢılık gösterilecek mahallerin inhisar 
suretinde olmaması ve enzar-ı ecnebiyede rehin rengine girmemesi kaziyeleri olduğun-
dan mesela Mısır virgüsi ve Beriyyet-üĢ ġam ve Ġzmir gümrükleri gibi Ģeyler olmayarak 
alelıtlak varidat-ı Devlet-i Aliyye'den olması lazım geleceğinden maliye nazırı müĢar-
ünileyh tarafından tanzim ve ibraz olunan iki kıta pusuladan birinde gösterildiği vechile 
mahall-i malume zeyt yağı aĢarı ve zecriyeden hasıl olan gümrük resmi ve memlehalar 
bedelatı ve sair aĢar ve rüsumu varidatı olan altmıĢ bin kise akçe havale gösterilip Ģayed 
buna razı olmadıkları halde diğer pusulada muharrer gayr ez mesarif-i mahalliye 
Hüdavendigar eyaleti virgüsi olan otuz üç bin bu kadar kisenin dahi havalesinde beis 
olamıyacağı cihetle bu pusula dahi ihtiyati olarak müĢarünileyhe verilip her nasıl 
mümkün olur ise ol vechile tesviyesine terhis olunması ve bu alınacak akçenin bin beĢ 
yüz kise miktarı sigorta mesarifi olup böyle emr-i cesimde tahsil-i emniyet içün bu 
kadar mesarifin ihtiyarı caiz olabileceğinden ve mevsim dahi Ģitaya tesadüf ettiğinden 
gönderilecek mebaliğin sigortaya rabt ettirilmesi ve kat'a poliçe ve kambiyo kabul 
olunmayıp evvelki karar üzere cümlesi altun ve gümüĢ olarak ele geçirilmesi ve 
müĢarünileyhin memuriyeti sıfat-ı resmiyede olacağından elinde evrak-ı resmiye bulun-
ması dahi icab edip hariciye nezareti tarafından Londra ve Paris umur-ı ecnebiye vekil-
lerine ve sefaret-i seniyelere tahrirat-ı resmiye yazılarak bu tarafta olan sefaretler cani-
binden dahi kağıdlar alınıp kendisine ita olunması ve bu halde her taraftan muavenet-i 
mukteziye ve teshilat-ı mümkine ifa olunacağı derkar ise de Ģayed bankirler tarafından 
tamaa düĢülüp de bir guna müĢkilat zuhur eder ise derhal bu tarafa bildirilmesi ve 
nezaret-i hariciye canibinden ensile [isale?] olduğu üzere telgraf vasıtasıyla teshil-i 
muhabere içün mahsus huruf tertib olunarak verilmesi ve mebaliğ-i matlubenin 
güzeĢtesi ve müddet-i tayini hususlarında verilecek ruhsat ve mezuniyetin daire-i 
mahremiyette tutulması lüzumuna mebni bu maddeler içün gayet mahremane olarak 
müĢarünileyhe baĢkaca talimat-ı hafiye itası hususları beyn-el hazerat tezkir ve tansip 
olunmuĢ ve müzekkere-i mezkura mutalaat-ı meĢruhaya tatbikan talimat suretinde 
kaleme alınarak mezkur pusulalar ile beraber manzur-ı ali-i cenab-ı padiĢahi buyurul-
mak içün arz ve takdim kılınmıĢ olmağla hususat-ı maruza hakkında her ne vechile emr 
ü ferman-ı hazret-i padiĢahi müteallik buyurulur ise m*hassır-ı firdahin [?] inha olacağı 
ve zikr olunan talimat-ı hafiye müsveddesi dahi ayruca arz ve istizan kılınacağı 
beyanıyla tezkire.. 
 
Appendix 9. İ. HR. 103/5039 lef 1, dated 28 Muharrem 1270 (31 October 1853). 
Draft of confidential instructions to Namık Pasha. [Also available in A. DVN. 
MHM. 10/89-2]. 
 
Kendüye verilen ruhsat iktizasınca hariçten alınacak beĢ yüz bin kese akçenin suret-i 
tedarik ve celbi hakkında mevadd-ı lazıme diğer talimat-ı mahsusada beyan olunmuĢ 
olup anın ahkamına tatbikan tesviye-i maslahata sarf-ı himmet olunacağı misillü itası 
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icab eden güzeĢtenin dahi bir ehven suretle kararlaĢtırılması lazımeden olduğuna ve 
mukaddema Paris'den alınan haberlere nazaran nihayet senede dört, dört buçuk guruĢ 
güzeĢte ile istenilen mebaliğ alınabileceği memul bulunduğuna binaen hin-i mukavelede 
kararlaĢtırılacak güzeĢtenin bu mikdarı tecavüz etmemesine ziyadesiyle ikdam ve gayret 
olunup mümkün olamadığı halde nihayet ül nihaye altıya kadar mezun olacakdır. 
 
Bu husus-ı nazikenin Ģayan-ı dikkat olan bir yeri dahi alınacak mebaliğin tediyesi 
zamanının tayini sureti olup çünkü bunun emr-i tesviyesi bir müddet-i tevileye rabt 
olunur ise uzun uzadıya deyn-i bari altında kalınacağından mümkün olduğu mertebe 
sa'y ve himmet olunarak tayin olunacak müddet-i tediyenin on sene olmasına ve 
olmadığı surette nihayet on beĢ seneye kararlaĢtırılmasına çalıĢılacaktır. 
 
Rivayet ve tahkik olunduğuna göre Avrupa'da bu makule teati olunan mebaliğin senevi 
güzeĢtesi nihayet yüzde altı olarak andan ziyadeye olmayıp fakat ahval-i ihtiyaciyede 
güzeĢtenin zammı yerine alınacak akçeyi tamamı tamamına vermeyip iskonta tabiriyle 
mesela yüz kuruĢa mukabil doksan kuruĢ verilmek veyahud yüz kuruĢ verilip prim 
tabiriyle yüz on kuruĢa sened alınmak ahval-i mesbukaları iktizasından olmasıyla eğerçi 
paĢa-yı müĢarünileyh istikamet-i zatiyesi iktizasınca ve olunan talimat-ı Ģifahiye vechile 
sipariĢ olunan akçeyi tamamı tamamına almağa kemal-i derece cedd ve sa'y edeceği 
memul ise de Ģayed ahval-i mücbire-i zamaniye icabınca akçe verecek bankirler 
tarafından bu nevi bir teklif vuku bulur ise maslahat gecikmemek içün nihayet yüzde 
beĢ kadar noksan alınmasına biz-zarure mezun olacaktır. 
 
[Seals] Sağdan sola: Safveti, Rıfat, Fethi, Mehmed Ali, Mustafa ReĢid, Ahmed Arif,  
Mustafa Naili. 
 
Lef 2: [from the petition of the Sadrazam]  “... çünkü bunların mikdarı ve keyfiyeti 
Ģayed bir takarrüb ile bankirler duyar ise elbette tamaa düĢerek ziyade isteyecekleri 
mülahazasına göre bu madde gayet hafi tutularak Meclis-i Mahsus'da dahi tezkir 
olunamayıp beyn el havass kararlaĢtırılmıĢ ve bir kıta müsveddesi dahi kaleme aldırılıp 
temhir kılınmıĢ olduğundan bu maddeye dair maliye nezaret-i celilesi tarafından tanzim 
olunan cedveller ile beraber manzur-ı... fi 28 M 70.  
[Ġrade] Gurre-i Safer 70. 
 
Appendix 10. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 17, dated 4 November 1853. French ambassador 
Edmond de La Cour’s instructions to head dragoman Schefer on bringing the rest 
of the allied fleets to the Bosphorus. 
 
Ambassade de France á Constantinople 
Therapia, le 4 Novembre 1853 
 
Monsieur 
 
 J‟ai reçu hier au soir le rapport que vous m‟avez fait l‟honneur de m‟envoyer pour 
m‟annoncer que le conseil avait résolu de nous adresser a S. M. Mr l‟Ambassadeur 
d‟Angleterre et a moi, l‟invitation de faire remonter les Escadres du détroit des 
Dardanelles dans celui du Bosphore. Je vous invite a faire savoir a S. A. Rechid Pacha 
que je n‟attends que la communication officielle qui doit m‟être adressée a cet égard 
pour la transmettre a Mr l‟Amiral Hamelin qui ne manquera pas de d‟y conformer. 
 Je ne saurais toutefois dissimuler que je n‟ai pas appris sans surprise la 
détermination de la Porte de donner a la Flotte Ottomane l‟ordre de mettre a la voile: 
cette mesure me semble au contraire prématurée: peut être les conseillers du Sultan 
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penseront ils qu‟il y aurait avantage avant d‟y donner suite, d‟attendre que les Escadres 
combinées ai eut mouille devant Constantinople afin que le Capitan Pacha puisse avant 
de prendre la mer, se concerter avec les amiraux commandant les flottes combinées. Je 
vous invite a faire part serais de lui de ces observations a S. A. Mr le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 
 Recevez, Monsieur, l‟assurance de ma considération très distingue. 
 [signed] E. de la Cour  
 
Appendix 11. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 16, dated 4 November 1853. Official translation 
of the above instructions of the French ambassador into Turkish. 
 
Fransa sefiri Mösyö de la Cour tarafından bin sekiz yüz elli üç senesi Teşrin-i 
Sani‟sinin dördü tarihiyle müverrehan Fransa sefareti baştercümanı Mösyö Schefer‟e 
ita olunan talimatnamenin tercümesidir. 
 
Donanmaların Kala-i Sultaniye‟den Boğaziçi‟ne celbi hususu gerek benden ve gerek 
Ġngiltere sefiri cenablarından iltimas olunmağa Meclis-i Vükela‟da karar verildiği 
beyanını mutazammın irsal kılınan takririniz ahz olunmuĢ olmağla bu babda tarafımıza 
icra buyurulacak tebliğat-ı resmiyeye intizar eylemekte olduğumuzu ve bu tebliğat 
Amiral Hamelin‟e irsal olunarak mumaileyhin dahi buna tevfik-i hareket eylemekte 
tecviz-i kusur etmeyeceğini übbehetlu devletlu ReĢid PaĢa hazretlerine beyan eylemeğe 
sizi davet ederim. Mahaza donanma-i hümayunun buradan azimet etmesinin emr ü 
ferman buyurulmasına canib-i Bab-ı Ali‟den verilen karara hayret ve istiğrab ile kesb-i 
vukuf eylediğimi ketm edemem. Çünkü bu tedbir bilakis bana vakitsiz gibi 
göründüğünden tedbir-i mezkuru icra etmezden evvel devletlu Kapudan PaĢa 
hazretlerinin donanma-i müttefika kumandanlarıyla kabl-el hareket müzakere edebil-
mesi içün mezkur donanma-i müttefikaların Dersaadet‟e muvasalat etmesine intizar 
buyurulmak hususunun faideden hali olmayacağına vükela-i fiham-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye 
hazeratı tarafından sarf-ı efkar buyurulacağı memul bulunduğundan iĢbu ihtaratı 
hariciye nazırı übbehetlu devletlu paĢa hazretlerine serian beyan eylemeğe sizi davet 
eder, derkar olan hürmet-i mütemayizemin teminat-ı mükerreresini size ibraz ve tekid 
eylerim. 
 
Appendix 12. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 15, dated 4 November 1853. British ambassador 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe’s instructions to head dragoman Etienne [Stephen] 
Pisani on bringing the rest of the allied fleets to the Bosphorus. 
 
Extrait. Instruction a Mr E. Pisani de la part de Lord Stratford. Therapia, le 4 
novembre 1853. 
 
Monsieur de la Cour et moi sommes prêts d‟envoyer chercher le reste de la Flotte, 
désque la demande nous en sera faite et nous sommes sensibles du courage et de l‟esprit 
de patriotisme manifestes par les Ministres Ottomans en se faisant voir empresses 
d‟envoyer leur Escadres, a la exception des trois ponts, dans la Mer Noire. Toutefois, 
nous croyons que l‟opinion des gens de la profession, soit anglaise soit française, est 
défavorable à cette entreprise. On pourrait bien avoir des doutes si, dans cette saison 
avancée et connaissant la grande force disponible à Sevastopol, il serait prudent de 
risquer une si grande partie de la flotte Turque. Aussurement [ ?] le danger serait très 
grand et un insuccès dans ce moment serait un mal immense à la Porte. 
 Dans tous les cas, je sous décidemment d‟opinion que ce serait une folie de faire 
partir les bâtiments avant que nos Escadres soient réunis ici, et, même alors, il serait 
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beaucoup mieux, dans l‟opinion de notre Amiral d‟envoyer trois au quatre grands 
bateaux a vapeur, que d‟envoyer des vaisseaux de ligne a voile.  
 En conclusion, si la Porte se décide a envoyer des bateaux a vapeur au des 
bâtiments a voile, il serait fort a désirer d‟attendre pour cela l‟approche de la pleine 
lune, qui diminuerait de beaucoup le danger de la navigation dans la mer noire au mois 
de novembre. 
 
Appendix 13. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 14, dated 4 November 1853. Official translation 
into Turkish of the above instructions of Lord Stratford. 
 
İngiltere sefiri Lord Stratford de Redcliffe tarafından bin sekiz yüz elli üç senesi Teşrin-i 
Sani‟sinin dördü tarihiyle müverrahan İngiltere sefareti baştercümanı Mösyö Etienne 
Pisani‟ye ita olunan bir kıta talimatnamenin tercümesidir. 
 
Ġki donanma-i müttefikanın ma bakiyesini istenildiği gibi bu tarafa getürtmeğe Mösyö 
de La Cour ile beraber hazır ve amade olduğumuz halde üç anbarlulardan maada 
donanma-i hümayunun Karadeniz‟e çıkarılmasına müsaraat ile gayret-i vataniyelerini 
ibraz ve izhar etmiĢ olan vükela-i fiham hazeratının cesaret-i meĢhudelerinden müessir 
olmuĢuzdur. Fakat gerek Fransalu ve gerek Ġngilterelü erbab-ı vukufun rey ve efkarı 
iĢbu hareket ve azimete mugayir olacağını zannederiz. Vakıa mevsim bu kadar ilerlemiĢ 
ve Sivastopol‟de müheyya bulunan kuvve-i külliye-i bahriye mevadd-ı malumeden 
bulunmuĢ iken donanma-i hümayunun bunca sefainini böyle muhataraya ilka etmeklik 
kâr-ı âkıl olacağına iĢtibah etmek doğrusu caiz olup çünkü muhatara-i melhuze pek 
büyük olduğundan Ģu aralık bir âdem-i muvaffakiyetin vukuu Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin 
hakk-ı alisinde pek büyük bir mazarrat iras edeceği derkardır. Her halde bizim donan-
malarımız burada tecemmu etmezden süfun-ı hümayunu yola çıkarmaklık cinnet 
hükmünde bir hareket olacağı efkar-ı mukarreresindeyim. Donanmalarımız buraya 
geldikten sonra bile amirallerimizin reyine göre birtakım bayağı kapaklar göndermekten 
ise üç dört kadar büyük vapur sefineleri irsal olunsa daha eyü olur. Velhasıl Devlet-i 
Aliyye yelken veyahud vapur sefaini göndermeğe karar verdiği takdirde Karadeniz‟de 
TeĢrin-i Sani‟de seyr ü sefer eylemenin muhataratını hayliden hayli taklil edecek olan 
ay mehtabına kadar tevakkuf olunması temenni ve arzu olunacak mevaddandır. 
Appendix 14. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 19, dated 5 November 1853. French ambassador 
Edmond de La Cour’s instructions to head dragoman Schefer on the Porte’s 
determination to send the fleet to the Black Sea. 
 
Ambassade de France                              Therapia le 5 Novembre 1853 
á Constantinople                
 
Monsieur 
 
 Il paraîtrait, si je suis bien informé, que la Porte persiste dans la détermination 
qu‟elle a prise de faire sortir demain l‟escadre ottomane, malgré les observations que je 
vous ai charge de soumettre a S. A. Rechid Pacha. 
 Les rapports qui existent, en ce moment, entre le gouvernement de S. M. le Sultan 
et l‟ambassade, m‟imposent le devait de faire part a la S. Porte, jusqu‟au dernier 
moment, des graves inconvénients qui pourraient être la conséquence d‟une semblable 
mesure ; vous voudrez bien vous rendre, de nouveau, au pris de S. A. Rechid Pacha, 
pour lui réitérer sans perdre un instant, les considérations qui devraient engager le 
Cabinet ottoman a ajourner, au moins, le départ de l‟Escadre. Je veux, dans tous les cas, 
qu‟il soit bien établi que je n‟ai néglige aucun soin pour faire partager mon avis aux 
Conseillers de S. M. I. le Sultan et qu‟ils porteront exclusivement la responsabilité de 
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toutes les conséquences auxquelles peut dernier lieu une détermination que j‟aurai 
vainement combattre. 
 Recevez, Monsieur, l‟assurance de ma considération très distingue. 
 [signed] E. de la Cour  
 
Appendix 15. HR. SYS. 1189/54, dated 28 Safer 1270 (30 November 1853). Official 
note [takrir-i resmi] to the French and British embassies on the danger of the 
Russian battleships around Sinop. 
 
Bab-ı Ali 
Hariciye Nezareti 
Takrir-i Resmi 
 
Rusya sefain-i harbiyesinin bir fırkasının Sinop limanı ağzında ve Sinop sularında ve bir 
fırkasının dahi Bartın boğazı ve Amasra havalisinde dolaĢmakta olduğuna dair Sinop'ta 
bulunan süfun-ı hümayun kumandanları tarafından tevarüd eden tahriratın bir sureti 
manzur-ı sefiraneleri olmak üzere leffen taraf-ı asilanelerine irsal kılındığının ve 
keyfiyetin Ġngiltere devleti sefaretine dahi bildirildiğinin beyanı zaten derkar olan 
ihtiramat-ı faikamın teyid-i teminatına zeria ittihaz kılınır. Fi 28 S 270. 
 
Appendix 16. A. AMD. 50/30 and HR. SYS. 1189/55, dated 3 Rebiülevvel 1270 (4 
December 1853). Official note to the French and British embassies.  
 
Rusya sefain-i harbiyesinin Sinop havalisinde dolaĢmakta oldukları bundan evvelce 
taraf-ı asilanelerine takrir-i resmi ile beyan ve ihbar olunmuĢ idi. Bu defa Sinop'dan 
vürud eden Taif vapuru kumandanının vaki olan ifadesinden müstefad olduğu vechile 
Ģehr-i Safer'in yigirmi dokuzuncu ÇeharĢenbe günü Rusyalunun üç kıta üç anbarlı ve üç 
kıta kapak sefinesiyle iki fırkateyni Sinop limanına duhul ederek Devlet-i Aliye 
donanmasından fırkateyn ve korvetten mürekkep olarak orada bulunan bir fırka-i 
bahriye ile muharebeye tasaddi etmiĢlerdir. Muharebenin neticesi henüz malum değil 
ise de iĢbu fırka-i müfrezenin bulunduğu mevkiye ve düĢman sefinelerinin daha 
kuvvetli bulunmasına nazaran ziyadece sakatlık olması melhuzatdandır. Ġngiltere ve 
Fransa devletleri donanmalarının Boğaziçi'nde bulunmaları Devlet-i Aliyye'nin 
memalik-i sahiliyesini muhafaza niyet-i halisesiyle olup Ģimdi Rusya kuvve-i 
bahriyesinin Ģu hareketi ise gözüne kesdireceği mahallere tasallut edeceğine delalet eder 
bir keyfiyet olarak bu kadar sevahil-i vasianın muharesesi dahi derece-i kifayede kuvve-
i bahriyenin Kara Deniz'de bulunmasına mütevakıf olduğundan ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye 
her ne kadar kendi donanmasını Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkarmak niyetinde ise de iĢbu Sinop 
vakası sebebiyle  gidecek kuvve-i bahriye kifayet rütbesinde görünmediğinden iki 
devlet-i müttefikanın himmet-i fiiliyesine müracaat lazım gelmiĢ olmağla bu keyfiyetin 
Fransa devleti sefaretine bildirildiği misillu taraf-ı asilanelerine dahi beyanı zaten derkar 
olan ihtiramat-ı faikamın teyidine zeria ittihaz olunur. 
 
Appendix 17.  TNA. FO 195/309, dated 6 December 1853. Translation. “Deposition 
of the Captain & Officers of the Turkish Steamer “Tayf” [sic], concerning the 
action at Sinope on Wednesday the 30 November”.  
 
I was cruising in company with the Ferik Moustafa Pasha & returned after I had 
fulfilled my mission to Sinope under the orders of the Patrona Bey Pasha. On the 
following day Hussein Pasha also arrived with several ships, while the other ships 
arrived scatteredly by ones & twos. The “Erekly” and “Tayf” Steamers were necessarily 
kept with the ships and on Tuesday last they sailed from Sinope with the Steamers 
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attached to them. Wednesday, the day following, the wind being from the East, the 
Russian Commander with a flag in the Bow [?] was seen off the Port, that is at a place 
called Kerze six or seven miles distant with these Line of Battle Ships & with one 
“Batrika”, altogether four ships and a gun was fired from the Battery at Kerze to apprize 
the fleet & the Castle of Sinope that the enemy was coming. The Erekli Steamer was 
immediately got under weigh & sent to reconnoitre the Ships; but it was clear that they 
were the enemy‟s ships. When the Tayf fires [?] were lighted the Patrona Pasha 
signalled to her to get under way and Steam against the wind & she did so. Husseyn 
Pasha made a signal for the ships to make sail, but Osman Pasha signalled twice that 
this should be delayed a little & the ships remained. Having been drawn up as near to 
the shore as possible Osman Pasha signalled that they should be ready to make a stout 
resistance and they all made ready. The Enemy‟s Ships came down upon Sinope & 
remained at about a shot‟s distance. While the Tayf was coming right before them the 
Enemy‟s Commander made a signal and they all made as if to enter the port and then 
drew off again and remained under sail as if blockading it, dispatching brigs on an 
errand. These three line of battle Ships thus remained night and day, and in order to 
ascertain what they were about signals had been established between the Castle and the 
fleet.  
It had been reported that besides these ships four others had been to “Ayandjik” to 
water, but we had disbelieved that report. 
One day all the Captains had been assembled on board the Patrona. The second in 
command of the Tayf was sent and the Patrona Pasha gave the following instructions to 
all the Captains: “The enemy‟s ships are at sea and we cannot cope with them. If we put 
out to sea we will be lost; the best thing is to fight them, if they come, so long as we 
have a gun left. If there be any danger of their capturing you, slip your cable, run your 
ships on shore and let fire to them.” So it was agreed upon. 
The Captain of the Nizamiye Kadri Bey having been at that time charged to 
enquire whether any one had been sent to give intelligence of the state of matters at 
Constantinople, it was replied that a Tartar had been sent an hour afterwards. Husseyn 
Pasha came on board the Tayf and on being asked whether he had sent information to 
the Porte when the enemy‟s ships came off the Island, he replied that as it was a long 
way by land he would send by the Austrian Steamer which was expected; and it was 
heard that he had sent. 
While in daily anxious expectation of Steamers or succour from Const‟ple the 
English Screw Steamer arrived on Tuesday and on being questioned about Const‟ple 
news he replied that no steamers or Ships had left it.  
The eighth day after [the Russians] had made their appearance, Wednesday the 29 
inst. [30 Nov.] it was foggy and rained and no ships were seen in the offing. The wind 
was from the East and at six o‟clock [?] [11 a.m.] “Navik Bahri” signalled that the 
enemy had come inside the island. When the fog was dispelled, all at once three three 
deckers; three line of battle ships and two frigates appeared bearing down upon our 
Squadron. The Patrona Pasha having signalled the Tayf to get up her Steam & go out to 
sea in the direction from which the wind blew, we immediately prepared to get under 
way.  
The following signal was also made to the Squadron: “The moment has now come 
for acquiring glory & renown & for serving our King. Let me see what you can do. Be 
valiant.” 
Everything being ready the Enemy‟s fleet came into port so close to the Ships as 
to touch them almost. They each had two boats in tow. On this the Patrona Pasha again 
signalled “be valiant”.  
At 11 a.m. the action commenced, and the Tayf slipped her cable got under way 
and put out to sea between the Squadron and the shore. Two of the enemy‟s frigates 
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were blockading the port under sail and bore down upon us and engaged with us. 
Continuing to h*y [?] the Coast we distanced the frigates and while doing the best to 
escape three Russian Steamers bore down upon us from the island and engaged with us 
during an hour and a half. They then left us on a signal made from their fleet & returned 
towards it.  
On looking in the direction of Sinope it was observed that several of the enemy‟s 
masts had fallen. As the Nizamiye, the Avn Allah & the Damietta fired broadsides we 
expect that one of the enemy‟s three deckers and a line of battle ship were sunk. We 
then plugged up the holes made by the enemy‟s shot and observed a fire proceeding 
from the Greek Quarter at Sinope. The firing was heard until 4 p.m. & until 8 o‟clock 
[?] in the evening. Now and then there was an appearance of an explosion. 
It had been several times represented to the Patrona Pasha to get under weigh with 
the Squadron, but as there were different opinions on this subject he did not move. We 
know nothing further as to the result of the action; because of we [?] had staid behind on 
this account the three steamers which had already chased us would have again fallen 
upon us and mischief might have befallen us. We therefore made straight for Const‟ple 
and arrived on Friday.  
 
Return of Turkish Ships at Sinope when the Russians entered that Port 
 
Frigates Nizamiye 
  Kaidi Zafer 
  Nesimi Zafer 
  Naviki Bahri 
  Avn Illah 
  Fazl Illah 
  Damietta 
Corvettes Feizi Maboud 
  Nedjmi Nishan  
  Kulsefid  
Steamers Erekli 
  Pervazi Bahri 
 
Appendix 18.  TNA. FO 195/309, dated 7 December 1853. Adolphus Slade to 
Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.  
 
H.M.S. Retribution 
Bay of Sinope. 7
th
 Dec. 1853 
 
My Lord 
 
With deep sorrow I write to inform you of the total destruction by a Russian 
Squadron of the Turkish Squadron excepting of the Taif / named in the margin in the 
Bay of Sinope on Nov. 30, 1853. The destruction is complete, the Battered wrecks of 
eleven vessels are stranded in the shores of the Bay, of 4000 gallant men who manned 
the squadron not more than 400 are with certainty in existence and of their nearly one 
half are wounded. Not a ship struck her colors, only two, namely the Avni Allah and the 
Nesimi when resistance had ceased to be possible, were taken possession of by the 
enemy but their condition was so bad as to cause them to be abandoned and destroyed 
the following day. The Gallant Commander in chief of the Turkish Squadron Osman 
Pasha was taken prisoner, wounded, in the Avni Allah and carried to Sevastopol. The 
second in command Husseyn Pasha left his burning ship in the evening of the action 
390 
after she had stranded, to swim to the shore: He reached it but a fragment of grape shot 
struck him on the head and terminated his existence. His remains were recovered and 
interred at the tekkieh adjoining the town. This officer‟s career commenced at the battle 
of Navarin and the last day of it has been marked by rarely if ever equalled devotion. 
The Turkish Squadron anchored in the Bay of Sinope about the 15
th
 of November 
last; about the first a Russian Squadron of three two-decked ships and a frigate and a 
Brig stood in [?] the Bay and ranged within two guns shot of the Turkish line. Having 
made this reconnaissance it established a blockade of the Bay by cruising off Cape 
Indjey. Keeping its station day and night in very bad weather. Seeing this as *?* 
informed, Husseyn Pasha and Emin [?] Bey (the Liman Reis of Sinope) counselled 
Osman Pasha to get under weigh and return to the Bosphorus either by forcing the 
blockade or by passing the blockading squadron in the night unnoticed. 
Osman Pasha having previous to his anchoring at Sinope suffered in his ships 
from a gale of wind and swayed by other appreciable motives, assumed [?] an action at 
anchor preferable to an action under way, but had he contemplated the reinforcement 
which subsequently arrived to the enemy, he would doubtless not have come to this 
conclusion. His 7 frigates, 3 corvettes and two steamers, whatever might have been the 
inexperience at sea of the captains and crews, would have made their way good against 
3 line of Battle Ships and a frigate at the same time as he appeared to be in expectation 
of being attacked by that force only, he ensured complete success by awaiting it at 
anchor. A few days then passed. The Russian brig with the blockading squadron having 
been noticed from the Turkish signal station to part company it was presumed that the 
Russian squadron composed of 3 3-deckers and 3 two deckers, two of the ships having 
respectively the flag of a Vice Admiral and of a Rear Admiral, stood into the bay before 
the wind, towards the Turkish Squadron under all plain sail including Royals each ship 
towing some of her boats astern, the frigates and 3 steamers remained outside to cut off 
the escape of any of the intended prey. The Turkish Squadron forsweared [?] the 
advantage of firing on the enemy during his approach and allowed him unmolested to 
take up his position. About noon the Russian ships clewed up their sails and came to an 
anchor with springs on their cables. Although the Pasha‟s flags were not hoisted, the 
position of their ships was denoted by their signals and opposite this part of the line the 
Russians anchored their three deckers. 
Husseyn Pasha in the Nizamiye opened the fire it was taken up by all the Turkish 
line and immediately responded to by the enemy, then for the first time frigates were 
opposed to three deckers. 
The Avni Allah (36) had a three decker directly abeam of her and as the survivors 
say they could not avoid striking her, for she appeared like a great wall beside them. At 
the commencement of the action the Taif slipped her cable and steamed out to sea and 
passing the frigates and steamers outside reached Constantinople on the 2
nd
 inst as you 
Excellency already knows. 
Half an hour after the action commenced, the Navik Turkish frigate blew up. Her 
Captain Ali Bey, seeing as he thought an enemy‟s ships about to board him exclaimed 
that he would blow his ship up rather than be captured, and descending to the Magazine 
he fired the powder; the crew not involved in the explosion jumped overboard a few 
reached the shore; most of them were drowned.  
In one hour or one hour and a half, the action had virtually ceased, save dropping 
shot here and there from the want of means on one side to continue it, half the crews of 
the Turkish Ships were slain, their guns were mostly dismounted and their sides literally 
beaten in by the number and weight of the enemy‟s shot. Some of the ships were on fire 
either from their own or the enemy‟s fire balls, the ships one by one excepting two 
slipped their cables, some went foul of each other, all went ashore and there lay wrecks. 
The Russians then manned their yards and cheered, they had obtained the object for 
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which they had come into the bay, viz. the destruction of the Turkish Squadron in it, on 
every consideration they should then have ceased firing, and had they done so, they 
would have avoided merited censure, but they reopened their fire on the stranded bulks, 
and in addition to the ships already engaged, their frigates came into the Bay to range 
close to them and complete their demolition. Many men thus lost their lives either by 
the shot or by drowning in their attempts to reach the shore. While the Turkish ships lay 
at their anchors, however feeble their fires might have become through the exhaustion 
of the means of prolonging it, I am not prepared to say that the Russians would not have 
been satisfied, strictly speaking in continuing to fire at them although a generous foe 
would have shrunk from doing so, but when resistance had not only ceased, but had 
become impossible, it was wrong to fire another shot. It was the imperious duty rather 
of the Russian admiral to send his boats to the wrecks to take off the survivors of the 
action. He refrained from doing that duty the two days he lay at Sinope - the town was 
without head or guidance and in consequence many remained on the wrecks till the 
Friday night or Saturday morning following. How many thus perished from cold and 
starvation it is impossible to say. Together with the ships the Russians destroyed the 
Turkish quarter of Sinope with shells and carcasses, the ruin is complete, not a house is 
standing, the inhabitants having followed the Governor and Kadif [?] of Sinope in their 
flights from the town at the first shot, the flames had then over [?] way. 
On Friday morning December 2
nd
 the Russian admiral sent a boat on shore but 
finding no person to communicate with he recalled it and addressed a letter to the 
Austrian Consul a copy of which is enclosed. 
On the same day, the Russian squadron left the Bay of Sinope to return to 
Sevastopol. Four of the ships disabled in their spars were towed out by steamers. 
Examination of the Russian missiles shew that 68 pr [?] guns are numerous in their 
ships and that fire balls and shells are used. 
On December the 6
th
 the French war steamer the “Mogadore” and HMS [?] 
“Retribution” arrived at Sinope on their mission of Humanity. There were found at 
Sinope out of the crew of the destroyed Turkish Ships, 13 officers including three 
doctors, (120 (about) sound men and about as many wounded. About 150 Sound men 
had been taken by the Russians out of the Avni-ilah and the Nesimi [?] as also Ali 
Mahir Bey and Radshid Hassan Bey, two of the Captains and carried prisoners to 
Sevastopol with Osman Pasha. Hundreds of men were supposed to have escaped from 
the beach in which they landed from their ships to adjoining villages but nothing certain 
is known thereon. Several wounded men have however been brought in from 
neighbouring villages in the course of this day the wounded in the town were found 
lying in the various cafés in a state of great destitution, and suffering in want of 
commonest necessaries. The three medical men landed from the Turkish ships had been 
unremitting in their attentions to them but were totally without means to alleviate their 
sufferings. This care was immediately taken up by the Medical Officers of the 
Mogadore and of the “Retribution” and by the Medical Officers sent for occasion from 
the squadron at Beikos and too much praise cannot be to given to these gentlemen for 
their skilful and persevering exertions in the face of unaccustomed obstacles. At first it 
was proposed to convert the lazzarette into a hospital but it being non apparent that 
disappointment would follow that Captain Le Vallé and Captain Drummond adopted the 
wise and humane resolution of embarking all the wounded whose cases admitted of 
removal and of conveying them to Constantinople. They have also consented to convey 
the unwounded officers and seamen at Sinope to Constantinople; their embarkation has 
accordingly been effected. Seeing the probability of more wounded men being brought 
in from the country after the departure of “Mogadore” and “Retribution”; I have 
directed two officers, two medical men and 8 seamen belonging to the late Turkish 
Squadron to remain at Sinope for the purpose of attending to them, and they have been 
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supplied with money and the necessary medical appliances. I cannot close this letter 
without expressing my sense of admiration of the gallantry and devotion of the Turkish 
Officers and Seamen of the late Turkish squadron at Sinope during their unexampled 
contest against an overwhelming force.  
I have the honor to be  
My Lord 
Your most obedient Servant 
  Adolphus Slade 
 
Appendix 19. A. MKT. UM. 149/7, dated 7 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (8 December 1853). 
From the grand vizier to the governors of Damascus and Jerusalem on the 
prevention of ill-treatment of Christians. 
 
Devlet-i Aliyye asakirinin Rusyalu ile ind-ül muharebe mazhar oldukları muzafferiyet-i 
harbiyenin ol taraflara vasıl olduğu esnada ahali-i Ġslamdan bazı sebükmeğazan bir 
takım mutaassıbinin tahrikat-ı vakıalarına mebni orada mütemekkin Hıristiyanlar ile sair 
tebaa-i ecnebiye haklarında na-marzi muameleler icra eyledikleri bu kere istihbar 
olunmuĢ olup ol havalide bulunan tebaa-i ecnebiye içinde Rusyalu az olarak ekseri dost 
devletler tebaasından oldukları ve memalik-i mahruse-i mülukanede bulunan düvel-i 
mütehabe memurin ve tebaasına her dürlü hüsn-i muamele olunması nezd-i ali-i hazret-i 
padiĢahide matlub ve mültezem olduğu halde bunların böyle evza-ı barideye duçar 
olmaları yolsuz ve layıksız olduğuna ve Hıristiyan tebaa-i Devlet-i Aliyye ise bu 
muharebede velinimet-i bi-minnet padiĢahımız efendimiz hazretlerinin uğur-ı 
Ģahanelerinde ez dil u can ehl-i Ġslam ile birlikte olarak bununla beraber Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye'nin meĢmul-i afak olan merhamet ve adalet-i celile-i hakkaniyet-perverisi 
icabınca tebaa-i merkumenin evvelkinden ziyade hoĢ tutulmaları ve hiçbir yüzden renc 
ü reva-i elemnak olmamaları kaziyesi muahharen ittihaz buyurulan karar üzerine her 
tarafa tamimen iĢar ve beyan kılınmıĢ iken yine anın aksine gidilerek sadakat ve 
istikamet ve hidayetlerini bila fütur ibraz etmekte olan bir tebaa-i sadıkaya nazar-ı 
garazla bakılması dahi doğrusu pek çirkin ve rıza-i meali-irtiha-i padiĢahiye mübayin 
bulunduğuna mebni bu kaziyenin lazım gelenlere bildirilmesiyle beraber meftur 
oldukları Ģime-i meham-ı aĢinayi ve fetanet iktizası ve mukaddemki iĢarat ve ilanat 
muceb ve mukteziyesi üzere gerek düvel-i mütehabe tebaası ve gerek sunuf-ı tebaa-i 
Devlet-i Aliyye haklarında her suretle neĢr-i müessir-i sahabet ve ve ma'delet olunarak 
edna mertebe muamelat-ı cevriye ve tahkiriye vukua getirilmemesi ve bir de çünkü 
böyle Ģeylere cesaret nik ve bedi fark etmez ve dostunu düĢmanını bilmez bir takım 
mutaassıban ve sebükmeğazan tarafından tahaddüs edeceğinden ve o misillülerin 
harekat ve niyat-ı vakıalarından öteden berü müĢkilat tekevvün edegeldiğinden bu 
makulelerin ıslah-ı efkar ve etvarı ile muğayir-i adab-ı insaniyet halat-ı na-makulede 
bulunanlarının dahi terbiye-i lazımeleri icra olunarak derhal bu tarafa beyan-ı keyfiyete 
müsaraat kılınması ve orada mevkufen bulunacak Rusya tebaasından bazı uygunsuz 
hareket edenler olur ise icabına bakılmak hükümete aid olacağından anlara dahi ahali 
tarafından bir Ģey denilememesi hususlarına ale-t-tevali medd-i enzar-ı dikkat ve 
ihtimam  buyurulmaları sibakında Ģukka. 
 
Appendix 20. HR. SYS. 903/2 lef 55-57, dated 11 December 1853. Stratford to 
Reshid Pasha on the Battle of Sinop. [See HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 24 for its translation 
into Ottoman Turkish] 
 
His Highness Reshid Pasha  
Pera, December 11
th
 1853 
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 The notes addressed to me by Your Highness under the respective dates of the 
29
th
 ultimo and the 4
th
 Instant have been duly received and I should have done myself 
the honor of acknowledging them at an earlier moment, had it not been advisable for me 
to consult previously with the French Ambassador to whom similar notes had been 
addressed end in concert with His Excellency to wait for the return of the steam vessels 
which we sent to Sinope soon after receiving Your Highness‟s second note. 
 It is with sentiments of deep affliction that we have learnt the full extent of loss 
sustained by the Porte‟s flotilla in its late unfortunate conflict with a Russian force of 
disproportioned magnitude and for my own part I find no adequate consolation either in 
the heroic devotion displayed by the Turkish seamen on that occasion, or in the relief 
which has been conveyed to the wounded survivors by the vessels dispatched to Sinope 
under the respective colors of England and France. There is more reason to lament a 
disaster so distressing to humanity, as the exposure of the Sultan‟s vessels at Sinope to 
certain destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, if earlier attention had 
been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by 
effective batteries on shore. It now only remains for me to hope that greater foresight 
and more activity will be henceforward employed by the Porte in rendering available for 
the protection of her coasts, her naval forces such means as are still left at her disposal I 
should ill discharge the duties of a Representation if I omitted this opportunity of 
pressing one upon the Porte‟s most serious attention what I have so often recommended 
in previous communications. 
 Your Highness‟s note of the 4th Instant, announces the readiness of your 
government to send their squadron into the Black Sea, intimates at the same time an 
expectation that the Allied Squadrons, which are now anchored in the Bosphorus will 
concur in lending their active assistance for the protection of the Turkish Coasts.  
 A friendly attention has already been paid to his appeal, and indeed the presence 
of the Squadrons in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople is itself a very 
significant fact. It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador 
to assure Your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as 
the season may permit, and as circumstances may require for giving effect to the 
instructions, under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the 
protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression, but in the performance 
of that defensive duty they can not be expected to lose sight of those considerations 
which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to render their 
operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace as well as to the 
maintenance of the Sultan‟s rights.  
 With respect to the Turkish Squadron, I can not too strongly advise a 
reconsideration of the Porte‟s intention under such further information as may be 
obtained from the experience and professional judgement of those distinguished officers 
who are in command of the united Squadrons. I can not conceal form Your Highness 
that the impressions which I have derived from that source are anything but calculated 
to inspire me with confidence in the fitness of the Ottoman Squadron for active service 
at sea in presence of an imposing enemy and this unfavorable season. My observation is 
particularly directed to vessels under sail. 
 Your Highness is too enlightened not to appreciate the frankness with which I 
have expressed my sentiments at a moment of such pregnant importance to the interests 
of this Empire and its August Sovereign. 
 I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to Your Highness the assurances of my 
high consideration. 
 Stratford de Redcliffe 
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Appendix 21. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 25, dated 12 Kanun-ı Evvel [December] 1853. 
Translation of the official note of the French embassy in response to the Porte’s 
request to sail into the Black Sea. 
 
[tebyizi 16 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (17 December 1853)] 
 
Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel‟inin on ikisi tarihiyle 
müverrahan Dersaadet‟te mukim Fransa devleti büyük elçisi Ceneral Baraguey 
d‟Hilliers tarafından ita olunan takrir-i resminin tercümesidir. 
 
Nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟de mukim Fransa devleti büyükelçisi on yedi numerosuyla 
murakkam ve 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel‟inin dördünde vaki bin iki yüz yetmiĢ senesi 
Rebiyyülevvel‟in üçü tarihiyle müverreh olarak nazır-ı umur-ı hariciye-i Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye übbehetlu devletlu paĢa hazretleri tarafından ita buyurulan bir kıta takrir-i 
resmiyi ahz ile kesb-i fahr eylemiĢ ve takrir-i mezkurda altı kıta Rusya kapak 
sefinelerinin iki gün mütemadiyen Sinop limanı önünde göründükten sonra Ģehr-i 
TeĢrin-i Sani‟nin otuzu tarihinde liman-ı mezkura girerek orada lenger-endaz-ı ikamet 
olan ve fırkateyn ile korvetten ibaret bulunan donanma-i hümayunun fırka-i müfrezesi 
üzerine hücum eyledikleri beyan ve ifade olunmuĢtur. Vuku bulan muharebenin netice-i 
mükedderesi sefir-i mumaileyhin malumu olarak iĢbu neticeden dolayı an samim-ül 
kalb teessüf etmekte ise de Ģan ve namus ile icra olunup fakat hasımın kuvvetiyle 
mukabele olunan kuvvet beyninde pek çok tefavüt olduğundan asakir-i bahriye-i 
Ģahanenin Ģecaat ve gayret-i vataniyeleri bi semere kalmıĢ olduğu halde meĢhud olan 
sadakat ve istikametlerini kamilen pesend eder. Mamafih sefir-i mumaileyhimanın ne 
nazayihi ve ne de harekat-ı vakıasıyla medhali bulunmayan böyle bir vaka-i 
mükeddereye sebeb olan tedabirden dolayı kendü hakkında en cüzi bir mesuliyet eserini 
bile göremeyeceği derkardır. Çünkü vükela-i fiham hazeratı taraflarından her ne vakitle 
donanma-i hümayunu Karadeniz‟e çıkarmak arzusu izhar buyurulmuĢ ise sefir-i 
mumaileyh suğur-ı Osmaniye‟nin muhafaza-i meĢruası içün Devlet-i Aliyye‟in kuvve-i 
bahriyesini istimal buyurması hususuna hiçbir vechile muhalefet etmek istemediğini ve 
fakat bununla beraber donanma-i hümayunun yelken sefinelerinin ahval-i askeriye ve 
maddiyesine ve gerek adetce Rusyalulardan azlığına ve alel husus bu mevsimde 
Karadeniz‟de daima muhataralu olan seyr-i sefain maddesinin derkar olan müĢkilatına 
nazaran ya bir Ģedid furtuna zuhuru veyahud düĢmanın adetce faik olan kuvvetine 
tesadüf olunması takdirlerinde bir musibet ve felaket zuhur etmesinden havf ve istiraz 
üzere olduğu cevabını ita eylemiĢ idi. ĠĢte sefir-i mumaileyh iĢbu mülahazat ü ihtaratını 
bugünkü günde dahi tecdid ve tekrar ile beraber Saltanat-ı Seniyye vapur sefinelerini bir 
hüsn-i tedbir ve ittifak ile sevk ve istimal eylediği halde Rusya devleti aleyhinde faidelü 
surette mukabele buyurabileceği zann ü memulünde bulunduğundan bu babda nazır-ı 
müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin dikkat-i kamilesini davet eyler. Vakıa Fransa ve Ġngiltere 
donanmalarının Boğaziçine gelmeleri mücerred gerek haĢmetlu Ġmparator Napoleon ve 
gerek haĢmetlu Ġngiltere kraliçesi hazeratının Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin istiklal ve tamami-i 
mülki kaziyeleri ne derece mültezemleri olduğunun bir delil-i alisini ibraz etmek 
niyetine mebni olduğu bi iĢtibahtır ve bizim gemilerimizin Büyükdere‟de bulunmaları-
nın politikaca bir büyük manası olduğundan baĢka hususen muvafık-ı Ģan ve namus bir 
musalahanın istihsali ümidi münkatı olmadıkça mezkur gemilerin huzuru bir müzaheret-
i maneviye demek olduğu aĢikardır. Kaldı ki eğer Rusyalular Karadeniz boğazını 
zorlamağa tasaddi ederler veyahud harekat-ı harbiye üzerine veya Memalik-i Mahruse-i 
ġahane‟nin emniyet ve asayiĢine doğrudan doğruya bir tesiri olacak surette sevahilin bir 
mevkiine asakir çıkarmağa sa‟y ederler ise ol mahalde muhafaza-i Memalik-i Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye içün donanma-i müttefikaların bila tereddüd fiilen ve müessiren muavenet 
edecekleri teminatını sefir-i mumaileyh asaletlu Ġngiltere elçisi cenablarıyla bil-ittifak 
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Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟ye ibraz eylediği halde devlet-i metbuası niyatının tercümanı olmuĢ 
olacağını zann eder. ĠĢte Fransa ve Ġngiltere vapur sefinelerinin Sinop ve Varna‟ya bu 
niyete mebni gönderilmiĢ oldukları misillu donanma-i müttefikaların dahi Karadeniz‟e 
çıkmaları yine bu niyetle olacağı beyanını sefir-i mumaileyh devletinin Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye hakk-ı alisinde derkar olan efkar-ı hüsn-i muvalatının tecdid-i ifade-i halisane-
sine zeria ittihaz eyler.  
 
Appendix 22. İ. HR. 105/5151 lef 37. Musurus à Son Altesse Rechid Pacha. La 
nouvelle du déplorable événement de Sinope. Londres, le 15 Décembre 1853. 
 
La nouvelle du déplorable événement de Sinope, reçue par une dépêche 
télégraphique de Vienne, a produit ici une impression des plus pénibles une tristesse 
universelle et l‟on peut dire une indignation contre l‟inaction imposée aux flottes 
mourillées dans le Bosphore. Ce sentiment d‟amour-propre national est partagé par le 
Cabinet lui-même, quels que soient ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix. 
… Je lui ai rappelé ce qu'il m'avait dit dans le temps sur l'assistance que les deux 
flottes, prêteraient a la Sublime Porte, et qui se bornerait a l'aider en cas d'attaques 
agressives de la part de la Russie, mais nullement dans une guerre offensive de notre 
part. J‟ai fait observer à Sa Seigneurie que c‟était certainement par suite de cette 
promesse d‟assistance que la Sublime Porte n‟avait pas envoyé, ou peut-être avait été 
conseillée, de ne pas envoyer toute sa flotte dans la mer noir, convaincue qu‟elle était 
qu‟une telle promesse n‟aurait pas été donnée sans une engagement préalable de la 
Russie envers les Puissances a cet égard…  
 
Appendix 23. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 4, not dated, written 4 to 18 December 1853. 
Kapudan-ı Derya Mahmud Pasha to the grand vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha on the 
battle of Sinop before his dismissal on 18 December 1853. 
 
Çend gün mukaddem Amasra açıklarında Rusya gemileri gezmekte bulundukları haber 
alındıkta donanma-i hümayun kalyonları dahi denize çıkarak geĢt ü güzar eylemeleri 
lazım geleceği ve iki filoya taksim olunarak bir filosuyla [2] Ferik saadetlu Mustafa 
PaĢa ve bir filosuyla dahi Fırka-i Mısriye kumandarı saadetlu Hasan PaĢa hazeratının 
çıkması ve müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa Ġngiliz ve Hasan PaĢa Fransız lisanlarına aĢina 
bulunduklarından ve düvel-i bahriye [3] gemilerinden dahi birlikte çıkıldığı halde 
anların zabitanlarıyla müzakerede kolaylık olacağı ve Büyükdere‟de Mahmudiye ve 
Mesudiye ve Memduhiye kalyon-ı hümayunlarıyla bazı fırkateyn ve sair süfun-ı 
hümayunlardan [4] birazlarının eyyam-ı Ģita olmak münasebetiyle kalması lazım 
geleceğinden ferik-i bahriye saadetlu Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin süfun-ı hümayunlara 
kumanda etmek üzere burada kalması ve Tersane-i Amire‟nin iĢine sekte iras [5] 
etmemek, düvel-i bahriye donanmalarının dahi Deraliye‟ye vürud edeceklerinden anlar 
ile müzakere olunmak bazı hususda kendilerine müracaat kılınmak ve noksan bulunup 
matlub eyledikleri eĢya olur ise [6] Tersane-i Amire tarafından tesviye olunmak üzere 
Ģimdilik Kapudan PaĢa bulunanın dahi bu tarafda bulunması karargir olmuĢ idi. Bunun 
üzerine ba-irade-i Ģahane kalyon-ı hümayunlar ferik-i müĢarünileyh kumandalarıyla [7] 
denize çıkarılacak iken ol günlerde düvel-i bahriye donanmaları Beykoz piĢgahına 
vürud etmekte olduklarından bunların amiralleriyle müzakere olunarak büyücek gemiler 
ol vakit çıkarılmasun Ģimdilik birkaç gün [8] tevkif olunsun da yalnız fırkateynler 
çıkarılsun deyu emr ü ferman buyurulmuĢ idi. Anın üzerine donanma-i hümayuna 
gidilip Mahmudiye kalyon-ı hümayununun kamarasında Ferik-i Bahriye saadetlu 
Ahmed ve Mustafa PaĢalar [9] hazeratı birlikte bulundukları halde Patrona-i hümayun 
izzetlu Osman ve Bahriye mirlivalarından izzetlu Hüseyin PaĢalar celb olunarak 
Ģimdilik kalyon-ı hümayunlar birkaç gün tevkif olunarak yalnız fırkateynler çıkacaktır. 
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Fakat Amasra açıklarında Rusya gemileri bazen görünmekte bulunduklarından anların 
mürur u ubura tasallut eylemelerini men‟ etmek içün gideceksiniz. Daima biriniz 
Amasra ve biriniz dahi Ereğli [11] üzerlerinde bulunacaksınız. Eğerçi düĢman 
gemilerine tesadüf ederseniz mukabele edeceğinizi gözünüze kestirebildiğiniz halde 
hemen hasmane harekete mübaĢeret edeceksiniz lakin düĢman tarafı kuvvetlice görünüp 
de mukabele olunamayacağı hissolunduğu halde ol vakit dirayet ve istikametiniz 
iktizası üzere süfun-ı hümayunları muhataradan vikaye ve muhafazaya gayret 
edeceksiniz fakat düĢman gemilerine olsun veyahud denizde muhalif havaya [13] 
tesadüf etmiĢ bulunsun selamet tarafı neresi ise süfun-ı hümayunları nerede muhafaza 
edebilecekseniz ve dirayet ve sadakatiniz iktizası üzere ol vakit bir çaresine 
bakacaksınız fakat naçar kalıp da Dersaadet‟e [14] avdetle Boğaz‟dan içerü girmek 
lazım geldiği halde bu vechile dahi içerü girmeğe mezunsunuzdur deyu kendülerine 
tenbih olunarak ve birbirinizden pek çok ayrılmayup daima aralık aralık birleĢesiniz 
deyu tekraren [15] tenbih buyurularak maiyetlerine verilecek süfun-ı hümayunlar 
süvarileri dahi celb olunup paĢa-yı mumaileyhima hazeratının yanlarında süvari-i 
mumaileyhime lazım gelen tenbihat arasında maiyetde bulunduklarını ve paĢa-yı [16] 
mumaileyhimanın emirlerinin hilafı hareketde bulunmayacaklarını ve sonra bir 
uygunsuzluk ve kumandarlarınız tarafından bir Ģikayet vuku bulur ise mesul ve muateb 
olacaklarını ve Ģu vakitde güzelce gayret ve sadakat [17] eyledikleriniz müĢahade 
olunduğu halde cümlenize mükafat olunacağı ilan ve tenbih kılınarak ve paĢa-yı 
mumaileyhimaya ahval-i kadimi üzere lazım gelen harcırahlar ile muhtasar birer talimat 
verilerek ertesi günü sabahleyin [18] mahall-i memuriyetlerine çıkarılmıĢ olduğu ve 
çend gün sonra vuku bulan emir üzerine saadetlu Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerinin vapur-ı 
hümayunlardan Saik-i ġadi ve Feyz-i Bari ve Taif ve Ereğli vapurları verilip Tophane-i 
[19] Amire istihkam alayları Mirlivası izzetlü Rüstem PaĢa dahi tayin buyurularak ve 
donanma-i hümayundan dahi mühtedi ve müstaidd birkaç nefer zabitan verilerek 
kendüsi ve müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri hazır olduğu halde marr-ül zikr [20] 
Mahmudiye kalyon-ı hümayununda müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerine sizin 
memuriyetiniz Sinop ve Trabzon ve Batum ve Çürüksu‟ya uğrayarak Batum orduy-ı 
hümayunu müĢiri devletlu paĢa hazretlerini bulup tahrirat-ı aciziyi vererek görüĢülüp 
oradan dahi bir malumat alarak Sohum tarafına gidilip oraların suları ve ahval-i hazırası 
ne heyettedir tahkik olunabildiği mertebe anlayıp Çerkes sevahilinden geçerek eğerçi 
oralarda bir münasip [22] mahalle biraz cephane çıkarılmak mümkün olabilür ise ve 
hava dahi muhalif olmadığı ve düĢman gemilerinin galebeliği bulunmadığı surette 
heman ihtiyaten verilmiĢ olan fiĢenk ve külçe kurĢun ve bir miktar barut-ı siyah [23] ile 
maiyetine verilen Çerkes Ġsmail Bey‟in yedinde bulunan emirname-i samileri serian 
mahall-i mezbura çıkarılıp badehu o kıyılardan Soğucak taraflarına gidilip oraları dahi 
Sohum misillü muayene olunarak [24] oradan dahi Kırım sevahilinden doğru Rumeli 
tarafından Deraliye‟ye avdet olunması ve Ģayed Sohum‟a uğrayıp da Çerkes sevahilinde 
hava muhalif bulunup kıyı tarafına inilemeyip ve düĢman sefineleri dahi çok olduğu 
[25] halde ol vakit mezkur cephane ve saire ile evrakları ol mahalle bırakmakdan sarf-ı 
nazarla hemen doğrudan doğruya mahall-i malumeler dolaĢılarak avdet olunması ve 
eğerçi ziyade muhalefet-i hava vuku bulup da hiç [26] dolaĢılamaz ise ol vakit gerüye 
avdet olunması ve kendüsünün dirayet ve sadakat ve istikametine havale kılınarak bir 
muhtasar talimat dahi verilmiĢ ve ahval-i kadimi üzere harcırahı dahi ita kılınmıĢ idi. 
[27] Fakat müĢarünileyh hazretleri Çürüksu‟dan kalkıp gayet hava müsaid olduğu halde 
Sohum‟a uğramayıp doğru Çerkes sevahiline giderken gece bir düĢman fırkateynine 
tesadüf etmiĢ ve sabahleyin birbirlerini müĢahade [28] ettikleri ve kezalik hava eyyam 
bulunduğu surette birbirlerine bir mikdar top endahtıyla oradan düĢman sefinesini 
bırakarak kıyıya inip sandallar ile mezkur cephane ve saireyi çıkarmıĢ ve orada birkaç 
kıta [29] Rusya uskunalarından ufak Ģeyler görülmüĢ ise de anları dahi hava muhalif 
olmadığı halde kovalamamıĢ ve hava eyyam bulunduğu surette kendisine tenbih olunan 
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mahallere dahi uğramıyarak gerüye avdet edip [30] üç kıta vapur ile doğru Sinop 
limanına vasıl olmuĢ ve mukaddema denize karakola çıkarılmıĢ olan patrona-i hümayun 
mumaileyh Osman PaĢa çend kıta süfun-ı hümayun ile liman-ı mezkurda görülüp çend 
gün sonra mumaileyh Hüseyin PaĢa dahi maiyeti bulunan süfun-ı hümayunlar ile birer 
ikiĢer limana dahil olup müĢarünileyh hazretleri kumandar-ı mumaileyhimadan niçün 
geldiniz deyu sual eyledikte hava muhalif olduğundan her birimiz bir tarafa dağılarak 
liman-ı mezkuru tutabildik deyu ifadelerinde müĢarünileyh hazretleri maiyeti bulunan 
vapurlardan Taif ve Ereğli vapurlarını bırakıp ben gideceğim sizler de kalkın deyu 
tenbih etmiĢ ve ol esnada [33] liman-ı mezbur açıklarında Rusya gemilerinden bazı 
sefineler müĢahade olunmuĢ olduğundan mukaddem ol tarafa maslahata gönderilmiĢ 
olan Persud vapuru dahi orada bulunmuĢ idüğünden mezkur vapuru karakola 
göndererek [34] görünen sefineler kaç kıta olduğu tahkik olunup badehu vapur-ı mezbur 
avdet ederek haber verdikten sonra müĢarünileyh hazretleri gece maiyeti bulunan 
vapurlardan Saik-i ġadi ve Feyz-i Bari ve Persud vapurlarını [35] alıp Deraliye‟ye avdet 
etmiĢ olduğundan keyfiyet bu vechile vuku bulmuĢ olduğu tahkik kılınmıĢ ve siz 
bahriye feriki bulunduğunuz halde donanma-i hümayunu ol hal ile orada niçün 
bırakdınız ve böyle bir muhataralu [36] mahalde ol vechile donanma-i hümayunu 
bırakarak vapurları alıp bu tarafa gelmeniz pek layıksız bir Ģey olmuĢ deyu 
müĢarünileyh hazretlerine ifade olundukta ben onlara tenbih ettim ve yanlarına vapurlar 
bıraktım ve liman-ı [37] mezkurdan her rüzgar ile kıyam olunur ve bir açık mahaldir ki 
muhatarası yokdur ve durmayacaklardır deyu taraf-ı acizaneme ifade eylemiĢ olduğu ve 
tekrar ne sebebe mebni sana tenbih olunan mahallere gitmediniz ve hava muhalif değil 
[38] imiĢ ve tesadüf eylediğiniz düĢman sefinelerine galebe edeceğiniz dahi memul iken 
niçün bırakıp avdet ettiniz deyu sual-i acizanemde eğerçi o gemiyle uğraĢmıĢ olaydık 
geceye kalacaktık [39] ve belki hava muhalif olduğu halde bir muhatarada bulunur idik 
veyahud düĢmanın donanması gelip de bir zarar eder idi ve biz ol gemiyi hayli 
korkuttuk ve Sohum ve Soğucak sevahillerini dahi uzakdan [40] gördük ve hava 
muhalif olduğundan anın içün avdet ettik cevabını vermiĢ ise de bazı vapur-ı 
hümayunlarda bulunanlardan iĢidilmiĢe göre ziyade vehmlerinden avdet etmiĢ oldukları 
anlaĢılmıĢ ve bunun üzerine [41] donanma-i hümayunun Sinop‟ta kalmıĢ olduğu 
anlaĢıldığından düvel-i bahriye amirallerinin ifadelerine nazaran bundan sonra yelken 
gemilerinin Kara Deniz‟e çıkması caiz olmayacağından donanma-i hümayundan dahi 
bundan sonra [42] büyücek gemilerin çıkmasından sarf-ı nazar olunarak yalnız Boğaz‟a 
karib mahallerde beĢ altı fırkateynin karakolda gezmesi münasip olup fakat münavebe 
tarikiyle büyük vapurlardan üç kıtasının bir ferik kumandasıyla [43] sevahillerde [sic] 
gezmesi emr ü ferman buyurulmuĢ olduğundan serian birkaç gün zarfında müĢarünileyh 
Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin üç kıta vapur ile denize çıkılması kendüsüne tenbih olunup 
hazırlanmakta iken Sinop tarafında bulunan [44] donanma-i hümayun kumandarları 
tarafından vürud eden tahrirata nazaran Rusya gemileri mahall-i mezburu abluka 
suretinde gezdiklerini beyan etmiĢ oldukları beyn-el vükela anlaĢıldığı anda mezkur 
gidecek vapurlara birkaç kıta vapur dahi ilave olunarak hemen gönderilmesi emr ü 
ferman buyurulmuĢ olmasıyla  ol ahĢam Meclis-i Ali‟den Tersane-i Amire‟ye avdet-i 
acizide bahriye meclisi reisi saadetlu paĢa ile müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazeratı celb 
olunup [46] müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerine “beĢ altı kıta vapur-ı hümayun ile 
serian bir iki gün zarfında çıkacaksınız ve süfun-ı hümayunları muhataradan kurtarmağa 
dirayet ve istikametiniz iktizası üzere oraca bir çaresini düĢüneceksiniz” [47] deyu ifade 
olundukta ol anda “beni siz muhatarada bulunduracaksınız ve düĢmanın gemileri 
geziyormuĢ ve müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerini gönderdiğiniz vakit bir iĢ 
görmeden bırakdı geldi. ġimdi beni muhataraya [48] gönderiyorsunuz” deyu cevablar 
vermiĢ olduğundan taraf-ı aciziden cevab olarak “siz vapur ile gideceksiniz öyle bir 
muhatarada bulunacağınızı aklınız kestiği anda avdet edersiniz niçün böyle 
söylüyorsunuz ayıp değil mi eğerçi gidemiyecekseniz bana resmen cevab verin Bab-ı 
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Ali‟ye gideyim bu hal ve keyfiyeti ifade edeyim ben kendim vapur-ı hümayunlar ile 
yarın inĢallahu teala giderim” deyu ifade eylediğimde keyfiyetin neticesi uygunsuz [50] 
olacağını hissettiği anda ol vakit “ben mutlak gitmem demiyorum fakat ümera-i bahriye 
toplansın da bir müzakere edelim vapur-ı mezkurlar ile mahall-i mezkura gittiğim halde 
ne hareket edeceğimi kararlaĢtıralım ondan sonra gideyim” [51] deyu ifade eyledikte 
“ümera-i bahriye sizden ibaret değil midir ve siz onlardan talimat aldığınız halde mi 
hareket edeceksiniz ve denizde bulunduğunuz müddetçe ol talimatın haricinde hiçbir 
Ģey yapmıyacak mısınız ve deniz halidir [52] bu talimat derununda muharrer bulunan 
Ģeylerin hiç birisi icra olunamayıp da kendü dirayet ve malumatınız iktizası üzere bir 
Ģey yapacak olduğunuz halde hiçbir Ģey icra etmiyecek misiniz ve bu ana kadar [53] 
denize çıkdığınız vakit ümera-i bahriye toplanıp size bir talimat vermedikçe çıkmadınız 
mı idi? Böyle Ģey ayıp olmaz mı?” denildi ise de yine kel evvel bir meclis olunsun deyu 
ısrar ederek [54] ertesi gün mevcud bulunan ümera-i bahriye meclis-i bahriyeye celb 
olunarak müzakere olundukta badehu kulunuza gelip ifade ettikleri halde kulunuz dahi 
cümlesine hitaben “bu ana kadar Rumeli‟de [55] ve Anadolu‟da saye-i Resulullah‟da ve 
saye-i Ģahanede haylü fütuhatlar oldu bahren daha hiçbir Ģeylere muvafık olamadık. Ben 
hiçbir zatın yanına gidemiyorum ve gittiğim halde dahi hicabımdan [56] ne yapacağımı 
bilemiyorum. Ayıp değil midir ? Saye-i Ģahanede bu rütbelere ve niĢanlara nail olduk 
hiçbir iĢ görmedik ve kanğınızı bir memuriyete gönderecek olsak birtakım muğalata 
[57] gösteriyorsunuz. Resmen size ifade ederim ki eğerçi gidemiyecekseniz ve 
korkuyorsanız bana haber verin Bab-ı Ali‟ye gideyim bu keyfiyetleri beyan-ı hal 
edeyim yarın içinizden reis paĢayı veyahud [58] birinizi alırım vapur-ı hümayunlara 
rakib olarak giderim” deyu kendülerine ifade eylediğimde “gideriz fakat düĢman 
gemileri böyle ziyade görünmekte bulunduklarından biz yalnız vapurlar ile gitmemiz 
kuvvetsiz [59] bulunacağından yalnız karakol gezmemiz lazım gelür zira bundan sonra 
bizim yelken gemileri eyyam-ı Ģita olmak münasebetiyle dıĢaru çıkması münasip 
olmayıp Ġngiltere ve Fransa amirallerinin efkarı da [60] budur ve hatta bu defa giden 
fırkateynler muhalif havaya tesadüf ederek Sinop limanına gittiler ve çıkamadılar 
bundan sonra Amasra açıkları geçildiği halde bu tarafa avdet etmek güçdür. [61] Rusya 
donanması geziyor ise de Kırım taraflarından kalkıp Sinop üzerlerine gelmek pek 
kolaydır ve pek yakındır yine o tarafdan Kırım tarafına avdet etmek veyahud Batum ve 
Sohum [62] tarikine gitmek kolay olup ve Rusya‟nın limanları oralara yakın 
bulunduğundan anın içün o sularda geziyor ve daima rüzgar üstünde bulunup fakat bu 
vakitlerde Boğaz‟a yakın [63] büyük gemilerini getiremez eğerçi gelse bir muhalif hava 
esdiği anda karaya gider gerüye avdet etmek mümkün değildir veyahud Boğaz‟dan 
içerü girmesi lazım gelür baĢka selameti yokdur” [64] deyu ifade etmiĢ oldukları ve 
bazen ferik-i müĢarünileyhima hazeratıyla birlikte müzakere olunup bazı tenbih olunan 
Ģeylerin arasından üç beĢ gün geçip de Ģayed bir aksi veyahud [65] kendülerine 
dokunacak bir Ģey olur ise “ol anda siz böyle demediniz baĢka surette söylediniz” 
diyerek sözlerinden nükul etmekde bulundukları pek çok [defa, CB] taraf-ı aciziden 
nefsimce [66] müĢahade etmiĢ olduğumdan ve hatta kendülerine bundan sonra sizler ile 
bir Ģey müzakere olunduğu vakit daima yanımda baĢka bir adam daha Ģahadet etmek 
içün bulunmak veyahud her olunan [67] müzakereyi yazıp sizlere temhir ettirmek lazım 
gelecek deyu ifade eyledim ve bu keyfiyetlerin böyle vuku bulduğunu tamamı 
tamamına ifade eyledim ise de birazlarını vükelay-ı Devlet-i Aliyye‟den [68] bazı zat-ı 
alikadirlere dahi ifade eyledim ve hatta her ne vakit donanma-i hümayundan bir 
veyahud çend kıta süfun-ı hümayun bir mahalle kendüleri getürecek olsalar sekiz aydan 
berü Tersane-i Amire tarafındaki [69] anbarlardan ve taĢradan mübayaa olunarak daima 
süfun-ı hümayunlara mühimmat verilmekte olduğu Tersane-i Amire nazırı atufetlu bey 
efendi hazretleriyle meclis-i bahriye ve sair memurin-i [70] tersanenin cümlesinin 
malumlarıdır. Elan bugün yine bir mahalle ufak bir sefine ile gidecek olsalar pek çok 
muğalata göstermekte oldukları ve bu verilen mühimmat daima [71] mevcud sefine 
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bulunduğu donanma-i hümayunun külliyet üzere bir tarafa çıkmadığı ve “sekiz mahdan 
berü niçün noksanlarınızı ikmal etmediniz ve daima bir Ģey noksan kalmasun deyu 
sizlere tenbih olunur [72] her vakit noksanımız yokdur her bir Ģeyimiz tamamdır deyu 
ifade ediyorsunuz sonra bir memuriyet sizlere gösterildiği anda böyle muğalatalara 
kalkıĢıyorsunuz” deyu tekraren taraf-ı acizanemden ifade [73] kalmakta olduğu ve 
cenab-i Hakk velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padiĢahımız efendimiz hazretlerine bitmez ve 
tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan buyursun Tersane-i Amire ümerasının bazılarının hal ve 
ahvalleri [74] iĢte bu merkezdedir. Ve bunların böyle olduğunu bildiğim halde beyan-ı 
hal etmek kulunuza yakıĢmayacağını bilürüm ve elden geldiği mertebe bunları 
muhafaza eylemek sevdasında idim. Fakat [75] Ģimdi Ģu vakit Ģu hale nazaran bunların 
ne ahlakda ve ne efkarda olduklarını nefs-i acizanemde tecrübe eyledim. Ve bazı daha 
bilen baĢka zatlar dahi olmalıdır. Bunlar kendü kabahatlerini [76] kapayup daima üst 
tarafında bulunan amirlerini nas beyninde kötülemek efkarında bulundukları ve 
bazılarının dahi Ģu vesile ile belki bir kapudanlık memuriyeti tahsil ederiz [77] 
sevdasında olduklarından babaları hakkında bile cenab-ı Hakk‟dan havf etmeyip her 
dürlü hilaf ve kizbi irtikab ederek gezdikleri ve yürüdükleri mahallerde bazı sözler 
söylemek ve söylettirmek efkarında bulunuyorlar ve hatta bu defa vuku bulan Sinop 
keyfiyetinden dolayı birtakım sözler söylemiĢler ki pek çok nas beyninde ve sair uĢak 
makuleleri yanlarında güya vuku bulan keyfiyetlerin cümlesine Kapudan PaĢa sebeb 
olmuĢ diyerek havadis ettirilip söylemekte bulunduğunu kulunuz ve sair bendeleriniz 
iĢitmekte olduğumuz ve zat-ı devletleri dahi [80] bazı sözler elbette iĢitmiĢsinizdir. Bu 
hale nazaran bunlara nasıl emniyet olabilür kulunuzdan mukaddem makam-ı acizlerinde 
bulunan zatların bazıları müĢarünileyhima bendelerinin bazıları hakkında vuku bulan 
Ģikayetlerinde hakları olduğu Ģimdi Ģu vakitde kulunuz müĢahade eyledim ve 
kendülerine dahi acizane hak verdim ve zat-ı ali-i hıdivilerinin iĢte [82] bu keyfiyete 
malumat-ı tammeleri bulunmak ve hin-i icabında kulunuzdan dahi sual buyurulmak 
lazım geleceği zira Ģu keyfiyetleri kulunuz iĢitdikçe alimallah ne derecelerde mükedder 
ve me‟yus [83] oluyorum. Zira birtakım nas bu vechile bu keyfiyetleri bilmediklerinden 
ve bilemiyeceklerinden birtakım ehl-i fesadın sözlerine inanıp ağızdan ağıza pek çok 
Ģeyler aks [84] ederek söylemekte olduğu ve kulunuz dahi saye-i resulullahide ve saye-i 
Ģahanede bu ana kadar familyaca kazanmıĢ olduğumuz namusu gayb etmemek içün her 
dürlü Ģeyi ihtiyar [85] ederim ve canımı dahi uğur-ı padiĢahiye telef ederim ve bu 
namus-ı acizanemin vikayesi mücerred emr ü irade-i seniye-i devletlerine menut ve 
mütevakkıf mevaddan idüği malum-ı ali-i hıdivileri [86] buyurulmak babında ve her 
halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir. 
 
Appendix 24. HR. TO. 219/84, dated 23 December 1853. Translation of an extract 
from a report from the British consulate in Erzurum to the British embassy. On 
Hurşid Pasha’s (General Guyon’s) appointment. 
 
Ġngiltere sefaretine 1853 senesi Kanun-ı Evvel‟inin yigirmi üçü tarihiyle müverrehan 
Erzurum canibinden tevarüd eden tahriratdan müstehrec bir bendin suret-i tercümesidir. 
 
Bazı rivayete nazaran HurĢid PaĢa kendüsinin bir ferman-ı âliyi hamil olduğunu kemal-i 
metanetle tasrih ve ifade ile kendü rey ve efkârını açıktan açığa beyan edeceğini ve ârâ 
ve efkâr-ı mübeyyenesine havale-i sem‟-i itibar buyurulmasına ve nesayih-i vakıasının 
icra olunmasına muntazır olduğunu ve rey ve efkar ve nesayihi dinlenilmediği takdirde 
serian Dersaadet‟e avdet ile canib-i Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye beyan-ı hal edeceğini müĢir paĢa 
hazretlerine arz ve beyan eyledikte kendüsi gerek paĢa-i müĢarünileyh ve gerek meclis 
azası taraflarından cümleten nesayih-i vakıasına itibar olunacağından orduy-ı 
hümayunun muamelat-ı harbiye-sine dair kaffe-i mesalihi idareye davet olunarak ifay-i 
memuriyete mübaderet eylemiĢdir. ġehrin muhafazası zımnında bazı istihkamat inĢasına 
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mübaĢeret olunmuĢ olduğundan mumaileyh HurĢid PaĢa bunları ledel muayene mevakii 
beğenmediğinden hedm ü mahvını tebeyyün ve diğerlerini tertib ile bizzat kendüsi 
nezaret ederek bunların inĢasına neferat-ı askeriyeyi serian sevk eylemiĢ askerin kıĢla ve 
makulat ve maaĢlarını teftiĢ ile beraber hastahaneleri gezmiĢ ve nihayet askerin maaĢı 
ne kadar mütedahilde olduğunu bit-tahkik ekserisi on iki ve on dört ve bazıları dahi on 
sekiz mahdan berü maaĢ almadıklarını ve müteakıben paĢaların kaç aylık alacakları 
olduğunu sual ile bazıları üç ve ekserisi bir mah kadar tedahül ile maaĢ aldıklarını 
tahkik eyledikte kendülerinin menafiini bu derecede vikaye ettikleri halde zir-i 
kumandalarında bulunan ademlere kat‟a bakmadıklarını takbih ile bu kadar maaĢ alur 
iken müddet-i medide neferatın maaĢını tedahülde bırakacak yerde bir senelik 
maaĢlarından vazgeçmeleri kendülerine hiç bir bâr ü sıklet olmayacağını ifade eylemiĢ 
ve hazine-i askeriyede mebaliğ-i külliye bulunduğunu haber almıĢ olduğundan nukud-ı 
mevcudenin neferat-ı askeriyeye tevzi‟ olunmasını emr ile kâffe-i ordunun iki aylık 
maaĢını tesviye ve tediye ettirmiĢdir. ĠĢte bu keyfiyet ve gerek paĢa-i mumaileyhin ifay-
i memuriyet emrinde vuku bulan ikdam ve gayretiyle beraber neferat-ı askeriyenin 
istihsal-i saadet-i haline nazar-ı imtina ve dikkat eylemesi kendüsinin makbuliyetini 
vücuda getirmesiyle kâffe-i asakir esnay-i harbde ta son derecesine kadar kendüsine 
icray-i muavenet edeceklerini vadetmiĢlerdir. HurĢid PaĢa piyade ve atlu karakolları 
içün güzel bir usul ihdas edip herkesi [sic] kendü fariza-i zimmetini müessiren ifa 
etmekte olduğunu müĢahade eylemekdedir. 
 
[at the back of the paper] Tebyiz olunmuĢdur. Fi 15 R 70 [15 January 1854]. Mübeyyizi 
arz olunmak üzere saadetlu amedci bey efendi hazretlerine verilmiĢdir. Fi 16 R 70. Aslı 
Mösyö Pizani‟ye iade olunmuĢdur. 
 
Appendix 25. HR. MKT. 68/42, dated 26 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (27 December 1853). 
From Ferik Hurşid Pasha [General Guyon] in Kars to Reşid Pasha the foreign 
Minister. On the causes of the defeats of the Kars army in the battles of Ahısha, 
Bayındır and Başgedikler.  
 
Hakpay-i ali-i nezaretpenahiye bin iki yüz yetmiĢ sene-i hicriyesi mah-ı Rebiyy-ül-
evvel‟inin yigirmi altısı tarihiyle müverrahan Kars canibinde bulunan ferik rütbesinde 
HurĢid PaĢa tarafından takdim olunan bir kıta arizanın tercümesidir. 
 
Erzurum‟a gitmem içün taraf-ı valay-i sipehsalariden irsal buyurulan emirnameyi ahz 
eylediğim anda yola çıkmağa Ģibat etmedim ve menzil ile gece ve gündüz [2] gittiğim 
halde Ģehr-i Kanun-ı Evvel‟in dokuzuncu gününde Kars ordusuna muvasalat eyliye-
bildim. ĠĢte Ģehr-i TeĢrin-i Sani‟nin dokuzu tarihiyle lutfen taraf-ı [3] bendeganeme irsal 
buyurulan emirname-i ali-i nezaretpenahilerini iĢbu Kars mevkiinde ahz ile kesb-i 
iftihar ettiğimden canib-i seniyy-ül cevanib-i Devlet-i Aliyye‟den müceddiden [4] 
mazhar olduğum iĢbu itimad-ı aliden dolayı hakpay-ı sami-i hıdivanelerine arz-ı teĢek-
kürler etmekle beraber hizmet ve memuriyet-i bendeganemin ne olacağını katiyyen [5] 
bilmekliği arzu etmekteyim. Eğerçi harcırahımı evvelce almıĢ olaydım vaktiyle yola 
çıkarak bu tarafa daha erkence vasıl olmuĢ olacağımda iĢtibah yoğidi. Fakat [6] 
harcırahıma destres oluncaya kadar bendenizi iki hafta beklettiklerinden ġam-ı ġerif-
den bu tarafa daha az vakitde gelmeklik emr-i muhal olduğundan artık birisi Ģehr-i 
TeĢrin-i [7] Sani‟nin on üçünde Kara Kilisa ile Gümrü‟den iki saat mesafede Bahandır 
[Bayındır?] beyninde ve ikincisi Ģehri mezkurun yigirmi altısında Ahısha kurbünde ve 
üçüncüsü [8] dahi Kanun-ı Evvel‟in ibtidasında BaĢ Gedi [BaĢgedikler?] ve Orta Gedi 
ve Kolveren nam mahallerde Rusyalular ile vuku bulan üç muharebelerimizde hazır 
bulunacak suretde [9] bir süratle gelemediğimden dolayı izhar-ı teessüf etmekten gayri 
bir çarem yokdur. ġu kadar ki usul-i harbce bizim ordumuz tarafından vuku bulan 
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hatalar hakkında halisane [10] ve acizane beyan-ı efkara mücaseret ettiğim halde zat-ı 
übbehet-ayat-ı daverilerinin iĢbu cesaret-i bendeganemi mücerred Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟ye 
sadıkane ve gayurane ibraz-ı hizmet [11] etmeklik babında derkar olan arzu-i çakerane-
me haml ü isnad buyurmalarını niyaz ederim. ġöyle ki, evvela iĢbu ordunun beher topu 
içün ibtidaları dörder yüz atımlık [12] hartucu olup Ģimdi ise herbir topun yalnız ikiĢer 
yüz atımlık hartucu kalmıĢ olduğundan ordunun toplarıyçün kifayet mikdarı mühimmat 
olmadığı, [13] saniyen Kars‟dan birisi Ahısha ve diğeri Bayezid içün iki kol asker ifraz 
olunup halbuki mezkur iki mahal Kars‟dan pek uzak bulundukları cihetle ledel hace 
[14] Kars ordusundan oralara imdad olunamayacağına nazaran iĢbu tedbir ile asıl 
orduya iras-ı vehn ü zaaf olunduktan maada mezkur iki kol askerin dahi beyhude yere 
[15] tehlikeye ilka olunduğu, salisen asıl büyük ordu ile Gümrü üzerine yürümek içün  
hiçbir sebeb yoğidi çünkü alelacele sefere gitmek üzere cem‟ ve tertib [16] olunarak 
yalnız yigirmi sekiz bin askerden ibaret olan bir ordu Gümrü gibi cedid ve metin ve 
mütehakim bir kale aleyhinde ne yapabilirdi? ĠĢte doğru Tiflis [17] üzerine gidilmek 
lazım iken gidilmemiĢ ve birtakım yanlıĢ tedbirlere teĢebbüs olunmuĢ olduğu halde 
bizim askerimizin nısfı mikdarı olan ve kale-i mezkure derununda bulunan [18] Rusya 
askeri Ģehr-i TeĢrin-i Sani‟nin on üçüncü gününde Gümrü‟den iki saat mesafeye kadar 
bize karĢı gelerek Kara Kilisa‟da tertib-i saff-ı harb etmiĢ olmaları bize tekrar bir [19] 
büyük fırsat idi ve eğerçi bu vakada Rusyalu‟nun pek çok zayiat ve telefatı olmuĢ ise de 
ancak bütün kavga dört buçuk saat mümted olmuĢ olan top ateĢinden [20] ibaret olup ol 
esnada ne piyade ve ne de süvari asker sevk olunmadıktan baĢka düĢmanın kaleye 
avdetini bile kesmeğe çalıĢılmadı. DüĢman ise pek ilerülememiĢ [21] olmasıyla bunun 
icrası pek kolay ve neticesi gayet azim olacağı, rabian Ahısha maddesinde ol tarafa sevk 
ve irsal kılınan birkaç taburlar birbirlerinden [22] pek uzak tertib ve ikame 
olunduklarından cümlesi kesb-i zaaf eylemiĢdi çünkü bir tarafdan düĢmanın mikdarı 
bizimkine müsavi olduğu halde anlar top ve müctemi‟ [23] bulundukları cihetle bizim 
taburlarımıza nisbetle kuvvetlu ve bir de bizim taburları-mızın mevkileri dağınık 
olmasıyla kumandada b**?tlik mümkün olmadıktan fazla kumandar [24] bulunan Ferik 
Ali PaĢa hazretleri ibtida kendüsi meydan-ı muharebeden çekilmekle orada mevcud 
olan on dört pare kadar toplarımız eyâdi-i düĢmana geçerek külliyen [25] münhezim ve 
periĢan olduğumuz, hamisen Ģehr-i Kanun-ı Evvel‟in ibtidasında BaĢgedi ve Ortagedi 
ve Kolveren‟e eğer düĢman yine kaleden çıkar iken kumandar bulunan [26] Reis 
Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri evvel emirde nizam üzere girü çekilerek Arabistan ordusunun 
Kars‟da boĢ duran sekiz tabur piyade ve on sekiz pare top ile [27] üç alay süvarisi gelip 
kendüsiyle birleĢmek üzere bazı tedabire teĢebbüs etmiĢ olaydı ol halde Kars‟dan iki 
veya üç saat mesafede vuku bulan iĢbu kavgada kuvvetimizin ziyadeliğine nazaran 
muzaffer olmaklık memuli bütün bütün bizim tarafda olmak lazım geleceğinden ol vakit 
hem düĢman saff-ı harb üzere kavgadan [29] istinkaf eder ve hem de bizim tarafdan 
vuku bulan bu kadar külli zayiata duçar olunmaz idi. Kaldı ki iĢbu vakada yalnız 
yigirmi altı pare topumuz zayi olmayıp belki askerin [30] gayret-i maneviyelerine *?* 
iras *?* olunmuĢdur çünkü kavganın akıbetinde nizamsız bir halde vuku bulan ricatdan 
sonra askerimiz beyninde firar maddesi ve kumandarlarından [31] adem-i emniyet 
keyfiyetleri pek uygunsuz bir surette zuhura gelmeğe baĢlamıĢ olduğu derkardır. 
Binaberin Kars‟da bulunan ordunun hal-i hazırına ve bir de [32] Rusya askerinin 
mevsim-i Ģitada unsur-ı tabiisinde gibi bulunacağından Ģimdiki halde Gürcistan 
dahilinde her bir guna hareket-i taarruziyenin icrası imkansız göründüğüne binaen Ģu 
mevsimde [33] fakat öyle bir hareketin istihsali esbab-ı lazımesiyle iĢtiğal olunabilür. 
Mesela Devlet-i Aliyye evvel bahara kadar buradaki ordusunun kuvvetini elli veya 
altmıĢ bin nefere ve toplarının [34] adedini yüz veya yüz otuz pareye kadar iblağ 
buyurduğu halde evvel bahar hululünde Gümrü civarında bir kolordu bıraktıktan sonra 
ġamil Bey ile iltihak hasıl etmek [35] ve kaffe-i ahali-i Ġslamını ayaklandırarak Tiflis‟e 
doğru gitmek ve Rusyalu‟yu ovalara düĢürerek ġamil Bey‟in kuvve-i müctemiası ve 
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birtakım tavaif-i Ġslamiyenin ayaklanmaları sebebleri ile [36] bizim tarafda hasıl olacak 
kuvve-i cesime ile Rusyalulara galebe etmek velhasıl kala ü mütehakim mahallerini 
birer birer zabt ü teshir eylemek misillü pek müsaid bazı tedabirler ile [37] Rusyalu 
aleyhinde harekât-ı tecavüzîye ve taarruzîyeye mübaĢeret olunabileceği vareste-i kaffe-i 
beyandır. Bundan maada ehemm-i umurdan olan bir madde yani ordunun suret-i [38] 
idare ve kumandası hakkında dahi bazı söz irad eylemekliğime müsaade-i mekârim-âde-
i nezaretpenahilerinin Ģayan buyurulmasını rica ederim. ġöyle ki aĢurı fena olmak üzere 
birkaç haritadan baĢka [39] hiçbir haritamız olmadığından ve Rusya erkân-ı harbi 
marifetiyle tanzim ve tersim olunmuĢ olan Kafkas haritasının bir sureti ise Paris‟de 
umur-ı harbiye nezaretinde mevcud idüğünden taraf-ı ali-i [40] hıdivanelerinden talep 
ve iltimas buyurulduğu takdirde bir suretini bize gönderecekleri bi-iĢtibahdır ve bir de 
para az verildiğinden casuslarımızın tertibi kifayet mertebede olmadığı ve zahire [41] 
tedarikinin usulü bütün bütün indî ve örfî olduğu ve erkân-ı harbiyemiz nukuda ve bir 
meydan icraata muhtaç bulunup çünkü vuku‟at-ı ahire askerin yeis ve füturunu [42] 
müstelzem olmuĢ olmağla askerin  hizmetine mücteni [?] tezyid ettirecek suretde iĢgal 
olunmaları lazıme-i halden olduğu bedidârdır.  
 
 
Appendix 26. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 1. End of December 1853 – Beginning of January 
1854. Mahmud Pasha's defence statement after his dismissal on 17 December. 
 
Rabbimiz teala ve tekaddes hazretleri velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padiĢahımız efendimiz 
hazretlerine bitmez ve tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan buyursun ve cem-i düĢmanlarını 
kahhar ismiyle kahr etsün. Kullarının hiçbir Ģeye liyakat ve istihkak-i acizanem 
olmadığı halde ve ba husus deniz fennine [2] malumat-ı acizanem bulunmadığını 
velinimetim efendimiz ve saniyen vükela-i azam bildikleri surette bendehanelerinde 
dua-i tezaid-i ömr ü ikbal-i Ģahaneye devam etmekte iken mabeyn-i hümayun-ı 
Ģahaneye celb olunarak kapudanlık memuriyeti ihsan-ı hümayun buyurulmuĢ idi. 
Kaderullahi [3] bu defa infisal-i acizanem vuku bulmasıyla hasımım bulunan asakir-i 
bahriye-i Ģahane ferikanından saadetlu Ahmed ve Mustafa PaĢalar hazeratıyla Meclis-i 
Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kulunuzun ru be ru muhakeme olunmaklığım lazım geldiği halde 
Tersane-i Amire nazırı sabık atufetlu Zühdi Bey [4] ve Bahriye Meclisi Reisi saadetlu 
Rağıb PaĢa ve meclis-i mezkur azasından saadetlu Salih PaĢa hazeratı beynlerine liman 
reisi ve KurĢunlu Mahzen limanı memuru izzetlu paĢalar kulları ve mekremetlu müfti 
efendi dailerinin Meclis-i Mahsus-ı mezkurda bulunmaları lazım gelür ise de [5] zaten 
Tersane-i Amire ümerasının ve zabitanının ekserisi müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa 
bendelerinden ziyadesiyle havf etmekte ve birkaç defa infisali vuku bularak yine 
muahharen hidemat-ı sabıkasında istihdam olunmakta olmak mülasebesiyle ümera-i 
müĢar ve zabitan-ı [6] mumaileyhimin ekserisini tekdir etmiĢ ve ettirmiĢ ve bazılarını 
dahi muamele-i tehdidiye ile kullanmıĢ olduğundan ümera-i müĢar ve mumaileyhimden 
her kangisi meclis-i mezkura celb olunsa çünkü bunların ber vech-i muharrer müĢarün-
ileyh Ahmed PaĢa'dan kimisi havf [7] üzere ve kimisi dahi tarafdarı olup hiç birisi 
müĢarünileyhin vuku bulacak ifadesine muğayir ve mübayin cevab vermiyecekleri ve 
ba husus bu defa vuku bulan infisal-i acizi üzerine müĢarünileyh Ahmed ve Mustafa 
PaĢalar hazeratının ibkaları münasebetiyle [8] ümera ve zabitan-ı mumaileyhim bir kat 
daha havf edecekleri derkar olduğu misillü kullarının ve müĢarünileyh nazır bey efendi 
hazretleri bendelerinin infisal-i acizanelerimiz vuku bulup müĢarünileyhima 
memuriyetlerinde bulundukları halde ümera-i müĢar [9] ve zabitan-ı mumaileyhimin 
meclis-i ali-i mezkurda müĢarünileyhima haklarında hiçbir Ģey diyemiyecekleri aĢikar 
olduğundan eğerçi müĢarünileyhima dahi memuriyetlerinden azl ve infisalleriyle 
hanelerinde dua-i padiĢahide bulundukları ilan olunduğu halde [10] ol suretle meclis-i 
ali-i mezkurda ol vakit müĢarünileyhima hazır bulundukları surette ümera-i müĢar ve 
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zabitan-ı mumaileyhim kulları belki doğruca ifade ve cevap etmeğe cesaret geleceği 
memuldür. Zira bunların ikisi birbirinin aleyhine olarak kulunuz [11] makam-ı 
kapudanide bulunduğum müddetçe pek çok lakırdılar söyledikleri halde Ģu günlerde 
ittifak ederek daima gezdikleri mahallerde kullarının aleyhimde bulunmaları ve geçen 
gün Meclis-i Vâlâ‟da çakerlerinin ve bazı ümeranın hakkında hilaf söyleyorlar [12] 
diyerek kasem etmeleri kendilerini doğruluğa çıkarıp vuku  bulan keyfiyeti bendelerine 
azv etmek sevdalarında bulundukları ve hatta müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa‟nın kulunuza 
dargınlığına sebeb müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa‟nın kendisine takaddüm ettirildiği [13] ve 
“Sinop canibinde sefain-i Ģahaneyi bırakıp niçün geldin?” deyu bazı sözler söylemiĢ 
olduğundan ve müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa dahi çend mah mukaddem bil-vasıta Fransız 
gazetesine birtakım layıksız Ģeyler derc ettirip muahharen tahkik ve tedkik olunarak 
[14] kendisine ifade olundukta aĢuru mahcub bulunduğundan ve bu defa vapur-ı 
hümayunlar ile Kara Deniz'e gideceksin söylenildikte bazı mertebe cevablar verdiğinin 
üzerine “Bab-ı Ali'ye sizi Ģikayet ederim” deyu taraf-ı acizanemden ifade [15] vuku 
bulmasından dolayı havfa düĢerek müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa ile birleĢip icray-i 
nefsaniyete kalkıĢmıĢ oldukları ve asakir-i bahriye-i hazret-i Ģahanenin elbise ve erzak 
tayinatlarıyla süfun-ı hümayun-ı mülukanenin tamiratından ve mühimmat-ı 
lazımelerinden [16] dolayı bazı Ģikayetleri vuku bulmuĢ olduğundan bunların verilip 
verilmediği ve tamiratı olup olmadığının nazır-ı müĢarünileyh ile Bahriye Meclisi'nden 
ve liman reisi paĢa tarafından ve aklam-ı bahriyeden tahkik ve tedkik buyurulması lazım 
geleceği [17] ve eyyam-ı Ģita olmak cihetle bundan sonra donanma-i hümayunun Bahr-i 
Siyah'a çıkamıyacağı ve çıkıldığı halde dahi nerelerde gezilebileceği bil-müzakere 
kaleme alınan layihanın dahi takdim kılındığı ve süfun-ı humayun denize çıktığı 
vakitlerde ne surette hareket edeceklerini ve kaç filoya taksim olunmalıdır bunun dahi 
elan bir müzakeresi vuku bulmuĢtur deyu ifadeleri vuku bulmakta olduğu ve tanzim 
ettirilen mezkur layihayı kulları beraber bulunduğum halde asakir-i bahriye-i Ģahane 
ümera ve zabitanıyla Fırka-i Mısriye süvarileri ve bazı kılağuzlar dahi Mahmudiye 
kalyon-ı hümayununa celb ile meclis olunarak tanzim ettirilip ahz olunan layiha 
hakpay-i ali-i sadaretpenahiye ve makam-ı vâlâ-yı hariciye ve seraskeriye takdim 
kılınarak manzur-ı alileri buyurulmuĢ olduğu ve mezkur filo pusulası dahi [20] birkaç 
kere ümera ve zabitan-ı mumaileyhim hazır oldukları halde Reis PaĢa hazretleri 
tertibinde donanma-i hümayunda birlikte bulunduğu surette yapılıp bendelerine 
verilerek geçenlerde saye-i Ģahanede hitam bulup havuzdan dıĢarı ihrac olunan [21] 
kalyon-u hümayunun cemiyeti gününde sair jurnaller ile beraber bir kıtası hakpay-ı 
hümayun-ı Ģahaneye ve diğerleri dahi bazı zevat-ı kiram hazeratına takdim ve ita 
kılındığı ve kulunuz donanma-i hümayuna altı aydan berü güya beĢ altı defa gidip 
kalmıĢtır deyu [22] ifade etmiĢ olduklarından halbuki kulları donanma-i hümayuna altı 
mahdan berü kaç kere gidip bazısında bir gece ve bazısında dahi iki üç gece kaldığım ve 
icabına göre on günde bir ve bazen yigirmi veyahud bir ayda bir gidip bulunduğum 
asakir-i bahriye-i neferatlarının dahi malumları bulunduğu ve beĢ altı defası zat-ı vâlâ-yı 
hazret-i seraskeri ile bil-maiye bulunmuĢ idüğüm ve makam-ı kapudanide bulunan zatın 
ve bahriye ferikleri olan paĢaların kangısı Deraliye'de kalıp [24] ve kangısı denize 
çıkacak ise Bab-ı Ali'de bil-müzakere taraf-ı acizanemden dahi tansip kılınarak anın 
üzerine vaki olan emr ü ferman vechile gönderilmekte idüği malum-ı ali olan halatdan 
bulunmuĢ olduğu ve hatta asakir-i Ģahanenin sayfiye [25] ve Ģitaiye elbiseleri kanun 
üzere altı mahda bir defa verilmekte olduğu ve Kasım duhulünde irade-i Ģahane vuku 
bulduğu anda taĢrada bulunanlara beylik ve kumpanya vapurları ve bazıları dahi yelken 
sefineleriyle icab-ı mevkiine göre [26] gönderilmekte olduğu cümlenin malumudur ve 
neferat-ı bahriyenin denizde bulundukları müddetçe lahm tayinatı ekl ettiklerinden 
eğerçi Ģikayet vuku bulmuĢ ise de donanma denizde ve yelken üstünde bulundukları 
vakitlerde usul-i kadim-i bahriye üzere peksimad ve zeytun [27] ve saire ile eğer taam 
tabh olunması mümkün olabilür ise Ģurba ve pilav dahi tabh olunacağı ve Ģayed bir 
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liman veyahud bir memleket kenarına yakın vardıkları halde ol vakit taze lahm ve 
etmek alıp asakir-i bahriye-i Ģahaneye tevzi [28] olunmak usul-i kadim-i bahriyeden 
bulunduğu ve süfun-ı hümayunun yedeklik mühimmattan bazı noksan Ģeyler var imiĢ 
deyu söylenmekte imiĢ bunların dahi mukaddema tersane-i amire ümera ve zabitanının 
ittifak ve kararı üzere tanzim [29] olunup elan destur-ül amel tutulmakta olan muktefi[?] 
mucebince kamilen yedeklik verilen mühimmattan maada usul-i tersanenin harici olarak 
pek çok mühimmat verilmiĢ olduğu liman defterlerinde mukayyed bulunacağı [30] ve 
asakir-i Ģahanenin bu sene-i mübarekede denizde bulunacakları memul olduğundan 
fevkalade tertibatdan tesviye olunması ve asakir-i merkume rahat etmeleriyçün bin beĢ 
yüz kese akçelikden ziyade gömleklik fanila çend mah mukaddem konturato [31] 
olunmuĢ olacağından bu günlerde  vürud etmek üzere bulunduğu ve süfun-ı hümayunun 
bazı çürük mahalleri var deyu Ģikayet olunmakta ise de öteden berü Tersane-i Amire'nin 
usulü üzere beher sene ruz-i Kasım duhulünde memurlar marifetiyle vizite [32] 
olunarak direk ve tekne ve sair mahallerde bulunan çürükleri derhal tamir olunup evvel 
bahar hululünde hazır ve müheyya bulundukları misillü bu sene-i mübarekede dahi sair 
seneler gibi tamir ve termimleri bil-ifa Büyükdere piĢgahına çıkarılmıĢ idi. ġimdi Kasım 
hulül etmiĢ idüğünden sene-i sabıkada olduğu misillü vizite olunarak icab eden 
tamiratlarına mübaĢeret kılınmıĢ olduğu ve bazı süfun-ı hümayun çürükdür denize 
çıkamaz deyu Ģikayet olunmuĢ ise de Memduhiye kalyonu ile Suriye ve ġerefresan nam 
fırkateynlerin dahi denize çıkarılmasında bir mahzur olmadığını ferik-i müĢarün-
ileyhima ifade ve beyan etmiĢ olduklarından heman saye-i Ģahanede asakir ve 
mühimmat-ı sairesi serian bit-tanzim donanma-yi hümayuna ilave [35] kılınmıĢ olup 
fakat zikr olunan ġerefresan pek çürük olduğundan ve ziyadesiyle tamire muhtaç 
göründüğünden anın içün taraf-ı aciziden memurin-i sairenin re'yi beraber olduğu halde 
tevkif kılınmıĢ idi. ġimdi cenab-ı Hakk'dan haya [36] etmeyerek gezdikleri yerlerde 
çürükdür havadisini edeyorlar ve müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerinin Sinob 
limanından donanma-i hümayunu nizamen çıkaramamıĢ deyu ifade etmekte bulunmuĢ 
ise de “kanğı kanun ve nizama tatbikan demiĢtir ve Devlet-i Aliyye [37] donanmasının 
feriki olup da maiyetinde üç dört kebir vapur bulunarak bazı mahal sevahillerini 
viziteye gidip hava müsaid olduğu halde oralarını dahi nakıs dolaĢarak avdetle Sinob'a 
gelip süfun-u hümayunun furtunadan birer [38] ikiĢer perakende toplandıklarını 
gördüğü halde orada bulunan ümera ve zabitanı celb edip sularınızı ve sair 
levazımatınızı ahz ederek memuriyetleri bulunan mahallere azimet edeceklerini haber 
vererek fi 20 S 70 [22.11.1853] tarihinde akĢam [39] vapur-ı hümayunlar ile 
müĢarünileyh bendeleri kıyam etmiĢ ve yanlarına iki vapur bırakarak mahall-i mezburda 
batmak muhatara olduğunu bildiği suretde bu misillü bir büyük ümeranın vapur-ı 
hümayunları alıp savuĢarak bu tarafa gelmesi layık ve reva mıdır? [40] ve “Sinob 
limanına gidip orada yatacaksınız ve orası donanma merkezinizdir” deyu taraf-ı 
acizanemden mühürlü talimat verilmiĢ olduğu halde meydana çıkarsunlar ve donanma-i 
hümayunun liman-ı mezkurda  yatıp bu kazanın vuku bulması sui [41] tedbirden mi 
neĢ'et etmiĢdir?” deyu sual vuku bulmuĢ ise de bu keyfiyet sui tedbir ise de 
kumandarlarının muhalif havaya tesadüf ederek liman-ı mezkura gidiĢlerinden neĢet 
etmiĢ ve müĢarünileyhin bunlara bir vechile iane etmeyip güya sair [42] devletin 
donanması gibi orada bırakıp avdet ediĢi içün acaba yedinde bir talimat var mı ki 
“Devlet-i Aliyye donanmasından Kara Deniz'de muhatarada bulunanları gördüğün 
vakitde veyahud denizde tesadüf ettiğin esnada sakın hiçbir Ģey [43] deme ve bir 
kumanda verme sonra hakkında fena muamele olur” denilmiĢ midir? ve hatta süfun-ı 
mezkureden ol furtunada beraber bulunarak ayrılıp Ereğli limanına gelen Cay-i Ferah 
nam brik-i hümayun bis-sıhhat ves-selamet Deraliye'ye vasıl olmuĢdur [44] ve 
mukaddem kendülerine Ģifahen ifade kılındığı vechile Amasra ve Ereğli açıklarında 
bulunarak Ferik Mustafa ve Hasan PaĢalar maiyetlerinde bulunacaklarını 
müĢarünileyhima bu günlerde düvel-i bahriye amiralleriyle müzakere olunduktan sonra 
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kalyon-ı hümayunlar ile [45] denize çıkacakları ve Patrona Osman PaĢa'nın Hasan PaĢa 
ve Mirliva Hüseyin PaĢa'nın Mustafa PaĢa filolarına mukaddem tayin olunduğunu ve 
hatta mumaileyh Osman PaĢa fırka-i Mısriye kalyonlarının yerine eĢyalarını götürmüĢ 
ve muahharen eĢyasını ihraç [46] ederek rakib olacağı fırkateyn-i hümayuna va'z ve 
nakl etmiĢ olduğu ve hava ziyadesiyle sert ve furtuna olup da münasip bir mahalde 
kendinizi muhafaza etmek ve çaresiz kalarak Boğaz'dan içerü girmek lazım geldiği 
halde ol vechile içerü girmelerine [47] dahi mezuniyet verilmiĢ idüği ve havanın gayet 
sisden ve baran ve telatum-i deryanın kesretinden Sinob'a gittikleri merhum Hüseyin 
PaĢa'nın taraf-ı aciziye vürud eden tahrirat meali dahi ispat eder ve müĢarünileyh 
Mustafa PaĢa'nın liman-ı [48] mezkura duhulünde “burada durmayın kalkın 
memuriyetiniz olan mahallere gidin” deyu tenbih ediĢinden anlaĢılan memuriyetleri 
Sinob değil imiĢ ve gidecekleri mahal neresi olduğunu müĢarünileyh bilür imiĢ ve Ģimdi 
müĢarünileyh [49] “benim sefain-i mezkureyi liman-ı mezburdan kaldırmağa 
mezuniyetim yokdur” deyu bazı mahallerde ifade etmekte bulunmuĢ ise de liman-ı 
mezburda bulunan zabitan ol vakit “burada durmayın memuriyetiniz olan mahalle 
azimet ediniz” deyu tenbih etmemek [50] lazım gelür iken ne sebebe mebni tenbih 
etmiĢdir ve eğerçi bu keyfiyetler çakerleri donanma-i hümayunu kamilen bil-istishab 
Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkıp böyle bir filo süfun-ı hümayunu bir mahale getirip orada bir 
muhatarada kalarak çakerleri tarafından iane [51] olunmayıp da hali üzere bırakaydım 
binaen aleyh bu keyfiyet vuku bulmuĢ olaydı vakıa kulunuzun sui tedbirinden neĢet 
etmiĢ olur idi ve patrona-i hümayun mumaileyh Osman PaĢa müddet-i vafireden berü 
Tersane-i Amire'de istihdam olunmakta [52] olduğu halde Bahr-i Sefid ve bu kere dahi 
birkaç defa Bahr-i Siyah'a yedi sekiz kıta süfun-ı hümayun ile gidip yine avdet ederek 
salimen gelmiĢ olduğu ve merhum Hüseyin PaĢa dahi mukaddem Tersane-i Amire'de 
pek çok vakit hizmet-i Ģahanede [53] terfi-i rütbe eylemiĢ ve bu defa bil-intihab mülkiye 
hizmetinden asakir-i bahriye-i Ģahaneye mirlivalık rütbesiyle nakl olunmuĢ idi ve 
mumaileyhimanın ikisi dahi mücerreb olmamıĢ olaydı Ģimdiye kadar kapudan-ı deryalık 
memuriyetinde bulunan zatlar [54] tard ve ihraç ederler idi. Bu babda kulunuzun 
kusurum olmadığından maada ferik-i müĢarünileyhin kendisi müttehem bulunduğu 
halde kullarınızın hakk-ı acizanemde birtakım sözler söylemesi garaz ve nefsaniyet 
olduğu aĢikardır ve süfun-ı hümayunun [55] derununda bulunan topların ekserisi ecnas-ı 
muhtelife olup ve çapları dahi küçük olduğu rivayet kılınmakta ise de Devlet-i 
Aliyye'nin tersanesinde mevcud bulunan alel-ıtla [?] olanların top ve mühimmat-ı 
sairenin cümlesi süfun-ı hümayuna [56] verilmiĢdir ve elan anik [?] bulunan Ģeylerin 
bazıları Tersane-i Amire varidatının zuhurat-ı tertibatından ve bazısı dahi mahsus olan 
tahsisatdan peyderpey tesviye olunmak üzere konturatoya rabt olunarak mübayaa 
olunmakta olup fakat [57] Tersane-i Amire'nin zikr olunan mühimmatlarının kaffesi 
def'aten düvel-i bahriye gemilerine tatbik olunmak mümkün müdür? ve aniklerinin 
tebdili dahi kaç yüz bin kese akçeye tevakkuf eder ve bu akçenin verilmesinin çaresi var 
mıdır? eğerçi mezkur [58] tebdili ve aniklerinin birden bire ka't olunması mümkün 
olmuĢ olaydı mukaddem kapudanlık hizmetinde bulunan zat-ı alikadrler icra buyururlar 
idi. Çend seneden beru donanma-i hümayunun nizam u intizamı ve mühimmatının 
derunlarına [59] va'z olunması ve asakir-i bahriye-i Ģahanenin talim ve taallümleri ne 
suretde tanzim ve icra olunmak lazım gelür ise cümlesi ferik-i müĢarünileyhima re'y-i 
inhimamlarıyla yapılmıĢ ve yapılmakta bulunmuĢ olduğu ve hatta çend mah mukaddem 
Meclis-i Umumi'de [60] bazı zat-ı alikadr hazeratından sual olunduğu misillü 
kullarından dahi sual buyuruldukta saye-i resul-ul uhde ve saye-i Ģahanede mevcud 
bulunan donanma-i hümayun ile Kara Deniz'e çıkarız ve düĢmanımız ile muharebe 
ederiz fakat Akdeniz tarafında Rusyalunun Bahr-i Baltık donanması bulunup da Boğaz 
tarafına doğru gelür ise ol tarafa gönderecek donanmamız yokdur deyu ifade eyledim. 
Cümleden sual olunduğu misillü ferik-i müĢarünileyhimadan dahi sual olundukta saye-i 
Ģahanede gideriz ve muharebe ederiz deyu cümlesi yekzeban olarak ifade eyledikleri 
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malum-ı alilerinizdir. Eğerçi kulları ol vakit din ü devlet ve millete cenab-ı Hakk 
göstermesün bir ihanet etmek içün hilaf bir Ģey ifade etmiĢ [63] olaydım ol anda ferik-i 
müĢarünileyhima sadık oldukları halde donanma-i hümayun çürük ve fena haldedir 
muharebe edemeyiz deyu meclis-i aliye ifade etmek lazım gelmez miydi? ġimdi 
birtakım gezdikleri yerlerde kulunuzun aleyhinde hilaf [64] olarak biraz sözler ilan 
etmekte bulundukları layık mıdır? Donanma-i hümayunun mevcudu büyük ve küçük 
kaç kıtadır ve ne kadar noksan neferatı vardır ve ne kadarı fevkalade mesarife muhtaçdır 
bunların cümlesi Meclis-i Bahriye'de [65] müzakere olunarak bir kıta defter ve 
mazbatası bit-tanzim Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kıraat olunduğu malum-ı alilerinizdir 
ve Rusya devleti askeri kanğı mevkilerdedir ve ne miktardadır ve donanması kaç 
kıtadan ibaretdir? Bunları bilip [66] ana göre haritalar meydana konularak devletlu 
atufetlu serasker paĢa hazretleri ve saire bunları mülahaza ederek icabına göre asker 
tertib olunmalıdır deyu bazı zat-ı alikadrler tarafından sual varid olmuĢ idi. Anın üzerine 
[67] Rusya'nın ne kadar askeri olduğu na-malumdur ve bazı yüz bin ve bazı kere ziyade 
denilmekte olduğundan mikdarı bilinemediği misillü donanması dahi donanma-i 
hümayundan ziyade veyahud eksik deyu söylenmekte ise de bunun aded ve miktarını 
mevla-i müteal hazretlerinden baĢka kimse bilmeyip fakat muharebeye mübaĢeret 
olunduğu vakitlerde bozmak ve bozulmak da cenab-ı Hakkın emridir maazallahu teala 
bizim tarafdan bozğunluk vuku bulur ise sonra Serasker PaĢa [69] hazretleri Ģöyle ve 
filan böyle dedi diyerek muharebeye mübaĢeret olunub da iĢte bu hali kesb ettin diyerek 
lanet olsun sebeb olanlara deyu muahharen bir Ģey denilmesün iĢte mevcud olan asakir-i 
berriye ve bahriye [70] bu mikdardır biz askeriz ne emr ü ferman buyurulur ise 
elimizden geldiği mertebe dinimize ve devletimize hizmet etmekde sa'y ve gayret-i na-
mütenahi ederiz deyu kulunuz tarafından ifade ve cevab verilmiĢ idi ve hatta hace 
efendilerin biri [71] kim lanet olsun diyecekdir öyle Ģey olur mu o cenab-ı hakkın 
bileceği Ģeydir deyu cevab buyurmuĢlar idi ve süfun-ı hümayunlar harb tahakkuk 
etmezden evvel Kara Deniz'e çıktıkları vakit ne surette hareket edeceklerine dair [72] 
bahriye meclisinden bir kıta talimat tanzim olunarak Bab-ı Ali'ye takdim kılınıp ol 
vechile icra buyurulmasına emr ü ferman buyurulmuĢ idi. Badehu meclis-i mezkurdan 
ve taraf-ı aciziden temhir olunarak denize çıkan kumandarlar tarafına ita kılınmıĢ idi. 
[73] Muahharen birkaç mah sonra bazı müzakere üzerine Rusya devletine çend gün 
mehil verilerek sonra hasmane harekete mübaĢeret olunsun deyu bir karar verilmiĢ idi. 
Bunun üzerine taraf-ı aciziden mehl-i mezkura tekmil olunduğu anda [74] hasmane 
harekete ne surette mübaĢeret olunacaktır deyu bir kıta ariza ile Bab-ı Ali'den istizan 
kılınmıĢ idi. Muahharen Ģifahen Rusya sefinelerine hitam-ı müddette tesadüf olunduğu 
vakit hasmane harekete mübaderet olunmak lazım gelür [75] ve böyle tenbih edin deyu 
çend kıta emr ü ferman buyurulmuĢ idi. Binaberin taraf-ı aciziden ol vakit denizde 
bulunan kumandan kullarına tahrirat yazılarak Büyükdere'den bir vapur ile gönderilsün 
deyu donanma-i hümayun tarafına [76] irsal kılınmıĢ iken birkaç gün sonra sahilhane-i 
ali-i hazret-i seraskeride Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Ali'de “birkaç gün daha mehil verilecektir 
hasmane harekete bizim tarafdan Ģimdilik mübaĢeret olunmasun öte tarafdan vuku 
bulmadıkça” [77] deyu karar-ı ali vuku bulduğu anda “aman efendim kulunuz ol vakit 
emr ü iradeniz ile tahrirat yazdım vapur ile gönderdim geriye ahz edeyim” deyu ifade 
eyliyerek serian ve acilen Yaver Besim Efendi kulları Büyükdere'ye donanma-i 
hümayuna gönderilip mezkur tahriratı götürecek vapur gitmek üzere iken mezkur 
tahrirat-ı aciziyi geriye ahz ile sabaha yakın sahilhane-i ali-i mezkura getirdiler ve 
meclis-i alileri muvacehelerinde lillahi hamd vel minnet gitmemiĢ diyerek Ģükür 
olunmuĢ idi. [79] Muahharen harb tahakkuk etmiĢ olduğundan badehu çıkacak süfun-ı 
hümayun Rusya sefinelerini gördükleri anda mukabele edeceklerini akılları kestiği 
halde berri ve bahri hasmane harekete mübaĢeret edecekleri daima vükela [80] meclisde 
cereyan etmekte bulunduğundan ve mukaddem tezkire-i acizi ile matlub eylediğim 
talimatın dahi hükmü kalmamıĢ olduğundan Bab-ı Ali'den cevab-ı alisi zuhur etmemiĢ 
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idi. Bunun üzerine yine denize çıkan ümera-i bahriyeye Ģifahen ve tafsilen eyleyecekleri 
hareket tenbih olunarak birer muhtasar talimat dahi verilip dirayet ve istikametlerine 
havale kılınarak donanma-i hümayun-ı muhataradan muhafaza etmek ve düĢmana 
tesadüf olunduğu halde mukabele edeceğini aklı [82] kestiği surette hasmane harekete 
mübaderet eylemek ve mukabele edemeyecek oldukları halde bir selamet tarafa 
savuĢmak ve bazı ufak ve tefek bir Ģey denizde düĢman tarafından derdest olunmak gibi 
Ģeylere muvafık olunduğu [83] halde kendilerine mükafat olunacağı dahi tenbih 
olunmuĢ velhasıl her halde donanma-i hümayunun muhataradan ve furtunadan 
muhafazası kendilerinin dirayet ve malumatlarına havale kılınmıĢ idüği ve hatta 
kumandar-ı mumaileyhima taraflarından [84] ferik-i müĢarünileyhima hazır oldukları 
surette Mahmudiye nam kalyon-ı hümayunda kullarından sual eylediler ki “hava 
Ģiddetlü olup bir tarafda muhafaza olunmak üzere gidilemeyip de Boğaz'dan içerü 
girmemiz lazım geldiği halde ne yapalım?” demelerinde [85] “kendinizi muhafaza 
edemediğiniz halde Boğaz'dan içerü girmeğe mezunsunuz” deyu alimallahu teala 
Ģifahen cevab ve tenbih eyledim. Kullarının pek büyük isyanım budur ki feriki 
müĢarünileyhimaya emniyet etmekliğim ve saniyen her bir [86] müzakeremizi tahriren 
ve temhiren olmayıp da Ģifahen olmaklıktan bu fenalık ve fesatlıklar zuhur etmiĢ idüği 
ve donanma-i hümayuna gittikçe ve canib-i Tersane-i Amire'de bir Ģey tenbih olunması 
lazım geldikçe daima süvari beyler paĢa sefinesine cem olunup ferik-i 
müĢarünileyhimanın ikisi beraber bulundukları halde taraf-ı aciziden verilecek tenbihat 
Ahmed PaĢa'ya ve müĢarünileyh bulunmadığı surette Mustafa PaĢa'ya ifade ve tenbih 
olunarak süvari beylere gidin bu vechile divan [88] verin deyu ifade olunmakta idi. 
Daima süvari beylere bunlara ifade etmeksizin tenbih edecek olursam ol vakit 
müĢarünileyhima “bizi adam yerine koymuyor ve bize söylemiyor ve emniyet etmiyor 
kendi tenbih ediyor” [89] diyeceklerinden her bar kendilerine riayet olunmak üzere 
müĢarünileyhimaya ifade ve tenbih olunmakta idi ve süvari beyler dahi kalyon-ı 
Mahmudiye'ye cem oldukları vakit kulları orada bulunduğum müddetçe ekseri süvari 
beyleri [90] gördüğümde istifsar-ı hatırdan sonra asakir-i bahriye-i Ģahanenin süfun-ı 
hümayunların noksanları ve talim ve taallümleri ve taharet ve nezafetleri sual birle “bazı 
tenbihat vardır paĢalar hazeratı sizlere emir verecekler güzelce [91] icrasına sa'y ve 
gayret edin” diyerek hemiĢe taraf-ı aciziden bu vechile icra olunduğunu ve yalnız bir 
Ģey yapmadığımı ispat ederim ve hatta çend defa müĢarünileyh Mustafa PaĢa Ahmed 
PaĢa hazretlerini beni iĢaret çekip [92] süvari beyler gibi celb ediyor deyu ve hakkıma 
hiç riayet etmeyerek ber minval-i muharrer hususlar içün ve sair ettiği fesadları içün 
olsun her bar kulunuza Ģikayet edip malumat vermekte iken müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa 
dahi [93] müĢarünileyhin nerelerde gezdiğini ve kimlere havadis verdiğini daima 
Ģikayet etmekte oldukları halde Sinob maddesinden berü Mustafa PaĢa'nın ve Fransız 
gazetesinden dolayı Ahmed PaĢa'nın kulunuzu mukaddem [94] hafiyen ve muahharen 
alenen kötülemek sevdasında bulundukları bazı zevat-ı kiram hazretlerine dahi Ģifahen 
ifade etmiĢ idim. Heman bu günlerde kendilerini resmen Ģikayet edeceğimi hiss 
etmeleriyle ittifak ederek [95] bu iĢlere teĢebbüs ettiler. Allah-ı zülcelal havale eyledim. 
ĠnĢallahu teala ıyal ve evladlarıyla periĢan olurlar vallahul azim ve billahul kerim bunlar 
bazı zabitan ve neferata hilaf ve kizb Ģeyler öğreterek kulunuz hakkında [96] her dürlü 
iftirayı ederler ve ettirirler zira bunlar Allahu teala ve tekaddes hazretlerinden havf ve 
tehaĢi etmezler ve bu Ahmed PaĢa'nın devletlu atufetlu Halil PaĢa ve Süleyman PaĢa 
hazeratının zaman-ı kapudanilerinde askerlikten ihraç ettirdikleri ve defterde müĢir-i 
müĢarün-ileyhima hazeratı haklarında nasıl layihalar yapıp ve nerelere takdim ettiği ve 
Cuma günleri sailler marifetiyle rikab-ı Ģahaneye dahi arzuhal takdim ettirdiğini ve elan 
mevcud olan bazı zevat-ı kiram [98] hazeratı ve müĢir-i müĢarünileyhima hazeratının 
hakk-ı alilerinde birtakım sözler söylediğini kendisi kulunuza ifade etmiĢ olduğu halde 
iĢte bu Ģeyleri unutup da bunlara emniyet etmekliğim pek büyük hata eyledim ve müĢar-
ün ilehima [99] kulunuz hakkımda bu derecede hasmane harekette bulunmaları yalnız 
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kendilerini kurtarıp kulunuzu lekedar etmek garazından ibaret olduğundan saye-i 
resulullahda ve saye-i hazret-i padiĢahide altmıĢ seneden berü familya-yı acizi hidemat-ı 
Ģahanede bulunarak [100] hiçbir yüzden lekedar olmadıkları misillü kulunuz dahi otuz 
beĢ seneye karib küçük yaĢımdan berü Tophane-i Amire ve asakir-i hassa-i Ģahane ve 
Tersane-i Amire ve tekraren asakir-i hassa-i Ģahane orduy-ı hümayunu müĢirliğinde min 
gayr-i liyakatin hizmet-i ĢehinĢahide [101] olup hiçbir suretle lekedar olmadığım halde 
bu defa Tersane-i Amire'de iki seneye karib kapudanlık hizmetinde vü's ve kudret-i 
acizanem teallük ettiği mertebe hizmet-i ĢehinĢahide bulunmakta iken birkaç mahdan 
berü böyle bir iki defa hizmet-i sabıkasından [102] tard ve ihrac olunarak muahharen 
merhameten yine Tersane-i Amire hizmetinde istihdam olunmak üzere alınıp da iĢiyle 
meĢgul olmak lazım gelür iken bu defa kulunuz ile uğraĢmağa kalkıĢan vasıfsız olduğu 
halde buna tayin eden [103] paĢa kullarının dahi böyle memuriyetlerinde bulunduğu 
surette kulunuz ile muhakeme olmalarını vükela-i azam hazeratı tecviz buyurmaya-
cakları aĢikardır ve eğerçi hiçbir kabahatları tebeyyün etmeyip de yine memuriyet-
lerinde istihdam olunmak iktiza ettiği [104] halde istihdam olunmaları hususları rey-i 
alilerinize menut ve mütevakkıf olup fakat bunların ihracıyla Tersane-i Amire'nin iĢine 
zerre kadar sekte iras etmeyeceği dahi aĢikardır ve mukaddem yine müĢarünileyhin 
sebebine Tersane-i Amire'den [105] hasb-el kader infisalleri vuku bulmuĢ olan 
ümeradan daha dirayetli bendeleriniz vardır bir kere de bunlar istihdam olunarak 
tecrübe olumak lazım gelür gibi zann olunur. Kullarının bu ana kadar padiĢah nan-ı 
parasından baĢka bir tarafdan medar-ı maaĢım [106] yokdur ve elan bazı mahallere dahi 
haylice düyunum vardır. Bendehanenizde olan malımı füruht etsem kendimi iki mah 
idare ederim. Bu halde bulunan adem ve bu vakte kadar bir ihaneti zuhur etmeyip de 
Ģimdi Devlet-i Aliyye'ye [107] sadakat izhar edecek vakitte kanğı hal ve malına 
mağruren ihanet eder ve böyle mazulen hanesinde oturduğu surette kendisi ve familyası 
ne halde muzdarib bulunacakları aĢikardır. Bir adam mecnun olsa yine buralarını 
mülahaza eder. [108] Mevla-i müteal hazretleri içün ve Resulullah aĢkına olsun bu 
makule ehl-i fesadın sözüyle namus-ı acizanemin hetk olunması layık ve reva değildir 
ve efendilerimiz dahi bir vechile hakkaniyetden ayrılmazsınız ve kulunuzun bu derece-
lerde hakpay-i alilerini [109] tasdi etmek layık olmadığını bilürüm fakat bunların hakk-ı 
acizanemde vuku bulan Ģikayetlerine nazaran çaresiz bu kadarcık ifade-i hal-i 
acizaneme mecbur oldum. PadiĢahımız velinimetimiz efendimizn baĢı içün olsun ber 
minval-i meĢruh layiha-i [110] acizanem kıraat olunarak icabının icrası emr ü ferman-ı 
devletlerinize menut mevaddan idüği malum-ı alileri buyuruldukta ol babda emr ü 
ferman hazret-i men leh ül emrindir. 
 
Appendix 27. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 17, not dated. Evidence of Ferik (Vice-Admiral) 
Mustafa Pasha on the Battle of Sinop. 
 
Devletlu Kapudan PaĢa hazretleri süfun-ı hümayunun bu kere Sinob'da duçar oldukları 
halat-ı mükeddireyi bi-gayr-i hakkın bendeleriyle saadetlu Ferik Ahmed PaĢa [2] 
hazretlerine isnad etmek istiyor ise de bu babda delail ve senedat ve beyyine-i sahiha ile 
müspet olan hakikat-i hal Ģu vechiledir ki altmıĢ dokuz senesinde [3] vaki TeĢrin-i 
Evvel'in yigirmi üçüncü günü [4.11.1853] ümera-i bahriye ve bil-cümle süvari ve süfun-
ı tüccar kapudanları birlikte akd-i meclis olunarak mevsim-i Ģitada [4] donanma-i 
hümayun-ı mülukane Bahr-i Siyah canibine çıkarıldığı surette limanca ittihazı lazım 
gelen tedabire dair kaleme alınıp makam-ı cenab-ı kapudaniye [5] takdim kılınan on 
yedi bendi Ģamil diğer bir kıta varakanın sekizinci ve onyedinci bendinde Sinob limanı 
vakt-i muharebede muhataradan salih ola- [6] -mıyacağı beyan ve tezkar kılınmıĢ iken 
varaka-i mezkurenin takdiminden çend gün sonra tamamen mefadının aksi olarak 
kapudan-ı müĢarünileyh hazretleri [7] iki filo olmak üzere Bahr-i Siyah'a memur 
eylediği süfun-ı hümayun-ı mülukane kumandanları Patrona-i Hümayun izzetlu Osman 
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PaĢa ve Mirliva Hüseyin PaĢa [8] bendeleriyle sefain-i merkume süvarilerini celb ile 
Bahriye Feriki saadetlu Ahmed PaĢa hazretleriyle bendeleri hazır bulunduğumuz halde 
mumaileyh Osman PaĢa'ya taht-ı [9] kumandana verdiğim süfun-ı hümayunlar ile Bahr-
i Siyah'ın Anadolu Ereğli'den Amasra'ya ve kezalik mumaileyh Hüseyin PaĢa'ya dahi 
müsteshab-ı maiyetinde [10] olan süfun-ı hümayun ile Amasra'dan Sinob'a kadar 
memursunuz binaberin led-el hace bile Boğaz'a avdet etmemek üzere havali-i 
memurenizde [11] geĢt ü güzar ederek icabı takdirinde birleĢip Rusya sefinelerine 
tesadüfle mukabele edebileceğinizi aklınız kesdiği takdirde muharebeye ibtidar [12] 
ediniz ve muhalif havalara tesadüf eylediğiniz veyahud süfun-ı hümayunların suları 
tükendiği surette Sinop limanına gidip suyunuzu alınız deyu emr ü tenbih eylediğinin 
üzerine süfun-ı hümayunun böyle talimat ile iki filo olarak gönderilmesi denizde 
periĢaniyetlerini muceb olacağından icabı [14] vechile hareket olunmak üzere süfun-ı 
mezkure ile müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa ile bendelerini göndermeleri hususu Kapudan-ı 
müĢarünileyh hazretlerinden niyaz olundukta [15] “sizin gitmeniz icab etmez” deyu 
redd ile cevab vererek beĢ günden sonra çakerlerini celb ile Feyz-i Bari ve Saik-i ġadi 
ve Taif ve Ereğli naman [16] vapur-ı hümayunlar ile Çerkes‟e cebhane götürmek üzere 
memur etmiĢ ve memuriyetiniz yalnız cebhaneyi salimen mahalline isal etmekdir deyu 
emr ile zikr [17] olunan iki fırka donanma-i hümayuna rast gelür isek Ģu vechile bu 
vechile hareket etsünler deyu süfun-ı hümayun-ı mezbure kumandanlarına bir guna 
tenbih [18] etmekliğimi tecviz etmemiĢdir. Çakerleri ol gün ahĢam üzeri vapur-ı 
hümayunlar ile Bahr-i Siyah boğazından huruc ve Sinob limanına duhul birle [19] 
vapur-ı hümayunların icab eden kömürlerini aldıktan sonra mahall-i mezbur kale ve 
tabyelerini muayene eylediğimde Sinop limanı bir büyük liman ise de rüzgar altı [20] 
bulunduğundan baĢka kale ve tabyelerinin istihkamatı bahren derece-i matlubda 
olmayıp Ģimdiden buranın istihkamat-ı lazımesine bakılması icab-ı hal [21] ve 
maslahattan bulunduğu ve müstashab-ı maiyetim olan Ereğli nam vapur bati‟ ül hareke 
olmasıyla ilerüde iĢimize sekte vereceğinden Trabzon‟dan bazı [22] havadisle gerüye 
iade olunacağı ba ariza-i kemteri makam-ı müĢarünileyhe arz ve iĢar olunup iĢbu ariza-i 
acizinin müĢarünileyh hazretlerine [23] vasıl olarak meali malumları olduğu Tersane-i 
Amire mektubisi izzetlu efendi bey ve sair zevatın Ģahadetleriyle müsbet olduğu ve 
Sinop‟tan [24] kıyam Trabzon ve Batum ve Çürüksu sevahillerini dolaĢıp on iki günden 
sonra tekrar Sinop limanına vusulümde Patrona-i Hümayun [25] mumaileyh Osman 
PaĢa bendeleri beĢ kıta süfun-ı hümayun ile muhalif havaya tesadüf ettiğinden maada 
rakib olduğu fırkateynin ter*mkt[?] [26] sizi[?] Ģikest olduğundan liman-ı mezkura 
vusulümden dört gün evvel süfun-ı hümayun ile liman-ı mezkura gelmiĢ olduğu 
avdetimde gördüğümde [27] Trabzon‟dan Deraliye‟ye avdet edecek Ereğli vapurun 
Osman PaĢa filosunda kalmasını makam-ı kapudaniden mumaileyh Osman PaĢa‟ya ba 
tahrirat iĢar olunmuĢ olduğunu Sinop‟ta mumaileyh Osman PaĢa bendelerinde 
görülmüĢtür ve bahriye mektubisi izzetlu efendiden dahi isbat olunabilür ve paĢa-i [29] 
mumaileyh bendeleri ve maiyetinde bulunan süfun-ı mülukane süvarileri celb olunup 
liman-ı mezkur rüzgar altı bir mahal olduğundan baĢka kale ve tabye- [30] –lerinin 
istihkamatı süfun-ı mülukaneyi vikaye edebilecek derecede olmadığından orada asla 
muhataradan salim olamıyacaklarını beyanen [31] denize çıkmaları tenbih kılındıktan 
sonra ferdası ahĢam üzeri liman-ı mezkurdan kıyam olunur iken mumaileyh Mirliva 
Hüseyin PaĢa maiyetinde bulunan [32] süfun-ı Ģahane ile furtunaya tesadüf ederek ve 
istif sularının dahi ikmali zımnında liman-ı mezkura gelip temürleyerek furtuna 
esnasında [33] Rusya donanmasının Ģiddet-i hava münasebetiyle perakende olarak 
Sivastopoli limanına pocalamıĢ olduğunu taraf-ı çakeriye ifade eylediğinin [34] üzerine 
paĢa-i mumaileyhe dahi liman-ı mezkurun ol vechile uygunsuzluğunu tafsilen ifade 
birle taht-ı kumandasında bulunan süfun-ı Ģahanenin [35] vapuru olmadığından refakat-ı 
acizide bulunan vapurlardan Taif nam vapur-ı hümayun paĢa-i mumaileyhimin niyazına 
mebni maiyetine bırağılup ol [36] ahĢam oradan kıyam ederek Dersaadet‟e vusulümüz-
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de Rusya donanmasının Sivastopoli‟ye pocaladığını paĢa-i mumaileyhimden istihbar 
eylediğimden [37] talimat-ı kapudanelerinin hilafında olarak süfun-ı mülukaneyi atıf-ül 
beyan Sinop limanından ihraca cesaret edemiyeceğim bahsiyle beraber liman-ı mezkur 
[38] rüzgar altı olarak kale ve tabyelerinin istihkamatı dahi donanma-i hümayunu 
muhafaza edebilecek halde olmadıklarından süfun-ı merkumenin [39] Dersaadet‟e 
celbine dair kumandanları tarafına emir göndermeleri kapudan-ı müĢarünileyh hazret-
lerine ihtar olundukta buna asla havale-i sem‟ ve itibar [40] etmediğinden iki günden 
sonra husus-ı mezkur tekrar ifade ve rica olundukta artık ne hal ise liman memuru 
Ahmed PaĢa bendelerini celb ile [41] Ġngiliz vapurunun iki saat evvel kıyam eylediğini 
paĢa-i mumaileyhden istihbar eylediğinden ihtar ettiğiniz emri kara postasıyla 
gönderelim [42] deyu ifade eyledikleri misillü Sinop‟tan kıyam-ı aciziden on bir gün 
sonra Taif nam vapur-ı hümayun bil-vürud donanma-i hümayunun havadis-i mükeddire-
sini getirdiğinde ber vech-i meĢruh evvel ve ahir vaki olan bunca ihtarat ve mütalaatı-
mızı ıska etmeyerek donanma-i hümayunun bu haline kendü [44] talimatlarıyla sebeb 
olduğu halde kapudan-ı müĢarünileyh hazretleri bu khtl[?] bendeleriyle müĢar-ü ileyh 
Ferik Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerine isnad zımnında Bab-ı Ali‟ye layiha [45] takdim etmiĢ ise 
de hakikat-i halin salif üz zikr mevadd-ı sahiha ve müsbete delaletiyle müstebandır ve 
bendeleri donanma-i hümayunda öyle bir tehlike-i azime [46] halinde veyahud düĢman 
muhasara etmiĢ bir halde görmediğim donanmaca cümlenin malumudur. Fakat ilan-ı 
harb gününden berü Bahr-i Siyah‟da bulunan [47] limanlarımızda donanma temürlemesi 
tehlikeden hali olmayacağından daima ihtirazda bulunduğumuzdan ihtar olunmakta 
bulunulduğu ve öteden berü bu kulunuzun [48] gerek Akka ve Beyrut kalelerinin zabt ü 
teshirlerinde ve gerek ol tarihden bu ana kadar müstakilen süfun-ı hümayun ile abluka-
larda [49] ve sair tayin buyrulduğum memuriyetlerde meĢhud olan sıdk u besalet ve 
hüsn-i harekatım keyfiyatı sadr-ı esbak devletlu ubbehetlu Ġzzet Mehmed PaĢa ve 
devletlu [50] ubbehetlu Serasker PaĢa ve devletlu atufetlu Halil PaĢa ve devletlu Said 
PaĢa ve Darbhor devletlu ReĢid PaĢa ve devletlu Süleyman PaĢa hazeratından [51] 
tahkik buyurulmak babında ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh ül 
emrindir. 
 
[Sealed by] Mehmed Emin, Ġsmail, Ahmed ?, ??, Mehmed Pir, Mustafa, ??. 
 
 
 
Appendix 28. İ. HR. 106/5182 lef 6, not dated. Instructions to Osman and Hüseyin 
Pashas. 
 
Patrona Osman ve Mirliva Hüseyin Paşaların yedlerine verilen talimatlara makam-ı 
kapudaniden yazılan buyruldunun suretidir 
 
Beyandan müstağni olduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliyye ile Rusya devleti beyninde harp 
tahakkuk etmiĢ olmasına mebni mevcud maiyetiniz bulunan süfun-ı Ģahane ile Bahr-i 
Siyah‟da geĢt ü güzar eylediğiniz mahallerde Rusya sefain-i harbiyesine tesadüf 
olunduğu ve kazanacağınızı aklınız kesdiği ve gözünüze kesdirdiğiniz halde anlar 
tarafından top atılmasına bakılmayıp tevekkeltu alellah deyip hemen hareket-i 
hasmaneye mübaderet edip bundan böyle iĢbu talimat-ı atikaya riayet olunmayıp avn-i 
Hakk‟la ber minval-i muharrer harekete itina ve dikkat olunmak. 
 
Appendix 29. İ. DH. 19277 lef 3, dated 12 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (13 December 1853). 
From Sheikh Shemuil the Imam of Dagestan to Abdi Pasha, the commander of the 
Anatolian army. 
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[1] Es seniyy-ül himem kerim üĢ Ģiyem halen orduy-i hümayun seraskeri paĢa-i celil-üĢ 
Ģan hazretleri edamallahu ikbaluhu ve nasere cunuduhu, Amin. [2] Bundan akdem sene 
bin iki yüz altmıĢ dokuz tarihinde hazret-i Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin kefere-i Rusya üzerine 
seferi etraf-ı erbaadan tevatüren ihbar ile sabit ve mukarrer iken ve asakir-i nusret 
marufu dahi [3] sınır u hudud bulunan Arpaçay kenarında kain kefere-i mezburenin 
Gümrü ve Erivan ve Üç Kilise nam kalelerini ihata etmiĢ deyu mesmu‟umdur. Harbe 
mecalim kalmayıp kabzımda olan asakir-i Dağıstaniye [4] ile huruc-ı Gürcistan semtine 
azimet edip ba‟de muharebe-i Ģedid çar ülkesine duhulümüzde bi-takdir-i Yezdan kar ve 
yağmur düĢüp ve dağlar kapanık gibi bulundukları halde olmağla bit-tekrar diyar-ı [5] 
Dağıstan‟a rücu edip mülakatımız müyesser olmadı ise de bu tarafın ahval ve ahbarı 
malumunuz olmak ehemm-i lazımeden olduğu ecilden iĢbu Ģukka tahrir olunup taraf-ı 
eĢrefinize ba‟s ve irsal [6] kılınmıĢtır. Bi mennihi teala led-el Ģeref el vusul manzur-ı 
ayn-ı inayetleri buyuruldukta bu küffar-ı haksarın ekser cem‟ ve a‟zam-ı sevaddı esliha 
ve alat-ı harbiyeleri taht-ı kabzımızda olan Ġslam taifesindendir. [7] Mücerred sevadı 
çokça izhar eyleyip bir tarafdan mekr ü hüdeat ile sulh ve barıĢık duzağını ilka edip bir 
fırsat ve fitne tahayyür etmesine sa‟y ederler. Zira anlar bilürler ki ol hududlardan bir 
kere ayakları [8] kopar ise hiçbir aher yerde sebata mecal vermeyip ol taraftan sizler bu 
taraftan bizler kendülerini ortalığa alıp etraf ve diyar-ı Kafkaziye‟den tard ve müzmehel 
edeceklerini ve bu sebepten her hal [9] sulha kasd edeceklerdir. Gayet mekrlerinden 
ihtiraz ve hüdaetlerinden içtinap oluna ve bu tarafda bizler dahi kabzetimizde olan 
asakir-i Dağıstaniye ile kanğı tarafa sa‟y ve seferimiz esleh ise [10] iĢaretini ve ol 
taraftan Kazak ülkesinden Karabağ ve ġemahi üzere Demir Kapu‟ya bir kul gönderilür 
ise esna-yı mürurlarında müdahiller [?] olmayıp vüsulları muayyendir efendim. Fi 12 
Ra sene 1270. 
Dağıstan imamı  
El Gazi  
[Sealed] ġemuil  
 
Appendix 30. HR. SYS. 1346/38, dated 21 December 1853. Stratford de Redcliffe à 
Son Altesse Reshid Pasha. Pera, le 21 Décembre 1853. 
 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
Je viens d‟apprendre d‟une manière digne de foi que les Softas et autres individus 
ont eue recours à des réunions qui menacent la Capitale d‟une insurrection immédiate, 
et les Chrétiens d‟un désastre. 
N‟ayant ni le tems [sic] ni les moyens de vérifier soit la cause soit la portée de cet 
incident, je crois devoir m‟adresser en premier lieu à Votre Altesse pour avoir des 
informations plus exactes de ce qui en est, et en même tems [sic] de lui exprimer toute 
la confiance que je place dans la fermeté, la rigueur et la loyauté du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. 
Le gouvernement n'hésitera pas, sans doute, de prendre les mesures nécessaires 
pour maintenir le bon ordre, et je croirais lui faire tort si je rappelais à Votre Altesse la 
grave responsabilité qui pèserait, aux yeux de toute l'Europe, sur la Porte et son Empire, 
s'il était permis aux factieux de donner le défi à l'autorité des loi et de fouler aux pieds 
les droits et la vie des Chrétiens, ou d'autres classes des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan. 
Votre Altesse doit comprendre que dans cette occasion je suis l‟organe du Corps 
diplomatique, dont les membres, à l‟exception de ceux qui ne sont pas en ville, m‟ont 
fait l‟honneur de se réunir chez moi. 
Je profite de cette occasion pour renouveler à Votre Altesse l‟assurance de ma 
haute considération. 
[Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe  
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Appendix 31. İ. HR. 21334 lef 1, dated 20 Rebiyülevvel 1270 (21 December 1853). 
Renewal of peace negotiations with Russia. Meclis-i Umumi mazbatası.  
 
[1] İşbu mazbata ve fetva-i şerife manzur ve meal ve müeddaları malum olmuştur. 
Fetva-i şerife mucebince mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile bir müsalaha akdi 
mücaz olduğu ve emniyet-i istikbaliyenin lüzumu dahi meclisce maruz-ı kabulde 
göründüğü cihetle [2] harb haline hiçbir cihetle halel getirilmemek ve kaffe-i tertibat ve 
tedarikata evvelkinden ziyade ikdam ve ihtimam olunmak üzere mesele-i hazıra 
hakkında ittifak-ı ârâ ile verilen kararın icray-ı iktizasına ibtidar olunsun. Fi 22 Ra 70. 
 
[3] ġayan buyurulan ruhsat-ı seniye-i hazret-i padiĢahi mukteza-i münifi üzere iĢbu 
Ģehr-i Rebi-ül evvelin on yedinci Cuma irtesi günü Bab-ı Ali'de münakıd olan Meclis-i 
Umumi'de mesele-i sulhiyeye dair mazbata-i memhure ve Ġngiltere sefaretinin 
müsalahayı tervic yolunda mukaddemce vermiĢ olduğu layiha ile ana cevaben [4] 
düvel-i bahriye sefaretlerine verilen layiha birer birer kıraat olunarak mebhas-ı sulhda 
süfera taraflarından vuku bulan nesayih ve teĢvikat ve anın üzerine tertib eden 
mülahazat meclisce malum olduktan sonra yevm-i mezkurda ve gerek ferdası Pazar 
günü cereyan eden müzakeratın fezlekesinde müsalaha maddesi hemen [5] hazır gibi 
olmayarak sefaretler canibinden irad olunan sual devlet-i aliyenin ne suretle sulha 
rağbet edebileceğini anlamaktan ve Ģayet mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile 
kanaat olunmayıp da  bazı menafi-i cedide istihsali dahi arzu olunduğu takdirde devlet-i 
metbualarının o raddelere gidemeyeceğini anlatmaktan [6] ibaret olup ve muceb-i harb 
olan Ģeyler Eflak ve Boğdan'ın Rusyalu tarafından zabt ve istila olunması ve hukuk-u 
seniyeye dokunacak bazı tekalif-i anife [*] meydana konulması keyfiyatı olduğundan 
bunlar bertaraf olunduğu gibi muharebe dahi bit-tabii münkatı olmak lazım gelir ise de 
ila-i kelimetullah farizasından naĢi [7] yine harbe devam ile bu sırada din ve devlete 
hayırlı bazı kavaide vusul dahi diyanet ve hamiyyet iktizasınca cümlenin arzu ettiği bir 
keyfiyet olarak hususiyle bu kadar mesarif-i kesire vukuuna Rusyalu sebeb-i müstakil 
olduğu cihetle bunun tazmini kaziyesinin ise netice-i amal olduğunda hiç Ģübhe olmayıp 
[8] Ģu kadar ki Ģimdiki hale göre devletlerin muaveneti bir dereceye kadar giderek 
andan ileriye varamayacağı tebeyyün etmesine nazaran ol dereceden ötesini saltanat-ı 
seniye kendi kuvve-i mahsusasıyla istihsal etmek lazım geleceğinden devletlerin 
nesayihi dairesinden çıkıldığı halde anların dostluk halinde kalıp [9] kalmayacağı ve 
yalnızca harekete Devlet-i Aliye'nin kuvve-i hazırası kafi olup olmadığı mübahesatında 
cümlenin malumu olduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliye'nin ilan-ı harb etmesi devletlerin 
muaveneti ile meĢrut olmadığı misillu saltanat-ı seniyenin mahfuziyet-i hukuk ve 
tamamiyet-i mülk ile iktifa etmeyip de ziyade Ģey [10] istemesi dahi anların 
muvaffakiyeti muallak ve merbut olmadığından Devlet-i Aliye rey-i alisinde müstakil 
olarak talep buyuracağı Ģeylere ve muharebenin temdidi maddesine hiçbir taraftan 
mümanaat olmayacağı ve iki devlet-i bahriyenin nesayihi mevki-i itibarda 
tutulmasından dolayı anlardan adavetkarane [11] hareket vukua gelmeyeceği ve 
donanmalarının burada bulunması dahi saltanat-ı seniyenin murad buyuracağı harekata 
kuvve-i mania suretinde olmayarak Ģimdi buradan gitmeleri ifade olunsa derhal kalkıp 
Bahr-i Sefid'e azimet edeceklerinde Ģübhe olmadığı velhasıl bunlar beyan ettikleri 
dairenin dahilinde [12] muavin olmalarıyla beraber kuvve-i mahsusaya istinaden anın 
haricine çıkılmak istenildiği surette ana dahi mani olmayacaklarından bu devletler 
donanmalarının burada bulunup bulunmaması müsavi addolunarak maslahatın sair 
cihetlerini mülahaza etmek iktiza edeceği ber vech-i tafsil irad olunduğuna binaen [13] 
bundan sonra müzakerat kuvve-i mahsusa üzerine deveran ederek Ģu meselenin 
bidayetinden berü millet-i Ġslamiye ve heyet-i mecmua tarafından gösterilen asar-ı 
gayret ve hamiyyete ve asakir-i hazret-i Ģahane taraflarından berren ve bahren ibraz 
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olunan Ģecaat ve besalete hiç diyecek olmayarak bununla [14] yar ve ağyara karĢu 
Devlet-i Aliye'nin Ģevket ve satveti dahi isbat olunmuĢ olduğundan ve Rumili tarafında 
bulunan orduy-ı hümayunun dahi kaffe-i tedabir ve harekatı tahsine seza 
bulunduğundan bunlardan dolayı cümlemizin bir hal-i Ģükr altında bulunduğumuz 
bedihi olup fakat bir su-i tedbirin [15] neticesi olarak donanma-i hümayunun bir fırkası 
Sinob'da kazazede olarak Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununda dahi kavaid-i harbiyeye adem-
i riayetin seyyiesi olmak üzere bazı uygunsuzluk zuhura gelmesi kuvve-i hazıraya 
nakısa vermiĢ ve Batum ve ġekvetil taraflarının askerce ve zehair [16] ve mühimmatça 
müzayakası kemalde olduğu ve saye-i Ģevketvaye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahide burada 
asakir-i külliye ve mühimmat-ı vafiye mevcud bulunduğu halde bahrin mesdudiyeti 
cihetle muavenet icrası rütbe-i istihsalde görünmüĢ olmasına ve Anadolu ordusunun 
rütbe-i matlubeye isali dahi zamana muhtaç bulunacağına [17] nazaran kuvve-i hazıraya 
düĢmanın Ģevketini kesr ile istenilecek Ģeyleri istihsale kafi denilemeyeceği ve düvel-i 
bahriye donanmalarının buradan tebaidi takdirinde anların bitaraflığı Yunanlu ve 
Karadağlu gibi mutarassıd-ı fırsat olanları uyandırmak ve sair bitaraf bulunanları dahi o 
halden çıkarmak gibi [18] fenalıkları intac edeceği yani gailenin büyüyeceği ihtimaline 
göre bir kat daha tezyid-i kuvvet olunmak icab edip bunda dahi mülkce ve malca 
müĢkilat bulunduğu ve mesela def‟-i mazarrat ile iktifa olunmayıp da celb-i menfaat 
vadisine gidildiği halde böyle Ģeylere Rusyalu kolaylıkla [19] muvaffakiyet 
etmeyeceğinden sair metalib Ģöyle dursun yalnız tazmin akçesi almak içün bahren 
Sivastopol'ü yakmak ve berren dahi Moskov Ģehrine kadar varmak iktiza edip buna ise 
Ģimdiki halde imkan müsaid olmadığı mülahazatı üzerine uzun uzun mübahaseler ile 
mahfuziyet-i [20] hukuk ve tamamiyet-i mülk ile bir müsalaha akdinin lüzumu rütbe-i 
sübuta reside olduğu esnada maslahatı mesele-i Ģeriasına tatbik içün hoca efendiler 
hazeratı taraflarından ümera-i bahriye ve berriye baĢka baĢka isticvab olunarak kuvve-i 
bahriyenin mevcudu Rusyalunun kuvve-i bahriyesine muvazin olmadığı [21] ve bu 
mevsimde yelken sefinelerinin Bahr-i Siyah'a çıkarılamayacağı tahakkuk edip kuvve-i 
berriye dahi Rumili tarafında tahaffuza elverir ise de tecavüz ile düĢmanın kesr-i Ģevketi 
derecesine henüz kafi olamadığı ve Anadolu hududlarının muhafazası himmete muhtaç 
olacağı anlaĢılmıĢ ve malca olan müzayaka dahi [22] ber tafsil bildirilmiĢ olduğundan 
ve düĢman tarafından sulha rağbet olunmak mesele-i Ģeriyesi iktizasından olduğu 
cihetle bu keyfiyet dahi hoca efendiler hazeratı taraflarından istifsar olunduğuna mebni 
her ne kadar düĢman canibinden doğrudan doğruya buraya haber veyahud mektup 
irsaliyle taleb-i musalaha olunmamıĢ [23] ise de Rusya devletinin gerek evrak-ı 
resmiyesinde ve gerek sair devletlere olan tebliğatında sulha meylini beyan olunduğu 
cevabı verildiğinden keyfiyat-ı meĢruhaya mebni sulhün mücaz olduğu müĢar-ı fetva-i 
Ģerife verileceği taraf-ı meĢihat-i Ġslamiyeden beyan olunmuĢ olmasıyla ve ber minval-i 
meĢrua mahfuziyet-i huku ve tamamiyet-i [24] mülk ile iĢ bittiği takdirde Devlet-i 
Aliye'nin ihtiyar ettiği teklifat ve mesarifat ile def'-i mazarrat olunmuĢ olacağı cihetle 
buna beyhude denilemeyerek Rusyalunun Viyana müsveddesine icra olunan tashihatı 
kabul etmeyeceğini ilan ettiğinin üzerine Ģimdi tashihat-ı mezkure gibi muhafaza-i 
hukuka salih [25] bir suret ile tesviye-i maslahat olunur ise zarar ve rezaletin Rusyaluya 
raci olacağı ve beyn-ed düvel cari olan emniyet-i umumiyeden hissedar olacak vechile 
bir Ģey istihsal olunur ise atiyi temin edeceği bahsinde bunun sübab-ı muharebe edip 
etmeyeceğine dair vaki olan suallere dahi [26] inĢallahu teala Devlet-i Aliye'ce matlub 
derecede istitaat husulünde vesail dahi aksak olmayacağı cihetle muharebeye bunun hail 
olamayacağı cevabı verildiğine mebni böyle bir emniyet-i istikbaliyenin lüzumu dahi 
meclisce maruz-ı kabulde göründüğünden sefaretlerle bu yolda müzakere-i maslahat 
içün [27] hariciye nezaretine mezuniyet verilmesi emrinde ittifak-ı ârâ hasıl olmuĢ ve 
canib-i fetvapenahiden dahi iktiza eden fetva-i Ģerife ita olunmuĢ olmağla ol babda ve 
bir de bu karar müzakere-i maslahata ruhsat itasından ibaret olarak müsalaha değil 
mütareke bile henüz meydanda olmayıp hususuyla [28] burada sefaretlerle 
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kararlaĢtırılacak esası Rusyalunun kabul edip etmeyeceği dahi meçhul olduğundan Ģu 
meydanda olan harb haline hiçbir cihetle halel getirmek caiz olmayarak bilakis kaffe-i 
tertibat ve tedarikata evvelkinden ziyade ikdam ve ihtimam olunmak lazım geleceği 
dahi cümlenin reyiyle [29] muvafık bulunmağla bu hususta dahi her ne vechile irade-i 
seniye-i cenab-ı tacidari müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise inĢallahu teala mehaz-ı 
hayr u isabet-ade olacağı rehin-i ilm-i ali buyruldukta her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i 
men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 20 Ra 70. 
[Sealed by 163 persons] 
 
Appendix 32. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 37-38, dated 31 December 1853. Extract from a 
despatch of the British consul in Monastir Mr. Longworth to ambassador 
Stratford de Redcliffe on Hakkı Pasha and the Albanian irregulars. 
 
On the subject of the additional levy of Rediff [the recruitment for want of money 
I believe] has been almost entirely suspended. 
Of the Rediff at Monastir 2,000 are provided [?] with muskets and clothing. Abdi 
Pacha is indefatigable in his endeavours  with the slender means at his command to give 
them discipline and efficiency. He is night and day engaged in drilling them; but owing 
to the bad weather, the exercise, I observe, is chiefly **mal [?]; there is not much 
parade or field duty. The health of these troops is on the whole good, though more 
sickness has prevailed within the last four days. There are at present 285 men in hospital 
which out of a force of 7,100 is no great number. The average proportion of deaths 
thereon, which I am informed has for some time been 9 per cent is in the absence of 
epidemic diseases, too heavy. The medical department as regards personnel is at present 
inefficient. The native physicians, Greek, Armenian, and Turkish, who have diplomas 
from the college of Galata Serai, are in the most part incompetent, their practise lying 
chiefly,  in intrigue and peculation. 
The Government is about to have recourse to a measure of somewhat questionable 
expediency. Namely a levy of the Spahis. Though the superannuated among them may 
send substitutes still as the majority must consist of elderly persons, some of them 
Shopkeepers [Esnafs] and people of sedentary habits; I do not suppose they will make a 
very formidable body. In one respect this levy will have the advantage of that of the 
wild and fierce Albanian mercenaries. They have some property and respectability, nor 
are they likely either from choice or necessity, to be guilty of the excesses which have 
begun to mark the track of the Albanians.  
I stated before that a certain Hakie Pacha had come here with a commission from 
the Government to raise a corps of 5,000 Albanians; the only possible reason for 
conferring this appointment on a man who is an invalid, bowed down by adversity and 
bodily infirmities, must have been to indemnify him for the injustice to which at a 
former period he had been subjected by the Porte; his property at Dobra having been 
confiscated on a false charge of favouring the revolt in that quarter. The consequences 
of this job have been already bad enough and no less a remedy be applied may prove 
still more serious. While at Monastir Hakee Pacha was confined by sickness to his 
chamber. Facilities however were afforded him by Abdi Pacha and emissaries were 
employed to recruit in Albanians. But the sole aim of Hakee Pacha being to make as 
much as could upon the pay and rations assigned by the Government to the 5,000 men 
he had to raise. The very worst / as they were the cheapest / that could be found, both 
with respect to equipment and character, the scum and refuse of both North and South 
Albania were enrolled by them. Nor was this all: fearing perhaps that he might not 
complete his contingent, he had empowered each of his recruiting agents to assemble an 
indefinite number. M*[?] mustering therefore at Monastir it was found there were 
several hundreds more than were wanted and these without receiving a piastre for their 
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expenses were disbanded and turned adrift here. These vagabonds have consequently 
weakened their fury and disappointment on all the villages they could contrive to visit 
on their way home again. Nor have the hands, which have proceeded t Sophia under 
Hakee Pacha behaved themselves much better. Their leader in the last stage of debility 
[?] travels with his military chest in a close carriage, while his ruffianly followers make 
themselves everywhere at home in the Bulgarian villages, revelling, pilfering and 
committing all sorts of outrage wherever they come. For the 200 men who form this 
body guard even, he habitually issues 20 billets only. While they were at Monastir, the 
authorities managed by dint of threats and severe chastisement to preserve some order 
among them. But once upon the tra*[?] again, all control has been improbable. Such has 
been the result of this recruiting speculation. I can affirm on authority of the best kind in 
these matters that out of this rabble of 5,000 men not 1,000 would stand fire a face the 
enemy. In the meanwhile the firmans that have been issued for the protection of the 
Rayahs by the Government are to this extent rendered nugatory by its own incurable 
spirit of jobbery. Had the regular authorities either civil or military been commissioned 
to raise this body of irregulars, they would by exacting securities for each individual 
have insured steadiness and good conduct on their part.  
  
Appendix 33. İ. HR. 114/5554-09 lef 1. From Ömer Lütfi Pasha in Şumnu. 13 
Rebiyyülahir 1270 (13 January 1854). Battle of Çatana [Cetate].  
 
Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki 
 
Asakir-i Ģecaat-müessir-i cenab-ı mülukane on dört tabur piyade ve dört batarya top ve 
üç alay süvariden mürekkeb ve müretteb olduğu halde Kalafat‟dan hareket ve mezkur 
piyadeden üç taburu ihtiyat suretiyle geri köylerde bırağılıp maadası Kalafat‟dan altı 
saat ilerüye sevk ve azimet ettirilip oraya gelmiĢ olan on beĢ tabur piyade ve yigirmi 
dört kıta top ve üç alay süvari Rusya askeriyle Çatana nam karye ile sahrada azim bir 
muharebeye mübaĢeret olunmasıyla lillahil hamd vel menna asakir-i hazret-i Ģahanenin 
piyadesi düĢman piyadesinden dört tabur noksan olduğu halde fevkalade galebe ve 
nusrete muvafık olarak Rusyalu‟yu fena suretle münhezim ve periĢan ve mahall-i 
mezkurdan nizamsız suretle firar u kertiran [?] ettirmiĢler ve muharebe-i mezburede 
Rusyalu‟nun sahih olarak dört bin kadar telefat ve birçok mecruhatı olup asakir-i 
Ģahaneden dahi üçyüz mikdarı Ģehid olup yedi yüz nefer mecruh zuhura gelmiĢ ve bu 
sırada Rusyalu‟dan hayy olarak hayli esir tutulmuĢ ise de asakir-i Ģahane kemal-i hiddet 
u Ģiddetinden sağ bırakmayıp kaffesini süngüden geçirerek yalnız birkaç neferi hayyen 
Kalafat‟a getirmiĢdir. Mücerred keyfiyet Ģimdilik bu kadarca malum-ı ali-i seraskeri 
olmak ve bunun arkasından vukuatın tafsilatı dahi beyan kılınmak üzere suret-i ihbalde 
[?] arz ve **-i keyfiyetle tebĢir-i muzafferiyet-i celileye mübaĢeret olundu. Her halde 
emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir. Fi 13 R 70. An ġumnu.  
 
MüĢir-i orduy-ı Rumeli 
Ömer Lütfi [mühür] 
 
Hengam-ı muharebede zikr olunan Çatana karyesinde asakir-i Ģahane Rusyalu‟nun dört 
bölük piyadesinin bir takrib-i ıstılatını kat‟ ile öteye alıp bir can kurtulmamak üzere 
kaffesini alef-i yatağ [batağ?]-ı telef eylemiĢ ve muharebe-i mezburede asakir-i 
Ģahanenin ümera ve zabitan ve neferatı bir derecede fevkalade ibraz-ı Ģecaat ve gayret 
ve sebat ve metanet eylemiĢdir ki tarif ve beyanı na-kifayet?-i husule-i hame ve lisan 
olup hatta ferikandan reis-i erkan saadetlu Ġsmail PaĢa ve saadetlu Mustafa PaĢa hazeratı 
bendeleri hafif suretle yaralanıp süvari miralayı izzetlu Hüseyin Bey ve piyade miralayı 
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Ali Bey ve topçu miralayı Abdullah Bey bendeleri dahi cerhayab [?] olmuĢ ve piyade 
redif miralayı Hüseyin Bey bendeleri dahi mecruh bulunmuĢdur. 
 
Bu haberin üzerine derakab daha yedi tabur piyade asakir-i Ģahane ile iki batarya top 
bit-tertib bu gece zuhuratlar ihracıyla Vidin‟e sevk ve tesrib [?] olunmaktadır. Her halde 
emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir. 
 
[Sealed] Ömer Lütfi  
 
Appendix 34. HR. SYS. 905/1 lef 86, dated 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1270 (31 January 
1854). From Namık Pasha in London. Demonstrations of the British people in 
favour of the Ottomans.  
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Tarih-i ariza-i çakeri gününde Ġngiltere parlamentosunu haĢmetlu kraliçe hazretleri 
bizzat küĢad ettiğinden resm-i mezkurda bulunmak üzere kulları dahi Saltanat-ı Seniye 
sefiri Musurus Bey cenablarıyla birlikte azimet olunmuĢ ve esna-i tarikte ve iki taraflu 
hanelerin pencelerinde müctemi' ve memlu bulunan zükur ve inasın kaffesi azimet ve 
avdette rakib olduğumuz arabaları gördükçe Ģapkalarını çıkarıp, nisa taifesi ellerindeki 
mendillerini sallayıp aferin maĢallah Türkler muzaffer olunuz Sinop vakasına esef 
etmeyiniz deyu çağrıĢarak velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz padiĢahımız efendimize ve devlet-i 
aliyelerine olan meyl ve muhabbet-i kamilelerini ilan ve izhar eylemiĢler ve haĢmetlu 
kraliçenin ehli Prens Albert cenabları kan-ı mesele-i hazıradan dolayı Rusya ve 
Avusturya tarafını tutmuĢ ve bahçede Ġngiltere sefirine dahi mahremane bazı kağıtlar 
yazmıĢ olduğu beyn-en-nas mütevatır bulunduğundan prens-i mumaileyhin aleyhine 
gazeteler birtakım Ģey yazmakta ve halk dahi söylenmekte bulunduklarından saraydan 
parlamentoya kraliçe ile beraber alay ile gider iken prensin bu ahvalinden adem-i 
hoĢnudiyetlerini ibraz zımnında halktan bazıları Ģapkalarını çıkarmadıktan maada bazı 
ıslık çalmak ve daha bazı Ģeyler söylemeğe ictisar etmiĢ oldukları istima olunmuĢtur ve 
resm-i mezkura Rusya elçisi gelmemiĢtir ve kraliçenin nutuk-ı resmisi manzur-ı ali-i 
cenab-ı nezaretpenahileri buyrulmak zımnında ariza-i çakerime tya? takdim kılınmıĢtır. 
Ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 2 Ca 70. 
 
Mehmed Namık 245 [Sealed] 
 
Appendix 35. A. MKT. UM. 150/86, dated 15 January 1854. Memorial [mazhar] of 
the sancak of Zaho on Yezdanşer.  
 
[1] Cizre ve havalisi kazalarda vuku bulan uygunsuzluğun arz ve ifadesine Ģu vechile 
ibtidar olunur ki kazaha-i mezbure ahalilerinin min el kadim mevsuf ve maruf oldukları 
tavr-ı fesadane ve harekat-ı bağiyane iktizasından olarak daima suret-i [2] tuğyan ve 
Ģekavete meyyal ve izhar-ı saire-i fesad ve isyan ile malum ve mefhum ül ahval 
oldukları derkar ise de bir müddetten berü baği Bedirhan Bey‟in zamanından Ģimdiye 
kadar meram-ı bağiyane ve dilheva-i müfsidanelerine adem-i nailiyetleri ancak saye-i 
[3] kudretvaye-i mülukanede havali-i mezbur mevakilerinin asakir-i fevzmealleri cenab-
ı Ģahane ve top ve mühimmat-ı hüsrevaneden hali olmadığından olup beĢ altı mahdan 
berü mesele-i hayriyeden dolayı mevaki-i mezbureden asakir ve mühimmat-ı mezbure 
[4] orduy-ı zafer-buy-i Ģahaneye celb buyurulduğundan naĢi ekrad-ı bednihad önlerini 
boĢ gördükleri gibi vakt-i ganimet ve hengam-ı fırsat ittihazıyla hafiyen birbirleri 
meyanlarında leylen ve neharen ba tezkir Ģerar-feĢan ve süluk-i tarik-i bağy [5] ü tuğyan 
olduklarından baĢka Kürdistan eyaleti dahilinde kain kazaha-i saire ve belki Musul ve 
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beri tarafdan Harput eyaletleri kazalarının dahi ahalilerini dahi tahrik ve iğfale 
mübaderet ederek hem ol vechile mekasıd-ı derunelerine ibtidar ve harekat-ı [6] 
bağyanelerini izhar edecekleri sırada Zaho sancağı kaimmakamlığına memur ve tayin 
buyurulan rifatlu Hüsnü Bey bendeleri bu ateĢ [?] üzerine kaza-i mezbura gelmiĢ ve 
eĢkıya-i merkumenin bu hallerini irae ve müĢahade eylediklerinde Ģu vaka-i nazikede 
[7] gaile tahaddüs ettirmemek niyet-i mergubesiyle itfa-i nar-ı fesad içün bid-defeat 
eĢkıya-i merkumeye kavl-i leyyin ile vesaya-i lazımeyi ifa ve **men uğur-ı meyamin-
mevfur-ı tacidaride bezl ü baĢ ü can ederek eĢkıya-i [8] merkumenin cemiyetleri 
perakende olması içün hilat-i fahire-i külliye verilip pend ve nesayih-i mukteziye-i 
resmiye icra etmiĢ ise de bir vechile iskan olunamayıp ahir ül emr iki bin beĢ yüzden 
mütecaviz ekrad-ı bednihad birbirleriyle ahd ü [9] Ģart edip kaffe-i memurin ve nefs-i 
Cizre ahali-i fukarasını katl ü idam ve emval ü eĢyalarını nehb ü garet eyledikten sonra 
etraf ve eknafı bütün bütün kendilerine ram etmek hülya-i fasidesiyle Cizre'nin [10] 
üzerine hücum etmiĢler [?] ve kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh bendeleri iĢ iĢten geçtiğini 
gördüklerinde muhafaza-i mülk-i devlet ve vikaye-i fukara-i raiye zımnında Cizre'de 
bulunan asakir-i muvazzafa-i cüziyeyi bil-istishab cenab-ı hakkın ianesine istinaden 
[11] ġehrizor tarafından gelip muhasarada bir mahalle kapanmıĢ asakir-i muvazzafa 
sergerdeleri müteberanından Kolçaklı Hacı Mehmed Ağa kullarını asakir-i muvazzafa 
üzerine kumandar nasb ü tayin ve mukabele-i bil-misile ibtidar ve Ģeciane hareketle 
herkese kuvvet ve [12] metanet vererek ve terğib ve teĢvik ederek dört saat muharebe-i 
Ģedideden sonra bi-inayetullahi teala imdad-ı ruhaniye-i hazret-i peygamberide talih 
ferhunde metalih-i mülukane iktizasından olmak üzere ekrad-ı bednihadın [13] 
cemiyetlerini tarümar eylediği derkar ve lilhamd bunun üzerine havali-i mezburda 
alelgir-i iĢtial olan ateĢ-i fesadteskin olduğu misillu emsal ve akranlarına ibret olarak 
mahall-i saire dahi temkin [?] olmuĢ ve Hüda nekerde [14] eĢkıya-i merkume metalib-i 
fasidanelerine nail olmuĢ olsalardı değil bu havali, maazallahu teala beri taraftan Sivas 
ve öte taraftan Bağdad canibine kadar bu uygunsuzluk nüksederek taraf-ı saltanat-ı 
seniyeye mesarifat-ı [15] külliye-i müstelzem ve bu hususun Bedirhan Bey mesele-i 
müfsidesinden dahi azim ve giderek kat ender kat cesim olacağı nemudar ve emr-i 
aĢikar bir keyfiyet olduğu ve zaman-ı teshirden beri bu havalide bu makule ekradın 
böyle yekdil [16] ve yekvücud müttefik oldukları ve bu misillu muharebe-i Ģedide 
vukuu görülmüĢ ve iĢitilmiĢ mevaddan olmadığı ve kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh 
bendelerinin bu babda vuku bulan gayret ve Ģecaat ve tedabir-i hüsn-i hem[?] külliyesi 
hiçbir Ģeye mukayyes olmayıp [17] vedia-i cenab-ı kibriya olan fukara ve reayanın can 
ve ırz ve malları vikayesinde ve mülk-i mülukanenin muhafazası emrinde cansiperane 
ve Ģeciane harekat-ı merğubeleri kaffemizin meĢhud ve malum-ı acizanelerimiz olmuĢ 
[18] olduğunu mübeyyin iĢbu arz-ı mahzar-ı ubudiyet-eser-i çakeranelerimiz tanzim ve 
takdimine ictisar olunmuĢtur. Ol babda ve kaffe-i halde emr ü ferman ve lutf ü ihsan-ı 
feravan hazret-i men leh ül emr ül ihsanındır. Fi 15 R 270.  
 
Appendix 36. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 3, dated 19 February 1854. Lord Palmerston to 
Namık Pasha in London. Recommending Sir Charles Wood as someone who can 
give good advise on the loan. 
 
Carlton Gardens, 19 Febr. 1854 
Mon cher Pacha, 
 
 Je vous envoye une lettre adressée au Chevalier Wood autrefois Ministre de 
Finance dans le Gouvernement de Lord John Russell. C‟est un Homme qui entend 
parfaitement toutes les affaires de la Bourse, et qui pourra vous donner de bons Conseils 
par Rapport à votre Emprunt. 
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 Je vous recommande fortement de vous laisser guider d‟après ce qu‟il pourra vous 
dire. Et si vous ne pouvez pas obtenir l‟argent dont votre Gouvernement à Besoin, aux 
Conditions fixées par vos Instructions il faut absolument que vous mettiez ces 
Instructions de Coté, et vous devriez dans ce cas rendre un Service important a votre 
Pays malgré les ordres de votre Gouvernement. C‟était une absurdité que de vouloir 
fixer à Constantinople le Prix auquel les Capitalistes de Londres et de Paris voudraient 
prêter leur Argent. Si votre Gouvernement pouvait se dispenser de faire un Emprunt a la 
Bonheur dans ce cas la ils auraient bien pas vous dire de ne faire l‟Emprunt qu‟a telles 
ou telles Conditions mais puisque l‟argent leur est indispensable la Saine politique 
aurait du leur présence de vous dire, apportey [sic] nous l‟argent qu‟il nous faut aux 
meilleures Conditions auxquelles vous pouvez l‟obtenir. 
Mille compliments 
Palmerston 
 
Appendix 37. İ. HR. 332/21357 lef 2, dated 25 February 1854. Rothschild from 
Paris to Reshid Pasha the foreign minister on the loan. 
 
Makam-ı nezaret-i celile-i hariciyeye bin sekiz yüz elli dört senesi Şubat‟ının yigirmi 
beşi tarihiyle müverrehan Mösyö Rothschild tarafından takdim kılınan bir kıta arizanın 
tercümesidir. 
 
Devletlu Namık PaĢa hazretlerine havale buyurulmuĢ olan memuriyetin savb-ı 
bendeganeme iĢarıyla beraber elimizden geldiği mertebe müĢarünileyh hazretlerine 
muavenet etmekliğimize dair geçen Ģehr-i TeĢrin-i Evvel‟in beĢi tarihiyle lutfen tahrir 
ve irsal [2] buyurulmuĢ olan bir kıta emirname-i ali-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerinin 
ahzıyla kesb-i fahr etmiĢ idim. Tahrirat-ı mezkure-i hıdivanelerine daha evvelce cevab 
tahrir edememekliğim bu babda istihsal-i malumat ile hakpay-i ali-i [3] safderanelerine 
oldukça iĢe yarar bir cevab vermek isteğimden neĢet etmiĢdir. Bundan akdem fırsatyab 
olunduğu esnada Devlet-i Aliyye ile mesalihce akd-ı münasebat ederek kendüsüne 
faidelü [4] suretle iĢ görmeğe arzukeĢ olduğumuzu arz ettiğimizden maada lafz-ı 
elçisinin kefaletiyle evvelce oldukça külliyetlu bir peĢin itasıyla kendüsünün ikrar-ı 
alisine olan itimadımızın [5] delil-i sahihini ibraz eyledik zannederim. Ve atıf-ül beyan 
münasebatın devamını ma-al memnuniye müĢahade ile beraber sair devletler içün 
ettiğimiz misillü burada kendüsünün itibarını daimi suretle tesis etmek [6] zımnında 
Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye bezl-i muavenet etmek niyetinde olduğumuzun isbatı zımnında 
mevadd-ı meĢruhanın beyanı kifayet eder ise de bir maddeyi taahhüd eylediğimizde her 
Ģeyden evvel müteahhid olduğumuz ol maddenin tesviyepezir [7] olması kamilen 
muhtemel olmasını istediğimiz misillü müteĢebbis olduğumuz umurda muvaffakiyeti-
miz her ne mertebe meczumumuz olur ise mücerred kendimizi ol kadar meydana 
çıkaracağımız derkar olduğundan müĢarünileyh Namık PaĢa hazretleriyle [8] gerek 
burada ve gerek Londra‟da görüĢerek müĢarünileyh hazretleri canibinden teklif olunan 
hudud-ı Ģurutun el-haleti hazihi derkar olan ahval-i politikiye ve maliyeye gayr-i 
muvafık olduklarına cezm-i yakin [9] hasıl etmiĢdir. Burada mücerreden bir itibar tesisi 
içün sermaye sahiblerinin mukaddem kendüsünden akçe istikraz etmiĢ olan bir devletin 
yeni bir akçe teklifine birbirlerine rekabete tamah ve rağbet etmeleriyçün [10] Ģübhesiz 
bir faide bulmaları lazımedendir. Alel husus mübalağalı olan akçe ihtiyacatıyla korkulur 
ki bizim dolgun bahalarımızı her tarafta pek aĢağı bahalara tenzil ettirmekte  
bulundukları [11] iĢbu esnada bile müĢarünileyh Namık PaĢa hazretleri müesses olan 
Ģurutunun ıtmaı içün gayr-i kafi oldukları ve hatta kendüsiyle ber vech-i matlub 
muhabere ve münasebetimiz derkar olması mülasebesiyle [12] bu babda olan 
efkarlarımızı devletlu Veli PaĢa hazretlerine bildirmekle kesb-i fahr etmiĢ idik. ĠĢte 
Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin menafii ve bu babda tehirat-ı muzırradan vikayesiyçün sefirlerinin 
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bahaca [13] daha ziyade vüsatlüce terhis buyurulmalarından maada be tekrar 
Dersaadet‟e istizana mecbur olmaksızın katiyen karar vermeleriyçün bu babda muktezi 
olan ruhsat-ı kamileleri olması lazımeden idüğini zan ve kıyas ederiz. Çünkü ol halde 
süfera-i mumaileyha istikrazın tesviyesiyçün müsaid fırsatdan istifade etmek ve karz-ı 
mezkurenin zuhurunda yeni baĢtan tacil [?] ve tehir ile [15] elden çıkarılmamak içün 
eyü bir mevkide bulunacakları aĢikardır. Kaldı ki iĢbu maddenin tesviyesine muvafık 
olunacak ahvale vasıl olduğunu müĢahade etmeğe ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin memnun 
[16] olacağı bir karara vasıl olmasına arzukeĢ olduğumun beyanı zaten derkar [olan] 
ihtiramat ve ubudiyetimin arz ve ibrazına vesile-i cemile ittihaz kılınmıĢtır.  
 
Appendix 38. HR. SYS. 1347/18 lef 1, dated 2 Cemaziyelahir 1270 (2 March 1854). 
From the Armenian patriarch and Armenian millet meclisi. On the atrocities of the 
başıbozuks. 
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
Anadolu tarafında kain ordu-yu hümayuna gitmek emeliyle gönüllü yazılarak berren 
müteazim olan baĢıbozuk askeri takımı esna-i rahda mürur [2] ve ubur eyledikleri 
mahallerde ve hususiyle Harput ve Sivas eyaletleri dahilinde vaki Eğin ve Arapkir ve 
Kuruçay ve ÇemiĢkezek ve Divriği kazalarından [3] geçtiklerinde baĢbuğları bulunan-
ları karye be karye gezerek reaya-i mevcudeden beĢer ve onar bin kuruĢ ve 
maiyetlerinde bulunan gönüllü takımı neferatı [4] dahi kırkar ve elliĢer kuruĢ ve 
bargirler talep ve cebren ahz ü tahsile mütecasir olup ve vermeye iktidarı olmayanları 
Ģediden darb ve hanelere [5] nüzul ile envai erzak ve makulat talep ve ırzlarına tasallut 
etmek misillu gunagun zulm u teaddiyata cüret eyledikleri ve bazı mahallerde dahi 
geçen [6] Paskalya günleri on beĢ güne değin kilisaları sedd ve bend ile reaya kullarını 
icra-i ayinden men‟ eyledikleri cihetle reaya kullarının asayiĢ [7] ve emniyet-i haliyeleri 
külliyen münselib olarak bir guna takat ve tahammülleri kalmadığı beyanıyla teaddiyat-ı 
merkumenin külliyen men‟i esbabının istihsali ve haklarında [8] sahabet-i aliye ve 
himayet-i seniyenin ibzali hususu bu kere mahall-i merkumeden iĢ‟ar ve istirham 
olunmuĢ ve bu keyfiyet-i mültezim ali olan ma'delet-i mültezime-i [9] asriye ve 
hakkaniyet-i seniyenin bil-vucuh hilafı ve reaya-yı merkumenin dahi iĢ‟ar-ı mağduriyet 
ve periĢani hallerini müeddi olarak her vechile [10] Ģayan-ı merhamet ve sahabet ve 
himayet-i seniye bulundukları emr-i vazıh ve bu halde mugayir-i rıza-i ali keyfiyetin 
hiçbir tarafda vukuu caiz görülmeyeceği [11] derkâr olmağla teaddiyat-ı meĢruhanın 
külliyen menniyle reaya-i mevcude kullarının kemakan himaye ve sıyanesi emrinde 
itina ve dikkat olunması irade-i [12] aliyyesini Ģamil Anadolu tarafında bulunan vülat-ı 
izam ve mutasarrıfin-i kiram hazeratı bendelerine hitaben evamirname-i [sic] samiye-i 
hazret-i sadaretpenahinin tasdirine [13] müsaade-i merahim-ade-i aliyyeleri erzan ve 
Ģayan buyurulması babında ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehül emrindir. Fi 2 
C 70. [Sealed by the Patriarch and the Armenian meclis] 
 
Appendix 39. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 125, dated 12 March 1854. British consul at 
Varna Lt. Col. Edward Neale to Lord Stratford. Outrages and disorders 
committed by bashi bozuks in the vicinity of Rassova  
 
Varna, March 12
th
 - 1854 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 I have this moment been informed that great disorders and atrocities have been 
recently perpetrated by the Turkish irregular troops in the vicinity of Rassova on the 
Danube.  
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 A party of Mokans [Transylvanian shepherds] driven by the concentration of 
Russian troops in Wallachia, sought refuge with their flocks on an island situated 
opposite Rassova. The Turkish irregular troops appear to have gone over to the island 
and although the Mokans stated that they were Austrian subjects and occupied the 
island for no hostile purpose and urged in proof of this statement that they were 
unarmed thirty of their number were decapitated on the spot and six or seven thousand 
sheep were carried off by the Bashi Bozuks. One of the Mokans who escaped has 
arrived in Varna, and the depositions he has made upon this event form the subject of a 
report which the Austrian Vice-Consul here has addressed by this occasion to the 
Internuncio. 
 I also regret to report to Your Lordship that similar and still greater atrocities have 
been committed by the Bashi Bozuks upon the inhabitants of the village of Keserler 5 
hours distant from Rassova. The women were dishonored and many of the men and 
children killed. Such of the inhabitants as escaped, have fled to the woods. 
 I have etc. 
 [Signed] Edward St John Neale 
 
Appendix 40. HR. TO. 52/50, dated 23 March 1854. The despatch of Musurus to 
Reshid Pasha, translated from the French. On the loan and advance money of 10 
million francs. 
 
Londra sefiri Kostaki Bey [Musurus] tarafından Reşid Paşa'ya takdim olunan arizanın 
tercümesi. İstikraz. 10 milyon frank avans. 
 
Taht-ı müzakerede bulunan istikraz akçesinden tediye olunmak üzere Ġngiltere ve 
Fransa devletlerinden on milyon frank istizan olunması zımnında canib-i [2] Bab-ı 
Ali'den devleteyn-i müĢarünileyhima sefirleri nezdinde vuku bulan teĢebbüsatave bu 
husus hakkında Lord Clarendon nezdinde taraf-ı acizanemden [3] dahi teĢebbüsat-ı 
lazıme icra kılınması emrine dair cemaziye-l ahirin ikisi [2 Mart 1854] tarihiyle 
müverrahan huruf-ı mahsusa ile tahrir buyurulan emirname-i ali-i nezaretpenahilerini 
[4] ahz ile kesb-i mübahat etmiĢtir. Emirname-i mezkurun vürudunu müteakıben Lord 
Clarendon ile mülakat olunup Lord-ı mumaileyhe madde-i [5] muharrereye dair vuku 
bulan tebliğat ve tahrihat ve itirazat-ı abidanem üzerine Devlet-i Aliyye'nin iĢbu iltiması 
Lord Stratford tarafından dahi [6] kendisine tahrir olunduğunu ifade ile Ġngiltere 
devletinin bu hususa vuku'-ı muvafakiyetinin davet edeceği müĢkilatı tasrihden sarf-ı 
nazar ederek fakat [7] parlamentoda evvel be evvel müzakere olunacak madde Saltanat-
ı Seniyye'nin ahval-i hazırada muhtaç olduğu akçeyi istikraz vasıtasıyla tedarik ve 
istihsale muvafık [8] olup olmıyacağı hususunun bilinmesi olduğunu ve Mösyö 
Rothschild iĢbu istikrazı yüzde beĢ faiz ile yüzde yetmiĢe mübayaa etmeğe arz 
ettiğinden [9] ve iĢbu teklif dahi gerek kendisinin ve gerek sair Ġngiltere ministrolarının 
rey ve efkarına göre Ģu aralık Devlet-i Aliye hakkında faidelü ve kabule [10] Ģayan 
bulunduğu halde taraf-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye'den karin-i kabul-i rağbet buyurulduğundan 
Ġngiltere kabinetosu iĢbu ahvali parlamento mecalisine bildirmeğe mecbur olacağını 
[11] ve bu ise Devlet-i Aliyye'nin balada muharrer iltimasının redd olunmasını davet 
edeceğini beyan ve tasrihe hasr-ı itiraz edip Lord-ı mumaileyh istikraza [12] muvafık 
olunamadığı takdirde Ġngiltere kabinetosu Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin iltiması üzerine sarf-ı 
efkar ederek ne yapılmak lazım geldiğine karar vereceğini tebliğ [13] ile beraber Mösyö 
Rothschild'in vuku bulan teklifinin kabul buyurulmasını taraf-ı acizaneme nihayet-ül 
gaye ibram ile hatm-i kelam eyledikde Mösyö Rothschild'in arzettiği [14] yüzde yetmiĢ 
fiyatı pek dun olduğu cihetle devletlu Namık PaĢa hazretlerine ita buyurulan talimatın 
hududu haricindedir lakin Londra'nın pek zengin [15] ve muteber sermaye sahiblerinden 
Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Palmer ile Mösyö Rothschild'in teklif ettiği Ģeraitten daha 
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faidelü Ģerait ile istikrazın tesviyesi üzerine katiyen bir Ģeye karar vermek üzere 
olduğumuzu ve bu sırada vukua gelen ikdamatımızın neticesini kariben kendilerine 
ifadeye kesb-i iktidar [17] eylemeğe memul etmekte olduğum cihetle emirname-i ali-i 
hıdıvilerinde musarrah madde üzerine bundan böyle yine söz açacağımı tebliğ ile cevab 
verilmiĢdir. [18] Bunun üzerine Lord Clarendon zaten bildiği Mösyö Goldsmid ve  
Mösyö Palmer haklarında hüsn-i Ģahadet etmekle beraber istikrazın serian ve katiyen 
[19] tesviyesi hakkında ibramat-ı vakıasını teyid ve tekid etmiĢtir. Zaten istikraz 
maddesine gelince Mösyö Rothschild Avrupa'nın kaffe-i ashab-ı sermayesinden [20] 
ziyade bu misillu mevaddın hüsn-i neticesini temine muktedir olduğu cihetle madde-i 
mezkurenin mumaileyhe ihalesi hususunu ta ibtidasından berü tercih etmiĢ isek de [21] 
Rothschild sair ashab-ı sermaye nezdinde ikdamatımızın neticesiz kalacağını memul 
ettiğinden devletlu Namık PaĢa hazretleriyle vuku bulan mülakatlarında [22] bazen 
izhar-ı tereddüd ettiği ve bazen dahi kabul olunamıyacak metalibi meydana koyduğu 
cihetle pek çok vakit zay' etmemize sebeb olmuĢ [23] olduğundan muahharen Mösyö 
Goldsmid ve Mösyö Parker ile bu maddeyi cidden ve hakikaten müzakere etmeği 
iltizam ettiğim hasebiyle yüzde altı faiz ve yüzde [24] seksen beĢ fiyat ve istikrazın 
kaffe-i mesarifine mukabil sermaye-i hakikiye üzerine yüzde iki komisyon ile Ģehr-i 
Nisan'ın ibtidasından itibaren [25] dört beĢ ayda akçe tahsil olunmak ve on beĢ senede 
tediye ve iade kılınmak teklifini mumaileyhimadan istihsale muvafık olduğumda paĢa-i 
müĢarünileyh [26] hazretleri dahi Ģerait-i muharrereden daha faidelü bir suret-i 
tesviyenin icrası mümkün olmadığına mülzem olmuĢ olduğundan teklif-i mezkuru kabul 
edip konturatoya [27] vaz'-ı imza etmek üzere olduğu halde Mösyö Rothschild 
konturatonun imzasından bir gün evvel müĢarünileyh hazretlerine çakerleri dahi hazır 
olduğum halde [28] gelip teklifat-ı sabıkasını tekide baĢlamıĢ ise de kendi hakkında be-
heme-hal tecviz-i rüchaniyet edeceğimizi temin ile beraber imza atmak üzere 
bulunduğumuz [29] konturato maddesini kendisine ifade ettiğimizde ferdası sabaha 
kadar mütalaa etmek üzere kendisine vakit vermemizi niyaz ve iltimas etmiĢ idi. [30] 
Vakıa ferdası günü Paris'de bulunan ammisiyle telgraf vasıtasıyla muhabere ettikten ve 
bazı teklifat-ı cedide ile kendi hakkında faidelü [31] olacak Ģeraitin istihsalinden kat'-ı 
ümid eyledikten sonra Mösyö Goldsmid ve Mösyö Palmer ile akd olunacak konturato-
nun imza olunmasına [32] tayin olunan müddet heman hulul edeceğini görünce 
mumaileyhimanın arz ettiği kaffe-i Ģeraite ve bizim ısrarımızın üzerine istikrazın bir 
Ģilini [33] komisyonun bir Ģiliniyle mumaileyhimanın vuku bulan ruhsat ve gayretlerine 
mukabil kendilerine terk etmeğe muvafakat etmiĢ ve Mösyö Goldsmid ile Mösyö 
Palmer dahi [34] bu babda pek çok Ģikayat ve itirazatından sonra iĢbu teklif-i ahiri kabul 
ile artık bir diyecekleri kalmadığını beyan etmiĢlerdir. Binaberin istikrazın [35] kararı 
bugün ilan olunacaktır. Bunun bir Ģilini mumaileyhimanın muvafakatiyle temin 
olunmuĢ olduğu ve Mösyö Rothschild pek çok itibarı [36] bulunduğu cihetle istikrazın 
hüsn-i neticesi kamilen ve serian hasıl olacağı muhakkak olup madde-i mezkureye 
Ģimdiden bitmiĢ nazarıyla bakılarak sermaye-i [37] müstakrizenin küllisi dört mah 
zarfında Londra'da tarafımıza tediye olunacaktır. ĠĢbu istikraz 1852 sene-i 
Miladiyesinde [38] Paris'de karargir olan istikrazın Ģeraitiyle tesviye olunmuĢ ise de 
mukaddemki yigirmi üç seneye olup Ģimdiki ise dilhah-ı âliye [39] muvafık olarak on 
beĢ senedir. Ġstikraz-ı ahir vakıa emel ettiğimiz derecede faidelü olmayıp bir kaç mah 
mukaddem olsa daha menfaatlu [40] suretle tesviye olunabilür idiyse de el haleti hazihi 
Devlet-i Aliyye ile Rusya devleti meyanında zuhur eden muharebeye Fransa ve Ġngiltere 
devletlerinin [41] iĢtiraki olduğu ve kaffe-i istikrazatın fiyatı külliyetlüce tenzil ettiği 
halde bizim istikrazımız cümlenin efkarına göre menafi-i mümkineyi Ģamil [42] 
olduğundan tebrike Ģayan mevaddan bulunmuĢtur. Bu maddenin kaffe-i tafsilatı 
devletlu Namık PaĢa hazretlerinin tahriratında musarrah olup [43] paĢa-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerinin vaki olan müzakerat-ı meridede menafi-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin vikayesi 
zımnında mevadd-ı sairede müĢahade olunmuĢ olan gayretini [44] bezl etmiĢtir. 
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MüĢarünileyh hazretleri hakpay-i hazret-i hıdivilerine takdim ettiği arizalar da iĢbu 
maddenin vusul-i hüsn-i neticesine ale-t-tevali sarf eylediğim ikdamat hakkında hüsn-i 
Ģahadet buyurmuĢ olduğunu ümid ve memul ettiğim ifadesi zat-ı hazret-i nezaret-
penahilerine [46] derkar olan ubudiyet-i kamile ve kadimemin tecdid-i teminatına hüsn-
i zeria ittihaz olunmuĢtur. 
 
Appendix 41. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 142. General Burgoyne to Stratford Redcliffe. 
Extrait d’une lettre du Général Burgoyne à Lord Stratford en date du 23 Mars 
1854. 
 
 Je prends la liberté de dire à Votre Excellence que pendant ma tournée de 
Schumla à Varna, plusieurs plaintes m‟ont été adressées par les habitants des Villages, 
sur les outrages commis sur eux et leurs femmes et leurs filles, par les Bashi-Bozuk, qui 
ont  traversé le pays, et m‟ont instamment prié que je passe des représentations à cet 
effet aux autorités à Constantinople, dans le but qu‟on porte un remède à cet état de 
choses. 
 Les habitants tout vois leur empressement de fournir à ces gens là, des logements, 
des provisions et du fourrage, et se soumettraient même avec patience de faire des 
dépenses pour eux ; mais ils demandent seulement une protection personnelle pour eux-
mêmes leurs familles. Une vieillard qui est venue me voir, était dans une telle agitation, 
qu‟il était clair qu‟il venait d‟être victime des attaques des Bashi Bozuk. Il n‟y a pas le 
moindre doute que le même mal existe partout dans l‟arrière de l‟armée, ainsi que sur la 
route que j‟ai traversé. 
 Il me parait que le remède à appliquer serait d‟avoir de petits détachements de 
troupes régulières, de Cavalerie, ou des Gendarmes à Cheval, sur lesquels on puisse 
compter, disperses dans les differents districts et qu‟on rendrait responsable pour 
empêcher ces actes de violence. Ils doivent faire la ronde dans les villages, obtenir les 
informations nécessaires, et pour sciore ? tous les coupables, et avoir l‟autorité de les 
punir d‟une manière sommaire. 
 Une cause piste souffre gravement d‟un mal flagrant. 
 Il y a de grands doutes à quel point ces irréguliers pouvaient être adites à armée et 
s‟il ne voudrict ? pas mieux de les décourager d‟avancer en avenue manière, s‟il est 
possible. 
 
Appendix 42. İ. HR. 107/5272 lef 3, dated 24 March 1854. Telegraph of Namık 
Pasha from London to Istanbul via Belgrad.  
 
Londres vendredi. 
Izzet Pacha Belgrade. par Semlin.  
L'emprunt Ottoman est conclu avec la maison Rothschild au prix de quatre vingt cinq et 
six pour cent d'interet. Le premier versement se faira le trois Avril et le dernier premier 
Août. Le Gouverneur de Belgrade est prit transmettre par expresse cette nouvelle a la 
Sublime Porte en accusant même temps a Londres la réception de cette Dépêche. 
Namik Pacha  
 
Appendix 43. HR. TO. 52/60, 3 April 1854. Translation [from French into Turkish] 
of the dispatch of Musurus to Reshid Pasha. On the declaration of war by Britain 
and the loan. 
 
Londra sefiri Kostaki Bey [Musurus] tarafından Reşid Paşa'ya takdim olunan arizanın 
tercümesi. İngiltere'nin ilan-ı harb etmesi. İstikraz. 
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Rusya aleyhine ilan-ı muharebeye dair kraliçenin nutuk-ı resmisine cevaben tazim 
olunan mahzar Ģehr-i Martın otuzbirinde parlamentonun iki meclisinde dahi ittihad-ı ârâ 
[2] ile kabul ve tasdik olunduğu cihetle bugün mezkur iki meclisin kaffe-i azası saraya 
gidip takdim edeceklerdir. ĠĢbu hal mahzar-ı mezkurun [3] fevkalade kesb ettiği 
ehemmiyeti müsbit olmağla Ģehr-i mezkurun otuzbirinde parlamentoda vuku bulan 
müzakeratın zabtını havi bazı evrakı leffen [4] takdim ile kesb-i mübahat kılınmıĢdır. 
Parlamentonun muhalifin takımı yevm-i mezkurda harbin ilanını tamamıyla kabul ve 
tahsin eylemiĢ iseler de muhaberat [5] ve mükalematın ibtidasında kabinetonun 
muamele-i mütereddidanesine bazı mertebe itiraz etmiĢlerdir. Rusyalunun Tuna'dan 
mürur ile Dobruca kazasına [6] duhulü üzerine burada dürlü dürlü tevilat cereyan edip 
ez cümle saltanat-ı seniye hayırhahları ve gerek fünun-ı askeriyeye vakıf olan zevat [7] 
iĢbu hareketin Rusya ordusu hakkında netayic-i vahimeyi davet edeceğini istidlal 
eylemektedir. Viyana kabinetosu malum olduğu üzere Avusturya devletinin [8] beka-i 
usul-i bitarafiyesi Rusyaluların Tuna'yı geçmekten ictinab eylemelerine muhtaç ve 
mütevakıf olduğunu beyan eylediğinden zikr olunan kabinetonun bu vukuat [9] üzerine 
kesb edeceği heyet cümlenin matah-ı nazar-ı itinası olmuĢtur. Bazı karain-i haliyeye 
nazaran Viyana ve Berlin kabinetoları ahval-i hazırada [10] Almanya hükümat-ı 
müttefikası meclisiyle müttehiden ihtiyar edecekleri meslek-i politikaya karar vermek 
üzere Ģimdiki halde birbirleriyle icray-ı muhabere ve mükaleme eylemek [11] ve 
meslek-i matluba karar verildiği gibi kendi menafi-i müĢterekelerine aid olan avarız-ı 
melhuzanın vukuu halinde baĢka baĢka nasıl ve ne vechile hareket edeceklerini [12] 
tayin etmek içün düvel-i erbaa taraflarından Viyana'da bir mazbata tanzimi lakırdısı 
deveran etmekte ise de bu babda malumat-ı sahiha henüz kesb-i ıtla [13] olunamamıĢtır. 
Ġstikrazımızın emr-i icrasına müĢkilat-ı adide arız olduğundan istikraz-ı mezkurun 
temami-i icrasıyla hitamında iade etmek üzere [14] Fransa devleti gibi tarafımıza itası 
mültemis olan on milyon frank maddesine muvafakat olunmasının eĢedd-i lüzum ve 
ehemmiyeti üzerine Lord Clarendon [15] nezdinde ısrar eylemekliğim lazım gelmekle 
Lord-ı mumaileyh iĢbu maddeyi ministrolar meclisine arz ile beraber tervic edeceğini 
vadetmiĢ ise de ne çare ki [16] meclis-i mezkurun kararı memul-i acizaneme tevafuk 
etmeyip Ģöyle ki Lord Clarendon Ġngiltere konstitüsyonu iktizasınca parlamentonun 
rızası [17] istihsal olunmadıkça hiçbir iane-i nakdiye icra olunamayacağı cihetle madde-
i mültemis parlamentoya arz ve beyan olunsa kabinetonun muhalifin takımı [18] bunu 
tasib edeceğinden madde-i mezkureye red ile cevab verilmesi ve istikrazın Mösyö 
Rothschild ile mukavele olunandan dunca bir baha [19] ile icrasına gayret olunması 
üzerine vükelanın müttehid ül rey olduğunu serd ve ityan ve Mösyö Rothschild dahi 
Ġngiltere ministrolarının [20] bizim istikraza hiç bir guna kefalet etmek veyahud 
istenilen on milyon frankı vermek istemediğini ve Devlet-i Aliye'ye iane etmekliğin 
çare [21] ve tedbiri istikrazın halk tarafından kabul olunabilecek Ģerait ile icrası 
olduğunu ifade ve beyan eylemiĢtir. Bizim istikraza [22] kefalet olunması sözü hiçbir 
vechile ima bile etmediğim halde Ġngiltere kabinetosunun bu kefaletten istinkaf etmesi 
rey-i acizaneme göre mucib-i esef olacak mevaddan olmayıp bilakis Saltanat-ı Seniye 
[23] Avrupa'da icray-i istikraz etmek içün düvel-i ecnebiyenin kefaletine maazallah 
müracaat etmeğe mecbur olsa keyfiyet-i mezkure cay-i teessüf olur idi. [24] Çünkü o 
halde Devlet-i Aliye'nin itibarı Yunan hükümeti gibi devletler derecesine tenzil etmesi 
ve bir kefalet-i ecnebiye olmadıkça istikrazat-ı Osmaniyenin icrası [25] bundan böyle 
kesb-i suubet etmesi ve belki bütün bütün muhal olması velhasıl malum-ı dakik-i mlr?-
fehm-i hidivileri buyurulduğu üzere Devlet-i Aliye'ce [26] bir takım mehazir-i 
külliyenin vücuda Ģita ile kesb-i vücud eylemesi lazım gelür. Ġki üç mah mukaddem 
istikrazımızı muahharen Mösyö Rothschild ile tayin olunan [27] Ģeraitten faidelü Ģurut 
ile bila kefalet-i ecnebiye icra edebileceğimize mülazemet-i acizanem hasıl olmuĢ ve 
vakıa Ģimdiki halde bu surete muvafık [28] olunamamıĢ ise de müsait bir vesile 
zuhurunda yine bila kefalet-i ecnebiye Mösyö Rothschild ile karargir olan Ģerait 
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veyahud daha biraz faidelü suretle [29] istikraz maddesini icra edebileceğimizi memul 
etmekte olduğumdan istikrazımızın halk tarafından kabul olunamayacak Ģerait ile arz ve 
teklif olunması [30] adem-i icrasına sebeb irae olunarak bunun icrasını istihsal etmek 
içün bahasının tenzili hususunun lazım geldiğine dair Ġngiltere kabinetosunun vaki olan 
[31] ifadesini cerh etmek üzere eğer bizim istikrazımızın Ģeraiti makbul ve muteber 
olmamıĢ olsa ilanı gününde bir milyon üçyüz bin lira isterlin kadar müĢteri zuhur etmez 
[32] ve bahası dahi yüzde iki fazla bulmaz idi ve bundan baĢka Mösyö Rothschild'in bu 
misillü mesalihe vukuf-ı kamili olduğu cihetle mumaileyh bizim istikrazımızı kendi 
[33] üzerine almaz idi. Lakin halkın iĢbu temayülat-ı hayriyesinin  bir gün sonra tağyir 
etmesi Rusya imparatoru tarafından zuhur eden cevab-ı reddin ilan-ı harbin [34] 
vukuunu müstelzem olmasına mebni olduğundan eğer bu cevab-ı red haberi beĢ gün 
sonra vürud etse veyahud Mösyö Rothschild ile mukavelemiz beĢ gün [35] evvel vuku 
bulmuĢ olsa istikrazımızın icra olunmuĢ olacağı ve Ģeraiti halkça düvel-i saire 
istikrazatından ziyade faidelü olan iĢbu istikrazımızın [36] adem-i icrasının asıl sebebi 
kaffe-i istikrazat-ı düveliye tahvilatının ilan-ı harb vukuundan dolayı pek çok tenzil 
etmiĢ idüği aĢikardır. Fi-l-hakika Ġngiltere'de efradın sermaye-i mevcudesi ale-t-tevali 
tahvilat-ı istikraziye üzerinde olduğu cihetle Ġngiltere halkının bundan gayrı boĢta 
akçesi hiçbir vakitte [38] kalmadığından bizim istikrazımız daha faidelüdür deyü 
tahvilatımızı mübayaa etmeğe talib olanlar mutasarrıf olduğu evrak-ı saire-i 
istikraziyeyi biz-zarur [39] elden çıkarmağa mecbur olup lakin evrak-ı mezkurenin 
rayici Ģimdiki halde pek tenzil edildiğinden istikraz-ı Osmaniyenin teminat-ı 
melhuzasıyla [40] kapanamıyacak bir zarar-ı külli ihtiyar etmedikçe evrak-ı mezkureyi 
bey' ve füruht edemiyecekleri derkardır. ĠĢte bu keyfiyet ashab-ı sermayeyi tebrid [41] 
etmeğe sebeb-i müstakil olduğundan el haleti hazihi istikrazın Ģerait-i vakıası halka 
daha ziyade faidelü surete idhal olunsa bile keyfiyet-i muharrere baki oldukça [42] 
Mösyö Rothschild'in ifade-i musaddıkasına göre yine istikrazın icrası mümkün 
olamıyacağı bi-iĢtibahdır. ġimdiki halde istikraz-ı Osmani her ne kadar [43] icra 
olunamamıĢ ise de mevaki-i muharebe ve Kara Deniz veyahud bahr-i Baltık'tan ümid ve 
temenni ettiğim vechile havadis-i hayriye zuhur ettiği veyahud Avusturya devletinin 
düvel-i garbiye lehinde daha bir kararlu heyet kesb ettiğine teminat geldiği anda ashab-ı 
sermayeye dahi cesaret gelerek tahvilat-ı [45] istikraziyenin ve hususiyle Ġngiltere 
devleti tahvilatının rayici tekessür edeceği cihetle bunlar ehvence zarar ile elden 
çıkarılabildikçe bizim [46] tahvilatımızın tervici kesb-i suhulet edeceğinden istikraz-ı 
Osmaniyenin icrası ol halde bila kefalet-i ecnebiye Mösyö Rothschild ile mukavele [47] 
olunan Ģerait veyahud daha biraz fark ile mümkün olacağı derkar olup lakin devletlu 
Namık PaĢa bendeleri bu akĢam Paris'e azimet edeceğinden Ģu adem-i muvafakiyetimiz 
[48] üzerine üç dört hafta daha Londra'da meks ü ikamet etmeği tansib buyurduğundan 
dolayı beyan-ı esef ederim. Her nasıl ise Mösyö Rothschild'in [49] vaadine nazaran 
istikrazatın Ģeraiti halkça faidelü olacak surette tağyir olunsa dahi imkan-ı icrası temin 
olunamayacağına binaen talimat-ı seniye-i [50] nezaretpenahilerine bila muttasıl on 
milyon frankı koparmak üzere Lord Clarendon nezdinde ısrara devam edeceğim ifadesi 
hakpay-i [51] ali-i hıdivilerine derkar olan ubudiyet-i kamile ve kadimemin ibraz-ı 
teminat-ı mükerreresine vesile-i hüsn ittihaz olunmuĢdur. 
 
Appendix 44. İ. HR. 108/5309, dated 5 Receb 1270 (4 April 1854). From Namık 
Pasha in London to Reshid Pasha on the loan. 
 
Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki 
 
Rothschild marifetiyle açılan istikraz-ı nakit Londra‟da bir milyon yüz bin liraya kadar 
talipleri tarafından yazılıp Paris‟de ne miktar mebaliğe yazılmıĢ oldukları bilinememiĢ 
ve görünüĢe göre istikrazın husulüne sekte gelmiĢ idüğünden Ġngiltere ve Fransa devlet-
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leri tarafından muavenet eylemeleri lazım geleceği geçen posta ile takdim-i hakpay-i 
ali-i nezaretpenahileri kılınan ariza-i çakeride arz ve beyan olunmuĢ idi. Paris‟deki 
Rothschild‟in oğlu mahsusen Londra‟ya gelip ifadesine göre Paris‟de kimse yazılmamıĢ 
olduğu haber alınmıĢ ve Londra‟da yazılan ademlerin ekserisi dahi akçeyi tedarik edip 
veremiyen takımdan olup Ģu halde Ġngiltere ve Fransa devletlerinin kefaleti olmadıkça 
istikrazın husulü muhal görünmüĢ olduğunu mumaileyh Rothschild Ġngiltere devleti 
hariciye nazırı Lord Clarendon ile Fransa elçisine ifade eyleyip keyfiyeti savb-ı 
çakeraneme dahi haber vermiĢ ve bu babda henüz bir guna sened dahi imza olunmamıĢ 
ve kefalet talebine memuriyetim olmadığından ve mahzuru dahi aĢikar idüğünden 
muavenetlerini talep eylemek ve hususuyla matlub buyurulan on milyon frankın 
isbaline ikdam eylemeleri iltimas olunmak üzere Kostaki Musuruz [sic] Bey bende-
leriyle birlikte nazır-ı müĢarünileyhe gidilip istikraza ne suretle sekte geldiği ve Devlet-i 
Aliye‟ye Ģu esnada muharebede akçenin Ģiddet-i lüzumu derkar olup istikrazın husulüne 
muavenetleriyle beraber matlub buyurulan meblağ-ı mezburun irsaline himmet eyleme-
leri ehemm idüğü bil-etraf beyan olundukta bazı mertebe müĢkilat beyan eyledikten 
sonra “ġimdi meclis-i meĢverete gideceğim ve keyfiyeti dahi arz edeceğim bu akĢam 
bize meduvv olduğunuz cihetle teĢrif edersiniz ne suretle karar verilür ise size haber 
veririm” demiĢ ve ol akĢam nazır-ı müĢarünileyhin hanesine gidildikte “Siz istikrazı 
bunca vakit süründürüp yapmadınız ve Ģimdi dahi pek bahalu yaptığınızdan kimesne 
rağbet edip almadı. ġimdi biz muharip olduğumuz ecilden bunca mesarif-i la-yuhsaya 
duçar olup halkın vergisini arttırdık ve siz akçeyi bunca nabeca mahallere sarf-ı itlaf 
edeyorsunuz Ģimdi biz halktan virgü alıp da size para vermek veyahud kefalet etmek 
gibi Ģeyleri parlamentoya arz edecek olsak bir vechile kabul etmezler ve diyecekleri 
kelamlara cevap bulup söylemekten aciz kalıruz bunu yapmak bize muhaldir ne bir akçe 
vere-bilirüz ve ne de kefalet ederiz nasıl bilür iseniz öylece ediniz” deyü katice ve 
kavice menhurane cevap verdikte Ģu istikraza konulan fiyat halka pek ucuz ve Devlet-i 
Aliyye‟ye pek bahalu ve herkes dahi pek talip ise de sair istikrazları bahaları ziyadesiyle 
tenzil etmiĢ ve herkes yedinde bulunan istikrazı satıp akçe tedarikiyle bunu almak lazım 
gelmiĢ ve bu da ahval-i haliyeden iktiza eylemiĢ bir keyfiyet idüğünden esna-i muhare-
bede Devlet-i Aliye‟ye akçenin Ģiddet-i lüzumu ve müttefiklerinin bu babda dahi 
muavenetleri ehemm idüğüni tekrar bahs olunarak bu vechile cevabları nareva idüği bil-
etraf beyan olunmuĢ ise de asla tesiri görülemedikte çakerleri bu halde burada ikametim 
bihude idüği ve bir ayak evvel Paris‟e avdet ile bir çare aramak ve orada da bir Ģey 
yapılamadığı halde Dersaadet‟e ricatle keyfiyeti beyan eylemem lazım geleceği ifade 
olundukta bizden bu babda bir Ģey memul etmeyiniz ve bir ayak evvel Dersaadet‟e gidip 
keyfiyeti beyan ediniz deyü cevap vermiĢ ve Lord Palmerston dahi sonradan oraya gelip 
anınla dahi söyleĢdikte anın dahi ifadesi diğerine mutabık bulunmuĢ ve ertesi gün de 
Musuruz Bey cenablarıyla Palmerston‟un hanesine gidilip istikrazın husulüne ve matlup 
buyurulan mebaliğin ita olunması ehemmiyetine dair iki saat kadar bahs olunmuĢ ise de 
siz devletinizin varidatını yolsuz cem edip nice yolsuz ve lüzumsuz Ģeylere sarf ile itlaf 
ettiğinizi Ġngiltere halkının kaffesi bilür iken anlardan cem ve tahsil olunan maldan 
tavizen size akçe vermek veyahud kefalet etmek bize göre muhaldir ve yelli denizi 
içmek [geçmek?] daha kolaydır. Eğer size akçe lazım ise halk akçelerini elli ve altmıĢ 
yüze ve yüzde yedi sekiz faizi isterler nasıl ırza edebilür iseniz ol vechile istikraz edin 
deyü kesdirme cevab vermiĢ ve bu babda pek çok Ģeyler taraf-ı çakeriden ve Musuruz 
Bey tarafından söylenmiĢ ise de yine bildiğinden ĢaĢmamıĢ ve bankir Rothschild‟in 
savb-ı çakeriye yazmıĢ olduğu mektubun leffen takdim-i hakpay-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri 
kılınan sureti mütalaasından malum buyurulacağı vechile Ģu aralık her ne fiyata olur ise 
olsun istikrazın husulü muhal görünmüĢ ve vakt-i müsaidin hululü na-malum olup 
mutarassıdan bihude burada ikamet etmek ve birtakım maaĢ ve mahiye alarak mesarife 
bais olmaktan ise Paris‟e avdet eylemek ve orada bir Ģey yapmak mümkün ise icra-i 
iktizasına bakmak ve olmadığı halde doğruca Dersaadet‟e azimet eylemek üzere tarih-i 
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ariza-i çakeranem günü Londra‟dan hareket olunmuĢ ve Ģu aralık böyle altından 
kalkılmaz mertebe nemalı ve fiyatlu bir istikraz etmekten ise kavaim-i nakdiyeyi 
çoğaltıp dahil-i memalik-i mahruse-i Ģahanede cereyanına ruhsat ita buyurulmak ve 
vakit müsaid olduğu vakitte ehven fiyat ile Avrupa‟dan külliyetlü istikraz alınıp ol vakit 
kavaim-i mezbureyi toplatmaktan baĢka çare maa-el huzur hatıra gelmemiĢ idüği 
muhat-ilm-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri buyuruldukta ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman 
hazret-i men leh ül emrindir. Fi 5 Receb 70.  
[Sealed] Mehmed Namık 
 
Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki 
Rothschild'in mektubu sureti leffen takdim olunduğu metn-i ariza-i çakeride tahrir 
bulunmuĢ ise de sureti çıkarılması yetiĢtirilememiĢ olduğundan hafta-i atide takdim 
kılınacağı muhat-ilm-i ali-i nezaretpenahileri buyuruldukta ol babda ve her halde emr ü 
ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir.  
 
Appendix 45. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 44, dated 22 April 1854. Extract from a British 
consular report from Monastir on banditry. 
 
Ġngiltere sefaretine 1854 senesi Nisan‟ının yigirmi ikisi tarihiyle müverrehan Manastır 
tarafından tevarüd eden tahriratdan müstehrec bir bendin suret-i tercümesidir. 
 
BeĢ Kuyular nam mevki-i mersumun hala eĢkıya tasarrufunda olduğu Yanya canibinden 
ahz olunan havadis-i ahireden istibraz [?] olunmuĢtur. Abdi PaĢa mevki-i mezkur 
üzerine hücum etmek üzere bulunup zabt ü istilasına muvafık olur ise fesad u ihtilal o 
semtlerden bütün bütün bertaraf olunmuĢ olacaktır. Lakin YeniĢehir sancağında ahval-i 
cariye pek de memnun olacak vechile ilerülemekte olmayıp Selanik‟den muahharen 
gelen posta ile alınan havadise nazaran üç bin kadar Rum Kasandra ile Aynaroz 
meyanında vaki Sakya nam mahalle çıkmıĢlardır. Mahall-i mezkur civarında pek çok 
ahali-i Hıristiyan bulunduğu cihetle bazı rivayete göre bunlar isyan etmekten istinkaf 
etmiĢler ise de nihayet-i emrde tuğyan etmeğe mecbur olacakları havf olunmaktadır. 
ĠĢbu eĢkıyanın takarrüb etmekte olması Selanik Ģehrinin Ġslam ahalisinin zihnini muha-
tarayı davet eyleyecek surette tahrik eylemiĢdir. ĠĢbu tahrikat birtakım kura [?] ve 
meclis azasından bazıları tarafından tervic ve teĢvik olunmaktadır. Selanik valisi ise 
asayiĢ-i hali hıfz u sıyanet eylemek zımnında tahsin olunacak cihetle bezl-i ikdam ve 
gayret etmektedir.  
 
Appendix 46. HR. SYS. 904/1 lef 215-216. Redcliffe’s instructions to Stephen 
Pisani. Pera, May 14
th
: 1854. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 You have already by my direction apprized the Ottoman ministers, verbally, of the 
afflicting intelligence received from Salonica. Although the letter which I instructed you 
to shew them, contained the leading circumstances of a massacre, as wanton as it was 
barbarous, yet, as  it came from a private source, I confined myself for the moment to a 
general expression of my sentiments both as to the fact and as to the redress to be 
expected. I am now in possession of the official report from H. M. Acting Consul at 
Salonica, and you will lose no time in placing it under the eyes of Reshid Pasha with a 
request that it may be submitted forthwith to the Council, and also to His Majesty the 
Sultan. His Highness will find in Mr. Razy‟s dispatch an ample confirmation of the 
massacre previously denounced to him. The discrepancies of detail are few and 
unimportant. We have in both reports the butchery without provocation or resistance, of 
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about thirty Christians, more than twenty of whom were primates of district, by a band 
of irregular troops, or Bashee-Bozooks, summoned from Salonica to protect them 
against the Hellenic marauders, who had vainly endeavoured to seduce them from 
allegiance, and acting by command of two Turkish leaders, whose names are given 
identically in both accounts. 
 No words of horror and indignation, however natural, no cries for vengeance, 
however just, can give any additional weight to simple statement of facts like these. We 
have at once in view of the cruel, cowardly, calculated butchers, together with the 
innocent, unarmed, unsuspecting victims, - the former betraying the honor of their 
Sovereign, the latter sacrificed by their submission to his authority. In every heart not 
rendered callous by brutal passion or senseless fanaticism there is what calls for 
judgement on the one and sympathy with the other. I will not insult the Turkish 
Ministers by supposing it otherwise with them. Indeed I am assured by you that they are 
alive to the requirements of justice in this case, and to the obligation of punishing with 
exemplary rigour an outrage which is no less treasonable towards the Porte, than 
disgraceful to humanity, and ruinous to the Empire. It is enough therefore, I hope for me 
to repeat … 
 
Appendix 47. İ. DH. 18893 lef 1, dated 19 Şaban 1270 (17 May 1854). Finance 
Minister Musa Safveti Pasha to Grand Vizier Mustafa Naili Pasha on the financial 
situation. 
 
Maruz çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Malum-ı ali-i sadaret-penahileri buyurulduğu vechile maliye hazine-i celilesinin biraz 
senelerden berü varidat ve mesarif-i asliyesi muvazin olamayıp külli açığı görünmesiyle 
bu babda tedabir-i icabiyeye sarf-ı efkar [2] buyurulmakta olduğu halde mesele-i hazıra 
zuhuratından naĢi altmıĢ dokuz senesi Eylül‟ü nihayetine [12.10.1853] kadar varidat-ı 
asliye tahsilatının üç yüz bin kiseden ziyadesi nakden ve havaleten mesarif-i 
fevkaladeye verilmiĢ [3] ve muahharen mesarif-i fevkalade içün alınacak mebaliğden 
yerine konulmak üzere açılan yüz bin kiselik kavaim-i nakdiye dahi yine mesarif-i 
fevkalade içün tahsis ve ita olunarak ardı alınmıĢ olduğundan sal-i hal varidatına destres 
olununcaya ve Avrupa‟dan tedarik olunacak akçe vürud edinceye kadar sene-i mezbure 
TeĢrin-i Evvel‟i ibtidasından [13.10.1853] ġubat‟ı gayetine [12.3.1854] değin beĢ mah 
müddette muvazeneye tatbikan tahmin olunan mesarif-i asliyeden taĢra emvalinden itası 
mukarrer olan [5] ve sal-i hale tehirinde beis olmayan bazı Ģeyler aĢağı varıldıktan sonra 
küsur-ı kabil-i tehir olamayan mesarif üç yüz bin kiseye ve Bağdad ve eyalet-i Berr-i 
ġam misillu varidatı mesarifiyle mahdud [6] ve havalat ile mesdud olan mahallerden 
maada eyalat ve elviye ile Dersaadet‟ce olan varidatın sinin-i sabıka bakayası ve altmıĢ 
dokuz senesi emvalinden tahsilat ve mesarif-i mahalliye ve mürettebat-ı sabıka-i 
askeriye ile mesele-i mezbureye dair [7] fevkalade mesarif içün olunan havalat bit-tenzil 
maadasıyla iane-i umumiye bakayası olarak matlub-ı hazine görünen yedi yüz altmıĢ üç 
bin bu kadar kise meyanında altmıĢ dokuz senesi gayetine [12.3.1854] kadar sarrafan‟ın 
[8] hazinece taahhütlerinde bulunan varidat-ı bedelatdan ve sinin-i sabıka zimmetiyle 
mevadd-ı saireden tahsili ve Cezayir ile Anadolu canibinden vürudu memul olan 
mebaliğ dahi yüz yetmiĢ yedi bin Ģu kadar kiseye baliğ [9] olarak maadasının tahsili 
vakte ve ikdamat-ı kamileye muhtaç olması ve o da hazinenin düyun-ı mevcude-i 
külliyesinin karĢuluğu bulunması cihetle Dersaadet‟ce olanların mensub oldukları 
zevat-ı kiram [10] ve hazain-i Ģahane ve taĢrada bulunanların tanzim olunan talimata 
tevfikan mahalli memurları marifetiyle bir tarafdan tahsiline fevk-al-gaye ikdam ve 
ihtimam olunmak üzere ber minval-i muharrer husul ve vürudu [11] memul olan yüz 
yetmiĢ yedi bin Ģu kadar kise kabil-i tehir olamayan üç yüz bin kise ile bil-muvazene 
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daha ihtiyaç görünen yüz yigirmi iki bin bu kadar kisenin Ģehriyesi yigirmi beĢer bin 
kise [12] itibarıyla beĢ aylığı birden olmazsa da Avrupa‟dan celbi musammem olan 
akçenin vusulüne değin üç aylığı ve hiç olmaz ise iki aylığı mikdarı olan elli bin kisenin 
dahi çaresine [13] bakılması ol zaman hazine-i celilede bazı vükela-i fiham ve 
memurin-i hazineden teĢkil olunan komisyon-ı muvakkatta bit-tezkir ol babda tanzim ve 
takdim olunan mazbata Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükela‟da dahi bil-mütalaa [14] küsur-ı 
bakayanın ol vechile bil-ittifak bir tarafdan tahsiline ikdam ve gayretle beraber Ģu açık 
görünen yüz yigirmi bin kise içün mümkün olunabildiği mikdar mebaliğin marifet-i 
acizanemle tedariki bit-tensib [15] irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı ĢehinĢahi dahi ol vechile 
Ģerefsunuh buyurularak saye-i imkan-vaye-i cenab-ı mülukanede Mısır‟ın yetmiĢ senesi 
virgü-i aslisi karĢılık ittihazıyla bazı tüccar ve sarrafandan altmıĢ [16] dört bin Ģu kadar 
kise ve muahharen mesarif-i fevkalade içün Ġzmir ve Aydın ve sair elviye-i 
mütecavirenin sinin-i sabıka bakayası ile sal-i hal emvalinden sarf-ı fazla olarak 
hazineye gönderilecek akçenin tesviye-i havalesiyle [17] Baltacı Todoraki bazergandan 
yigirmi bin kise akçe ki ceman seksen dört bin kise akçe alınarak bunlardan ve 
hazinenin beyan olunduğu vechile husul-i vürudu memul olan varidatıyla bakaya-i 
saireden [18] vukua gelen tahsilat ile saye-i muvaffakiyetvaye-i hazret-i padiĢahide 
ġubat gayetine kadar beĢ ay müddetle Ģimdiye değin iki ay ki tam yedi ay mesarif-i 
asliye-i hazine rüyet ve tesviye olunduktan sonra mesarif-i [19] fevkaladeye dahi pek 
külli akçe verilmiĢ ve bundan böyle bir iki maha kadar ikdamat ve tasarrufat-ı kamile 
iltizamıyla bazı bakaya ve zimem tahsilatından ve esham-ı kadimeden bazı cihetle 
mümtaz olarak yüzde on faiz verilmek üzere küĢad olunup tab‟ olunmakta olan altmıĢ 
bin kiselik esham-ı cedideden ve saireden uyuĢdurularak mehma emken idare olunması 
kuvve-i tali‟-i ferhunde-metali‟-i cenab-ı mülukane icab-ı alisi ma-la-nihaye-i 
sübhaniyeden memul ve muntazır [21] bulunmuĢ ise de beyandan müstağni olduğu 
vechile karar-ı mezburdan berü rabbim mezdad ve feravan eylesün kuvve-i askeriye ve 
tedarikat-ı harbiye an be an tezaid ve terakki ederek orduy-i hümayunlar ve mevaki-i 
saire-i [22] askeriye dairesinde eyalat ve elviye varidatı kaffeten oraların cemiyet-i 
askeriye ve mesarif-i istihkamiyelerine münhasır ve muahharan Yanya ve Tırhala 
sancaklarıyla civarı bazı mahaller dahi kesb-i nezaket ederek [23] mürettebatı iliĢik 
peyda eylediğinden mesarifat-ı mahalliye ve mesarif-i cedide-i zaruriyelerinin canib-i 
hazineden ianeye ihtiyaçları zahir olarak ve eyalat ve elviye-i saire varidatı emvali 
mesarif-i mahalliye [24] ve mürettebat-ı askeriye ve havalat-ı mühimme-i saire ile ve 
Ġzmir ve Aydın ve elviye-i saire-i mütecavire fazla-i varidatıyla Mısır‟ın virgü-i aslisi 
dahi salif-üz zikr alınan akçelerle mesdud bulunarak devletlu Namık PaĢa [25] hazretleri 
de bu defa Avrupa‟dan bir Ģey tedarik edemeyerek tehi-dest avdet etmiĢ ve buraca 
Avrupa‟dan akçe alınmasının imkanı meçhul bulunmuĢ olduğundan mehma emken 
idare memul olan Ģu iki ayın [26] hitamında artık mesarif-i asliye ve fevkaladeye 
hazinece vaki olan gayret ve ikdamatın bir semere husulü memul olamayıp be-heme-hal 
Avrupa‟dan sürat-i tedarik ve celbine Ģiddet-i ihtiyaç [27] görünen külliyetlu akçenin 
Ģimdiden bil-mütalaa tedabir-i lazıme ve acilesinin serian icrası himem-i celile-i 
sadaretpenahilerine mütevakıf olarak ber mukteza-i memuriyet ve ubudiyet sonra hakk-ı 
abidanemde [28] bir guna mesuliyete mahal kalmamak üzere bil-mecburiye iĢte 
Ģimdiden ihtar ve beyan-ı hakikat-ı hale ibtidar kılınmıĢ olmağla ol babda ve her halde 
emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 19 ġ 70. 
[signed] Safveti  
 
Appendix 48. HR. TO. 418/259, dated 6 June 1854. Translation of Black and 
Durand’s letter submitted to the minister of finance.  
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1854 senesi Haziran'ının altısı tarihiyle müverrehan Mösyö Durand ve Mösyö Black 
taraflarından istikraz maddesine dair vaki olan bazı mütalaatın müsveddesi 
tercümesidir. 
 
Muharrer ül-imza Mösyö Black ve Mösyö Durand Avrupa'ya giderek tanzim ve icrasına 
memur oldukları istikraz maddesinde Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin mesarifatını mümkün 
mertebe taklil etmek arzusunda bulunduklarından Maliye Nazırı ve Reis-i Meclis-i 
Vâlâ-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye devletlu paĢalar hazeratı taraflarından vaki olan teklif üzerine 
istikraza destres oldukları halde komisyonlarını ati-ül beyan mikdara göre tayin ve 
tanzim eylemeğe razı olmuĢlardır. ġöyle ki evvela eğer istikraz yüzde yetmiĢ beĢ 
hesabıyla icra olunur ise mumaileyhima komisyonları içün iĢbu istikrazın yekunu 
üzerinden yüzde yarım demek olup cem'an on yedi bin beĢ yüz lira isterlinden ibaret 
olan meblağı ahz etmekle iktifa edeceklerdir. Saniyen istikraz yüzde seksen hesabıyla 
icra olunduğu halde bu surette Devlet-i Aliyye'ye yüz yetmiĢ beĢ bin lira isterlin kar ve 
faide olacağından mumaileyhima yirmi iki bin lira komisyon alacaklar ve bu ise yüzde 
seksen [sekize?] beĢ demektir. Salisen istikraz yüzde seksen beĢ hesabıyla icra 
olunduğu takdirde Devlet-i Aliyye'ye üç yüz elli bin lira faide hasıl olacağından 
mumaileyhima yirmi beĢ bin lira isterlin ahz edecekler ve bu ise yüzde üç rubdan dahi 
az demektir. Fakat mumaileyhima mahvel-i uhde-i memuriyetleri iĢbu istikrazı hiçbir 
suretle tanzim ve icra edemedikleri halde bunlar kendilerine harcırah olmak üzere 
burada verilecek ve istikraz icra olduğu halde komisyonlarının yekunundan tenzil 
olunacak olan yirmi beĢ bin frankdan maada mükafat namıyla hiçbir Ģey iddia 
etmeyeceklerdir. 
 
Appendix 49. HR. TO. 418/273 lef 1, dated 13 June 1854. Durand to Revelaky to 
Ali Şefik Paşa the minister of finance. On the price of the Turkish Loan. 
Translation into Turkish. 
 
Mösyö Durand tarafından 1854 senesi Haziran'ının on üçü tarihiyle müverrahan Paris 
canibinden tevarüd eden bir kıta mektubun suret-i tercümesidir. 
 
Ġstikraz-ı Osmani maddesine dair Ģehr-i Mayıs'ın otuzu tarihiyle müverrahan bir kıta 
mektubunuzu ahz eylemiĢ ve icray-ı icabı mahal olmayıp müĢkil olduğunu telgraf 
vasıtasıyla tarafınıza bildirmiĢizdir. Ahval-i adide ve ez cümle devletlu Namık PaĢa 
hazretleri Paris'de bulunan Kredi mobiliye [Credit Mobilier] nam sarraf kumpanyasının 
pek meyli olduğu halde maslahatı bitirmemesi ve sonra dahi Rothschild kumpanyasının 
fahiĢ baha ile istikrazı iltizam etmesinden naĢi ma'yub olacak vechile muvafık 
olamaması madde-i mezkureyi bozmağa medar olmuĢdur. Binaberin bu maslahatı tekrar 
canlandırmak pek müĢkil olup halkı terğib etmek içün tayin olunacak baha dun ve 
verilecek teminat pek kavi olmak lazım geleceğinden bu maddenin bil-mükatebe 
müzakeresi zann-ı acizanemize göre mümkin olmayub mezuniyet-i kamile ve vasia ile 
bir seyahat etmeği göze almalıdır. Ġstikrazın bahasına gelince, Avusturya devleti yüzde 
beĢ faiz ile otuz beĢ milyon frank yüzde yetmiĢe istikraz eylediğine nazaran Devlet-i 
Aliyye yüzde altı güzeĢte ile yüzde yetmiĢ beĢten ziyadeye istikraz edemez. Hengam-ı 
harbde akçeye muhtaç olan devletler yüzde beĢ on misillü farklara pek de itina 
edemezler. Bu kadar ağırlığın ihtiyarı elzemdir.  
 
[Submitted to the Ottoman minister of finance on 4 ġevval 1270] 
 
Appendix 50. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 41. Extract from a British consular report from 
Calabaca to ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 19 June 1854. Fuad Efendi 
defeats the Greek insurgents. 
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Calabaca, June 19
th
 1854 
 
 The division of the Turkish army commanded in person by Fuad Effendi, the 
Imperial Commissioner, and consisting of 7000 regulars and irregulars, yesterday 
defeated the forces of the forces of [sic] the Greeks and insurgents at Calabacca at three 
o‟clock P.M. The Turks marched, drums beating and colors flying, along the bed of the 
river Salymbria, into the centre of the strong positions occupied by the enemy to the 
number of 4000 and in the course of an hour the latter were flying in all directions – 
Fuad Effendi distinguished himself not only by the ability displayed in his military 
combinations and by his personal bravery, but also by his humanity in the heat of the 
action itself, bestowing rewards on such as brought him prisoners and discouraging the 
barbarous practise of decapitulation, of which I am glad to report to Your Lordship that 
there occurred only two instances. The loss of the Greeks must have amounted to more 
than 100 killed – that of the Turks to about forty and as many wounded. Five standards 
have been taken, but what the Turks prize more than any other trophies, are the four 
pieces of cannon taken from Selim Pasha, when his army, under the influence of a paine 
[?] [“dehşet-i kazibe” in official translation] was routed in this place three weeks ago. 
 
Appendix 51. HR. SYS. 1190/1 lef 49. Extract from a British consular report from 
Monastir, dated 30 June 1854. 
 
“As regards the reputation of the invading force, I believe Fuad Effendi has 
proved himself fully equal to the task, if, indeed, it be not already accomplished. 
Protection of the Christian inhabitants against the licence of the Bashi Bozuks is more 
difficult. Money is required in both Epirus and Thessaly, but the great difficulty is to get 
the local authorities to proceed with sufficient severity, or to execute the firmans of the 
Government. The time is come for making some severe examples, not only in Thessaly 
and Epirus but also in Macedonia, where the evil is making alarming progress – the 
roads are every day becoming more insecure villages are plundered and all this I cannot 
help thinking has in some measure arisen from the remissness of the authorities in 
restraining and punishing such disorders in the beginning as they should have done. 
In passing the rough Serfidje on my way hither, I learnt that excesses similar to 
those committed at Grevena had also been committed in that district villages had been 
destroyed and the cattle and effects of the Christians carried off by the Mussulmans of 
the neighbouring district of Sari Ghieul. All this had been done without any reasonable 
pretext, as the people were not in a state of insurrection. The chief of the marauders was 
a certain Ahmed Aga Mudir of Kailar.  
Among other atrocities, he had cut off the heads of several Kodja Bashis or elders, 
who were returning to their villages with “Rai – bourouldis” or letters of amnesty from 
the Pasha. The only punishment inflicted on him for his misdeeds has been his dismissal 
from his office as mudir of Kailar; and though I understand some of the cattle stolen 
from the people of Serfidje have been restored to them; many of their villages are 
reduced to ruin and starvation; and much remains to be done for the relief of the 
oppressed and the punishment of the guilty.  
 
Appendix 52. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 36, dated 10 July 1854. Lord Stratford’s 
instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani on Egypt's impediment of free 
trade. Therapia, July 10
th
 1854.  
 
 Sir 
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 Her Majesty's Government having received information from Egypt that the Pasha 
of that Province has of late allowed measures to be adopted by his officers calculated to 
impede the free trade in grain, I am instructed to inform the Porte that the system 
adopted by His Highness is clearly an infraction of the Treaty, and to request that proper 
communications may be addressed to him for his future guidance in that matter.   
 Her Majesty's Government attach much importance to a due compliance with their 
requisition, because as the supplies usually drawn from Russia, are now interrupted, it is 
extremely desirable that the trade should be unfettered in all other quarters and His 
Government are fully entitled to expect that in the dominions of the Sultan no 
unnecessary impediments shall be thrown in their way.  
 I am informed by Reshid Pasha, that the Porte, to his [sic] best of his knowledge, 
has authorized no measures in Egypt tending to monopolize the trade in grain, and 
therefore in communicating this instruction to His Highness, you will notably find too 
difficult in obtaining the adoption without delay or reserve of such measures as may be 
required to satisfy the just demand of His Government. 
 You are at liberty to leave a copy of this instruction in the Ottoman minister's 
hands, should he apply for it. 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe  
 
Appendix 53. HR. TO. 52/78, dated 5 Rebiyyülevvel 1270 (13 July 1854). From 
Musurus on the loan commission.  
 
Mösyö Black ile Mösyö Durand‟ın istikraz edecekleri akçenin sarf olunmasına nezaret 
içün bir komisyon-ı muhtelit teşkil olunması efkarından sarf-ı nazar olunmadığını havi 
Mösyö Muzurus tarafından varid olan bir kıta tahriratın tercümesi. Fi 5 Ra 70. 
 
Ġngiltere ve Fransa devletlerinin kefaletleri olmaksızın istikraz edebileceğimizi memul 
etmekteyim. Mösyö Black ile Mösyö Durand‟ın dahi mesai ve mechudatları iĢbu 
maddeye sarf olunmaktadır. Kaldı ki talimat-ı seniyye-i hazret-i nezaretpenahileri 
mucebince memurin-i mumaileyhima yed-i iktidarlarında olan kaffe-i esbab ve vesail-i 
mümkineyi istimal ettikten sonra bila vasıta istikraza destres olunmak mümkün 
olamayacağına cezm [haberim?] hasıl etmedikçe devleteyn-i müĢarünileyhimanın 
kefaletini iltimas eylemiyeceğimiz bedihi ve aĢikardır. Fakat Ġngiltere devletinin 
mebusan-ı millet kamarası tarafından mezun olmadıkça kefalet veremiyeceği ve 
parlamento meclisi ise gelecek ayın ibtidalarına doğru hitampezir olacağı cihetle devlet-
i müĢar-üm ileyha bizim bu babda olan niyet-i katiyemizi bilmeğe istical ettiğinden 
memurin-i mumaileyhimanın kaffe-i esbab-ı mezkureyi sarf içün lüzumu görünen vakti 
bulabilecekleri cay-i iĢtibahdır. Ġstikraz akçesinin sarf ve istimaline nezaret etmek içün 
bir komisyon-ı mahlut teĢkil olunması efkarını redd ve cerh zımnında vaki olan itirazat-ı 
acizanemi hakpay-i ali-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerine arz ve ifade ile kesb-i fahr etmiĢ 
idim. Fakat iĢbu nezaret ve teyakkuz usulünden bütün bütün sarf- nazar olunmadığı ve 
belki istikraz akçesinin bir miktarı tevkif olunması üzerine ısrar olunacağı maznun ve 
muhtemeldir. Eğer iĢbu ihtiyattan murad Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin bir istikraz-ı cedide 
veyahud iane-i nakdiyeye muhtaç olmaksızın gelecek sene dahi  muharebeye devam 
buyurması esbabını temin etmekten ibaret ise rey-i acizaneme göre iĢbu fart-ı ihtiyata 
riayet içün Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin namus-ı alisine daha ziyade münasip olan baĢka 
çareler bulunması mümkünatdandır. ĠĢbu çareler dahi ya Fransa‟nın istikraz-ı ahiri 
misillü istikraz-ı mezkurun  teslimat-ı ahiresinin coste coste ve bir müddet-i medide icra 
olunmasından veyahud beĢ milyon lira  isterlinden ibaret olan istikrazın yalnız bir 
miktarı Ģimdilik ahz u kabz olunarak iĢbu mebaliğin bakiyesi bir istikraz-ı cedid ile 
tahsil olunmaktan ibaret bulunmuĢtur. Her nasıl ise kaffe-i Ģurut nezaret ve teyakkuz 
talimat-ı seniyye-i hazret-i nezaretpenahilerinin haricinde bulunduğundan ve Paris ve 
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Londra‟da mukim Devlet-i Aliyye sefaretleri dahi Saltanat-ı Seniyye canibinden bir izin 
ve ruhsat-ı mahsusa olunmadıkça Ģerait-i mezkureyi  kabul edemiyeceklerinden 
devleteyn-i müĢarünileyhimanın kefaletini iltimasa kendimizi mecbur göreceğimiz 
halde ana göre tazyik-i hareket edebilmemiz içün bu babda talimat-ı mukteziyenin taraf-
ı acizanemize irsal buyurulması menut-ı rey-i zerrin-i hazret-i nezaretpenahileri idüği 
beyanıyla zat-ı ubbehesimat-ı hidivilerine derkar olan ubudiyyet-i amikamın arz ve 
ibrazına teamül?-i vesile ittihaz kılınmıĢtır. 
 
Appendix 54. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 21-22, dated 8 August 1854. Raglan to Redcliffe. 
From Varna. On the complaint of the vali of Varna on British troops forcibly 
taking corn in villages of Varna 
 
 My Lord 
 
 In consequence of the accompanying complaint from the civil Pasha of Varna, in 
which it is stated that some corn cut by the inhabitants of the village of Sumbey had 
been forcibly taken by Her Majesty's troops and paid for at a price infinitely below the 
value, I directed Lieut. General the Duke of Cambridge to make inquiry into the matter. 
 ... 
 ... unwillingness manifested by the Bulgarian Peasantry to bring supplies into our 
camp arises from their having received notice not to sell their grain or forage to either 
English or French troops lest there should be none left for the Turkish army... [After 
protesting this] I deem the Ottoman Government most fortunate in having to deal with 
an ally who is willing to pay for that which is provided. [Arpa fiyatından hiç söz 
etmiyor, ardından daha önemli bulduğu konuya giriyor] 
 ... the monstrous treatment of the Bulgarian population by the robbers who live in 
the Turkish villages and by the Bashi Bozouks.  
 
Appendix 55. İ. HR. 113/5512 lef 2, dated 16 August 1854. Musurus to Reşid Pasha 
via telegraph to İzzet Pasha in Belgrad. Loan. 
 
Deutsch-Österreichischer Telegraphen-Verein 
Station Simlin 
 
A Son Excellence Izzet Gouverneur général a Belgrade 
 
Londres à 16 Août 1854 a 9 heures et quart du soir 
 
Le ministre de la Sublime Porte a Londres. Je pris Votre Excellence de transmettre 
immédiatement par courrier extraordinaire a Son Excellence Rechid Pacha la présent 
dépêche par la quelle j'annonce positivement a son Altesse que notre emprunt a 
complètement réussie au taux de quatre vingt a six pour cent de intérêt sans la garantie 
des deux Gouvernements. 
 
C. J. Mousurus 
 
Appendix 56. HR. TO. 220/45, dated 29 August 1854. Redcliffe’s instructions to 
head dragoman Pisani to be read to Reşid Pasha. On the sale of women and 
children taken from the Christian population of Georgia, and the revival of a 
traffic in slaves from among the Mahometan population of Circassia. Therapia. 
August 29
th
 1854. 
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 Sir, 
 
 I have heard with feelings of painful concern that the retirement of the Russians 
from certain parts of Circassia, and the irruption of the Turkish Forces last year into 
Georgia, have been attended with consequences which tarnish the brightness of military 
success, and diminish the satisfaction to be derived from the Sultan's triumphs in a just 
cause. The circumstances, to which I allude are the sale of women and children taken 
from the Christian population of Georgia, and the revival of a traffic in slaves from 
among the Mahometan population of Circassia. It is well known that such acts with 
respect to Christians have none but a religious justification in the eyes of a Mussulman, 
and even this uncertain plea extends not to children of tender age. It is also notorious 
that to enslave a Mahometan is illegal in any country where the creed of Mahomet 
prevails. Notwithstanding these unquestionable truths, one kind of slavery insulting to 
Christians, and another condemned by Mahometans, - both being a scandal to humanity, 
- have been of late revived, and are now practised with impunity by the Sultan's 
subjects, at the very seat of Government. Worse than all this, the renewal of atrocities, 
which cannot be too strongly reprobated, is made to stand in contrast with the enemy's 
conduct in that respect, and the Sultan's Allies, without whose cooperation the very 
existence of the Turkish Empire would be endangered, Christians in faith, and 
champions of legality, are called to assist at outrages which, in both characters, they 
repudiate with unutterable abhorrence. 
 These are not idle assertions. Circassians themselves are here to bear witness to 
what concerns their own country. I have received authentic information of Georgian 
children, brought to Constantinople, as slaves, in an Austrian Steamer, and conveyed to 
a person high in the Turkish employment. It is matter of public notoriety that boys and 
girls from Georgia are sold in Pera and Galata.  
 Such things are inhuman enough at any time. They are scarcely credible when 
viewed as public transactions occurring at Constantinople under the reign of so 
benevolent a Sovereign as the present Sultan. Brought to notice at a time when Christian 
Powers have sent their armies and squadrons into Turkey for its defence, and when 
those armies and squadrons composed of Christians, are fighting side by side with 
Mussulmans, and confounding all differences of religion in the common cause of 
humanity and national independence, they set at nought every calculation and excite the 
most unqualified disgust. 
 There are persons who distinguish between slavery in the East and slavery in the 
West. The distinction is not wholly unfounded. Unlike the negro in America, the slave 
in Turkey is rather a domestic servant than a field-drudge or beast of burthen. He is not 
ostensibly ill-treated. If a male, he rises occasionally to posts of profite and honor; if a 
female, ease, and even luxury, may be her portion in the Harem of some Court favorite 
or opulent functionary. The degradation nevertheless, remains, and the privation of 
liberty, not forfeited by crime, is itself an intolerable evil. But the injury does not stop 
there; the slave can hold no property: he is a property himself; and, worse than all, he is 
but too often an instrument of vice, and sometimes even of crime. His life is at his 
owner's mercy. If a Christian, his children are born to slavery, as if to reconcile those, 
who never can be parents to the mutilation which deprived them of that hope. In one 
respect there is no difference between negro and Circassian slavery. Black or White, 
wherever slavery exists, the whole society suffers. A curse is on the trade. Dealer and 
owner are alike inflected by the taint. They treat their fellow creatures like brutes, and 
are themselves brutalised in return. 
 In Turkey where the disease, appearing in a milder form, is, nevertheless, fatal to 
a sound state of health, imported slaves fill many places in the state, and most places in 
private families, which might be better occupied by free natives. So placed, they 
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minsiter to those habits of expense and sensuality which undermine the strength of the 
Empire, and convey but too often the sentiments of a slave into posts of high command 
and honorable trust. 
 Such being the case, it is not too much to expect that in its own interest, as well as 
from consideration for its allies, the Porte will exert itself to check the barbarous and 
shameful practise which I have described. Let preventive measures be applied to three 
stages of the traffic, to purchase, to conveyance, and to sale. Let a firman declare the 
Sultan's pleasure in these respects. Let peremptory instructions prohibiting the purchase 
of slaves be sent to the commanders of His Majesty's forces. Let the conveyance of 
slaves be treated as contraband on the responsibility of all concerned. Let their sale 
within the Sultan's dominions be strictly prevented by the police, and every 
transgression be visited with punishment on buyer and seller alike. 
 So long as the trade is permitted or connived at, so long as preventive measures, 
capable of enforcement, are loosely or not at all, employed, the Turkish authorities will 
justly be opened to censure, and incur, to their peril, the charge of acting upon 
principles inconsistent in spirit and effect with the existing alliances. Let them beware 
of producing throughout Christian Europe a total relaxation of that enthusiasm for the 
Sultan's cause, which has hitherto saved his empire from the grasp of Russia.  
 You will read this instruction to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and you will leave a copy and Turkish translation of it in His Highness's hands. 
 I have reason to believe that the French Embassy takes a similar step.  
 I am etc. 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe 
 
Appendix 57. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 31 dated 7 September 1854. Instruction to M. 
Stephen Pisani on export restrictions. 
 
The British Embassy cannot assent to the Porte's memorandum of the 8
th
 Zilhidje 1870 
[sic, the Hicri year must be 1270, 1 September 1854], with participating in what appears 
to be an unfounded and unnecessary measure. The Commercial Treaty stipulates for 
unrestricted liberty of commerce in articles of Turkish produce, as well for exportation 
as for internal trade. The occasional restrictions which have been submitted to with 
respect to grain were justified by urgent necessity. In the present instance no such 
necessity exists. There is an abundant harvest, and the armies no longer look to 
Constantinople for their supplies. A continuance of restriction with partial exceptions 
can therefore be of no benefit except to speculators and those who encourage them. The 
plan is contrary to treaty and warranted by no necessity. On these grounds I rely upon 
the Porte's sense of justice and wisdom not to persevere in its original intention as stated 
in the memorandum. 
Therapia, September 7
th
 1854. 
 
Appendix 58. HR. SYS. 1928/48, dated 14 September 1854. Extract. Sale of the 
Ushour duties to the prejudice of the Government. 
 
The Ushour duties on Grain in this neighbourhood were put up to public auction both 
her and at Magnesia and the biddings amounted to about 8 millions of Piastres. The 
Minister of Finance refused to accept these offers when submitted for his approval, but 
sold the duties to parties at Constantinople for the same sum payable in Paper Money, 
whereas the biddings here were to be paid in Cash (Beshliks) and between these two 
modes of payment there was then a difference of 20 to 25 per Cent, causing a loss of a 
Million and a half to two Millions of Piastres to the Government. The Purchasers who 
have resold the Duties for Cash, have profited to the above extent over and above any 
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advance which they may have obtained on their bargain, but the Pacha and the 
Municipal Council cannot with justice be blamed for the acts of the Minister of Finance, 
whose conduct in accepting worse conditions than had been offered here, can only be 
accounted for by supposing that he thereby served his private interests.  
 
Appendix 59. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 3, dated 3 Muharrem 1271 (26 September 1854). 
From İsmail Pasha the Governor of Erzurum to the grand vizier on the reception 
of Colonel Williams. 
 
Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki 
 
Erzurum‟da mukim Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi konsolosu rütbetlu Mösyö Brant 
cenablarının vaki olan tebligatına nazaran devlet-i fahime-i müĢarünileyhanın feriklik 
rütbesini haiz olarak miralaylık umurunda müstahdem [2] bulunan asaletlu Mösyö 
Williams cenabları mah-ı sabıkın yigirmi ikinci PençĢenbe günü alesseher Erzurum‟a 
muvasalat edeceğinden ve mumaileyh merai ül hatır memurin-i mütehabeden idüğünden 
hakkında merasim-i [3] istikbalkâri ve ihtiram-Ģiarinin kemaliyle icrası ihtar olunmasına 
ve bu misillü memurin haklarında resm-i behiyye-i meralet[?]sazinin kema yenbaği 
icrası mütehattim-i zimmet bulunmasına mebni yevm-i mezkurda heyet-i [4] erkan-ı 
eyaletle Erzurum‟da bulunan mevaki-i askeri memurları üniformalarıyla mumaileyhi 
bil-istikbal alay ile meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun dahi orada ikamet etmekte olan vali 
konağına getirmeleriyle çaker-i kemineleri dahi [5] hakk-ı mumaileyhde levazım-ı 
hürmet ve riayeti mea ziyadeten ifa ve Ģan ü Ģekvede [?] Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟ye layık 
suretle acizane resm-i hoĢamedi ve birsen-i [?] hatır ve ahval sıraları icra ile konsolos-ı 
mumaileyh tarafından tehiyye [6] ettirilmiĢ olan misafirhaneye izam ettirilmiĢ ve ferdası 
günü dahi resmen izzetlu Defterdar Bey bendeleri ve sair zabitan-ı askeriye ile bulundu-
ğu konağa gidilerek vizite resminin ifası sırada [7] mumaileyh esas-ı memuriyeti orduy-
ı hümayuna tefri‟ eder bazı Ģeyler olduğunu bil-beyan buna dair taraf-ı abidaneme gerek 
taraf-ı ali-i sadrazamiden ve gerek efendimizden ve makam-ı celil-i seraskerîden bir 
gûna [8] evamir göstermemiĢ ise de konsolos-ı mumaileyhin sureti ifadesi üzerine 
tanılarak [?] suver-i ifadatının birincisi Erzurum‟da kıĢlayacak asakir-i Ģahane içün 
mukaddemce tedarik ve istihzar olunmuĢ olan [9] han ve hane ve mevaki-i saireyi ve 
alelhusus hastahaneleri gezmeğe talib bulunması cihetiyle orduy-ı hümayun meclisi 
livası izzetlu Mustafa PaĢa bendeleri mumaileyhin yanına bit-terfik mahall-i mezkure 
ile hastahaneleri [10] gezip beğendiğini ve Ģu kadar ki mezkur hanlardan bazıları ufak 
tefek bazı tamirat-ı cüziye ile badanaya muhtaç idüğüni ifade ve beyan ve zehair ve 
hatab ve sair levazımdan mukteziyenin tehiyye ve istihzarı [11] kaziyelerinde ihtarat-ı 
tesevviayı [?] dermiyan eylemiĢ ve bunlar ise pek de ihtara muhtaç olmayarak saye-i 
muvaffakiyet-vaye-i cenab-ı ĢehinĢahide telahak [?] intizar [?] kimya [?] asar 
hıdıvileriyle evvelden yapılmıĢ ve yapılmakta [12] bulunmuĢ Ģeyler olmağla mamafih 
ihtaratına teĢekkürle beraber mezkur hanların tamirat-ı lazımelerine ibtidar ettirilmiĢ ve 
mumaileyh dahi çend gün sonraca Kars‟a azim olarak esna-i azimetinde savb-ı 
abidaneme [13] göndermiĢ olduğu Franseviyy-ül ibare bir kıta varaka-i dostanesi 
manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı huzur-ı nezaret-sazileri buyurulmak üzere leffen takdim-i 
huzur-ı mekarim-neĢur-ı hıdivaneleri kılınmıĢ [14] ve ber vechi muharrer memur-ı 
mumaileyhin Ģu ihtarat ve sairesinin kabulü bir guna irade-i seniyyeye z*f*r [?] 
bulunamamak mülasebesiyle mücerred konsolos-ı mumaileyhin mültezimce [?] ifade-i 
harime-i vakıasından [15] ve bu misillülere ihtiramat-ı mütehayyize-i layıkanın lüzum-ı 
icrasından neĢet eylemiĢ idüği arz ve beyanıyla takdim-i ariza-i ubudiyete ictisar 
kılındığı muhat-ilm-i alem-ârâ-i daveraneleri buyurul-dukta  [16] ol babda ve her halde 
emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 3 M 71. Bende 
Vali-i eyalet-i Erzurum 
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[Sealed] Ġsmail 
 
Appendix 60. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 2, 4 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (25 November 1854). 
Promotion of Colonel Williams to the rank of ferik. 
 
Maruz-ı çakerleridir ki 
 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi memurlarından Mösyö Vilyams [Williams] cenablarının 
Erzurum‟a vusuliyle hakkında ne vechile muamele-i ihtiramiye icra olunmuĢ olduğuna 
ve vuku bulan ihtaratı keyfiyetiyle ol babda sair bazı ifadata dair Erzurum valisi 
devletlu paĢa hazretlerinin tahrirat-ı varidesiyle makam-ı ali-i asafanelerine takdim 
kılınan tezkire-i çakeri hamiĢine muharrer cevab-ı ahirimi de mumaileyhin devletce 
olan itibar ve rütbesine ve Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi sefareti canibinden vuku bulan 
tebligata nazaran uhdesine feriklik rütbesi tevcihi ve orduy-i hümayunca vuku bulan 
ifadat ve ihtaratı üzerine tertib edecek Ģeylerin bil-müzakere ifay-i mukteziyatı suretinin 
dahi devletlu Ġsmail PaĢa hazretlerine bildirilmesi emr ü izbar buyurulmuĢ ve 
mucebince mumaileyhe rütbe-i mezkurenin tevcihini mutazammın emr ü alisinin tastiri 
taraf-ı eĢref-i hazret-i vekaletpenahiye iĢar ve suret-i hal müĢir-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine dahi Ģimdilik tahkiye ve tezyar kılınması ve vali-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerinin bu hususa dair makam-ı celil-i asafanelerine olan tahriratı mumaileyhin 
melfuf Ģukkası ve tercümesiyle beraber leffen yine huzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı daverilerine 
takdim kılınmıĢ olmağla ol babda emr ü ferman hazreti men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 4 Ra 
[12]71. 
[Signed] Rıza? 
 
Appendix 61. HR. MKT. 94/56 lef 1, dated 16 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (7 December 
1854). Approval of İsmail Pasha’s treatment of Williams 
 
Erzurum valisine tahrirat-ı samiye 
 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi memurlarından Mösyö Vilyams‟ın [Williams] Erzurum‟a 
vusuliyle hakkında ne vechile muamele-i ihtiramiye icra olunmuĢ olduğuna ve vuku 
bulan ihtaratının tafsiliyle buna müteferria sair bazı ifadata dair tevarüd eden tahrirat-ı 
behiyeleri malum-ı senaveri olarak mumaileyh hakkında ol suretle icra buyurulan 
muamelat-ı ihtiramiye pek yolunda ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye ile Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi 
beynlerinde payidar [?] olan revabıt-ı kaviye vifak ve ittihada [?] merkez-i muvafakatda 
bulunmağla beyan-ı hal siyakında Ģukka-i hulusveri terkim kılındı. 
 
Appendix 62. İ. HR. 114/5553, 28 Zilhicce 1270 (21 September 1854). Sadrazam 
Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha on Georgian and Circassian slave trade. 
 
Atufetlu efendim hazretleri 
 
Çerakize ve Abaza ve Gürcistan sevahilinden ahz ü nakl-i üsera maddesi bu esnada 
vüsat ve serbestiyet ile icra olunmakta olduğu ve müttefik donanmalar oralarda iken bu 
maddenin kesb-i tevsi' etmesi [2] Avrupa'da efkar-ı umumiyenin galeyanını mudi ve 
Saltanat-ı Seniyye hakk-ı alisinde olan temayülata halel irasını muceb olacağı vadisinde 
ve sair surette birçok tafsilatı Ģamil ve bu maddenin vukuunu [3] menne kafi görünecek 
esbab ve tedabirin icrasına taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliye'den himmet buyurulmasını müstedi 
Ġngiltere ve Fransa sefaretleri taraflarından baĢ tercümanlarına verilen talimnamelerin 
suretleri tercümeleri iĢbu [4] Ģehr-i Zilhicce-üĢ ġerife‟nin yirmi beĢinci günü 
[18.9.1854] akd olunan Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela'da kıraat olunarak cereyan eden 
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müzakeratın fezlekesinde malum-ı ali buyurulduğu vechile Gürcistan kıtasından bir 
hayli vakitten beri [5] üsera celb ve nakli münkatı olduğu gibi Rusyalu Bahr-i Siyah'ın 
sevahil-i Ģarkiyesini istila ettikten sonra oralara kala' ve husun yaparak ve sefain 
tayiniyle bahren dahi esbab-ı maniaya teĢebbüs ederek [6] Çerkezistan tarafından dahi 
esir çıkarılmasını men' etmiĢ ve hatta sefaretinin istidasına mebni Bahr-i Siyah'ın 
Anadolu sevahilinde memurin-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye evamir-i aliyye ve tahrirat-ı 
mahsusa ile icra olunmağa [7] tenbihat-ı resmiye ve aleniye icra olunmuĢ olduğundan 
vuku-u muharebeye değin Çerkezistan'dan kaçırma tarikiyle getirilen üsera dahi pek az 
olduğu halde Rusyaluların muahharen Gürcistan'ın hududa yakın yerlerinden [8] ve 
Çerakize sevahilinden çekilmeleri ve müttefik donanmaların dahi inzimam-ı 
muavenetleriyle Kara Deniz'in serbestlik halinde bulunması üzerine bu esir ticareti 
maddesi filhakika serbestiyet-i kâmile ile icra olunmağa [9] baĢlamıĢ ve Çerkezler 
beyninde evlad ve akrabalarını satmak adet-i garibesi var ise de Gürcüler beyninde ol 
suretle olmayarak mukaddemleri getirilen Gürcü üserası dahi sirkat olunarak getirildiği 
hususla [10] Gürcistan ahalisi Rusyaludan müteneffir olduklarından asakir-i hazret-i 
Ģahanenin oralara satvet-endaz-ı vusul olduklarında ma'delet-i seniyyeden hissedar 
olmak üzere orduy-ı hümayuna dehalet ve arz-ı [11] hizmet etmiĢ oldukları halde çoluk 
çocuklarını Lazistan ahalisinin ve sair Ģunun bunun seby ve istirkaka baĢladıklarını 
görünce tahvil-i efkar ve niyet eyledikleri kazaya-i malumeden [12] bulunmuĢ olup 
halbuki Çerkezler millet-i Ġslamiyeden bulunarak sair edyanda bulunanların bile eĢya ve 
hayvan gibi akçe ile satılıp alınması caiz olmadığına ve bu esaret maddesinin menni 
düvel-i mütemeddinenin [13] emeli olup hatta Fransa ve Ġngiltere devletlerinin 
Afrika'nın Bahr-i Muhit tarafında bulunan sevahilinde zenci esaretinin menni içün 
bunca tekellüfler icra edegeldikleri dahi bedihi olarak ber vech-i meĢruh [14] Bahr-i 
Siyah'da Rusyalunun mennine çalıĢdığı Gürcü ve Çerkez üserası nakli hususunun Ģimdi 
gözleri önünde ve bayağı kendilerinin teshilat ve müsaadatına azv olunacak surette bu 
ticarete alıĢmıĢ [15] olanlar ve birtakım aklı ermeyen ademler tarafından kemal-i 
serbesti ile icra olunmakta olması filvaki Avrupa'ya münakıs oldukça Devlet-i Aliyye'ce 
maddi ve manevi tesirat-ı muzırrayı istilzam edeceği misillü [16] Ģu ahval-i harbiyenin 
neticesinde inĢallahu teala Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin ol havalice istifade buyuracağı Ģeyler 
hakkında dahi mazarrat-ı adideyi müstelzem olacağında iĢtibah olunmamak lazım 
geleceğine ve eğerçi husus-ı [17] mebhusun menn-i küllisi takdirinde sedd-i bab-ı 
rıkkiyet demek çıkacağı cihetle Ģu teklif üzerine maslahatın bu derecesine kadar 
gidilmek istenilmez ise de bu ticaret erbabına kapuyu bütün bütün açık bırakmak dahi 
[18] asla caiz olmayarak gösterilecek kayıdsızlığın mazarratı dahi görüleceği cihetle 
Ģimdi teĢebbüs olunacak tedabirin nümayiĢ ve Ģayiası ile Ģu hamle savuĢdurularak esaret 
maddesinin kabl-es-sefer [19] bulunduğu daire-i mahdudede cereyan etmesi kabil gibi 
görünüyor iken hiçbir Ģey yapılmadığı takdirde maslahatın ta memnuiyet-i külliye 
derecesine kadar gideceğine Ģüphe olmadığına mebni hem Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin 
kavaid-i insaniyet ve Ģiar-ı [20] hamiyete muvafık harekatı hemiĢe iltizam 
buyurageldiğinin iki devlet-i müttefika nazarında bir delil-i cedidesini daha ibraz ile 
anların temayülat-ı halisanelerini ve hem de Gürcü taifesinin hoĢnudilerini celb ve 
istihsal buyurmak [21] olmasıyçün bu babda bir usul-i münasibe vaz' ve icrası Ģan-i 
celil-ül unvanına çesban olacağı bahsinde efkar-ı huzzar ittihad edip bunun icrasında 
dahi Gürcistan'dan bazı ademlerin bir takım nisvan ve sübyan [22] tutup esir ederek 
satmakta oldukları nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de malum olduğundan bahisle bu muamele 
ve hareketin men' olunduğu ve ba'd-ez-in buna oralarda her kim cesaret eder ise bayi ve 
müĢterisi tedip ve mücazat [23] olunacağı mazmununda Batum orduy-ı hümayunu 
devletlu Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerine hitaben bir kıta ve kiĢinin evlad ve akrabasını 
satması Ģiar-ı insaniyete yakıĢmayacağından bu babda Çerkezlere nesayih-i lazıme [24] 
ve üseraya mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi tedabir-i mukteziye icra olunması babında dahi 
diğer bir kıta evamir-i aliyye ısdar ve kendisiyle ol tarafa tisyarının müĢarünileyh 
438 
hazretleri tarafından birinin gerek Batum ve Çürüksu [25] taraflarında ve diğerinin dahi 
Çerkezistan'da ilanıyla beraber icab edenlere ve hususen ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyeye 
tenbihat-ı ekîde dahi icra olunarak ol havaliden üsera nakl ü ihracının menni suretine 
bakılması [26] ve buraca dahi çünkü Ģu aralık Ġstanbul‟un ekser sokaklarında ve belki 
Galata ve Beyoğlu taraflarında bile birer suret-i alenide üsera alınıp satılmakta 
olduğundan umur-ı zabtiye ve ihtisab nezareti ve gümrük emaneti [27] taraflarına 
bildirilip Ģu aleniyet maddesinin def'iyle Ģu bey' ve Ģiranın haneler derununda bir 
mesturiyet halinde cereyan etmesi tedbirinin dahi hakimane istihsal ettirilmesi ve zikr 
olunan sefaretlere dahi [28] bu kararın nezaret-i hariciyeden Divan-ı Hümayun 
tercümanı saadetlu bey efendiye hitaben talimname itasıyla bildirilmesi hususları tansib 
ve tezkar olunmuĢ ise de efkar-ı aciz-asar-ı bendeganın mükemmeli emr ü ferman-ı [29] 
hazret-i padiĢahi olmağla ol babda dahi her ne vechile irade-i isabet-ade-i cenab-ı 
cihanbani müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise hükm-i celili icra olunacağı ve marr-ül 
beyan talimname tercümeleri manzur-ı mealimevfur-ı hazret-i [30] hilafetpenahi 
buyurulmak üzere arz ve takdim kılındığı beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkim olundu 
efendim. Fi 28 Z 270. (mim) 
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Reside-i dest-i tazim olan iĢbu tezkire-i samiye-i asafaneleriyle mezkur tercümeler 
manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı hazret-i padiĢahi buyurulmuĢ ve tensib ve istizan buyurulduğu 
üzere zikr olunan evamir-i aliyyenin ısdar ve müĢarünileyh hazretleriyle ol tarafa tisyarı 
ve hususat-ı sairenin dahi ber minval-i muharrer icray-i iktizaları müteallik ve 
Ģerefsudur buyurulan emr-i irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı cihanbani muktezay-i münifinden 
bulunmuĢ ve marr-ül beyan tercümeler yine savb-ı sami-i asaflerine iade kılınmıĢ 
olmağla ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi Selh-i Z 70. 
 
Appendix 63. HR. TO. 220/48, dated 23 September 1854. Stratford de Redcliffe’s 
instructions to head dragoman Stephen Pisani on Sheikh Shamil's kidnapping of 
women in Georgia.  
 
Therapia, September 23
rd
 1854. Stephen Pisani Esquire etc etc etc 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I brought verbally under Reshid Pasha's notice some days ago an occurrence 
which has been stated in the public prints. It appears from the published statement, to 
which I allude, that an act of barbarous atrocity has been committed in Georgia by a 
party of soldiers, - it may be presumed, irregulars, detached from Sheik Shamyl's army. 
These practical marauders are described as having attacked the country house of some 
person of wealth and official distinction in Georgia. The owner was absent. No 
resistance was made. Two young ladies and their French governess were, nevertheless, 
murdered by them in the house. The proprietor's wife, a lady of rank and education, was 
carried off to the mountains with several female friends, her guests at the time. I need 
not remark to you that these are circumstances which shock every feeling of humanity. 
They are not the acts of soldiers, but of assassins. Honorable war rejects them, and 
honorable men can have no sympathy with the perpetrators. 
 Such, I am well persuaded, is the the view which Reshid Pasha and his 
enlightened colleagues will take of the matter, and I apply to them in full reliance on 
their willingness to assist in redressing the evil in so far as it is still susceptible of 
redress. The innocent victims of cruelty cannot be recalled to life but the ladies, who 
439 
have been carried off, may be restored to their friends, and the Sultan's influence may be 
employed to prevent the recurrence of such horrors. 
 It is in this sense that you will apply to Reshid Pasha, and if need be, to the Grand 
Visir. Perhaps His Majesty the Sultan would deign to write to Schamyl, or cause a letter 
to be written to him; and some officer might be detached from the army of Kars to 
present it to the Sheih, and to see to the recovery of the ladies, who were carried off, in 
concert with a British officer whom I would undertake to have sent with him. No 
expense need be incurred by the Porte for the object of benevolence, and under present 
circumstances, of sound policy also. 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe.    
 
Appendix 64. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 32 dated 25 September 1854. From Stratford de 
Redcliffe on the cessation of the temporary restriction on grain exports. 
 
 The undersigned has received the Porte's official note, dated yesterday, 
announcing the cessation of the temporary restriction which, for certain specified 
reasons, had been laid on the exportation of grain from Turkey.. 
 ...certain reservations are still made as to the purchase of that article for 
exportation. It is therefore, his duty, to state that all restrictions on the exportation of 
grain, as upon any other article of Turkish produce, are contrary to the stipulations of 
the Commercial Treaty and only to be justified by special necessity and during the 
undoubted existence of that necessity. If the Porte's note is to be understood in its literal 
sense, the Turkish authorities are still instructed to prevent the purchase of grain for 
exportation, until they are satisfied that provision is made for local consumption, seed, 
and the arrangements for supplying the Imperial army. 
 As this state of things would open a wide door for arbitrary proceedings and 
exclusive speculations, it is desirable that some further explanation should be afforded 
and that whatever is really objectionable in those respects should be removed.  
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe 
 Therapia, September 25
th
 1854. 
 
Appendix 65. HR. SYS. 1191/1 lef 54, dated 27 September 1854. Lord Clarendon to 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the appointment of Müşir İsmail Pasha to 
command the Kars Army. (Extract in PRMA, No. 13). 
 
 With reference to the observation contained in your dispatch No 489 of the 9
th
 of 
September respecting the appointment of Ismail Pasha to command the Turkish Army at 
Kars, and the objections stated by the Porte to the chief command of that army being 
entrusted to General Klapka, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's 
Government have little doubt that a deep rooted jealousy of foreigners is, as you 
suppose, the main cause of the neglect of the army in Asia; but the suicidal indulgence 
of that feeling ill becomes a Government whose very existence depends upon the 
support of foreigners.  
 Repeated disasters may possibly overcome the feeling but these disasters must 
prolong the war at the cost of the blood and treasure of England, and as H. M. 
Government will not submit to disaster or disgrace that common precautions may avert, 
Y. E. will inform Reshid Pasha of the great dissatisfaction which all the proceedings in 
connexion with the Army of Asia have caused to Her Majesty's Government who must 
insist that their advice shall be taken if their support is to be continued.  
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Appendix 66. HR. SYS. 1190/12 lef 1, dated Evasıt-ı Muharrem 1271 (1-10 October 
1854). Instructions to Mustafa Pasha, commander of the Batum army, on the 
prohibition of the Circassians from selling their children into slavery.  
 
Evladlarını satmak isteyen Çerkeslerin tedibi hakkında Batum ordusu kumandanı 
Mustafa Paşa'ya ita olunan talimatname. 
 
Bab-ı Ali 
Hariciye Nezareti 
Hazine-i Evrak Müdiriyeti.  
Hulasa 
 
Sohum sevahili muhafazası memuriyeti inzimamıyle Batum orduy-ı hümayunu 
kumandanı bulunan ve Mecidiye [2] niĢan-ı hümayununun birinci rütbesini haiz ve 
hamil vezir-i dirayet-semirim Mustafa PaĢa iclalehu hüküm. Cenab-ı Hakk [3] nev'-i 
beni ademi eĢref-i mahlukat olarak hulk ve icad ve hürriyet-i zatiye ve tabiiye ihsanıyle 
dahi karin-i [4] is'ad buyurmuĢ olduğu halde bu hilkat ve mazhariyetin hilafı olarak 
Çerkesistan ahalisi evlad [5] ve akrabalarını esaret suretiyle satmak ve bazıları dahi 
birbirlerinin evladını serika ile bayağı [6] hayvan ve eĢya gibi bey' ve füruht eylemek 
adet-i garibesini itiyad etmiĢ olduklarından bu keyfiyet doğrusu [7] Ģiar-ı insaniyet ve 
hamiyete münafi ve rızay-i hazret-i barinin hilafı bi-gayet mezmum ve çirkin bir Ģey 
olduğundan [8] redd-i ma'delet-vafir-i mülukanemde bir vechile tecviz olunmadığına 
mebni bunun men'-i esbabının istihsali zımnında [9] ahali-i merkumeye lazım gelen 
nesayih ve vesaya ve tenbihat-ı müessirenin tebliğ ve ifasıyla beraber bu misillulerin 
[10] irsaline mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi men'-i mürurları içün tedabir-i mukteziyenin 
ifası ve keyfiyetin [11] ol havalide bulunan bil-cümle zabitan-ı askeriye ve memurin-i 
mülkiyeye dahi beyan ve tefhimi hususuna bu kere [12] emr ü irade-i seniye-i 
mülukanem müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulmuĢ olmağın ilanen ve tenbihan divan-ı 
hümayunuma [13] mahsusen iĢbu emr-i celil-ül kadrim ısdar olunur. Sen ki müĢir-i 
müĢarünileyhsin keyfiyet malum-u [14] rüyet-melzumun oldukta mecbul ve meftur 
olıcak kemal-i mehamm-i iĢtiba ve hamiyet muktezası üzere [15] emr ü irade-i seniyemi 
ahali-i merkumeye ve sair lazım gelenlere bil-etraf ilan ve iĢaretle balada [16] beyan 
olunduğu üzere fi-ma-ba'd bu misillu evlad ve akrabasını satmak adet-i mekruha ve 
gayr-i meĢruasının [17] men'i zımnında nesayih ve tenbihat-ı mukteziye-i lazımenin 
ifası ve mahrec olan iskelelerde dahi men'-i mürurları içün [18] tedabir-i icabiyenin 
icrası ve tenbihatın hilafına olarak gerek evlad ve akrabasını satmağa veyahud [19] 
sairin evlad ve akrabasını çalmağa mütecasir olanların ve gerek bu makuleleri satun 
alub aher [20] mahallere çıkarmak isteyenlerin tedib ve terbiyeleri lazımeden olmağla 
bundan dahi kat'a gaflet olunmaması [21] hususlarına derin itina ve sarf-ı makderetle 
her halde ifay-i muktezası karĢinasi ve ruyete bezl-i cell-i meknet [22] eyliyesin. ġöyle 
bilesin, alamet-i Ģerifeme itimad kılasın. Tahriren fi evasıt-ı Ģehri Muharrem ül haram 
sene [23] ihda ve seb'in ve mieteyn ve elf.  
 
Appendix 67. HR. MKT. 89/99, dated 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). 
Orders to the police director, municipal and customs authorities. On the prohibi-
tion of the open slave trade in the streets. 
 
Zabıta müĢirine ve ihtisab nezaretiyle gümrük emanetine tezkire-i samiye 
 
[1] Bu aralık Ġstanbul‟un ekser sokaklarında ve Galata ve Beyoğlu taraflarında bile bir 
suret-i alenide üsera alınıp satılmakta olduğu mervi olup bu üsera bey‟ ve Ģirası 
maddesinin kabl es sefer [2] bulunduğu daire-i mahdude ve mesture içinden çıkarılarak 
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Ģimdi öyle göz önünde ve sokak aralarında icra olunması caiz olmayacağından [3] iĢbu 
aleniyet maddesinin def‟iyle üsera bey‟ ve Ģirası kaziyesinin haneler derununda ve bir 
mesturiyet halinde cereyan etmesi tedbirinin hakimane suretle istihsali [4] hususunun 
taraf-ı valalarına ve ihtisab nezaret-i behiyyesiyle gümrük emanetine tevcih ve 
havalesine Meclis-i Vükela kararı üzerine bil-istizan emr ü ferman-ı hümayun-ı cenab-ı 
cihanbani [5] müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurularak mucebince keyfiyet nezaret-i müĢar- 
ve emanet-i mumaileyhaya bildirilmiĢ olmağla ve bu maslahatın suver-i icraiyesinde 
olunacak muamelat [6] ve iĢin bir daire-i mesture içine alınmasında görülecek 
muhasenatın derece-i nezaketi nezd-i devletlerinde tavzihten müstağni bulunmağla ber 
manzume iradesine ana göre iktiza-ı halin icrasına [7] himmet buyurmaları siyakında 
tezkir. 
 
Appendix 68. HR. MKT. 89/100 dated 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). 
From the sadrazam to the governors of Trabzon, Lazistan and Canik. On the slave 
trade. 
 
Trabzon valisiyle Lazistan ve Canik mutasarrıflarına tahrirat-ı samiye 
 
[1] Gürcistan‟dan bazı kesanın bir takım nisvan ve sübyanı tutup esir ederek satmakta 
oldukları tahkik ve istihbar olunup böyle bir hareket pek mezmum [2] ve menfur Ģey 
olduğundan baĢka cemiyet ve insaniyete dahi yakıĢur Ģey olmadığından bunların 
külliyen men‟iyle bad-ez-in buna ol havalide her kim cesaret eder ise bayi‟i [3] ve 
müĢterisi hakkında lazım gelecek mücazat-ı Ģedidenin icrası ve Ģunun bunun ellerinde 
kalan etfal ve nisvanın bit-taharri bulundurulup familyalarına [4] teslim ettirilmesi 
hususlarının Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanı devletlu Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerine ve 
bu makule mağsub olan etfal ve nisvanın [5] berren Anadolu içlerine geçirilmesi ve 
bahren dahi bir tarafa salıverilmesi kaziyelerinin taraf-ı valalarıyla Lazistan ve Canik 
mutasarrıfları saadetlu [6] paĢalara tevcih ve iĢ‟ar olunması hususuna emr ü ferman-ı 
cenab-ı cihanbani [7] Ģerefsunuh ve sudur buyurularak mucebince kumandan-ı 
müĢarünileyh ferman-ı ali icraya ve paĢa-yı mumaileyhimaya dahi tahrirat-ı [8] 
mahsusa irsal kılınmıĢ olmağla ve bu keyfiyetin derece-i mezmumiyeti ise tavzihten 
müstağni bulunmağla dirayet-i fıtriye-i desturileri [9] kumandan ve mutasarrıf-ı müĢar- 
ve mumaileyhim ile bil-muhabere ber mantuk-ı seniye iktizayı halin icrasıyla isbat-ı 
asar-ı rüyete himmet buyurmaları [10] lazım geleceği beyanıyla Ģukka 
 
Appendix 69. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 14, dated 11 Muharrem 1271 (4 October 
1854). From Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army, to the Abkhazian prince 
Hamid Bey [Mikhail Shervashidze].  
Abaza ahalisi beyi olup Rusya tarafında bulunan Hamid Bey‟e fi 11 M 71 tarihinde 
yazılan tahrirat suretidir. 
[1] Tarife hacet bu kadar ki nice yıllardan berü Devlet-i Aliyye‟nin en büyük hasım ve 
düĢmanı olan Rusyalu ile padiĢahımız azim gavgaya baĢladı [2] ve bu Moskovlunun 
zalim ve gaddar ve haksız olduğunu bütün cihan anladığından Ģunun hakkından gelmek 
ve haddini bildirmek için kaffe-i devletler [3] bizim devletimizle birleĢti. Artık Rusyalu 
asla baĢa çıkamayıp Allahu Teala‟nın lütuf ve ihsanıyla yakın vakitte bütün bütün altı 
üstüne gelecektir. [4] Zira karada ve denizde bozulmağa ve tarumar olmağa yüz tutarak 
Kırım‟dan ekseri yerleri alındıktan baĢka Sivastopol limanı dahi alınmak derecesine [5] 
geldi. Kendi milletimizden bulunan Abaza ve Çerkes ahalisine Ģimdiye kadar 
Rusyalu‟nun ettiği zulm ve tasallut hadden aĢarak Ģimdi bu açılan [6] ğavğa münase-
betiyle hamd olsun anlar dahi Rusya belasından kurtulduklarından inĢallah bundan 
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sonra zinhar devletimiz bu toprakları Rusyalu‟ya [7] vermeyecek ve ahalisine el 
uzattırmayacaktır. Bunun için padiĢahımız bu defa Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kuman-
danlığı ile bütün Abaza [8] ve Çerkesistan muhafızlığını uhde-i acizaneme tevcih ve 
ihale buyurduğundan külliyetli maslahat ve asakir ile Ġstanbul‟dan çıkıp Batum‟a ve 
Sohum‟a geldim. [9] Siz hayli defaattan beri Rusya tarafına geçerek orada kalmıĢsınız 
ve kend ve vatan ve memleketi terk etmiĢsiniz. Halbuki siz buranın büyük hanedanın-
dan [10] olup belli baĢlı ve akıllı, hatırı sayılır bey olduğunuzdan burayı terk edip de 
düĢmanımız olan Moskovluyu isteyeceğinize inanmam. Hatta [11] Sohum‟a geldiğimde 
Devlet-i Aliye tarafına gelip hizmet etmek niyetinde olduğunuzu iĢittim. Bunun için 
sizin orada Ģimdiye değin kalmaklığınızın [12] sebebi Ģöyle hatırıma geliyor ki acaba 
siz iç yüzünden buralı ve zahirde Rusyalu olup asıl gayretiniz ve muradınız Rusya‟nın 
halini ve kolayını [13] anlamak mıdır yahut çünkü dünyada olmadık Ģey yoktur 
hususiyle böyle vakitlerde ara yerden fesad ekmek değildir. Size dahi öyle uygunsuz 
[14] ademler gelüb de birtakım yalanlar ile zihninizi mi bozdular? Yoksa Devlet-i 
Aliye‟nin senin gibi iĢe yarar beylere ihsanı ve muhabbeti çok olacağını [15] Ģimdiye 
değin layıkıyla size anlatamayıp da sizi küstürecek bir Ģey mi yaptılar? Sizin orada 
kalmaklığınız elbette Ģu sebeplerden birisi içindir. [16] Her ne ise böyle Ģeyler 
olağandır. Senin nasıl iĢe yarar ve dirayetkar bey olduğunu ben iyi bildiğimden ve pek 
sevdiğimden hem devletimize [17] ve milletimize el birliğiyle bir hizmet etmek ve hem 
de senin gibi cesur ve hanedan bir beyi öyle düĢmanımız içinde bırakmayıp 
padiĢahımızın ülkesinde [19] ve sayesinde büyütmek için dostane ve halisane iĢbu 
mektupla sizi bu tarafa davet eylerim. Ey hemĢerim iĢitmiĢsinizdir ki ben dahi zaten 
Anapa‟dan çıkmıĢ olduğumdan buralı demek olurum. Her vakit de devletimize ve 
milletimize hizmet etmek üzerlerimize lazımdır ve insaniyet dahi [20] budur. Artık 
Rusyalu‟nun burnu kırılacaktır. Bundan sonra dahi orada kalacak olur iseniz size pek 
yazık olur. Balada beyan [21] olunduğu vechile eğer ara yerde size bir müfsitlik eden 
olup da zihninizi bozdular ise hepsi boĢtur. Hiçbirine inanmayıp hemen [22] gelesiniz. 
Size doğru söylerim ve Ģimdiden söz veririm ki Rusyalu‟dan nasıl rütbe kazandın ise 
andan ziyadesi geldiğin anda [23] taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliye‟den size verilecektir. Ve sen 
devlet ve millete bir güzel hizmet eyle de daha her ne talep eder isen padiĢahımız [24] 
cümlesini ihsan buyurur. Bu babda asla ve kat‟a Ģüphe ve endiĢe etmeyip bir gün ola bu 
tarafa dehalet ederek gelmenizi isterim. ĠĢte benim [25] sahihen muradım devlet ve 
milletimize hizmet etmek ve size dahi dostluk eylemektir. Ġmdi mektubumuz vusulünde 
benim bu sözlerimi kırmayıp aklınız [26] ve dirayetiniz iktizasınca hemen gelmenizi 
memul ederim.  
 
Appendix 70. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 15, 22 Muharrem 1271 (15 October 1854). 
From Mustafa Pasha the Müşir of Batum to Circassian tribal chiefs. 
 
22 Muharrem 1271 tarihinde Çerakise‟ye yazılan buyrulduların suretidir. 
 
Ubıh, Suca [?], Dardan [?], Hize [?], Subas [?], Çohok [?], Ğuba [?] kabilelerinin 
uleması ve sair söz sahipleri inha olunur ki: Öteden beri devlet ve milletimizin büyük 
düĢmanı olan Moskovlular yigirmi beĢ otuz seneden beri [2] gerek sizlere ve gerek ol 
tarafda bulunan sair Çerkes ve Abaza ahalisine ettiği zulm u teaddi haddini aĢmıĢ ve 
taĢmıĢ ve aramızda birleĢmeye mani olup sizler dahi anın mukabelesinden baĢlı baĢınıza 
nasıl çalıĢıp [3] çabaladığınız ve izzet ve  metanetiniz bütün aleme ibret niĢandır. ĠĢte 
sizlere Ģimdiye değin Moskovluların öyle zulm ü tasallut etmesine kemal-i merhameti 
ve Ģefkati dünyayı tutmuĢ olan padiĢahımız ziyadesiyle acıyıp [4] anın zulm ve 
pençesinden kurtarmak pek büyük murad-ı Ģahaneleri olduğu halde fillah-il hamd ve-l 
menna vakit ve saati gelerek iĢitmiĢizdir ki Moskovlular ile azim muharebeye baĢlamıĢ 
ve Moskovluların [5] haksızlığı artık dünyayı doldurduğundan devletimizle sair 
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devletler dahi birleĢerek bi-nusret-illahi teala gerek karada gerek denizde Moskovlular 
münhezim ve periĢan olmağa yüz tutmuĢ ve hatta Kırım‟ın çok yerleri bile [6] zabt 
olunmuĢ olduğundan padiĢahımız Anadolu‟nun bu havalisinde yani umum Çerkesistan 
ve Abaza memleketleri muhafızlığı ile Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığını 
uhdemize tevcih ve Sohum‟da ve Batum‟da ve sair ol havalide [7] bulunan paĢalar ve 
beyleri maiyetime tayin buyurmuĢ olmağla külliyetlu asakir ve mühimmat ile 
Dersaadet‟den kalkıp Batum‟a geldim. Ol emirde Batum‟un ahval-i hazırasını gereği 
gibi anlayıp inĢallah yoluna kodukdan sonra [8] Çerkes ve Abaza memleketlerinin icab 
eden yerlerine bin-nefs geleceğim ve padiĢahımın fermanı üzere sizlerle görüĢüp 
birleĢerek müstainen bi-inayet-illahi teala ve müstezaen bi-imdad-ı hazret-i Resul-i 
Huda el birliğiyle bu tarafdan dahi [9] Ģu düĢmanımızın hakkından gelmeğe sa‟y ve 
gayret eyleyeceğimiz musammemdir. Ġmdi vusulümden evvel tarafınızdan tercümanı-
mız bulunan rifatlu … [void in the original] mahsusen memur ve tisyar ve buyruldular 
ıstarıyla ilan keyfiyetine ibtidar olundu. [10] Tarife hacet bu kadar ki padiĢahımıza her 
cihetle itaat ve itikad ve birbirlerimizle ittifak ve ittihad idüb düĢmanımızla can u 
gönülden uğraĢmak ve vatan ve memleketimizi muhafazaya çalıĢmak Allah‟ımızın ve 
peygamberimizin [11] emirleriyle üzerimize farzdır ve padiĢahın emrine itaat ve 
elbirliğiyle düĢman muharebesine mübaĢeret edenler dünya ve ahrette selamet ve 
saadeti bulacağı misillu maazallah bir kimse zerre kadar padiĢahın emrinden [12] çıkar 
ise ol halde zahiren ve manen kendüsini ağır ve Ģedid azaplara i‟tablara ilka idüb hiçbir 
mahalde rahat ve necat bulamayacağı güneĢ gibi aĢikardır. Hususiyle rabbim ömr ü 
ikbal ü Ģevket-i Ģahanesini günden güne [13] müzdad ve feravan ve düĢmanını makhur 
ve periĢan edip bizleri sayesinden ayırmasun. Asr-ı ma'delethasr-ı Ģahanelerine nail ve 
zıll-ı zelil-i mülukanelerine mustazil olduğumuz padiĢahımız efendimiz hazretleri öyle 
bir müĢfik ve adil [14] padiĢahdır ki daima efkar-ı seniye ve eĢfak-ı aliye-i tacidarileri 
her halde tebaasının istikmal-i esbab-ı huzur ve rahat ve asayiĢ ve istirahatlarına masruf 
olarak evlad u ıyal u ırz u can u vatan [15] ve mallarımızın muhafazası içün bunca 
akçeler sarf ile askerler topçular cephaneler tertib buyurmaktadır ve sayesine sığınmıĢ 
olan bilcümle nasın kemal-i rahat ve asayiĢleri ile hiçbir zaman da görülmemiĢtir. Böyle 
bir adil [16] ve merhametkar padiĢahın uğurunda canımızı feda etmek ve her ne ferman 
buyurur ise mahaza kendi rahat ve selametimiz için olduğunu bilip her emrini 
tamamıyla icra ve eda eylemek bizlere dahi ne mertebelerde lazım olduğu [17] muhtac-ı 
tekrar değildir. Balada beyan olduğu vechile sizler öteden berü düĢmanla uğraĢtığınız ve 
gayet Ģeci ve azimli ve doğru ademler bulunduğunuz padiĢahımızın malumu olduğun-
dan sizlere kemal-i meyl ü muhabbet-i [18] Ģahaneleri vardır. Hatta bu abd-i aciz gibi 
nice kulları var iken Çerakise ve Abaza idaresinin uhdemize tevfik ve havale 
buyurulması zaten içinizden çıkıp hemĢehriniz bulunduğum içindir. Zira hallerinize [19] 
vakıf olduğumdan rahat ve selametinize herkesten ziyade çabalayacağım ve küçük-
lerinizi evladım ve karındaĢım ve büyüklerinizi babam gibi hoĢ tutacağım derkardır. ĠĢte 
padiĢahımızın sizlere olan kemal-i meyl ü muhabbet [20] ve Ģefkat-i Ģahanelerini 
bundan dahi anlarsınız ve geçende Dersaadet‟e bu defa bizimle gelen bazı hemĢehri-
lerinizden dahi iĢiteceksiniz ki padiĢahımızı anları bizzat huzur-ı Ģahanesine celb edip 
[21] haklarınızda olan muhabbet-i Ģahanelerini beyan ve her biri dünya değecek ve 
kimse nail olamayacak surette iltifatlar erzan buyurdu. ĠnĢallah bundan böyle sizler dahi 
görüp pek çok yüzden anlayacağınıza [22] Ģübhe yoktur. Heman hazret-i Allah böyle 
doğru yoldan giden ve hakkaniyeti isteyenleri darında rahat ve düĢmana galibiyetle 
mesrur ve handan ve devlet ve milletimiz aleyhinde olan düĢmanı her halde muzmahil 
ve periĢan [23] eyliye amin. Hulasa-i murad *?* itiyad sizlerden umarım ki 
padiĢahımızın matlub-ı alisi vechile el birliğiyle çabalamağa gayret ve Ģimdiden 
keyfiyeti cümle ahaliye birer birer söyleyip anlatmağa himmet ve mahkemelerde [24] 
ahkam-ı Ģer‟ianın tamamıyla icrasına ihtimam ve dikkat eylemeniz sibakında divan-ı 
mektubi-i orduy-i hümayun bulunan ve Çerkesistan ve Sohum‟dan iĢbu buyruldu tastir 
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ve imla olunmağın mucebince amel ve harekete bi-gayet [25] itina ve himmet 
eylemenizdir. 
 
Appendix 71. HR. SYS. 1190/12 lef 2, dated 10 Safer 1271 (2 November 1854). 
Answer to the official notes of France and Britain on the Georgian and Circassian 
slave trade. 
 
Saadetlu tercüman bey efendiye verilen talimatname. Gürcü ve Çerkes üserası. 
 
Bab-ı Ali 
Hariciye Nezareti 
Hazine-i Evrak Müdiriyeti 
 
Gürcistan ve Çerkezistan taraflarından esaret suretiyle çıkmıĢ olan eĢhasdan dolayı 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi [2] sefir-i kebiri asaletlu Lord Ġstratfort [Stratford] cenabları 
ve Fransa devlet-i fahimesi maslahatgüzarı Mösyö [3] Benedetti taraflarından sefaretleri 
baĢ tercümanları Mösyö Pisani ve Mösyö ġefer'e [Schefer] verilmiĢ olan talimatname-
lerde [4] suretleri meclis-i meĢveretde mütalaa olunup bu babda vuku bulan ihtarat usul-
i insaniye ve Devlet-i Aliye'nin [5] efkar-ı adlisine muvafık olduğu nezd-i saltanat-ı 
seniyede kemaliyle takdir olunmuĢdur. Gürcistan halkının [6] nisvan ve sıbyanına 
tasallut vukuu Devlet-i Aliyye‟ce asla tecviz olunur mevaddan olmadığı cihetle bunun 
içün [7] evvelce dahi icraı tenbihat olunmuĢ iken her nasıl olmuĢ ise bu misillu harekat-ı 
kabiha vuku bulmuĢ [8] olması doğrusu teessüfü muceb olup Çerkezlerin evlad ve 
akrabalarını satmaları veyahud [9] birbirlerinin evladlarını sirkat ile be'y ve füruht 
eylemeleri keyfiyat-ı garibesi dahi Ģayan-ı takbih [10] olarak bunların menni lazımeden 
olacağına bu babda müteallik buyurulan irade-i isabet-ade-i hazret-i padiĢahi [11] 
mukteza-i münifi üzere ısdar olunan ekid ül mazmun ferman-ı alilerin suretlerini iki 
düvel-i fahime sefaretlerine [12] ita ile beraber bundan böyle bu hususa daha ziyade 
takayyüd ve ihtimam olunacağı ve Gürcistan'dan bu [13] tarafa vürudu mervi olan 
eĢhasın dahi derhal nail-i hürriyet olmak ve istedikleri halde [14] familyaları nezdine 
iade olunmak üzere taharrisine dikkat olunmakta olduğu ve bu üsera maddesinden 
dolayı [15] iktiza eden mahallerde tenbihat-ı Ģedide icra kılındığı dahi zikr olunan 
sefaretlere tebliğ buyurmalarını [16] rüyet-hamane?lerinden ümid ederim. Fi 10 S 271. 
 
Appendix 72. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 19, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 
1854). From Mustafa Pasha in Batum to the grand vizier. 
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Mukaddemce Çerkes ve Abaza ahalisinin her kabilesine baĢka baĢka yazdırıp 
göndermiĢ olduğum buyrulduların ve Rusya tarafında bulunan Hamid Bey‟e 
gönderdiğim [2] tahrirat-ı bendeganemin bu defa canib-i vâlâ-yı seraskeriye birer 
suretleri ile bazı hususat-ı mühimmeye dair iki kıta tahrirat-ı mufassala [3] irsal 
kılındığından kaffesinin birer aynı dahi leffen hakpay-i mekarim-intiha-i asafanelerine 
min gayr-i resmin takdim ve isal kılındı. Ahval-i hazıra [4] ve efkar-i kasire-i 
çakeranem meallerinden müsteban olacağından ol babda ve her halde muhtaç 
bulunduğum teshilat-ı seniye ve talimat-ı dakayık-ayat-ı [5] aliye-i sadaret-penahilerinin 
sezaver ve Ģayan buyurulması babında emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 15 
S 71. An Çürüksu 
Bende 
MüĢir Kumandan-ı Orduy-i Hümayun-ı Batum.  
[Sealed] Mustafa. 
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Appendix 73. A. MKT. UM. 1970/19 lef 21, 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). 
From Müşir Mustafa Pasha, commander of Batum army to the seraskier.  
 
Fi 15 S 71 tarihinde canib-i hazret-i seraskeriye yazılan tahrirat suretidir. 
 
ġimdiye değin vuku bulan iĢarat-ı bendeganemin cümle-i ibtidaiyesi ve mesele-i 
memuriyet-i çakeranemin re‟s ve esası olduğu vechile Ģu hal ve mevkide orduy-i 
hümayunun heyet-i tahaffuziyesi muhavver-i layıkında [2] görülemediğinden bunun bir 
suret-i kaviye-i mümkine tahtına vaz‟ ve idhali maddesinin derece-i evlada mevkuf-ı 
aleyhi olan tezyid-i kuvve-i askeriye hususunda çare-i seria görüp evvel ve ahir celbi 
istidasında [3] bulunduğum Tunus‟tan memur asakir-i hazret-i Ģahanenin bir taburu 
vürud ederek küsurunun dahi zuhuruna terakkub olunmakta ve mevcud olan üç bin 
nefer mikdarı asakir-i muvazzafadan baĢka [4] Ģimdilik üç bin nefer dahi Lazistan ve 
Trabzon sancaklarından bit-tertib celb kılınmakta olduğuna ve diğer ariza-i çakeride 
beyan olunduğu vechile tedabir-i lazıme-i mevkıyenin icrasına dahi [5] teĢebbüs olun-
duğuna mebni meyamin-i tevcihat-ı aliye-i sipehsalariyle bu keyfiyet Ģöylece tasarlan-
maktadır. Bu sırada Gürcistan ahalisinin tamamıyla celb ve imaleleri zımnında bu 
havalide en muteberleri olan [6] Melakiye ile bil-vasıta hafiyen söyleĢilip Ģimdiye kadar 
her dürlü teminat ve teĢvikat ibrazı ile celpleri kuvve-i karibeye getirilmek rüknü 
görülmüĢ yani merkum Melakiye Rusyalu‟nun [7] ordusunu gezdirmek ve ahvalini 
bildirmek içün taraf-ı çakeriden bir adem isteyip derhal zabitan-ı askeriyeden bir 
bendeleri gönderildiğinden filhakika kendü hükümeti dahilinde vaki [8] Rusya ordusunu 
gezdirmiĢ olduğu halde bu tarafa dehaletleri maddesinin merkez-i fiiliyatı gelecek 
sırada merkum Melakiye renk ve revĢ değiĢtirerek Sivastopol tamamıyla [9] zabt ve 
teshir olunmadıkça ve orası alındıktan sonra Rusyalu dahi külliyen içlerinden çekilip 
gitme-dikçe dehalet etmeyeceklerini ve Ģu kadar ki her ne vakit istenilir ve adem 
gönderilir ise [10] Rusyalu‟nun ordusunu gezdirip ahvalini bildireceğini cevaben haber 
göndermiĢ ve bu hale Gürcülerin bazı ef‟al ve etvar-ı meĢhudelerine göre bunların 
cidden ve sahihen Rusya [11] taraftarlığı iltizamında oldukları anlaĢıldığından bu tarafa 
meyl ve dehalet etmeleri memul olamayıp celpleri suretine teĢebbüs olundukça böyle 
meyl-i ruĢeni [revĢini?] göstermeleri dahi [12] mücerred satvet-i seniye-i hazret-i 
Ģahaneden gözleri yılıp halleri kuvve-i cebriye-i saltanat-ı seniyeye müntec ve müncerr 
olmamak  içün sania[?] imaliyle bu tarafı dahi iğfal etmek garazından ibaret [13] olması 
teferrüs ve istidlal olunmuĢtur. Mamafih salif-üz zikr Rusyalu‟nun teftiĢ-i ahvali 
emrinde merkum Melakiye‟nin verdiği söz netice-i hasene-i matlubeden ümidin 
münkatı‟ [14] olmama-sına bir vasıta ittihaz olunarak dakayık-ı matlub-ı aliyeyi 
mutazammın Dersaadet‟de almıĢ olduğum talimat-ı Ģifahiye-i seraskerilerine itbaen yine 
bir taraftan teminat [15] ve teĢvikat ibrazıyla celpleri sureti iltizam ve buna halel 
vermemek içün bu taraftan hiçbir ferdin Gürcülere tecavüz ve tasallut etmemesine be-
gayet dikkat ve ihtimam [16] olunmakta olup hatta geçende ġekvetil havalisinde asakir-i 
nizamiye karakollarından bir ince karakol gezerken ormanlıktan bağteten bir takım 
Gürcü silah endahtıyle bir nefer [17] Ģehid ederek serini dahi alıp götürmüĢ 
olduklarından bu madde-i müellimenin üzerine bile ma-et-teessür sabr ü sükut kılındı. 
Fakat Gürcistan‟ın öbür tarafında bulunan [18] Megral ve Dadyan taifeleri anlar gibi 
olmayıp daima hareket-i hasmane göstermekte ve bazı tedabir-i kaviye-i seriaya icab ve 
sebeb vermekte olduklarından izaha ibtidar [19] olunur. ġöyle ki Abaza sevahilinden 
Çamçıra tabir olunan mahallin sekiz saatlik içerüsünde ve Anakra nehrinin iki tarafında 
dört bin haneden mürekkep Samirzağan [Samurzakan] [20] nam mahal bulunup buranın 
ahalisi zaten Gürcülerden olduğu halde Abazaların en büyük reisi ve muteberleri olarak 
el-yevm Rusya tarafında bulunan ma‟hud Hamid Bey‟in [21] zir-i idaresine tefviz etmiĢ 
ve çünkü mezkur Samirzağan ahalisinin iki bin hanesi nehr-i mezkurun Ģimal tarafında 
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ve iki bin hanesi cenub [22] yakasında bulunmuĢ olduğundan mesele-i hazıranın 
zuhurundan sonra Abaza takımının canib-i eĢref-i saltanat-ı seniyeye dehaleti sırasında 
nehr-i mezkurun Ģimal [23] tarafındaki Samirzağanlular dahi dehalet etmiĢ iseler de zikr 
olunan Megral ve Dadyan taifeleri bunları Rusyalu‟ya avdete mecbur etmek ve oradan 
ilerleyip [24] Abaza ahalisine dahi tecavüz ve taarruz eylemek garazıyla Rusya 
askeriyle mahluten daima sarkıntılık ederek tazyikten hali olmadıkları cihetle 
muhafazaları zımnında ahali-i merkume [25] feryad ve bu babda Abazalar dahi telaĢ ve 
istimdad etmekte olduklarına ve eğerçi tiz elden Abaza canibinden bin beĢ yüz nefer 
mikdarı asakir-i muvazzafa cem‟ ve tertibiyle hudud-ı mezkureye [26] tayini maddesine 
teĢebbüsle asakir-i merkumenin hududdan zinhar tecavüz ettirilmeyerek suret-i tedafü 
ve tahaffuzda bulundurulması zımnında tenbihat-ı kamile ve tekidat-ı mümkine icra 
olunmuĢ ve mukaddemce [27] Sohum‟a azimet-i bendeganemde zikr olunan Megral ve 
Dadyan taifelerinin celp ve imaleleri zımnında münasip zemin ile haberler gönderilmiĢ 
ise de buna elan bir guna cevabları zuhur etmeyip ber vech-i muharrer [28] suret-i 
isyanlarını artırmakta olduk-larından hudud-ı mezkurenin öyle cüzi asakir-i muvazzafa 
ile muhafazası kabil olama-yacağına ve mezkur Samirzağanlular ile bütün Abaza ahalisi 
bu tarafa henüz [29] ısıttırılmakta olup hususiyle reisleri Hamid Bey‟in celbi zımnında 
melfuf olan sureti mucebince mukaddemce hafiyen bir kıta tahrirat gönderilip el-yevm 
çabalanmakta ve dehalet edeceğine dair bazı haberler alınmakta [30] idüğine ve eğerçi 
mezkur Dadyan taifelerinin Ģu hallerden geçirilip celp ve telifleri suretine çalıĢılmakta 
ve ol tarafa azimet-i çakeranemde dahi yine bil-etraf çalıĢacağım rütbe-i bedahette ise 
de [31] Ģimdiki hal ve hareketleri ol merkezde bulunduğuna binaen ol havalinin hüsn-i 
muhafa-zası esbab ve tedabir-i seriasının istihsali farizadan ve malum-ı alileri 
buyrulduğu üzere orduy-ı hümayunun kuvve-i mevcudesi dun olmak hasebiyle [32] 
buradan asakir-i nizamiye sevk ve irsali mümkün olamayacağından yine Abaza ve 
Çerakise ahalisinden mikdar-ı kafi asakir-i muvazzafa tertib ve tayin olunmaktan baĢka 
çare bulunamayacağı vazıhattan bulunmuĢ ve Ģu kadar ki ahali-i merkumeden [33] bu 
suretle hudud-ı mezkureye kuvvetlice asakir tertib ve tayin olunduğunda Megral ve 
Dadyan taifeleri yine tek durmayıp kema fi-s-sabık Rusya askeriyle tecavüz ve taarruza 
ibtidar edecekleri [34] ve ol halde salif-üz zikr cem‟ olunacak asker dahi cunud-ı 
nizamiye gibi olmayıp müdafaa sırasında ileriye yürüyerek Megral ve Dadyan toprağına 
geçmeğe davranacaklarından [35] ol vakit mev‟ud-ı Sübhani olan muzafferiyet runüma 
oldukda zikr olunan taifeler biraz zedeleneceği derkar olup halbuki bu babda dahi suret-
i aherle imkan ve çare [36] görülememiĢ olmasına nazaran ol vechile ahali-i 
merkumeden mikdar-ı kafi asker tertib ve sevk olunması emrinde istizan-ı irade-i aliye-i 
seraskerî-lerine mecburiyet görünmüĢ olmağla [37] bu babda müteallik ve Ģerefsudur 
buyurulacak irade-i seniye-i asafanelerinin lutfen ve serian beyan ve iĢ‟arına müsaafe-i 
aliye-i sipehsalarîleri Ģayan buyurulması babında emr ü ferman [38] hazret-i men leh-ül 
emrindir.  
 
Appendix 74. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 1, dated 15 Safer 1271 (7 November 1854). 
Stratford to the Porte. Ottoman Irregular Cavalry. 
 
İngiltere sefareti tarafından tevarüd eden bir kıta varakanın tercümesidir 
  
Ġngiltere devletinin hizmetinde olmak üzere baĢıbozuklardan mürekkep bir süvari 
fırkasının tertip ve teĢkilini Ģimdiye kadar bazı mevâni'-i gayr-i melhuze tehir [2] etmiĢ 
ise de devlet-i müĢarünileyha bu babda olan tasmimini bu defa fiile getirmeğe azim ve 
niyet etmiĢtir. Binaberin paĢa unvanıyla hizmet-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'de [3] bulunan 
Kolonel Beatson zikr olunan süvari fırkasının teĢkiliyçün en eyü baĢıbozuklar beyninde 
dört bin nefer süvari askeri intihab etmeğe [4] mezun ve memur olmuĢtur. Fakat öyle bir 
fırka-i askeriyenin bazı esbab-ı malumeden dolayı ne Kırım tarafında bulunan Ġngiliz 
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ordusu ve ne de [5] devletlu refetlu Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin kumandasında olan 
orduy-ı hümayun maiyetlerine verilemeyeceği misillü zikr olunan fırkanın iĢbu iki [6] 
orduların haricinde olarak kullanılması dahi caiz olamayacağına nazaran kolonel-i 
mumaileyhin zikr olunan süvari fırkasını gelecek evvel baharda [7] Lord Raglan 
cenablarının zir-i kumandasında olduğu halde ibraz-ı hidemat-ı fiiliye edecek surette 
teĢkil ve tanzim etmesi ve Ģimdiki halde kolonel-i mumaileyh [8] kendisini yine Serdar-
ı Ekrem hazretlerinin maiyetinde bilmesi hususlarını Ġngiltere devleti arz ve teklif eder. 
ĠĢte niyat-ı meĢruhanın [9] canib-i Bab-ı Ali'den müĢarünileyh Serdar-ı Ekrem 
hazretlerine iĢar buyurulmasıyla beraber bu babda lazım gelen evamirin dahi kendisine 
gönderilmesi arzu [10] olunmaktadır. Vakıa infak ve idarelerinden aciz olup bir takım 
ademlere nezaret etmek sıkıntısından kurtulacağı cihetle iĢbu suretle [11] müĢarünileyh 
Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin dahi memnun kalacağı memuldür. 
 
Appendix 75. İ. MMS. 3/97 lef 3, dated 20 Safer 1271 (12 November 1854). The 
Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha’s tezkire to the Sultan on the 
recruitment of some irregulars for the Batum army and rewards to Georgian and 
Circassian nobility.  
 
Batum orduy-ı hümayununun neferat-ı muvazzafası pek cüzi kaldığından eĢedd-i 
lüzumuna mebni Lazistan sancağından Ģimdilik bin neferin tedarik ve celbi suretine 
ibtidar olunduğu ifadesini [2] ve asakir-i nizamiyesinin dahi mikdarına noksan tari 
olduğundan bu tarafda kalan Tunus askerinin serian yetiĢtirilmesi lüzumunu ve Abaza 
ve Çerakize ümerasının taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye celbleri ne suretle [3] hasıl olacağına 
dair mütalaat ve ol babda olan teĢebbüsatını mutazammın orduy-ı hümayun-ı mezkur 
kumandanı devletlu paĢa hazretlerinin tevarüd eden bir takım tahriratı iki kıta tezkire-i 
behiyye-i sipehsalariyle [4] Ģehr-i halin on yedinci günü akd olunan meclis-i meĢveretde 
kıraat olunup siyak-ı iĢara nazaran zikr olunan orduy-ı hümayunun esbab-ı adideden 
dolayı kuvve-i muvazzafa ve nizamiyesi [5] tenakus ederek düĢman askerinin dahi 
harekat-ı müstahbere ve merviyesi cihetle saye-i kudret-vaye-i hazret-i mülukanede 
ordunun tezyid-i kuvveti ehemm olduğundan ve irsali mukarrer ve matlub olan [6] 
Tunus askerinin bir taburu gönderilüb maadasının dahi heman izamına canib-i vala-i 
seraskeriden himmet olunacağı misillü marr-ül beyan bin nefer asakir-i muvazzafanın 
celbi suretine kumandan-ı müĢarünileyh [7] canibinden teĢebbüs olunmuĢ olmasıyla 
bunun dahi kariben merkez-i orduy-ı hümayuna vasıl olacağı derkar idüğinden asakir-i 
merkumenin ol vechile celb ve istihdamına mezuniyet verilerek keyfiyetin [8] ve fakat 
bu misillu asakir-i muvazzafanın ekser mahallerde tertibi faraza yüz nefer olduğu halde 
zabitleri altmıĢ yetmiĢ nefer istihdam ederek küsurunun yalnız maaĢ ve tayinatlarını 
almakta olduğundan [9] iĢbu celb olunacak neferat-ı muvazzafanın nüfusu adedine 
muvafık olmasına ve bulunacakları mahallerde hiç kimse hakkında cevr ü teaddi 
edememeleriyçün hüsn-i zabt ü rabtları maddesine itina ve dikkat [10] olunması 
kaziyesinin kumandan-ı müĢarünileyhe iĢarıyla muamele-i kuyudiyesinin tesviyesi 
maddesinin *?* [one word unreadable] vechile maliye nezaret-i celilesine bildirilmesi 
ve zikr olunan asakirin bir an akdem tedarik [11] ve izamı suretinin tekidiyle Lazistan 
mutasarrıfı saadetlu paĢaya tahrirat gönderilmesi ve Abaza ümerasından orduy-ı 
hümayun maiyetinde bulunmak emeliyle mukaddemce taraf-ı eĢref-i Saltanat-ı 
Seniyye‟ye dehalet [12] ve iltica etmiĢ olan Mağan Kasi1185 oralarca sahib-i itibar ve 
ikinci derecede malik-i nüfuz ve iktidar olduğundan mumaileyhin ve oğullarının temin 
ve taltifiyle hizmet ve Devlet-i Aliyye‟de kullanılmaları [13] filhakika Abaza beyi 
Abdülhamid Bey‟in ve refte refte sair ümeranın berü canibe mümayilet ve 
meclubiyetlerini istilzam etmek ve oralarda Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin bu suretle dahi bir 
                                                 
1185  Lieutenant-General Katsi Marganiya of the Russian army. (C.B.). 
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kuvveti hasıl olduğunu [14] berü yanda Gürcüler görünce havf ederek Devlet-i 
Aliyye‟nin istihkâma-tına tasallutdan mübaadet ve belki onlar da orduy-ı hümayuna arz-
ı dehalet eylemek gibi nice fevaidi müstevcib olacağına [15] ve mumaileyh Mağan Kasi 
ve oğullarına Rusyalu tarafından rütbe ve niĢanlar ve maaĢlar verilmiĢ olduğu cihetle 
kendülerinin ve gerek emsali-nin berü tarafa meclubiyetleri Rusyalu‟dan gördükleri [16] 
itibarata mukabil elbette haklarında taltifat-ı seniyyenin icrası lazım geleceğine binaen 
kumandan-ı müĢarünileyhin bu husus hakkında olan mütalaat ve teĢebbüsatı yolunda ve 
muvafık-ı maslahat görünmesiyle [17] inhası vechile mumaileyh Mağan Kasi uhdesine 
mirmiranlık rütbesi tevcih ve Ģehriye iki bin kuruĢ maaĢ tahsis olunarak rütbe-i mezkure 
içün bir kıta emr-i ali ısdarıyla [18] müĢarünileyh hazretlerine irsal ve mumaileyhin 
oğullarıyla müteallükatına dahi vaad olunan rütbe ve maaĢların dahi tevcihi ve itasıyla 
keyfiyetleri bu tarafa bildirilmesinin tavsiye ve iĢar olunması ve bu husus [19] hakkında 
dahi nezaret-i müĢarünileyhaya iktizası vechile malumat verilmesi ve müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerinin iĢarından müsteban olduğuna göre gerek Abaza ve Çerakize ümerasından 
ilerüde [20] iktiza edenlere verilecek rütbelerin rüteb-i askeriyeden olması ve her ne 
rütbe verilir ise maaĢ dahi tahsis olunması lazım gelip Ģu kadar ki ita kılınacak rütbeler 
ve maaĢlar [21] bila lüzum ve istihkak verilmeyerek Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye hüsn-i 
hizmetleri görülüp de taltife sahihan ve hakikaten kesb-i liyakat ve istihkak edenlere 
verilmek icab edeceğinden ve burasını müĢarünileyh dahi [22] inhasında izah ve tasdik 
eylemiĢ olduğundan bu Ģarta riayeten ümera-i mumaileyhimden iktiza edenlere 
mülazımlıktan ferikliğe varınca rüteb-i askeriye ita ve münasibi mikdar maaĢlar dahi 
[23] tahsis ve ifa eylemek üzere müĢarünileyh hazretlerine mezuniyet verilmesi 
hususları merkez-i tasvibde görünmüĢ ise de ol babda dahi her ne vechile irade-i isabet-
ade-i hazret-i Ģehriyari [24] müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı münifinin 
icrasına mübaderet olunacağı ve evrak-ı mezkure Ģimdi meĢmul-i lihaze?-i Ģevket 
ihaze?-i cenab-ı cihanbani buyurulmak içün arz ve takdim kılındığı [25] beyanıyla 
tezkire-i senaveri terkim olundu efendim. Fi 20 S sene 71. 
Ġrade fi 21 S sene 71. 
 
Appendix 76. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 62, dated 25 Safer 1271 (17 November 1854). From 
İzzeddin Şir to the sadrazam. 
 
Cizreli Ġzzeddin ġir Bey‟in nemikası suretidir. 
 
Saadetlu efendim hazretleri 
 
[1] Evvel ve ahir hakpay-ı samilerine takdim kılınan maruzat-ı acizanem meallerinden 
malum-ı valaları buyurulduğu vechile bu tarafa vürudumuzdan berü teshil-i umurumuza 
hiçbir taraftan ruy-i müsaade gösterilmediğinden baĢka Hacı [2] Süleyman Ağa ve 
Bedirhan Bey‟in vekili bulunan Molla Sadık nam ile daha bazı taraflar[ın?] dahi 
muhalefet-i sa‟y-i na-mahsur etmiĢler ve burada cem‟ ve tahrir kılınan bin nefer piyade 
ve iki yüz nefer süvariye yirmi beĢ bin kuruĢ Cizre [3] emvalinden havale gösterilmiĢ ve 
mebaliğ-i mezburun ahzıyla mevcud neferatın ma-zimmatlarını tesviyesiyle dört güne 
kadar mahall-i memuriyetimize azimet ve müddet-i mezburda çıkılamadığı halde verilü 
gelen tayinatları dahi [4] kat‟ eyleyeceklerine dair Mardin kaimmakamı saadetlu Osman 
PaĢa tarafından tahriren ve Ģifahen verilmiĢ ve bu melanet dahi Hacı Süleyman Ağa ile 
Bedirhan Bey‟in vekili bulunan Molla Sadık‟ın tahrikiyle [5] olduğu bil-etraf haber 
alınmıĢ ve ez gayr-ı hem Cizre sakinun bir çend kimesneler dahi burada mevcud olan 
askerin tebrid ve tahriklerine çabaladıkları halde kaimmakam-ı mumaileyh bu vechile 
emirname-i kat‟isi tamam [6] ellerine serriĢte ve vesile-i fırsat ittihazıyla doğruca cevab 
verdiler ki buradan size ne havale var ve ne bundan böyle tayinat verilecek ve Ģu yirmi 
bin kuruĢ dahi hatıra mer‟aten verilmiĢ demeleriyle artık [7] ol vakit bir vechile 
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tahammüle takat getiremeyerek heman merkumları girift ile tedibat-ı layıkalarını icra 
ettim ve bunun üzerine süfeha-i merkumların ol vechile tedibatları icra olunduğu bil-
istima‟ çar taraftan herkes kemal-i  Ģevk ve sürur ile tarafımıza gelmiĢler ise de parasız 
bin beĢ yüz neferi idare edip getiremezken Ģimdi üç bini tecavüz eyledi ve vakit dahi 
mürur ederek eyyam-ı Ģita takarrüb [9] eyledi. Artık bu kıĢı burada çıkarıp ve biraz daha 
asker cem‟iyle inĢallahu teala vakt-i merhunda veyahud müsaade-i eyyam olur ise 
heman kıĢ ortasında beĢ altı bin nefer ile canib-i orduy-ı [10] hümayuna iltihak 
olunacağı musammem-kerde-i acizanem bulunmuĢ olduğu ve bu kere Bağdad ve 
ġehrizor caniblerinden bil-vürud Kürdistan tarafına mürur edecek zuhurat postasını 
BiĢabur önünden çöl [11] tarikiyle savuĢturulmuĢ olduğu haber alınmıĢ ve bu keyfiyet 
havsala-i tasvirden hariç kulunuza endiĢe ve azar na-madud olmuĢ Huda alim ve 
danadır ki bendeniz Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye isyan etmek emellerinde [12] olmayıp ancak 
uğur-ı hücum-ı Ģahanede bezl-i vücud etmek ve hizmet-i mefruzeyi eda etmek emeliyle 
bu tarafa geldim ve Ģimdilik tedbir-i takdire muvafakat ettiğinden bir iki mah daha bu 
tarafda [13] lazım gelmiĢ olduğu muhat-ilm-i alileri buyuruldukta bundan böyle gerek 
posta ve gerek sair guna ebna-i sebilin kema fi-s-sabık doğruca bu taraftan mürurlarına 
ruhsat buyurulmuĢ ve zat-ı [14] Ģevket-simat-ı hazret-i tacidarinin adeta bir bende-i 
hakir erleri olduğumdan elimden geldiği kadar mürur-ı uburun müreffehen izam ve 
imrarlarına bezl-i makderet olunacağı ve bir de bendenizi el-ıyazu billâh [15] suret-i 
Ģekavette ittihazıyla ol tarafta olup familya-yı çakeranemi bir gune rencide buyurmayıp 
kapu piĢgahında misillu memur tayin buyurulması akdem amal-i acizanemdir ve beyana 
hacet olmadığı üzere [16] Huda ne kerde bendenizde isyan etmek hulyası olsaydı 
familya-yı acizanemi Ģimdiye kadar bu tarafa celb etmiĢtim ve icab eder ise oraca 
muteber kefil irae olunacağı ve her vechile rıza-ı [17] ali-i tahsilden baĢka maksud ve 
meramım olmadığı ve vuku‟u hale kesb-i ıtla‟ olunmak ve ifadem dahi kanaat gelmek 
üzere ya mahdum-ı a‟li-vekarları fütüvvetlu Tahir Bey Efendi [18] veyahud kethüda-yı 
samileri fütüvvetlu Ġzzet Efendi‟nin bu tarafa irsaline himmet buyurulmak niyazı 
maruzunda ifade-i hale mücaseret kılınmağla ol babda irade ve himmet efendimindir. Fi 
25 S 71. Bende. 
 
Appendix 77. HR. MKT. 93/93, 1 December 1854. From the grand vizier to the 
commander of the Batum army and the governor of Trabzon. 
 
Batum orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanına ve Trabzon valisine tahrirat-ı samiye. Esaret 
maddesi.  
 
Gürcistan'dan esaret suretiyle hiçbir Ģahsın çıkarılmaması ve Çerkesistan ahalisinin dahi 
evlad ve akraba ve müteallükatlarını satmaktan men' kılınması tenbihatını mutazammın 
bundan mukaddemce mahsusen evamir-i [2] aliye takrir ve irsal kılınmıĢ ve bu makule 
eĢhasın irsaline mahreç ittihaz olunan iskelelerde takidat-ı lazımenin icrası vesayası 
dahi tahrirat-ı mahsusa ile baĢkaca bildirilmiĢ idi. [3] Bu husus insaniyetçe ve 
maslahatça kemaliyle itina olunacak mevaddan olduğuna binaen bu babda kaffe-i 
memurinin ziyadesiyle dikkat ve sarf-ı mesai ve gayret eylemeleri devlet-i aliyenin 
matlub-u [4] kat‟isi olup el haleti hazihi Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi ve donanmasının 
Kara Deniz‟de bulunması münasebetiyle bu misillu esaret suretiyle çıkarılacak eĢhasın 
men‟i azimeti hususunda [5] led-el hace memurin-i saltanat-ı seniyeye Ġngiltere 
donanması tarafından muavenet olunması hususunda haĢmetlu Ġngiltere padiĢahı 
hazretleri tarafından Ġngiltere devleti amiraline mezuniyet [6] verildiği dahi bu kere 
Ġngiltere sefir-i muteberi cenapları cihetinden ifade olunarak Kara Deniz‟de bulunan 
Fransa devlet-i fahimesi amiralinin dahi böyle bir madde-i mühimmeye [7] sarf-ı 
himmet edeceği bedihiyyattan olmağla icabı takdirinde anlar ile dahi bil-muhabere 
maznun olan iskelelerden o makule eĢhastan hiçbirinin çıkamaması esbabının [8] 
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istihsaline himmet buyurmaları lazım geleceği ve bu maddede cüzice müsamaha pek 
büyük mesuliyeti davet edeceği beyanıyla nemika-i mahsusa-i senaveri terkimine ibtidar 
kılındı.  
 
Appendix 78. İ. DH. 19997, dated 14 Rebiyyülevvel 1271 (5 December 1854). From 
the grand vizier. On Ömer Pasha’s appointment to the Crimea and İsmail Pasha’s  
appointment to the Rumeli army. 
 
Atufetlu efendim hazretleri 
 
[1] Geçende Ġngiltere elçisi Lord Stratford cenabları nezd-i senaveriye gelerek Kırım‟da 
devam etmekte olan harekat-ı harbiyenin bir ayak evvel hüsn-i netice bulmasının 
ehemmiyet-i müsellemesinden ve Ġngiltere ve Fransa devlet-i fahimelerinin [2] oradaki 
kuvve-i askeriyelerinin tevfirine teĢebbüs olunduğundan ve Ģimdiki halde Gözleve 
tarafında bir fırka-i kaviye-i askeriye bulundurulup da Sivastopol‟ün haricinde ve düvel-
i müttefika askerinin arka tarafında içtima eden [3] Rusya kuvve-i askeriyesini 
ĢaĢırtacak tedabire teĢebbüs etmeklik lüzumundan bahisle Rumeli orduy-i 
hümayunundaki asakir-i hazret-i mülukaneden yigirmi bin nefer kurbünde ve muharebe 
görmüĢ asker ile bir büyük kumandan [4] gönderilmesini ifade ile bu kumandanın 
devletlu Ömer PaĢa hazretleri olmasını dahi Lord Raglan‟ın tarafına vaki olan iĢ‟arı 
üzerine derece-i evla‟da [?] olarak irad etmiĢ olduğunu ve bu mülahaza [5] nezd-i 
devlet-i aliyede karin-i kabul olacağını anladığı gibi çünkü bu maddeyi Lord Raglan 
Fransa ordusu kumandan-an-Ģefi Ceneral Canrobert ile dahi müzakere etmiĢ 
olduğundan Fransa maslahatgüzarıyla [6] birlikte ve suret-i resmiyede Bab-ı Ali‟ye 
beyan-ı keyfiyet olunmak üzere bu babda mahremane mülahaza-i vükelayı istifsar 
eylediğine mebni ifadat-ı meĢruha Ģehr-i sabıkın evasıtından sonraki günlerin birinde 
beyn el-havas [7] dermiyan olundukda vakıa Sivastopol‟ün tahriri ve Kırım‟ın teshiri 
mesele-i mevcudenin ruhu olup inĢallahu teala orada vücuda gelecek muzafferiyet harp 
ve sulhun hüsn-i netayicinden emniyet bahĢ [8] olacağı ve oranın iĢini yalnız devleteyn-
i muavine asakirine ve kumandanlarına bırakmayıp devlet-i aliyenin dahi bir kuvve-i 
kamile ve muntazama ile müĢareketi hem teshil maslahat-ı mev‟udu ve hem de Ģan-ı 
meali-unvan-ı [9] hazret-i ĢehinĢahiye muvafık ve çesban idüği ve çünkü Avusturya 
devleti asakirinin Memleketeyn‟e duhulü mülabesesiyle Rusyalu‟nun oralara tekrar 
tahattisi takdirinde ana karĢu durmak Nemçelü‟ye ait [10] bir hizmet olarak iĢbu yigirmi 
bin asakir-i muntazamanın tefrikinden sonra orduy-ı hümayunun baki kalacak kolu dahi 
Bulgaristan‟ın muhafazasına bakmak lazım gelip Rumeli orduy-ı hümayununun [11] 
ilerisinde hasıl olacak faide dahi yalnız Rusyalu ol havalideki asakirini bütün bütün 
Kırım imdadına gönderememek mülahazasından ibaret olduğu halde bu hareketin 
vaktiyle icrası kabil [12] olamadığı cihetle el-yevm Rusyalu Kırım tarafına külliyetlu 
asker sevk etmiĢ olduğundan maslahatın bu günkü haline göre müĢarünileyh Ömer PaĢa 
hazretlerinin orduy-ı hümayunda bulunmasından Kırım‟da devleteyn büyük 
kumandanlarıyla [13] birlikte olması daha elzem göründüğü cihetle bu mülahaza 
devleteyn sefaret ve kumandanları nezdinde ber minval-i muharrer tasvip ve istihsan 
olunduğu takdirde devlet-i aliyenin dahi re‟y ve rızası anlarla beraber [14] 
bulunacağının sefir-i mumaileyh ifadesine müsteniden karar verilerek ol vechile 
mahremane beyan-ı keyfiyet edilmiĢ ve devlet-i aliyenin evvelden Kırım‟da yigirmi bin 
kadar kuvve-i askeriyesi bulunduğunun üzerine [15] bu kere dahi yigirmi bin asker daha 
irsal olunur ise bunun topu kırk bine baliğ olacağı cihetle böyle külliyetlu asakirin 
makulat ve mühimmatını nakl ve isale yalnız saltanat-ı seniye vapurları kafi [16] 
olamayacağı mülahazasına göre asakirin nakli hizmetinden baĢka zehair ve mühimmat-ı 
mukteziyenin peyapey Kırım‟a irsali maddesine dahi düvel-i müttefika donanmalarının 
muavenet ve himmet eylemeleri iktiza edeceği dahi [17] sefir-i mumaileyhe bildirilmiĢ 
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idi. Sefir-i mumaileyh Lord Raglan‟ın iĢaratı üzerine mülahazat-ı meĢruhasını maslahat-
güzar-ı mumaileyh ifade eylediği vakit Canrobert tarafından kendüsi böyle bir iĢ‟ar [18] 
olmamıĢ olması cihetle suret-i resmiyede Bab-ı Ali‟ye tebliğat itasında sefir-i 
mumaileyh mürafakatında mütereddid bulunması üzerine Lord-ı mumaileyh, Ceneral 
Canrobert‟in bu maddeye dair iĢarat-ı müttehidanesine göre [19] icab-ı halin icrasına 
bakmak üzere bu keyfiyet meskut kaldığı halde bu kere iki kumandanın efkarı 
birleĢerek maslahatgüzar-ı mumaileyh dahi tahrirat gelmiĢ olduğundan Ģimdi iki sefaret 
tarafından dahi [20] ol miktar mücerreb ve münteheb asakir ile müĢarünileyh Ömer 
PaĢa hazretlerinin Kırım‟a azimetini ve bu asakirin nakli zımnında amiraller tarafından 
mahsus vapurlar tertip olunacağı ecelden müĢarünileyh Ömer PaĢa hazretlerinin asakir-i 
matlubeyi [21] tertip ve teheyyü eyleyerek müĢarünileyhima Raglan ve Canrobert ile 
bil-muhabere ircaı memuriyetine müsaraat eylemesi resmen ifade olunarak bu halde 
Anadolu ordusu müĢiri devletlu Ġsmail PaĢa hazretlerinin Rumeli [22] orduy-ı 
hümayunu kumandanlığı kaimmakamlığına tayiniyle Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa 
büyük kumandanlığa muktedir ve münasip bir zat intihap ve tayin kılınması tabiiyet-i 
maslahattan olacağına ve asakir-i matlubenin sevk [23] ve irsali ve müĢarünileyh Ömer 
PaĢa hazretlerinin bu asker ve devleteyn kumandan-an-Ģefleriyle birlikte bulunup 
müĢarünileyh Ġsmail PaĢa hazretlerinin Rumeli orduy-ı hümayunu kumandanlığı 
kaimmakamlığına tayini hususu [24] mukaddemce mecliste dahi güzeran etmiĢ idüğine 
mebni ber minval-i muharrer müĢarünileyh Ömer PaĢa hazretlerine beyan-ı hal ve 
müĢarünileyh Ġsmail PaĢa hazretlerinin dahi kaimmakamlık ile Rumeli orduy-ı 
hümayununa derhal irsal [25] edilmesi hususunda her ne vechile emr ü ferman-ı 
keramet-unvan-ı hazret-i hilafetpenahi müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise mhsrhir [?] 
ve isabet inha olacağı ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununun ıslahat-ı layıkaya [26] ihtiyacı 
umur-ı müsellemeden olmasıyla oraya dahi münasip ve muktedir bir zat intihap 
olunarak ve Kırım‟da bulunacak kuvve-i askeriyenin hüsn-i idare-i levazımatı için bir 
rabıtalı defterdar tayini dahi [27] muktezi göründüğünden bu memuriyet için münasip 
bir zat bulunarak bu keyfiyetlerin dahi mübarek hakpay-i aliden istizan kılınacağı 
beyanıyla tezkire-i senaveri terkim olundu efendim. Fi 12 Ra sene 71 (mim) 
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Hame-pira-yı tazim olan işbu tezkire-i samiye-i asafaneleri manzur-ı meali-mevfur-ı 
hazret-i padişahi buyurulmuş ve ber minval-i muharrer müşarünileyh Ömer Paşa 
hazretlerine beyan-ı hal ve müşarünileyh İsmail Paşa hazretlerinin dahi kaimmakamlık 
ile Rumeli orduy-ı hümayununa derhal irsal edilmesi ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa 
münasip ve muktedir bir zat intihap olunarak ve zikr olunan kuvve-i askeriye 
defterdarlığı memuriyeti için dahi münasip bir zat bulunarak bu keyfiyetlerin dahi 
istizan kılınması şeref-sünuh ve sudur buyurulan emr ü irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı 
şehinşahi mukteza-ı celilinden bulunmuş olduğu muhat-ilm-i sami-i sadaretpenahileri 
buyuruldukta ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 14 Ra sene 71 
 
Appendix 79. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 4, undated. Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha’s testimony on 
the battle of Ahısha. (Comments of others are given in italics. Texts in red ink are 
from the original). 
 
Ahısha‟da vuku bulan bozgunluğun sebebi Ferik Ali PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta 
orada olan vukuata dair yazmıĢ olduğu iĢbu varaka meydana konulup Abdi PaĢa ve 
Ahmed PaĢa hazeratı hazır oldukları halde irad olunan suallere müĢarünileyhim 
tarafından verilen cevablardır ki maddeleri yanlarına surhla iĢaret kılındı.  
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Mesele-i hazıradan dolayı Ardahan‟a sevk olunmak üzere teheyyü olunmuĢ olan fırka-i 
askeriyeyi bil-istishab Erzurum‟dan hareket olunarak ber tıbk-ı dilhah-ı ali nezaret-i 
icabiye ve ikdamat-ı kamilenin icrasıyla esna-i rahda ve Ardahan‟da ikamet olunduğu 
müddetçe saye-i ihsan-vaye-i hazret-i Ģahanede asakir-i merkumeye zerreten zaruret 
çekdirilmediği misillü muğayir-i rıza-i bari ve ali bil-cümle tebaa ve sekeneye vechen 
min el vücuh teaddi ve hasar vuku bulmayarak kaffe-i sekene memnun ve müteĢekkir 
olduklarını an zahr?-il gayb hakpay-ı aliye ba mazbata inha etmiĢ ve mazbata-i 
mütekaddimeleri Ceride-i Havadis nüshalarında be-ibaretha tab‟ ve temsil buyurulmuĢ 
idüği 
Suret-i hareketini beyandan ibaret olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
Fırka-i mezkure ile Ardahan‟a bil-muvasala bölük heyetiyle rükz-i hiyam ve ordunun 
etrafına nizamı vechile karakollar tesvik ve hasb-el ihtiyat Batum ve Ahılkelek ve 
Ahısha ve Kars ve Erzurum ve nefs-i Çıldır caddelerine piĢrev karakollar tayiniyle 
ihtimam ve ihtiyat-ı icabiyenin icrasında ikdam-ı tam olunmuĢ olduğu  
Bu maddenin dahi hükmü olmadığı 
 
DüĢmanın ahvaline kesb-i ıtla‟ ederek ona göre hareket ve emr-i tedabire mübaderet-i 
lazıme-i halden ve usul-i harb iktizasından olduğuna mebni müteaddid casuslar 
tedarikiyle Ahısha ve Tiflis ve Ahılkelek taraflarına def‟aten ba‟d aheri irsal ve isra ve 
ol babda olunan istihbarat ve istirakat peyderpey Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müĢiri 
devletlu Abdülkerim PaĢa hazretleri tarafına tafsilen arz ve inha olunmuĢ olduğu 
Bu dahi 
 
Fırka-i mezkurenin Ardahan‟da müddet-i ikameti imtidad olacağı mütalaasıyla Çıldır 
sancağı kaimmakamı saadetlu Feyzullah PaĢa ile bil-muhabere vel-mükatebe gerek 
müĢarünileyh tarafından ve gerekse taraf-ı bendeganemden müteaddid memurlar tayin 
ve tisyarıyla bir sene-i kamile idare edecek erzak liva-i mezbur kazalarından mübayaa 
ve isticlab birle Ardahan‟da iddihar-ı anbar kılınmıĢ ve an zahr?-il gayb vuku‟ bulan arz 
ve iĢar-ı saireye mebni sübut-i Ceride-i Havadis olmuĢ idüği 
Bu dahi 
 
ĠĢte bala-i hikaye bulunan asakir ve ümera-i zabitan-ı askeri yekdil yekvücud cümlemiz 
derecesiz dikkat ve cansiperane hizmet ederek hatta taburların nısfları dahi geceleri bile 
münavebe ile hazır durmakta olup artık kuvve-i metanet pek yolunda olarak düĢman 
tarafından fırsat olmak pek memul olmaz idi. Fakat Telfiz [Tiflis?] caddesinin zabt ü 
ihtimamına muvafık olamadığımız cihetle buradan her vakit muhatara memul olur idi. 
Bu memule göre fi 24 S sene 70 [26.11.1853] tarihinde Rusya askerinin saat sekiz 
raddelerinde beĢ tabur piyade bir takım süvari yedi kıta top imdadı gelip cadde-i 
mezkurdan geçip Ahısha‟ya azimetlerini ümera-i zabitan-ı askeri ve neferat ve 
cümlemiz müĢahade ederek bunun üzerine tarafımızda daha ziyade kuvve-i metanet ve 
basiret ve gece gündüz gaile-i gafletden beri olmak üzere memur bulunan mirliva 
paĢalara ve ümera-i zabitan-ı askerinin [sic] cümlesine Ģifahen ve gerek tezkire-i ekid 
ile tenbih-i tekrar olunarak bu halde kuvve-i ihtimam ve basiretde iken fi 25 S sene 70 
[27.11.1853] tarihinde ale‟s-sabah Rusya askeri kaleden dıĢaru çıkıp Suhlic [sic] karyesi 
üzerine doğru gelmekte oldukları müĢahade olundu-ğuna mebni bizim dahi hazır ve 
müheyya olmaklığımız lazıme-i hizmetten olduğuna binaen bit-tertib ve icab tedarik-i 
basiret birle durmakta iken bir top menzili kadar tarafımıza yakın geldikte hatt-ı harb 
üzere karĢuda durup bizim tarafa toplar atmağa mübaĢeret eylediğinden biz dahi bizim 
topların atılmasına mübaĢeret ederek Suhlic‟deki [sic] olan piyade üç tabur ile ma 
süvari bir hat olmak üzere sağ cenahdaki [sic] bulunan üç taburdan birisi Harput 
redifinin dördüncü taburu BinbaĢı Mustafa Ağa kumandasıyla derakıb Suhlic‟e 
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gönderildi. Sağ cenah-ı mezkurda kalan iki tabur piyade ve beĢ kıta top birinci hatta 
ihtiyat olmak üzere Mirliva Mustafa PaĢa‟ya Ģifahen tenbih olunarak tertib olunduğu 
cihetle vaktinde hemen geldiler ve bendeleri dahi iki hattın ortalık yerinde bir tepecik 
üzerinde durdum. Ol vakit nizamiye altıncı alayının iki taburunu dahi kaimmakam ve 
binbaĢılar kumandasıyla Suhlic‟e gönderdim. Mahall-i mezkurda altı tabur piyade bir 
alay süvari yedi kıta top mevcud oldular. Ġki tabur piyade ve beĢ kıta top dahi ihtiyatdan 
kaldılar. Dört saat kadar top muharebesi oldukta gerek zeminin buharı ve gerek 
tarafeynden atılan topların dumanı çöküp gece misillü karanlık olduğundan artık 
birbirimizi görmez olduk. 
 
Ol vakit düĢman tarafından daha top atılmadığından bizim tarafdan dahi attırmadan beĢ 
on dakika kadar tarafeyn sükunetle durdular ise de badehu düĢman askeri “uğra” [sic] 
deyu haykırmalarıyla bizim asker dahi “padiĢahım çok yaĢa” deyu bülend-avazlar ile 
haykırıp top ve tüfenk ve kılınç artuk tarafımızdan bir vaveyla-i azim ile muharebe 
etmekde iken saat sekiz raddelerini bulunca Harput redifinin bazıları gerüye ricat 
etmeğe baĢladıklarını gördüğüm halde bunların gerü çevirilmesiyçün durduğum 
noktadan bunlara nazaran yanımda duran zabitana dahi bunları çevirin ve çevirdin deyu 
söyleyerek öyle uğraĢırken daha ziyade kesret bulmakta olduğundan bulunduğum nokta 
mahallinde iki tertib koyup toplanma tranpetesini urdurdum çünkü muharebeden bir 
mah mukaddem yeni gelen kanunname-i hümayun herkese baĢka baĢka ve bölüklerde 
dahi okutturulmuĢ idi. Ol vechile icray-i hareket olunarak ricat eden neferatın cem‟i 
hakkında bendelerinin ve zabitanın uğraĢıp yine mümkün olamayarak önü alınamamıĢ, 
ol vakit bendelerine yüz hatve mesafe mahal hayliden hayli baĢıbozuk neferim [sic] 
askeri ve gerek nizamiye dağa doğru kaçmakta olduklarını gördüğümde arkaları sıra Ģu 
vechile haykırdım: „Yahu asker kanununu okudunuz. Niçün kaçıyorsunuz? Dönün, 
gelin!‟ dediğimde sem‟ ü iltifat etmediler ve hatta baĢıbozuklara dahi ayrıca haykır-dım: 
„Kendü gönlünüz ile gelip de Ģimdi niçün kaçıyorsunuz? Askere de sebeb oldunuz, sizi 
ururum!‟ dediğimde bunlar dahi iltifat etmediklerinden ber muceb-i kanunname bir el 
silah attım ve „Dönmediğiniz halde size top attırırım!‟ deyu haykırdım. Yine dönmenin 
mümkünü olmayıp gittiler. Fakat attığım bir el silah kimesneye isabet edip etmediğini 
bilemiyorum. ĠĢte bu firariler içün uğraĢmakta iken Mirliva Ali PaĢa‟nın uĢağı gelip 
paĢanın urulduğunu haber verdikte bendeniz süratle hayvanı sürüp vardığımda kendüni 
askere bildirme deyu ifade edip oradan Bamık (?) karyesine getürdüm ve yine 
bulunduğum nokta mahalline geldim. Tranpet urulmak sebebiyle ricat eden askerden 
biraz nizamiye tecemmü olup ihtiyat ile beraber yine muharebeye baĢladılar ise de yine 
içlerinden ricat eden eksik olmayıp kesretde zuhur eylediğinden bunların zabt ü 
tecemmüü olamayıp ve cem‟ olunsalar dahi yine kaçmakta olmalarıyla düĢman ise bu 
halleri ve bozgun misillü hareketleri hiss etmesiyle daha üzerimize varmakta olmasına 
ve askerin çevrilmesine led-el meĢgul rakib olduğum esb ile sağ ve sola derken esb dahi 
yorulup yıkıldıkta bendeniz altında kaldım. Ol vakit yanımda bulunan sekiz on nefer 
Kürt bendenizi kaldırdılar. ĠĢte bu vechile uğraĢıp ve muharebe olmakta iken 
muahharen ihtiyat tarafları bozulup bir daha tecemmü mümkün olamayıp her biri bir 
tarafa kaçtılar. Bunun üzerine Rusyalu dahi hücum ederek topları zabt eyledi. Ol hale 
nazaran bendeniz de avdet eyledim.  
 
Ve rivayet olunduğuna göre esnay-i rahda baĢıbozuk ve asakir-i nizamiyeye silah attı 
deyu hakk-ı acizanemde mekal olmuĢ ise de bunların aslı olmayıp bala-i beyan 
muharebe arasında attığım bir el silahdan ibaret idi ve malum-ı alileri buyurulduğu 
vechile böyle bozgun müteferrik gittiği halde değil silah dun muamele bile olamaz. 
Bozgun olarak avdetimiz ile esnay-i rahda baĢıbozuk askerine Ģu vechile ifade eyledim 
ki „DüĢmanın bize galib gelmesi ancak onların itaatlu olmasındandır. Hatta baĢıbozuk 
kulları bile boru ile kumanda icra ederler. Ben size ol mikdar haykırdıktan sonra 
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muharebe mahallinde yine bir el silah dahi attım, yine çeviremedim. Yazıklar olsun!‟ 
dedim.  
 
Ve HurĢid PaĢa‟nın inhasından anlaĢılan muharebeye mübaĢeret olunduğu vakit ferik 
paĢa gerüye çekildi deyu hakk-ı acizanemde rivayet olunmuĢ bu misillü keyfiyat vuku 
bulma-mıĢdır ve hem dahi bu guna mekalatı asla kabul etmem. ġu muharebede değil 
bendenizin kaffe-i zabitan can ve baĢtan hizmet ettik ve bendelerinin dahi bu hal üzere 
can ve baĢım uğur-ı meyamin-i padiĢahide heba ve itlaf etmek ve alel husus din ve 
millet yolunda cansiperane hizmet etmek hususunu nimet-i celil bilerek muharebe-i 
mezkur bidayetinden nihayetine kadar iki hattın aralık yerinde ne vechile uğraĢdığımı 
batınen cenab-ı hakk bildikten sonra zahiren Erzincan Ģeyhlerinden Hilmi Efendi ve 
Hacı Ġbrahim Efendi ve Erzurumi Hacı Mustafa Efendi ve Gevleve (?) kazasından 
Küçük Arslan Bey sekiz on ademler ile ve Oltu meclis azasından CoĢkun Bey bunların 
cümlesi heyet ve hizmet-i acizanemi gördüler ve batınî dahi ne vechile idim ancak 
cenab-ı hakk bilür. Bu cihetle istek ve gayret var iken düĢman-ı mezkuru münhezim 
etmek memulünde iken muvafık olamamıĢ olduğumuzdan vuku‟-ı muharebenin bed ve 
nihayeti bil-etraf hikaye-i acizanem üzere der cenab-ı halık içün kudretlu padiĢah-ı 
velinimetimiz efendimiz hazretlerinin ömr ü afiyetlerini mezdad ve ber karar buyurup 
âdâ-i bedhahilerin periĢan ve Ģu hallerin ahz-ı intikamlarını müyesser ve mukadder 
eylesün amin.  
 
[page 6] 
 
Hasb-el ihtiyat Ardahan‟da bazı istihkamatın icrası hususu müĢir-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretleri taraflarından bil-istizan iktizasına irae-i ruy-i müsaade buyurularak istihka-
mat-ı mezkureye lüzum görünen adatı matlub olduğu halde irsal buyurulmadığından 
biz-zarur ġavĢad kazasından bin aded kürek ve yüz elli kadar kazma celbiyle iki aded 
tabya ve yigirmi beĢ göz zeminlik inĢa olunmuĢ ve elyevm mamur ve mevcud bulunmuĢ 
olduğu 
Bu dahi 
 
Ġlerüye azimet olunduğu vakit lüzum mütalaasıyla mezkur ġavĢad kazasından fındık 
çubuğu celb olunarak iki yüz aded sepet ve altı kalkan imal ve çayı geçmek içün lüzumu 
mikdar tahta ve tulum dahi tehiye ettirilmiĢ ve el haleti hazihi Ardahan‟da mevcud 
bulunmuĢ idüği  
Bu dahi 
 
Bu cümle-i tedbir üzerine kuvve-i askeriyenin kemalinde olmuĢ olması lazıme-i halden 
ve faraiz-i umurdan olduğuna ve fırka-i mezkur ise altı tabur redif ve iki tabur 
nizamiyeden mürekkeb olup zikr olunan redif taburlarının üçü Kars‟dan Ardahan‟a 
muahharen gelmiĢ ve on iki saat mesafede otuz neferi esnay-i rahda firar etmiĢ 
bulunduğuna ve suret-i hale nazaran hin-i muharebede gevĢek davranacakları maznun 
olup nizamiyenin dahi zaten az göründüğü-ne mebni lüzumu kadar nizamiyenin irsal ve 
kuvve-i askeriyenin ikmal buyurulması hususu müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine arz ve 
inha olunduğu halde bir guna semere müĢahade olunmamıĢ olduğu. 
“Bu askerin muallem nizamiye ile tebdili mümkün değil mi idi?” sualine “işe 
yaramayacağı beyan olunan asker Taşköprü redifinin pek güzidesi olup, olmasa bile 
işbu terfik olunandan ziyade sevk etmek veyahud bunları tebdil eylemek maddeleri 
hayyiz-i imkanda olamayıp çünkü asakir-i mevcude iktiza eden mahallere 
yerleşdirildiğinden bir yerin huluvviyle diğer mahalle kuvve-i kafiye sevki caiz 
olamayacağı” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından verilmişdir. 
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Fırka-i mezkurede bulunan topçu binbaĢısı ve neferatının ekserisi redif olduğundan 
topçu binbaĢılarından harb görmüĢ, cesur ve dirayetli bir binbaĢının irsali hususu müĢir-
i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine arz ve inha olunmuĢ olup geçenlerde kol ağalığı inha olunan 
YüzbaĢı ġakir Ağa‟nın istidadından bahisle irsal olunarak matlub vechile binbaĢı 
irsaline müsaade buyurulmamıĢ idüği 
“Böyle bir binbaşının gönderilmesi lazım idi” denildikte “Erzurum‟da iken Ali 
Paşa‟nın intihabıyla bir topçu binbaşısı tayin olunmuş ise de muahharen bunda işe 
yaramadığı tarafından inha olunması üzerine keyfiyet meclise havale olunup Ali 
Paşa‟nın maiyetinde bulunan Yüzbaşı Şakir Ağa‟nın ehliyeti cihetle rütbesinin kol 
ağalığına terfiiyle istihdamı kararlaşdırıldığından iktizası vechile keyfiyet kendülerine 
yazılmışdı. Bunun üzerine mumaileyhin işe yaramadığı beyan ile diğerinin irsalini 
müşarünileyh bi-tekrar yazdı ise de öyle zabitan memuriyetleri üzerinde olduğundan 
biz-zarur tayin olunamadığı ve mumaileyh Şakir Ağa‟nın ehliyeti meclisce bilinip 
istihdamı kararlaşdırılmış idüği” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından 
verilmişdir. 
 
Fırka-i mezkure ile Ardahan‟da bulunan cephane bil-muvazene fırka-i mezkurenin 
mevcudu dört bin olduğu halde beher nefere sekiz deste ve mevcud sekiz bine baliğ 
olacağı takdirde beher nefere dört deste fiĢenk düĢeceği ve bu suretle mezkur fiĢenklerin 
az olduğu misillü topların dörder yüz atım cephanesi olduğundan bunların altıĢar yüze 
iblağı ve mikdar-ı vafi fiĢenk irsali hususu kezalik müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine 
yazıldığı halde irsal buyurul-mamıĢ olduğu 
Bu cephanenin niçün gönderilmediği ve suret-i tesviyesi ne vechile olduğu led-es sual, 
“topçu binbaşısı tarafından noksan neferata ve mevadd-ı saireye dair verilen pusulayı 
Ali Paşa bana gönderdi. Ben dahi usuli vechile meclise havale eyledim. Meclis dahi 
topçu livası burada olmadığından vürudunda iktizasına bakılacağını istilam etmekle 
mucebince (?) kendüsine yazmış idim” cevabı müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri 
tarafından verilmesi üzerine “şu gönderilmiş olan pusulada muharrer olan şeyler ne 
idi?” denildikte müşarünileyh Ali Paşa işte bunlardır diyerek bir kıta pusula irae 
eylemiş ise de muharrere olan yalnız neferata verilen fişengin mikdarını mübeyyin 
olmasıyla hudud-ı haric bulunduğu anlaşılıp müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri dahi 
Ali Paşa‟nın buna dair gelen tahriratı hasb-el usul meclise verildikten sonra meclis 
dahi topçu livasına havale eyledikte müşarünileyhin beraber aldığı cephanenin kafi 
olduğu ve ilerüde lüzumu olur ise icabına bakılacağı derkenar olunup mucebince 
meclisden dahi ilam olunarak müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri biraz cephane daha 
gönderildiğini ifade eyledikte müşarünileyh Ali Paşa dahi “vakıa cephane geldi lakin 
vaktiyle vasıl olamayıp avdetimde cephaneye yolda tesadüf ettim. Cephanenin ol kadar 
lüzumu var idi ki gavga esnasında asakir cephanesizlikten düşmana el ile taş attılar” 
demişdir.  
 
Mirliva Veli PaĢa lüzumu mikdar asker ile avangard tarikiyle Kars‟dan Arpaçayı‟na 
doğru irsal buyurulmuĢ olduğundan bahisle Ardahan‟dan dahi münasip bir zabit ile 
Ahısha‟ya hudud baĢına avangard olarak asker sevk olunması ba emirname-i müĢir-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafından emr ü iĢar buyurulmuĢ olduğundan iki bölük süvari 
ve iki bin kadar asakir-i muvazzafa ile Miralay Hasan Bey avangard tarikiyle hudud 
baĢına sevk ve izam olunup ve orada ne vechile amel ve hareket edeceğini bilmek ve 
ona göre hareket eylemek üzere emirname-i mezkure mir-i mumaileyhe irae ve meal-i 
valası bil-etraf ifade ve tefhim ettirilmiĢ idüği 
Meclisce teşebbüs olunan tedabire dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
Mumaileyh Hasan Bey re‟s-i hududa muvasalatından çend gün sonra düĢman tarafından 
tahatti zuhur ve silah endahtından naĢi beri tarafdan def‟-i kıyam ve muharebeye atf-i 
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licam olunarak cenab-ı hakkın lütf ü ihsanıyla asakir-i Ġslam muzaffer ve düĢman askeri 
münhezim olarak hayliden hayli telefat vukuundan baĢka bir bab karantinahane ve 
yigirmi bab postahaneleri ihrak ve yüzbaĢı ve çavuĢ ve onbaĢı ve neferattan çend re‟s 
esir ahz ve ol esnada kelle ve kulak kesilmesine dair men‟ iradesi henüz Ģeref-tevarüd 
etmemiĢ olduğundan beĢ on kadar kelle kesilerek mezkur üsera ile beraber Ardahan‟dan 
taraf-ı çakeraneme irsal ve tisyar ve bunun üzerine düĢmanın külliyetlu asker ve topu 
geleceğini müĢahade etmiĢ olduğundan kuvve-i zuhuriye yetiĢdirilmesi hususu mir-i 
mumaileyh tarafından suy-i abidaneme iĢar olunmaktan naĢi derhal üsera-i mezkure ve 
kelle ve kulaklar müĢir-i müĢarünileyh taraflarına irsal ve mir-i mumaileyhin iĢarı 
vechile imdad yetiĢdirilmesi istizan olundukta cevaben varid olan iradelerine mebni üç 
tabur piyade ve altı kıta top ile Mirliva izzetlu Ali PaĢa mumaileyh Hasan Bey tarafına 
sevk olunmuĢ olduğu 
Vukuatın beyanını mutazammın olup paşa-i müşarünileyhin istizanı üzerine mumaileyh 
Hasan Bey tarafına Mirliva Ali Paşa‟nın kumandasıyla mikdar-ı kafi asker 
gönderilmesi yazılmış olduğunu müşarünileyhima Abdi Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa hazeratı 
ifade ve beyan eylemişlerdir. 
 
Mirliva-i mumaileyh miralay-ı mumaileyhe muvasalatında bi-tekrar muharebe vuku‟ 
bularak bi-avn-i rabbani asar-ı muzafferiyet asakir-i Ġslamiye tarafında ve müdemmeri-
yet Rusyalu canibinde zuhur edip hayli telefatı olduğundan yedi nefer dahi esir alınarak 
düĢman askeri müzhezimen avdet ve kaleye kapanmak üzere müsaraat ve asakir-i 
nusret-müessir-i hazret-i Ģahane dahi bit-takib hücum birle hatta süvari nizamiye ve 
asakir-i muvazzafa derun-ı Ahısha‟ya girip yine avdetle kaleye yarım saat mesafede 
vaki Suhlis nam karye ile civarında bulunan karyelere yerleĢerek mezkur esirleri taraf-ı 
bendeganeme irsal etmiĢ ve bendeleri dahi Ardahan‟dan hareket etmiĢ bulunduğumdan 
üsera-i merkumeye yolda tesadüf eylediğimden onlar dahi emsali misillü müĢir-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafına irsal ve fakat bu muharebede bir nefer onbaĢı ve bir 
çavuĢ Ģehid olmuĢ olmağla keyfiyetleri müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine iĢar ve lüzum 
görünmesi cihetle Kaimmakam Hacı Eyüp Bey ile iki tabur piyade taraf-ı çakeriden 
derhal imdaden ilerüye irsal ve tisyar olunmuĢ olduğu 
“Liva ve miralay-ı mumaileyhimanın böyle tecavüz eylemelerine ne tarikden emir 
verilmiş-dir?” denildikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Tecavüz olunmayıp 
tahaffuzi durulmasını yazmış idim. Bilmem nasıl oldu” demeleri üzerine müşarünileyh 
Ali Paşa “Vakıa müşarünileyh hazretlerinin böyle bir tahriratı gelerek mumaileyhimaya 
gösterdüm ve mealini dahi bil-etraf tefhim eyledim. Onlar bu tecavüzi hareketi 
kendüliklerinden ihtiyar eylediler” demişdir. 
 
Mirliva-i mumaileyh keyfiyet-i meĢruhayı evvelce taraf-ı bendeganeme iĢar ve 
müsaraaten yetiĢmemizi izbar etmiĢ olduğundan derhal keyfiyet müĢir-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretleri tarafından bil-istizan ol babda ruhsatı nümayan olmağla bir gün sonra gelmek 
üzere bir tabur piyade ve dört bölük süvari ile Mirliva Mustafa PaĢa Ardahan‟da 
bırağılıp çakerleri iki tabur piyade ve altı kıta top istishabıyla Ardahan‟dan hareket ve 
Poshov kazasına tabi Diğor karyesine muvasalat olunmuĢ ve salif-üz zikr Suhlis 
karyesine varılıp varılmaması mumaileyh Ali PaĢa‟dan istihrac olundukta hemen 
mezkur Suhlis karyesine yetiĢilmesi lazımeden olduğunu iĢar etmekten naĢi oradan 
hareket ve Suhlis karyesinde mirliva-i mumaileyhe muvasalat olunmuĢ ve Ahısha 
kalesinin bir çaryek mesafesinde Nevabet [?] dağına ve sair icab eden mahallere liva-i 
mumaileyh tarafından evvelce va‟z ve ikame olunan karakollara bir kat dahi taraf-ı 
çakeriden nezaret ve takviyet verilerek kalenin etrafı bütün bütün zabt olunmuĢ ve 
mumaileyh Mustafa PaĢa dahi beraberinde bulunan piyade ve süvari ile bir gün sonra 
taraf-ı çakeraneme muvasalat ederek Çenek [Cenk?] nam karyede bir tabur ile ikame 
ettirilmiĢ idüği 
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Bu harekete suret-i mezuniyetleri ne vechile olduğu sual olundukta müşarünileyh Ali 
Paşa, “İlerü gitmek içün ba-tahrirat istizan eyledim ve şu gelen cevaba göre hareket 
ettim” demesi üzerine “Vakıa meal-i tahrirata göre ruhsat verilmiş demek oluyor. 
Mukaddemki tahriratınızda tecavüz olunmayıp tahaffuzi halde durulmasını yazmış 
olduğunuz halde, sonradan böyle hareket-i tecavüziyeye ruhsat verilmesi neden iktiza 
eyledi?” denildikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa, “Şu gösterilen mektubda beyan olunduğu 
üzere Ali Paşa ilerü gitmek içün ruhsat istemiş ve bunda ne suret memul idüğini 
kaviyyen tasrih eylemiş olduğundan bunun üzerine ruhsat vermemek nasıl caiz 
olurdu?” demişdir. 
 
Gerek mirliva ve miralay-ı mumaileyhimanın Ahısha üzerine ve gerek Ardahan müdiri 
Hüseyin Bey ile biraderi Çıldır müdiri Hasan Bey‟in Ahılkelek tarafına sevk olunduğu 
vakitlerde iĢbu serzede-i zuhur olan mesele hiçbir vakitde zuhur etmemiĢ olup bu halde 
cihad üzerinde bulunan ehl-i Ġslam “esteizu billahi teala innema el muminun ihvatun” 
irade-i hikmet-adesi mucebince yekvücud karındaĢı olması ve bu umur-ı muazzama-i 
diniye ve dünyeviyenin hüsn-i ifası zımnında fiilen ve kalben bezl-i mechud eylemiĢ ve 
mukaddemki vakada Rusyalu‟nun mahruset-ül memalik-i hazret-i Ģahaneden bazı 
mahalleri istila etmesine sebeb adem-i ittihad ve ittifak olmuĢ olduğu ve mamafih Ģu 
vakitde bir ehl-i Ġslam ile diğer bir ehl-i Ġslamın kıtal iddiası olsa bile tarafeyn terk-i 
dava ile Ģime (?)-i ittihad-ı diniyeye can-ı hakla sarılıp uğur-ı din ve Devlet-i Aliyye‟de 
fedakârane hareket ve “cahidu fi sebilullah” nass-ı celili üzere cihada himmet etmek 
lazım geleceğini ve maazallahu teala bunun hilafına hareket eden ve taraf-ı Devlet-i 
Aliyye‟ye öte taraf ahalisinden istihak üzere bulunan reayaya hilaf-ı Ģer‟-i Ģerif ve 
kanun-ı münif teaddi ve hasar eyliyenlerin tedibat-ı icabiyeleri icra kılına-cağı asakir-i 
nizamiye ve muvazzafaya layıkıyla tefhim eylemeleri ve kendüleri dahi minval-i 
meĢruh üzere hareket eylemeleri mir-i mumaileyhim taraflarından suy-i çakeriden ba 
nemika-i mahsusa beyan kılındığı misillü anif-ül beyan Suhlis karyesine muvasalat-ı 
bendeganemde Ahısha‟nın havi olduğu kazalarda kain ehl-i Ġslam ve reayaya velinimet-
i bi-minnetimiz padiĢah-ı faruk-sıfat efendimiz hazretlerinin Ģamilet-ül afak olan adl ü 
dad ve merhamet-i seniyyelerini iĢaren ve ihbaren ilan ve taraf-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟ye 
dehalet ve istiman edenlerin irad ve akar ve emlak ve sair her neleri var ise kemakan 
ihsan buyurulacağı ve mal ve can ve ırz-ı namusundan emin olacaklarını ityan 
eylediğime ve min gayri liyakatin bu suretle iknaa muvafık olduğuma mebni bil-cümle 
kazaların söz anlarları taraf-ı abidaneme gelmiĢ ve merasim-i Ģükr-güzarinin ifasıyla 
birer nefer müdir nasbını istida etmiĢ ve ol vechile altı kazaya altı nefer müdir nasb u 
tayin ve yedlerine istiman-ı kamileyi mutazammın ahaliye hitaben birer kıta buyruldu 
ita olunarak mahallerine tesrib ve buyrulduların birer kıta suretleri-nin leffiyle vukuuhal 
müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafına arz ve iĢar kılınmıĢ ve yalnız kalesiyle nefs-i 
Ahısha kazası Rusyalu‟nun elinde kalmıĢ olduğu ve kale-i mezburun teshiri kale döğer 
toplara mütevakıf ve imdad olarak biraz asker irsaline menut olduğu izbar olunmuĢ 
olduğu 
Hikayeden ibaret olmasıyla hükmü olmadığı 
 
Bunca defa olan arz ve istiday-i bendeganem üzerine kuvve-i askeriyece bir guna 
müsaade runüma olmadığı gibi noksan olan altı kıta kapaklunun irsali hususu müĢir-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretlerine iĢar olunarak zuhur etmediğinden tehirine sebeb bargirin 
olmaması ise oralarda lüzumu mikdar hayvanat muvafakat-i çakeranemle alınıp irsal 
olunacağından bahisle iĢin gerü kalmaması tekrar istizan olundukta ona dahi irae-i ruy-i 
ruhsat olunmayarak nihayet mezkur kapaklular öküzler ile Ahısha‟ya irsal olunmuĢ 
olduğu 
“Bu kapaklular niçün gönderilmedi?” denildikte Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Mümkün 
olabildiği ve mevcud bulunduğu kadar gönderildi” demesi üzerine Ahmed Paşa 
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hazretleri, Ali Paşa‟nın Ardahan mevkiine memuriyetinde gerek kendüsinin bil-istishab 
götürdüğü ve gerek muahha-ren irsal olunan toplar on iki kıta ve kapaklular altı aded 
idi. İşbu on iki kıta topun dörder yüz atım olmak üzere cephanelerinin bir mikdarı 
mezkur altı kıta kapaklulara ve küsuru dahi sanduk ve sepetler derununda hayvanata 
tahmilen mükemmel olarak Erzurum‟dan gönderil-mişdi ve bunlardan başka diğer altı 
kıta kapaklunun dahi gönderilmesi her çend murad olundu ise de bazıları tamir 
olunmakta bazıları dahi Cizre [?] tarafından gelmekte olduğundan vakit ve zamanıyla 
yetişdirilemediğini ifade eyledikten sonra öyle öküzler ile gönderilmesi neden iktiza 
eylediği soruldukta müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa “Öküz ile gönderildiğini bilmiyorum. 
Revş-i halden anlaşıldığına göre keyfiyet Ali Paşa tarafından Kars‟a yazılmış ve orada 
müsteşar efendi marifetiyle gönderilmiş demek oluyor demekle bunların vürudundan 
kaç gün sonra bozgunluk zuhur eylediği sual olundukta üç dört gün sonra vuku‟ 
bulduğunu Ali Paşa ifade eylemesi üzerine müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa‟nın “Şimdi 
maslahat meydana çıktı. Bizim Kars‟dan hareketimizden on - on beş, belki on yedi gün 
sonra bozgunluk zuhura gelmiş idi. Demincek dediğim gibi Kars‟a yazılmış ve müsteşar 
efendi marifetiyle göndermişdir. Çünkü hesabca o vakit Kars‟dan çıkılmış idi” demesini 
müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa tasdik edip, “Hal böyle olunca bu kapaklulara niçün bargir 
tedarik olunmadı?” sualine “Mukaddem bulunduğum Ardahan ve civarından bargir 
tedariki mümkünatdan idi. Mübayaasına her bar tahriren ruhsat istedim. Abdi Paşa 
vermedi ve mennine dair gelen tahriratı işte budur” cevabını vermesi üzerine 
müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa, “Evet öyle bir tahriratı geldi lakin meali maiyetinde bulunan 
topların hayvanat ve sairesi noksan olduğundan ibaret bulunup meclisine bil-havale 
kendüsiyle sevk olunan asakirin kaffe-i levazımatı mükemmel olmak iktiza edeceğinden 
bundan şimdilik sarf-ı nazarla eğerçi bu işar neferat-ı mevcudenin tekessür etmesinden 
neşet eylemiş ise bilinip ona göre icabına bakılması kararlaşdırıl-dığından keyfiyet 
kendüsinden istizah kılınmışdı. Bu hale göre bargir mübayaasına ruhsat istenilmesi o 
kapaklu ve topların vürudundan evvel demektir” deyu beyan-ı hal edip “vakıa bu 
tahriratın meali bunu musaddık olduğundan ve kapakluların vürudundan evvel işar 
olunduğundan bunun sıhhati nasıldır?” denildikte, Ali Paşa, “Ben bilmem. Yazdım gibi 
hatıra gelür” demesine mebni “mektub tarihe göre evvel yazılmış” denildikte “Belki 
öyledir. Pek de bilmiyorum” dedikten sonra “Bunlar içün ifadeniz vechile sahihen 
bargir istemek veyahud mübayaa edilmek lazım gelür idi” sualine buna vakit kalmayıp 
bozgunluk zuhur ettiği ve “O kapaklular ve toplar nerelerde kaldı?” denilmesine dahi 
eyadi-i düşmana geçtiği cevabını vermişdir. 
 
Bir gün Ahısha kazası üzerine hücum olunmak üzere asakir-i nizamiye kol heyetine 
konulup kasabanın piĢgahında bulunan tepe üzerine varılarak asakir-i muvazzafa 
kasabanın kenarına sevk olunmasıyla beraber muharebeye ibtidar olunduğu anda zikr 
olunan asakir-i muvazzafaya düĢman tarafından fakat bir top endaht olunduğu halde 
redif askerine fevkalgaye havf ve dehĢet tari olup hatta Harput redifinden on beĢ – 
yigirmi kadar neferat ittisalinde bulunan meĢeliğe doğru yüz çevirdiklerinden hazır 
bulunan erkan ve ümera ve zabitan her ne hal ise askeri heyetinden çıkarmamağa gayret 
ederek düĢmana renk vermeksizin ol gün hücumdan sarf-ı nazarla ahĢama kadar fakat 
top muharebesi olunmuĢ idüği 
Ahısha‟ca zuhur eden muharebeye ve asakirin ahvaline dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ber minval-i meĢruh Ahısha‟nın abluka heyetinde etrafı zabt olunduğu kumandanı 
tarafından Tiflis serdarına ba-posta çıkarmıĢ olduğu dörder beĢer nefer Kazak süvarileri 
müstesahib oldukları çanta ve muharebatla ahz ü gereft ve mezkur çantalar derununda 
olan evrak keĢf ve Rusyalıca [sic] bilür asker etbasından birine tercüme ettirildikte 
Tiflis‟den irsal olunacak asker ve mühimmat ve sairenin araba ve esblere tahmilen ve 
irkaben sürat-i irsalini yazmıĢ oldukları anlaĢılarak mezkur çantalar ve Kazaklar ve 
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tercüme olunan evrak takımıyla müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafına tisyar ve 
düĢmanın bu vechile olan hareketi üzerine serian ve acilen imdad yetiĢdirilmesi izbar 
olunmuĢ ve bu babda fevkalade terci ve **?* kılınmıĢ ise de yine bir guna eser 
müĢahede olunamamıĢ olduğu 
Bu istenilen asker niçün gönderilmediği sual olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Öyle 
asker irsaline imkan bulunamayıp olsa bile kumandan olarak Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin 
mevcud maiyeti olan başıbozuk askeriyle oraya gitmesine pek de hacet yok gibi idi” 
cevabını verip “Ne tarihde istimdad olundu?” denildikte Safer‟in yigirmi beşinci 
gününden evvel istimdad eylediğini Ali Paşa söylemiş, müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa dahi 
“çünkü Ali Paşa daima asker ve levazımat istemekden hali olmaz idi. Lakin Kars‟ca ve 
mevaki-i sairece ol vakte kadar asker ve levazımat lüzumu derecesinde olduğundan ve 
eğerçi Kars‟da üç tabur asker mevcud idi. Bunun ihracıyla oranın hali bırağılmasını 
tecviz etmediğimden tevkif edip arası biraz geçerek yine tekid ettiğinden ve Zarif Paşa 
dahi yazdığından şiddet-i lüzumu anlaşılıp Arabistan ordusundan gelecek asker dahi 
Kars‟a yaklaşdığından Kars‟da mevcud olduğu beyan olunan üç taburun ikisi 
Ardahan‟a sevk olundu” demiş olmasıyla “İşte asker gönderilmiş demektir. Geldi mi?” 
denildikte, “Bu askeri bozgunluk zuhurundan sonra Ardahan‟a avdetinde orada 
bulduğunu ve Miralay Mustafa Bey‟e “Niçün imdada gelmediniz?” denildikte miralay-ı 
mumaileyh “Biz üç gün oldu buraya geleli. Bize bir guna emir olunmadı ki gidelim” 
deyu söylemiş olduğunu Ali Paşa ifade eylemesi üzerine bu askerin orada sebeb-i tevkifi 
sual olundukta “Bilmem ben sevk eyledim. Artık orada kim kumanda etmişse ondan 
sormalı” cevabını müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa verdikten sonra “Rusyalu‟nun tutulan posta 
kağıtları geldi. Lakin defaatle kıraat ettirildikte içinde işe yarar bir lakırdı bulunmayıp 
tayinata dair jurnal ve sair misillü evrak olduğu anlaşıldı” demesi üzerine Ali Paşa 
dahi “O kağıtların içinde pek çok işe yarar şey var idi. Hatta tercümelerinin hulasası 
dahi işte budur” diyerek bir varaka ibraz etmiş ve “Buna itimad olunmaz ise asılları 
dahi mahallinden celb olunsun” demiştir.  
 
Bu hal ile beĢ defa muharebe vuku‟ bulup muzafferiyet asakir-i Ġslamiye tarafında 
bulunmuĢ ve Rusya askeri münhezimen kaleye ricat eylemiĢ ise de Tiflis tarafından 
külliyetlü imdadı geleceği sahihen haber alınıp serian bir alay piyade ve bir alay süvari 
ve iki kıta kebir kale topu ve bir havan gönderilmesi ve Ģayed Kars‟da mevcud yoğise 
kale-i Erzurum‟dan celb ile yetiĢtirilmesi defaten ba‟d aheri müĢir-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine arz ve iĢar olunduğu halde maiyyet ve refakat-i çakeride bulunan asker 
mertebe-i kifayede olduğunu cevaben iĢar edip ondan kat‟-ı ümid olunup suret-i hal bil-
etraf devletlu Zarif PaĢa tarafına iĢar kılınarak müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine on 
yedi defa yazmıĢ ve bilahere mühürdarı Ahmed Bey‟i dahi göndermiĢ ise de bir faide 
müĢahede edememiĢ olduğundan biz-zarur çakerleri refakatinde gelmiĢ olan Erzurumi 
Cennetzade fütüvetlu Ziya Bey‟i Ģifahen ifade etmek üzere müĢir-i müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine Kars‟a Kars‟a [sic] irsal ederek mir-i mumaileyh tarafından keyfiyet bil-
etraf ifade olundukta ondan dahi bir faide olmamıĢ ve bir nefer imdad gelmemiĢ idüği 
Bu madde dahi nasıldır sualine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Demincek beyan eylediğim 
vechile imkanı bulunabildiği derecede icab eden mahallere asker gönderildiği sırada 
Ali Paşa tarafına dahi bir miktar asker gönderilmiştir” cevabını vermiştir. 
 
Heyet-i mezkur üzere yigirmi beĢ gün üzerinde kalınıp bir gün iane ve imdad 
yetiĢmediği gibi Ahısha ile Kars‟ın arası on beĢ – yigirmi saatten ibaret mesafe iken bari 
heyet-i ordu ve abluka ne vechile olduğunu ve ne suretle hareket olunmakta idüğini 
müĢahade etmek üzere erkan-ı harb memurlarından olsun birisi irsal buyurulmamıĢ ve 
bin-nihaye yetmiĢ senesi Safer-ül Hayr‟ının yigirmi üçüncü PencĢenbe günü Rusyalu-
nun beĢ tabur piyade ve bir miktar süvari imdadı gelip bil-müĢahede keyfiyet yine 
müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine yazılmıĢ ve Ģehr-i mezbur yigirmi beĢinci günü 
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[27.11.1853] ale‟s-seher asakir-i mevcud-ı külliyle Ahısha‟nın yerlü reayasını bil-
istishab mezkur Suhlis karyesinin karĢusuna toplarını çekip endahtıyla beraber tarafeyn-
den muharebeye mübaĢeret ve dört saat kadar top muharebesi olunarak bura taburları 
sevk olunup bi-hikmetillahi teala ol gün havan‟ın sesiyle beraber tarafeynden topların 
dumanı bil-izma‟ (?) tarafeyn birbirini görmez olup o ara beĢ dakika kadar tarafeynin 
topları kesilip sükut olunduğu halde düĢman askeri tarafından “ura!” lafzı ve asakir-i 
nusret-müessir-i hazret-i Ģahane canibinden “padiĢahım çok yaĢa!” sadaı vacib-ül edası 
icra ve dört saat dahi top ve tüfenk muharebesi olunarak Harput redif taburları karma 
karıĢık ricat ederken sol cenahımızda bulunan süvari askeri Rusya askerinin periĢan 
olduğunu görüp taraf-ı çakeraneme haber vermiĢ ve derhal mezkur redif taburlarının 
çevrilmesi hususuna cümle tarafından pek çok ibram ve düĢmanın inhizamını ifham 
eylediğimiz halde bir vechile anlatılamayıp düĢmanın avdet etmiĢ olan askerine nefer-i 
amm-ı Ġslam askerinin ricatini görüp ilan etmiĢ olduklarından münhezim olan düĢman 
askerinin topçusundan maada piyade ve süvarisi tekrar ricat ve asakir-i Ġslamiye üzerine 
hücuma mübaderet ederek mezkur redif taburlarının ricat ve teferrükü cihetle nizamiye 
taburları dahi yüz çevirip her taraftan tecemmülerine mübaĢeret ve tabur-ı evvel 
tranpeteleri çaldırılarak bunların toplanmaları hususuna cümle zabitan tarafından 
kumanda-i çakeranemizle pek çok ikdam ve gayret olunmuĢ ise de cenab-ı hakkın 
murad-ı ilahiye ve hikmet-i baliğa-i samedanisi bir guna kâr kesr-i tesir olmayıp 
cümlesi birden ricat etmiĢ ve iĢbu muharebe arasında topkeĢan hayvanatının ekserisi 
tüfek ve top daneleri isabetiyle telef olduğundan baĢka zaten dahi miktar-ı kifayede 
olmaması cihetle beraber bulunan çend aded meydan topu ve kopuzun tahliyesine çare 
bulunamayarak semt-i düĢmanda kalmıĢ ve hakikat-i hal bu merkezde bulunmuĢtur. 
Cenab-ı rabb-ül izzet velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz velinimet-i alem padiĢahımız efendimiz 
hazretlerine ilel ahir-ül zaman serir-i Ģevket-masir?-i mülukanelerinde ibka ve hem 
kerdar?-ı ĢehinĢahilerinde hazır ve tevfikat-ı ilahiyesini rehnüma ve ***-ı Devlet-i 
Aliyye‟lerini mübtela-i cah buyursun, amin. Bi hürmet-i min ca-i aliye-i Cebrail amin. 
Bu muharebe keyfiyeti sizce nasıldır sualine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “bu maddenin 
tafsilatı ve ordunun suret-i firarı ve inhizamı mechulümdür fakat erkan-ı harbiye 
zabitanından iki nefer zabit bulundurulmuştu” cevabını vermiş ve Ahmed Paşa dahi 
“benim de bu hususa malumatım yoktur” demiştir. 
 
Ahısha‟da zuhura gelen bozgunluğun sebeblerine dair komisyondan vaki olan sualler 
üzerine vaki olan sualler üzerine taraflarımızdan irad ve beyan olunan cevablar 
maddeleri balalarına surh ile iĢar kılınmıĢ olduğundan temhirine dahi ibtidar kılınmıĢtır. 
 
[Seals from left to right: Abdülkerim Nadir, Ahmed, Ali Rıza] 
 
Ahısha piĢgahında olan muharebenin tafsilatını tahriren beyan etmek üzere komisyon 
tarafından vaki olan talebe mebni Ali PaĢa‟nın yazıp verdiği varakadır ki aynıyle bu 
mahalle kayd olundu. 
 
Rabbimiz teala ve tekaddes hazretleri zat-ı Ģevketsimat-ı padiĢahımız velinimetimiz 
efendimiz hazretlerine bitmez ve tükenmez ömr ü afiyetler ihsan ve kaffe-i hutur ve 
kederden masun ve âdâ-i bedhahilerin münhezim ve periĢan olsun amin. 
 
Saye-i kudretvayelerinde nusret-i celilullah ve iane-i resul-i enbiya ve kuvvet-i evliya-i 
feyz-i meserretle salhal-i yetmiĢ senesi mah-ı Safer-ül Hayr‟ın üçüncü gününden 
[5.11.1853] bil-hayr vel-niyet Ahısha hudud baĢında Rusyalu ile muharebeye bed ve 
mübaĢeret olunarak bi-lütf-i Hüda nail-i nusret-i Ġslam ile düĢman-ı haksarın ekserisini 
itlaf ve helak ile gerüye ricat ettirilerek gereft olunan esirleriyle ve kelleri dahi taraf-ı 
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müĢiriye gönderilmiĢ ve mezkur kellelerin kat‟ına kadar kelle kesilmemesi hakkına dair 
irade-i aliyye-i cenab-ı padiĢahi müteallik ve sudur etmemiĢ idi. 
 
Ġkinci muharebede düĢman-ı mersum yine üzerimize gelip tekrar muharebeye mübaĢeret 
olundukta bi-avnillahi teala nusret-i Ġslam asakir-i Ģahanede olup düĢman-ı haksarın 
münhezim ve periĢanlarıyla gerüye ricat birle asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane ve baĢıbozuk 
dahi arkaları sıra yarım saat kadar koğaldı [sic] ve ol vakit abluka heyetiyle Ahısha‟nın 
lazım gelen etraflarına karakollar tertib ve tayin ile tutulmuĢ olan esirlerini dahi yine 
taraf-ı müĢiriye irsal kılınmıĢ ve mahall-i mezkura gülle menzili mesafe karĢusunda bir 
çıplak dağ olmak hasebiyle üzerinden Ģehri döğüp zabtına destres olmak içün oraya dahi 
münasip vechile karakollar tayin ve tertip kılınmıĢ çünkü dağın Ģehir ve kale tarafları 
gayet sarp olduğundan iĢtibah vaki olmaz idi. Fakat bu yüzden her ne kadar yoğise de 
sağ ve sol cenahlarından memul olur idi. Bu memul münasabetiyle sağ cenah bulunan 
Ab karyesine üç tabur piyade asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane ile beĢ kıta top ve binden 
mütecaviz baĢıbozuk ve sol cenah Suhlic [sic] nam karyeye üç tabur piyade ve bir alay 
süvari askeri asakir-i Ģahane ile yedi kıta top vaz‟ olunarak ve sol cenahlarında dahi 
bulunan karyelere ihtiyat olarak iki binden mütecaviz neferim ve baĢıbozuk askeri 
konulmuĢ idi ve Suhlic nam karyeye bir çaryek saat mesafe karyeye iki tabur nizamiye 
askeri konulmuĢ idi. Çünkü düĢmanın bu iki cenahın birisinden hücum ve galebe etmesi 
memul ve maznun olur idi. Onun içün bu ihtiyatlara kuvve-i metanet vermek suret-lerini 
bil-cümle ümera-i zabitan-ı askeriyle bil-ittifak tertip ve vaz‟ olunmuĢ idi ve ihtiyat-ı 
mezkure tertip ve tayin olunan karakollara taraf-ı çakeriden Ģu vechile ekid-i tenbih 
olunan düĢmanın memul ettiğimiz mahallerin sağından gelecek olduğu halde sol cenaha 
ve solda geldiği halde sağ cenaha tüfenk endaht ile tarafeyn birbirine ihtar etmelerini 
zabitana dahi baĢka baĢka tenbih olunmuĢ idi ve Suhlic nam karyede bulunan toplar 
içün tez elden tabya misillü bir Ģeyin imal olunmasını orada bulunan istihkam bölüğüne 
ve mühendis binbaĢısına ve zabitan-ı askeriyeye tenbih ile çarçabuk imal ve toplar vaz‟ 
olunmuĢ idi. 
 
Ve sağ cenahda olan askerin üzerine Mirliva izzetlu Mustafa PaĢa kumandar tayin 
kılınmıĢ idi. Yani YeniĢehir tarafı demek ve sol cenaha Suhlic‟de olan asker üzerine 
Mirliva izzetlu Ali PaĢa tayin kılınarak bendeleri dahi bu mahallerde bir çaryek saat 
mesafe Yemak [Bamık?] nam karye ki merkez add ettiğimiz mahalde bulunmakta idim.  
 
Asker ve gerek toplar her bir tarafda dağınık deyu rivayet olunmuĢ ise de değil dağınık 
zikr-i bala cihetle birbirine karib ve mürtefi‟ ve harbce dahi Ģu zeminler ve tertib-i 
mahal pek yolunda olduğuna binaen ona göre hareket ve dikkat nusretle sırasını 
gözederek cümlemiz birlikte beĢ defa Ab karyesine tecemmü olduk. Rusya askeri dahi 
kezalik Ģehirden taĢra çıkıp beĢ defa dahi top ve baĢıbozuk muharebesi oldu ve beĢ 
defasında dahi asakir-i Ģahane ve baĢıbozuk s**f*r? ve muzaffer olarak Rusyalı‟yı 
münhezim eyledik. Çünkü tecemmü olduğumuz karye gayet sıralu mahal idi. 
 
Ve bu muharebeler hengamında Rusya‟nın Ahısha kumandanıyla ve istihkamat memuru 
mühendisinin Tiflis taraflarında olan kumandanları tarafına dört defa çıkarmıĢ oldukları 
postalarını tutup alınan muharreratları tercüme ettirildikte bu bizim tuttuğumuz ve asker 
ve top vaz‟ eylediğimiz mahaller mahal [sic] ve mevkilerin pek yolunda olduğunu dahi 
tasdik eylemiĢler ve muharrerat-ı mezkur taraf-ı müĢirinin manzur ve malum-ı alileri 
buyurulmak içün bir büyük çantaya mevzuen postacıları olan iki nefer Kazak ve üç 
nefer süvari Rusya askeri dahi derakıb taraf-ı müĢiriye irsal kılınmıĢ idi. 
 
Appendix 80. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 5, undated (end of 1854 or beginning of 1855). 
Abdi Pasha’s testimony at the MVL on the defeat at Gedikler. 
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Kars canibinde vuku bulan bozgunluğun sebebi Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual 
olundukta orada olan vukuata dair yazmıĢ olduğu iĢbu varaka meydana konulup Ahmed 
PaĢa ve Ali PaĢa hazeratı dahi hazır oldukları halde ibraz olunan suallere 
müĢarünileyhim tarafından verilen cevablardır ki maddeleri yanlarına surh ile iĢaret 
kılındı. 
 
Beyana hacet olmadığı üzere meydan-ı ceng ü gavgada (?) düĢmanı bozmak ve 
bozulmak mukadderat-ı ilahiyeden olduğu misillü esbab-ı zahirde dahi kusur etmemek 
akdem-i umurdan ve bu dahi istrateji ve taktik fenlerine kesb-i vukuf ve malumat 
etmeğe mütevakkıf mevaddan olarak çakerleri saye-i ihsanvaye-i hazret-i Ģahanede bu 
fenleri oldukça okumuĢ ve ameliyatını görmüĢ bulunduğum cihetiyle bu memuriyet-i 
acizanemde her bir harekat ve sekenat-ı çakeranemi fünun-ı harbiyeye tatbik ve fence 
madud olan ihtimalatın içinde cüzi mahzurlu add olunanları terk ile harbiyyunun en 
ziyade intihab ve itina eyledikleri usule tevfik eylediğimi fenn-aĢina olan zevat 
indlerinde her suretle isbata muktedir olduğumdan fazla emr-i muharebeye memuriyet-i 
çakeranemin vukuunda ıyal ü evlad ü dünyanın muhabbetini sahife-i dil-i sıdk-i muil-i 
(?) acizanemden külliyen tayy ü imha ederek ancak velinimet-i bi-minnetimiz Ģevketlu 
kerametlu padiĢahımız efendimiz hazretlerine ve din ve milletime bu uğurda hidemat-ı 
mebrure ibrazıyla feda-i can ü baĢ etmekle gayret-i sadıka ederek ol hal ile icra-i emr-i 
memuriyete çalıĢmıĢ olduğum hazret-i alim-üs sırr vel hakikata malum olup bunun isbat 
ve izharını dahi merhamet ve madelet-ir rabbiden niyaz ve istirham etmekteyim. Ne 
çare ki beyan ve tafsili tekrar hüzün ve melal getirecek esbab-ı adideden naĢi dilhah-ı 
kemteranem vechile hareket ve merkez-i matluba muvasalat müyesser olamamıĢ ve 
eğerçi nefs-i kemteraneme aid bulunan hususatda her ne dürlü muamele ve teaddi vukua 
gelse ona sabr ü sükut etmek min el kadim ihtiyar eylediğim usul ve meslek 
iktizasından ise de velinimetimiz padiĢahımıza ve devletimize raci olan mevadda yolsuz 
hal ve hareketde bulunanları söylememek dahi bir nevi ihanet ve muğayir-i Ģiar-ı 
ubudiyet bulunmuĢ olduğundan binaberin bu babda vaki olan yolsuz harekatın ve 
haylulet eden mevaniin bazı mertebesi ma‟t-teellüm beyana cüret ederim. 
 
Ġlan-ı harb olunduğu haberinin Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa vürudunda oralarda Ģita 
hulul ederek hükmünü icraya baĢlamıĢ ve çünkü Anadolu tarafında matlubun husulü 
Dağıstan ahalisiyle birleĢmeğe mütevakkıf olarak ol esnada yollar kapanıp onlar 
tarafından dahi iane olunmak ve birleĢmek zamanı geçmiĢ olması cihetle emr-i 
muharebenin evvel bahara tehiri her suretle hayr ü faideyi müstelzem göründüğünden 
bu kaziye mahremane erkân ve ümera-i askeriye ile müzakere olundukta ittifak-ı ârâ ile 
karar verilerek hakikat-i hal ol vakit makam-ı vâlâ-i seraskeriye beyan ve iĢar ve çünkü 
asakir-i Ģahanenin cümlesinin kıĢ mevsiminde Kars‟a yerleĢdirilmesi halinde sıhhat-i 
bedeniyelerinin muhafazası mümkün olamayacağına ve Arabistan orduy-ı hümayunun-
dan celb ve Anadolu tarafına sevk buyurulmuĢ olan iki alay piyade ile iki alay süvarinin 
dahi yolda gelmekte oldukları haber alındığına binaen bunların Erzurum‟da tevkifiyle 
yerleĢdirilmeleri zımnında Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim PaĢa dahi Erzurum‟a irsal ve 
tisyar olunarak Kars‟da bulunan asakir-i Ģahane dahi hem bir guna zahmet ve zaruret 
çekmemek ve hem de fenn-i harb kaidesi dairesinden taĢra çıkmayıp düĢmanın hal ve 
hareketini gözetmek üzere Mirliva izzetlu Veli PaĢa beĢ tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari 
asakir-i nizamiye ve mikdar-ı kifaye asakir-i muvazzafa ile Kars‟dan ilerü Subatan nam 
mahal ile daha ilerü köylere avangard suretinde tayin ve izam olunup ve mevaki-i ehem 
ve lazımeye dahi karakollar konulup küsur asakir-i Ģahane dahi Kars‟a ve civar bulunan 
mahallere yerleĢdirilmiĢ idi. 
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Bu maddeyi Ahmed Paşa hazretleri tasdik ile beraber o vakit asakir çadırda iken 
kışlaklara nakl ü iskan ettirildiğini beyan ve Ali Paşa dahi evvelce hareket etmiş 
olduğundan o esnada orada bulunmadığını ityan eylemişdir. 
 
[page 2] 
 
Bunun üzerine Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müsteĢarı nasb buyurulmuĢ olan atufetlu 
Rıza Efendi hazretleri Kars‟a gelür iken müĢarünileyh Abdülkerim PaĢa‟ya Kars ile 
Erzurum‟un beyninde vaki Yeniköy nam mahalde tesadüf ederek keyfiyet-i 
memuriyetini anlayıp Erzurum‟a gitmeyerek Yeniköy‟de eğlenmesini ve kendüsinin 
Kars‟a muvasalatında celb ettireceğini paĢa-i müĢarünileyhe ifade ve tenbih ederek 
kendüleri Kars‟a muvasalat edip hakikat-i hali anlamaksızın Rumeli tarafında fütuhat-ı 
mütevâliye vuku bulmakta ve Anadolu tarafında ağır davranılmakta olduğuna dair 
tefevvühat ile teĢvikata baĢlayıp eğerçi efendi-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri zaten nezaket 
ve iffet ve istikametle mutasavvıf esdika-i bendegan-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟den ve bu 
babda çalıĢması dahi kemal-i gayretinden neĢet eder bir halet idüği umur-ı müselleme-
den ise de kendüleri fenn-i harbden bi-behre bulunmaları cihetle bu babda akılsız dost 
hükmünde olup çakerlerinin ihtiyatkârane hareket ve devlet ve milletime zull ü mazarrat 
irasını muceb bir keyfiyet vuku bulmamak içün vakitsiz ve mevsimsiz muharebe 
vukuundan mücanebetimi beynlerinde cebanetime haml eylemelerine ve hakikat-i hale 
vakıf bazı erkan ve zabitan dahi Ģayed kendüsine töhmet-i cebanet azv ü isnad olunur 
vahimesiyle efkâr-ı sahihasını ortaya koyamayıp biz-zarure mümaĢat ederek evvelki 
karar ve neticeden tekevvül ve udûl ile Ģiddet-i Ģitaya bakmayıp muharebe olunması 
tarafını iltizam ve tercih eylediklerine ve efendi-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerini müteakıb 
devletlu Zarif PaĢa hazretleri Kars‟a gelerek onlar dahi muharebe etmek efkârında olup 
bu hal neferata varınca sirayet eylediği hiss olunduğuna binaen ba‟dezin tevkif olunması 
muharebeden ziyade mahzurlu görünmekden ve evvel günlerde her ne kadar Ģedid 
soğuk var ise de hava fil-cümle açık bulunmakdan naĢi zabitan ve neferatın hahiĢlerine 
fütur getirilmiĢ olmamak ve havaya bir fenalık geldiği anda asakir-i Ģahane kar altında 
bırakılmayıp derakıb yine avdet olunmak üzere ma el huzur fenn-i harbde petit guerre 
tabir olunan bazı ufak ve muhtasar çarha muharebeleri icra olunması sureti ihtiyar 
olunarak orduy-ı hümayunun ol vakit reis-i erkânı bulunan devletlu Ahmed PaĢa 
hazretlerinin kumandasına altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile mevcud olan asakir-i 
muvazzafa verilerek orduy-ı hümayunun mumaileyh Veli PaĢa kumandasıyla avangardı 
bulunan askeri dahi istishab ile götürülmesi ifade kılınarak memur ve tayin ve Arpa 
Çayı civarında BaĢ ġuregel denilen mahal bu vechile harekât-ı askeriyeye gayet elveriĢli 
münasib bir mahal olmak ve mezkur ġüregel‟in karĢusunda vaki Bayındır‟da 
Rusyalu‟nun bir mikdar Kazak atlusu bulunduğu haber alınmak mülasebesiyle mevcud 
maiyeti olan asakir-i nizamiyeyi mevki-i mezkurda olan tepenin arkasına fenn-i harb 
üzere tayin edip bir mikdar asakir-i muvazzafa ile mezkur Kazak atlusu urulup 
yerlerinden kaldırılması ve Arpa Çayı‟ndan karĢuya geçilmeyip Gümrü kalesinde olan 
Rusya askerinden bir kıta-i müfreze çıkar da berülere doğru gelerek kaleden uzatılabilür 
ve gözlerine kesdirilür ise urulması ve her bir harekat ve vukuatın dahi peyderpey taraf-ı 
acizaneme bildirilmesi kaziyeleri çünkü kendilerinin okuyup yazmaları olmadığından 
talimat-ı muharrere verilmiĢ olsa aherine kıraat ettirmeğe mecbur bulunduğu ve bu 
halde kaziyeye kendüsinden evvel aheri mahrem ve vakıf olacağı cihetle biz-zarure 
Ģifahen yegan yegan tekid ve tenbih kılınarak sevk ve izam olunmuĢ idi. 
Bu keyfiyet sual olundukta Ahmed Paşa, Kerim Paşa ile müsteşar efendi beyninde 
olunan müzakereyi bilmem, fakat Kerim Paşa Kars‟a avdetini istizan eylemesi üzerine 
Abdi Paşa hazretleri tarafından memuriyetle gitmesi ba tahrirat kendüsine yazılmış 
olduğunu beyan ile Ali Paşa dahi bu bende *?** olunan maddeyi yani müsteşar 
efendinin suret-i ifadatını Kerim Paşa‟dan işittiğini ifade edip müsteşar-ı müşarün-
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ileyhin teşvikat ve terğibatı maddesinin sıhhatini müşarünileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretleri 
dahi tasdik eylemiş ve ümera-i askeriyenin bu babda mümaşat edenlerinin isimleri sual 
olundukta Abdi Paşa hazretleri livalara kadar vardır demesiyle Ahmed Paşa‟dan sual 
olunup cevabında Zarif Paşa hazretlerinin Kars‟a geldiğinin ertesi günü ziyaretlerine 
varmış idim. Raşid Paşa ve müsteşar efendi mevcud olduğu halde gavga etmek içün 
bazı mertebe sohbetler arasında “Bu ne hamiyetsiz ve gayretsizlikdir” diyerek makam-ı 
tevbihde bana dahi hitabet etmelerine cevaben “Benim dahi büyük memurum vardır. 
Onun emriyle hareket ederim” der iken Abdi Paşa hazretleri dahi gelmesiyle sohbet 
kapanmış ve yine o gün bir saatden sonra sıraya gitmiş idim. Orada dahi Abdi Paşa 
hazretlerinin yanında müsteşar efendi ve Mustafa Paşa ve Raşid Paşa mevcud olarak 
yine bunun sohbeti açılıp teşvikat üzerine tevbihane sözler deveran ederek hatta 
Mustafa Paşa “Maiyetime asker verilsün ben gavgaya giderim” ve müsteşar efendi dahi 
“Ben politika memuru olduğumdan gavga etmek içün size sened veririm ve siz gitmez 
iseniz ben dellal çağırdıp ahaliyi toplar giderim” demesine cevaben Abdi Paşa 
hazretleri “Eğerçi bir fenalık olur ise sizin sözünüz beni kurtarır mı?” dedikte “Evet 
ben memurum kurtarır” demesine Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Pek memul etmem ki beni 
kurtarsın” demesiyle müsteşar-ı müşarünileyhe bir nevi infial gelerek o meclisden 
kalkmış olduğu ve bunun üzerine sairleriyle müzakere olunup olunmadığını bilmeyip 
fakat bir gün kendüsini Abdi Paşa hazretleri celb edip halkın ağzı kapanmak içün alel 
ıtlak icabı vechile gavga etmek içün memur ettiğini ve tepenin arkasında askerin tabiye 
edilmesi ve Kazakların kaldırılması gibi şeyler tenbih olunmayıp bu madde mufassalen 
verdiği kağıdda yazmış olmağla ondan malum olacağından ve tecavüz olunmasını 
tenbih eylediklerini müşarünileyh hazretleri evvelce itiraf eyledikleri dahi zabt olunmuş 
idüğünden tekrara hacet olmadığını ifade eylemişdir. 
 
MüĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri Kars‟dan harekete Ģitab ve ilerüde mumaileyh 
Veli PaĢa kumandasıyla orduy-ı hümayunun avangardı bulunan askeri dahi istishab 
ederek vakıa ibtida taraf-ı acizanemden kendüsine vaki olan tenbihat ve tarifat vechile 
hareket edip Rusyalu‟nun Bayındır‟da olan atlusunu yerlerinden kaldırmıĢ ve keyfiyeti 
dahi taraf-ı acizaneme iĢar eylemiĢ ise de Rusyalu‟nun Bayındır‟da bulunan Ģirzime-i 
kalilesinin kaldırılması müĢarünileyh hazretlerine cesaret getürüp ertesi günü mevcud 
maiyeti bulunan asakiri istishab ile Arpaçayı„ndan Bayındır‟a mürur eylediğini suy-i 
acizaneme inha etmiĢ olduğundan paĢa-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin bu vechile 
muğayir-i tenbihat Bayındır‟a geçtiği haberi geldiği gibi çünkü Rusyalu‟nun Gümrü‟de 
yigirmi tabur askeri olduğu evvelce vaki olan tahkikat-ı çakeranem cümlesinden olmak 
ve bunların üzerine geleceğine ihtimalat-ı kaviyye bulunmaktan naĢi hemen çakerleri 
dahi altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve on sekiz kıta top alıp hareket ve seyr-i seria 
ile azimetle ferdası günü Kars‟ın sekiz saat ilerüsünden Kars suyu geçilip asakir 
kamilen suyu geçer geçmez Rusyalu müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin üzerine 
gelip muharebeye baĢlanıldığı haber alındığından refakat-ı çakeranemde bulunan piyade 
gerüden yetiĢmek ve süvari ile toplar dahi arkamdan gelmek üzere erkan ve ümeraya 
tenbih olunarak çakerleri biz-zarure münferiden kemal-i sür‟atle Bayındır‟a yetiĢip top 
muharebesi olunmakta olduğu halde Rusyalu‟nun icra eylediği manevra müĢarünileyh 
Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin kumandasında bulunan asakir-i Ģahanenin sağ baĢını urmak 
üzere bir hareket olduğundan bizim ordunun sağ baĢını bayağı sıkıĢdırmıĢ olduğu halde 
gerüden gelen süvari ile toplar yetiĢip derakab sağ baĢa toplar ile süvari sevk olunarak 
gerek iĢbu topların ateĢinden ve gerek süvarinin lillahil hamd vel menna tarif-i 
acizanem vechile harekete muvafık olmasından ve piyade dahi yetiĢip karĢu Bayındır‟a 
geçürülmesinden dolayı Rusyalu ricat ve hezimete mecbur olup Gümrü kalesine 
çekilmiĢdir. Bunun üzerine orduy-ı hümayunun mühimmatı yoklama olunarak top 
muharebesi mümted olmak hasebiyle hartuçları ziyade telef olup mevcudu cüzi kalmıĢ 
olduğundan eğerçi bu halde orduy-ı hümayun avdet eder ise Rusyalu fen-aĢina düĢman 
465 
bulunmak hasebiyle orduy-ı hümayunun bir cihetle noksani-i levazımatından olduğunu 
hissederek takib edeceği ağleb-i ihtimalatdan olduğundan derhal avdetden sarf-ı nazarla 
bulunduğumuz mahalle tabya inĢasıyla istihkam verilerek ve bir tarafdan dahi Kars‟dan 
müsaraaten cebhane celb olunarak on iki gün kadar orduy-ı hümayun ile Bayındır‟da 
ikamet olunmuĢ ise de Rusyalu bir tarafdan baĢ gösterememiĢ ve havalar fenalaĢmağa 
baĢlamıĢ idüğünden ba‟d-ez-in orada tevakkuf kabil olamayacağı misillü orduy-ı 
hümayunun mevcudu fakat yigirmi iki yigirmi üç tabur piyade ve üç alay süvari ve otuz 
bu kadar toptan mürekkeb bulunmuĢ ve zahire ve cebhane ve esbab-ı nakliye henüz 
baĢluca bir hareket-i tecavüziye icrasına kafi bulunmaması hasebiyle ilerüye gidilmesi 
dahi orduy-ı hümayunu göz göre muhataraya ilka demek olacağından biz-zarure kavaid-
i harbiyeye tevfikan Bayındır‟dan hareket ve Kars‟a müteveccihan avdet olunarak Kars 
suyu geçilip suyun berü tarafında kain Aküzüm karyesinde bir gece beytutetle ferdası 
günü yine hareket ve Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunup orduy-ı hümayunun 
avangardı bulunan mumaileyh Veli PaĢa mevcud maiyeti olan asakir-i Ģahane ile yine 
avangard olarak merkez-i kadimi olan Subatan nam mahalle izam olunup çakerleri 
küsur-ı asakir-i Ģahane ile Gedikler‟de ikamet eyledim. 
Muğayir-i memuriyet Arpaçayı‟nı mürur eylemesi keyfiyeti Ahmed Paşa‟dan sual 
olundukta “Öyle geçdim diyerek yazdığını bilmeyip fakat asker gönderin veyahud siz 
teşrif buyurun diyerek yazmış idim” demesiyle Abdi Paşa, “Dediğim gibi yazmışdır ve 
gelen mektub mahallinde mevcuddur. Celb ile keyfiyet anlaşılur” demesi üzerine Ahmed 
Paşa, “Abdi Paşa‟nın geldiği ve askerin suret-i tertibi ve gavga keyfiyeti verdiğim 
takrirde muharrerdir. Müşarünileyh Bayındır‟da yetişdim demiş ise de o vakit Baş 
Şüregel‟e gelmişler idi” dedikte müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa dahi “Yanlış olmuş, Baş 
Şüregel denilecek iken Bayındır denilmişdir ve o vakit cebhanenin celbiyle beraber 
asker dahi gelmişdir” cevabını vermişdir. 
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Salif-üz zikr Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunduğu gibi Rusyalu dahi Gümrü‟den 
çıkıp Arpaçayı‟ndan berü tarafa geçtiği haberi alındığından çakerleri Miralay Ġsmail 
Bey‟e kendü hayvanımı verip Rusyalu‟nun ordusunu ve keyfiyetini keĢf etmek üzere 
aceleten ilerüye tayin ve izam eylediğimden mir-i mumaileyh gidip Rusyalu‟nun 
ordusunu keĢf ve muayene ederek avdet edip on iki tabur kadar piyade ve iki alay süvari 
ve bir mikdar baĢıbozuk askeri olduğunu keĢf ü tahmin eylediğini haber verip 
Rusyalu‟nun bu hal ile geliĢi aranıp bulunamayacak bir keyfiyet olduğundan mumaileyh 
Veli PaĢa kumandasında bulunan asakir ile avdet ve sabahleyin tayin olunan vakitde 
Gedikler‟e yetiĢip muvasalat eylemiĢ ve Kars‟da bulunan Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim 
PaĢa hazretleri dahi iki alay piyade ve iki alay süvari ile Ardahan tarafına memur ve 
tayin kılınmıĢ ise de diğer tahrirat-ı acizanemin vusulüne kadar Kars‟da tevakkuf 
eylemesi ahĢamdan kendülerine haber gönderilmiĢ ve orduy-ı hümayunun karakolları 
tertib ve tayin olunmuĢ ve mumaileyh Veli PaĢa dahi vakt-i muayyende yetiĢmiĢ ve 
Rusyalu dahi Kars suyunu geçmek üzere olduğu haberi gelmiĢ olduğundan orduy-ı 
hümayun her suretle saff-ı harb nizamına konulmağla elveriĢli münasip bir mevkide 
nizam-ı harb heyetine konularak ve süvari ve topçu ve ihtiyat kumandanları tefrik ve 
tayin kılınarak çakerleri bir mikdar ilerüde bulunan mevkii bir kat daha keĢf ü muayene 
etmek üzere ilerüye azimet eylediğimde Rusyalu‟dan bir alamet görülemeyip her ne 
kadar Kars çayından bir mikdar süvari berü tarafa geçürmiĢ ise de böyle süvariyi berü 
geçürmesi ordusunun gerüye ricat edeceği hareketini setr içün olup süvarisini berü 
tarafa sevk ile beraber ordusunu gerüye avdet ve ricat ettirip muahharen süvarisini dahi 
gerüye alıp savuĢmuĢ olduğu tahkik olunmuĢdu. 
Kendü layihasında dahi böyle yazmış olduğunu beyan ile bu bendin mealini Ahmed 
Paşa hazretleri tasdik edip “Fakat ol gün Miralay İsmail Bey‟in tahkik içün 
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gönderilmiş olduğunu bilmiyorum. Ertesi Pazar günü göndermişler idi ve Rusyalu gelür 
deyu Pazar günü sabahleyin o haber getürdi ve onun üzerine hareket ettik” demekle 
Abdi Paşa hazretleri “Ben İsmail Bey‟i birkaç defa göndermiş idim. Galiba siz yalnız 
Pazar günü geldiğini görmüşsünüz” demişdir.  
 
Bend-i sabıkda beyan olunduğu üzere Rusyalu savuĢup gitmesi ve ol gece Ahısha 
tarafında bulunan Ferik saadetlu Ali PaĢa hazretlerinin bozulduğu haberi gelmesi cihetle 
derhal müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri nezd-i acizaneme celb ile müĢarünileyh Ali 
PaĢa‟dan ve buna dair mahall-i saireden gelen tahrirat kendüsine kıraat olunmuĢ ve bu 
havadis beyn el asakir Ģüyu‟ bulmamak içün mahrem tutulması tenbih kılınmıĢ ve Ģu hal 
icabınca iki tarafa dahi kumanda olunmak içün çakerlerinin Kars‟a azimetime lüzum-ı 
kavi hasıl olmuĢ olup ancak ona dair müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerine bir Ģey 
açılmayıp mütefekkir bulunduğum halde Kars‟a azimet-i çakeranemin ehemmiyetini 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi idrak ederek bir an evvel Kars‟da bulunmaklığımın Ģiddet-
i lüzumunu tezkir ve dermiyan ve eğer bir guna vukuat olur ise derhal taraf-ı 
çakeraneme ihbara müsaraat edeceğini ifade ve beyan eylediğinden onun üzerine 
Gedikler mevkiinde bulunan orduy-ı hümayunu hemen Subatan mevkiine kaldırması ve 
çakerleriyle dahi bu cihetle muhabereye müsaraat eylemesi kendüsine ariz ve amik bil-
etraf ifade ve telkin olunarak ve eğer hiçbir vukuat olmaz ise yigirmi dört saat zarfında 
dört defa vukuat olur ise ol anda süvariden tertib olunan postalar vasıtalarıyla taraf-ı 
çakeraneme haber gönderilmesi tekid kılınarak çakerleri dahi sürat üzere Kars‟a avdet 
ve azimet eyleyip derhal Ahısha tarafının tahkik-i ahvali zımnında memurlar tayin ve 
irsal olunmuĢ ve müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerine her ne kadar Ģifahen ve tafsilen 
tenbihat tenbihat icra kılınmıĢ ise de daha hareket ve Subatan‟a azimet etmediği 
muahharen aldığım tahriratdan anlaĢılmıĢ olduğundan Kars‟da mevcud olan erkan ve 
ümera ile bil-müzakere müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin Subatan‟a azimeti tahriren dahi 
beyan ve tekid olunması tasvib olunmuĢ olmasıyla ol vechile Subatan‟a azimet 
eylemesini cevabnamede dahi tekid ve iĢar eylediğimden cevabname-i mezkur el haleti 
hazihi müĢarünileyh hazretleri nezdinde olacağından mütalaa buyurulduğu halde 
malum-ı ali buyurulur. MüĢarünileyh hazretlerine manevranın suver-i icraiyesi bil-etraf 
tarif olunmasına ve Rusyalu bu suretle gelecek olur ise aranıp bulacak Ģey olmadığı 
ifade olunması hatırlarında kalmasına binaen mücerred kemal-i gayretlerinden naĢi 
kendüleri bir hizmete muvafık olmak emeline düĢerek tenbihat ve iĢarat-ı acizaneme 
havale-i sem‟-i itibar etmediğinden baĢka Rusyalu bunların üzerlerine geldiği gün ilerü 
karakollar vasıtasıyla kendülerine Rusyalu‟nun gelmekte olduğuna dair haberler gelmiĢ 
ve anifen beyan olunduğu vechile vukuat olmaz ise yigirmi dört saat zarfında vukuat 
olur ise ol anda haber gönderilmesi tenbihat-ı acizanem icabından bulunmuĢ iken ol gün 
taraf-ı acizaneme asla haber gönderilmemiĢ olduğundan Ģübhelenerek sebebi anlaĢılmak 
içün suy-i kemteranemden yaver-i harb irsal olundukta müĢarünileyh hazretleri kendü 
kendülerine muharebe ederek bozulup avdet eyledikleri haberi yaver vasıtasıyla 
alınmıĢdır. Eğerçi müĢarünileyh hazretleri tenbihat-ı acizanem vechile hareket etmiĢ 
olsalar idi tertib ve tasmim olunan manevra icabınca Kars‟da müheyya bulunan kuvve-i 
kafiye ile derhal hareket olunarak müĢarünileyh hazretleriyle birleĢmek eshel ve 
Rusyalu‟yu Ģu suretle berbad ve periĢan etmek harbiyyun indlerinde yüzde doksan 
dokuz derece muhtemel iken ne çare ki Ģu fırsat beyhude za‟y olunduktan baĢka eğerçi 
Rusyalu‟nun gelmekde olduğu haberi verildiği vakit olsun suy-i kemteraneme 
bildirilmiĢ olsa idi muharebeden evvelce oraya yetiĢilmesi ve cenab-ı hakkın avn ü 
ihsanıyla yine muharebenin kazanılması mümkünatdan iken inhaen beyan olunduğu 
vechile mücerred kendüleri bir iĢ görmek ve vukua gelecek galebe ve nusret kendüsine 
aid olmak içün bunların hiçbirini icra buyurmayıp bu derecelere netice vermiĢdir. 
Bu madde Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinden sual olundukta, “Ahısha bozğunluğunun haberi 
vürudu üzerine Abdi Paşa hazretleri beni celb ettiler. Yanlarında üç kıta tahrirat var 
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idi. Birini bir top ateşe attılar diğer ikisini ceplerine koydular ve Ahısha bozğunluğuna 
muttali oldum. Ama tahriratları okudular da mı muttali oldum yohsa şifahen mi ihbar 
eylediler ve ol ateşe attığı kağıd ne idi bilmiyorum ve dediler ki „müsteşar efendi Ahısha 
bozgunluğuna bizim Bayındır‟dan kalkmamız sebeb oldu deyu yazmış. Biz Bayındır‟dan 
Cuma günü kalkdık. Ahısha bozgunluğu Cumartesi günü olmuş. Rusyalu Ahısha‟da ne 
çabuk oradan kalkdığımızı haber almış ki bozgunluğa sebeb bizim kalkmamız olsun‟ 
deyu söyledi. Müşarünileyhin Kars‟a gitmesini ben tasdik ve dermiyan etmek şöyle 
dursun „Düşman buradadır. Bir yere gitmemişdir. Sizin bir yere gitmeniz caiz değildir‟ 
dediğimde „Düşman çekildi gitti. Benim de Kars‟a gitmem lazımdır‟ demekle ben dahi 
biz-zarur mümaşat ederek „siz bilürsünüz‟ dedim. Bunun üzerine Mirliva Mustafa ve 
Hafız ve Hüseyin Paşaları celb edip Kars‟a gideceklerini beyan ederek benim kuman-
damda bulunmalarını ve sair hususatı tenbih edip sonra giderken Veli Paşa‟ya dahi 
yolda rast gelip bu tenbihatı ona dahi eyledi ve birkaç günden sonra ordunun Subatan 
karyesine kaldırılmasını ve vukuat olur ise kendüsine bildirilmesini tenbih etti ve sonra 
dahi Subatan‟a çekilmek üzere bir tahriratı geldi. Liva paşaların cümlesi hazır 
oldukları halde tahrirat kıraat olundu ve mumaileyhimden Hüseyin Paşa hazır 
bulunmadığından ondan maada cümlesi kalkılmasını tensip etmediler ise de yine ben 
ertesi günü kalkılmasını tenbih eyledim ve verdiğim layihada yazdığım gibi kalkılmak 
üzere iken düşman gelip gavga oldu” deyu ifade eyledikten sonra tekrar müşarünileyh 
Ahmed Paşa hazretleri kelama ibtidar ile “bu bendde Abdi Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu‟nun 
Gümrü‟ye çekilip gittiğini yazmışlar mahaza ki çekilip gitmemiş idi. O civarlarda idi ve 
böyle olduğunu şu iki kıta tahriratlar ki tevarih-i malume ile müverrehdir isbat ederim” 
dediklerinde tahrirat-ı mezkureden fi 28 S sene 70 [Wednesday, 30.11.1853] tarihiyle 
olan Hasan Yazıcı ile Alişan Bey nam kimesnelerin tahriratı kıraat olundukta 
Rusyalu‟nun süvari ve karakolu dünkü mahalle kadar gelmiş ise de bu defa Aküzüm 
nam karyeye vardıklarında orada bulamadıklarından ve uzak yakalarda bazı süvari 
karakollarını gördüklerinde asıl orduları nerelerde olduğunu tahkik etmek içün beş on 
atlu ile Hacı Hüseyin Bey nam kimesneyi gönderip Rusyalu‟nun Arpaçayı‟nın bu 
canibinde mukaddem asakir-i şahanenin imrar olunduğu köprünün tahtında haymenişin 
olduğunu tahkik eylediklerini ifadeden ve diğer fi 29 S sene 70 [1.12.1853] tarihiyle 
Hasan Yazıcı‟nın tahriratı dahi okundukta mahall-i mezkurda olan Rusya askeri tarih-i 
mezkurda sabah vakti tranpet çaldırıp talim eder gibi askerini oralarda gezdirdikten 
sonra evvelki gün gibi Kars suyunu bu tarafa geçip Yılanlı ve Aküzüm karyelerine doğru 
gelmekte olduklarını işardan ibaret olmağla bunun üzerine Ahmed Paşa hazretleri 
Rusyalu‟nun İstehane [?] karyesinde bulunan ordusu üzerine gidilmesini ve peksimad 
gönderilmesi ve bu babda olan rey ve tedbirlerini sual ve beyan etmişdim. Abdi Paşa 
hazretlerinin 28 S 70 yevm-i Salı tarihiyle müverreh cevaben gelen tahriratlarında 
Rusya ordusuyla bulunduğumuz mahallin arasında Kars suyu olup geçmesi suubetli 
olacağından ve suret-i karar yine işar kılınacağından Pencşenbe gününe kadar bu 
babda teemmül ve mülahaza olunarak iktiza-i hale bakılmasını yazmışlar idi. Halbuki 
müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri Rusyalu‟nun Gümrü‟ye çekilip gittiğini ve Kars‟a 
azimetlerinde arkamdan sen de gel deyu bana tenbih ettiğini işbu bendde beyan 
etmişler. Halbuki müşarünileyh hazretleri o gün kalkmamızı buyurmuş olsalar işbu 
tahriratlarında dahi işar ederler idi” demeleriyle tahrirat-ı mezkure kıraat olundukta 
meali vech-i muharrer üzere olduğu anlaşılmışdır. Badehu Ahmed Paşa hazretleri 
kelama ibtidar ile Abdi Paşa hazretleri yine işbu bendde Subatı karyesine çekil deyu 
Salı gecesi saat üçde yazmış olduğu tahriratlarında manevranın suret-i icraiyesi ve 
kendüleri Kars‟da bulunduğu halde tedabire teşebbüs olunması muharrer ise de 
tahrirat-ı mezkurda Subatı karyesine doğru çekilerek Rusyalu Kars çayını geçtiği haber 
alındıkta alel gafle basdırılsa bir iş görülür deyu muharrer olduğundan led-el iktiza 
tahrirat-ı mezkure kıraat olunduğu halde keyfiyet anlaşılacağını ifade eylemişdir. 
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Ardahan mevkiinin dahi Rusyalu‟nun bulunduğu mahalle ve gerek Kars‟a on iki 
baidiyeti olmakdan naĢi orası dahi boĢ bırağılmıĢ olmayup tahaffuzi hareket etmek ve 
ilerüde operasyon icrası lazım geldiği vakit orduy-ı hümayun ile birleĢdirilmek üzere 
Ferik saadetlu Ali PaĢa hazretleri dahi sekiz tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve malum-ül 
kıtaat top ile mevki-i mezkura tayin kılınmıĢ ve ilan-ı harb haberi geldiği gibi ferik-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri kemakan Ardahan‟da tahaffuzi halde bulunmak üzere ne 
vechile hareket ve ne suretle karakollar tayiniyle mübaderet eylemesi lazım geleceğini 
mübeyyin kendüsine tahriren talimat-ı kafiye gönderilmiĢ ve bunun üzerine Rusyalu 
hududu berü tarafa tecavüz etmekte olduğunu ve kendüsinin dahi ilerü hareketine lüzum 
göründüğünü suy-i acizaneme iĢar eylemiĢ olduğundan evvelki talimat-ı acizanemin 
hükmünü Ģerh ve tekidi ve çünkü Ģita hükmünü icra edeceği mevsim olarak pek de 
harekat-ı askeriye zamanı olmadığından asakir-i Ģahanenin Ģevk ve kuvvetleri 
mübeddel-i beis ve zaaf olmamak içün kıĢ mevsiminde hareketden ictinap olunmasını 
mutazammın tekrar talimat kaleme alınarak ve muahharen makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i 
seraskeriden vürud etmiĢ olan talimatın dahi bir sureti ihrac ettirilerek irsal ve tisyar ve 
her halde tahaffuzi tedafüi harekete ibtidar kılınması derc ve tezkar ve bu aralık devletlu 
Zarif PaĢa hazretleri orduy-ı hümayuna memur buyurulmuĢ olmasıyla mukteza-i 
memuriyetleri üzere evvel emirde Kars‟a gelmiĢ ve mevcud maiyetleri bulunan asakir-i 
muvazzafa ile Ardahan kolu ordusunun kumandasına himmet buyurmaları beynimizde 
kararlaĢdırılarak vali-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi ol vechile Ardahan tarafına tevcih 
ve azimet buyurmuĢ olduğundan badezin ferik-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi nasıl 
hareket olunmak lazım geleceğini vali-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinden istizan ederek her 
halde rey ve kumandaları vechile harekete mübaderet eylemesi lazımeden bulunmak 
cihetle bu kaziye dahi kendüsine yazılan tahrirat-ı acizi de bir guna kırgınlığını muceb 
olmamak içün ibarat-ı münasibe ile tevcih ve izbar kılınmıĢdı. 
 
Vali-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin Ardahan‟a gelmek üzere olduklarını ferik-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri haber aldıkları gibi müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin Ardahan‟a 
muvasalatlarından yarım saat evvel ferik-i müĢarünileyh hemen hareket ve ilerüye 
azimet eylemiĢ ve hatta avdet eylemesine dair müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretleri 
tarafından kendüsine gönderilen ademe “sizin paĢanız nasıl müĢir olmuĢ ise ben dahi 
ilerüye azimet ve ibraz-ı hüsn-i hizmet ederek müĢir olacağım” demiĢ olduğunu 
müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretleri muahharen mülakat-ı acizanem vukuunda 
çakerlerine maruz-ı (?) hasbihalde beyan buyurdular. ĠĢte ferik-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri 
gerek talimat ve gerek vali-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin tenbihatının muğayiri olarak 
Ahısha üzerine karar-ı azimet etmiĢ ve badehu bazı mertebe fütuhata muvafık 
olduklarını ve Ahısha‟da Rusyalu‟nun pek cüzi askeri olduğunu ve ahaliden dahi el 
tutularak Ahısha kalesini Devlet-i Aliyye‟ye teslim edecek olduklarını Ģamil ferik-i 
müĢarünileyh suy-i acizaneme tahriratı gelmiĢ ve müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretleri 
dahi muvaffakiyet-i mezkureyi suy-i aciziye iĢar ve kendüleri dahi mevcud maiyetleri 
olan asakir-i muvazzafa ile Ahısha‟ya müteheyyi-i azimet bulunduklarını beyan ve izbar 
buyurmuĢ ve Rusyalu‟nun oralarda bulunan asakiri beĢ taburdan ibaret olduğu tahkikat-
ı vakıa-i acizanem iktizasından olarak müĢarünileyh Ali PaĢa hazretlerinin kumandasın-
da ise sekiz tabur piyade ve bir alay süvariden baĢka Çıldır sancağının asakir-i 
muvazzafası dahi olmak hasebiyle Ģu halde Rusyalu‟dan hayliden hayli kuvvetlu 
bulunup vali-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi mevcud maiyetleri olan asakir-i muvazzafa 
ile azimet ve bunlara muvasalat  buyurdukları takdirce kuvvetleri Rusyalu‟nun üç dört 
misli derecesine vasıl olacağı derkar bulunmuĢ olmakdan naĢi maslahatın bu dereceye 
geleceği hayalhane-i tasavvura gelür Ģey olmadığından ferik-i müĢarünileyh tecavüzi 
hareket eylemesi her ne kadar talimat ve iĢarat-ı acizanemin muğayiri ise de 
müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinden ber vech-i muharrer tahrirat gelmesi cihetle 
reyleri bu merkezdedir zan ve kıyas olunarak muceb-i mahzuziyet olduğuna dair 
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kendülerine ve ferik-i müĢarünileyhe cevab tahrir ve ol vechile kalenin istihlasına 
himmet ve her halde müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretlerine müracaat eylemesi derc ve 
tezbir (tedbir?) kılınmıĢ olup halbuki muahharen vaki olan tahkikat-ı acizaneme göre 
ferik-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin iĢbu hareketi müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinin 
inzimam-ı rey ve iradeleriyle olmayıp hod be hod icra eylediği ve kumandasında 
bulunan cunud-ı nizamiye ve asakir-i muvazzafa kaide-i harbiyeye muğayir perakende 
olarak karyelere tefrik olunduğu anlaĢılmıĢ olduğundan derhal asakiri toplayıp gerü 
hududdan içerüye avdet eylemesi zımnında suy-i çakeranemden kendüsine ekid-ül 
mazmun tahrirat gönderilmiĢ ise de iĢ görmek gareziyle ısğa etmediği ve hatta yanında 
bulunan erkan ve ümera dahi tahrirat-ı acizanem vechile harekete müsaraat eylemesini 
hayırhâhâne ihtar eylemiĢler ise de kulak vermeyip muahharen Rusyalu bunların 
üzerine pek cüzi asker ile geldiği halde bunlar karyelere müteferrik bulunmalarından 
dolayı kuvvetleri dağılmıĢ bulunduğundan mukavemete tâb-âver olamamalarına sebeb 
olduğu cümle-i tahkikat-ı çakeranemden bulunmuĢdur. 
Bu madde Ali Paşa‟dan sual olundukta “Zarif Paşa Ardahan‟a geldiği gün vakıa ben 
çıkmış idim ve ol gün müşarünileyhin geleceğinden haberim yok idi ve çıkdıktan sonra 
müşarünileyhin bana ademi gelmedi ki „sizin paşanız gibi ben müşir olacağım‟ diyeyim 
ve ahaliden el tutarak Ahısha kalesini bize teslim edecekler deyu ben kimesneye kağıd 
yazmadım. Vakıa asakir karyelerde müteferrik idi ise de verdiğim layihada muharrer 
olduğu vechile muharebe vaktinde cümlesi yerlerinde bulundular ve muahharen asakiri 
toplayıp hududdan içerü çekilmeğe dair Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin tahriratı bana vasıl 
olmadı. Ben Ahısha‟da iken bana başıbozuk askeri gönder deyu vali paşaya yazmış 
idim. Ne asker gönderdi ve ne de iane eyledi. Velhasıl müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa 
hazretlerinin işbu bendde azv ü isnad buyurdukları taksiratın hiç birisini kabul etmem. 
Her bir harekat ve sekenatım müşarünileyhin emriyle olduğundan ve bunların her 
birisinin emirnamesi mevcud idüğünden isbata muktedirim. Hatta Ahısha‟nın Yenişehiri 
üzerinde vuku bulan muharebe keyfiyetine dair gönderilen tahrirata cevaben fi 4 S sene 
70 [6.11.1853] tarihiyle gelen tahriratı ibraz ederim” demesiyle tahrirat-ı mezkur 
kıraat olundukta vakıa ferik-i müşarünileyhin bu babda olan gayret ve himmetlerinden 
izhar-ı mahzuziyetden başka kendüsine tezyid-i kuvvet olmak üzere devletlu Zarif Paşa 
hazretleriyle Ferik saadetlu Abdülkerim Paşa‟nın asakir-i kafiye ile ol tarafa sevk ve 
izam kılındığı muharrer olup bu bendde yazıldığı vechile gerüye avdet olunmasına dair 
fıkra olmadığı ve bunun üzerine müşarünileyh Ali Paşa “Şu ibraz eylediğim tahriratın 
tarihinin ertesi günü ki Safer‟in yigirmi beşinci günüdür [27.11.1853] bozgunluk vuku 
buldu. Müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin gerüye avdet etmemize dair işbu bendde 
muharrer tahriratı bana nasıl vasıl olabilür?” demesi üzerine müşarünileyh Abdi Paşa 
hazretleri “Ben o tahriratı Ali Paşa‟nın bozulduğunu duymazdan evvelce göndermiş-
dim. Galiba tarafına vasıl olmamış” demişlerdir. 
 
Umum orduy-ı hümayunun uygunsuzluğu sebeblerine dair komisyondan vaki olan 
sualler üzerine tarafımızdan irad olunan cevablar maddeleri bâlâlarına surh ile iĢarat 
kılınmıĢ olacağından temhirlerine dahi ibtidar kılınmıĢdır. 
 
[Seals from left] Abdülkerim  Nadir, Ahmed, Ali Rıza. 
 
Appendix 81. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 2, undated. Ahmed Pasha’s report on the defeat of 
Gümrü (Gedikler) and his answers to questions together with those of Abdi Pasha 
and Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha. [Marginal notes in red above the paragraphs are written 
in red ink in the original and they are given here below the paragraphs] 
 
Gümrü‟de vuku bulan bozğunluğun sebebi devletlu Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinden sual 
olundukta orada olan vukuata dair yazmıĢ olduğu iĢbu varaka meydana konulup 
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devletlu Abdi PaĢa ve Ali PaĢa hazeratı dahi hazır oldukları halde irad olunan suallere 
müĢarünileyhim taraflarından verilen cevablardır ki maddeleri bâlâlarına surhla iĢaret 
kılındı. 
 
Kars‟da bulunan asakir-i nizamiye-i cenab-ı Ģahaneden altı tabur piyade ve bir alay 
süvari ile on beĢ kıta top ve ilerüde Kars‟a dört buçuk saat mesafede vaki Subatı 
karyesinde bulunan beĢ tabur piyade ve beĢ bölük süvari ile Mirliva izzetlu Veli PaĢa‟yı 
alıp ġüregel ve ZarĢat kazalarında mevcud bulunan üç binden mütecaviz neferat-ı 
muvazzafaları dahi bil-istishab Gümrü piĢgahında Arpaçayı‟nın önüne doğru azimet 
etmek ve düĢmanın kuvvetini anlayarak harb eylemek ve icabı takdirinde kazanılacağı 
anlaĢıldığı halde Arpaçayı‟nı geçip bir nokta tutup keyfiyetin serian taraflarına yazılmak 
hususunu tekiden irade buyurmuĢ oldukları. 
Beyan-ı hal kabilinden olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
MüĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin iradelerine imtisalen Ģehr-i Safer-ül Hayr‟ın 
dokuzuncu PencĢenbe [11.11.1853, but Friday!] günü Mirliva izzetlu Mustafa PaĢa 
kumandasıyla Kars‟da bulunan altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve on beĢ kıta top ve 
lüzumu kadar mühimmat-ı harbiye ile Kars‟dan hareket ve yevm-i mezkurda ahĢam saat 
on ikide mezkur Subatı karyesine varılarak ferdası Cuma günü bir tabur piyade ile iki 
kıta top karye-i mezkurda terk olunarak dört tabur piyade ve beĢ bölük süvari ve dört 
kıta sürat topu dahi alınarak ve mezkur ġüregel ve ZarĢat kazalarında bulunan neferat-ı 
muvazzafanın Arpaçayı‟nın bu tarafında vaki BaĢ ġüregel nam karyeye cem‟ olunması 
hususuna memur-ı mahsus çıkarılarak on tabur piyade ve bir alay beĢ bölük süvari ve on 
dokuz kıta top ile oradan dahi kalkıp Kars çayının bu tarafında kain Aküzüm karyesine 
saat on raddelerinde muvasalat ve beytutet olunmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
 
Rusya toprağında bulunan Tukaber [Tuhaber?] nam karyede Rusyalu‟nun üç yüz kadar 
Kazak süvarisi ve iki kıta topu bulunduğu haber verilmekten naĢi bunların ahz ü gerefti 
içün müĢarünileyhin ifadeleri vechile ġüregel kazası müdiri rifatlu Meded Bey ile ol 
havalinin Karapapak ve aĢair atlusundan bin kadar atlu ol gece mezkur Tukaber 
karyesine gönderilmiĢtir.  
Bu dahi 
 
Ferdası yevm-i sebt [13?.11.1853] mezkur Aküzüm‟den hareket birle Kars suyunu 
geçip mezkur BaĢ ġüregel karyesine vakt-i zuhurda muvasalat olunmuĢ ve asakir-i 
muvazzafa dahi vaki olan iĢar üzerine orada hazır ve müheyya bulunmuĢtur. 
 
Mezkur BaĢ ġüregel karyesinin karĢusunda Arpaçayı‟nın öte tarafında kain Bayındır 
karyesinde TaĢtimur kumandasıyla Rusyalu‟nun iki binden ziyade Karapapak atlusu 
orada mevcud bulunmuĢ olduğundan asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane ve toplar yerlerine 
konularak karye-i merkume piĢgahında bit-tevfik neferat-ı muvazzafa üç kol tertip olup 
sınıf-ı evveli Arpaçayı‟nın kenarına varmak üzere iken düĢman tarafından mezkur çayın 
kenarına inilerek silah endahtına mücaseret etmeleri cihetle bu tarafdan dahi mukabele-i 
bil-mislin icrasıyla mezkur çayın öte tarafına geçip bizim tarafdan vaki ve irae olunan 
kuvvete düĢman askeri tâb-âver olamayarak münhezimen Gümrü‟ye doğru yüz 
çevirmiĢlerdir. 
Bu bendin meali Abdi PaĢa tarafından tasdik olunmuĢtur. 
 
Mezkur üç kol neferat-ı muvazzafadan bir takımı ihtiyat olarak mezkur Bayındır‟ın 
kenarında alıkonulup iki takımı düĢman arkasından takib ettirilmiĢ ve Gümrü kazası 
piĢgahında muvasalatlarında Gümrü canibinden bir alay Rusya süvarisi süratle bizim 
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tarafa hücumları görülmüĢ olduğundan Erzincan kazası müdiri izzetlu AliĢan Bey 
kumandasıyla ihtiyat bırağılan mezkur neferat-ı muvazzafa dahi eriĢip yerleĢerek 
düĢman askerini bozup münhezim ve periĢan ederek Gümrü kazasına kadar sokturulmuĢ 
ve mezkur kazanın karĢusunda neferat-ı muvazzafa yarım saat miktarı tevkif ettirilerek 
badehu gerüye alınmıĢ ve ol gün bir hayli Rusyalu tarafından telefat vuku bulup beĢ on 
esir ile yüzden ziyade kadana bargiri ve hayli süngü ve kama ve tabanca ve kılıç 
alınmıĢtır ve ol gün cenab-ı hakk saye-i hazret-i Ģahanede nusret ve muzafferiyet ihsan 
eylemiĢtir. 
Bu dahi 
 
Ve evvelce neferat-ı muvazzafanın bir takımı Bayındır karyesinde ve asakir-i nizamiye 
dahi BaĢ ġüregel karyesinde aram ve beytutet ve ferdası Pazar günü cümleten asakir-i 
nizamiye ve muvazzafa Bayındır karyesine geçileceği keyfiyetiyle bir takım süngü ve 
silah-ı saire gönderildiğine dair yaver-i harb Mülazım Osman Efendi vasıtasıyla 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri taraflarına ba tahrirat iĢar ve iĢaat kılınmıĢtır.  
Muharebenin vukuunu yazmıĢlar ise de karĢuya geçilmek üzere yazıldığı hatırlarında 
olmadığından olan tahrirata müracaat olunması iktiza edeceği Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
tarafından ifade olunup tahrirat kıraat olundukta karĢuya geçileceği sarahaten beyan 
olunmamıĢ ise de Gümrü üzerine doğru hareket olunacağı ve düĢman kaleden çıkar ise 
muharebe olunacağı beyan olunmuĢtur. 
 
ġehr-i mezkurun on ikincisi [14.11.1853] olup zikr olunan Pazar günü Bayındır 
karyesine geçilip bir nokta tutulması mahsenatı (?) muceb olacağından Arpaçayı‟na 
köprü yapılarak mevcud maiyetimizle karye-i merkumeye geçilmiĢ ve lazım gelen 
mahallere karakol vaz‟ ve tertip olunmuĢ olup ol gün Rusyalu tarafından hiçbir hareket 
vukua gelmemiĢtir. 
Abdi PaĢa hazretleri bu bendin müĢtemil olduğu nokta maddesi bir Ģeyi (?) müfid (?) 
olmadığını ifade eylemiĢ ise de noktanın tutulması mahsenatı (?) müstelzem olacağını 
mukaddemce Abdi PaĢa hazretleri inha etmiĢ olduğunu Ahmed PaĢa beyan etmesiyle 
buna dair tahrirata müracaat olundukta muharrer bulunan nokta keyfiyeti baĢka bir 
nokta olup bu noktaya hiç münasebeti olmadığı anlaĢılmıĢtır.  
 
MüĢarünileyh hazretleri altı tabur piyade ve dört bölük süvari ve malum-ül kıtaat top ile 
Subatı karyesine geldikleri beyanıyla iki yüz kadar atlunun Miralay izzetlu Ġsmail Bey 
taraflarına gönderilmesine ve Pazar ertesi teĢrif edecekleri ifadesine dair bir kıta 
tahrirat-ı müĢiraneleri vürud etmekten naĢi hemen ol gece atluy-ı mezburı hazır ederek 
mir-i muma-ileyh taraflarına gönderilmiĢtir. 
Bu bendin meali kendüsince bir guna hüküm getürür Ģey olmadığını Abdi PaĢa 
hazretleri beyan eyledikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri bu bendde muharrer olup fi 12 
S sene 70 [14.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh müĢarünileyh Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinin 
tahriratını bil-irae kıraat olundukta meali zir-i kumandalarında olan piyade ve süvari 
asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane ile Subatı karyesine geldiklerini ve ferdası hareket olunarak 
ol tarafa muvasalat edeceklerini beyan ile zikr olunan asakir-i Ģahane içün orada yer var 
mıdır yohsa burada tevkif olunması mı icab eder ve oraca suret-i hareketleri ne 
merkezdedir istifsar ile beraber icabı kadar atlu ile Kaimmakam Ġsmail Bey‟in veyahud 
Meded Bey‟in taraflarına gönderilmesini mutazammın olduğu anlaĢılmıĢtır.  
 
Mezkur gece sabahı ve gündüz saat yedi buçuka kadar düĢman tarafından bir guna 
hareket görülememiĢ ve müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi Bayındır karyesine birbuçuk saat 
mesafede vaki Kars Suyu‟nu geçtiği haber alınmıĢ iken hemen ol halde var kuvvetiyle 
Rusyalu kaleden çıkıp orduy-ı hümayun canibine hareketleri görüldüğünden derakıb 
dokuz tabur piyade ve bir alay ile beĢ bölük süvari ve on dokuz kıta top ile mevcud 
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bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafayı alıp düĢmana karĢu yavaĢ yavaĢ varılmıĢ ve düĢmanın 
böyle hareket etmeleri keyfiyetiyle bir ayak evvel teĢrif eylemelerine dair müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine haber gönderilmiĢtir. 
Bu bendin müfadından anlaĢılan haber maddesinin vuku‟ bulmadığını Abdi PaĢa 
hazretleri beyan edip Ahmed PaĢa dahi vukuunu musirren ifade etmektedir. 
 
Asakir-i Ģahane mezkur karyeden haylice ayrılıp piyade taburları iki hat üzere tertib 
olunup süvari alayı bölükleri sağ ve sol cenahlara ve neferat-ı muvazzafa dahi 
nizamiyenin sağ ve sol taraflarına ve toplar cenah ve ortaya konularak ve mumailey-
hima Veli ve Mustafa PaĢalar sağ ve sol cenahların kumandalarına tayin olunarak ve 
ben dahi asakir-i Ģahaneye metanet ve cesaret gelmek üzere sağ ve sol tarafı ve tabur 
aralarını gezer iken saat dokuzda düĢman tarafından top endahtına mücaseret ve 
mukabele-i bil-mislin icrasıyla bizim tarafdan dahi harbe mübaĢeret olunmuĢtur. 
Hikaye kabilinden olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
DüĢmanın on tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve iki binden mütecaviz Karapapak atlusu 
ve kırk kıta top [sic] meydan-ı muharebede görülmüĢtür. 
Bu dahi 
 
Saat on buçukta müĢarünileyh hazretleri mezkur ül miktar asakir-i Ģahane ile birlikte 
bizim gavga etmekte olduğumuz mahalle yigirmi dakika mesafe bulunan mezkur BaĢ 
ġüregel karyesine geldikleri haber alınmaktan naĢi yanlarında bulunan Ferik saadetlu 
RaĢid PaĢa hazretleri dört yahud üç tabur piyade ve bir batarya top ile bizim sol ve 
düĢmanın sağ tarafından hareket etmesini müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine birkaç defa 
ifade etmiĢ ise de müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri asla sem‟ ve itibar etmediği 
muahharen ferik-i müĢarünileyh ifadelerinden anlaĢılmıĢ, eğerçi ol vakit müĢarünileyhin 
vaki olan ifadesi üzerine sevk-i asker olunmuĢ olsa idi avn-i hakla bütün bütün 
kazanılacağına Ģüphe yok idi. 
Bu madde Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Ahmed PaĢa gavga eder iken 
geldim. Ġmdad içün süvariyi hemen karĢu yakaya geçürdüm ve düĢman bozulup Gümrü 
canibine ricat eyledi. Lakin ReĢid [sic] PaĢa benden ne asker istedi ve ne de rica eyledi” 
deyu söylemiĢtir. 
 
MüĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri ahĢam ezanından evvelce Bayındır karyesine 
geçmezden evvel maiyetlerinde bulunan dört bölük süvari ve topları mahall-i 
muharebeye gönderdiler ve kendüleri dahi mezkur Bayındır karyesine teĢrif eylediler. 
Bu bendin müfadını Abdi PaĢa hazretleri tasdik eder. 
 
Ol gece saat iki buçuka kadar muharebe mümtedd olduğu halde müĢarünileyh hazretleri 
tarafından sevk-i asker ve kendüleri dahi bir tarafdan teĢrif edip asakir-i Ģahaneye Ģevk 
ve gayret verilememiĢ olduğundan ümera ve zabitan cümlemiz asakir-i Ģahanenin 
içlerinde bulunmakta ve asakir-i Ģahaneye Ģevk ve gayret gelmek üzere kelime-i 
tayyibeler ile pend ve metanet verilmekte bulunduğu halde gece saat iki buçukta ateĢ 
kesildiği müĢarünileyh hazretlerine bildirildikte hemen asakir-i Ģahaneyi gerüye çekip 
gelsün deyu haber göndermiĢ ise de düĢman gidip gitmediği ve ne halde bulundukları 
anlaĢılmak içün saat beĢe kadar durulmuĢ ve sol cenaha doğru gezer iken düĢman 
tarafından yol ĢaĢırıp süratle bir kapaklı gelmekte olduğu müĢahade olundukta derakıb 
süvari dördüncü nizamiye alayı Kolağası ġerif Ağa ve birkaç süvari neferatı sevk 
olunmuĢtur.  
Muharebe esnasında büyük kumandarların asakirin içinde bulunması lazım gelmeyece-
ğinden ba‟del muharebe dahi askerin içine gitmeğe lüzum görünmediğinden münasip 
gördükleri yerde kalmıĢ olduğunu Abdi PaĢa beyan eder.  
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ĠĢbu kapaklunun yanında bulunan bir nefer Rusyalu mülazımı ve bir nefer topçu Kazağı 
teslim olunmasına ikdam olunmuĢ ise de teslim olmamaları cihetle mersumlar katl ve 
telef ve derununda gülle ve kobuz mahmul olduğu halde mezkur kapaklu ve dört re‟s 
kadana bargiri bizim topçu zabitlerine teslim ve ita kılınmıĢ ve saat beĢde asakir-i 
Ģahaneyi bil-istishab karye-i mezkura gelinerek müĢarünileyh hazretleriyle mülakat 
olunmuĢtur. 
Bu bendin istintakça hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve Ģehr-i mezkurun on dördüncü Salı [16.11.1853] günü müĢarünileyh hazretleriyle 
esblerimize binip muharebe olan mahalle varılmıĢ ve birçok Rusyalu laĢesi ve topkeĢan 
hayvanatı meydan-ı muharebede kaldığı müĢahade olunmuĢ iĢbu laĢeler ile muharebe 
evvelinden nihayetine kadar Gümrü kalesine götürmüĢ laĢe ve mecruh binden ziyade 
olduğu ve fena suretle periĢan ve münhezimen leylen Gümrü kalesine sokuldukları ve 
Ġslam olup Rusyalu tarafında bulunan Karapapak atlusu bütün bütün dağılarak hemen 
yüz elli kadar kaldıkları ve iĢbu yüz elli atluyu dahi siz Ġslamla gavga etmediniz diyerek 
emniyetleri selb olup cümleten Rusyalu tarafından katl ü idam oldukları muahharen 
tahkik ve istihbar kılınmıĢ ve bu muharebede dahi bi-tevfik-i teala saye-i fütuhatvaye-i 
cenab-ı Ģahanede nusret ve muzafferiyet bizim tarafda olmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
 
ĠĢbu muharebede bizim tarafdan yigirmi üç Ģehid ve kırk yedi kadar mecruh vukua 
gelmiĢ ve mukaddem ve bu kere neferat-ı muvazzafadan dahi hemen bu kadarca Ģehid 
ve yaralı vuku bulmuĢ ve topkeĢan ve binek ve neferat-ı muvazzafa hayvanlarından 
yüzden ziyadece telefat olmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
 
Ve Cuma ertesi gününe kadar atılan top danelerinin yerine Kars‟dan celb olunarak üç 
yüz atıma baliğ olmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
 
Ve mukaddem Subatı karyesinde bırağılmıĢ olan bir tabur piyade ve iki kıta top yevm-i 
ÇeharĢenbe Bayındır karyesine getürülmiĢtir. 
Bu dahi 
 
Ve Mirliva izzetlu Hafız PaĢa kumandasıyla Kars‟da bırağılmıĢ olan üç tabur redif ve 
bir tabur nizamiye dahi yevm-i mezkurda Bayındır karyesine gelmiĢtir ve Ģehr-i 
mezkurun on dokuzuncu Pazar günü asakir-i Hassa ĢeĢhane taburu mükemmelen 
mezkur Bayındır karyesine gelmiĢtir. 
Bu dahi 
 
Mukaddemce mezkur Tukaber [?] tarafına gönderilmiĢ olan mumaileyh Meded Bey 
yigirmi kadar esir ve bir miktar bargir ile Salı günü Bayındır‟a gelmiĢ ve bunlardan dahi 
bir miktar Rusyalu tarafından dahi haylüce telefat vuku‟ bulmuĢ olduğu mir-i 
mumaileyhin ifadesinden anlaĢılmıĢtır. 
Bu dahi 
 
Bizim kuvve-i mecmuamız yigirmi iki tabur piyade ve iki buçuk alay süvari ve sekiz 
yüz kadar topçu ve otuz sekiz kıta top ile üç binden ziyadece neferat-ı muvazzafa 
olduğu düĢman askeri pek gayet zaafiyetde ve gereği gibi imdadsız kaldığı ve asakir-i 
Ģahane ber vech-i matlub Ģevk ve gayretde bulunduğu halde düĢman askeri kasabadan 
dıĢaru çıkarlar ise üzerlerine varılıp harb olunması ve çıkmadıkları suretde Gümrü‟ye 
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daha karib mahalde vaki Kara Kilisa karyesine geçip bir münasip istihkam verilerek 
oraya on saat mesafede kain Üç Kilisa nam mahalde bulunan Rusyalu‟nun üç tabur 
askerini bir fırka asakir-i Ģahane ile gidip basdırılması ve bu dahi olmaz ise kalenin arka 
tarafına yani Tiflis tarikini dolaĢarak Ahılkelek tarikinin üzerine bir münasip istihkam 
verilerek kaleye bir karaltı gösterilip beĢ on tabur ile Ahısha‟ya doğru Ferik saadetlu Ali 
PaĢa‟nın tarafına hareket ve azimet kılınması ve Ģu üç suretden her kanğısı mütenasip 
görülür ise ol vechile emr ü icra buyurulması hususu Ferik saadetlu RaĢid PaĢa ve 
Kerim PaĢa ve muahharen atufetlu müsteĢar efendi hazeratı hazır bulundukları halde 
bid-defeat müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerine ifade ve beyan kılınmıĢ ise de hiç birisine 
itibar etmeyip orada bir güzelce istihkâm verilmiĢ iken on iki gün beyhude eğleĢilmiĢtir. 
Yalnız iĢbu beyan olunan üç suret değil daha pek çok suretler düĢünüldü ise de 
hiçbirisinin faidesi olmayacağı anlaĢıldığından akıbet-ül emr Kars‟a avdet sureti 
mürecceh görünerek cümle ittifakıyla ol vechile Kars‟a avdet olunmağa karar verildiği-
ni Abdi PaĢa hazretleri ifade eder. 
 
ĠĢbu on iki gün zarfında beyhude oturulması cihetle asakir-i Ģahanenin Ģevk ve 
gayretleri gün be gün zail olarak bir gevĢeklik arız olmakta ve tayinat dahi Kars‟dan 
layıkıyla gelmemekte ve Tiflis ve Çaçak [?] tarafından peyderpey düĢmana imdad 
gelmekte olup hatta kaleye sokulup dıĢarıya çıkamaz iken beĢ altı günden sonra 
ordusunu kasabanın sol tarafında karĢumuza çıkarıp hayme-niĢin-i ikamet olmuĢlardır. 
“Esbab-ı nakliyenin fıkdanı ve yolların çamur ve bozukluğu cihetle zahire celbinde 
noksaniyet oldu. Fakat mev‟ud zahire ile asker idare olunup aç bırağılmadı ve biz orada 
iken düĢmana imdad geldiğini görmedik ve haber almadık ve Rusya ordusunun kaleden 
dıĢarı çıkması imdadının gelmesinden olmayıp Gümrü kalesinin etrafı müstahkem ordu 
mesabesinde olmağla her ne vakit murad olunsa yüz binden mütecaviz askerle kale-i 
mezburun istihkamatı altında barınılabilür” deyu Abdi PaĢa hazretleri ifade eder. 
 
Ve bu aralıkta r*b*z*? cenah-ı müstelzem ül-felah hazret-i Ģahaneye dehaletle 
Dersaadet‟e gelmiĢ olan Rüstem Bey ve kolağası orduy-ı hümayuna gelip Rusyalu‟nun 
gayet zayıf vakti olup harb olunsa bizim tarafdan iĢ görüleceğini müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine ifade etmiĢ ise de ona dahi sem‟-i itibar etmeyip velhasıl her ne mütalaaya 
mebni ise orduy-ı hümayunun Kars‟a avdetini münasip gördüler. 
ĠĢbu Rüstem Bey mechul-ül hal bir adem olmağla bazı mütalaata mebni ifadatına 
havale-i sem‟-i itibar olunamadığını Abdi PaĢa hazretleri ifade eder. 
 
MüĢarünileyh RaĢid ve Kerim PaĢa ile birlikte taraflarına celb birle havaların 
soğuklarından bahisle orduy-ı hümayunun [sic] Kars‟a avdet ve hareket ettireceğini 
ifade ve beyan buyurdular ve bizler dahi “Muharebe olmuyor ve bir mahalle gidilmiyor 
burada beyhude oturmaktan ise iradeniz vechile Kars‟a gidelim” denildikte “Askerin 
hazır olmalarını tenbih ediniz fakat ne tarafa gidileceğini bu dördümüzden baĢka 
kimesne duymasun” deyu irade buyurmuĢlardır. 
Bu bendin mealini Abdi PaĢa hazretleri tasdik eder. 
 
MüĢarünileyh hazretlerinin iradelerine imtisalen Cuma ahĢamı mirliva paĢaları ve 
neferat-ı muvazzafa sergerdeleri celb edilerek yarın kalkılacak hazır olup ve yükleri 
dahi yüklettirip ordunun Gümrü canibinde falan mahalde durmalarını ve süvari 
alaylarıyla iki batarya süvari topu Mirliva izzetlu Veli PaĢa kumandasıyla yine ordunun 
Gümrü cenahında neferat-ı muvazzafanın sol cenahında kol heyetiyle durup amade ve 
müheyya olmaları ekiden tenbih ve ifham olunmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
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ĠĢbu tenbihat üzerine asakir-i Ģahane müheyya olarak ferdası yani Ģehr-i mezkurun 
yigirmi dördüncü Cuma günü tahsis olunan mahallere saf-beste-i tecemmü olup saat 
üçte Arpaçayı geçilerek asakir-i muvazzafa sergerdelerinden Hacı Temür Ağa zikr 
olunan BaĢ ġüregel karyesinde terk ve tevkif birle orduy-ı hümayun ile cümleten 
Aküzüm nam karyeye muvasalat olunmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi tasdik olunmuĢtur. 
 
Orduy-ı hümayun ile beraber yanımızda bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafa sergerdelerinden 
mevcud maiyetleriyle her kanğısı tensib (?) bilür ve ne mahalde ikameleri irade 
buyurulur ise hududa karib birkaç karyede ikadı hususu taraf-ı aciziden müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine ifade olunmuĢ ise de ilerüde icabına bakılur deyu cevab verdiler. 
Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “bu askerin cümlesi yerleĢtirildi” dedikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa 
“bunda olan mazarrat askerin dağılması maddesi olup çünkü sergerdelere bir mahal irae 
olunmadığından dağıldılar” demesine cevaben Abdi PaĢa “Aküzüm‟e gelmek üzere 
tertip eyledik. Sergerdeler geldiler, neferatı gelmediler. Bunlar nasıl olsa dağılacak idi” 
cevabı üzerine Ahmed PaĢa bazı mertebe itiraz ederek bu maddenin istilam olunmasına 
iki tarafdan dahi muvafakat olunmuĢtur.  
 
Ve bir de cenahlarda bulunan fırka-i askeri kumandanlarına yani Revan canibinde Üç 
Kilisa‟nın karĢusunda Aras suyunun kenarında bulunan Hakkâri valisi devletlu Mehmed 
PaĢa ve Ahısha‟da olan müĢarünileyh Ferik Ali PaĢa hazeratına orduy-ı hümayunun 
gerüye alınıp sizler dahi ona göre hareket etmek ve olmadığı halde ne vechile tedabire 
teĢebbüs eylemek lazım geleceği keyfiyetlerine dair orduy-ı hümayun mezkur Bayındır 
karyesinden hareket etmezden çend gün evvel müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretleri 
taraflarından ba tahrirat malumat verilmek iktiza-i halden iken bu dahi kat‟a vuku‟ 
bulmamıĢtır. 
Bunlara beyan-ı keyfiyet olunamaması neden iktiza eylediği Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden 
sual olundukta “Bu madde onlara bildirilmek lazım gelmez. Benim bunları yazmamak-
lığımdan ne zarar oldu?” demeleri üzerine Ahmed PaĢa, “Ali PaĢa gerü gelür idi” 
demesiyle Abdi PaĢa, “Ali PaĢa‟ya yazdım” demiĢ ise de Ali PaĢa kendüsine öyle kağıt 
gelmediğini ifade eyledikte Abdi PaĢa, “Ben yazdım lakin size vasıl olmamıĢ. Bunun 
müsveddesi mahallinde mevcuddur. Ona müracaat olunsun fakat evvelce yazılmağa 
lüzum olmadığından Hakkâri valisine yazılmıĢ idi ve böyle yazılmıĢ bile olsa bizim 
kalktığımız gün Ali PaĢa bozuldu” demesine cevaben Ahmed PaĢa, “Hakkâri valisine 
Salı günü ben yazdım. Vasıl olduğu gibi hareket eyledi. Bunu da Abdi PaĢa‟nın tenbihi 
üzere yazdım” demiĢtir. 
 
[page 5] 
 
Yevm-i mezkurda ġam-ı ġerif canibinden azimet etmiĢ olan Sergerde Hasan Yazıcı Ağa 
gelip “Esnay-i rahda müĢir paĢa hazretlerini gördüm. Bizleri bir münasip mahalle 
yerleĢtirmek üzere size gönderdiler” diyerek ifade ettiklerinde ne kadar atlunuz var deyu 
sual ettim. Ġki bin kadar atlumuz vardır deyu ifade etmelerine mebni li-ecl-i müĢahade 
binip mumaileyhle atlunun içlerine varıldıkta nısfından ziyadesi çoluk çocuk olarak 
cümleten sekiz yüz kadar atlusu ancak olduğu görülmüĢ ve yem verecek ziyade 
bulunması cihetle mumaileyh mevcudatıyla beraber mezkur Aküzüm karyesine memur-
ı mahsus ile gönderilmiĢtir. 
Bu madde dahi Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta, “Demincek dediğim gibi yolda 
rast geldim ve Ahmed PaĢa kumandasına gönderdim” demiĢtir. 
 
Mumaileyh Hasan Yazıcı Ağa karye-i mezkura varıp oturur oturmaz üst tarafındaki 
[sic] bulunan tepeden Rusya taburları yüz gösterdikte ağa-i mumaileyh karyeden dıĢaru 
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çıkıp burada ben kalamam deyip derakıb haber göndermiĢ olduğundan keyfiyetin tahkik 
ve tedkiki zımnında Kolağası mumaileyh ġerif Ağa gönderilerek sahihen ordunun [sic] 
mahall-i mezkurda görüp haber getürmiĢ ve ağa-i mumaileyh ol gece mezkur Gedikler‟e 
yarım saat mesafede vaki Kilisa karyesinde beytutet ettirilmiĢ ve keyfiyet-i vakıa Salı 
gecesi ba tahrirat müĢarünileyh hazretleri taraflarına bildirilmiĢtir. 
Hikayeden ibaret olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve ferdası Salı günü Rusyalu‟nun dört tabur piyade ve dört kıta top ve bir alay süvari ve 
bir miktar Karapapak atlusu yine Kars suyunu geçerek Aküzüm karyesinin alt tarafında 
neferat-ı muvazzafa ile harbe mücaseret edip hatta top endaht ettikleri dahi mezkur 
Gedikler karyesinde istima olunmuĢtur. 
Bu dahi 
 
Bunun üzerine yine asakir-i nizamiye ile mezkur Gedikler karyesinin haricine çıkılıp hat 
tertip olundukta birkaç atlu ile ilerüye gitmiĢ ve harb olunduğunu görmüĢ olduğumdan 
ve sonra tarafeynden birkaç telefat vukua gelerek düĢman mezkur Kars çayını öteye 
geçip ordusu canibine gittiklerinden yine gerüye avdet kılınmıĢtır. 
Bu bendin meali Abdi PaĢa tarafından tasdik olunmuĢtur. 
 
Ve Pazar günü saat yedide vuku-ı hal ile asakir-i Ģahanenin tayinatından dolayı zaruret-i 
hallerinden bahisle keyfiyet ba tahrirat müĢarünileyh taraflarına iĢar kılınmıĢtır.  
Gedikler karyesinden Salı gecesi yazılan tahriratımıza cevaben Salı günü müĢarünileyh 
Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden alınan tahriratda PencĢenbe gününe kadar iktiza-i hal bit-
teemmül yine sureti karar iĢar olunacağından ona göre iktiza-i hale bakılması münderic 
olup tahrirat-ı mezkur yedlerinde mevcud bulunduğundan iktiza eylediği halde irad 
edeceğini Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri ifade eylemiĢtir. 
 
Ferdası ÇeharĢenbe günü karakollar birbirleriyle muhabere etmek sırasında (?) iken 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafından mersul tahrirat-ı aciziye cevabname vürud etti ve 
meali Ģu oluyor ki asakir-i Ģahanenin tayinatı Ģimdiye kadar çamur ve yağmurun kesreti 
cihetle gönderilemediği ve kendü katarıyla bir miktar neferat-ı muvazzafa cephanesi 
gönderildiği ve yavaĢ yavaĢ Subatı karyesine gelinse Rusyalu Kars çayını geçtiği anda 
haber alınarak alel gafle basdırılsa bir iĢ görülür deyu tahrirden ibaret olup bunun 
üzerine Mirliva izzetlu Veli ve Hafız ve Mustafa PaĢalar celb olunarak tahrirat-ı mezkur 
meydana konulup kıraat olunduktan sonra yarın PencĢenbe günü kalkılacağı ifade 
olunmuĢ ise de paĢa-i mumaileyhima [sic] tarafından bazı mahzurlar mütalaasıyla 
ifadede bulunmuĢlardır. Yani Ģöyle ki “Bizler buradan kalkarsak düĢman peĢimizde ve 
çoluk çocuk ve emval ve eĢya ve ırz ve ıyal bilcümle bilcümle [sic] ayak altında kalur 
ve bizlerce dahi bir fenalık melhuzdur ve değirmanlarda cem ve iddihar olunmuĢ olan 
hıntalar değirmanlar ile düĢman elinde kalur ve Kars‟dan tayinat gelmiyor ve Subatı 
karyesinde değirman yok. Zaruret-i hale giriftar olmak ve düĢman peĢimizde iken 
kalkup gitmek lazım gelmez. Bir iki gün sabr edelim. DüĢman gelür ise gavga 
eyliyelim. Eğer gelmez de Gümrü‟ye çekilür gider ise baĢluca buradan kalkup Subatı ve 
Kars‟a kadar gideriz” deyu bu yolca ifadede bulunmuĢ olduklarından ben dahi inĢallahu 
teala yarın sabahleyin gidelim deyu müzakerede iken müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerin-
den yaver-i harb BinbaĢı Arif Efendi geldi. MüĢir paĢa hazretlerinin selamı var yarın 
kalkılsa yavaĢ yavaĢ Subatı karyesine doğru çekilinse yine siz bilürsünüz deyu bu 
vechile ifade etmiĢtir. 
Bu madde Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Olunan müzakere vechile muradım 
asakir-i Ģahaneyi Subatan karyesine çekip ve Rusyalu‟yu Kars çayından berü alıp orada 
sıkıĢtırarak bir muharebe etmek maksadına mebni idi. Zira bu manevranın icrası içün 
asakir-i Ģahaneyi berü almaklıkla olur ve yazdığım tahrirat bunu müeyyiddir” demesiyle 
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tahrirat kıraat olunup vakıa bu bendde muharrer olduğu vechile olup fakat zahire 
gönderilip yağmur ve çamur münasebetiyle henüz vasıl olmuĢ olacağı muharrer olmağla 
bunun üzerine Abdi PaĢa Kars‟a avdet olunduğu vakit her günde dört kere vukuat 
yazılması tenbih olundu ve kendüleri orduyu Subatan‟da bildiği cihetle yaveri 
Subatan‟a gönderip orada bulamadığından ilerüde bulup Kars‟a avdet olunmasını ifade 
eyledi ve hatta Kerim PaĢa‟yı bile Kars‟dan çıkarıp ordu içün mahaller bile hazırlattı 
dedikten sonra “Ben yaveri gönderdiğim vakit Ahmed PaĢa‟ya ne söylemiĢ ve onlar 
dahi yavere ne cevab etmiĢ yaverden sual olunsun ve yazdığım kağıdı okuyan liva 
paĢalardan dahi keyfiyet istilam kılınsın” demiĢlerdir. Ve Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri dahi 
buna muvafakiyet etmiĢ ise de Zarif PaĢa‟nın bizlere husumetleri cihetle kendülerinden 
ve kumandasında bulunan zabitan ve saireden sual olunsa hakikat-i hal beyan 
etmeyecekleri maznun olduğundan istilama gelecek cevaba asla itimad edemeyeceğini 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri ifade eylemiĢlerdir. 
 
Ve biz dahi bu keyfiyeti paĢalar ile müzakere etmekteyiz diyerek müĢarünileyh 
hazretlerine böylece haber gönderilmiĢtir. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Bunun üzerine mumaileyh Meded Bey ve biraderi Miralay Ġsmail Bey gelip istima‟mıza 
göre yarın buradan hareket edecek imiĢsiniz. Sizler gittiğiniz halde bu kazada bulunan 
çoluk ve çocuk ve ırz ve ıyal periĢan olup ayak altında kalur. Hiç olmaz ise bari bir iki 
gün tevkif ediniz bu havalide bulunan kura ahalilerini Kars canibinde kain münasip 
karyelere gönderelim deyu ifade etmelerinde onlara dahi bakalım deyu cevab 
verilmiĢtir. 
Bu dahi 
 
ġehr-i mezkurun yigirmi beĢinci Cuma ertesi günü [27.11.1853] mezkur Aküzüm 
karyesinden dahi kalkılıp salif-üz zikr Subatı karyesine birbuçuk iki saat mesafede kain 
Gedikler karyesine muvasalat olunmuĢ ve altı tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ile bir 
batarya top esnay-i rahda mumaileyh Veli PaĢa‟nın kumandasıyla Subatı karyesine ve 
müĢarünileyh Kerim PaĢa dahi Kars‟a gönderilmiĢ ve müĢarünileyh RaĢid PaĢa 
hazretleri dahi gitmiĢtir. 
Bu bendin mealini Abdi PaĢa hazretleri tasdik eder. 
 
Bu aralık BaĢ ġüregel‟de bırağılmıĢ olan mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ağa‟nın katibi Hasan 
Efendi gündüz saat on raddelerinde gelip Rusyalu kuvve-i mecmuasıyla saat yedi 
kararlarında Arpaçayı‟nı berü tarafa geçip BaĢ ġüregel karyesine geldiğini ve 
mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ağa dahi karye-i mezkurdan kalkıp buraya gelmek üzere esnay-
i rahda bulunduğu müĢarünileyh hazretlerine ifade ve beyan etmiĢ ve ben dahi ol vakit 
asakir-i Ģahaneyi birleĢtirmek üzere bulunduğum halde nöbetçi çavuĢ Mustafa‟yı li-ecl-
il icab arkamızdan göndermeleri cihetle yanlarına geldim ve katib-i mumaileyhin 
ifadesini ber tafsil nakil buyurdular ve bunun üzerine asakir-i nizamiye ve 
muvazzafadan münasip mahallere karakol ve top konulması tensip gördüler. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve bunun üzerine bendeleri esb-süvar olup mirliva paĢaları celb ederek karakol ve top 
ikadı iktiza edecek mahaller müĢahade olunmak üzere keyfiyeti paĢa-i mumaileyhimaya 
ba‟d et-tenbih Rusyalu‟nun geleceği tarik üzerinde vaki Ermeni köyüne kadar giderek 
neferat-ı muvazzafanın yanlarına ve karye-i mezkurun kenarına vardım. Yigirmi otuz 
atlu ile Kiğı kazası müdiri Mehmed Bey‟in mahdumu Ġsmail Bey ile Malatya kazası 
hanedanından Hacı Mehmed Ağa‟yı kırk elli kadar atlu ile orada bulup küsur neferat-ı 
muvazzafayı sual ettikte Kars‟a doğru savuĢup gitmiĢ olduklarını ifade eylediler. 
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Bu bendin mealini dahi müĢarünileyh tasdik edip fakat kaçtı denilen asakir evvelce 
tertib ve tesrib olunmuĢ idi. Sonra kendüliklerinden firara karar vermiĢler deyu ifade 
eder.  
Ve ol ahĢam saat on bir buçuk raddelerinde mumaileyh Hacı Timur Ağa mevcud 
maiyeti bulunan üç yüz kadar atlu ile gelerek Rusyalu‟nun Kars çayının öte tarafına 
gelip nasb-ı hıyamla ikamet ettiklerini beyan etti ve bunların cümlesi ol gece Hamza 
Gelik [?] nam karyede ikamet etmelerini ve ilerüye dikkatli karakol çıkarmalarını ve 
geçen düĢman tarafından bir hareket vukua gelür ise arkalarında bulunan nizamiye 
karakollarına haber vermelerini bunlara dikkatlü (?) tenbihat icra olunarak ve çıkarılan 
karakol mahalleri dolaĢılarak ol gece saat ikide orduya geldim ve benim oturacağım 
odada müĢir-i müĢarünileyh hazretlerini hazır bulup keyfiyet-i vakıayı kendüsine bit-
tafsil ifade eyledim. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve iĢbu ifadenin üzerine Subatı karyesinden mumaileyh Veli PaĢa‟nın celbi zımnında 
taraflarından tahrirat gönderilip gece yarusu paĢa-i mumaileyh mevcud maiyetiyle 
gelerek asakir-i merkume Yukaru Gedikler karyesine yerleĢtirildi ve berf-i baran 
yağarak ol gece  sabah olmuĢtur. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Yevm-i Pazar [28.11.1853] ilerüde bulunan karakollardan Rusyalu geliyor deyu alınan 
habere binaen müĢarünileyh hazretleriyle birlikte olduğumuz halde karye-i mezkurun 
karĢusuna çıkıp iki hat üzere asakir-i Ģahane tertib eyleyerek ve sağ ve sol cenahlara 
süvari konularak ve bizler dahi iĢbu hatlardan kırk elli hatve ilerüye giderek saat 
dörtden sekize kadar durulup düĢman askerinin süvarisi Kars çayını bu tarafa geçti ve 
muahharen yine dönüp gerüye gittiler deyu bizim karakollar haber getürdiler. Bunların 
ne tarafa gittiklerine muttali olup ifade etmek üzere müteaddid ademler gönderilip 
asakir-i Ģahane gerüye mahallerine alınmıĢtır. 
Bu bendin mealini Abdi PaĢa hazretleri tasdik eder. 
 
Ve Ģehr-i mezkurun yigirmi yedinci Pazar ertesi günü [29.11.1853] Yaver-i Harb 
YüzbaĢısı Hasan Ağa ile müĢarünileyhin gönderdiği habere binaen kalkup odada 
yanlarına vardıkta yanında üç kağıt olup “Ahısha‟da bir fenalık zuhura gelmiĢ ve bu 
fenalığın vukuu orduy-ı hümayunun Bayındır karyesinden gerüye alınmasından neĢet 
etmiĢ deyu atufetlu müsteĢar efendi yazmıĢ olduğundan ve Kars‟dan layıkıyla tayinat 
gelmemekte bulunduğundan ben Kars‟a gideceğim” deyu ifade buyurmuĢlardır. 
Bu madde Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Vakıa ben de gitmek efkârında 
idim. Ahmed PaĢa efkârımı tasdik ettiğinden Kars‟a gittim. Bu vukuat bizim çıktığımız 
günden bir gün sonra oldu. Buna bu çıkıĢ nasıl sebeb olabilür?” demiĢtir. 
 
“Her çend düĢman peĢimizde dolaĢtığı halde sizin gitmekliğiniz kat‟a caiz değil” deyu 
vaki olan ifade-i acizaneme mebni “DüĢman firar ederek Gümrü kalesinden içerüye 
girdi ve bana sahih haberi geldi” deyu ifade buyurmuĢlardır. 
Bu maddenin kat‟a aslı olmadığını ve Rusyalu Gümrü kalesine geçmiĢ diyerek ifadat ve 
ihbarat vaki olduğundan onun üzerine keyfiyet buraya dahi yazıldığını Abdi PaĢa ifade 
eyledikte “Rusyalu Gümrü kalesine gitmeyip olduğu yerde bulunmuĢ iken hilaf ifadeye 
mebni çarçabuk keyfiyet buraya yazıldığı ve bu keyfiyeti yazmak üzere kendüsine ifade 
etmiĢ ise de dinlemediğini Ahmed PaĢa beyan ettikte Abdi PaĢa tasdik edip lakin bu bir 
vukuat demek olmadığından yazılmasında beis olmadığını ifade etmiĢtir. 
 
Halbuki mezkur düĢman zikr olunan ġüregel karyesinin önüne ordu kurup oturmakta 
oldukları güneĢ gibi zahir iken bu guna ifadede bulunduklarına binaen “siz bilürsünüz 
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irade sizindir” deyu hatm-i kelam olunmuĢtur. Sonra mirliva paĢaları çağırıp “Size 
tayinat göndereyim ben Kars‟a gideceğim. Siz Ahmed PaĢa ile burada çadırlar ve çamur 
kuruyunca [sic] kadar ikamet edip birkaç gün sonra geleceksiniz” deyip binip 
gitmiĢlerdir. 
Bu madde Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta öyle oturmak içün tenbihat vaki 
olmayıp fakat Hasan Yazıcı yolda olduğundan o geldiği gibi hareket olunması ve 
badehu Ahmed PaĢa kumandasında bulunması tenbih olunarak avdet olundukta yarım 
saat berüde Hasan Yazıcı dahi gelmekte olduğu görülmüĢtür deyu ifade eylemiĢtir. 
 
Ve PencĢenbe günü nöbetçi miralayı gelip değirmanlarda iki bin kıyye dakik teraküm 
ettiğini ve beĢ on tabur iki üç günden berü bir Ģey almadıklarını ifade etmekten naĢi 
çarçabuk dakik-i mezkuru müsavat üzere taksim ederek ve yakın karyelerden bir miktar 
tezek getürdilerek ve hemen etmek yapsunlar kalkılacak deyu ifade ve tenbih ettim. 
Bundan bir saat sonra Rusyalu Kars çayını geçip geldiğini karakollar gelip haber 
verdiler. Derakıb mirliva paĢalara haber gönderdim. Askeri silah baĢına alıp geçen 
Pazar günü çıkılan mahalle doğru asker çekünüz deyu tenbihat-ı lazıme icrasıyla 
beraber üç tabur piyade ve altı kıta top Mirliva Hafız PaĢa‟nın kumandasıyla köyde 
ihtiyat bırağılarak esbe rakiben köyün kenarına çıkıp bakdım ki düĢman gelmekte ve 
asakir-i Ģahane dahi çıkmaktadır.  
Bu dahi 
 
ĠĢbu asakir-i Ģahaneden beĢ tabur piyade ve bir alay süvari ve altı kıta top ve beĢ yüz 
kadar neferat-ı muvazzafa mumaileyh Veli PaĢa‟nın kumandasına verilerek bizim sol 
cenahımızdaki köyün sol tarafına doğru gönderilmiĢ ve baki yanımızda bulunan on üç 
taburdan dört beĢ taburu Mirliva Hüseyin PaĢa‟nın kumandasıyla sağ cenahda ve bir 
alay süvari ve Hasan Yazıcı dahi sağında ve beĢ taburu dahi Mustafa PaĢa kumandasıyla 
onun solunda ve bu taburların altısı birinci hat ve dördü ikinci hat ve üç taburu dahi 
gerüde ihtiyat konulmuĢtur ve heman otuz iki kıta top ile çıkılmıĢtır. 
Askerin bir hat üzerine tertip olunduğuna dair mahallinin bazı tahkikat ve iĢaratı var ise 
de bu hale göre asakir-i mevcude iki hat olarak ihtiyatı dahi tertib olunmuĢ olduğu 
anlaĢılmıĢtır denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri eğerçi ben gavgada bulunmadım ancak 
ibtidai tertibi bu vechile olduğunu tasdik ederim fakat suret-i icraati meçhulümdür 
demiĢtir.  
 
ĠĢbu toplardan altı adedi mumaileyh Veli PaĢa ile sol müfrezede ve yigirmi altısı muma-
ileyhima Hüseyin ve Mustafa PaĢa kumandalarında kalıp bir hat üzere taburlardan elli 
altmıĢ hatve ilerüsünde olup fakat üçe münkasım olmuĢtur. Yani sekizi sağ ve solunda 
ve on adedi ortada çift kolların ilerü hareketinde hat açacak mahallerin arası açık 
bırağılmıĢtır.  
Hasbel mevki topların vaz ve tertibi Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin bu bendde ifadesi vechile 
fenn-i harbe muvafık gibi anlaĢılur ise de bu misillü Ģeylerin tahkikatına mukaddema 
memur-ı mahsus gitmiĢ olmasıyla bu maddenin tahkikine tevfik olunması münasip 
olacağını Abdi PaĢa hazretleri ifade eyledikten sonra ihtiyat kıtasında top bulundurula-
mamıĢ gibi anlaĢıldığı dermiyan olundukta hatt-ı harbin gerüsünde olarak yakın bir 
köyde dahi altı kıta top olduğunu Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri ifade eylemiĢtir. 
 
Erkân-ı harb zabitanı cümleten Kars canibine gidip mevcud olmadıklarından ve düĢman 
dahi karĢuda pek takarrüb ettiğinden aceleten bu kadarca tertib ve tesviye olunmuĢtur. 
Bu madde Abdi PaĢa‟dan sual olundukta “Zaten orduca böyle iĢlerin erbabı erkân-ı harb 
zabitanı bulunmayıp fakat Faik Bey var idi. O dahi bilmem o aralık nerede idi demesine 
cevaben mumaileyhin Çürüksu‟dan geldikten sonra Kars‟a gittiğini Ahmed PaĢa beyan 
etmiĢtir. 
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Ġki nefer mirlivalarda altı bölük avcı olup bunların dahi üç bölüğü ilerü ve üç bölüğü 
ihtiyat olarak gerüye konulmuĢtur ve iki bölük dahi mumaileyh Veli PaĢa tarafına 
gönderilmiĢtir. 
Tertibi beyandan ibaret olmağla hüküm getürür Ģey olmadığı 
 
Bu hengamda mumaileyhima mirliva paĢalar ve topçu miralayı Abdullah Bey çağırılıp 
tenbih ettim ki düĢman karĢumuzda top ve tüfenk attığı gibi benim kumandama 
bakmayıp icabına göre kumandanızda bulunanlara tenbih ediniz ve düĢmanın geliĢine 
göre hareket ve gayret etsünler deyu tenbih olunmuĢtur. Zira bir mevkide çok aram 
edemem sağ ve sol tarafa giderim iktizasına göre sizlere yaverler gönderirim ona göre 
hemen siz iĢinize bakasız deyu tekiden tenbihat-ı lazıme icra olundukta mahallerine 
gitmiĢlerdir. 
Hareket-i harbiyeyi beyan demek olmağla hükmü yoktur 
 
Rusyalu‟nun karĢumuzda yigirmi dört tabur piyade ve altı alay süvari ve üç bin kadar 
baĢıbozuk atlusu ve altmıĢ kıta topu olup bunların on sekiz taburu ile beĢ alay süvarisi 
ve iki bin kadar baĢıbozuk atlusuyla elli altı kıta top bizim karĢumuzda ve altı taburu 
gerüde arabaların yanında ve bir alay süvari ile dört kıta top mumaileyh Veli PaĢa‟nın 
karĢusunda olduğu halde ibtida Rusyalu tarafından top endahtına mücaseret ve 
tarafeynden kezalik saat yedide harbe mübaĢeret olunmuĢtur. 
Bu askerin miktarı Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta “On iki tabur olduğunu 
iĢittim” demiĢtir. 
 
Bu halde Veli PaĢa‟nın karĢusundaki süvari alayı ilerü vararak iki top ahz etmiĢ ve 
muahharen dahi beri tarafda bulunan topların birkaç kobuz kapaklusuna gülle tesadüf 
ederek ateĢ alıp yanında bulunan asker ve hayvanata ziyade sakatluk vermiĢtir ve sağ 
cenaha bir alay süvari hücum etmiĢ ise de bizim taraf ihtiyat avcıları kuvvetiyle yine 
gerüye avdet ettirilmiĢtir. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve bunu müteakip piyadesini ilerüye sevk ederek bizim tarafdan dahi taburlar hareket 
edip hat açarak tüfenk gavgasına mübaĢeret olunmuĢtur. 
“Bu bendin mealine nazaran hatlar açılamamıĢ demek oluyor. Bu halde asker açılmak 
lazım gelür idi” denildikte “Evet, iĢte düĢman askeri açıldığı gibi bizimki de açıldı” 
deyu Ahmed PaĢa‟nın vaki olan ifadesi üzerine “Kavaid-i harbiyeye göre gavgaya 
baĢlama Ģöyle dursun tüfenk atılmaksızın bile saff-ı harb tertib olunmak lazım gelür idi” 
suali cevabsız kalmıĢtır. 
 
Ve ol aralık Mirliva Mustafa PaĢa‟nın sol ve ilerüsünde bulunan tepe tutulması münasip 
mütalaasıyla ihtiyat bırağılanlardan iki taburunu alarak mahall-i mezkura varıldıkta üç 
tabur düĢman askeri bize karĢu gelip muharebeye ibtidar olunmuĢ ve onlar gerüye 
çevrilmiĢ olduğu halde muharebe her tarafdan müĢtedd olarak sonra Rusyalu tarafından 
bizim sağ tarafa üç alay süvari ve taburların mukabelesinde tabur sevk etmiĢ ve topları 
dahi ziyadece bulunmuĢ olduğundan bizim tarafdan her ne kadar ikdam ve gayret ve 
süngü süngüye gelinmiĢ ise de sağında bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafa ve süvari alaylarını 
kaldırmıĢ olduklarından kalkan süvari alayı ikinci hattın sağ baĢından gerüsüne doğru 
firar ederken ikinci hattın sağında bulunan redif taburuna da periĢanlık tari olmuĢ 
olduğundan Rusyalu dahi birinci hatta ziyade yüklenerek birinci hattı dahi gerüye 
dönderdi ve ikinci hattın sağ baĢında bulunan redif taburu uygunsuz hareketde 
bulunduklarından baki kalan üç tabur birinci hatta yerleĢtirilmiĢ ise de onlar dahi tâb-
âver olamayıp sol tarafa doğru geldiler ve topkeĢan bargirlerinin ekserisi telef 
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olduğundan ve birazı dahi gerüde köyde ihtiyat olarak Hafız PaĢa‟nın kumandasıyla 
bırağılmıĢ olan topçular topları koĢup Kars canibine firar eylemelerini muharebede 
bulunan topçular gördüklerinden bunlar dahi biraz topkeĢan bargirlerini alarakdan 
savuĢmuĢlar ve yigirmi altı pare toptan on dört top ma kapak güç ile kaçırılmıĢ ve 
asakir-i Ģahane tarafına Rusyalu tarafından ziyadesiyle piĢrev ve kurĢun endaht 
olunmakta olduğundan min tarafilllah [?] sağ tarafdan bu vechile hal-i mükeddire vukua 
gelmiĢ olduğu. 
“Bu dağılan askeri toplatmak mümkün olamadı mı?” sualine “Pek çok çalıĢıldı lakin 
düĢmanın kuvveti ziyade olduğundan çaresi bulunamadı” deyu Ahmed PaĢa tarafından 
cevab verilmiĢtir.  
  
ĠĢbu asakir-i Ģahaneden bir takımı savuĢup firar ve bir takımı doğruca bizim olduğumuz 
tarafda tepeye gelerek orada bir miktar harp ziyadelendi ve birkaç defa biz onları ve 
onlar bizi dönderdiler ve hatta ol vakit esbden inip asakir-i Ģahanenin arkasından kılınç 
ile binbaĢı makamında kumanda dahi ettim ise de kader-i ilahi böyle imiĢ periĢaniyet 
vukua gelerek etrafımı Rusyalu kuĢatıp yanımda iki tabur ancak kalıp yüzbaĢı ve 
mülazimden baĢka bir büyük zabit bulunmadığından ve esbimi dahi seyis alıp bir tarafa 
gitmiĢ olduğundan yayan kaldım ve bizim esb gelinceye kadar asakir-i Ģahane tepeden 
ve etrafdan güzelce gayret ettiler ve esb geldiği anda süvari olup muharebe ederek ve 
yaverler ve uĢaklar hayvanlarına mecruh yükleyüp gerüye alarak öylece içlerinden 
çıkılmıĢ ve iki defa Rusya taburları gelüp çatdı ise de yine asakir-i Ģahane gerüye 
çevirüp yaraluları ve zayıfları toplamak içün gerüye dönüp gavga ederek mecruhlar 
selamete çıkartdırılmıĢ ve ol halde Hafız PaĢa bırağılmıĢ olan karyeye geldikte paĢa-i 
mumaileyh nerelerdedir ve taburlar ne mahaldedir sual olundukta toplar Kars‟a gitti ve 
Hafız PaĢa dahi burada yok deyu taburlar bu vechile ifadede bulunmakta iken Mirliva 
Hüseyin ve Mustafa PaĢalar oraya geldiler ve düĢman yine karĢudan on pare top ile 
gelüp ateĢ etmeğe baĢlayup obüs danelerini ziyadesiyle atmakta iken tabur-ı mezbur ile 
saat on bir buçukta Subatı karyesine doğru çekildik ve orada Hafız PaĢa‟yı görüp asakir-
i Ģahaneyi niçün bıraktınız ve topları niçün gönderdiniz deyu sual olundukta toplardan 
haberim yok lakin giden askeri çevirmek üzere buraya geldim deyu ifade ettiler ve ol 
anda keyfiyet-i hal müĢir paĢa hazretlerine ifade olunmak üzere Miralay Ġsmail Bey ve 
muahharen mirliva-i mumaileyhima Hüseyin ve Mustafa PaĢalar gönderilmiĢtir ve ol 
aralık mumaileyh Veli PaĢa mevcud maiyetiyle geldi ve mukaddem Subatı karyesine 
bırağılmıĢ olan çanta eĢya-i sairelerini götürebildikleri kadar askere aldırılarak gece saat 
iki raddelerini geçerek Kars çayına azimet ve saat dokuzda muvasalatla müĢir paĢa 
hazretleriyle mülakat ve keyfiyet-i vakıanın ifadesine mübaderet olunmuĢ ve müĢir-i 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri dahi takdir-i ilahi olup noksan tedabirden olmadı diyerek 
teselli-i hatırda bulunmuĢtur. 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
Ve iĢbu muharebede bizim tarafdan beĢ yüzden ziyade Ģehid ve yedi yüzden ziyade 
mecruh ve yaralı olup meydan-ı muharebede Ģehid zannıyla kalmıĢ olan bir nefer 
binbaĢı ve bir nefer mülazım ve bir çavuĢ ve bir nefer ve köyde samanlık damına girmiĢ 
olan üç nefer ki ceman yedi nefer esirimiz vukua gelmiĢ ve düĢman tarafından meydan-ı 
muharebede üç bine yakın mürd ve telef olanlardan yüz yigirmi mülazım ve miralay ve 
ceneral ve küsuru tüfenk-endaz, topçu ve süvari olduğu ve dört binden ziyade 
mecruhları bulunduğu sahihen tahkik olunmuĢ ve beĢ nefer zabitan ile bir nefer tranpete 
neferi ki ceman altı nefer dahi esir alınmıĢ olup iĢte keyfiyet-i muharebe bu vechile 
olmuĢtur ve bu muharebede mevcud bulunan ümera ve zabitan ve asakir-i Ģahane ve 
cümleten uğur-ı Ģahanede elden geldiği mertebe çabaladık ise de muzafferiyete muvafık 
olamamıĢ olduğu beyanıyla takrir-i hale ibtidar kılındı. 
Bu dahi 
482 
 
Gümrü‟den esnay-i avdetde zuhura gelen bozğunluğun sebeblerine dair komisyondan 
vaki olan sualler üzerine taraflarımızdan irad ve beyan olunan cevablar maddeleri 
balalarına surh ile iĢaret kılınmıĢ olduğundan temhirine dahi ibtidar kılınmıĢtır. 
 
[Seals from right to left] Ali Rıza, Ahmed, Abdülkerim Nadir  
 
Appendix 82. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 6, undated. Answers and comments of former 
commanders of the Anatolian army Müşir Abdi Pasha and Müşir Ahmed Pasha 
and of Ferik Ali Rıza Pasha to questions of the military commission in Istanbul on 
the situation of the Anatolian army. 
 
Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunun bazı vukuatına dair derdest bulunan tahrirat üzerine orduy-
ı hümayun-ı mezkur müĢiri esbak ve sabık devletlu paĢalar hazeratıyla Ferik saadetlu 
Ali PaĢa hazretlerine komisyonda vaki olan es‟ile ve müĢarünileyhim hazeratı taraf-
larından verilen ecvibedir ki ber vech-i ati zikir ve beyan olunur. 
 
Devletlu Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinin fi 14 S sene 70 [16.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh 
tahriratı kıraat olunup mevadd-ı mündericesinden gönderilmediği beyan olunan iki tabur 
asker ile çend kıta topun suret-i tehiri ve böyle maddeler içün yazdığı Ģeylere cevab 
tahrir kılınmaması sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “Rusya‟lunun Gümrü‟ye imdad 
gönderecek mahalli olup zabtı mümkün denilen Kayğulu ve Kazancı boğazları teshir 
olunmak Ģöyle bir vakit ile mümkünatdan olamadığından baĢka bunlar içün o civara 
asker göndermek muhataralu olduğundan bu sureti tecviz etmediğim cihetle askeri 
göndermedim. Fakat bu tahrirata ve bunun gibi her yazdığı mevadda derakıb cevap 
gönderdim” cevabını vermiĢtir. 
 
Atufetlu müsteĢar efendi hazretlerinin fi 25 S sene 70 [27.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh 
tahriratı aynen kıraat olunup, netice-i hükmünde Abdi PaĢa‟nın emr-i muharebede olan 
tereddüdüne ve gevĢekliğine dair olan sözlere Abdi PaĢa, “HaĢa, ben böyle bir umur-ı 
cesimede gevĢeklik isnadını kabul etmem. Mukaddemce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile 
hasb-el mevsim muharebeyi evvel bahara talik etmiĢ idim. Kendilerinin vüruduyla 
herkesin efkarını suret-i ahire meyelan ettirerek tekevvün eden kil u kal ve muahharen 
zuhura gelen vukuat-ı müteellime doğrusu bana da dağ-i derddendir. Kendüleri gelip de 
bu suretle davranmamıĢ olsalar bunların biri vücuda gelmez idi” dedikten sonra Gümrü 
muharebesinde fırsat elde iken düĢman askerine hücum olunmayıp ihtiyat durulması 
RaĢid PaĢa‟ya tenbih olunduğu beyan olunduğundan sebebi soruldukta “DüĢmana 
hücum etmek mümkün değil idi çünkü ben süvari ile gavgaya yetiĢdim lakin piyade 
ahĢam ezanıyla beraber ve belki daha sonra geldi. RaĢid PaĢa‟nın ifadesi sahih değildir 
ve bil-farz yetiĢse bile öyle hücum kolay Ģey değildir. Kendüsinin böyle Ģeylere 
malumatı olmamak cihetle her kim ne söyler ise onu yapar ve yazar. Mamafih böyle 
yazmasından anladığıma göre bana nefsaniyeti var imiĢ demek oluyor. Bilmem 
nedendir” demesiyle Ahmed PaĢa, RaĢid PaĢa ile Miralay Ġsmail Bey bana dediler ki 
“Piyade saat on buçuk raddelerinde BaĢ ġüregel tarafına geldi. Ġlerü gitmek içün her ne 
kadar ibram etmiĢ isek de Abdi PaĢa ruhsat vermedi” deyu rivayet etmesine cevaben 
Abdi PaĢa, “Hayır ezan vakti geldiler ve mumaileyhima bunun içün bana bir Ģey 
söylemediler. Söylese bile bilmiyorum” demesiyle Ahmed PaĢa “Saat dokuzda gavgaya 
baĢlanıp yaver gönderildi. Hesabca piyade yetiĢebilür idi ve yetiĢdi” demiĢ ise de Abdi 
PaĢa yetiĢmedi dediğinden bu maddede ihtilaf vaki olmuĢtur.  
 
MüsteĢar-ı müĢarünileyhin fi 9 Ra sene 70 [10.12.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahrirat-ı 
mufassalasında beyan olunduğu üzere Ahmed PaĢa‟nın teferrüdü sual olundukta Abdi 
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PaĢa “Nizam üzere her dediğim Ģeyleri icra edip fakat Ģu Gedikler muharebesi 
maddesinde verdiğim talimat-ı Ģifahiyeye vuku‟ bulan muğayir hareketten baĢka her 
halde itaat ve inkıyad üzere bulunurdu” demesiyle, Ahmed PaĢa dahi “Abdi PaĢa büyük 
kumandan olduğu halde teferrüd etmek ve emrine itaat etmemek nasıl olabilür? ġu 
Gedikler muharebesi vukuatı dahi zaruri olduğu ve habere vakit bulamadığını evvelce 
beyan etmiĢtim. Zann ederim ki bu Ģikayetler oranın efkarınca Abdi PaĢa aleyhinde 
bulunduğumdan neĢet etmiĢtir” dedikten sonra ordunun her umurunda iĢar kılınan 
teseyyüb ve sui idarenin esbab-ı mücbiresi ne olduğu sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa “Sui 
idare ne demektir? Ben elimden geldiği ve vüs‟üm yettiği mertebe çalıĢıp çabaladım” 
deyip Ahmed PaĢa dahi “Ben idaresizliğe dair bir Ģey göremedim” deyu tasdik etmiĢtir. 
BaĢıbozuk askeri sergerdelerinin harekat-ı gayr-i layıkaya ictisarları halinde men‟ 
olunmamaklığının sebebi sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa, “BaĢıbozuk sergerdelerinden Ġnce 
Arab nam Ģahıs ġam‟dan oraya gelinceye kadar yollarda haylice fenalık ettiği söylendi. 
Kadir değil idim ki ġam tarafında onu o yoldan men‟ edeyim. Orduya geldi ve Bayezid 
tarafına memur edildi. Orada biraz fenalığı tahkik ve istima‟ olduğundan gerü alınıp ve 
habs ü tevkif ettirilip tedibine bakıldı. Galiba buraya da gönderildi” demesi üzerine 
beyan olunan sirkat ve telefat nasıl Ģeydir deyu sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa “Sirkat 
maddesini bilmem. Bunda dahi elden geldiği kadar sa‟y ederdim. Bunu bilmiĢ olsam ve 
mennine bakmasam Ģerik-i sarik demek olacağından bunu bir vechile kabul etmem. 
Kendüleri dahi memur-ı müstakil olduğundan böyle Ģeyleri aramak ve mennine bakmak 
lazım gelür idi. Bu suret umur-ı mülkiyeye aid ise ol halde memurlarından sual 
olunmalıdır” dedikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa, “Ben dahi bunları tasdik ederim” demesiyle 
Rusyalu Sivas‟a kadar getürdilerek ondan sonra def‟i çaresi istihsal olunacağına dair 
edilen tedabir nasıl Ģeydir denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri Rusyalu‟yu Sivas‟a kadar 
getürdürüm demek maazallah oraları ona teslim edilmek manasına olmayıp alel ıtlak 
hikaye ve beyan-ı efkar tarikiyle ve hasbihal yoluyla eğerçi düĢman kuvvetli gelür ise 
bile ondan korkmak lazım gelmez ve kuvve-i mütesaviye bulunmadıkça gavgaya 
durulmak olmaz böyle bir hal vukuunda bu denilen mahaller tahliye ettirilip gerü 
çekilmeli yine takib eder ise bu usule riayet etmeli. DüĢman tecavüz etdikçe tefrik-i 
kuvvet edeceğinden artuk ondan sonra üzerine hücum olunur ise pek kolay def ve 
periĢan edilür diyerek kavaid-i harbiyeden ihtimal ki bazı Ģeyler beyan olunmuĢtur. 
Ancak bu lakırdı suret-i resmide olup da bu yolda memurlara talimat verilmemiĢ ve 
tahliye maddesine teĢebbüs olunmamıĢ ki bunu böyle yazmıĢlar. Her ne hal ise bunlar 
garazlı Ģeylerdir” denmesi üzerine Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “Abdülkerim PaĢa bir gece 
Zarif PaĢa hazretlerine gidip orada defterdar efendi ile beraber meclisde hazır oldukları 
halde Abdi PaĢa hazretleri bu fıkrayı söylediklerini bana hikaye ve beyan eyledi” 
demiĢtir. 
 
Yine müsteĢar efendi hazretlerinin fi 25 S sene 70 [27.11.1853] tarihli bir tahriratında 
Gümrü kalesinden vuku‟-ı avdetinde oralar ahalisinden Kars‟a gelecekleri rivayet 
olunduğu beyan olunan kesan kimler olduğu sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “Böyle 
Ģey vukuunun kat‟a aslı yoktur” demesi üzerine tahrirat-ı merkumenin fıkrat-ı 
mündericesinden iĢe layıkıyla bakılmıĢ olsa Ahısha ve Ahılkelek ve Revan kalelerinin 
ele geçmesiyle beraber Ģimdiye kadar Tiflis‟in içinde bulunabileceğine dair sözler 
istifsar olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında “Böyle sözleri söyleye söyleye 
herkesin zihnini tahrik ile akıbet Ģu iki vukuat-ı mükeddirenin zuhuruna sebeb verildi. 
Hasb el mevki bu kalelerin alınması ol vaktin kuvve-i mevcudesine göre mümkün 
olamayacağı erbabı indinde malumdur. Bu mütalaa varid ise de noksanı olup Ģöyle ki 
evvela vaktin ilerüsi kıĢ idi. ġeyh ġamil ile iltihak mümkün olmazdı. Ġkincisi asıl bunda 
faide ve kuvvet o civar ahalisinin teminatıyla hasıl olacağına ve bu ise nakden 
fedakârlık ihtiyarına menut olduğu halde mevcud akçe olmamasına binaen ihtiyar 
olunmadı. Bunlar hayal-i muhal kabilindendir. Kendüsi bunları düĢünüp kendü iĢine 
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bakmadığından Gümrü‟den Kars‟a avdetde ibtida haylice dakik mevcud iken onu tekmil 
edip de yerine tedarik etmediğinden dolayı beĢ on gün çekilen zahmetler cümlenin 
malumudur” dedikten sonra olunan suale cevab verilmemesinin ve bazı Ģeyler mektum 
tutulmasının sebebi soruldukta “Ġktizasına göre sualine cevab verirdim ve pek güzel 
katib olduğundan hatta mühim ve mektum Ģeyleri kendülerine rica ile yazdırır idim” 
deyu Abdi PaĢa hazretleri ifade eylemiĢtir. 
 
Yine müsteĢar efendi hazretlerinin fi 26 S sene 70 [28.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh 
tahriratında yazdığı Ģeylerden Erzurum valisi müĢarünileyhin Ahısha ve Ahılkelek 
üzerlerine vuku‟-ı memuriyetinden sonra istenilip gönderilmeyen iki tabur asker ile iki 
topun ve Kürdlerden bazılarının eyledikleri çapulculuğun yazılmıĢ iken men‟ine 
bakılmamasının sebebi soruldukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında “Ġstenilen iki tabur ile 
iki top Ahılkelek‟e gönderilmeyip ihtiyat durmak ve maiyetinde bulunmak Ģartıyla 
gönderdim ve baĢıbozuk takımından öyle hareketde bulunanların men‟i çaresine 
bakılurdı. Bundan anlaĢıldığına göre civar köyler ahalisinden olan baĢıbozuk neferatı 
bazı umurlarını tesviye eylemek ve yem ve yiyeceklerini kendi köylerinden ve çarĢudan 
almak içün ruhsat isteyerek azimet ve avdetlerinde bu makule halat-ı namarziyeye 
cesaret edebilmeleri ihtimalatdan olduğu misillü bunların bu yoldan men‟ olunmaları 
dahi mertebe-i imkanda olmadığı Ģübhesizdir” dedikten sonra asakir-i Ģahanenin Gümrü 
piĢgahında çadırsız kaldıkları sebebi soruldukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “Asakir-i 
mevcudenin birazı köylere ve bir takımı çadırlara yerleĢtirilmiĢti. Vakıa biz-zarur 
lüzumu derecesinde çadır getirilememesinden dolayı biraz asker açıkta idi. Bunlar da 
karakol demektir” demesiyle Ģu tahriratınızda ki fi 26 S sene 70 [28.11.1853] tarihiyle 
müverrehdir, soğuk ve çadırsızlık münasebetiyle avdet olunacağı beyan olunduğundan 
bu kol tasdik olunuyor denildikte “On altı tabur içün nısf tertib çadır getürülmiĢ idi. 
Askerin birazı Ģuraya buraya yerleĢtirildikten sonra birazı karakol heyetinde olarak 
açıkta idi” cevabı verilip “Çadır mahallinde mevcud değil mi idi?” sualine dahi 
“Mevcuddur lakin nakli güçtür” demeleriyle o civar ahalisinden dehalet edip de 
yedlerine bayrak ve buyruldu verilenlerin bazı Ģeyleri Kürd taraflarından yağma 
olunmasıyla tazallüm-i hal eylemeleri keyfiyeti sualine Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında 
“Dehalet maddesi sahihdir lakin evvelce köyler tahliye ettirilmiĢ olduğundan bu suretle 
gelenler öyle külliyet üzere olmayıp yalnız bir iki kocabaĢıdan ibaretdir ve yağmanın 
aslı yokdur çünkü Ģimdi söylediğim gibi köyler her  Ģeyden hali bırakılmıĢ idi. Kürdler 
gidip de ne çalacak?” demesi üzerine Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “Fakat bir iki kiĢi gelip 
tazallüm ettiklerinde derakıb Meded Bey‟e havale ile iktizası icra ettirildi. Bunlar 
cüziyattan ve men‟-i vuku‟-ı muhalatdan olan Ģeylerden olmasıy-la Ģikayete Ģayan 
değildir” dedikten sonra gönderilen arabaların tevkifi beyan olunduğundan sebebi nedir 
denildikte Ahmed PaĢa cevabında “Cephanenin hayvanatı lüzumu derecesinde 
olmadığından belki lüzumu olur mütalaasına mebni alıkonulmuĢ ve zahire içün bezden 
çuval yapıldığı dahi sahih bulunmuĢtur” demesiyle asakirin etmek hususunda zaruret 
çektikleri beyan olunmasıyla bu hususun menĢei istizah olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri, 
“MüsteĢar efendi hazretleri zahirenin memuru olmasıyla vaktiyle gönderilmesi lazım 
gelür idi” demeleriyle zabt ü yağma olunduğu iĢar olunan zehair maddesi sualine dahi 
“Çünkü oralar ahalisi arpa ve buğdaylarını kuyulara vaz‟ eylediklerinde bazı Kürdler 
bunu bilip ve biraz Ģey çıkarıp sattıkları istihbar olunmasıyla derakıb bit-taharri 
buldurulup aldıkları arpa hayvanata verdirilmiĢtir” cevabını vermiĢ ve sual olunan 
tedabire cevab verilmediğinden Ģikayet edilme-siyle bunun sebebi nedir denildikte 
“Vakıa bazı Ģeyler sual etmiĢ idi lakin mevki icabınca beyan edeceğim Ģeyleri yar ve 
ağyarın istima‟ edebilmesi mümkünatdan olduğundan ve bu dahi caiz olmadığından 
söylememekten baĢka böyle lakırdı tefevvühünün bile bil-münasebe önü kestirilmiĢtir” 
dedikten sonra müsteĢar efendinin Gümrü‟ye geliĢine hazz olunmaması sualine “Vakıa 
geldi, görüĢtük. O gece Ahmed PaĢa‟da kaldı. Ertesi oraları gezmiĢ ve gecesi bilmem 
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nerede kalıp daha ertesi gün kendü kendüye avdet etmiĢtir. Hazz olunmamasında bir 
sebeb bulamam” cevabını vermiĢtir. 
 
[page 4] 
 
MüsteĢar efendi hazretlerinin fi 27 S sene 70 [29.11.1853] tarihiyle müverreh tahrirat-ı 
mevrudesi melfufatından Zarif PaĢa‟nın bir tahriratında Gümrü üzerinde düĢmana 
mukabil kırk binden mütecaviz asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafa mevcud iken Ahısha 
taraflarıyçün istenilen iki tabur asker ile çend kıta topun gönderilmediği gösterilmiĢ 
olduğundan bunların sebebi sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında “Gümrü 
üzerinde olan asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafanın miktarı nihayet on yedi – on sekiz bin 
raddelerinde olmasıyla böyle sözler buranın zihnini dolaĢtırmak içün yazılmıĢ demektir. 
Çünkü benim sözüm Ģu babda müfarık-ı sıhhat olmamak tarafına haml olunur ise 
asakir-i mevcudenin miktarını mübeyyin her zaman taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriye jurnalleri 
takdim olunur idi. Ona müracaatla keyfiyet ve miktarı anlaĢılur. Bununla beraber biraz 
asker göndermek kabil idi. Lakin bunda olan sebeb-i tehir Subatan vukuatıdır. Vakıa 
evvelce lüzumu yazılıp Kerim PaĢa maiyetiyle Ardahan‟a gitmek üzere biraz asker 
tertib ve ihrac olundu. Biraz mahal gidilmiĢken çarçabuk haber irsaliyle yolda tevkif 
ettirildi” demesiyle yine müĢarünileyhin müsteĢar efendi tarafına varid olup bir sureti 
melfuf bulunan tahriratında maiyetinde bulunan baĢıbozuk askerinin bil-münasabe 
cüziyattan bahs olunmuĢ olmasıyla Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri bu maddeye tarizen 
“MüĢarünileyh valiliğinde mevcud olan dört bin nefer baĢıbozuk askeriyle Ahısha 
taraflarına gideceğini Dersaadet‟e yazmıĢ idi. Vukuattan evvel oraya gidip imdad etmek 
ve ordunun etrafına karakollar koymak mümkünatdan idi. Lakin o kadar baĢıbozuk 
askerinin aslı olmayıp öyle yazılmaktan murad kendüsinin orduya azimetine lüzum ve 
ehemmiyet göstermekten ve ordunun sui halini beyan eylemekten garaz buranın efkarını 
teĢvik etmek maksadına mebni olduğunda Ģüphem olmadığı misillü müsteĢar efendi ile 
mükatebeleri ve suretlerinin buraya irsalleri muvazaa suretiyle olmak dahi 
ihtimalatdandır. ĠĢte bunlar ve bunun emsalince fenalıklar vukua gelmiĢtir. Ezcümle 
Gedikler gavgasından beĢ altı gün evvel ordu basıldı. Müslümanlar meydana çıksun 
diyerek Kars‟da münadiler dağıldığından herkes kemal-i telaĢ ve ızdırab ile 
dükkanlarını kapayıp bir fena hal kesb eylediğinden ne hal ise Kerim PaĢa bu eracifin 
önünü almıĢ idi. Buna yakın fenalıkların nihayeti yoktur” demesi üzerine Abdi PaĢa 
hazretleri “Evet bu eracife ve sair fenalıklara bunların ikisi sebeb-i müstakill oldular” 
demiĢtir. 
 
MüĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinin fi 22 Receb sene 70 [20.4.1854] tarihiyle 
müverreh tahrirat-ı varidesinde Gümrü‟nün öte tarafında vaki Tuhaber [Tukaber? 
Tuhayr?] nam mahalden Ahmed PaĢa hazretlerinin reyiyle emval ve mevaĢi ve esir 
alınıp satıldığı gösterildiğinden keyfiyet sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında 
“Orada Rusya askeri ve iki top olduğu haber alınarak bin kadar baĢıbozuk askeri Meded 
Bey maiyetiyle gönderilip urdurulmuĢ olduğundan biraz pilaçka almıĢlar ve yedi sekiz 
Kazak askeriyle ahalisinden çend nefer adem esir diyerek getürmiĢler idi. Ufak tefek 
olan Ģeyler biz-zarur asker yedinde kaldı ve Kazak askeri tevkif ettirildi. Küsur ahaliden 
aldıkları ademler iade kılındı. Muahharen dahi Ģunun bunun yedinde ora ahalisinden 
çocuklar zuhur etmesiyle mahalline gönderilmiĢ idi. Zannederim ki Ģimdi bulundu 
denilen ademler dahi ol vakitden kalanlardan olmalıdır. Ol vakit ben bu babda tahrirat-ı 
lazımede kusur etmedim. Lakin bu hale nazaran saklanmıĢ demek oluyor. BaĢıbozuk 
askerinin girdiği yerden boĢ çıkmayacağı umur-ı müsellemedendir” demiĢtir. 
 
Yine müsteĢar-ı müĢarünileyhin fi 19 Ra sene 70 [20.12.1853] tarihli tahriratında beyan 
olunduğu üzere Subatan muharebesinden Kars‟a avdet olunduktan sonra Rusyalu hayli 
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zahire ve saire almıĢ olduğundan bu babda tegafül olunduğu zımnen Ģikayet 
olunmasıyla bunların esbab-ı sahihesi ve Gümrü ve Ahısha ve Ahılkelek ve Ardahan 
taraflarında külliyet üzere zahireye destres olunmuĢ iken göz göre ve bila mucib elden 
çıkarıldığı beyan olunduğundan sebebleri nedir denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
cevabında muharebenin sabahı Subatan‟a biraz asker gönderilip oranın ahvali teftiĢ 
ettirilmiĢ idi. Hatta bu askerin Ģimdi irsali düĢmanın teĢciini muceb olur diyerek 
müsteĢar efendinin hayli telaĢ eylediği halde böyle yazması doğrusu cay-i istiğrabdır ve 
elden çıkarılan zahire nasıl Ģeydir bilmem Ģu kadar ki öte tecavüz olduğu halde ahali-i 
meskunesi mal ve canından temin olunmakta ve oraları emval-i miriyeden hali olup 
mevcud olan zahire cümleten ahalinin malı olarak kuyularda bulunmakta olduğundan 
bu hale göre zahireyi zabt etmek nasıl olur? Fakat lüzumuna mebni biraz arpa alınıp 
hayvanata verilmiĢ olduğundan bunun iktiza eden defter ve mazbatası müsteĢar 
efendiye verilmiĢtir” dmesiyle etmekçi Kozma‟nın ve tayinat-ı lahmiye müteahhidi 
KeĢiĢoğlu‟nun bu maddelere suret-i taahhüdleri nasıldır ve Rusya casusu oldukları 
rivayet olunduğundan sahih midir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri evvel emirde beĢ 
bin somar hınta verilmek ve etmeğin beher kıyyesi yigirmiĢer paraya olmak üzere 
Kozma ile ve etin beher kıyyesi yaz ve kıĢ kırk yediĢer paraya verilmek Ģartıyla 
KeĢiĢoğlu‟yla konturato olunmuĢ idi. Bunların casusluğuna dair bir guna tahkikatım 
olmadığı halde cihet-i mezhebiyeden dolayı bunların her ne kadar konturato olunmuĢ 
ise de def‟leri çaresine bakılmasına müsteĢar efendi ile RaĢid PaĢa‟nın Erzurum‟dan 
Kars‟a geldiklerinde resmen ve alenen söylemiĢ idim. Eğerçi filhakika öyle casus 
olsalar derakıb ruhsat verilürdi. Bundan sonra ben dahi tahkikat-ı kafiyeye ibtidar 
eylediğimde ona dair bir Ģey anlayamadım. Mamafih münasebet-i mezhebiye cihetle 
gönül rahatsızlığı mevcud iken bu maddeyi ondan baĢka hüsn-i idareye muktedir 
oralarca kimesne bulunamaz zann ederim. Çünkü kendüsi eshab-ı iktidardan olduğu 
cihetle oralarda pek çok furunlar inĢa ettirmiĢ ve zaten dahi oranın ahalisinden gibi 
bulunmuĢ olduğundan böyle Ģeylerde yed-i tulası [?] olduğu derkârdır” demesi üzerine 
“Bu Kozma hakkında bazı tarafdan sahabet olunduğu beyan olunduğundan bu ne 
tarafdan olmak iktiza eder?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri müteahhidi olduğu 
maslahatın mercii meclis olduğuna ve reisi ise Ahmed PaĢa bulunduğuna mebni olsa 
olsa sahabet o tarafdan olmuĢ demek olur. Bununla beraber bunu da beyan ederim ki 
konturato Erzurum‟da yapıldı ve Ahmed PaĢa ol vakit Harput‟da bulundu. Hatta 
mersumun aleyhinde bulunduğunu teferrüs etmiĢ idim” dedikte Ahmed PaĢa “HaĢa bu 
tesahüb maddesini kabul etmem. Zira etmek bozuk gibi göründüğünden Kozma‟nın 
habsini Abdi PaĢa‟dan niyaz ve rica eyledim. Himayet ve sahabet etmiĢ olsam bu yolda 
mı bulunurdum?” demesi üzerine Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “Vakıa öyle Ģikayetleri üzerine 
iktizasına bakılmıĢ idi” dedikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “Bunların ikisiyle olunan 
konturato gadr ü himayeden aridir ve haklarında kimesne tarafından tesahüb vuku‟ 
bulmadı ve casus olduklarını iĢitmedim. Bunların adem-i sıhhatine hala istihdam 
olundukları delalet eder. MüsteĢar efendi hazretleri bu Kozma ile KeĢiĢoğlu‟nun 
uygunsuzluklarından bahisle hesap-larının rüyetiyle iktizasına bakılmasını inha 
eylemelerine mebni buna dair taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden emirname geldiğini 
Erzurum‟da iken bana yazmıĢlar idi. Ben dahi ber muceb-i emirname iktizasına himmet 
buyurmalarını cevaben yazmıĢdım. Sonra müsteĢar-ı müĢarün-ileyh hazretleriyle Zarifi 
PaĢa hazretleri infisalimiz vukuunda mersumanı beraberce Kars‟a getürmiĢ ve bilahare 
kendüleriyle tecdid-i konturato olunarak tayinat-ı askeriyede istihdam olundukları 
devletlu Hayreddin PaĢa hazretlerinin tahkikat mazbatasında muharrer bulunmuĢ” 
olduğunu ifade ederler. 
 
“Ferik HurĢid PaĢa‟nın fi 26 Ra sene 70 [27.12.1853] tarihli suret-i tahriratında evvel 
emirde Gümrü‟ye gidilmeyip Tiflis‟e gidilmek lazım geleceğini beyan edeyor. Burası 
nasıl olmak iktiza eder idi?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri Tiflis denilen mahal Gümrü 
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ve Ahılkelek ve Ahısha kaleleri mevkilerinin arkasında olmak ve asıl kesdirme yolu 
Kars‟dan on iki saatde Gümrü‟ye ve Gümrü‟den dahi otuz altı saatde Tiflis‟e 
gidileceğinden ve orduy-ı hümayun ise Gümrü ve Ahısha ve Ahılkelek piĢgahında 
bulunduğundan o halde Tiflis‟e gitmek nasıl olur? Bundan murad hiç Tiflis‟e gidilmez 
ve orası teshir olunmaz manasına olmayıp ol vaktin kuvveti oraya gitmek içün derece-i 
kifayede değil idi” demesi üzerine Ahmed PaĢa ve Ali PaĢa “Biz de bu sureti tasdik ve 
bunun kailini tahmik ederiz” dedikten sonra “Karakilise‟de vuku‟ bulan gavga bütün top 
ateĢinden ibaret imiĢ. Bunda düĢmanın ziyadece telefatı vukua getürmek ve kalesine 
avdet edememek içün yolunu kesdirmek mümkünatdan olduğu beyan olunduğundan 
bunlar nasıl Ģeylerdir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “Gece olduğundan vakıa öyle 
top gavgası edildi ve iki taraf birbirinden bihaber idi. Lakin bu ibtidaki gavga demek 
olduğundan nusret bizim tarafda idi. Buranın haritası mahallinde mevcud olmağla celb 
ile bil-mütalaa keyfiyeti layıkıyla anlaĢılur ki öyle düĢmana hücum etmek ve kalesine 
girememek içün yolu kesdirmek mümkün olur mu?” demiĢ ve bunun üzerine Ahısha 
tarafına sevk olunan kuvve-i askeriyenin taburları birbirinden uzak mahallere 
konulduğu beyan olunduğundan “Bunun sebebi nedir?” denildikte Ali PaĢa mevcud 
olan askerin birazı bir köye ve bir miktarı dahi bir çaryek saat mesafede olan diğer 
karyeye ikamet ettirildi ve arasına dahi süvari yerleĢtirildi. Bu hale göre bunların 
mevkileri birbirine dörder beĢer dakika demek olur dedikten sonra Ali PaĢa gavgadan 
ibtida kendüsi kaçmıĢ olduğu rivayet olunduğundan sıhhati led-es-sual yine Ali PaĢa 
“Takdim eylediğim layihada tafsilen beyan eylediğim vechile dokuz saat top ve tüfenk 
gavgası olup ben piyade olduğum halde durdum. Gavganın Ģiddeti ve duman basması 
cihetle Harput redifinden birazı firar eylediğinden onları gerü çevirmek ve Liva Ali 
PaĢa yaralanmıĢ olduğundan kendüsini gerü çekdirmek içün oralarda gezinmekte iken 
düĢman Ģiddetlenip bizim asker bütün bütün firara baĢladı. Bir taraftan onların 
çevrilmesine ve bir taraftan piĢrev atılmasına dikkat ve itina olunmuĢ ise de kârger 
olamadığının üzerine ben dahi askerle beraber avdet eyledim. Elhasıl muharebenin 
nihayetine kadar orada bulunduğum mahallince meĢhur ve müsellem olmağla buna 
itimad olunmaz ise mahallinden sorulsun” demesi üzerine Abdi PaĢa ve Ahmed PaĢa 
hazeratı “Bunda firar maddesini biz dahi iĢitmedik” dedikten sonra Gümrü 
muharebesinde Ahmed PaĢa imdad istese pek menfaatli olacağı beyan olunduğundan bu 
madde sual olundukta Ahmed PaĢa “Bunda olan mevanii takdim eylediğim layihada 
tafsilen beyan etmiĢtim” demiĢtir. 
 
MüĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinin fi 9 ġ sene 70 [7.5.1853] ve fi 23 C sene [70? 
23.3.1854?] tarihiyle müverreh iki kıta tahriratında beyan olunduğu üzere Ahmed PaĢa 
ve sairenin kendü malları olarak ordu hizmetinde kullandırılan hayvanatın ücuratı 
alınmıĢ olduğundan “Bunun suret-i istihdamları nasıldır?” denildikte Ahmed PaĢa 
“Vakıa bu madde sahihdir. Hayvanatın orada kılleti cihetle kendü hayvanlarımı orduya 
yazdırdım ve bundan benim maksadım hitam-ı maslahatda bunların ücretleri her kaç 
kuruĢa baliğ olur ise saye-i hazret-i Ģahanede orduy-ı hümayun hazinesine teberrü etmek 
idi. Ġnfisalimiz vuku‟ bularak buna muvafık olunamadı ve hayvanları bu tarafa gelür 
iken Trabzon‟da bırakmıĢtım. Oradan hazine yükletilip orduy-ı hümayuna gönderilmiĢ. 
Bunlar oradan avdetle el haleti hazihi Bayburt kazasında mevcuddur zannederim. 
Çünkü müĢarünileyh Zarif PaĢa hazretleri kan ben bu hayvanların ücuratını almıĢım gibi 
beyan ederek ücuratına mahsuben onları orduy-ı hümayun hizmetine rabt ü tahsis 
etmiĢler. Halbuki benim orduy-ı hümayun hazinesinden aldığım akçe müĢirlik 
maaĢından ve sair cihetden dolayı ba senedat üç yük bu kadar bin kuruĢa mahsuben 
olmağla daha küsur alacağım var iken müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin iĢbu matlubat-ı 
çakeranemden dolayı alel hesab olarak aldığım akçeyi hayvanat-ı mezkure ücuratı-dır 
diyerek inha etmiĢ ve zikr olunan hayvanları ol suretle zabt etmiĢ olmalarıyla burasını 
madelet-i seniyyeye havale ederim” deyu ifade ettikten sonra mekkari hayvanatından 
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birazı etmekçi Kozma‟nın umurun-da iĢlemiĢ ve bir takımı dahi ordan nakl eylemiĢ 
olduğundan bunun sebeb ve hikmeti Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinden sual olundukta Bayezid 
vukuatından sonra dakikin telefatından dolayı azracık olan degirmanlara zahire irsali 
lazım geldiğine ve Kozma‟nın mevcud hayvanatı kifayet etmemesiyle beraber mekkari 
hayvanatının o aralık baĢka hizmetleri olmadığından birazı beĢ on gün Kozma‟nın o 
iĢinde kullandırılmıĢ idi. Bu müddetin ücuratının merkumdan merkumdan ahz u istihsali 
lazım gelür. Hatab maddesi bahsine gelince çünkü hayvanat aralıkta boĢ kaldıkça gerek 
Kars‟ca ve gerek Erzurum‟ca civardan kat‟ ve nakl ettirilmiĢ idi. Erzurum‟ca kat‟ 
ettirilen hatabın mesarif-i katiyesi bil-hesab onun eshabına itasıyla ücurat-ı nakliyenin 
irad ve masrafı icra ettirildiği misillü Kars‟ca dahi bu vechile muavenet-i lazımesi bil-
icra iktiza eden mazbatası memurine bırağılmıĢ olduğundan bu dahi resmen ve usulen 
buyrulmuĢ olacağı derkardır deyu ifade eylemiĢlerdir. 
 
Erzurum canibinden Ġngiltere sefaretine vürud eden mektubun bir bendi tercümesi 
mealinden müsteban olduğu üzere Mühendis Faik Bey marifetiyle yapılan tabyalar fena 
halde olduğundan hedm ile tekrar yapılması neden iktiza eylediği Abdi PaĢa 
hazretlerinden sual olundukta “Gerek Kars‟ca ve gerek Ardahan‟ca yapılan tabyaların 
mahallerini bizzat irae ve tarif ile yaptırttım. Sonradan öyle yıkılıp tekrar yapıldığına 
malumatım yoktur” demeleri üzerine “Ferik Ali PaĢa‟ya taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden 
geldiği beyan olunan tahrirat nasıl Ģeydir?” denildikte Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri cevabında 
“MüĢirliğimiz o anda sair ümera-i askeriyeye tamimen geldiği gibi ona dahi bir tahrirat-
ı seraskeri geldi ve meali dahi bazı mertebe tenbihatı Ģamildir” demiĢlerdir. 
 
Devletlu Abdi PaĢa hazretlerinin fi 14 ve 16 S sene 70 [16-18.11.1853] tarihleriyle 
müverreh makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeriye ve fi 13 S sene 70 [15.11.1853] tarihiyle 
orduy-ı hümayun müsteĢarı sabık atufetlu efendi hazretleri tarafına mebus üç kıta 
tahriratları led-el kırae hulasa-i mealleri Gümrü piĢgahında Rusyalu ile Ahmed PaĢa 
hazretlerinin vuku bulan muharebesine ve kendülerinin ne suretle imdada gelerek 
muzafferiyet-i seniyyeye mazhar olduklarına ve müĢarünileyh hazretleri her bir hususda 
gayurane ve Ģeciane hareket edip sair ümera ve zabitanın dahi bu yolda gayret ve 
besaletleri meĢhud-ı mesbuk idüğini tavsiye ve beyandan ibaret bulunmuĢ olmağla 
müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri, “Madamki müĢarünileyh Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
hakkında böyle hüsn-i Ģahadet eylemiĢlerdir, layihalarında güya Arpaçayı‟nı öteye 
geçme deyu tenbih buyurmaları üzerine hilaf-ı hareket etmiĢ olduğumun muharrer 
olması Ģu tahriratlarının mealine münafi oluyor” demeleri üzerine Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
“ĠĢbu tahriratlarım muharebe vukuundan üç dört gün sonradır. MüĢarünileyh Ahmed 
PaĢa‟ya verdiğim talimat-ı Ģifahiye muharebeye hin-i sevkindedir. Vakıa ol vakit 
beynimizde bazı müzakerat vuku‟ bulmuĢ idi. Yani ba‟d-el muharebe müĢarünileyh 
hazretleriyle mülakat ettiğimizde emr-i muharebede vuku‟ bulan kusurları kendülerine 
yegan yegan ifade olundukta bazılarına sebeb beyan ederek bazılarını dahi itiraf 
etmiĢler idi ve tarafımızdan dahi Ģu muharebede muzafferiyet vukuuna mebni bundan 
sonra vuku‟ bulacak muharebelerde yoluyla hareket edecekleri memuliyle kusurlarından 
sarf-ı nazar etmiĢtim” dediklerinde Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri cevabında müĢarünileyh 
Abdi PaĢa hazretleriyle bu misillü Ģey müzakere etmedim ve bir guna kusurum vuku‟ 
bulup da itiraf eylemedim” deyu cevab vermiĢlerdir. 
 
Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunun bazu vukuatına dair derdest bulunan tahrirat üzerine bu 
defa komisyondan vaki olan es‟ileye taraflarımızdan verilen ecviye dahi derc ü ilan 
kılınmıĢ olduğundan temhir olunmuĢtur. 
 
[Seals from right to left] Ali Rıza, Ahmed, Abdülkerim Nadir  
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Appendix 83. İ. MMS. 3/107 lef 3, undated, probably January 1854 or December 
1854. Answers from the meclis of the Anatolian army in Erzurum to the questions 
of Inspector Hayreddin Pasha in Erzurum and answers from Abdi Pasha, Ahmed 
Pasha and Ferik Ali Pasha to questions at the MV in Istanbul.  
 
Zabıta müĢiri devletlu Hayreddin PaĢa hazretlerinin Erzurum canibine muvasalatlarında 
teĢkil olunan komisyonda ibraz eyledikleri bir kıta layihalarında Anadolu orduy-ı 
hümayununun ahvaline dair vaki olan suallerine verilen cevablar üzerine orduy-ı 
mezkur müĢiri esbak ve sabık devletlu Abdi PaĢa ve Ahmed PaĢa hazeratıyla Ferik 
saadetlu Ali PaĢa hazretlerinden istizahı icab eden maddeler baĢka baĢka sual olunarak 
ahz olunan cevabların suretidir ki ber vech-i ati zikr u beyan olunur. 
 
[Question 1] Orduy-ı hümayun el haleti hazihi ne heyettedir ve ne kadar piyade ve 
süvari ve topçu cunud-ı nizamiye ve ne mikdar asair-i muvazzafa mevcuddur ve maaĢ 
ve tayinatları ne merkezde ve ne mahalden verilmektedir? Yoluyla ve vakit ve 
zamanıyla verilür mü? Giyecek ve örtecek Ģeyleri ve muhafazalu yatacak yerleri var 
mıdır? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Mahalli meclisinin istintak cevabı 
Piyade ve süvari ve topçu asakir-i nizamiye ve redife-i Ģahanenin mikdar-ı mevcuduyla 
güzeĢte maaĢlarının ne kadar olduğu takdim kılınan hulasa jurnaliyle defterden malum-ı 
ali-i müĢirileri buyurulacağı ve tayinat maddesi hasbel icab beĢinci maddede tasrih ve 
ifade olunduğundan tekrarından sarf-ı nazar olunmuĢdur ve neferat-ı muvazzafa Ġsmail 
PaĢa nezaret ve marifetiyle yoklama ettirilerek onların dahi mikdar-ı mevcudu zikr 
olunan jurnale idhal ettirilmiĢtir ve asakir-i Ģahanenin mevcuduna göre Kars‟ın vüsati 
kafi olamadığından ve kıĢla gibi bir mahall-i mahsus dahi bulunmadığından mukaddem-
leri asakir-i Ģahane yatacak ve oturacak  yerlerce zaruri müzayaka ve sefalet çekmiĢler 
ise de icabına göre bazı süvari alaylarıyla piyade taburları civar münasip kuraya 
çıkarılarak esbab-ı istirahatlarına itina olunmakta ve bu suretin hastagan ve vefeyatca 
fark ve faidesi anlaĢılmakta bulunmuĢdur ve mevcud olan cunud-ı cenab-ı mülukaneden 
Anadolu orduy-ı hümayununa mensub olanların bu sene-i mübarekede elbise-i 
Ģitaiyeleri Dersaadet‟den tamamen vürud etmemesi cihetle noksanları bulunmuĢ ise de 
saye-i hazret-i Ģahanede bir uçtan gelmekte olup bunlar dahi ikmale reside olmakta 
olduğu gibi yağmurlukları dahi Gedikler muharebesinde vuku bulan dağınıklıktan 
dolayı neferat-ı askeriye alamamıĢ olduklarından noksantari olmuĢ ve saye-i 
zılliyetvaye-i cenab-ı mülukanede peyderpey gelmekte ise de henüz ikmal 
olunamadığından mikdar-ı mevcud ve noksanı üçüncü maddede beyan olunan elbise 
mazbatasına idhal ve imla kılınmıĢdır. 
 
Bu tarafdaki komisyonda verilen cevablar 
Kars‟ın vüsatsizliği cihetle asakir-i Ģahane civar münasip köylere yerleĢdirilerek refah 
ve rahatları istihsal kılındığı beyan olunduğundan bu hususun daha evvelce 
yapılmaması neden icab eylediği ve asakir-i Ģahane elbisesinde beyan olunan 
noksaniyete sebeb ne idüği ve Gedikler muharebesinde asakirin dağınıklığı cihetle 
yağmurluk alamadıkları beyan olunduğundan yağmurluğun mikdar ve keyfiyeti dahi 
sual olundukta Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında burada beyan olunduğu üzere asakirin 
civar mahallere yerleĢdirilmesi maddesi benim zamanımda yani azlimden yigirmi otuz 
gün evvel icra olundu ve ordunun elbise-i Ģitaiyelerinde müĢirliğimiz evanında hiçbir 
Ģey gelmemiĢ idi ve gerek gavgada ve gerek dağınıklık zuhurunda yağmurluk telef 
edilmeyip fakat ol vakit köylere yerleĢdirilmiĢ olan asakirin biraz yağmurluğu telef 
olduğu misillü Subatan‟dan asker gece gelmek cihetle bunların dahi zayiatı vuku 
bulduğundan keyfiyet ol vakit makam-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeriye yazıldı demiĢdir. 
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[Question 2] Böyle kesret üzere asakir-i nizamiyeden vefeyat vukuu tabiblerin vech-i 
layıkında hastalara bakmamalarından mıdır, yohsa yiyecek Ģeylerine ve yatacak 
yerlerine kemaliyle dikkat ve nezaret olunmamasından mıdır? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Asakir-i Ģahane Kars‟dan çıkarak Bayındır‟a sevk olundukları esnada mevcud olan 
hıyamdan mikdar-ı kifaye çadır istishab olunmamıĢ ve orada dahi heyet-i harb üzere 
bulunduğundan cunud-ı nizamiye kuraya tevzi ve ikame olunamamıĢ olduğundan ve 
Gedikleri karyesi civarında gelindiği esnada dahi karyenin adem-i istiâbı cihetle açıkta 
kalındığından asakir-i Ģahane bu suretle zedelenip Kars‟dan nan-ı aziz ve dakik irsaline 
her ne kadar gayret olunmuĢ ise de adem-i kifayeti ve oralarda tedarik olunamaması 
cihetleriyle bu suretle dahi zaruret ve meĢakkate duçar ve bozgunluk vukuunda elbise 
ve yağmurlukları dahi za‟y olarak Kars‟a gelip gayet zıyk ve sıkındı mahallere ittiad 
olunup sıklet-i mekan ve zaruret-i elbise ve örtünüp yatacakları olmaması cihetle adem-i 
refah ve huzurlarıyla bazı meyusiyetlerinden neĢet etmiĢdir ve ol babda Sertabib 
Miralay izzetlu Salih Bey bendeleri canibinden tanzim olunan çend bendi Ģamil bir kıta 
takrir-i mufassala dahi manzur-ı meali-neĢur-ı asafaneleri buyurulmak üzere takdim 
kılınmıĢdır. 
 
Bu dahi 
Asakir-i Ģahaneden külliyet üzere vefeyat vukuuna sebeb Bayındır‟da iken çadırsız 
kalmak ve kuraya tevzi olunamamak ve bozgunluktan sonra Kars‟a avdette zıyk 
yerlerde ikamet ettirilmek maddeleri beyan olunduğundan bunların mümkün mertebe 
esbab-ı maniası istihsal olunmak lazım gelür idi denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
cevabında asakirin soğuk alması ve çadırsız kalması gibi fenalıkların zuhuru kıĢ 
münasebetiyle umur-ı tabiiyeden olup fakat Kars‟da mahallerinin beyan olunan zıyklığı 
cihetle demincek beyan olunduğu cihetle Ģuraya buraya dağıtılıp mahalleri tefrik ve 
tevsi olunmuĢ idi. Böyle Ģeyler imkan bulundukça yapılmamak nasıl olur ve bununla 
beraber asakirin Kars‟da ikamet ettiği mahaller öyle pek de Ģayan-ı teĢekki Ģeyler 
değildir. Bunlara asıl sebeb sonradan Arabistan tarafından asker gelmesi ve hilaf-ı 
memul cümleten asakirin Kars‟a bozulup gelmesi maddeleridir ve hasb el mevsim terk-i 
harb ihtiyarı bunların vukua gelmemesi havfından ibaret idi. Ne çare ki nasıl ise o babda 
sebat edemediğime teessüf ederim. Mukaddemce Kars‟da yigirmi dört zeminlikler 
yapılmasına karar verilerek inĢasına mübaĢeret ettirilmiĢ olduğu halde Kars‟dan çıkılıp 
vakta ki avdetimde oraca teseyyüb olunup bakılmadığından dolayı natamam olarak tatil 
edilmiĢ bulduk. Bu yapılmıĢ olsa oldukça barınacak Ģey idi. Asakirin ziyade 
hastalanmasına sebeb Ģeylerden ez cümle hamam hususu ki nefs-i Kars‟da dört hamam 
olup ikisi iĢe yaramaz asker yıkanamaz surette fena Ģey olduğundan diğer ikisiyle 
oranın adetince ve hamamcılık icabınca suyu gayet sıcak olduğundan askerin hücum ile 
girip çıkmasında soğuk aldıklarından ve oturdukları yerler ahur gibi Ģeyler olup tecdid-i 
havaya mahal olmadığından ben orada iken pencere ve baca gibi mahaller açılmasını 
tenbih etmiĢ idim. Bilmem nasıl oldu. Bir de abdesthane olmadığından gece soğukta 
taĢra çıkıldığından ekser hastalıklar bundan neĢet etmektedir [zan?] ederim” demiĢtir. 
 
[page 2] 
 
[Question 3] Cunud-ı nizamiyenin ne mikdarının elbiseleri vardır ve ne mikdarının 
yokdur? Eslihaları tekmil midir değil midir? Elbise ve eslihadan noksanı olduğu halde 
sebeb ve hikmeti nedir ve bundan böyle noksan kalmıĢ mıdır ve mikdarı nedir? Tafsilen 
beyanı. 
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Bu dahi 
Piyade ve süvari ve topçu cunud-ı nizamiye ve redife-i Ģahanenin elbise ve eslihalarının 
mikdar-ı mevcud ve sebeb-i noksaniyetini mübeyyin tanzim olunan bir kıta defteri 
takdim kılınmıĢdır. 
 
Bu dahi 
Hükmü olmadığı 
 
[Question 4] Edevat-ı harbiyeden elyevm mevcud nedir ve ne mikdar ve ne cinsdir ve 
derece-i kifayede midir değil midir? Olmadığı halde noksanının cins ve mikdarını 
mübeyyin tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Edevat-ı harbiyeden mevcud olan ve noksan bulunanların cins ve mikdarını mübeyyin 
erkan-ı harbiye meclisi tarafından terkim ve takdim kılınan defter mütalaasından 
müsteban buyurulacağından tekrarından sarf-ı nazar olunmuĢdur. 
 
Bu dahi 
Bunun dahi hükmü olmadığı 
 
[Question 5] Orduy-ı hümayunun idaresinde kifayet ve vefa edecek zehair ve erzak var 
mıdır? Olduğu halde ne mikdar ve ne cinsdir ve ne kadar müddet idare-i tayinat-ı 
askeriyeye kifayet edecekdir? Eğer kifayet edecek zehair ve erzak yoğise Ģimdiye kadar 
adem-i tertib ve iddihariyenin sebeb ve hikmeti nedir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Orduy-ı hümayun içün lüzum görünecek zehair-i külliyenin bidayet-i meselede tertib ve 
tedariki ve icabet-i umurdan ve sinin-i sabıkada olan feyz ve bereket cihetle bunun 
vaktiyle çaresine bakılmıĢ olsa bu maddede bir guna zaruret çekilmiyeceği vazıhadan ve 
bu dahi orduy-ı hümayun meclisine aid mevaddan olduğu gibi Ģu iddihar-ı zehair-i 
vafiye ve erzak-ı mütenevvia-i kafiye ve levazımat-ı saire keyfiyeti bazı erkan ve ümera 
tarafından dahi ol vakit lazım gelen mahalle ifade ve ihtar kılınmıĢ ise de baĢlıca 
tertibine bakılamamıĢ ve nan-ı aziz tayinatı dahi yedi sekiz seneden berü orada 
olageldiği misillü bu sene-i mübarekede dahi ba-marifet-i meclis orduy-ı hümayun Ģehr-
i Temmuz ibtidasından itibaren bir seneliği yalnız Erzurum somarıyla beĢ bin somar 
hınta verilmek ve bunun beher somarı yüz yigirmi kuruĢa ita olunup kendüsi dahi nan-ı 
azizin kıyyesini yigirmiĢer para hesabıyla vermek üzere orduy-ı hümayunun kadim 
etmekçibaĢısı bulunan Kozma ile konturatoya rabt olunmuĢ ve buna bakılmayarak 
Erzurum ve Çıldır ve Kars sancakları mahsulatından otuz bin somardan ziyade zahire 
teslim ettirilmiĢ ve tayinat-ı lahmiye dahi Erzurum‟da ala koyun etinin kıyyesi otuz 
ikiĢer ve Kars‟da yigirmi sekiz paraya olduğu halde sayf ü Ģitada bahaya çıkar ise bulup 
vermek üzere merkum Kozma‟nın kefaletiyle beher kıyyesi elliĢer paraya KeĢiĢ oğlu 
Artin ile yine bir seneliği kezalik meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun marifetiyle konturato 
edilmiĢ ve lahmin bahası mikdar-ı mezkur üzere olduğu halde mersum verdiği lahmin 
bazılarını dükkanlarda sürülemiyen etlerden ucuz baha ile alıp vermiĢ ve bozgunluk 
akabinde kendüsi Kars‟da izhar-ı acz ederek Erzurum‟da bulunan Ģeriki dahi adem-i 
iktidar sureti gösterip orada yine meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun marifetiyle mersumun 
mukavelesinden bir para noksan olarak Kasap Abdi Ağa ile yeniden konturato olunup 
idare ettirilmekte ise de Kars‟da aĢair ve saireden koyun celb ve mübayaa olunarak 
alaylar marifetiyle tarh ü ita ettirilmekde bulunmuĢ ve nan-ı aziz hususunda hayliden 
hayli sıkıntı çekilerk ol suretle sekiz mah idare olunup müddet-i bakıyede yoluyla idare 
edeceğini ve edemediği halde matlubatından orduy-ı hümayun hazinesine iki yüz bin 
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kuruĢ terk edeceğini mersum Kozma Erzurum‟da orduy-ı hümayun ve memleket (?) 
meclisleri birlikte olduğu halde iddia ve ifade ile konturatosu tekid ve el haleti hazihi 
icra buyurulan ikdamatı (?) semeresiyle temizce nan-ı aziz çıkarılmakta ve erzak-ı saire 
dahi meclis-i orduy-ı hümayun tarafından idare olunmakta olduğundan bu dahi nan-ı 
aziz gibi bulunmuĢdur. 
 
Bu dahi 
Zahire maddesine evvel emirde baĢlıca teĢebbüs olunmadığı beyan olunduğundan 
bunun sebebi nedir denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında “evvelce dahi beyan 
eylediğim vechile nan-ı aziz tayinatı içün etmekçi Kozma ile konturato edilmiĢ ve 
zahire hususu Vali PaĢa‟ya muhavvel olduğu halde buna bakılmayarak orduca iktiza 
eden mahallere mahsusen mektub yazılıp celb ü cem‟ ettirilmekde idi. Fakat bazı 
mahaller memurları biraz rehavet gösterdiler. Mamafih oradan çıktığım vakit orduy-ı 
hümayunu bir sene idare edecek zahire var idi. Beyana hacet olmadığı vechile bu zahire 
maddesinin lüzumu derecesi malum Ģey olduğu misillü emr-i tedarik ve iddiharı 
hususunda dahi elden geldiği sa‟y ve ikdamda kusur olunmadığı ve olunmayacağı 
bedihidir. Eğerçi bunlara itimad olunmaz ise yazdığım mektub-ların müsvedatı ve 
mahallerinden gelen mazbatalar orduca mevcud olmak lazım geleceğinden onlara 
müracaatla hakikat-i hal malum olur” dedikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “vakıa 
tertib olundu lakin celbine teĢebbüs kılınmadı” demesi üzerine Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
“tertib olduğu misillü celbine dahi teĢebbüs kılınmıĢ idi. Fakat öyle birden bire celbine 
kafi hayvan olmadığından refte refte gelür idi. Hatta MuĢ ve Erzurum taraflarında olan 
zehairin celbi bittabii tehir edeceğinden bazılarından yani oraların sayf ü Ģita ahvalini 
bilenlerden MuĢ ve Erzurum tariklerinin kıĢ münasebetiyle kapanıp kapanmadığı sual 
olundukta kapanmaz cevabını vermiĢler iken bi-hikmeti teala Ģiddet-i Ģita zuhuruyla 
bunlar kapanıp zahire celbine muvafık olamadım. Fakat mahall-i saire-i malumeden 
lüzumundan ziyade tertib ile celb olundu” dedikten sonra Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “vakıa 
zahire maddesi Vali PaĢa‟ya havale buyurulmuĢ idi. Lakin lüzumu kadar celbine 
teĢebbüs olunmayıp hatta bir gün Vali PaĢa defterdar efendi ile led-el mülakat bu zahire 
sohbeti açıldıkta lüzumu kadar zahire mevcud olmadığından biraz Ģey tedariki lazım 
geleceğini irad etmekliğime cevaben Vali PaĢa tarafından gavga edilmeyecek olmağla 
ziyade zahire tedariki çürütülmesini ve bu dahi mesuliyetimizi muceb olacağı söylenmiĢ 
idi. Ne hal ise Ģu beyan olunan zaruret hasb el icab askerin Kars‟a toplanmasından neĢet 
etmiĢdir” demesi üzerine “burada lahmin beher kıyyesi elliĢer paraya ve müsteĢar 
efendinin yazıĢı (?) kırk yediĢer paraya demek olur. Bunda olan ihtilafatın sebebi 
nedir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında “lahmin beher kıyyesi evvelce dahi 
beyan eylediğim vechile kırk sekiz parayadır. Bilmem bu yazıĢlar (?) nasıl Ģeydir” 
demesini Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri dahi tasdik etmiĢ ve “bu Kozma nasıl ademdir ve 
idaresi ne suretledir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri “bu herif gayet iĢgüzar ve sahib-i 
yesar olmağla etmek hususunu pek güzel ve yolunda idare edip bir aralık hakkında bazı 
güftegu tekevvün ettiğine binaen istifa etmiĢ idi. Haylice taharri olundu ise de yerine 
baĢka bir muktedir adem bulunamadığından yine ne hal ise etmek maddesi ona ihale 
kılındı” deyu ifade eyledikten ve bu keyfiyeti Ahmed PaĢa ve Ali PaĢa hazeratı dahi 
tasdik eyledikten sonra “Gedikler‟den Kars‟a avdet olundukta dakik olmaması cihetle 
beĢ on gün biraz meĢakkat çekildi. Lakin sonraları pek yolunda idare olunur idi. Ancak 
bir livaya un verilip kendileri etmek piĢirirler idi” deyu Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri 
söylemiĢdir.  
 
[Question 6] Elyevm kaç kıta top mevcuddur ve çap ve cinsleri nedir ve top-keĢan 
bargirleri kaç danedir? Derece-i kifayetde midir değil midir ve esnay-i muharebede top 
bargirlerinden telef olan kaç danedir ve Ģimdi mevcud ve telefatı nedir ve top 
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koĢumlarıyla levazımat-ı sairesi tekmil midir değil midir? Olmadığı halde noksan olan 
ve lüzum görünen nedir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Top ve mühimmat-ı harbiye ve edevat-ı saire ve hayvanatın cinsi ve mikdarıyla noksan 
ve mevcudu ve telef olanları tanzim ve takdim kılınan hulasa defterinden tebeyyün 
edeceğinden tafsil ve tekrarından ihtiraz olunmuĢdur.  
 
Bu dahi 
 
“Erzurum‟da ve Kars‟da ne mikdar var idi?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri cevabında 
“oralarda altmıĢ kadar top olup mikdarını mübeyyin defteri bundan evvel gönderilmiĢ 
idi” demesi üzerine sonradan etrafdan gelenler ile beraber doksan kıtaya baliğ olduğunu 
Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri ifade etmiĢdir. 
 
[Question 7] Temür baĢ olarak mevcud olan mekkare bargirleri ne mikdar … 
…. 
…. 
[Question 8] Ahısha hadisesinde asakir-i Ģahaneden Ģehid olan ve yaralanan ve 
düĢmanın eline geçip esir kalan ne kadardır ve mecruh olanlara Ģimdiye kadar bakılmıĢ 
mıdır ve elyevm dikkat üzere bakılıyor mu ve yaralılardan vefat etmiĢ ve ifâkat bulmuĢ 
ve henüz kesb-i ifâkat edemeyip yatakda bulunmuĢ olan kaç danedir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Zikr olunan hadisede bulunan taburlar Erzurum‟da olduğundan asakir-i Ģahaneden Ģehid 
olan ve yaralanan ve düĢmanın eline geçip esir kalan ne mikdardır ve yaralulara layıkıy-
la bakılıp bakılmadığı ve bunlardan vefat etmiĢ ve ifâkat bulmuĢ ve henüz kesb-i sıhhat 
edememiĢ bulunan ne kadardır buraca mechul bulunmuĢ ve eğerçi taburha-i merkume-
den altıncı alayın iki taburu burada ise de onların yaraluları dahi Ardahan‟da kalarak 
Erzurum‟a gelmemiĢ olduğundan buraca hakikat-i madde meydana çıkarılamayıp 
Erzurum‟dan istilamı lazım geleceği. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Ahısha muharebesinde mecruh olanların mikdarı nedir?” denildikte Ali PaĢa hazretleri 
“iki tabur nizamiyeden yetmiĢ bir ve altı tabur redifden kırk bir ve süvari topçusundan 
yigirmi otuz kadar ki mecmuan yüz kırk nefer mikdarı yaralu bulunup Erzurum‟a 
gidinceye kadar yedi neferi vefat etmiĢ idi. Küsuru dahi hastahanede pek güzel 
bakılmakta olduğunu hastahaneye gittiğimde gördüm” demiĢdir. 
 
[Question 9] Ahısha‟da mühimmat-ı harbiyeden zayiat ve telefat var mıdır? Olduğu 
halde cinsi ve mikdarı nedir? Ahısha muharebesinde düĢmanın eline top geçmiĢ midir? 
Geçtiği halde ne cins topdur ve çapları nedir ve asakirin yağmurluk ve silah ve çanta ve 
palaska ve çadırları za‟y olmuĢ mudur? Olduğu halde cins ve mikdarı nedir? Tafsilen 
beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Mühimmat-ı harbiye ve yağmurluk ve çanta ve palaskadan hayli Ģey ve bir taburluk 
çadır telef ve za‟y olmuĢ ise de sair alay ve taburlar burada mevcud olmadığı cihetle 
cinsi ve mikdarı bilinemeyip Erzurum‟dan tahkiki lazım gelmiĢ ve altıncı alayın üçüncü 
ve dördüncü taburlarıyla topçu bölükleri burada bulunmuĢ olduğundan salif üz zikr iki 
taburdan vuku‟ bulan zayiatın mikdarını mübeyyin ziri mazbatalu tanzim ettirilen bir 
kıta defteri takdim kılınmıĢdır ve mezkur topçu bölüklerinden zay‟ olan top ve 
mühimmat-ı harbiye ve sairenin cinsi ve mikdarı dahi Gedikler muharebesiyçün topçu 
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alayı tarafından tanzim ve takdim kılınan balası defterlu bir kıta mazbataya idhal 
olunmuĢdur. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Bu Ahısha muharebesinde olan telefatın mikdarı nedir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa 
hazretleri “bundan evvel defteri tanzim ve takdim kılınmıĢ idi. Ona müracaat olunması 
icab eder” demiĢdir. 
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[Question 10] Ahısha‟da vuku bulan uygunsuzluk ve periĢaniyet-i hale kimler sebeb 
olmuĢdur? Erkan ve ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyeden kanğısı ibraz-ı hizmet ve sadakat ve 
kanğısı izhar-ı cebanet ve hıyanet eylemiĢdir ve düĢman ile mukabele ve mukatele 
etmeksizin ve ağız önü bakmaksızın baĢlarını alıp gerüye avdet eden kimlerdir ve kanğı 
alay ve kanğı taburdur ve kumandaranının isim ve Ģöhretleri nedir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Ahısha üzerine memur asakir-i Ģahane kumandarı Ferik saadetlu Ali Rıza PaĢa 
hazretleri tarafından yigirmi iki gün zarfında mevcud olan top ve asakir-i Ģahane 
birbirine yarımĢar saat ve üçer çaryek mesafede vaki karyelere taksim ve ik‟âd olunmuĢ 
ve mikdar-ı kifayede ve muhavver (?) layıkında lazım gelen ve mutena (?) bulunan 
mahallere karakol konulmamıĢ ve müddet-i mezkur zarfında birinci redif alayının 
birinci ve ikinci ve Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade dördüncü ve redif alayının 
ikinci taburları ve yedi kıta top ile düĢmana en yakın olan AĢağı Süflis karyesinde 
oturtulmuĢ olduğundan düĢman askeri sabah vakti bağteten mezkur Süflis karyesi 
üzerine gelip evvela top muharebesine mübaĢeret etmiĢ ve üç saat kadar top muharebesi 
imtidad bulup muahharen dahi mezkur taburlar hat açarak düĢmanın piyadesiyle ve 
nevbet ateĢiyle cenk ve harbe baĢlamıĢ ise de bu müddet içinde sair karyelerde olan ve 
nihayet uzaklığı üç çaryek mesafede bulunan taburlar kumandarlarına düĢmanın Ahısha 
içinde hareketi istima‟ olunduğundan bu gece besaret üzere bulunulmasını ferik-i 
müĢarünileyh Mirliva Mustafa PaĢa ve Ali PaĢa‟ya birer kıta tezkire ile bildirmiĢ ise de 
düĢmanın bir mahalle bağteten geldiği halde Ģu suretle ve bu vechile hareket ve 
yekdiğere muavenet eylemelerine dair bir guna emr ü tenbih verilmemiĢ olmaktan naĢi 
zikr olunan mesafede bulunan taburlar vaktiyle gelip yetiĢememiĢ olduğundan düĢman 
bunları galebe ederek mezkur taburları dağıtmıĢ ve yedi kıta top dahi zabt eylemiĢ 
olduktan sonra zikr olunan birinci alayın üçüncü taburuyla nizamiye altıncı alayın 
üçüncü ve dördüncü taburları birbirini müteakıben gelmiĢ ise de mezkur taburlar 
neferatı dağılmıĢ olup celb ve cem‟ olunamadıklarından düĢman askeri dahi ziyadece 
bulunup kol açamadıkları halde harbe Ģüru‟ etmiĢler ise de tâb-âver-i mukavemet 
olamayarak bunlar dahi dağılmıĢ ve badehu düĢman askeri yürüyerek kumandar-ı 
müĢarünileyhin oturduğu karye üzerine gelmiĢ olmaktan naĢi orada bulunan iki kıta top 
ile topçular ateĢ etmiĢ ve bu sırada mezkur dördüncü redif alayının üçüncü ve dördüncü 
taburları oldukları karyeden oraya gelmek münasebetiyle bunlar dahi bir mikdar harb 
eylemiĢ ise de her nasılsa bunlar dahi mukavemet edemeyip kol ve tabur heyeti 
bozmayarak gerüye çekildikleri halde bu periĢaniyeti netice vermiĢ ve bunun vukuu 
kumandar-ı müĢarünileyhin sui tedbir ve karakollara adem-i dikkatle alay ve taburların 
bir mahalde topluca bulundurmamasından neĢet eylediği hin-i istintaklarında Mirliva 
Mustafa PaĢa ile Kaimmakam Hacı Eyüp Bey ve Topçu BinbaĢısı Mustafa Ağa ve 
erkan-ı harb zabitanından Osman Efendi‟nin ifadelerinden tebeyyün etmiĢdir. 
 
Bu dahi 
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Ahısha vukuatına sebeb askerin layıkıyla tertib olunamaması maddesi olduğundan “bu 
ne surette olmuĢdur?” denildikte Ali PaĢa hazretleri “evvelce tarif eylediğim vechile 
asakir mabeynleri birer çaryek olarak iki kol üzerine üç karyeye yerleĢdirilmiĢ ve 
düĢmanın gelecek iki tariki olup onlar dahi tutulmuĢ idi. Hasb el mevki bundan baĢka 
bir tertib olunmak mümkünatdan [değildi?] ve karakollar dahi yoluyla konuldu ve 
ihtiyat mevkiinde iki top olduğu gösterilmiĢ ise de beĢ kıta top var idi” demiĢdir.  
 
[Question 11] Ahısha üzerine memur olan kıta-i müfreze kumandarının asakir-i 
nizamiye-i Ģahaneden bir çavuĢ ile sekiz neferi idam ve telef eylediği sahih ve vaki 
midir? Olduğu halde kaçıncı alaydan ve kaçıncı tabur ve bölük ve onbaĢıdandır ve 
memleketleri neresidir ve isimleri nedir ve katl ü idam olunmalarına istihkakları neden 
ve kanğı töhmet ve kabahatten vaki olmuĢdur ve buna dair kumandarın yedinde Divan-ı 
Harb mazbatası var mıdır ve iradesini istihsal eylemiĢ midir veyahud ordu müĢiri 
tarafından kendüsüne mezuniyet verilmiĢ midir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
……. 
…. 
[Question 12] Ahısha üzerine memur olan kumandar esir olarak bir takım köle ve 
cariyeyi alıp füruht etmek üzere öteye berüye taksim eylediğinden baĢka el haleti hazihi 
birkaç danesi dahi yanında bulunduğu rivayet olunmuĢ olmağla rivayet-i mezkure sahih 
midir değil midir? Olduğu halde buna ne tarafdan mezuniyet almıĢdır ve yedinde bir 
guna sened var mıdır? Olduğu surette kimindir ve getürdiği köle ve cariye ne cins ve ne 
mikdardır ve nerelidir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Ahısha canibinde kimesne tarafından köle ve cariye alındığı iĢidilmeyip fakat Ferik 
saadetlu Ali Rıza PaĢa muharebe-i merkumeden birbuçuk iki ay evvelce ve akçesiyle 
ġavĢit kazası müdiri Selim Bey ile karındaĢı ġakir Bey marifetiyle iki cariye ile bir 
nefer köle almıĢ ve bunların dahi Gürcü bulunduğu ala rivayetin mesmu‟ olmuĢ olduğu 
Mirliva Mustafa PaĢa bendelerinin istintak-ı vakıasından tebeyyün etmiĢdir. 
 
Bu dahi 
Ahısha‟da alındığı rivayet olunan köle ve cariyenin keyfiyet-i bey‟ ve Ģirası nasıldır 
denildikte Ali PaĢa hazretleri “ġavĢit [ġaviĢet?] müdiri Selim Bey ile biraderi ġakir 
Bey‟in küçükten alıp büyüttükleri bir re‟s Çerkes köleyi ve babalarının kezalik evvelce 
alıp beslediği bir re‟s Çerkes cariyeyi baha-i layıkla Ardahan‟da iken aldım ve bunların 
alınıp verilmesi gavgadan üç mah evvelce idi” demiĢdir.  
 
[Question 13] Gedikler muharebesinde asakir-i Ģahaneden Ģehid olan ve yaralanan ve 
yaralılardan Ģimdiye kadar vefat eden ve ifakat bulan ne kadardır ve muharebede 
düĢmanın eline kaç dane ve ne cins top geçmiĢdir ve mühimmat ve edevat-ı harbiyeden 
zayiat ve telefat var mıdır? Olduğu halde cins ve mikdarı nedir ve asakirin yağmurluk 
ve silah ve çanta ve palaska ve çadırları za‟y olmuĢ mudur ve bunda erkan ve ümera ve 
zabitandan hüsn-i hizmet ve Ģecaat ibraz eden ve sui hareket ve ve cebanet ve hıyanet 
izhar eyliyen kimlerdir ve isim ve Ģöhretleri nedir? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
ĠĢbu muharebede Ģehid olan ve yaralanan ve Ģimdiye kadar yaralulardan vefat eden ve 
ifakat bulan zabitan ve neferatın mikdarını mübeyyin alayları canibinden ziri mazbatalu 
tanzim ve takdim kılınan defterden müsteban olacağı misillü düĢman eline geçmiĢ olan 
topların cins ve çap ve mikdarı ve bunların mühimmat-ı harbiye ve edevat-ı sairesinin 
zayiat ve telefat defteri dahi topçu alayı tarafından ziri mazbatalu defteri tanzim ve 
takdim olunmuĢ ve asakir-i Ģahanenin yağmurluk ve silah ve çanta ve çadırlarının 
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mikdar-ı zayiatı dahi kezalik piyade ve süvari ve topçu alayı ve taburları tarafından 
tanzim ve takdim olunan hulasa defterlerinden tebeyyün edecekdir ve bu vukua gelen 
periĢaniyet ve uygunsuzluk erkan ve ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyenin hiç birisine 
muharebe mahallinde Ģu vechile ve bu suretle hareket olunacağına veyahud filan 
mahalle veya muharebeye Ģu vechile bed ve mübaĢeret kılınmasına ve Ģayed düĢman 
galebe ederek gerüye çekilmek lazım geldiği halde bir mahalde toplanmasına en büyük 
kumandar bulunan devletlu Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri tarafından bir guna emr ü tenbihat 
vuku‟ bulmamasından ve yigirmi dört kıta topun hattın sağ baĢına ve bir mahalle vaz 
ettirmesinden ve sağ baĢ kumandarı bulunan Mirliva Hüseyin PaĢa bendeleri dahi her 
nasılsa muhafaza edemeyip zikr olunan topları düĢman almak ve oranın kuvve-i 
askeriyesi dağılmak cihetinden bu hal-i mükeddireyi vermiĢdir ve böyle sui ahval ve 
tedbire göre Bayındır ve Gedikler muharebelerinde topçular hudud-efzun-ı gayret ve 
Ģecaat etmiĢ oldukları gibi mezkur Gedikler muharebesinde cümle zabitan ve neferat-ı 
askeriye tarafından dahi gayret ve sebat olunmuĢ ise de taburlar neferatının haylicesi 
arpa ve saman ve tezek celbiyle ve cameĢuy yıkamak misillü hizmetler ile müteferrik ve 
meĢgul olup tabur mevcud-ı tammeleriyle harbe çıkamamasından ve on dokuz piyade 
ve on bölük süvariden mürekkeb çıkan asker dahi bir hatt üzerine ve hatt-ı sani ve 
ihtiyat bulunmamasından ve müĢarünileyh hazretlerinin esna-i muharebede taĢın 
arkasında bulunup taburların suret-i hareketlerine dair kumanda vermemesi misillü 
vukua gelen teseyyüb-i ahval ve sui tedbiratından neĢet etmiĢdir. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Gedikler muharebesinde ümera ve zabitan-ı askeriyeye hiçbir guna talimat ve tedabir-i 
mukteziye ve mevadd-ı saire-i icabiye içün kat‟a ifadat vuku bulmadığı ve düĢmanın 
galebe edip gerü çekilmek lazım geldiği halde asker toplanmak içün bir mahal tayin 
olunmadığı ve mevcud olan yigirmi dört kıta top hattın sağ baĢında olarak bir mahalle 
konulduğu beyan ve ima kılındığından bunlar sahih midir ve bu topların çoğu düĢmanın 
eline geçmesi adem-i muhafazadan neĢet eylediği iĢar kılınmasıyla niçün bu kayıdsızlık 
vuku bulmuĢdur ve asakir-i Ģahanenin ekserisi saman ve tezek celbiyle ve ve cameĢuy 
yıkamakla meĢgul idüğinden taburlar mevcud-ı tammeleriyle harbe çıkamadıkları ve bir 
hatt üzerine tertib olunup hatt-ı sani ve ihtiyat bulundurulmadığı ve esna-i muharebede 
Ahmed PaĢa‟nın taĢ arkasında bulunduğu beyan kılınmağla vaki midir?” deyu sual 
olundukta müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa cevabına ibtidar ile “Cümleten mahall-i 
muharebe[de?] bulunduğumuzdan öyle talimat ve tebliğat-ı resmiye vuku bulmayıp 
ancak bir kumanda olmak üzere mezuniyet-i kamile verilerek Veli PaĢa sol tarafa tayin 
olunduktan sonra Mustafa PaĢa ve Hüseyin PaĢa ve topçu mirlivası nezd-i acizaneme 
celb ile “ĠĢte düĢman askeri karĢuda duruyor. Din ve millete hizmet etmeklik maddesi 
tamam bu vakitdir. Ġcabı vechile hareket edip herkes kendü hizmet ve kumandasına 
dikkat eylesün” diyerek bazı mertebe icra-i tebliğat olunduktan sonra bizzat taburlar 
üzerlerine varılıp onlara dahi teĢvikat zımnında münasip lisan kullanılmakta iken 
düĢman tarafından tüfenk atılmasıyla muharebeye Ģüru olunmuĢ idi. Ġhtiyat taburları 
köylerde olduğundan asakirin avdeti halinde oralara yerleĢdirileceği umur-ı bedihiden 
olduğu misillü eğer bozgunluk olur ise mahal tayiniyle toplanılması maddesi alel infirad 
ilan olunmak düĢmanın kuvvetini bir nevi tazyif ve asakir-i Ģahane tehvif edilmesi 
demek olacağından burası abes gibi görünür ve zikr olunan top yigirmi dört kıta 
olmayıp yigirmi altı kıta idi. Evvelki meclislerde dahi söylediğim gibi yigirmi altı kıta 
topun bir hatt üzerine olarak sekiz kıtası sağda ve sekiz kıtası dahi solda ve on kıtası 
dahi ortada olmak ve askerin önünde olduğu halde silah iĢlettirilecek surette olmak açık 
bulmak üzere tertib olunmuĢ idi ve düĢman yedine top geçürülmemesiyçün pek çok 
çalıĢıldı lakin düĢmanın kuvveti ziyade olduğundan çaresi bulunamadı ve askere arpa ve 
saman ve tezek taĢıttırıldığının aslı olmamak gerekdir ve benim buna dair bir guna 
ruhsat ve emrim vaki olmadı. Ġhtimal ki üç beĢ adem cameĢuy yıkamak içün kalmıĢdır. 
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Böyle olduğu halde tabur mevcud-ı tamıyla çıkamadı denilemez cümleten çıkarılmıĢdır 
ve asakirin ne suretle tertib ve tesvik olunduğunu evvelce beyan etmiĢdim. Bunların 
dediğim gibi tertib olunduğuna mahallinde pek çok ademin malumatı olduğu misillü 
öyle taĢ arkasında bulunmadığım dahi meĢhud ve müsellemdir ve topçular suret-i tertibi 
ve muharebe keyfiyeti verdiğim layihada musarrahdır” deyu ifade etmiĢdir. 
 
[Question 14] Ahısha ve Gümrü muharebesinden avdet edenler ne halde ve ne suretle 
gelmiĢdir ve bunlar tabur heyetine idhal ve rabıta-i nizamiyeleri ikmal kılınmıĢ mıdır? 
Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Ahısha muharebesinden ricat edenlerden fakat Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade 
dördüncü redif alayının üçüncü ve dördüncü taburları kol ve nizam heyetiyle avdet edip 
küsur kalan taburlar perakende olarak Ardahan‟a geldiği tahakkuk etmiĢdir ve 
Gümrü‟den edenler Gedikler karyesine kadar kol ve nizam heyetiyle gelmiĢ ise de 
Gedikler‟de vuku bulan muharebede piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının ikinci ve üçüncü 
ve dördüncü ve üçüncü alayın ikinci ve Dersaadet orduy-ı hümayununun piyade 
dördüncü redif alayının birinci taburları ve Hassa orduy-ı hümayununun ĢeĢhaneci 
taburlarının iki ve süvari birinci alayının dört bölüğü ve dört kıta top ile ve neferat-ı 
muvazzafa sergerdelerinden mevcud refakatiyle Hacı Temür Ağa bendeleri Ferik 
saadetlu Veli PaĢa hazretleri kumandasıyla kol nizamında ve topluca avdet ve sairleri 
perakende olarak Subatı karyesine kadar gelmiĢ ve orada sair taburlar dahi meh-ma 
emken toplanarak Kars‟a muvasalat etmiĢdir. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Ahısha ve Gümrü muharebelerinden sonra asakir-i mevcude ne halde avdet eyledi?” 
denildikte Abdi PaĢa ve Ahmed PaĢa hazeratı zabıta müĢiri müĢarünileyh hazretlerine 
komisyondan verilen cevab vechile avdet olunduğu sahihdir ve topların cümlesi otuz 
sekiz kıtadan ibaretdir ve gavgadan gerü geldiği beyan olunan top dört kıta olmayıp on 
dört kıtadır. Bunlardan maadası düĢman yedine geçmiĢ demektir” deyu ifade 
eylemiĢlerdir.  
 
[Question 15] Muharebe vukuunda baĢ ve kulak kesmek memnu olduğu halde Bayındır 
muharebesinde muğayir-i irade-i seniyye baĢ ve kulak kesilmiĢ midir ve kesildiği halde 
ne mikdardır ve kanğı askerden olmuĢdur? Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
MüĢir-i sabık devletlu Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri zaman-ı riyasetlerinde ve devletlu Abdi 
PaĢa hazretlerinin hengam-ı müĢirliğinde evvelce orduy-ı hümayun ile Kars‟dan hareket 
ve Bayındır‟a muvasalatımızda vuku bulan baĢıbozuk muharebesinde aĢair ve nefer-i 
amm askeri tarafından yüz kadar kelle kesilip ve kesenlere defter tanzimiyle 
müĢarünileyh Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri tarafından elliĢer kuruĢ verilip arabaya tahmil ve 
kendü yaverini dahi yanına terfik ederek Kars‟a tesyil [sic] eylemiĢ olduğundan 
vusulünde derhal bir mahalle defin ettirilüp ondan sonra vukuu istima‟ olmamıĢdır. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Kelle kesildiği ve getürenlere ikram olunduğu sahih midir?” denildikte Ahmed PaĢa 
hazretleri “Filvaki baĢıbozuklardan bazıları yüz kadar kelle getürdiler. Biraz bahĢiĢ 
verilmiĢdi. Muahharen bunun mennine dair olan irade-i seniyyeden sonra keyfiyet ilan 
olunmağla vuku bulmamıĢdır” deyu ifade eylemiĢdir. 
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[Question 16] Asakir-i muvazzafa tarafından uğradıkları karyeler ahalisini rencide 
eylemek gibi hareketler vuku bulmuĢ ve bulmakta idüğü rivayet olunmağla bunların aslı 
var mıdır? Olduğu halde kanğı sergerdenin ademlerindendir? Vukua gelmekte ise 
meydana çıkarılarak icabının icra ve min ba‟d bu makule Ģeyler vukua gelmemesi ne 
esbaba mütevakkıf ise hemen iktizasına bakılarak icra ve kararının tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Bunun vukuu mertebe-i sübutta tevatür olarak bu habasete ictisar edenlerin en eĢna ve 
akvası Ġnce Arab nam Ģaki ve buna mümasil eyalat ve elviyeden toplanıp gelerek avdet 
edenlerden zuhura gelmiĢ ve sairlerine ibret olmak üzere merkum Ġnce Arab 
Bayezid‟den Kars‟a celb olunarak zulm ü teaddisini gören ahali ve fukara ile 
Erzurum‟da meclisce bil-muvacehe istintak ve muhakeme olunmak ve ona göre 
mücazatı tertib ve tahdid kılınmak içün memur-ı mahsus refakatiyle taraf-ı hazret-i 
müĢiriden Erzurum‟a irsal buyurulmuĢ ve bundan böyle bu misillü fezahat vukua 
gelmemesiyçün asakir-i merkume sergerde ve binbaĢılarıyla sair icab edenlere ekiden 
emr ü tenbih buyurularak tahlif olunmuĢ ve bu surette bunun dahi önü kesdirilmiĢ olup 
bir daha Ģahs-ı vahid bu makule halat-ı nahemvareye cesaret edemeyeceği ve edecek 
olduğu takdirde o makulelerin dahi derhal tedib ve terbiyelerinde taraf-ı bahr-eĢ Ģeref-i 
hazret-i müĢiriden dakika-i vahide fevt ve tehir buyurulmayacağı ve bu keyfiyet bundan 
sonra gelenlere dahi alel infirad ilan olunacağı. 
 
Bu dahi  
“BaĢıbozuk sergerdelerinden bazılarının ve bil-husus Ġnce Arab nam Ģahsın bazı 
uygunsuz hareketleri vuku bulduğu halde men‟ olunmaması ne sebebe mebnidir?” 
denildikte Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri “Ġnce Arab‟dan maada öyle halat-ı namarziyeye 
ibtidar eder kimesne bulunmayıp o dahi yaver gönderilerek Bayezid‟den Kars‟a celb 
olundu ve Erzurum‟a irsal ile icra-i muhakemesi derdest iken tebdil vukuundan dolayı 
kalıp komisyonun cevabından anlaĢıldığı cihetle Ģimdi icra-i muhakeme içün Erzurum‟a 
gelmiĢ demek oluyor” deyu ifade etmiĢdir. 
 
[Question 17] ġimdi kanğı mahalle istihkam verilmek lazımdır ve istihkam verilecek 
yerler neresidir ve Ģimdiye kadar ne kadarı yapılmıĢ ve ne mikdarı yapılmamıĢdır ve 
yapılmıĢ olanlara kaçar kıta ve ne cins top kullanmak lazımdır ve topların ne mikdarı 
mevcud ve ne mikdarı mevcud değildir ve bunların vakt ü zamanıyla hazır ve amade 
olmamasının sebebi nedir ve neden böyle kalmıĢdır? Tafsilen beyanı. 
…. 
…. 
 
[Question 18] Ve bu hale göre orduy-ı hümayunun ilerüye sevki ne mikdar kuvve-i 
askeriyeye muhtaçdır ve ne suretle tecavüzi hareket lazım gelür ve düĢmanın kuvveti ve 
hal ve hareketi ne merkezdedir? Bu babda olan tahkikat ve mesmuatınızın tafsilen 
beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Orduy-ı hümayunun sevki takdirinde ne miktar kuvve-i askeriyeye muhtaç olacağı ve ne 
suretle tecavüzi hareket lazım geleceği ve düĢmanın kuvveti ve hal ve hareketi ne 
merkezde bulunduğu erkan-ı harbiye meclisi tarafından verilen karar ile takdim kılınan 
memhur mazbatalardan muhat-ilm-i alem-araları buyurulacağı.  
 
Bu dahi 
Ordunun hareket etmesi tedabirine dair olmağla hükmü olmadığı 
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[Question 19] Elli altmıĢ haneyi havi Tuhber (?) denilen mahal ile kırk haneden yetmiĢ 
haneye kadar cevamili (?) bulunan BağdaĢen ve PaĢalu ve MudanıĢ (?) ve Kara Galata 
ve Akmasi (?) ve Hocabey ve Kervansaray ve Pervan Köle (?) namun karyeler urulup 
on bin iki yüz re‟s sığır ve bargir ve yigirmi dokuz bin sekiz yüz otuz dokuz re‟s koyun 
ve iki bin yedi yüz altmıĢ somar Ģair ve üç bin iki yüz seksen somar hıntaları yağma ve 
garat olunduğu gibi mezkur Tuhir ahalisinden ve taife-i nisa ve zükurdan haylice nüfus 
esir kılındığı istihbar olunmuĢ ve bu ise bil-vücuh madelet-i seniyyenin hilafı 
bulunmakdan naĢi tahkiki lazım gelmiĢ olmağla husus-ı mezkur sahih ve vaki midir ve 
olduğu halde buna cesaret eden kimlerdir ve kanğı zat tarafından mezuniyet verilmiĢdir 
ve salif üz zikr üsera ile mevaĢi ve zehair kimlerin yed ve zimmetlerinde kalmıĢdır? 
Tafsilen beyanı. 
 
Bu dahi 
Zikr olunan Tuhir [Tuhaber? Tevhir?] nam mahal müĢir-i sabık devletlu Ahmed PaĢa 
hazretlerinin zaman-ı riyaset ve ibtida Gümrü üzerine memuriyetleri hengamında 
ġuregel kazası müdiri Meded Bey baĢında bulunan Karapapağlı ile ve Zilanlı aĢireti 
müdiri Kasım Ağa ve Kaskan (?) aĢireti beyleri Beto (Tebo?) ve Hasan Beyler ve 
Cemedanlı (?) aĢireti müdiri Serhenk (?) Ağa ve buna mümasil kimesneler 
refakatlerinde bulunan aĢair atlusuyla müĢarünileyh hazretleri tarafından tertib ve Subatı 
karyesinden izam ve tesrib olunarak marr ül beyan Tuhir? nam mahal urdurulup emval 
ve eĢya ve mevaĢisi yağma ve garat ettirildiği ve birtakım ademleri dahi esir aldırmıĢ ve 
hatta üsera-i merkumeden kendisine odalık cariyesi olmak üzere bir nefer esir dahi 
müĢarünileyh hazretleri tevkif etmiĢ ise de devletlu Abdi PaĢa hazretleri yedinden 
aldırıp iade ettirmiĢ ve küsur kalan esirler ile emval ü eĢya ve saire dahi zikr olunan 
müdir ve ümera ve ağavat ile baĢlarında bulunan Karapapağ ve aĢair atlusu yedlerinde 
kaldığı iĢidilmiĢ ise de getürdikleri salif ül beyan üsera ile emval ve eĢya ve mevaĢi ve 
zehair ne mikdardır ve alel infirad kimlerin yed ve sahibliğinde kalmıĢtır buraları 
mechul olup fakat zikr olunan esirlerden birkaç neferi anif-üz zikr eĢhas-ı mersule 
yedlerinde olduğu taraf-ı eĢref-i müĢiriden haber alınarak bunların celbi zımnında 
tahrirat-ı samiye-i mahsusaları tastir ve müstakil memurlar dahi tayin ve tesyir buyurul-
muĢdur ve bu maddede asakir-i nizamiye-i cenab-ı Ģahane ve neferat-ı muvazzafadan 
bir zabit ve bir nefer gönderilmeyip yalnız aĢair-i merkume ve müĢarünileyh Ahmed 
PaĢa hazretlerinin inzımam-ı rey ve marifetiyle olduğu gibi birtakım kura-i sairenin dahi 
emval ve eĢya ve mevaĢi ve zahireleri akıb-ı yağma olduğu haber alınmıĢ ise de isim ve 
Ģöhreti ve cinsi mikdarı nedir ve kimlerin zimmetlerinde kalmıĢdır buraları bilinemedi-
ğinden ve aĢair-i merkumenin yağma ve garat etmesi cihetle bunlara dahi müĢarünileyh 
Ahmed PaĢa hazretleri malumatları bulunacağı memul-i kavi idüğünden kendüsinden 
istilam ve istiĢarı lazım geleceği. 
 
Bu dahi 
“Böyle esir alındığı ve köyler urulduğu sahih midir?” denildikte Abdi PaĢa hazretleri 
“Bu yazılan dereceyi bilmem. Mukaddemce dahi beyan eylediğim vechile birkaç 
karıdan ve çoluk çocuktan ibaret olarak alınmıĢ olan çend nefer adem yine iade olundu. 
Ahmed PaĢa odalık aldığının aslı yokdur ve Ģu Tuhaber (?) denilen mahal Rusya 
kıtasında olmak ve ahalisi Kazak taifesinden olup Rusyalunun iki kıta topu ile üç dört 
yüz Kazak atlusu dahi bulunduğu haber alınmak cihetle mukaddemce dahi ifade 
eylediğim vechile oraya biraz baĢıbozuk asker gönderilip urdurulmuĢdu. Lakin küsur-ı 
beyan olunan sekiz on kıta karyeler urulduğu ve zehair alındığını bilmiyorum. Orada 
iken Rusyalunun bazı karyelerini Revan aĢireti yağma ve garat edip bu tarafa geçdiği 
rivayet olunmuĢ idi. Ġhtimal ki bu havadis muahharen bu rengi kabul etmiĢ” demiĢdir.  
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Zabıta müĢiri devletlu Hayreddin PaĢa hazretlerinin Erzurum canibine muvasalatlarında 
tertib olunan komisyonda ibraz eyledikleri bir kıta layihalarında Anadolu orduy-ı 
hümayununun ahvaline dair vaki olan suallerine orduy-ı hümayun-ı mezkur meclisi 
tarafından verilen cevablar üzerine bu tarafda teĢkil buyurulan komisyonda olunan 
suallere taraflarımızdan verilen cevablardır ki yanlarına siyah mürekkeb ile iĢaret 
kılınmıĢ olduğundan iĢbu mahalle dahi temhirlerine ibtidar kılınmıĢdır. 
 
[Seals from left to right] Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, Ahmed Pasha, Ali Rıza Pasha.  
 
Appendix 84. HR. MKT. 96/99, dated 5 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (26 December 1854). 
From Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha to the commanders of the Batum and Anatolian 
armies and the governors of Trabzon, Erzurum and Lazistan on the ban on slave 
trade. 
 
Batum ve Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunları kumandanlarıyla Trabzon ve Erzurum valileri-
ne ve Lazistan mutasarrıfına üsera keyfiyetine dair bazı tenbihat. 
 
Geçen sene Ahısha ve ġekvetil taraflarında vuku bulan muharebelerde re‟s-i hududda 
Gürcistan kurası ahalisinden olup berü taraftan alınmıĢ olan bazı çoluk çocuklar ve 
meĢmul-i cihan olan ma'delet-i celile-i hazret-i padiĢahiye mazhar olmak emeliyle 
kendiliklerinden taraf-ı eĢref-i saltanat-ı seniyeye dehalet eden bir takım genç ademler 
ve çocuklar muahharen her nasılsa esir sıfatına konularak bunların ekseri bazı ümera ve 
zabitan yedlerine geçtiği ve sonraları dahi Ģuna buna satılıp el haleti hazihi bu muamele-
i nabeca ol havalide cari olduğu bu kere bazı ihbarat-ı mevsukadan anlaĢılmıĢtır. Beyan 
ve tekrara hacet olmadığı vechile bu makule insaniyet ve cemiyete muhalif olan 
muamelat-ı merdude'nin tamamen kaldırılması emel olunmakta olduğu halde oralarda 
bu madde-i na-revaya iki baĢtan revac verilerek memurin ve zabitan taraflarından alınıp 
satılmakta olması bil-külliye niyat ve tenbihat-ı devlet-i aliyeye mugayir olduğundan 
baĢka hürriyet-i tabiiye-i beĢeriyeye mugayir olan bu misillu muamelat-ı baridenin 
cereyanı Rusyalu‟ya bilahare bir büyük sermaye imtisar olarak taraf-ı saltanat-ı 
seniyeye mütemayil olan ahaliyi bu sebeple bis-suhule tebrid ve tenfir edeceğinden ve 
bu hususu enzar-ı ecnebiyede dahi pek çirkin görünerek nice muamelat-ı gayr-ı 
layıkanın hudusüne sebeb vereceğinden Ģu harekat-ı na-marziyenin bir an evvel önü 
kestirilmesi pek ziyade ihtimam ve ikdam olunacak mevadd-ı mühimme-i mülkiyeden 
olmasıyla bad-ez-in böyle uygunsuz Ģeylerin vukuuna kat‟a meydan verilmemesi ve 
Ģimdiye kadar oralara gelmiĢ olan bu misillu mülteciyandan her kimin yedinde üsera 
bulunur ise bahaları müteselsilen istirdad ettirilmesi ve devlet-i aliyenin adalet ve 
merhametine sığınmak emeliyle gelmiĢ olan bu kadar biçareganın bu suretle kayd-ı rıkk 
ve esarete (?) giriftar olmaları bütün milletimize ait bir sui Ģayiayı müstelzem olarak 
birkaç kendüyi bilmez ve devlet ve milletinin Ģan ve namusunu gözetmez eĢhas-ı cahile 
içün Ģu mehazir bir vechile ihtiyar olunamayacağından ve zükurdan kabul-i Ġslam 
eyleyenlerden elveriĢli olan ve istek edenlerin silk-i celil-i askeriye idhaliyle henüz 
hitanları icra olunmayıp memleketlerine avdet emelinde bulunanlarının dahi mümkün 
olabilir ise vilayetleri canibine izam olunması ve çocuk ve gayr-ı müdrik bulunanlar ve 
inasdan Ģeref-i Ġslam ile müĢerrefe olanlarının dahi münasip miktar nafaka tahsisiyle 
geçindirilmesi ve kız ve erkek çocukların familyasından aranılanları ve tebdil-i din 
etmeyip de gitmek arzusunda bulunanları olur ise ba‟d-es-sübut teslim olunması ve 
inasın kebireleri dahi tezevvücüne talep zuhurunda icabı icra kılınmak üzere ba marifet-
i Ģer‟-i Ģerif Ģimdilik birer emin mahallere yerleĢtirilmesi ve bu maddede cüzice 
müsamaha bilahare pek büyük mesuliyeti davet edeceğinden ber vech-i meĢruh serian 
icraı icabıyla keyfiyetin bu tarafa beyan ve iĢ‟ar kılınması hususlarına imtina ve himmet 
buyurmaları siyakında mahremane olarak iĢbu Ģukka. 
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Appendix 85. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 9. February 1855. Zarif Mustafa Pasha’s answers 
to questions in the MVL. 
 
1) Orduy-ı hümayun müşirliğine hin-i memuriyet-i devletlerinde mahsusen talimat 
verilmiş midir?  
 
Mahsusen talimat olmayıp eskilerini devr etmiĢler idi ve bazı tahrirat dahi Ģerefvurud 
etmekte idi. Öyle mahsusca talimat verilmediğinden yalnız kavaid-i harbiyeye ittibayla 
Kars‟dan altı saat ilerüye Kars Çayı ile kalenin vasatı olan Subatan mevkiine avangard 
yani talia çıkarılıp sonradan Rusyalu‟ya orada terekküp olundu. 
 
2) Orduy-ı hümayuna vürud-ı devletlerinde merkez kanğı mahal idi? Kuvve-i askeriye 
ve idare-i maliye ve tedarikat-ı mühimmat ve malzeme hususlarında vaz‟-ı mevcudu ne 
suretde buldular ve asakirin taayyüş ve sekenesi ve hastahane tertibatı ne raddelerde 
idi? 
 
Merkez-i ordu bit-tabii Kars olup Hayreddin PaĢa‟nın verdiği jurnale göre her nevi 
asakir-i muntazama olarak mevcud olan on yedi bin neferden on bir bini hasta idi. 
Süvarisinin hemen hayvanatı hiç kalmamıĢ idi. Top ve mühimmat ve levazımatı noksan 
bulunup fakat mevcud olan yetmiĢ topun ikiĢer yüz elliĢer atım cephanesi yokdu. 
Mevcud-ı anbar olan zahire üçyüz kıyye yağdan ve altmıĢ kıyye pirinç ile bin somar 
yani on iki bin kıyl hıntadan ibaret olarak hayvanata iki iki buçuk kıyye yem ve asakire 
dahi kavurma verilmekte olduğundan iĢbu kavurmadan beĢ altı günlük Ģey mevcud idi 
ve erzak gelememesinden dolayı mevcud-ı sanduk olan akçe on üç bin kuruĢdan ibaret 
bulundu. Havanın bürudeti cihetle neferat-ı askeriye ahali hanelerinde ve bazı zıyk 
mahallerde tahammülünden ziyade ikamet ettirildiğinden ve hastahaneler kesb-i taaffün 
eylediğinden ziyade hastalık vuku bulmuĢ idi. 
 
3) Bu keyfiyatın ıslahı zımnında ne tedbire müracaat buyurdular? 
 
Bir Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Muvakkat yapılıp ve nezareti müsteĢar efendiye havale kılınıp 
reisi RaĢid PaĢa ve azası süvari livası ġükrü PaĢa ve ordu mümeyyizi Emin Efendi ve 
ordu kadısı efendi ve kaimmakam tabip bey ve Arabistan ordusundan kaimmakam Emin 
Bey ve Anadolu ordusundan kaimmakam Selim Bey olup katibi dahi Dâr-ı ġûra 
ketebesinden olup müsteĢar efendi maiyetinde olan HurĢid Efendi idi. Ordunun askerce 
ve hayvanca ve her dürlü erzakça [?] olan noksanı ikmal kılındı ta Sivas‟dan bile redif 
askeri getirildi.  
 
4) Kars‟tan ilerüye ilk hareket ne memuriyete ve ne sebeb-i mahsusa mebni vuku buldu 
ve hangi talimata tatbik kılındı ve nereye varıldı ve düşmanın bundan evvel ve sonra 
hareketi ne oldu? 
 
Sekiz tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve iki batarya top talia olarak Subatan‟a gönderildi. 
Rusyalu Arpaçayı‟nı tecavüz ile köyleri tahribe ve karakollar üzerine hücum ile def‟e 
mübaderet eylediğinden avangarda bir kuvve-i zahiriye olmak üzere Vezin köyüne iki 
alay süvari daha götürüldü. Bunun üzerine Rusyalu Kars Çayını geçerek Ġncedere‟ye 
kadar gelip avangardın basılacağı casuslar tarafından haber verilmesiyle erkan-ı harbiye 
meclisi cem olup artık müdafaaya bütün bütün hacet gelerek meclisin kararı üzerine 
mukabele olunmak üzere hareket olundu. Elde baĢka talimat bulunmayıp fakat evrak-ı 
müdevvereden bazılarının netice-i emri Avrupalu zabitanın reyinden istifade ile ana 
göre hareket olunması lüzumunu beyandan ibaret olmağın bir meclis akd olunup karar-ı 
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müzakerat hükmünce çünkü Rusyalu‟nun Ģu tecavüzi hareketine mukabele olunmaz ise 
ta Kars‟a kadar gelecek ve ol halde ahalinin çok zedelenecek ve bilahare tedarik ve 
nakl-i zehair maddesi müĢkilata düĢecek olduğundan ve evamir-i mevcude ise def‟-i 
mazarrat içün olacak hareketi mani olmadığından hareket olunmasında ittifak hasıl oldu. 
Ol vechile Kars‟tan iki fırka olmak üzere hareketle fırka-i evveli Kerim PaĢa maiyetiyle 
Subatan‟a ve fırka-i sanisi kendi maiyetimle Hacı köyüne varılıp kırk sekiz gün orada 
düĢman ile beynimiz iki saat mesafe olmak üzere ikamet olundu.  
 
5) Bu meseleye dair meclis resmi olup müzakere-i adiyeden başka mazbatalu karar 
bulunur mu ve kimlere bildirildi? 
 
Heyet-i meclis erkan-ı harbiye zabitanı namına olarak bizden ve ecnebi takımından 
HurĢid PaĢa maiyetinde ne kadar erkan zabitanı var ise anlardan ibaret idi. Rusyalunun 
yetmiĢ altı topu var iken bizim seksen dört topumuz mevcud olduğu gibi asker 
mikdarınca dahi bizde ziyadelik var idi. Hatta peyderpey gönüllü askeri gelip gavga 
etmek isterler ve efkarı bozacak Ģeyler söylerler idi. Birçok meĢayih ve derviĢan cihad 
ve iğtinam içün baĢımıza toplanıp nizam çadırları arasında bile ne durayoruz gibi 
lakırdılar iĢitmiĢdim. Batum vukuatı dahi oraya aksederek biz de bir Ģey yapmıyacak 
mıyız yollu bazı mekalat tekevvün etti. Hal böyle iken Bayezid‟in bozğunluğu haberi 
gelmekle daha kimesne duymaksızın Sırrı PaĢa ve mevcud olan ferikan ile birleĢilip 
tedabir-i seriası hakkında cereyan eden mütalaatda Bayezid tarafına bir kol asker 
gönderilmesi karar bulup fakat HurĢid PaĢa buraya mümaĢat etmeyip orduyu iki kola 
bölmeyerek belki Rusyalu Bayezid‟den asker celbiyle kuvvetleĢmeye vakit bulmazdan 
hemen müctemi‟ olan askerimizle burada derhal hücum birle düĢman muzmahill 
oldukta artık Bayezid‟e dahi bildiğimiz vechile gitmek icab eder yollu burada gavga 
etmekliği tercih eylediğinden her ne kadar buna bakılmıyarak bir kuvve-i askeriye 
tefrikiyle irsale hazırlanmıĢ ise de asakirin böyle tefrikası halinde Karsca nasıl hareket 
olunmak lazım geleceği bilinmek içün Sırrı PaĢa ve ferikan ve bilcümle erkan-ı harb 
zabitanı takımından ibaret olarak bir meclis yapılıp burası dermiyan olundukta 
ekseriyet-i ara burada bulunan asakirin gösterdiği hahiĢine ve Rusyalunun Bayezid 
kuvvetini buraya getirebilmesi ihtimaline göre burada gavga edilmesi tarafında bulunup 
fakat RaĢid PaĢa bir fenalık olur vahimesine binaen pek mümaĢat etmedi ve baĢka rey 
dahi veremedi. Bunun üzerine tahaffüzi harekete dair Serasker PaĢa hazretlerinin bir 
tahriratı zuhur ile birkaç saat sonra yine meclis birikdirilip ve emirname meydana 
konulup huzzar-ı meclis “Ģu karar tamam meal-i tahrirata muvafıkdır çünkü biz Rusya 
memaliki tarafına gitmeyip anı memalik-i Osmaniye‟den def‟ edeceğiz. Hareket-i 
tahaffüzi ve tedafüi bu demektir. Eğer düĢman Kars çayının öte yakasına olsun def‟ 
olunmaz ise artık ordu Kars‟ta taayyüĢ edemeyip askerimizi beslemekte olan ZaruĢad ve 
ġuregil kazaları elden gider. Hatta Kars çayından öte gidilip düĢman ta serhadde 
Arpaçayı‟nın öte yakasına sürülmelidir” demeleriyle HurĢid PaĢa tasmim-i harekata 
mübaderetle bir tertip yaptı. Verilen karar vechile gece saat beĢde olan mehtabla hareket 
kılındı. Hatta HurĢid PaĢa reis-i erkan olup bana talimat verdiği misillü bilcümle 
ümeraya dahi verip tarafımızdan dahi üzerlerine mucebince hareket olunması iĢar 
kılındı. Tarafımıza verilen talimatın bir kıta sureti dahi buraya takdim kılınmıĢ idi.  
 
6) Harekat-ı vakıa be-tıbk-ı karar ve tasmim ve vakt-i muayyene imtisalen icra kılındı 
mı, olunmadı ise sebebi nedir? 
 
Cümlesi icra kılındı. Fakat ikinci fırka yolların fenalığı misillü bazı mevaniin suubetiyle 
vakt-i muayyenden bir saat kadar tehir etti. Gurub-ı kamerden sonra kalktı. Bu fıkrayı 
HurĢid PaĢa kendisi sevk ederdi ve karanlık diyerek kendüliğinden önü sıra kenar 
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çekdirmiĢ ve aleyhinde bulunanlar bu hareketini tezyif etmiĢler fakat bundan bir fenalık 
olmadı. 
 
7) Muharebeye mübaşeret olunduğu anda icra kılınan usul ne idi? 
 
Kerim PaĢa sağ cenaha kol nizamıyla hareket edip ilerüye giderek mevki-i muayyeni 
zabt ve cenge Ģüru eyledi. Fırka-i saniye dahi sol tarafa müteveccihen izam kılındı. 
Birinci fırkanın ihtiyatı Vanlı Mehmed PaĢa livası ikincisinin mersum Hasan PaĢa livası 
idi. Sağ cenahın sağ yanına tesadüf eden Karadağ‟a dahi biri ĢeĢhaneci olarak beĢ tabur 
piyade ve süvari ve üç bin baĢıbozuk ile Abdurrahman PaĢa anda olan istihkamatı zabt 
eylemek üzere bit-tayin icra-i fiiliyatı [?] görüldü. 
 
8) Bu usul ve nizam ne vakit müzakere ve ittihaz kılındı? 
 
Bunlar yukaruda beyan olunan meclisde vech-i meĢruh üzere karar verildi ve tamamen 
icra kılındı. 
 
9) Muharebenin harekat-ı mutena [?] ve kat‟isi ne oldu? 
 
Esnay-i muharebede birinci fırkanın sağ tarafı biraz zedelenip ihtiyatı uzak düĢerek 
gelememesinden fenalık zuhur etti. Bu periĢanlığı Karadağ‟da olan Abdurrahman PaĢa 
bin adım mesafeden gördüğü halde gelmediğinden eğerçi gelmiĢ ve imdad etmiĢ olsa 
bil-hal tamamı galebe hasıl olacak idi. Bu halde askerin ziyade fenalaĢdığını gördüğü 
anda nakl-i mevki edip biraz toplamak üzere iken Rusyalu bütün bütün sol tarafa verip 
ve bizim tarafdan asker eyü dayanıp ve üç saat gavga mümted olup birinci fırka hal-i 
telaĢla gerü çekilmekte iken artık ikinci fırka dahi asla nizamını bozmayarak avdete 
mecbur olmasıyla yerlü yerimize gerilere gelindi. Asker çadırına girip bir iki saat 
ikamet ettirildi ve baĢıbozuk külliyen Kars‟a firar ettiler. Andan sonra çadırlar 
kaldırılmağa baĢlandı.  
 
10) Bundan sonra kanğı mevki bulunup ne tedbir icra kılındı? 
 
O gün Kars‟a gelindi. Eski mahalline asker yerleĢtirildi. Hasta ve mecruhları Erzurum 
hasta-hanesine gönderildi. Kars kalesine mukaddema yapılmıĢ olan istihkamata üç 
tabya ilave kılındı. Rusyalunun Ģayed gelmek ihtimalini men‟ içün asakir-i mevcude 
talim ve taallüm-leriyle meĢgul oldular. Muharebeye avdet hahiĢi beyn el asakir mevcud 
idi. Nizamiye olarak piyade ve süvari tahminen otuz bin kadar mevcud olmalı idi. 
BaĢıbozuğun cümlesi firar edip muvazzafa dahi izin verilmiĢ idi. Fakat bin beĢ yüz 
kadarı kaldı. Hayvan ve levazımatıyla doksan beĢ top olup hatta neferatın hengam-ı 
muharebede Rusyalu‟dan aldıkları sekiz yüz kadar hayvanatdan yüz elli bargir toplar 
içün mübayaa olunmuĢ idi.  
 
11) Hasılı bu netice-i müteellimenin esbab-ı asliyesi nedir? 
 
Netice-i müteellime nedir? Zannıma göre bu harbden zarar görülmedi ve bais-i Ģan oldu. 
ġu layihamda tafsilen münderic bulunduğu vechile ricat susuzluktan ve asakirin 
imtidad-ı muharebe cihetle takatsizliğinden neĢet edip sair esbab-ı maniadan bir Ģey 
yoğidi. Yedi yüz Ģehid ile bin bu kadar mecruh bulunup avdetinde rediften bin kadarı 
firar etti. Bargirsizlik cihetiyle ve üç topun ağzı çatlamıĢ bulunmağla on beĢ top ve on 
sekiz kapaklu bırağılmıĢ idi. Rusyalunun asıl darb-ı destiyle aldığı dört topdur. 
Mesmuata göre Rusyalu‟nun sekiz bin nefer telefatı olup üçbin bargir naaĢı meydan-ı 
muharebede görüldü. 
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12) Bu suretde talimat-ı seniyye icra olunmuş mudur? Acaba harbce veyahud icray-i 
karar-ı evvelde müsamaha ve bir nevi tereddüd ve tehir zuhur etmiş midir? 
 
Bize mahsus talimat verilmeyip evrak-ı müdevvere var idi. Sonraki emirnamenin 
hükmü dahi tecavüzi hareket etmediğimiz cihetle tamamen icra kılındı. Demincek 
beyan eylediğim cihetle hareket-i lazıme vuku bulacak karara muallak olduğundan 
müzakerat-ı icabiyeye tamamıyla tevfik-i hareket olunup hiçbir Ģeyde kusur olunmadı 
ve ordunun sonraki hali evvelkiden eyüce idi.  
 
13) Orduy-ı hümayunun idaresinde irtikab vaki olmuş bu madde kimlerden ve kanğı 
maddelerde sadır oldu? Bu babda tahkikat-ı devletleri nedir? Emr-i idare kaide-i 
mer‟iye tahtında değil miydi? Usul-i mevzua-i devlet niçün tağyir etti? Kim sebeb oldu? 
Mazarrat nasıl men‟ buyuruldu? Bazıları niçün men‟ buyurulmadı?  
 
Hiçbir maddede bizden böyle Ģey vaki olmadı. Her dürlü tahkikat icra olundu. Umur-ı 
maliye müsteĢarlığa ait olduğu halde mesarifat-ı fevkaladeye bakılmak ve mücerred 
mazbutiyet [?] olmak içün orduy-ı hümayun mahallinden baĢka Erzurum ve Kars‟ta 
yine nezaret-i müsteĢari tahtında birer idare meclis-i muvakkatı teĢkil olunup muamelat-
ı mukteziyenin icrasını mahsus emr-i idarenin perakendelikten sıyaneti zımnında oraya 
havale eyledim.  
 
Asakir Erzurum‟dan ilerüye çekildiğinde Erzurum‟daki meclis-i muvakkat bittabii lağv 
olundu. Artık her iĢe bunlarla müsteĢar efendi baktılar. Hiçbir karıĢıklık olmadı. Men‟ 
olacak bir Ģey olsa müsteĢar efendi bakardı. Ama men‟ edecek bir Ģey olmadı ki ana 
dahi bakılsun. 
 
14) Eşyanın bahası kimlerin muvafakatıyla kat‟ olunurdu? Kim kayd ederdi? Kimin 
işaretiyle sarf ve muvafakatıyla tevzi olunurdu? Cümlesinde ordu müsteşarının reyi 
veyahud *ilmi [?] açık mı idi? 
 
Yukaruda yazılan meclis mübayaa fiyatını kat‟ eder, anbar memurları ile binbaĢı ve 
yüzbaĢılardan ve müsteĢar efendinin ağalarından olurlardı. Onlar eĢyayı kayd edip alay 
emini tarafından usuli üzere getirdikleri iĢaretsiz sened-i mahsusları mucebince verirler 
müteahhiren meclis tarafından vuku bulan istidalar üzerine mazbatası yapılıp yürüdülür 
idi. MüsteĢar efendi bu meclisin reisi gibi olup zat-ı maslahat ise memuriyeti dairesinde 
olduğundan her muamelata vakıf olur idi ve ahirinde alaylarla hesap görülüp 
mahsubunu icra ederdi. Bir de bu meclisin mübayaatı yağ ve pirinçten ibaret olup sair 
Ģeyleri sancak meclisleri tertib ve fiyatını kat‟ edip mazbatasıyla beraber canib-i orduya 
irsal ederler. Bu meclisin malumatı olmaksızın münferiden ve mahsusen kimesne bir 
Ģey mübayaa edemezdi ve mübayaat hususunda bizim ordumuzun iĢleri pek yolunda idi. 
 
15) Kozma kimdir ve nasıl ademdir? Etmekçilikten maada kasaplığa dahi karışması 
neden icab eyledi? Bunun istihdam kılınması babında emir yok muydu? Daha 
mübayaatda münferiden kimler kullanıldı? Meclise emir verilmez miydi? 
 
Demincek beyan eylediğim gibi levazımat mübayaa olunur idi. Bu Kozma etmekçi olup 
her eĢya memuriyetine teslim olunduğu misillü zahire dahi ona teslim kılınırdı. Ġbtida 
orduy-ı hümayuna vürudumda rivayet olunan uygunsuzluğunun bazı eseri görülmekle 
darb ve tedip olunmuĢ idi. Pek güzel hizmet etmeğe baĢladı. Kasaplığa sonra giriĢmiĢ 
olduğundan buna malumatım yoktur. Bunun tardı babında bana hitaben bir emir 
gelmeyip müsteĢar efendiye gelmiĢ ise anı bilmem. Döğdürdüğüm vakit ihrac etmek 
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üzere Erzurum‟dan etmekçiler celb ettim. Bunun yaptığı gibi anlar yapamayıp hayli Ģey 
ziyade istedikleri cihetle herif zengin imiĢ çaresiz meclis azası ittifakla ba mazbata ona 
ısmarlandı. Sairlerinin Kozma gibi etmek verememesi eser-i sahabet olmayıp 
kendüsinin külliyetlü sermayesi ve çok vakitden berü oralarda asakir-i Ģahane 
etmekçiliği iĢinde bulunup müteaddid furunları ve birçok iĢgüzar ademleri 
bulunmasından icab ediyor. Kozma hakkında tashilat ve sairleri içün tasibat irae 
etmedim. Çünkü  bunlar umur-ı müsteĢariye aid Ģeyler olduğundan andan sorulmak 
lazım gelir. Bu babda tarafımıza bir Ģey azv eyler ise bihakkın redd eyler ve bil-
muvacehe dahi söylerim. Artık ne derlerse desinler ben hak teala hazretlerine havale 
edip Ģimdi cibilliyetimi icra ederim. Kimesne hakkında bir Ģey demem. 
 
16) Memur bildiğini söylemek ikdam-ı faraizdendir. Şimdi kimesneye bir şey azv 
olunmayıp yalnız zat-ı devletlerinden eyü fena ne oldu ise sual kılınur. Bunda bais-i 
teessür bir şey yokdur ve elbette herkes bildiğini söyler. Muvakkat meclis orada 
kimlerden ibaret idi? Kars‟ta ne vakit teşkil kılındı? Daha eskiden var mıydı? Azası 
tebdil olundu mu? 
 
Ben Ģimdi bir Ģey bilemem. Davacı var ise çıksın ol vakit söylerim. Ben canen ve malen 
fedakarlıkla hizmet ettim. Saye-i Ģahanede istihkamat içün iĢlettiğim neferata yüz bin 
kuruĢu mütecaviz bahĢiĢ verdiğim ve bir an ve dakika ikdamı bırakmadığım bütün 
ordunun müsellemidir. Hatta ümeradan buraya gelmiĢ olanlar taht-ı kumandamda 
bulunup tehdidimi görmüĢ ademler olmasıyla anlar ve Avrupa zabitanından kezalik 
burada bulunanlar dahi bunu böyle söyleyecekleri derkar olmağla sorulsun. Meclis 
Kars‟ta Reis RaĢid PaĢa azası ordu kadısı ve maiyet-i [?] müsteĢaride olan Mümeyyiz 
Emin Efendi ve ġükrü PaĢa ve Kaimmakam Tabib Bey ve Kaimmakam Emin Bey ve 
Kaimmakam Selim Bey‟den ibaret olup Erzurum‟daki miralayı Selim Bey ile birkaç 
binbaĢıdan mürekkep olmak üzere teĢkil olunup Erzurum‟dan Kars‟a asker gelmedikten 
sonra bit-tabii lağv ile idarenin iĢine asıl ordunun meclisi nezaret ederdi. Kars‟a 
vürudumda teĢkil olunup ibtida reisi ġükrü PaĢa iken RaĢid PaĢa sonradan gelmekle reis 
tayin kılındı. Bunun tertibinden murad çünkü Erzurum valiliğinde ve Abdi PaĢa‟nın 
müĢirliğinde beĢ bin somar zahire tertib olunup tedarik ve irsali bana havale olundukta 
eğerçi bunun cüziyattan olduğu beyanıyla ziyade alınmasını ihtar etmiĢ isem de kabul 
olunmadığından ve sair levazımat dahi buna mikyas olduğunu bildiğimden zaruret ve 
müzayaka çekmemeleri içün her Ģeyin böyle ve vaktiyle tedarik ve celb olunması 
maksadına mebnidir. Bunlardan sonra asakire ne suretle *imla?* et ve etmek ve sair 
mekulat verildiği mahallinden istilam buyurulsa anlaĢılur. Azanın tebdili maddesi 
sebeb-i tahtında olmayıp umur-ı tabiiyeden idi. Mesela bir alay memuriyetle gider ise 
miralayı dahi gidip yerine meclis azalığına bir diğeri tayin kılınırdı. 
 
17) Raşid Paşa ve Şükrü Paşa haklarında ihtarat ve şikayat vaki oldukta taraf-ı 
devletlerinden araştırıldı mı? 
 
Hiç öyle ihtarat vuku  bulmadı. Cümlesi eylediğim tahkikata göre iĢlerinde gayret 
ederlerdi. Ben dahi arar idim.  
 
18) Et ve etmek tayinatı ne suretle ve ne miktar olarak idare olunmuştur? Müteahhidleri 
etmeği ve eti numunesine muvafık olarak veremediklerinin sebebi nedir? Yem keyfiyeti 
ne halde idi? Ne miktar kestiriliyordu? Çoğalıp artmadı mı? 
 
Ordunun tayinatı meclis-i muvakkat muvafakatıyla bil-mübayaa verilip avangard dahi 
olduğu yerlerde alayı canibinde idare olunurdu. Asakire tam tayın verilip pirinç az 
bulunduğundan pilav her hafta kamilen verilemez ise de çorbaları adeti vechile yolunda 
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veriliyordu. Et ve etmek konturato olunmuĢ idi. Bunları müteahhidleri numunesine 
muvafık olarak vermedikleri anda darb olunurlardı. Amma pek ala verdiler arpa ve 
saman usulü vechile anbarlardan tam veriliyor ve kestiriliyordu. Fakat çayır [?] vakitde 
arpa az bulunursa binek hayvanatına birer kıyye verilip yine top bargirlerine dair [?] tam 
veriliyordu. 
 
19) Asakir-i muvazzafanın maaşları ne suretle veriliyordu? Yoklama ve sergi defter-
lerini kimler tutardı? Kanğılarına rütbe verildi? Mekkari hayvanatı kullanıldı mı? Ne 
kadarı içün konturato yapıldı? Ne suretle yapıldı ve kimlerle pazarlık olundu? Ücretleri 
nasıl kat‟ ve tediye kılındı? Nerelerden bulduruluyordu? O [?] ordunun esteri ne 
mikdar var idi? 
 
MüsteĢar efendi tarafından sergerdelerine verilür, bu madde hem müsteĢar efendinin ve 
hem de meclisin nezareti tahtında olup ayda bir kere onlar tarafından ve bazen dahi 
meclisden birini tayin ederek ordu canibinden yoklamaları icra olunur idi. BaĢıbozuk 
takımının iki reislerinden biri Hacı Temur Ağa olup zararsız adem olmağla ve hayli iĢte 
bulunmağla ona kapucıbaĢılık rütbesi verdiğim misillü Latif PaĢa‟nın oğluyla vücuhdan 
baĢka birine hocalık ruusları verildi. Küsur kalan ruuslar devir kılındı. Diğeri Hasan 
Yazıcı olarak zaten fena bir adem olduğundan baĢka vukua getirdiği uygunsuzluklar 
üzerine mevcud maiyetim diyerek neferat içün istediği maaĢların itasını Hayreddin PaĢa 
hükm ettiği halde müteahhiren Ģu istenilen akçeden ba‟del muharebe Sırrı PaĢa‟nın 
konağında heyet-i meclis hazır olduğu halde iki bin kesesini tenzil ettim. Bunlar 
müsteĢar efendinin iĢi iken ben tesviye eyledim. Doğrusu herkesin iĢini ben arar ve 
sorardım. MüsteĢarın da meĢgalesiyle ben uğraĢdım. Mukaddema elliĢer kuruĢ yevmiye 
ücret kat‟iyle iki bin beĢ yüz kadar hayvanat istikra olunduğundan onlar ol vechile 
kullanılıyordu ve ziyade iktiza eder ise meclisce kazalardan buldurulup eshabı isimleri 
defterine kayd ile ücretleri vuku bulan istidaları üzerine yine elliĢer kuruĢ yevmiye 
hesabıyla taraf-ı müsteĢariden veriliyordu. Eshab-ı hayvanat haklarını almamıĢ ve 
alamamıĢ olsalar elbette sızlanacaklarından böyle bir iĢtika vukuunu bilmiyorum. 
Piyadenin saka bargirlerinden baĢka süvari ve topçunun katırları var idi. ĠĢe yaramazdı. 
Orduya mahsus olan evrak-ı nakdiyeyi akçe ile tebdil edip baĢ almak gibi Ģeyler vuku 
bulduğu iĢidilmiĢ ise de kimler yaptığını bilmezlenürüm. Hakkımda azv olunan irtikabat 
maddesi mahallinde ferikandan ta neferine kadar memur irsaliyle tahkik olunup eğerçi 
bir Ģey tebeyyün ettirilebilir ise hane ve eĢyamı satarak zâmin olacağımdan baĢka her 
dürlü cezaya dahi razıyım. Bu azviyata sebeb olanları cenab-ı hakka havale ederim. Zira 
tahammülüm kalmadı. 
 
20) Hayvan kirası veyahud sair hesaplar içün akçe isteyenler haklarını tamam alur 
mıydı? Böyle şeyler taraf-ı devletlerinden tahkik olundu mu? Bu babda karışıklık olmaz 
mı idi? Kabahat kimde idi? Maliyece kimlerin taksiri bulundu ve davacı olacaklar 
kimdir? 
 
Akçeleri verilememesinden dolayı bazıları Ģikayet edip müsteĢarlık iĢi olarak esas-ı 
madde mechulüm olduğundan ve sebeb olanların tahkik ve ta‟zirine dair bir emir 
bulunmadığından sükun eder idim. Buraları ordudan istilam buyurulmak lazım gelür. 
Zabitan ve neferat-ı askeriyeden kabahatlu bulunmayıp mülkiye memurlarından Kars 
kaimmakamı Latif PaĢa‟nın azlinde ise medhalim yokdur. Maliye iĢine karıĢmazdım, 
bilmem. MüsteĢar efendi ve mevcud maiyeti iĢlerinde kat‟a takayyüd ve ihtimam 
etmemeleriyle umur-ı maliye müĢevveĢ ve muattal olup hatta orduya gelen akçeyi 
eshab-ı matlubeden ibtida kim gelür ise o alıp sonra gelenler tehice avdet ederler bu 
cihetle ihtiyat içün hiçbir akçe bulunmazdı. Sonraları tarafımdan iĢaret olunmadıkça 
verilmemesini tenbih ile tesir ettirdiğimden biraz akçe teraküm ederlerdi. 
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21) Bu idare hususunda hatırgüzar-ı devletleri nedir? Islahı neye mütevakkıf idi? 
 
Ordunun meclisi ve umur-ı maliyenin memurları olduğundan bu babda bir diyecek 
bulamam. Ġnfisal ile buraya avdetimde ordunun üç aylık zahiresi mevcud idi. Orduy-ı 
hümayun tarafına vürud ile ta infisal-i acizaneme kadar olan harekat-ı askeriyeyi ve bis-
sual söylediğim Ģeyleri tafsilen Ģu kağıda yazdığımdan kıraat ve mütalaa olunur ise 
malumat-ı zaide alınmıĢ olur. 
 
Appendix 86. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 9, 3 February 1855. From Stratford de Redcliffe 
on the Turkish Contingent. 
 
The present memorandum is intended to declare that the British Government, in leaving 
to the Turkish Authorities the appointment of Subaltern Officers in the Body of Troops 
to be taken into its Service according to the Convention signed today, reserves only the 
nomination among them of a few British drill Serjeants, and that in case of difficulty or 
delay in making up the complete number of privates agreed upon by the terms of the 
Convention, the British Commanding Officer shall be at liberty to recruit, and make up 
the deficiency from among the subjects of the Sublime Porte indiscriminately without 
reference to their being already either Regulars or Rediffs. 
February 3
rd
, 1855. 
[signed] Stratford de Redcliffe    
 
Appendix 87. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 10, 3 February 1855. Ottoman Irregular 
Cavalry. Pera of Constantinople. February 3
rd
, 1855.  
 
 The means of raising within the Sultan's dominions a separate Corps of four 
thousand Ottoman Irregular  Cavalry [başıbozuk süvari askeri], to be paid by the British 
Government and commanded principally by British officers having been determined in 
pursuance of a proposal emanating from the British Government and accepted by the 
Sublime Porte the undersigned requests that proper steps may be taken and the 
necessary orders issued to the Provincial Authorities for giving every facility and 
assistance to the officers and agents charged with superintending the enrolment of the 
troops in question and directing them with suitable appliances to the several places of 
rendezvous.  
 The success of this important experiment depends so much upon the manner and 
spirit in which it is begun that the undersigned in addressing Aali Pasha on the subject 
cannot too strongly impress His Highness with the necessity of having the Vizirial 
letters, which he solicits, drawn up in the clearest and most stringent terms. It is, in 
particular, desirable that the men to be enrolled should know from the outset that in 
point of military service, pay, and rations they are to stand in direct connection with 
British officers and the Queen's Government. It is also essential that strict precautions 
should be taken to secure the peaceable inhabitants from any acts of plunder or violence 
in which the volunteers, if left entirely to themselves, might be tempted to indulge, 
while passing from their respective homes to the place of their destination.  
 The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Ottoman Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs the assurances of his high consideration. 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe. [Words in brackets from the official translation] 
 
Appendix 88. HR. TO. 221/6, dated 6 February 1855. Extract. Erzurum. Slave 
trade.  
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 The buying and selling of slaves by the officers of the Kars army is as notorious 
as any other malpractices on their part. Boys [“oğlan köle”] are preferred by these 
brutes, and the girls [“cariye”] are sent as bribes to Constantinople; and until the allied 
consuls are authorized to demand the restitution of these victims to Turkish Sensuality 
[“bu biçare köle ve cariyeleri Osmanlunun sui hırsından kurtarmak”], and are provided 
with funds to send them back to their families in Georgia; and until the Porte is bound 
by treaty to send the culprits so detected to the galleys for a certain specified time, this 
infamous traffic will flourish, and all which has been said or may be written about 
abolitionary firmans simply adds mockery to crime and woe.  [Words in brackets from 
the official translation] 
 
Appendix 89. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 4. Clarendon to Stratford on slave trade, not 
dated, translated on 26 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (16 March 1855). 
 
 The Turkish authorities in the Porte of the Black Sea have shewn no willingness 
to give effect to the Sultans's Firman prohibiting the traffic in Circassian and Georgian 
slaves; and that when two boats laden with Circassian slaves arrived at Trebizond about 
the 26 of December last, the Pasha's excuse for not detaining them was that he could not 
define whether they were slaves or not.  
 I have to instruct Your Excellency to communicate the enclosed extract to the 
Ottoman Govt and to request that clear and stringent Instructions may be sent to the 
proper autorities in the Ports of the Black Sea, pointing out to them that there can be no 
difficulty in ascertaining whether or ot the Circassians and Georgians brought to those 
ports are intended for sale; and that the Pashas must be held strictly responsible for the 
punctual execution of the Sultan's order declaring that this traffic is to cease.  
 
Appendix 90. HR. TO. 221/13 lef 2. Copy. Extract of a dispatch from Lord John 
Hay to Sir Edmund Lyons inclosed in a letter from Admiralty dated January 29
th
 
1855. 
 
Tribune at Karatch 
January 8
th
 1855 
 
 On the 28 December 1854 I visited the Mushir at Choorooksou: having expressed 
my surprise  that the Pacha at Soukoumkale had not received orders relative to the 
suppression of the Slave Trade the Mushir informed me that he was most anxious to 
give effect to the Sultan's Firman, but although he had received the Firman 6 weeks 
previously, no opportunity had as yet presented itself of communicating with 
Soukoumkale. Indeed the country boats passing were liable to capture by the enemy's 
gun boats out of the rivers at Poti and Anakria, and the only steamer at his disposal was 
merely sufficient to bring provisions from Trebisonde for the use of the army. 
Proceeded to and arrived at Trebisonde on 29
th
 Dec. 1854. The Pacha was absent when I 
visited him. I however learnt from Mr. Stevens, Vice Consul, that Two Boats laden with 
Circassian slaves had arrived at this Port a few days previous. The Pacha did not clearly 
see how he could give effect to the Firman of the Sultan not knowing how to define 
whether the people were slaves or not.  
 I recommended that Mr Stevens' advice should be acted on and that the Boats and 
people should be detained on suspicion.  
 Alltogether I think there does not appear to exist among the Turkish officials any 
excessive anxiety  to put a stop to the Circassian and Georgian Slave Trade. 
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Appendix 91. HR. SYS. 81/2, dated 15 February 1855. From British consulate in 
Diyarbekir to British embassy on Yezdanşer.  
 
İngiltere sefaretine bin sekiz yüz elli beş senesi Şubat‟ının on beşi tarihiyle Diyarbekir 
canibinden varid olan tahriratın suret-i tercümesidir. 
 
Ġzzeddin ġir Bey muahharen Midye kazasını basıp yağma ve külliyen harap etmiĢtir. 
Abdullah Bey namında birinin kumandasıyla yalnız baĢıbozuktan ibaret olan bir miktar 
asakir pek cüzi bir mukavemet [2] etmiĢ ise de bunların bir miktarı Mardin‟e avdet 
ederek Abdullah Bey dahi bakiye-i neferatıyla Mardin ile Midye beyninde kâin olup 
kendü maskat-ı re‟si olan Sur karyesine çekilmiĢ ve esna-yı [3] rahda rast geldiği kurayı 
kâmilen nehb ve garet eylemiĢtir. Mir-i merkum muahharen istifa etmekle Mardin 
kaimmakamı Osman PaĢa dahi bunun harekât-ı vakıasından kat‟a sual etmeksizin vaki 
olan [4] istifasını kabul etmiĢtir. Mardin civarında bulunan kâffe-i kura ahalisi kendü 
nefslerini tahlis zımnında Mardin‟e iltica etmiĢtir. Tahminen üç bin nefer-i nizam ile 
dört bin nefer-i baĢıbozuk asakiri [5] Bağdad‟dan Musul‟a çıkarılıp rivayet olunduğuna 
göre Cizre‟ye doğru azimet etmektedir. ĠĢbu hareket-i askeriye Ġzzeddin ġir Bey 
Midye‟den Cizre‟ye doğru çekilmesini davet ile Mardin üzerine [6] hücum etmesini 
men‟ etmiĢtir. Geçen iki mah zarfında pek çok rahmet yağdığı cihetle yollardan mürur 
ve ubur mümteni olmuĢ olduğundan Halep‟ten çıkan asakir henüz vürud etmemiĢtir. 
Sivas ve Erzurum‟dan [7] gönderilecek asakire dair hiçbir Ģey iĢitilmemektedir. 
Rivayet-i vakıaya nazaran Ġzzeddin ġir Bey Mardin semtlerinde bulunan Araplara zi-
kıymet hediyeler irsal ettiği cihetle bunlar ile pek eyü [8] dost olmuĢ ve muzafferiyet-i 
vakıası kendüsüne kemal-i cesaret vermiĢ olduğundan zan olunduğuna göre merkum 
Ģimdiki halde Cizre‟ye doğru sevk olunan asakir-i Ģahaneyi dağıtmağa muktedir olduğu 
[9] takdirde Musul canibini hücum ile yağma etmek üzere Araplar kendisiyle 
birleĢecektir. ĠĢbu Kürd isyanından tertip eden fakr ü harabiyet günden güne tezaid 
etmekte ve bu tarafların bu vechile [10] asakir-i muntazamadan hali bırakıldığından 
dolayı derkar olan gaflet kemal-i esef ve keder ile zahire çıkmaktadır. Asakir-i 
nizamiyenin birkaç yüz neferini cem‟ etmekte derkar olan müĢkülat [11] ve te‟hirat 
Midye‟de eĢkıya takımına derece-i gayede muceb cüret ve cesaret olmuĢ ve bu 
maddenin zuhurundan beri takriben üç mah mürur etmiĢ iken Diyarbekir‟e henüz bir 
nefer asker yetiĢtirilmemiĢtir.  
 
Appendix 92. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 34. Raglan to Redcliffe, 20 February 1855. 
Before Sevastopol. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 I have the honor to lay before Your Excellency the copy of a dispatch which I 
have today  addressed to the Duke of Newcastle and I request Your Lordship will be so 
good as to communicate it to the Imperial Exc. and to offer them my warmest 
congratulations on the successful resistance of the Ottoman Army to the powerful attack 
which was made upon Eupatoria on the morning of the 17 instant. 
 I have, etc. 
 Raglan 
 
Appendix 93. HR. SYS. 1190/32 lef 35. From Lord Raglan to His Grace the Duke 
of Newcastle on the battle of Eupatoria. [copy]. Before Sevastopol. Feb. 20. 1855 
 
 My Lord Duke, 
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 Your Grace will have learnt by my telegraphic dispatch of the 18
th
 inst. that the 
Enemy had on the previous morning at daylight attacked Eupatoria with a very large 
force, and a powerful body of Artillery, and had been repulsed after an engagement 
which terminated with their retirement at 10. a.m. 
 I have now the honor to lay before Your Grace copies of two letters which I have 
received from Colonel Simmons, who is attached to the Headquarters of Omer Pasha, 
containing the details of the action, and whilst Your Grace will rejoice to see that the 
Turkish Troops which have been landed at Eupatoria have availed themselves of the 
earliest opportunity to shew that the character they acquired on the Danube was well 
merited, and remained unimpaired, you will join in the regret which I feel that they have 
suffered so considerable a loss, and that among the killed is numbered the General of 
Division Selim Pasha [an Egyptian], and among the wounded a General of Brigade, also 
an Egyptian. This loss however, and particularly that sustained by a Battery of Artillery, 
afford ample proof of the gallant and determined conduct of the Troops, and of the 
serious nature of the attack which was made upon them, as well as of their being worthy 
of their illustrious chief. 
 I have great satisfaction in drawing Your Grace's attention to that part of Lt. 
Colonel Simmons' dispatch in which he bears testimony to the efficient assistance 
rendered to the Ottoman Army by Her Majesty's Ships in the Bay under the command 
of the Hon. Captain Hastings of the Curaçoa. 
 I have, etc. 
 [Signed] Raglan 
 
Appendix 94. İ. MMS. 4/135 lef 75, dated 21 February 1855. Report of the grand 
vizier on Yezdanşer.  
 
Atufetlu efendim hazretleri  
 
Kürdistan‟da izhar-ı bağy ü isyan eden Ġzzeddin ġir Bey‟in nezdine Anadolu orduy-ı 
hümayunu tarafından gönderilmiĢ olan kaimmakam Salih Zeki Bey‟in avdetiyle takrir 
ve ifadesinden mir-i merkumun [2] istifham olunan niyat-ı müfside-i gayatını ve gaile-i 
muzırrasının indifaı saye-i Ģevketvaye-i hazret-i Ģahanede birkaç tabur asakir-i nizamiye 
ile hasıl olacağından mahall-i malumeden gelmekte bulunan [3] ve talep ve tertip 
kılınan asakir-i nizamiye ve muvazzafa ile üzerine varılarak ba avn-i Hak tenkil ve 
istisaline bakılacağı ifadesini ve tebliğat-ı saireyi mutazammın Kürdistan ve Musul 
taraflarından bu defa [4] dahi alınan tahrirat ve Kürdistan valisi devletlu Ġzzet PaĢa 
hazretlerinin bu maddeye müteallik terkim ve ita eylediği on dört bend bir kıta layiha 
geçen PencĢenbe günü akd olunan Meclis-i Mahsus‟da [5] led-el kıraat tahrirat-ı 
mezkure meallerinden müstefad olduğu vechile merkumun revĢ ü hareketi müfsidane ve 
akavil ve iĢaratı dahi hilekarane Ģeyler olmasıyla ve güya arz-ı dehalet ve itaat [6] içün 
teminat talebinde bulunması dahi mücerred vakit kazanmak da‟yesinden ibaret 
bulunmasıyla bunlara bakılarak tedabir-i lazımenin gevĢetilmesi caiz olmayacağından 
ve müĢarünileyh Ġzzet PaĢa [7] hazretlerinin layihasında münderic olan mevadd Ģu 
gailenin indifaı ve bunu zuhura getirdiği istima‟ olunan sebeplerin ıslahı hakkında 
lazımlı Ģeyler olduğundan iktizaları [8] led-el mülahaza eğerçi tahrirat-ı merkumenin 
birinde beyan olunduğu üzere mir-i merkum birtakım haĢarat ile Garzan kazasına 
gelerek harekat-ı tecavüziyeye cesaret eylemesine mebni [9] mukabele-i bil-mislin 
icrasıyla münhezim olduğu misillu merkumun Midyat koluna sevk eylediği iki binden 
mütecaviz eĢkıya-yı ekradın dahi saye-i satvet-vaye-i cenab-ı cihanbanide orada [10] 
bulunan kuvve-i askeriye tarafından üzerlerine hücum ile yüzden ziyadesi cerh u itlaf 
olunarak eĢkıyadan malum-ül esami rüesa ile iki yüz kırk bu kadar nefer dahi [11] 
hayyen ahz olunmuĢ ve bunların da küsuru münhezim ve periĢan olarak sairlerine 
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vahĢet-ariz olduğu halde mir-i merkum bakaya-i eĢkıya ile Cizre nehrini geçip firar 
eylemiĢ ise de [12] bununla maslahata bitmiĢ nazarıyla bakılamaya-cağından def‟-i 
gaileye kafi kuvvet içtimaıyla merkumun bütün bütün kahr u tenkiline bakılması feraiz-i 
mülkiyeden görünerek bu madde içün [13] geçende bil-müzakere hakpay-ı aliden 
istizan olunduğu vechile bu taraftan ve Halep ve Sivas‟tan üç tabur piyade ve 
mükemmel bir alay süvari asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane tertip ve kezalik [14] piyade ve 
süvari olarak üç bin nefer kadar asakir-i muvazzafa tedarikiyçün dahi vali-i 
müĢarünileyhe mezuniyet ita olunup bu miktar asker eĢkıya-i merkumenin tedmir ve 
istisaline [15] kafi görünebileceği mülahaza kılınmıĢ ve maslahatça hüsn-i tesiri muceb 
olmak üzere Bağdad tarafından dahi bir miktar asakir-i nizamiyenin tehiyesiyle tedib-i 
eĢkıya içün gönderileceğinin [16] neĢr ü ilanıyla iktifa olunmuĢ iken Ģimdi ol taraftan 
bir alay süvari ve üç tabur piyade asakir-i nizamiye-i Ģahane dahi sevk ve izam kılındığı 
ve mahallince de sair sunuf-ı asakir [17] tedarik ve cem‟ edilmekte bulunduğu mezaya-i 
iĢ‟ardan anlaĢıldığından bu kuvve-i müctemia mahallince istenilen kuvve-i nizamiyenin 
iki katı demek olduğuna ve evvelki karar mucebince [18] bu taraftan gidecek iki tabur 
piyade asakir-i nizamiye dahi müheyya olunup heman ihraç ve izam kılınmak üzere 
bulunduğuna binaen bu maslahat içün yeniden asker tertibine hacet görünmemesiyle 
[19] tahrirat-ı merkumeye icabı vechile cevabnameler yazılması ve zikr olunan layihada 
münderic mevad üzerine cereyan eden müzakerat dahi bendleri balalarına surhla iĢaret 
kılınmıĢ [20] olduğundan ana göre icray-ı iktizalarına bakılması tensip olunmuĢ ise de 
ol babda her ne vechile irade-i isabet-ade-i hazret-i mülkdari-i keramet-efzay-ı suver 
buyurulur ise mantuk-ı münifi [21] icra kılınacağı ve evrak-ı mezbure manzur-ı Ģevket-
mevfur-ı cenab-ı padiĢahi buyurulmak içün arz ve takdim olunduğu beyanıyla tezkire-i 
senaveri terkim kılındı efendim. (mim) 
Fi 2 C 71 
[Sultan‟s aproval on 3 C 71] 
 
Appendix 95. HR. SYS. 1336/40, dated 13 Cemaziyelahir 1271 (3 March 1855). 
Mustafa Pasha, the commander of Batum army on Georgian slaves.  
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Geçen sene Ahısha ve ġekvetil taraflarında vuku bulan muharebelerde re's-i hududda 
bulunan Gürcistan kurası ahalisinden olup berü tarafdan alınmıĢ olan [2] bazı çoluk 
çocuklar ve meĢmul-i cihan olan ma'delet-i celile-i hazret-i padiĢahiye mazhar olmak 
emeliyle kendiliklerinden taraf-ı eĢref-i saltanat-ı [3] seniyeye dehalet eden birtakım 
genç ademler muahharen her nasılsa esir sıfatına konularak bunların ekseri bazı ümera 
ve zabitan yedlerine [4] geçtiği ve sonraları dahi Ģuna buna satılıp el haleti hazihi bu 
muamele-i nabeca cari olduğu bu kere bazı ihbarat-ı mevsukadan [5] anlaĢılmıĢ ve Ģu 
harekat-ı namarziyenin bir an evvel önü kestirilmesi pek ziyade ihtimam ve ikdam 
olunacak mevadd-ı mühimme-i mülkiyeden bulunmuĢ olduğu [6] beyan-ı alisiyle ba'd 
ez in böyle uygunsuz Ģeylerin vukuuna kat'a meydan verilmemesi ve Ģimdiye kadar 
buralara gelmiĢ olan o misillu mülteciyandan [7] her kimin yedinde üsera bulunur ise 
bahaları müteselsilen istirdad ettirilmesi ve zükurundan kabul-i Ġslam eyleyenlerden 
elveriĢli olan [8] ve istek edenlerinin silk-i celil-i askeriye idhaliyle henüz hitanları icra 
olunmayıp memleketlerine avdet emelinde bulunanlarının mümkün [9] olabilir ise 
vilayetleri canibine izam olunması ve çocuk ve gayr-ı müdrik bulunanlar ve inasdan 
Ģeref-i Ġslam ile müĢerrefe olanlarının dahi [10] münasip miktar nafaka tahsisiyle 
geçindirilmesi ve kız ve erkek çocukların familyasından ayrılanları ve tebdil-i din 
etmeyip de gitmek [11] arzusunda bulunanları olur ise ba‟d-es-sübut teslim olunması ve 
inasın kebireleri dahi tezevvücüne talep zuhurunda icabı icra kılınmak üzere [12] ba 
marifet-i Ģer‟-i Ģerif Ģimdilik birer emin mahallere yerleĢtirilmesi ve bu maddede cüzice 
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müsamaha bilahare pek büyük mesuliyeti [13] davet edeceğinden ber vech-i meĢruh 
serian icraı icabıyla keyfiyetin beyan ve iĢ‟ar kılınması talimat ve iradat-ı dekayık-ayat-ı 
celilesini Ģamil [14] fi 6 R 71 tarihiyle müverrehan mahremane olarak reside-i dest-i 
tazim ve tefhim olan fermanname-i sami-i vekaletpenahileri ahkam-ı celilesi sarf-ı harf 
be harf-ı [15] müdrike-ârâ-i çakeri olmuĢtur. Bu tarafa hin-i muvasalat-ı bendeganem-
den berü kendiliklerinden zükur olarak Ģeref-i Ġslam ile müĢerref [16] olmak emeliyle 
birer ikiĢer sekiz nefer Gürcü gelerek bit-tevfik bunlar haklarında ne vechile muamele 
olunmak lazım geleceği istizanına dair [17] fi 27 Ra 71 tarihinde makam-ı Vâlâ-yı 
hazret-i seraskeriye bir kıta ariza-i bendeganem takdim ve irsal olunmuĢ ve fi 7 C 71 
tarihiyle [18] müverrahan takdim hakpay-i ali-i vekaletpenahileri kılınan ariza-i 
bendeganem muhatilm-i ali-i sadaretpenahileri buyurulacağı vechile [19] bu madde-i 
mühimmece ikdamat ve takidat-ı kamilenin icrasında kat'a tecviz-i kusur ve tesamüh 
olunmayarak ve bazı kimesne yedinde [20] gizlü Gürcü çocukları olduğu bit-tahkik 
meydana çıkarılarak meyamin-i tevcihat-ı celile-i vekaletpenahileriyle buralarca önü 
kestirilmiĢ olduğundan [21] Ģimdiye değin gerek kendiliklerinden gelen ve gerek Ģunun 
yedinde sıfat-ı esarette kalıp buldurulabilenler [22] bil-istintak haklarında tıbk-ı talimat-
ı aliye-i vekaletpenahileri ahkam-ı celilesi üzere muamele olunarak keyfiyetleri arz ve 
inha [23] olunacağı ve bundan böyle dahi an be an takayyüd ve taharri olunmakta 
olduğundan ele geçdikçe icabı icra kılınarak hakpay-ı sami-i sadaretpenahilerine [24] 
bildirileceği muhat-ilm-i alem-ârâ-i vekaletpenahileri buyruldukta ol babda ve her halde 
emr ü ferman veliyyül emrindir. Fi 13 C 71. An Çürüksu. 
Bende  
MüĢir kumandan-ı orduy-i hümayun-ı Batum  
[Sealed] Mustafa 
 
Appendix 96. İ. MMS. 5/170 lef 2, dated 23 Receb 1271 / 11 April 1855. Mazbata of 
the Meclis-i Vâlâ on the trial of Zarif Pasha and Hurşid Pasha.  
 
[1] Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu müĢiri devletlu Zarif Mustafa PaĢa hazretlerinin ber 
muceb-i emr ü ferman-ı ali icray-ı istintakıyçün bab-ı vâlâ-i hazret-i seraskeride [2] 
münakıd olan komisyonun hulasa-i tahkikatını mutazammın sual ve cevab suretinde 
yazmıĢ olduğu müzekkeresiyle mazbata-i mahsusa ve ol babda bazı ifadatı [3] havi 
müĢarünileyh tarafından verilen bir kıta varaka-i mufassala Meclis-i Vâlâ‟ya havale 
buyurulmuĢ ve meallerine göre müĢarünileyhin emr-i istintakı icra ve ikmal olunarak 
[4] Ģimdi lazım gelenlerle muvacehe ve muhakemesi sırası gelmiĢ olduğundan müteallik 
ve Ģerefsudur buyurulan irade-i aliye-i vekaletpenahileri mucebince müĢarünileyh 
hazretleriyle orduy-ı [5] mezkurun erkan-ı harb reisi olup bu husus içün Dersaadet‟e 
celb olunan Ferik saadetlu HurĢid PaĢa ve kezalik orduy-ı mezkur ümerasından bu 
tarafda [6] bulunan saadetlu RaĢid PaĢa ve Hacı Rıza PaĢa hazeratı münferiden ve 
müctemian defaatle Meclis-i Vâlâ‟ya celb olunarak icra olunan muhakemelerinin 
keyfiyetlerini ber vech-i ati [7] beyan olunur. 
 
[8] Malum-ı ali-i asafaneleri buyurulduğu üzere Ģu tahkikat ve muhakematın lüzumu iki 
nevi vukuat üzerine tertib edip birisi Zarif PaĢa hazretlerinin müĢirliği [9] esnada 
Ġncedere nam mahalde vukua gelen muharebenin netice-i mükeddiresi ve diğeri idare-i 
tayinat-ı askeriye ve mesarifat-ı sairede zuhur eden sirkat ve irtikabat maddeleri [10] 
olarak komisyonca Ģu iki cihet üzerine cereyan eden sual ve cevablar müzekkere-i 
merkumede ber tafsil yazılmıĢ olmağla ibtidaki meclisde yalnız Zarif PaĢa ile [11] 
RaĢid PaĢa hazır ve mevcud olduğu halde zikr olunan müzekkere kıraatle emr-i 
muhakemeye orduy-i mezkurun hareket-i harbiyesi bahsinden baĢlanılıp evvela ordunun 
[12] kuvve-i mevcude ve ahval-i mevkiyesine dair sözlerden sonra Kars‟tan ilerüye 
hareket ve ictisar olunan harbin sebebleri ve keyfiyet-i icraatı ve neticesi hakkındaki 
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[13] iktiza eden sualler bir bir irad olunduğunun üzerine Zarif PaĢa hazretleri 
mukaddemce komisyonda irad eylediği cevablarını tekraren dermiyan eylediği 
ifadatında [14] orduy-ı hümayundan avangard namıyla talia olarak altı saat mesafede 
kain Subatan nam mevkie evvelce sekiz tabur piyade ve iki alay süvari ve ona kuvve-i 
zeyliye (?) [15] olmak üzere muahharen Vezin köyüne dahi iki alay süvari irsal 
olunduğunu müteakıb Rusyalu Kars çayını geçerek ve bazı karyeleri yağma ve ihrak 
ederek [16] Ġncedere‟ye kadar gelmesiyle li-ecl-il müdafaa Kars‟tan iki fırka olmak 
üzere hareket olunup bir fırkasının Kerim PaĢa kumandasıyla Subatan‟da ve diğerinin 
[17] kendi maiyetinde Hacı köyünde ikameti esnasında gönüllü askeri ve cihad içün 
gelmiĢ olan meĢayih ve derviĢan güruhu taraflarından gavga etmek emeliyle [18] asakir-
i nizamiye çadırları arasında bazı mekalat ihdas olunarak o aralık Batum‟un ve 
muahharen Bayezid‟in vukuat-ı müteellimesi haberleri dahi gelmiĢ olduğundan [19] 
Bayezid içün bir kol asker gönderilmesi tasavvur olunup fakat HurĢid PaĢa buna 
muvafakat etmeyerek kuvve-i mevcude ile düĢman üzerine hücum olunmasını tercih 
[20] etmiĢ ve akd olunan meclisde ekseriyet-i ara HurĢid PaĢa‟nın reyi tarafında 
bulunmuĢ olduğuna binaen HurĢid PaĢa‟nın yaptığı tertibe ve verdiği talimata tatbikan 
[21] gece hareketle alessabah mevki-i muharebeye varılıp tevcihle harb olunduğunu ve 
ne suretle ricat vuku bulduğunu uzun uzun hikaye ile neticesine göre [22] kaffe-i 
harekat ve icraatın usul ve nizamına ve meclisce ümera-i askeriye ittifakıyla icab-ı 
maslahata tevfikan yapıldığı davasında bulunup fil-hakika harekat-ı vakıa [23] bu 
tarafın talimat ve iĢaratına tevfik olunarak yolunda davranılmıĢ olsa diyecek olmaz ise 
de orduy-ı mezkur karar-ı ahir vechile tahaffuzi hareketle memur [24] olunduğu halde 
ibtida-i emrde altı saat mesafede kain mahalle külliyetlu asker çıkarılmasıyla beraber 
düĢmanın vüruduna terekküb olunması ve onun üzerine Kars‟ın [25] istihkamatı ve 
ordunun kuvve-i mevcudesi henüz kafi ve mükemmel değil iken Kars‟a ilerü hareket 
edilmesi ve baĢıbozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye arasına duhul ile [26] neĢr-i havadis 
eylemelerine fırsat verilip sonra bu mekalatın önü alınmak içün ihtiyar-ı harb olunduğu 
denilmesi ve Zarif PaĢa‟nın komisyonda vaki olan [27] ifadesi iktizasınca kaffe-i 
icraatını ümera-i askeriye ittifakıyla yaptığı misillü Bayezid‟e sevk-i asker olunmak 
veyahud Rusyalu üzerine gidilmek tasavvuratı üzerine [28] Hacı Köyü‟nde akd olunan 
meclisde dahi ekseriyet-i ara ile muharebeye karar verildikten sonra tahaffuzi harekete 
dair taraf-ı hazret-i seraskeriden tahrirat zuhur ederek tekrar [29] meclis akdiyle tahrirat-
ı mezkure ol vakit meydana konuldu demiĢ iken Ģimdi meclisdeki takririne göre 
tahrirat-ı mezkure meclis akdinden on gün mukaddem [30] gelmiĢ olduğu halde 
mucebince hareket olunmaması ve bu kadar asker ve mühimmatın leylen gurub-ı 
kamerden sonra kaldırılıp karanlıkta beĢ saat mesafe mahalle gidildikten sonra [31] 
yorgun askerin muharebeye sevk olunması ve badelmevde (?) hiçbir yerde 
durulmayarak on bir saat mesafesi olan Kars‟a kadar gelinmesi keyfiyeti cay-i bahs ve 
itiraz [32] olmağla keyfiyetleri baĢka baĢka istizah olundukta Zarif PaĢa hulasa-i 
ifadatında orduy-i hümayundan avangard olarak ol mikdar asker çıkarılmasının [33] 
kaide-i harbce lüzumunu ve Kars‟dan ilerüye hareket dahi ümeranın rey ve ittifakıyla 
olduğunu ve baĢıbozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye çadırları arasına [34] duhule mezun 
olmayıp neferat-ı askeriye beyninden ihdas eyledikleri mekalat-ı müfside çarĢu ve 
pazarda neĢr olunmuĢ Ģeyler idüğünü beyan edip harekat-ı [35] tahaffuziye hakkında 
olan tahrirat-ı hazret-i seraskerinin vürud ve vusulü hususunda dahi tahrirat-ı mezkure 
meclis-i mezkurun akdinden hayli vakit evvel [36] gelmiĢ ve kendüsi mealini bazı 
zabitan ve ümeraya dahi bildirmiĢ olduğu halde bu hareketin meal-i tahrirata muvafık 
olacağı rey olunmasına mebni icra olunduğunu irad ile [37] tahrirat-ı mezkurenin 
sonradan vürud ve zuhuruna dair komisyonda vuku bulan ifadesinde sehv ü hata 
olduğunu ve ordunun Hacı Köyü‟nden leylen [38] hareketi müĢarünileyh HurĢid 
PaĢa‟nın rey ve talimatıyla yapıldığını ve avdetinde doğruca Kars‟a kadar gelinmesi ise 
düĢman askerinden bir mikdarının Kars üzerine [39] geçtiği haber alınmasından ve 
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esna-i rahda düĢmanın takibi mülahazasıyla tahaffuz ve tedafüü kabil istihkamat 
olmadığından bil-mecburiye ihtiyar olunduğunu söyleyip [40] RaĢid PaĢa dahi Ģu 
denilen Ģeylerden bir takımını tasdik ile beraber Zarif PaĢa‟nın memuriyetinden sonra 
hakk el insaf orduy-i hümayunun usul-i idaresi [41] sabıklarına nazaran yoluna girmeğe 
baĢladığını dahi ilaveten mekal edip fakat kendüsinin reyi Bayezid‟e asker gönderilmek 
tarafında olduğundan bu muharebenin [42] suret-i tertib ve tedbirine izhar-ı malumat 
etmemek istemiĢ ise de ferik-i müĢarünileyhin ekser vukuat ve icraatına elbette vukuf-ı 
malumatı olmak lazım gelmesiyle [43] ikinci meclis RaĢid PaĢa yalnız celb olunarak 
maddenin aherine kadar söylettirilerek fezleke-i cevabında yine Zarif PaĢa‟nın gayret ve 
hizmetine dair [44] beyan-ı mukaddemat ile beraber usul-i mer‟iye ve nizamiye üzere 
mahsus meclisler akdiyle müzakere-i maslahat olunmak ve jurnal tutulmak gibi bazı 
Ģeylerde ve tedbir-i lazımede [45] mutasavver olunduğunu dahi irad edip hareket-i 
harbiye hakkında olan ifadatının hulasasında dahi kendüsinin reyi vechile ibtida-i emrde  
Bayezid tarafına asker [46] gönderilmek tasavvur olunduğu halde sonradan Zarif PaĢa 
ve HurĢid PaĢa ve sair bazı ümeranın reyiyle harbe karar verilip HurĢid PaĢa‟nın [47] 
yaptığı tertib ve verdiği talimat iktizasınca saat birde hareketle üç saat ilerüdeki mahall-i 
muayyende aram olunarak oradan dahi sabahleyin kalkmak [48] lazım iken saat beĢ ve 
altı raddelerine kadar kalınıp HurĢid PaĢa Zarif PaĢa‟ya “Kalkıp gidelim” dedikçe 
“Ordunun müĢiri benim. Kalkacak vakti [49] bilürüm” diyerek itâb eylemesiyle nihayet 
beynlerinde muaraza vukuuyla bu kadar kuvve-i cesimenin gurub-ı kamerden sonra 
karanlıkta yola çıkarılması ve ibtida [50] yarım saat gerüde bulunan ikinci fırka hareket 
etmek iktiza eder iken sonraya bırakılıp birinci fırkanın muharebeye Ģuruundan haylice 
vakit sonra [51] yetiĢmiĢ olması ve esna-i muharebede birinci fırkanın ihtiyatı uzak 
düĢmesiyle vaktinde yetiĢemediği gibi Zarif PaĢa‟nın takriri vechile beĢ tabur [52] 
asakir-i nizamiye ve üç bin neferat-ı muvazzafa ve altı kıta top ile Karadağ‟da memur 
Liva Abdurrahman PaĢa mevki-i harbe bin hatve mesafede olduğu halde [53] birinci 
fırkanın kumandanı Kerim PaĢa‟nın iki defada gönderdiği habere itaatle imdad etmiĢ 
olsa düĢmanın mağlup ve periĢan olacağı meczum iken [54] onun dahi mütabaat edip 
gitmemesi ve mahall-i harbe karib olan nehir düĢman tarafında kalarak askerin 
susuzluktan bitap olması Ģu netice-i müteellimeyi davet eden [55] esbab-ı mahsusadan 
olduğunu irad ederek bu cümle ile beraber baĢıbozuk güruhunun asakir-i nizamiye 
arasına duhulden men‟ olunduğuna ve hitam-ı [56] muharebede ikinci fırkanın asla 
nizamı bozulmayarak geri alındığına ve düĢman askerinden sekiz bin nüfus ile üç bin 
kadar hayvan naaĢının meydan-ı [57] muharebede kaldığına ve sekiz yüz kadar bargir 
ve hayvan alındığına dair Zarif PaĢa‟nın sıbkat eden ifadatını dahi RaĢid PaĢa 
tamamıyla teslim ve tasdik [58] etmeyip filhakika Zarif PaĢa evvelki takririnde 
baĢıbozuk takımının tefevvühat ve mekalatını nizam çadırları arasında bizzat iĢitmiĢ 
olduğunu [59] söylemiĢ iken muahharen bunlar asker içine giremez demesi mesmuu 
olamayacağı misillü bozgun askerin nizamı üzere gerü alınması dahi akıl kabul ediĢi (?) 
[60] olmadığı ve düĢman telefatı ise berü tarafın bozgunluğu cihetiyle tadad 
olunamayacağı malum olup fakat bu babda olunan rivayat ve ifadat-ı [61] 
mukteziyesine nazaran cunud-ı nizamiye-i cenab-ı padiĢahinin harekat-ı Ģecianesi eseri 
olmak üzere düĢmanın telefatı berü tarafdan ziyade olduğu muhakkakdır.  
 
[62] Bu harbin suret-i tertib ve icrasında HurĢid PaĢa‟nın ber minval-i muharrer beyan 
olunan rey ve malumatına ve Ferik saadetlu Hacı Rıza PaĢa dahi [63] muharebede 
birlikte bulunmuĢ olmasına nazaran onların diyecekleri dahi anlaĢılmak üzere meclise 
çağırılıp ifadeleri zabt ü tahrir olunduktan sonra [64] ertesi defaya Zarif PaĢa ve RaĢid 
PaĢa ile HurĢid PaĢa ve Hacı Rıza PaĢa birlikde olarak celb olunup bil-muvacehe ibtida 
HurĢid PaĢa‟nın [65] takrir ve ifadatı dermiyan olunarak onun söyleyiĢine göre orduy-ı 
hümayunun ahval-i mevcudesi icabınca kendüsinin reyi Kars‟ın ve Hacı köyünün [66] 
ikmal-i istihkamatıyla ilerüye tecavüz olunmaması tarafında bulunduğu halde bundan 
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dolayı Zarif PaĢa ile beynlerinde bazı mertebe muâraza ve bürudet [67] vukuuna mebni 
ince karakol memuriyetiyle harice gidip avdetinde ordunun Vezin köyüne doğru hareket 
eylediğini görmesiyle sebebini Zarif PaĢa‟dan [68] sual eyledikte “müĢir benim” 
tabiriyle cevap verip muahharen Subatan karyesinde yine Zarif PaĢa muharebe içün 
kendüden rey talep etmekle eğerçi bu suret [69] evvel ve ahir reyine muğayir ise de 
madem ki böyle niyet olunarak oraya kadar gelinmiĢ ve oranın yarısı ince karakol 
memuriyetiyle ilerüye [70] çıkarılmıĢ ve Rusyalu‟nun azlığı dahi tahkik kılınmıĢ 
olduğundan meram harb ise tamam sırası olduğunu beyan ile beraber vakit geçmezden 
ve düĢmanın [71] haline kuvvet gelmezden mukaddem (?) hareket olunmasını dahi 
söylemiĢ iken Zarif PaĢa o günlerde kamer burc-ı akrebde olduğundan itizar edip bu hal 
ile [72] orada beyhude birçok günler geçerek ve bu sırada birtakım yolsuz ve nizamsız 
Ģeyler dahi vukua gelerek nihayet olunan tertibin rengi ve hükmü [73] değiĢmiĢ olduğu 
halde hareket olunmuĢ olup HurĢid PaĢa ise ordunun erkan-ı harb reisi olarak cümleden 
evvel onun reyi alınmak [74] lazım olduğu halde rey ve malumatı olmayarak Kars‟dan 
hareketin sebebi Zarif PaĢa‟dan led-es-sual sebeb ve lüzumu hakkında tahriren ve 
Ģifahen [75] bast ü irad eylediği mukaddematı (?) tekrar ile beraber bunda HurĢid 
PaĢa‟nın dahi reyi munzam olduğunu teyid içün pek çok sözler söylemiĢ [76] ve 
harekât-ı harbiye hakkında beyan-ı mütalaat ve muhsenatı mutazammın HurĢid PaĢa‟nın 
bazı zabitan ile müĢtereken vermiĢ oldukları varaka tercümesini [77] isbat-ı müddeaya 
mevadd olmak üzere ibraz etmiĢ ise de varaka-i merkumede Kars‟dan harekete sened 
ittihaz olunur sarahat olmayıp HurĢid PaĢa ise [78] bu hareketde kat‟a reyi olmadığı 
davasında bulunduğundan ve diğer paĢalar canibinden dahi tarafeynin ifadatını red ve 
kabule medar-ı hüküm olur malumat [79] beyan olunmadığından HurĢid PaĢa‟nın bunda 
sahihen reyi olup olmadığı anlaĢılamayarak ancak bu bahsin asıl maslahatça aranılacak 
mahalli Kars‟dan [80] ilerüye hareketin sebeb ve lüzumu kaziyesi olarak HurĢid 
PaĢa‟nın dediği gibi Kars‟da Hacı köyünde ikmal-i istihkâmat ile [81] hal-i tahaffuzide 
durulmasının halen ve mahallen eslemiyet ve recmaniyeti (?) inkar olunamaz ise de 
Zarif PaĢa‟nın ifadesi vechile Rusyalu bir tarafa tecavüz ederek etraf ]82] ve civarda 
bulunan köyleri yakıp yıkmağa ve orduy-ı hümayunun ekser zad ve zehairi tedarik 
olunan ve hayvanatı otlatılan mahalleri zabt [83] ve istila etmeğe baĢlamıĢ olduğu halde 
orduy-ı hümayun her ne kadar istihkam altında bulunsa da ol halde idare-i asker 
hususunda sıkıntı [84] çekilmesi ve belki bir hal-i hatar ve müzayakada bulunulması 
düĢmanın dahi oraları istediği gibi tahririne fırsat verilmesi mülahazalarına nazaran 
orduy-ı hümayunun [85] Kars‟dan hareketi Ģu mecburiyet üzerine ihtiyar olunur demek 
olur ise de ilerüsünde “niçün usul ve kaidece davranılmadı ve tahaffuzi harekete dair 
[86] tahrirata gitmiĢ iken ne sebebe mebni ketm olundu ve resmen meclis akd olunup 
müzakere-i maslahat olunmaması neden neĢet eyledi?” denildiğine cevaben yine [87] 
Zarif PaĢa irad eylediği ifadatında harekat ve icraatını usul-i nizama tatbik ve tahrirat-ı 
varidenin hükmü ise kaffe-i ümeraya tebliğ eylediğini [88] ve mesalih-i vakıayı dahi 
daima meclis akdiyle müzakere edip fakat yapılan meclislerde cereyan eden müzakerat 
Ģayi ve münteĢir olmamak içün [89] ferikandan maada zabitan dahil olmadığını bil-
beyan hatta harbin lüzumuna dahi bir günde iki defa meclis akdiyle karar verildiğini 
beyan [90] ve tekrar etmekle karar-ı meclise dair mevcud olmak lazım gelen mazbata 
soruldukta mazbata yapılıp fakat HurĢid PaĢa‟nın talimat verdiğini [91] söylemesine 
binaen HurĢid PaĢa‟nın o meclisde bulunup bulunmadığı ve tahaffuza dair tahrirat 
hazret-i seraskerinin meydana çıkıp çıkmadığı kendüden sual olunarak verdiği cevabda 
vakıa muharebe içün yalnız ferikandan mürekkeb öyle bir meclis yapılmıĢ ise de 
kendüsi davet olunmamıĢ [93] olduğu halde bit-tesadüf meclise uğramıĢ olmasıyla reyi 
sorulup kendüsi dahi usul ve kaide-i harb üzere talimatını yazıp [94] vermiĢ ve RaĢid 
PaĢa‟nın ifadesi vechile asakirin saat birde kaldırılması tertib olunmuĢ iken Zarif PaĢa 
saat beĢ ve altıya kadar [95] tevkif edip ve aralıkta “vakit geldi, hareket olunsun” deyu 
ihtar olundukça orası kendü bileceği Ģey olduğunu söyleyip [96] nihayet bivakit 
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karanlıkta hareketle hatta askerin ve top ve mühimmatın tertibi dahi karıĢık olduğu 
halde azimet eylediğini beyan eylemesi üzerine [97] bu tevakkufun sebebi dahi Zarif 
PaĢa‟dan sual olundukta HurĢid PaĢa‟nın dediği vakitde hareket olunsa ilerüde sabah 
oluncaya kadar askerin [98] birkaç saat ayak üzerinde ve hal-i hatarda kalması lazım 
geleceğini söyledi ise de bu mütalaası nabeca görünmüĢdür. Komisyon müzekkeresinde 
[99] muharrer olduğu vechile HurĢid PaĢa‟nın leylen fenar çektirmiĢ olmasından bir 
mazarrat görülmemiĢ ise de sebebi anlaĢılmak içün bu keyfiyet dahi [100] soruldukta 
HurĢid PaĢa ortalığın karanlığı ve geçilecek yollar ise taĢlık ve dere ve tepe olması 
cihetiyle iktiza eden yerlerde [101] top arabaları geçirilmek ve hayvanlar kapanmamak 
üzere öyle fenar çekdirmiĢ ise de bunun bir guna mahzur ve mazarratı olmayıp [102] 
bilakis yolca münkatı olduğunu cevaben ityan ederek sairleri dahi HurĢid PaĢa‟nın bu 
ifadesini tasdik eyledikleri gibi muharebenin [103] suret-i vukuunda ve bozgunluğun 
esbabı hakkında dahi HurĢid PaĢa‟nın ifadesi Zarif PaĢa ve RaĢid PaĢa ve Hacı Rıza 
PaĢa‟nın [104] ifadatı merkezinde olduğu anlaĢılıp fakat HurĢid PaĢa muharebeden 
avdetinde bir baĢı Kars‟a kadar gidilmesinden ve bozgun askerin [105] o kadar 
mesafeyi bir günde kat‟ ettirilerek periĢan edilmesinden ise Vezin köyünde kalınıp 
muahharen avdet olunmasının imkanı [106] üzerine zahib olarak hatta bu sureti Zarif 
PaĢa‟ya teklif etmiĢ ve hiç olmaz ise orada kalan çadır ve mühimmatı toplamak içün 
[107] kendüsinin yanına bir mikdar süvari bırağılmasını istemiĢ olduğu halde Zarif PaĢa 
kabul etmeyerek gittiğini söylemekte ise de oranın istihkamatı [108] olmayıp 
Rusyaludan ise bir fırka askerin Kars üzerine geçtiği haber verilmesiyle mahall-i 
mezkurda kalınması hatadan salim olmayacağı diğer [109] paĢalar tarafından irad 
olunmuĢ ve vakıa Ģu halde orada tevakkuf ve ikametin mahzuru meydanda olmağla 
HurĢid PaĢa‟nın bu rey ve ifadesi [110] muvafık-ı mevki ve maslahat olmadığı derkar 
bulunmuĢdur. Zarif PaĢa‟nın Ģu davadaki zehabına göre muharebe-i mezkure düĢmanın 
berü tarafa tecavüziyle [111] hudud-ı Devlet-i Aliyye dahilinde vukua gelmiĢ 
olduğundan bu hareketin tahaffuz manasına haml ile meal-i tahrirata tevfiki itikadında 
olmasıyla [112] buna usul ve kaidece nasıl nazar ve itibar bakmak lazım geleceği 
HurĢid PaĢa‟dan soruldukta filhakika bu harbin arazi-i Devlet-i Aliyye‟de [113] 
vukuuna nazaran buna halkça harekat-ı tahaffuzi ve tedafüi nazarıyla bakılabilür ise de 
düĢman üzerine gidilip bozularak avdet olunması ve düĢmanın [114] takib etmemesi 
cihetiyle harekat-ı tecavüziye add ve itibar olunacağını söylemiĢ ve RaĢid PaĢa ile Hacı 
Rıza PaĢa dahi bu hareket tecavüzi değil ise de [115] tahaffuzi dahi olmadığını 
mütereddidane beyan eylemiĢ olup ancak burası fünun ve kaide-i harbiyece hall ve 
temyiz olunacak mevadd-ı mahsusadan [116] olmağla meclisce bir Ģey denilememiĢdir. 
 
[116] ġu tahkikat ve muhakematdan zahir olan neticeye göre orduy-ı hümayunun evvel 
emirde Kars‟dan hareketi Rusyalu‟nun berü tarafa tecavüziyle [117] vuku bulan 
mazarratın menni zımnında icra ve ihtiyar olunmuĢ ve muahharen muharebeye dahi 
düĢmanın azlığına ve vakit ve zamanın müsaadesine [118] istinaden ekseriyet-i ârâ ile 
karar verilmiĢ olduğundan Zarif PaĢa‟nın ifadesi vechile Ģu icraat harekat-ı tahaffuziye 
ve tedafüiyeden [119] sayıldığı halde yolsuz ve muğayir-i usul görünmeyip fakat böyle 
bir emr-i azimin kaffe-i harekat ve icraatı tedabir-i kaviye ile yapılmak [120] ve 
hususuyla cem‟i harekat-ı harbiyede erkan-ı harb reisi bulunan zatın rey ve malumatı 
munzam olmak lazım iken ibtida Kars‟dan [121] ilerü hareketde ve bazı maddelerin 
icrasında ReĢid [sic, HurĢid?] PaĢa‟nın iĢe karıĢtırılmaması ve ifadatına ber minval-i 
muharrer naseza cevablar [122] verilmesi ve hususat-ı mühimmenin resmen meclis 
akdiyle müzakere olunmaması ve baĢıbozuk takımının asakir-i nizamiye arasına duhul 
ile [123] neĢr-i mekalat etmelerine fırsat gösterilmesi yolsuz olduğu misillü HurĢid 
PaĢa‟nın tertibine muğayir olarak mülahaza-i mukarrere ile [124] bu kadar asker ve 
mühimmatın leylen gurub-ı kamerden sonra kaldırılıp harbe sevk olunması ve fırka-i 
saniyenin gerü bırağılması ve Abdurrahman PaĢa‟nın [125] imdad etmemesi ve top 
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bargirleri ve topçu neferatı mikdar-ı nizamiyesinden dun olduğu halde noksanı ikmal 
olunmayarak gidilmesi ve HurĢid PaĢa‟nın dahi [126] vukufuyla beraber susuz mahalli 
mevki-i harb tayin eylemesi keyfiyatı dahi mhsn (?) mütalaa-i kasire (?) ve malumat-ı 
nakısiyesi olacağını ve saye-i muavenet-vaye-i [127] hazret-i Ģahanede Ģu vukuatın 
esbab ve keyfiyatı ber minval-i meĢruh meydana çıkmıĢ ise de hareket-i harbiyenin 
tahaffuzi veyahud tecavüzi olup [128] olmadığı kesdirilemediği gibi zat-ı madde dahi 
umur-ı askeriye ve fünun-ı harbiyeye müteallik olmasıyla tertib edecek hükmünün 
ekabir-i kumandaran-ı askeriye [129] rey ve ittifakıyla tayin ve tertibi mukteza-i 
maslahatdan idüğüne binaen ol vechile iktiza edenler hazır olduğu halde keyfiyetin 
huzur-ı ali-i vekalet-penahilerinde [130] mütalaasıyla verilecek karar üzerine tesviye-i 
icabatı ve balada beyan olunduğu vechile Karadağ‟da bulunan Liva Abdurrahman 
PaĢa‟nın [131] birinci fırkaya imdad etmesi zımnında kendüye birkaç defa haber 
gönderilmiĢ iken gelmemesi ve kendüsinden büyük kumandarana itaat etmemesi 
askerce [132] azim kabahat olduğundan onun dahi Dersaadet‟e celbiyle badel 
muhakeme töhmetine göre hakkında muamele-i mukteziyenin icrası suretleri 
müzakerat-ı [133] vakıa iktizasından bulunmuĢdur. 
 
[134] Orduy-ı mezkurun idare-i tayinat-ı askeriye ve mesarifat-ı sairesi hususunda vuku 
bulan ahval-i irtikabiyeye dair komisyonda [135] vuku bulan sual ve cevablara nazaran 
Zarif PaĢa kendü müddet ve idaresinde o makule irtikabatın vukuuna bir guna malumatı 
olmayıp [136] bu keyfiyetlerin memur-ı idaresi bulunan ordu müsteĢarı ve defterdarıyla 
memurin-i sairesinden suali lazım geleceğini beyan ile neraber nukudun [137] kavaim-i 
nakdiyeye tebdili gibi bazı vukuat hakkında dahi bilmezlenürüm tabiriyle tecahül 
edeceğini söylemiĢ olmağla bu hususlar dahi meclisde [138] birer birer kendüden sual 
olundukta ifadatı komisyonda sıbkat eden ecviyesi mealinde olup tecahül edeceğini 
beyan eylediği kaime tebdili [139] maddesinin keyfiyeti soruldukta bu iĢe hazine-i 
celileden memuren orduy-ı hümayunda olan veznedarın mücaseret eylediği [140] 
tahakkuk eylemesiyle habsi ve tedibiyçün müsteĢar-ı sabık atufetlu Rıza Efendi 
hazretlerine göndermiĢ ise de nasıl ise bir cüzi müddet habs ile [141] salıverilmiĢ 
olduğunu irad edip bu keyfiyetler hakkında RaĢid PaĢa ve Rıza PaĢa ve HurĢid PaĢa‟nın 
vukuf ve malumatı onlardan [142] dahi sırasıyla led-es-sual Hacı Rıza PaĢa ekser 
vakitde ahir mahalde bulunduğundan bu hususlara kat‟a vukufu olmadığını beyan 
ederek RaĢid PaĢa ve HurĢid PaĢa dahi süvari hayvanatının yemleri eksik verilmek ve 
ziyade fiyat ile zehair almak gibi bazı yolsuz Ģeylerin [144] rivayet olunduğunu beyan 
ile beraber keyfiyetlerini isbata muktedir olamayacaklarını söylemeleriyle bu husus 
hakkında paĢaların vaki olan [145] ifadat-ı mukteziyesi hükmünce Zarif PaĢa‟nın 
memuriyetinden sonra mübayaat ve mesarifat maddelerinde sabıkları kadar uygunsuz-
luk [146] vuku bulmayıp asakir-i hazret-i Ģahaneye verilen tayinatın dahi bil-nisbe 
yerinde ve yolunda olduğu anlaĢılmıĢ ise de mahalince bazı memurlar taraflarından 
[147] hiyl ü irtikabat vukuu münker olmayıp fakat keyfiyetlerinin ve muhti ve 
mürtekiplerinin buraca zahire ihracı kabil olamayarak meclisce [148] tahkike mütevakıf 
olduğundan bunların icray-ı tahkikatıyla keyfiyat-ı mütebeyyinesinin bu tarafa 
bildirilmesi hususu orduy-ı mezkur kumandaranı [149] devletlu Vasıf PaĢa hazretleriyle 
defterdarı saadetlu Vehab Efendi hazretlerine havale olunarak vuku bulacak tahkikat ve 
iĢarat üzerine [150] tertib edecek hükmün baĢkaca icabına bakılması ve merkum 
veznedarın keyfiyeti dahi tahkik olunarak ve icab edenlerle muhakemesi görülerek 
[151] tebeyyün edecek töhmetine göre mücazatı icra olunmak üzere keyfiyetin bu tarafa 
yazılması hususunun dahi defterdar-ı müĢarünileyhe iĢarı tezkir kılınmıĢtır. [152] 
Mütalaat ve ifadat-ı meĢruha hakkında her ne vechile irade-i aliye-i vekalet-penahileri 
müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulur ise ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül 
emrindir. Fi 23 Receb sene [12]71.  
[Sealed by 13 seals] 
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Appendix 97. HR. SYS. 1352/49, dated Selh-i [29] Şaban 1271 (17 May 1855). 
Recruitment of irregular cavalry for the British army from the province of 
Damascus and the disorders caused by them. 
 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi ordusunda istihdam olunmak üzere tertibi tansip buyurulmuĢ 
olan malum ül miktar asakir-i muvazzafanın lazım gelen mahallerden celb ve tertibi 
suretlerine [2] teĢebbüs olunduğu misillü ġam-ı ġerif eyaleti dahilinde kain mahallerden 
dahi tedariki mümkün olan neferat ve zabitanın celb ve tertibi zımnında devlet-i 
müĢarünileyha [3] zabitanından tayin kılınmıĢ olan memur-ı mahsusu marifetiyle 
yazılacak neferat ve zabitan emsali müĢahade olunan baĢıbozuk takımı gibi uygunsuz 
[4] ve mechul-ül ahval makuleden olmayarak hanedan ve hüsn-i hal ashabından olmak 
üzere tahriri hususunda memur-ı mumaileyh hakkında muavenat-ı kamilenin icrası [5] 
iradesini Ģamil fi 29 Ca 71 [17.2.1855] tarihiyle müverreh ve fi 19 B 71 [7.4.1855] 
tarihinde hame-piray-ı tazim olarak meclisce kıraat olunan emirname-i sami-i 
vekaletpenahi [6] mantuk-ı alisince neferat-ı merkumenin ol suretle tahririne 
muavenetle infaz-ı irade-i seniyeye damen-der-meyan-ı gayret olduğumuz halde 
memur-ı mumaileyh [7] bu sıralara atf-ı negah-ı dikkatten ve hükümet ve meclise 
müracaattan sarf-ı nazarla ġam-ı ġerif'in süfeha ve erazil takımından ibaret olan ġağor 
ve Meydan [8] mahallerinin uygunsuz ve pek fena tezkiyeli makulelerinden hod be hod 
tahrir ve tertib etmiĢ olduğu beĢ yüz nefere karib süvari ve piyade asakiri denilen [9] 
ecnas-ı muhtelife bir takım haĢerat memur-ı mumaileyhin verdiği serbestiyete istinaden 
tek durmayarak gunagun sefahat-ı aleniye ve ehl-i ırz [10] nisvana tasallut ve kadimen 
husumetleri olan ehl-i memleketi darb ve cerhle muhill-i nizam-ı memleket ve hetk-i 
namus-ı hükümet olacak ve nihayet [11] ehl-i memleketi ayaklandıracak halat-ı na-
marziyeye mübaderetlerinden naĢi bu babda zuhuru mesbuk ve mücerreb olan ihtilal ve 
teĢviĢ-i memleketin [12] kabl-el vuku önü aldırılmak üzere niyazmendan olarak lazım 
gelen tebliğat nasihane ve dostane suretle kendisine iblağ ve tefhim olunmuĢ ise de [13] 
bir suretle tarafından kabul olunmayarak nihayet asakir-i merkume uygunsuzluğu 
çoğaltmıĢ olmalarıyla esliha keĢidesiyle Ģunu bunu darb ve cerh edenlerden [14] nizamı 
mucebince li-ecl-it-te'dib habse ilka olunmuĢken memur-ı mumaileyh bab-ı hükümete 
gelerek mahbusları istemiĢ olmasıyla çığrılıp eline verilmiĢ [15] ve anın üzerine memur-
ı mumaileyh mekteb-i idadiye önünden geçer iken  yol üzerinde vaki karavulhane 
kapusunda iki nefer asakir-i nizamiye [16] selam durmuĢ ve birisi dahi kapunun içerü 
tarafında kendi maslahatıyla meĢgul iken bi-n-nefs kendi kavaslarıyla karavulu tecavüz 
ederek [17] ve nefer-i merkum üzerine niçün sen de selam durmadın deyü at sürerek ve 
sürüderek ala mele-en nas alıp kendi konağına götürüp adeta darb etmiĢ ve nihayet 
bunların bu suretlerle harekat-ı indiyesinden ahalinin ekseri dehĢete düĢerek bir 
uygunsuzluk vukuu melhuz [19] bulunmuĢ olduğundan canib-i hükümetten tercüman 
Faris Efendi ve Ġngiltere devleti tercümanı Hoca Musa ve Mustafa Ağa havasla ve Hoca 
ġehade Ġstanbuli [20] memur-ı mumaileyhe gönderilerek asakir-i merkumenin Ģuradan 
ihracı nazikane beyan ve tefhim olundu ise de bir vechile müsmir olmayıp ve bunun 
üzerine [20] neferat-ı mezkure daha ziyade Ģımarıp fenalıkları tezaid-i kesb [sic!] 
eylediğinden bilcümle çarĢu ve bazar halkı dükkanlarını sedd ü bend ile bunların [21] 
ellerinden canib-i hükümete iĢteka ettiklerine ve iĢtekaları müsmir olamayacağı surette 
bunlar da silah altına girerek mukavemete mütesaddi [22] ve nihayet iĢ müĢkile 
düĢeceği siyak-ı halden münfehem idüğüne mebni her ne suretle taraf be taraf vaad ve 
vaid suretleriyle ahali-i mezbure yatıĢtırılarak [23] derhal Arabistan orduy-ı hümayunu 
müĢir vekili atufetlu reis paĢa ve übbehetlu defterdar ve faziletlu Molla Efendi 
hazeratıyla aza-yı meclis-i kebirden [24] Ġzzi[?]zade mekremetlu Ömer Efendi ve 
izzetlu Abdullah Bey ile ġam-ı ġerif'te mevcud bulunan Fransa ve Nemçe ve Sardinya 
ve Ġran devlet-i fahimeleri konsoloslarıyla Ġngiltere ve Prusya devletleri konsolosu 
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tercümanlarından mürekkep olarak tertib olunan meclis-i mahsusa müzakeratı kararı ve 
cümlesinin tasdiki [26] üzere neferat-ı mürettebe tekmil oluncaya kadar mevcud 
neferatın Hama tarafına ve böyle olmazsa ġam-ı ġerif civarında Kıbbe [Kıyye ?] 
karyesine çadır ve çerke [27] ve tayinatlarının isbaliyle neferat-ı mevcudenin ġam-ı 
ġerif'ten bil-ihraç orada ikametleri veya kaffesinin eslihası alınıp bila silah ırz ve 
edebleriyle [28] gezdirilmesi ve bu da kabul olunmazsa neferat-ı merkumenin hakların-
da lazım gelen ahkam-ı zabtiyenin icrasıyla ol suretle uygunsuzluklardan [29] men'i 
keyfiyetlerinin yirmi dört saate kadar imsalen ihtarıyla bununla neferat-ı merkumenin 
kabul-i surethalleri nümayan olmadığı halde [30] ol vakitte memleketin bundan vukuu 
ve tekevvünü melhuz olan fitne-i azimesi basdırılmasına medar olacak esbab-ı 
hükümetin icrasına hasıl olacak [31] mecburiyet keyfiyeti memur-ı mumaileyhe ba 
tezkire-i mahsusa-i resmiye bildirilmiĢ ise de yine bir faide hasıl olmamıĢ ve iĢte 
neferat-ı merkumenin uygunsuzluklarından [32] naĢi ahval-i memleket bu raddeleri 
bulmuĢ olduğundan bundan böyle neferat-ı merkumeden ol suretle tasallut ve taarruza 
cesaretleri vukuunda biz-zarur [33] canib-i hükümetten habsi ve terbiyeleri emri 
istihsalinden baĢkasıyla husul-i asayiĢ-i matlube-i ahali müyesser olamayacağı sibak-ı 
halden anlaĢılmıĢ olduğundan [34] anların birisi olmadığı surette bu suretle namus-ı 
hükümet ve ahali ve reayanın emn ü istirahatlerinin vikayesi esbab-ı [35] vacibesinin 
istihsalinden gayri bir çare bulunamamıĢ ve bununla her ne hal ise Ģimdilik memleket 
yatıĢmıĢ ve salif-üz zikr yazılan Arabiyy-ül ibare [36] tezkire-i resmiyenin tercümesiyle 
beraber bir kıta sureti dahi merbuten takdim-i hakpay-i alileri kılınmıĢ olduğundan 
beyan-ı hal maruzatında mazbata-i mahsusa-i kemteranemiz takdimine ibtidar olunmuĢ-
tur. Ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi Selh-i ġ sene 71.  
 
[Sealed by 19 members of the meclis of Damascus including governor Vamık Pasha, the 
Greek member‟s place [an taife-i Rum] is not sealed, the Jewish and Catholic members 
have also sealed] 
 
Appendix 98. HR. SYS. 1352/55, dated 20 May 1855. Commander of Batum army 
Mustafa Pasha on slavery. 
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Rusyalu tarafından firaren bu canibe gelen eĢhasın sıfat-ı esarette tutulması ve Ģuna 
buna satılması hakkında evvel ve ahir vukuu iĢtika ve istima olunan muamelat-ı gayr-ı 
layıkanın henüz önü alınmayarak daima bir suret-i serbestane ile [2] icra olunmakta 
olduğu ekser taraftan rü'yet olunarak hatta öte taraftan bu aralık firaren berüye gelmiĢ 
olan bir Ģahıstan kendisinin kân-ı kayd-ı esaretten tahlisi içün Acara'da vaki Ardanuc 
kazası müdirinin üç yüz kuruĢ rüĢvet dahi ahz etmiĢ olduğundan dolayı yine bir takım 
Ģikayat ve rivayat vuku bulmuĢ olup bu maddenin elan vukua gelmesi bu babda 
Ģerefsudur buyurulan talimat ve tenbihat-ı mahsusanın nazar-ı dikkat [3] ve ehemmiyet-
le görülmeyerek bir mevki-i adide tutulmasından icab eyleyeceği ve bu ise bilahare 
mesuliyet-i Ģedideyi istilzam edeceği beyan-ı dehĢet-niĢan-ı alisiyle bu hususta bid-
defaat nezaret ve icab edenlere dahi tefhim-i ehemmiyet-i [5] maslahat ile talimat-ı 
mebusenin tamamen ifay-i ahkam ve dekayıkına ve müdir-i merkumun ber minval-i 
muharrer ahz-ı rüĢvet fezahatına cesareti mütehakkık olduğu halde kavanin-i mahsusaya 
göre te'dib ve terbiyesine mübaderet-i abidanemi [6] amir fi 6 Receb 71 tarihiyle 
müverreh olup Fransa devlet-i fahimesinin Batum'da bulunan konsolosu vasıtasıyla fi 
19 ġ 71 tarihinde mübahat efray-i hame-i tazim ve tefhim olan fermanname-i sami-i 
asafileri mefal?-i alisi sarf-ı taharrüf?-i [7] müdrike-aray-i çakeri olmuĢtur. Bu hususun 
ehemmiyeti her umur-ı mühimmeye müreccah tutularak Ģimdiye değin bu babda vu's-i 
bendeganemin nihayet mertebesine kadar çalıĢmakta olduğum ve imkanı olan 
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teĢebbüsat ve tedabir ve ikdamatın [8] iltizam ve icrasından bir hatve ayrılmadığım 
buraca herkesin meĢhudu olduğu misillu Ģimdiye değin vuku bulan ma'ruzat ve iĢ'arat-ı 
bendeganemden dahi muhat-ilm-i ali-i vekaletpenahileri buyurulmuĢ olacağı vechile ez 
cümle [9] geçende böyle üsera maddesiyçün Erzurum ve Kars taraflarına mahsusen 
yaver ve Acara'ya zabit gönderilerek hafiyen ve alenen ve cebren buldurulan esirler 
talimat-ı dekayık-ayat-ı asafanelerine itbaen isteyenler [10] ve sağir üs-sinn olanlar 
mümkün oldukça familyalarına teslim ve fail-i muhtar olup da burada kalmak isteyenler 
icabı vechile askerliğe ve hidemat-ı saire-i münasibeye tayin ve bu marziyetin hilafında 
bulunan görüldükçe [11] tedib kılınarak vuku-ı hal peyderpey hakpay-i sami-i 
vekaletpenahilerine arz ve tahrir olunmaktadır. Batum orduy-i hümayunu dairesinde 
bulunan ve hududa muttasıl olan mahaller ahalisinden ekseri öteden berü lisanen ve 
miĢvaren [12] Gürcülerle ülfet ve ihtilat edegelmiĢ olup adet-i melufeleri ve mevkileri 
icabınca her hususta bunların daire-i efkar-ı adlide [?] istikrarı yenice teklifatla [?] 
suretnüma olabilecek keyfiyattan bulunmamıĢ iken [13] mücerred destyari-i tevcihat-ı 
teshilat-ayat-ı vekalet-penahileriyle orduy-ı mezbur dairesinde Ģimdilerde esir maddesi-
nin vukuu kat'a iĢitilmemektedir. Bundan mukaddem arz ve iĢ'ar olunduğu vechile bu 
maddenin Anadolu orduy-i [14] hümayunu dairesinde dahi külliyen def'i orduy-i 
mezkur kumandanı devletlu paĢa hazretleriyle memurin-i sairenin dahi ikdam ve 
himmetleriyle hasıl olacağı derkar bulunmuĢ ve Ardanuc kazası ise Anadolu orduy-i 
hümayunu dairesi [15] dahilinde bulunan Çıldır sancağına merbut ve mülhak 
olmasından baĢka ol taraf ahalisi dahi mesmu'-i bendeganeme göre hasb-el mevki 
tamamiyle mazbut ül ahval olduğu anlaĢılmıĢ ise de mamafih tıbk-ı emr ü ferman-ı 
sami-i asafaneleri [16] mucebince kaza-i mezkur müdirinin fezahat-ı merviyesinin 
sıhhat ve hakikati zahire ihrac ile icabı icra olunmak üzere memur-ı mahsus tayin 
kılınmıĢ olmağla suret-i icraiyesi badehu hakpay-i sami-i vekaletpenahilerine arz ve iĢar 
olunacağı ve Ģu madde-i mühimme hakkında ve her halde kemakan ikdam ve gayrette 
kat'a kusur olunmayarak emr ü ferman-ı seniye ve talimat-ı isabet-ayat-ı aliye-i 
sadaretpenahilerinin bi lutfihi teala fiilen ve mütemadiyen [18] tefyiz?-i ahkam-ı 
celilesine muvafakiyetten büyük emel ve vazifem olmadığı muhat-ilm-i ali-i 
vekaletpenahileri buyruldukta emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy ül emrindir. Fi 3 N 71. An 
Gelencik 
Bende 
MüĢir kumandan-ı orduy-i Batum  
[Sealed] Mustafa 
 
Appendix 99. HR. SYS. 1192/2 lef 15-16, 19 April 1855. Redcliffe to His Excellency 
Saffet Effendi. The “Turkish Contingent”. 
 
 The undersigned, impressed with the urgency of giving effect without delay to the 
provisions of the military convention which he had the honor of signing with their 
Highnesses the Grand Vizier an the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 
the 3
rd
 of February last, cannot entirely conceal the regret which he experiences in 
observing so very imperfect a preparation for that purpose at Constantinople 
notwithstanding the representations addressed repeatedly by him to the proper 
authorities, and the specific assurances received in reply. 
 The Porte is aware that Lieutenant General Vivian appointed by the British 
Government to command the regular force of twenty thousand Turkish soldiers to be 
paid and officered by them has been several days at Constantinople, and that his first 
inquiries have been submitted both to the Ottoman Secretary of State and to the 
Seraskier Pasha. Other officers destined to act under General Vivian are either arrived 
or expected from day to day. 
521 
 Such are the circumstances under which the undersigned has requested that the 
Troops, which are to compose the Corps in question may be collected, and that such 
part of them as are at Constantinople, may be at once detached from the remainder of 
the Garrison, and reviewed in presence of the British General, to the amount of at least 
six thousand infantry, with two regiments of Cavalry and two or three batteries of Field 
Artillery. The season for operations in the field is rapidly coming on, and it is most 
desirable that the Turkish Corps in the Queen of England‟s pay should be prepared, with 
all practicable expedition and good effect, for taking part in them. 
 The Undersigned must remind the Ottoman Secretary of State that he is entitled to 
expect the number of troops agreed upon from the several places already designated by 
the Porte, namely, the Danube, Constantinople and Bosnia, or in failure of the required 
numbers in those quarters from other more convenient sources. He begs to observe at 
the same time, that according to his advices from the Crimea, there is no probability of 
any portion of the force in question being sent by Omer Pasha, since it appears beyond a 
doubt, that His Highness is not in a condition to weaken his army with any degree of 
prudence, and that he is employing the troops commanded by him, in strict agreement 
with the Commanders in Chief of  the Allied Forces... 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe 
 Pera, British Embassy. 19
th
 April. 1855. 
 
Appendix 100. HR. SYS. 1030/4 lef 65. Lord Clarendon to the Earl of 
Westmoreland. “Urgent wants of the Christian subjects of the Sultan”. Foreign 
Office. April 24, 1855. Copie. No. 164. 
 
My Lord 
 
The memorandum by Aali Pasha inclosed in Lord John Russell‟s dispatch No. 81 
of the 18
th
 Instant is dexterously drawn up and has been read with interest by Her 
Majesty‟s government but I have to observe that is passes over some of the urgent wants 
of the Christian Subjects of the Sultan. 
It is true that Christian evidence is admissible in criminal Courts, though in many 
places it is not admitted but the Judges in such cases are still exclusively Mahometans. 
The only mixed tribunals are commercial Courts whose functions are very limited 
– Christian Evidence is still inadmissible in civil cases and in as much as Robbery is a 
more frequent crime than murder, civil injuries are oftener perpetrated against 
Christians than personal injuries and the inadmissibility of Christian evidence in civil 
cases is a severe and daily felt grievance. There ought both in civil and criminal cases to 
be a court compared of an equal number of Christian and Mahomedan Judges. 
All the local authorities in the Provinces are still Mahomedan and this leads to 
endless oppression and injustice committed and connived at towards Christians.  
There ought to be some Christian officer of suitable rank attached of [sic] to each 
Musulman governor so that such Christian officer might be appealed to by injured 
Christians and he should have the right of appealing to Constantinople in the event of 
his not being able to obtain justice from the local governor. 
Christians ought to be allowed to rise to any rank in the military and civil services 
and their advancement should not form an exception to the rule by which they are 
excluded from the higher ranks of their profession, the interests of the Sultan would 
unquestionably be promoted by inlarging [sic] the field of selection and taking into his 
service many able and intelligent men who have now no access to it. 
The description given in the memorandum of the medical schools at 
Constantinople and of the kindly feelings which the youths of different creeds are taught 
to entertain towards each other should incourage [sic] the Porte to proceed in a system 
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which has been productive of such happy results and primary schools should be 
established in all the chief towns throughout the Turkish Empire in which Christian and 
Musulman children should receive elementary instruction together. 
Her Majesty‟s government do full justice to the enlightened views and benevolent 
intentions of the Sultan and they are convinced that if it depended solely on the will of 
His Majesty justice would be impartially administered throughout his dominions and the 
state of his Christian subjects would be prosperous and contented, but unfortunately the 
men on whom devolves the duty of giving effect to the Sultan‟s will are not animated 
by his spirit and until rapacity, injustice and corruption are systematically 
discountenanced and punished, the social system of Turkey must continue to deteriorate 
and the reforms and improvements upon which the prosperity and the independence of 
the Ottoman Empire depend, will exist only in name. 
Your Lordship will communicate this dispatch to Aali Pacha and furnish him with 
a copy if he should desire it. 
I am etc etc  
Signé Clarendon 
Appendix 101. HR. SYS. 1193/2 lef 88. The Times, Monday, April 30, 1855. 
Parliamentary Intelligence. House of Commons, Monday, April 30. The Vienna 
Conferences. 
 
… 
Mr. BASS inquired what part Turkey had taken in the conferences? (A laugh.) 
Lord J. RUSSELL. – I cannot go into details, but the Turkish plenipotentiaries were 
of the same mind as the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Austria. (“Hear, 
hear,” and laughter.) [end of article] 
 
Appendix 102. HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 1, 12 September 1855. Instructions to Midhat 
Efendi on the prevention of the oppressions of the başıbozuk. 
 
Meclis-i Vâlâ Ġkinci Katibi Saadetlu Midhat Efendi‟ye talimat müsveddesidir 
 
[1] BaĢıbozuk takımının bulundukları ve geçtikleri mahallerde cümle sunuf-u tebaa 
haklarında icrasına mütecasir oldukları muamelat-ı [2] reddiye ve teaddiyatın had ve 
nihayeti olmadığı misillu bazı mahallerde dahi haydutlar zuhuru ile Ġslam ve Hıristiyan 
birçok [3] bigünah ademlerin zatlarına ve familyalarına dürlü eziyetler ve gadirler 
ettikleri umur-u malumeden olmasıyla ve tedibsiz [4] kaldıkça bu makule ef‟al-i 
fecianın önü alınamayacağı bedihiyyattan bulunmasıyla bunun çare-i seriasına bakılmak 
lazım gelip [5] ordu-yu hümayunun gavail-i harbiyesi münasebetiyle böyle Ģeylere 
bakılmaklığa bit-tabia [?] vakit olamayarak vülat-ı [6] kiram dahi ziyadece meĢgul 
bulunduklarından ve küçük memurların bazıları tarafından dahi her ne sebebe mebni ise 
bu nevi [7] hususata ziyade takayyüd olunmadığından verilen memuriyet emr-i alisinde 
mestur olduğu vechile bu maddeye ruhsat-ı kamile ile [8] efendi-i mumaileyh ba irade-i 
seniyye memur buyurulmuĢ olduğuna ve zaman-ı ma'delet-niĢan-ı hazret-i padiĢahide 
hiç kimse hakkında [9] teaddiyat ve barbarca muamelat vukuu tecviz olunamayacağına 
binaen zirde beyan olunan suret vechile efendi-i mumaileyhin ifa-ı memuriyete sa‟y 
etmesi lazım gelecektir.  
 
[11] Efendi-i mumaileyhe teslim olunan evrak-ı mefahimden müsteban olunacağı 
vechile Varna havalisinde haydutlar tarafından [12] bazı biçare Bulgarlar hakkında 
insanı dilhun edecek surette vuku bulan muamelat-ı fecianın en büyük [13] davacısı 
Devlet-i Aliyye olduğundan ve bu misillu ef‟al-i keriheye mütecasir olan eĢhas-ı 
rezilenin mücazat-ı layıkalarını [14] görmeleriyle beraber anlara müsaid ve böyle 
523 
Ģeylerin men‟i maddesinde vazife-i zimmeti icrasına mütekasil olan memurinin [15] 
dahi derece-i cünhalarına göre tedibi hükümetçe pek elzem olduğundan efendi-i 
mumaileyh buradan bahren azimet ile Varna‟ya [16] vasıl olduğu gibi ibtida doğruca 
zikr olunan vukuat-ı fecianın olduğu mahallere gidecek ve buna mütecasir [17] olan 
eĢhası ele getirmekliğe ve müsaade ve müsamaha  gösterenleri dahi mizana 
çıkarmaklığa sarf-ı mesai eyleyecektir [18] ve bir kere eshab-ı töhmet derdest olduğu 
gibi anları derhal mahallerinde gayet muhıkkane ve müdekkikane muhakeme ile ceza-i 
[19] sezalarını mukaddemce neĢr olunup birer sureti kendisine ita olunan emr-i ali ve 
talimat-ı umumiye ahkamına tatbikan hemen icra etmez ise kendisi mesul olacaktır ve 
Ģayet fevkalade bir keyfiyet vuku bulur ise zikr olunan emr-i ali ve gerek talimat-ı 
umumiye ahkamının haricine çıkmak icab eder ise fakat anı bu taraftan istida 
mecburiyet halinde bulunacaktır. Vaki olacak icraat peyapey bu tarafa bildirilecektir.  
 
[23] Efendi-i mumaileyhin memuriyeti yalnız Varna havalisine münhasır olmayarak 
oradan bed ile Balkan‟ın öte yönünde [24] bulunan mahalleri bütün dolaĢacak 
olduğundan her nerede bu makule ef‟al-i reddiye vaki olmuĢ ise anın [25] tahkik ve 
icrasına bakacak ve hiçbir yerde lüzumundan ziyade durmayacaktır. 
 
[26] Efendi-i mumaileyhin maiyetinde lüzumu takdirinde mikdar-ı münasip kuvve-i 
askeriye bulundurulmak için iktiza edenlere tenbihat-ı [27] icabiye icrası taraf-ı vâlâ-yı 
serdar-ı ekremiye yazıldığı misillu iĢbu memuriyetinde kendisine her dürlü muavenat ile 
[28] ifası dahi hamil olduğu emr-i ali ile kaffe-i memurine bildirilmiĢ olduğundan artık 
ana göre makarimane [?] hareket ile [29] memuriyetini layıkıyla görmekliğe ve 
kendisinin memuriyetçe talep eylediği keyfiyatı icrada kusur edenler olur ise derhal [30] 
bu tarafa bildirmekliğe müsaraat olunmak iktiza-ı mesalihtendir.  
 
[31] Varna havalisinde düvel-i müttefika asakir-i muavenesinin muhtaç oldukları erzak 
ve es‟ar ve sair eĢyanın tedarik [32] ve itası hususunda pek çok kusurlar vuku bulduğu 
kezalik yedine verilen evraktan efendi-i mumaileyh [33] bil-etraf anlayacağından ve 
düvel-i müttefikanın mücerred devlet-i aliyenin muhafaza-i hukuk-u seniyesi niyet-i 
halisesiyle [34] bunca fedakarlıklar ederek göndermiĢ oldukları asakirin kaffe-i umur-u 
vakıasına can ve baĢla çalıĢmak akdem [35] vezaifden iken bu misillu kayıtsızlıklar ve 
d*rb*ğ muamelat mücerred hamiyetsizlik ve gayretsizlikten neĢat edeceği cihetle nezd-i 
saltanat-ı seniyede begayet mekruh olarak hatta Varna muhafızı sabık Hasan PaĢa‟nın 
azli dahi ancak [37] bu hususlarda zuhura gelen tekasülünden iktiza etmiĢ olduğundan 
bu misillu harekat-ı gayr-ı marziyeye mütecasir olanların dahi bit-tahkik tedipleriyle fi-
ma-bad herkesin bu babda ziyadesiyle dikkat etmeleri ve asakir-i muaveneye zehair ve 
erzakı kat‟a diriğ etmeyerek fiyat-ı mutedile ile ita eylemleri esbab-ı kaviyesinin 
istihsali ve bu keyfiyetin cümle ahaliye ilanı dahi ehem ve mühimdir. 
 
[39] Gezilen mahallerde vülat ve sair memurinin ahval-i idarelerini ve kaffe-i harekat ve 
muamelatlarını dahi hafi ve celî [40] tahkik ile bu tarafa bildirmeklik cümle-i 
memuriyetinden olmağla ve hiç kimsenin uygunsuzluğu ketm olunmak caiz olmadığı 
[41] misillu azviyat ve müftereyata vücud verilmek dahi kaide-i insafa mugayir 
düĢeceğinden gerek bu makule tahkikatta [42] ve gerek icra olunacak muhakematta 
bitarafane ve mû-Ģikâfâne ve hakkaniyet-Ģiarâne olunmaklık farizadan bulunmağla [43] 
ana göre ifa-yı me‟muriyete kemal-i dikkatle sa‟y kılınacaktır.  
 
[44] Bu memuriyette doğruca hareket etmek muceb-i mükafat olacağı misillu tarik-ı 
makusa gitmek dahi müstelzem-i itab [45] ve mesuliyet olacağından ana göre afifâne ve 
müstakimâne davranılması ve her varılan mahallerde derdi ve Ģikayeti olanların [46] 
Yenicuma‟ya [?] gelüb ifade-i hal etmelerinin ilan kılınması pek elzemdir. 
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HR. SYS. 1353/68 lef 2 
 
[1] Rumeli‟nin sol kolu ile Yanya taraflarına varınca vaki vülat-ı izamım iclaluhuma ve 
mühendishane-i hümayunum feriki olup [2] bu defa zikri ati hususa memur ve tayin 
kılınan Selim PaĢa damet mealiye [3] ve elviye kaimmakamları dame mecidihum ve 
naib ve müftiler zide ilmihum ve kaza müdirleri ve aza-yı mecalis ve vücuh-u memleket 
zide kadrihuma hüküm: [4] Memalik-i mahruse-i Ģahanemin bazı taraflarında baĢıbozuk 
asakirinin içlerinden bazı sebükmağaz ve cahil takımı esna-i rahda [5] gelip geçdikleri 
ve bulundukları mahallerde ahali-i Ġslam ve Hıristiyan tebaa-i Ģahanemin mal ve can ve 
ırzlarına tasallut ile adab-ı [6] insaniyet ve hamiyete yakıĢıksız bir takım harekat-ı 
kabihaya ibtidar ve bazı mahallerde dahi kutta-i tarik ve eĢrar ve haydut makuleleri 
sunuf-u tebaa-i [7] Ģahaneme ve çoluk ve çocuklarına tasallut ile izac ve ızrar etmekte 
oldukları ve iĢbu hareketlerin zuhuru bazı memurinin tesamuhundan [8] neĢet 
eylediğinden maada kendileri dahi bir takım teaddiyata ictisar ettikleri1186 bu kere bil-
istihbar tahkik olunup beyana hacet [9] olmadığı üzere yed-i müebbed-i hilafetime 
vedia-ı cenab-ı Halık-ül beraya olan kaffe-i sunuf-u ahali ve tebaa-i devletimin her 
dürlü [10] mezalim ve teaddiyattan vikayet ve himayetleriyle idame-i huzur ve 
istirahatları nezd-i mealimevfur-u mülukanemde gayet matlub ve mültezem 
idüğünden1187 [11] o makule haklarında lazım gelen mücazat-ı Ģedidenin icra ve ifası 
zımnında mukaddemce bilcümle Memalik-i mahruse-i Ģahaneme mahsus evamir-i 
celile-i mülukanem tasdir ve tesyir olunmuĢ olduğu halde yine bu misillu harekat-ı fecia 
vukuu doğrusu pek çirkin Ģey olduğundan artık hem bu makule edepsizliğe cesaret 
edenlerin ve hem de öyle hilaf-ı emr ü nizam iğmaz ve hareket eyleyen memurların 
haklarında mücazat-ı Ģedidenin sürat-i icrası lazım gelerek Rumeli tarafının sol kolunda 
bulunan mahalleri Yanya tarafına varınca dolaĢıp ita olunan talimat mucebince gerek 
bunlardan ve gerek memurin-i mumaileyhimden o makule kabahati vuku bulanların 
icra-ı muhakemeleriyle zikr olunan evamir-i celile-i mülukanemde münderic ahkama 
tatbikan mücazat-ı layıkalarını hemen bila istizan icra eylemek ve kanunnameden hariç 
bir Ģey zuhurunda icabını derhal bu taraftan istizan etmek üzere ferik-i müĢarünileyhin 
derkar olan dirayet ve istikameti cihetiyle ruhsat-ı kamile ile bu hususa memuriyeti 
tensip olunarak ol babda müteallik ve Ģerefsudur olan emr-ü irade-i seniye-i mülukanem 
mucebince hemen ol havaliye izam kılınmıĢ ve bazı mahallerde erbab-ı töhmeti ele 
geçirmek için ferik müĢarünileyhin kuvve-i askeriyeye muhtaç olması muhtemel 
olduğundan bu babda [20] tenbihat-ı mukteziye neĢr olunması kaziyesi dahi Serdar-ı 
Ekrem canibine bildirilmiĢ olmağın müĢarünileyhin memuriyet ve mezuniyetini havi 
Divan-ı [21] Hümayun‟um-dan mahsusen iĢbu emr-i celil-ül kadirim ısdar ve ita 
olunmağla siz ki vülat-ı müĢarünileyhimsiz keyfiyet malum-u dirayet-melzumunuz 
oldukda bu madde [22] mevadd-ı saireye bir vechile kıyas kabul etmeyip begayet dikkat 
ve itina olunacak Ģey olmasıyla bunların izame-i fırsat ve ikate-i vakt olunmayarak [23] 
hemen sürat-i icra-i cezalarına ikdam ve dikkat olunmadığı halde tesamuh edenler 
hakkında dahi netayic ve himayeyi mzdi [?] olacağından [24] ferik-i müĢarünileyhin ber 
muceb-i talimat icra edeceği hususatda tarafınızdan dahi muavenet-i külliye ve 
takayyüdat-ı mukteza-i mütevaliyenin ifası [25] ve erbab-ı töhmetin derhal ele 
getirilerek muhakeme ve tedipleri icra olunmak üzere ferik-i müĢarünileyhe teslimi 
hususuna bezl-i bari mekinet [?] [26] eyliyesiz ve sen ki ferik-i müĢarünileyhsin sen 
                                                 
1186 (Yalnız Midhat Efendi‟nin memuriyet emr-i alisine derc olunmak üzere) ve düvel-i müttefika 
asakir-i muavenesinin muhtaç oldukları zehair ve erzakın tedarik ve itası maddesinde tecviz-i 
kusur eyledikleri  [marginal note in the original] 
1187 (bu dahi) ve zikr olunan asakir-i muavenenin iĢlerini teshil etmek vazife-i zimmet olduğu halde 
hilafına hareket edenlerin tedibi tehir olunamayacağından [marginal note in the original] 
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dahi mukteza-i memuriyetin üzere hemen bu taraftan hareket ve zikr olunan mahallere 
azimetle [27] geĢt ü güzar eylediğin yerlerde o misillu harekat-ı feciaya cesaret eden 
baĢıbozuk takımının ve gerek sair eĢrar makulesinin [28] tarafına ita olunan talimat 
meal ve müeddasına ve zikr olunan emr-i aliĢanım ahkamına tatbikan muhakeme-i 
lazımeleri bil-icra sahib-i töhmet [29] haklarında lazım gelen mücazat-ı Ģedidenin 
hemen bila istizan ve bila ikate-i vakit icrası ve memurlardan her kim iğmaz ve tesamuh 
[30] etmiĢ ve eder ise anların dahi tedibat-ı lazımeleri icra olunmak üzere bil-etraf 
Dersaadet‟ime beyan ve iĢ‟arı hususuna ikdam [31] ve dikkat ve böyle Ģeylerde hatır ve 
gönüle ve büyük ve küçüklüğe bakılmayıp ihkak-ı hak ve icra-ı adalet olunması lazım 
geleceği misillu [32] bicürüm olan ve ırz ve edebiyle mkbd [?] bulunanlar haklarında bir 
guna teaddi vuku bulmaması emr-i ehemine dikkat velhasıl kemal-i bitarafi [33] ve 
hakkaniyetle icra-ı emr-i memuriyete bezl-i mahsul-u liyakat eyliyesin ve siz ki elviye 
kaimmakamları ve naib ve müftiler ve kaza müdirleri [34] ve aza-i mecalis ve sair 
mumaileyhimsiz mazmun-u emr-ü ferman-ı mülukanem sizin dahi meczumunuz 
oldukda ferik-i müĢarünileyhin ber minval-i muharrer [35] icra edeceği kaffe-i 
hususatda tarafınıza vaki olacak ifadatı vechile hareketle o makule ashab-ı ceraimin 
ketm ve ihfa olunmayarak [36] meydana çıkarılıp ihkak-ı hak olunmasında emr-i 
hümayunumun hilafı hal ve hareket vuku bulur ise hakkınızda muceb-i eĢedd-ü [37] 
mesuliyet ve vahamet olacağından ona göre ifa-yı lazıme-i kargüzari ve sadakatmendiye 
[?] sarf u sa‟y u kudret edesiz. [38] ġöyle bilesiz alamet-i Ģerifeme itimad kılasız. 
 
[39] Mecidiye niĢan-ı hümayunumun ikinci rütbesini haiz ve hamil halen Silistre ve 
Vidin valileri Vezir Mehmed Said PaĢa ve Abdurrahman Sami [40] PaĢa iclalehumaya 
ve rical-i devlet-i aliyemden Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye Katib-i Sanisi olup bu 
defa zikri ati hususa [41] memur ve tayin kılınan Ahmed Midhat dame uluvvuhuya ve 
elviye kaimmakamları dame mecidihum ve naib ve müftiler zide ilmihum ve kaza 
müdirleri [42] ve aza-yı mecalis ve vücuh-u memleket zide kadrihum Rumeli‟nin sağ 
kolu ile Balkan‟ın Tuna tarafına varınca aslı gibi. 
 
Appendix 103. HR. SYS. 1354/60 lef 1. Letter to Sheikh “Shemuil” on the 
kidnapped Georgian women. [Also available at İ. HR. 114/5577 lef 2] 
 
[On the envelope] Faziletlu zehadetlu fütüvvetlu daver-i ekrem ġeyh ġemuil efendi-i 
sütude Ģiyem hazretlerinin savb-ı Ģeriflerine  
 
Faziletlu zehadetlu fütüvvetlu daver-i ekremim efendi-i sütude Ģiyem hazretleri 
 
[1] Zat-ı fazilet-na‟t-ı kiramileri bihavlihi sübhan ve teala birçok zamanlardan beru 
savlet-i Ģeciane ve mekanet ve metanet-i hamiyetkarane ile def‟-i sail-i düĢmen ile 
vikaye-i hukuk ve namus ve muhafaza-i memleket ve millet iderek ve cibilliyet-i 
insaniyet ve [2] ketibe-i merdanegi ve besaletde meslek-i sedad ve sevab-ı ictihad 
buyurmuĢ oldukları ziver-i sahaif-i a‟vâm ve her halde tevfik-i selamet ve muzafferiyet-
i himemkârileri efsayı mekasıd ve meram olub ziver-i liva-yı nusret-i iltivalarında [?] 
cansiperane [3] sarf-ı mesai ve cuhud iden Ģucuanın [?] meslek-i Ģecaate ve kavaid-i 
merğube-i insaniyet ve nasfete riayetlerinden dolayı medayih-i müstahikkeleri dahi her 
tarafda iĢidildikçe muceb-i tahsin olmakda iken baĢıbozuk asakirinden bir takım haĢarat 
[4] Gürcistan tarafında muteberan-ı ahaliden ve ashab-ı iktidardan bir ademin kendü 
halinde ve sayfiyesinde bulunan etfal ve ıyali üzerine hücum ve iktiham iderek mezkur 
sayfiyede bulunan iki genç kız ile bunların muallimesini idam eyledikleri ve Ģahs-ı [5] 
merkumun zevcesiyle diğer nisvanı cibale nakl ettikleri ve iĢbu eĢhas-ı ğasibe güya 
maiyet-i saadetlerinde bulunan asakirin bir Ģirzime-i müfrezesinden olduğu kemal-i 
teessüfle istihbar olunmuĢdur. Zat-ı mekarim-semahatleri daima ahkam-ı münife-i [6] 
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Ģer‟i Ģerifin ve fariza-yı adalet ve hakkaniyetin icrasına merai olduklarından bu misillu 
bîgünah olan etfal ve nisvan haklarında ber-minval-i muharrer zulm u teaddi tarikine 
gidenlerin te‟dibine ve terbiyelerine taraf-ı müstecmi‟-üĢ Ģereflerinden himmet 
buyurmuĢ olacaklarında [7] Ģübhe yoğ ise de bu vukuat-ı facianın her tarafda Ģüyuu ve 
intiĢarı hemiĢe diyanet ve insaf ile zinetker-i [?] mesami‟ olan nam-ı fazilet ittisam-ı 
fazilanelerinin elsine-i enamda su-i iĢtiharını müstedi olacağından ve bu makule ef‟al-i 
kabiha nezd-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟de cümle indinde menfur olarak böyle Ģeyler enva-i 
mehazir ve mazarratı müstelzem olacağında dahi Ģübhe olmadığından erbab-ı cünha 
haklarında lazım gelen te‟dibatın sürat-i icrası ve ba‟d ez in bu misillu harekat-ı zulmiye 
vukua gelememesi tedabir-i muktezasının istihsali hususunda ziyadesiyle tacil 
buyurulmak lazım geleceğine binaen kendüyi bilmez ve sunuf-u ibada Ģamil olan 
merhamet ve adalet-i behiyyenin [?] kadr-i celilini idrak itmez bazı cühela canibinden 
vukuu mervi olan o makule ef‟al-i mezmume ve gayri meĢrua hakkında icra-yı tahkikat 
buyurularak  anların mücazat-ı layıkalarının serian icrasiyle beraber o makule eyadi-i 
zulmiyeye geçmiĢ olan nisvan ve etfalin dahi hanelerine ve müteallik bulundukları 
ademlere teslim ve itasına sarf-ı mekdaret ve bu vechile cebr-i mafate riayet 
buyurulması ve silah derdest olarak muharib bulunduğu halde maktul olanlardan maada 
bi gayri hakkın idam olunan mazlumanın ahkak-ı hukuku ve bi-lütf-i teala zabt olunan 
ve gerek bundan sonra teshir buyurulacak memleketlerde mutavattın olan ibad-ı ehlin 
her kanğı din ve mezhebde bulunur ise bulunsun cümlesinin adalet-i Ģamile-i Ģeriat-ı 
ğarraya mütesaviyen istihkakları bedihi [?] olduklarından bu kabilden olan ahalinin dahi 
temin ve irahe-i kulublarına ve her halde refah ve asayiĢlerine bakılması ve asıl Rusya 
askerinden hengam-ı muharebede esir edilenlerin dahi müddet-i esarette mesken ve 
makulat ve melbusatlarına kavaid-i mer‟iye-i düveliye üzere güzelce baktırılması 
Devlet-i Aliyye nezdinde matlub ve mültezem olarak bu keyfiyetin savb-ı samilerine 
iĢarı hususu irade-i seniye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahi müteallik ve Ģerefsudur buyurulmuĢ 
ve bu babda Ģifahen dahi icray-ı tefhimat memuriyetiyle Dağıstani Enis Efendi 
mahsusen savb-ı alilerine gönderilmiĢ olmağla inĢallahu teala led-el vusul surethal-i 
malum-ı fazilaneleri buyuruldukta ketibe-i Ġslamiyenin ittisaf ile iĢtiharına vesile olan 
esbab-ı menfurenin indifaıyla isbat-ı müddea-yı ma'delet ve diyanete sarf-ı mesai ve 
taraf-ı halisanemiz dahi asar-ı mebrure ve tevcihat-ı samimiye-i mehasin-Ģi‟arileriyle 
mübahi buyurulmak ve balada zikrolunan kesanın hamil-i tahrirat-ı senaveri olup Ģayan-
ı itimad zat marifetiyle familyaları tarafına iade ve teslim olunmaları hususuna bezl-i 
cell ü meknet olunmak vabeste-i fazilet ve himmet-i rufi[?]leridir.  
 
Appendix 104. HR. SYS. 1353/15 lef 2, dated 29 June 1855. From the governor of 
Baghdad. British consul in Musul is recruiting cavalry volunteers with 150 piastres 
of pay.  
 
Maruz-ı çaker-i kemineleridir ki 
 
Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu canibinden havale olunan güzeĢte maaĢın istihsali zımnında 
Musul‟a gelmiĢ olan Sergerde Laz Osman Ağa‟ya ve maiyetinde bulunacak yüzbaĢı ve 
zabitana müstevfi ve neferat-ı saireye dahi [2] gayr ez tayinat ve masarifat Ģehriye yüz 
elli kuruĢ maaĢ tahsis olunarak beĢ yüz nefer süvarinin tahririne Musul‟da mukim 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi konsolosu tarafından mübaĢeret olunduğu keyfiyetine [3] dair 
Musul mutasarrıfı Saadetlu Hilmi PaĢa hazretleri bendeleri tarafından bu kere su-i 
aciziye bir kıta tahrirat vürud etmiĢ ve tahrirat-ı mezkure mefadına nazaran konsolos-u 
mumaileyhin maaĢ-ı zaid ile [4] oralarda asker terğib ve tahrir eylemekte olduğu misillu 
devlet-i müĢarünileyha memurlarının Bağdad havalisinden dahi maaĢ-ı zaid ile asker 
tahrir edecekleri istima‟ olunmuĢ olup düvel-i müttefikanın [5] gerek iĢbu tahrir 
edecekleri asker hususunda ve gerek hususat-ı sairede murad ve niyetleri hayır ve 
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menfaatten ibaret olması meczum bulunmasıyla egerçi bu babda ez her cihet muavenat-ı 
lazıme [6] icrasına cümle tarafından sa‟y ve ikdam olunmak vacibeden ise de beyandan 
müstağni olduğu ve malum-ı dakayık-mevsum-ı hıdivileri buyurulduğu veche üzere 
buralarda Anadolu ve Arabistan [7] ve Rumeli tarafları gibi mahalli ahalisi istihdam 
olunamayıp bu havalide müstahdem bulunan neferat-ı muvazzafanın cümlesi evvel ve 
ahir hezar meĢakkatle Rum ve Anadolu canibinden celp olunmuĢ ve bunlara [8] Ģimdiye 
kadar Ģehriye maa masarif yetmiĢer kuruĢ maaĢ verilmekte bulunmuĢ olduğundan Ģu 
aralık ol suretle iki üç kat ziyade maaĢ verildiği ve memleketleri olan Rum tarafına sevk 
[9] olunacaklarını anladıkları gibi burada bir nefer Türk olarak asker kalmayıp cümleten 
asker yazılarak gidecekleri cihetle bu havalinin kuvve-i askeriyesine külliyen halel 
geleceğine ve Rusyalu‟nun ise [10] sureta [sür ta?] Kars ve bağteten [?] Bayezid 
kolundan Kürdistan havalisine icra-i su-i kasd ile ahalisi olan ekradı tağlit birle 
Dersaadet ile Musul ve Bağdad beyninde olan tarik-i muhabere ve amedĢüdi [11] kat‟ 
ile hıtta-i Irakiyeyi istianeden mahrum eyledikten sonra Ġranlu‟yu Süleymaniye ve 
Muhammere taraflarından Bağdad üzerine taslite yeltenmek niyat-ı fasidesinde olduğu 
teferrüs ve istihbar olunması [12] üzerine buranın teksir-i kuvve-i askeriyesi hususuna 
gece ve gündüz çalıĢılmakta ve hariçten adem celp olunmakta iken konsolos-ı 
mumaileyhin mevcud olan askeri elden çıkarmaları hatır- [13] güzar-ı acizi olduğundan 
baĢka asakir-i merkume Anadolu‟dan öte tarafa geçemiyecekleri ve bir iĢ göremeyerek 
beyhude yere buradan çıkmıĢ olacakları ve bu havalinin istihsal-i esbab-ı [14] 
muhafazasıyla mehazir-i mezkurenin vukua gelmemesi dahi düvel-i müttefikanın 
cümleten mültezemleri olduğu meczum bulunduktan naĢi mehazir-i vakıa keyfiyetini 
bil-istizan ol babda irade-i seniye [15] zuhuruna değin asakir-i merkumeyi tahrirde bazı 
mertebe teenni eylemesi hususunun münasibi vechile konsolos-ı mumaileyhe ifade 
eylemesini cevaben mutasarrıf-ı müĢarünileyh bendelerine iĢ‟ar ve inha ve keyfiyet 
devlet-i [16] müĢarünileyhanın Bağdad‟da mukim konsolosu cenablarına dahi ifade ve 
ima kılınmıĢ olduğuna mebni mücerred ariza ve hakikat-i hal maruzunda takdim-i 
arizaya ibtidar olunmuĢtur. Ol babda ve her halde [17] emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül 
emrindir. Fi 13 ġevval [?] [12]71.  
Bende 
MüĢir-i orduy-i Irak ve mücavir ve Vali-i eyalet-i Bağdad 
Mehmed ReĢid [Sealed] 
 
Appendix 105. HR. SYS. 1192/1 lef 55 ve 57, dated 10 November 1855. Stratford de 
Redcliffe to His Excellency Fuad Pasha. Grain exports. 
 
 The Undersigned has had the honor to receive the Porte's official note announcing 
its intention to prohibit the exportation of grain from the Turkish Dominions. Whatever 
it is proper for him to do with respect to so important a measure will have his immediate 
atteintion. He has already transmitted the necessary information to his Government. He 
holds it to be his duty at the same time to submit the following brief remarks to the 
serious consideration of His Excellency Fuad Pasha. 
 The right to export grain from the coasts and harbours of Turkey is secured by 
Treaty to British subjects as part of the produce of that Empire, and it is only as an 
indispensable object of subsistence that grain can be occasionally withheld from 
exportation without affording just cause of complaint. The occasion must be one of 
necessity, and the suspension of the right to export is to be limited in each case by the 
extent and duration of that necessity.   
 In the present instance there is no doubt information to warrant a belief that 
scarcity exists. But there is also reason to believe that the scarcity is partial. Measures, 
moreover, might be taken to facilitate the conveyance of grain from the interior to the 
528 
coast without resorting to the extremity of prohibition, or, at all events, without 
extending prohibition to the next harvest.  
 With respect to that period it may be observed that the term employed fixes no 
definite time. In this extensive empire the wheat harvest varies locally from April to 
July. The Porte, therefore, in extending its prohibition to the next harvest creates an 
uncertainty which is anything but favorable to commercial enterprise.  
 The Undersigned perceives with satisfaction that an exceptions is made in favor of 
the Allied Fleets and Armies and he hopes that the Porte will also in justice make 
exception for export contracts signed before the notification, especially as the term of 
notice is by no means long. This is the more desirable, as any disappointment in the 
fulfillment of contracts may be severely felt in those parts of Western Europe where the 
last crops are known to have been deficient. 
 The Undersigned has the honor to renew to His Excellency Fuad Pasha the 
assurances of his high considerations. 
 
Stratford de Redcliffe 
Therapia, November 10
th
, 1855. 
 
Appendix 105. HR. TO. 424/37 lef 2, 20 Rebiyyülahir 1271 (30 December 1855). 
Translation of Muhammed Emin’s Arabic letter to the Porte on Sefer Pasha’s 
attack on him. 
 
Hakpay-i mualla-i hazret-i sadaretpenahiye Mehmed Emin mühür ve imzasıyla memhur 
ve mumzi fi 20 R sene 72 tarihiyle müverrehan takdim olunmuş olan Arabiyy-ül ibare 
arizanın tercümesidir. 
 
ġapsuğ nam beldede Serdar-ı Ekrem hazretlerinin emr ü iradeleri ve Sefer PaĢa'nın reyi 
mutazammım olarak bina eylediğim mahkemeye azimet-i bendeganemde mumaileyh 
Sefer PaĢa bir takım kutta-i tarik ve casus makulesi asker göndererek [2] tarafıma 
gelecek ademlerin eslihalarını selb ve müttefikim bulunanların hanelerini garet ve nehb 
ve kulunuzla dahi muharebe ettiler ise de tâb-âver-i muka[ve]met olamayıp firar ve 
badehu paĢa-i mumaileyh asakir-i nizamiye ile üç kıta top [3] ve bir takım haydudları 
dahi cem‟ edip Anapa'dan Abaza tarikleri üzerine azimet ve ulema ve saliha zevatın ve 
ehl-i Ġslamın mal ve menâlini yağma ve garet ve kendilerini rabt ü bend edip tekrar 
kulunuzla muharebeye [4] ibtidar ve yine firar ettiler. Kendisiyle muhakeme olunmak-
lığı çendan istedim ise de muvafık olamadım ve süvari mirlivası Ali PaĢa dahi erbab-ı 
fesad ile ittifak ederek Çerakise ile hafi meclisler tertib ve tahrikat-ı nefsaniyeye [5] 
mütebais [?] ederek bunları ifsad ve Ġslam meyanesine ilka-ı fitne ve Ģikak eylemiĢtir. 
Keyfiyat-ı vakıaya nazaran bu taraflarda din-i Ġslam munkarız olmasından havf oluna-
cağı malum-ı asafaneleri buyuruldukta ve her halde [6] emr ü irade efendimindir. 
 
Appendix 106. HR. TO. 222/26, dated 15 January 1856. Extract from the report of 
the British consulate in Erzurum on the corruption of the governor [kaimmakam] 
of Muş Ömer Pasha and his bribes to the governor [vali] of Erzurum and the 
commander [müşir] of the Anatolian army.  
 
 Some time since a very large deputation came from Moosh to complain of the 
conduct of Omer Pasha who paid to Ismail Pasha the last Valy, 50,000 Piastres, to 
secure him the Post. As was natural, Omer Pasha indemnified himself amply for the 
sum his place cost him by plundering the people, who were so ill treated, that they came 
hither to solicit his recall, when Omer Pasha was called here to answer for his conduct. 
He has been long endeavouring to make interest with the Valy to get reappointed to 
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Moosh, but I warned His Excellency that I protested against Omer Pasha being sent 
back. 
 I now find that Omer Pasha is to return to Moosh. This has been related to me as 
the means he used. The Valy said he could not take the responsibility on himself, and 
referred him to the Mushir, who granted his request. There can be no doubt that a large 
direct bribe was given both to the Mushir and to the Valy. Omer Pasha, in the summer 
contracted to deliver Diarbekir rice for the troops, but the quality was so bad, that it was 
refused by the Medglis, and it was declared not worth P 10 per Batman. However lately 
it was taken by the same Mejlis for P 22 per Batman. The head of the Mejlis had been 
meantime changed, in the first instance, it was Tahir Pasha, and in the last, Etem Pasha, 
the creature of the Mushir. It is strongly suspected that the Mushir received a large 
portion of the difference between the real value of the Rice, and the exaggerated price 
paid. I have little doubt, fully as much was given to the Mushir by Omer Pasha for his 
confirmation, and something in proportion to the Valy Pasha.  
 
Appendix 107. HR. TO. 222/30 lef 2, dated 25 January 1856. Stratford à Monsieur 
Etienne Pisani. 
 
Copy.            Palais d‟Angleterre 
le 25 Janvier 1856 
Monsieur 
 Sous le même pli avec cette instruction vous recevez un mémorandum en français 
relatif aux privilèges et reformes administratives dont la Porte s‟accuse de concert avec 
les Allies, et une note officielle en Anglais, accompagnée d‟une traduction turque, 
relative aux persécutions religieuses. Vous vous empressez de présenter ces pièces à 
Son Excellence Fuad Pasha après en avoir donné lecture à Son Altesse le Grand Visir. 
Celle qui concerne les privilèges, est confidentielle, mais les Ministres Ottomans 
peuvent en faire tel usage qu‟ils jugent convenable, en la soumettant même à S. M. le 
Sultan et à leurs Collègues. C‟est le même mémorandum dont il a été question dans 
notre seconde réunion chez le Grand Visir. 
 Il m‟est revenu que je suis supposé d‟attacher moins d‟importance que les 
Représentants de France et d‟Autriche à ce que la permission de posséder des biens 
fonds en Turquie soit accordée aux étrangers. J‟ai à coeur de faire savoir que cette 
supposition est tout à fait erronée. Je suis convaincu, au contraire, que le rapprochement 
cordial de la Turquie à l‟Europe est essentiel au bien-être et au maintien de l‟Empire 
Ottoman, et que la mesure la plus efficace dans ce sens ne serait autre que la faculté 
assurée aux étrangers d‟y posséder les immeubles de toute espèce. 
 Quant à la Note, elle est à peu près identique en substance avec ce que j‟ai soumis 
au Ministère Ottoman il y a déjà plusieurs semaines par l‟ordre exprès de mon 
Gouvernement, soit de bouche soit par écrit. Les hésitations qui se sont laissées 
apercevoir dans les réponses des Ministres en dernier lieu, m‟imposent le devoir de 
présenter sans plus de retard cette pièce formelle, que j‟avais déjà préparée il y a deux 
mois environs - ce dont la date porte témoignage et j‟espère que la S. P. en prendra 
connaissance avec les sentimens [sic] que j‟aime à lui attribuer. 
 Il ne me reste qu‟à ajouter un mot en confirmation de mes opinions déjà plus 
d‟une fois exprimées, relativement à l‟admissibilité de toutes les classes aux conseils et 
aux emplois publics de l‟Empire. Dans l‟état actuel des choses c‟est l‟union seule des 
classes qui, à mon avis, peut rendre à l‟Empire la force qui lui manque dans l‟intérieur, 
et sans la mesure, que je viens de nommer, toute union réelle est une impossibilité.  
 Je suis etc. 
 [Signed] Stratford de Redcliffe  
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[Marginal note in Turkish] Hıfz olunsun 
 
HR. TO. 222/30 lef 1. 
 
Le Gouvernement de S. M. le Sultan continuera à faciliter l‟exploitation des ressources 
matérielles de l‟Empire, en y appliquant d‟une manière efficace les fonds nécessaires. Il 
formera des établissements convenables pour cet objet. Il veillera surtout à ce que de 
bonnes communications soient ouvertes par eau et par terre pour le transport des 
produits et l‟encouragement de leur consommation. Tout ce qui opère comme 
obstruction au progrès de l‟agriculture, de l‟industrie, et du commerce sera au plutôt 
examiné de fond et reformé dans l‟intérêt de leur développement complet, et de manière 
à leur assurer le concours et l‟aide de la science, des capitaux et des bras de l‟Europe.  
 
Appendix 108. HR. SYS. 1355/28, dated 12 February 1856. Hassa müşiri Selim 
Pasha on the interference of British officers in internal affairs and his request to be 
apppointed to somewhere else. 
 
Devletlu atufetlu efendim hazretleri 
 
Mukaddema dahi arz ve beyan kılındığı ve diğer ariza-i mütekaddime-i bendeganem ve 
melfuf tezkire mütalaasından keyfiyet bil etraf rehin-i ilm-i sami-i cenab-ı cihan-aĢina-i 
hıdivileri buyurulacağı vechile [2] Anadolu orduy-ı hümayunu refakatine memur 
Ġngiltere devlet-i fahimesi zabitanının Ģimdiye kadar orduy-ı mezkurun umur-i 
dahiliyesiyle kumandanların umur ve rey-i mütalaarına müdahale ve tağlit ederek [3] 
önü kestirilmesi hasb el vakıa mümkün olamamıĢ ve geçenlerde takdim kılınan 
maruzat-ı bendeganemin birinde keyfiyet müdahale-i vakıaları bir nebze beyan ve 
hikaye kılınması üzerine devlet-i müĢarünileyha sefaretine [4] tebligat-ı lazımenin 
icrasına irade-i seniye-i cenab-ı mülukane müteallik buyurulmuĢ olmaktan naĢi icabı 
icra buyurulduğu Ģerefvarid olan tahrirat-ı aliye-i hıdivileriyle beyan ve iĢar buyurulmuĢ 
idi. ġu hale göre [5] sefaret-i mezkure tarafından kendülere tayin ve iĢar vuku 
bulmasıyla zabitan-ı mumaileyhimin vezaif-i memuriyetleri dairesinden hariç bir 
maddeye açıktan müdahale etmemeleri memul ise de [6] bundan dolayı mumaileyhimin 
muğberr-ül-hatır olmalarıyla cüzi ve külli bir Ģey serriĢte ederek sefaretler tarafına 
herbar iĢtika ve isnad-ı salim-i yeniden? hali olmayacakları ve bu cihetle evliya-i umur 
[7] hazeratının tasdi-i seralilerini mucib bazı makalat [?] tekevvün edeceği melhuz olub 
hatta görüĢmek üzere tayin eyledikleri saatte gelmeyip üç saat mürurundan sonra gelmiĢ 
ve bu kadar [8] gelmelerine muntazır olmasına ve Avrupa kaidesince bu babda 
taraflarından beyan-ı mazeret lazımeden bulunmuĢ iken bilakis çakerlerine azv u 
kabahata ibtidar ile keyfiyet iğrazını ve Bab-ı Ali ile sefaretleri tarafına [9] arz-ı iĢtika 
edeceklerini ala-mela-en-nas tahrir ve izbar eylemeleri mülahazat ve efali musaddık 
görünmüĢ ve hasb el vakıa bunun önü kestirilmesi mutaasır ve çakerleri burada kaldıkça 
daima böyle cüzi [10] Ģeye külli nazarıyla bakılarak bir takım sadaı mucib olacağı emr-i 
bâhir olmasıyla rabbim göstermesin bunca senelerden beru çalıĢıp kazanmıĢ olduğum 
tevcihat-ı ihsanat-ı aliye-i sipehsalarilerini Ģu yüzden [11] kaybedeceğim ve bunlar ile 
iĢtigal olunan tesviye-i mesalih orduda tekamül vukuu ile bilahare taht-ı mesuliyette 
kalacağım vahamesi doğrusu kullarını vadi-i hayrete düĢürmüĢ ve bir de buraların [12] 
ab u havasıyla imtizaç edemeyerek bi hakk-ı Hüda bu tarafa geleli tedavi ve mualece ile 
vakit geçirmekte olduğum ve mukaddema takdimine mütecasir olduğum ariza-i 
mufassala-i bendeganemin bend-i ahirinde beyan olunduğu [13] üzere bu havali umuru 
kesb-i cesame ve nezaket ederek tesviyesine çalıĢılması sıhhat-i vücud ile beraber bir 
tarafdan müdahale vuku bulmasıyla husule geleceğine ve sıhhat-i vücud olmadığı 
misillü balada muharrer [14] olduğu vechile çakerleri burada oldukça müdahaleden hali 
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olmayacakları müstehıkk ve meczum-i bendeganem bulunmuĢ olduğuna mebni lutfen 
ve ihsanen ve hakk-ı na-müstahakk-ı çakeranemde min el kadim meĢhud olan ihsan [15] 
inayet-i aliye-i hıdivilerine alakaten ve sahihen [?] mesbuk olan ve istida ve niyaz-ı 
bendeganem vechile devletlu Ġsmail PaĢa hazretlerinin veyahud münasib diğer bir zatın 
buraya memuriyetleriyle kullarının Ģuradan [16] istihlasım her ne esbaba menut ise 
iktizasının icrası hususuna müsaade-i lutf-âde-i bendeperverileri Ģayan buyurulması 
niyaz-ı mahsusa-i çakeranem olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i 
veliyy-ül emrindir. Fi 5 C sene [12]72.  
Bende 
MüĢir-i hassa [sealed] Mehmed Selim  
An Erzurum 
 
Appendix 109. HR. SYS. 1352/35, dated 9 Şaban 1272 / 15 April 1856. From the 
governor of Harput. Sabık Harput Müftüsü. “İngilterelülere iane eyleyen ve 
bunların hizmetlerinde bulunanlar din-i İslam’dan çıkmış olacağı..” 
 
Maruz-u çakerleridir ki 
 
Sabık Harput müftisi Hacı Efendizade Hacı Ömer Efendi daileri bundan akdem cami-i 
Ģerifte vaaz ve tedris esnasında Ġngilterelülere iane eyleyen ve bunların hizmetlerinde 
bulunanlar din-i Ġslam‟dan çıkmıĢ olacağını güya [2] söylemiĢ olduğu misillu sair 
hocalar dahi Hıristiyanların gasb-ı emvalini tecviz eyledikleri ve halbuki halkın efkarını 
bozacak bu misillu rivayetler bu taraftan tedarik olunacak bargircilerin adem-i 
azimetlerine sebep [3] olarak umur-u nakliye memurlarının mesalihine sekte iras 
edeceği canib-i sefaretten ifade olunmuĢ olduğu beyan-ı alileriyle iĢbu rivayat neden 
neĢet etmiĢtir ve ne mealde ve sebebe mebni söylenmiĢtir tahkikiyle keyfiyetin [4] iĢ‟arı 
ve Ģayet hilaf-ı memul bazı ashab-ı garaz taraflarından o makule kelimat-ı gayr-ı layıka 
neĢr olunmakta ise derhal önü kestirilerek bunu neĢr edenlerin ahval ve etvarlarının dahi 
bildirilmesi vasıl-ı hame tazim olan [5] emirname-i sami-i vekaletpenahilerinde emr ü 
ferman buyurulmuĢ olup efendi-i mumaileyh daileri meclise celp ile istintak olundukta 
egerçi bundan altı ay mukaddem cami-i Ģerifte vaaz ve tedris esnasında cümle Ġngiltere 
[6] devlet-i fahimesinin bargircilik hizmetine yazılanlar tarafından ve andan [?] 
mukaddem Ġngilterelilere hizmet etmekte diyanetçe bir bais var mıdır yollu kendisinden 
olunan suale cevaben medar-ı taayyüĢ içün kanğı millete bir adem yazılsa [7] bais 
olunmaz ve dininden çıkmaz lakin beline zünnar takmaz ise kâfi olur mealinde söz 
söyleyip bundan baĢka bir Ģey tefevvüh etmediğini mecliste ifade ve tezkar ederek bu 
sözü kaza-yı mezkur bargircilerinin bazısı [8] anlayarak anlamayanlar dahi kalıb-ı ahere 
ifrağ ile tefevvüh etmeğe baĢlayıp efendi-i mumaileyh dailerinin efkar-ı adile-i saltanat-
ı seniyeye malumat-ı kafiyesi olarak zaten kendisi sair hocalar gibi mutaassıp 
olmadığından [9] böyle Ģeylere iliĢik etmediği gibi bazılarını dahi kendisinden istifsar 
vukuunda Ġngilizlere hizmet etmek üzere teĢvik eylediği cümle tarafından haber verilip 
mumaileyhin bu halini bazı mutaassıpların [10] çekemediklerinden hakkında böyle 
ifade ve iftiraya tasaddi eyledikleri ve esna-i vaazda vuku bulan ifadatını anlamayan bir 
takım bargirci makulesinin dahi zikr olunan hocalar bir mertebe daha efkarlarını 
bozacak [11] suretle Hacı Ömer Efendi böyle vaaz etti yollu sözler söylediği ve efendi-i 
mumaileyh dailerinin ifadatı suret-i aherde haber veren bargircilerden çend neferi dahi 
devlet-i müĢarünileyhanın tesviye-i malzemesine [12] memur Sucu [?] Karabet hazır 
olduğu halde celb ile istintak oldukta Hacı Ömer Efendi öyle vaaz etmiĢ deyu çarĢu ve 
bazarlarda ve kahvelerde Ģundan bundan haber aldık dediklerine nazaran rivayat-ı 
mezkurenin [13] li-garazin tekevvün ettirildiği tebeyyün edip merkum Sucu [?]  Karabet 
dahi bu yolda diyecek söz bulamayarak ve ol vakit kendisi Diyarbekir‟de bulunmuĢ 
olduğundan efendi-i mumaileyhin bu makule vaazdan haberi olmayarak [14] fakat 
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bargircilerin kolbaĢısı kendisine öyle yazmıĢ olduğunu ifade eyleyip sair hocaların dahi 
Hıristiyanın gasb-ı emvalini tecviz eylediklerine dair asla ve kat‟a kimsenin malumatı 
olmayarak hatta merkum Sucu [?] Karabet ile [15] mezkur bargirciler dahi  böyle söz 
iĢitmediklerini ifade eylemiĢ oldukları ve saye-i muvaffakiyetvaye-i hazret-i Ģahanede 
Ģimdiki halde buraca o misillu bir guna rivayet olmayarak devlet-i müĢarünileyhanın 
tedarik ve tesviye-i malzemesine [18] cümle tarafından sa‟y ve gayret olunmakta 
bulunmuĢ olduğu maruzunda ariza-i çakeranem terkimine cüret kılınmağla ol babda ve 
her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emr efendimizindir. Fi 9 ġaban 72  
Bende  
Vali-i eyalet-i Harput 
Arif [Sealed] 
 
Appendix 110. HR. SYS. 1928/2, dated 8 May 1856. Extract. Reports of a Muslim 
outbreak against Christians are exaggerated. Smyrna, May 8, 1856. 
 
 Suleiman Pasha proceeded to Magnesia to ascertain whether some reports of an 
intended outbreak on the part of the Mussulman population of that city against the 
Christian community which had been communicated to him by the Greek primates were 
well founded. 
 Suleiman Pasha having convinced himself that these reports were very much 
exaggerated, deemed it necessary to apprehend only three persons – two Turks and one 
Greek, who were forthwith claimed and sent here, and are now in custody at the 
Governor's palace.  
 The Prisoners are accused of having used exasperating language, the Turks 
towards the Christians of the place, and the Greek towards the Turks. These three 
individuals were informed by the pasha of the accusations preferred against them, but 
no explanation or defense was allowed them. 
 Their cases are to be referred to the Porte. 
 I cannot but regret, that H. E. should have proceeded in this matter in the sense of 
the arbitrary principle that has hitherto been the rule of the Turkish magistrates in 
similar cases, and which the Hatti Sheriff is intended to set aside, as it leaves the 
impression on the public mind that the Imperial Firman is an unsubstantial Reform 
which promises much, but effects nothing, and that no reliance can be placed on the 
hopes which were founded upon it.  
 
Appendix 111. HR. TO. 223/30, 30 May 1856. Extract. British Vice Consulate. 
Mitylene. Slave trade. 
 
 Since the commencement of the present year, three vessels under the Turkish 
[Osmanlu] flag, carrying slaves have arrived at this port from Tripoli [Trablusgarp]. 
Their dates of arrival as follows: 
 January the 7
th : The Brig “Beinet” [?] of 300 tons. Captain Abdallah, having on 
board 85 slaves [“köle ve halayık” in official translation].   
 January the 11
th :  The schooner “Eftichia” of 75 tons. Captain Omer, having on 
board 61 slaves.   
 May the 14
th
 : The Brig “Eftichia” of 75 tons. Captain Mehmet, having on board 
100 slaves.   
 None of the slaves on board of the first two mentioned vessels were landed at 
Mitylene, but were taken to Smyrna for sale. Of the slaves on board the Brig “Eftichia” 
only 8 were landed at Mitylene, the rest were taken to Smyrna. 
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Appendix 112. İ. DH. 362/23964, dated 12 Safer 1273 (12 October 1856). 
Interrogation of deserters from the Kars army who became prisoners of war to 
Russia and who returned to Istanbul after the peace treaty. 
 
Anadolu ordu-i hümayununda piyade dördüncü nizamiye alayının üçüncü taburunun 
sekizinci bölüğü çavuĢanından MuĢlu Said Kars muhasarasında Rusya ordusuna firar 
etmiĢ ve geçende Dersaadet‟e gelmiĢ olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi 
Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır. 
 
S[ual]. Sen Kars hastahanesinde memur bulunduğun halde firar etmiĢsin ve bir kısrak 
dahi alıp savuĢmuĢsun. Nereye gidecek idin ve niçün firar etdin? 
C[evap]. Ben alay-ı mezkurda çavuĢ idim. Taburum Bayezid tarafına gitti. Biz birkaç 
askerle perakende olarak Kars‟ta kaldık. Beni hastahaneye memur ettiler. Orada 
hizmetime bakıyordum. Mülazımlık intihabnamesini tanzim eylediler. Lakin Kars‟ta iki 
seneye karib hizmet ettim mülazımlık maaĢı alamayıp çavuĢ aylığı alurdum. Bu cihetle 
borçlu düĢtüm. Vilayetimde çoluk çocuğum aç kaldı. Erzurum‟a gitmek üzere oradan 
savuĢtum ve Tabip Ahmed Efendi‟ye gideceğimi söyledim. O dahi eğer gidecek isen 
benim hayvanımı al beraber git dedi. Her ne kadar götüremem dedim ise de zor [?] etti. 
Ben de mezkur hayvanı alıp Kars‟tan çıktım. Erzurum‟a giderken yolda Rusyalu beni 
tuttu.  
S. Rusyalu seni nerede tuttu? 
C. Gece saat birde iken Kars suyu kenarıyla Kars‟tan çıktım. Dört saat gittim orada beni 
tuttular.  
S. Rusyalu‟nun etrafda olan karakollarını cümleniz bilürdünüz ve hatta gerek askerden 
ve gerek ahaliden una [ona?] gidenleri bile Rusyalu tutardı. Bu hal ile kimsenin çıkıp 
kurtulamayacağını bilmedin mi ki kaçtın ve bahusus senin çıktığın yol doğruca 
Rusyalu‟nun ordusunun önüne giderdi? 
C. Rusyalunun eğerçi oralarda ve her yerde karakolu olduğunu bilmiĢ olsa idim öyle 
kaçar ve kendimi ateĢe atar mıydım? Lakim bilmedim kurtulurum hülyasıyla kaçtım.  
S. Rusya‟dan esir alınarak hastahanede olan bir neferini niçün beraber götürdün? 
C. Hayır ben götürmedim ve haberim yoktur. Vakıa Rusyalunun bir neferi hastahaneden 
benden evvel firar etti lakin nasıl gitti bilmem.  
S. Bizim iĢidip bilmediğimiz hastahanede olan Rusyalu neferi beraber alıp Rusya 
ordusuna götürmüĢsün. Ben bilmem haberim yokdur demek faide etmez. Doğrusu nasıl 
olmuĢ ise söyle. Hatta sen Rusya ordusuna gittiğinde seni karakol altına dahi koymayup 
hakkında ikram etmiĢler niçün saklarsın? 
C. Eğerçi neferi beraber götürmüĢ olsam iĢte kendim götürdüm ve yine ayağımla geldim 
ne yaparsanız yapın derim lakin Ģu neferden asla haberim yokdur. Siz bilürsünüz. 
Rusyalu beni tuttuğunda bana ikram değil karakol altına koydu ve Tiflis‟e gidinceye 
kadar hapsetti ve hatta beni hapsettiklerini topçudan bir çavuĢ vardır o dahi bilür ondan 
sual buyurun. 
S. O çavuĢ nerededir ve ismi nedir? 
C. Ġsmine Hasan ÇavuĢ derler beraber esir idi lakin Ģimdi burada mıdır değil midir 
bilmem. 
S. Sen nereye kadar habs idin? 
C. Tutulduğumdan Tiflis‟e varıncaya kadar ve orada bulunduğum müddetçe mahbus 
idim ve eğerçi gezecek olduğumuz vakitde dahi yanıma karakol korlar idi. 
S. Sen Kars‟ta bulunduğun vakit ben mülazımım deyu daima davada bulunurdun ve 
memuriyetin hastahanede olup sair zabitan ve asker gibi tabyalarda bekleyüp istihkam 
imalinde çalıĢmadın. Mülazım demek küçük zabitdir. Zabit olan adem firar eder mi? 
Niçün kaçdın? 
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C. Kaçdığımın sebebi balada beyan eyledim. Gider ve borçtan ve açlıktan ziyade 
sıkıldım firar ettim.  
S. Namus-ı askeriyeyi vikaye etmeyip kaçdığın Ģöyle dursun. Sen Kars‟ta teehhül ettin 
ve diyorsun ki borçtan ve açlıktan sıkıldım kaçdım. Bir adem aç kalur da yalnız nefsini 
kurtarmak içün ıyalini öyle bikes bırağup da firar eder mi? Bu nasıl insaniyetdir? 
C. Kars‟ta vakıa teehhül ettim ve kayın pederim var idi ıyalimin idaresine bakardı. 
S. Eğer öyle ise senin firarın idaresizlikten firar etmek olmayıp balada söylediğin Ģeyler 
dahi hilaf demek oluyor. 
C. Efendim baĢım sıkılıp tahammül edemedim. Can cümleden akdem olduğundan 
kendimi kurtarırım hülyasıyla kaçtım. 
S. Kars‟ta olan asakir-i nizamiye ve redifeden gerek zabit ve gerek nefer bütün gün 
bütün gece karakol bekler ve tabya yapar ve her dürlü sıkıntıyı çekerdi. Senin anlar gibi 
sıkıntın var mıydı ve anlara ziyade tayin ve mahiye verilip de sana noksanı verilir miydi 
ki kaçtın? 
C. Bir diyeceğim yokdur siz bilürsünüz. Benim diyeceğim üç Ģeydir. Birisi Ģudur ki ben 
Rusya‟ya kaçmadım. Ġkincisi Rusya neferinden haberim yokdur. Üçüncüsü Kars‟ta 
borçtan pek fena sıkıldım. Evde ve odada duramaz oldum. Ya ölürüm veyahud 
kurtulurum, eğer habs ve ta*?* olunursam alayımda olayım deyu her Ģeyi gözüme 
aldırdım. Erzurum‟a gitmek üzere savuĢtum. 
S. Sen zabit bulunduğun halde firar etmek sana töhmet değil midir ki firar ettin? 
C. Töhmet olduğunu bilürdüm lakin borçdan fena suretde sıkıldım. Her ne olursa olur 
ve alayıma gideyim deyu kaçdım.  
S. Firar eden Rusyalu‟dan benim asla haberim yokdur ve bilmem deyu ifadede bulunur 
idin [?]. Yolda gelürken bindiğiniz vapur kapudanı “Sen utanmadın mı firar etmiĢsin ve 
Rusyalu‟yu kaçırmıĢ[sın]?” demesiyle “Hayır öyle değildir. ġu firar eden Rusyalu‟yu 
taharri etmek üzere gittim sonra tutuldum” demiĢsin. 
C. Öyle değildir. Vakıa kapudan bana sual etti ve “Niçün firar ettin ettin ?” dedi. Ben de 
o kadar asakir ve saire içinde halimi uzun uzadıya nasıl ifade edeyim benim kaçdığım 
uzun Ģeydir dedim.  
S. ġimdi biz kapudanı çağırıp sual edersek o zaman ne dersin? 
C. Kapudan gelür öyle söyler ise ne diyeyim. 
 
Mukaddemce Ardahan tarafında kır serdarlığı ile müstahdem olup orada Rusyalu 
tarafından ahz ü gereft olunarak geçende esaretten Dersaadet‟e gelmiĢ olan Ġsmail Ağa 
celb olunarak Ģunun sefinede olan ifadesi nasıldır deyu sual olundukta “Biz gemi ile 
beraber gelür idik. Gemi kapudanı kıç üzerinde bu Said Ağa‟yı celb ederek „Sen 
Rusyalu‟ya kaçmıĢ ve bir Rusyalu‟yu dahi kaçırmıĢsın. Sen utanmaz mısın?‟ dedi. 
Orada „Ben kaçmadım fakat Rusyalu neferini aramak içün gittim, tutuldum‟ dedi.  
 
S. Ġsmail Ağa‟nın ifadesine ne dersin? 
C. Hayır efendim v‟allah-ül azim Ģu Rusyalu‟nun firarından asla haberim yokdur. 
S. Çünkü haberin yokdur geçende kapudana niçün öyle söyledin ve Ģimdi niçün haberim 
yokdur diyorsun?  
C. Kapudan Bey sual etti. Ben de hasb-el icab öyle söyledim. 
 
Merkum komisyona celb olunarak suret ve esbab-ı firariyesi yegan yegan kendüsinden 
sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiĢ olduğu cevabı balada baĢka baĢka gösterilmiĢ ve suret-
i hale nazaran icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuĢ 
olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 12 S sene 
73. 
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[Seals from right to left] BinbaĢı-i sol [?], an aza, Mehmed Selim, BinbaĢı-i Süvari, an 
aza, Ahmed (?), BinbaĢı-i yemin [?], an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti, Kaimmakam-ı yemin [?], 
an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top (?), an aza, Ġbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade (?), an aza, Abdülkadir 
Sadık, Mirliva, an aza, Süleyman Hilmi, Mirliva, an aza, Mustafa Alim, Ferik, reis-i 
komisyon, Hafız.  
 
Anadolu ordu-yı hümayununda piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının birinci taburunun 
yedinci bölüğü çavuĢanından Asitaneli Osman Kars muhasarası esnada [sic] firar etmiĢ 
ve Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü gereft olunarak geçende Dersaadet‟e gelmiĢ olduğundan 
komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır. 
 
S. Kars orduy-ı hümayununda bu kadar asakir-i Ġslamiye ile oranın muhafazasına 
bakılmak üzere bu kadar asker ve [sic] ölünceye kadar sebat olunmuĢ [sic] ve sen dahi 
çavuĢ olduğun cihetle küçük zabitsin. Bölükte olan asakirin muhafazasına bakacak 
yerde zorun ne idi ki firar etdin? 
C. Açlıktan dolayı. Erzurum‟da ihtiyat ordusuna gidip orada yine padiĢahımıza hizmet 
edecek idim. 
S. Nereye kadar gittin ve nerede Rusyalu seni tuttu? 
C. Soğanlı dağına kadar gittim. Rusyalunun atlısı orada beni tuttu. 
S. Rusyalu‟nun karakollarını görmez miydin ve Kars‟dan kimesne dıĢaru çıkamıyarak 
elbette tutulacağını bilmedin mi? 
C. Rusyalunun ordusunu daima görürdüm. Lakin gece haliyle ve belki kurtulurum 
hülyasıyla Rusyalunun birkaç karakolunu geçtim. Soğanlı dağında tutuldum. 
S. Senden baĢka Kars‟da aç adam ve asker yok muydu ve senin tayinatın diğerinden 
noksan mı veriliyordu ve cümle asakir-i Ģahane sabr ü tahammül etti. Sen niçün 
durmayup firar ettin? 
C. Cümlemize bir sibak üzere tayin verilir idi. Lakin ben açlığa sabır ve tahammül 
edemedim ve biraz daha kalsam idi açlıktan telef olacak idim. Anın içün kaçtım.  
S. Tahmas muharebesinden evvel mi sonra mı kaçtın? 
C. Muharebeden kırk beĢ gün sonra kaçtım. Ve benim kaçtığımdan yedi gün sonra Kars 
teslim oldu. 
S. Kars‟dan firar edüp de sonra tutulanlar olur ise hakkında Ģiddet üzere mücazat 
olunacak deyu her bar tenbihat olunurdu. Sen iĢitmedin mi? 
C. Daima iĢidirdim ve lakin açlıkdan zayıf düĢdüm. Erzurum‟a gider açlıktan kurtulu-
rum hülyasıyla kaçdım. 
S. Erzurum‟a gidenler hakkında dahi öyle mücazat olunacak deyu tenbih olunurdu, 
bilmez misin? 
C. Buna dair asla tenbihat iĢitmedim. 
S. Kaçtığın vakit karakolda mıydın ve silah ve arkadaĢın var mıydı ve ne vakit ve nasıl 
kaçtın? 
C. Hafız PaĢa tabyasının dıĢarusunda karakolda idik. Karakol nöbetinde gittik (?). 
Çadırlara gelürken ben oradan gece saat altı raddelerinde kaçdım ve arkadaĢım olmayıp 
silahım var idi. 
S. YüzbaĢı Ġbrahim Ağa, bu çavuĢun firarı karakolda olduğu halde mi vuku‟ bulmuĢtur 
yohsa takriri vechile karakoldan gelürken mi olmuĢtur? 
C. Bunlar karakolda idiler. Nöbet beklerken gece saat üç buçuk sularında firar etmiĢ ve 
beĢ arkadaĢ idiler. Cümlesi ol gece firar eylemiĢdir. 
S. Osman ÇavuĢ, YüzbaĢı Ġbrahim Ağa diyor ki gece karakolda ve beĢ arkadaĢ olduğu-
nuz halde firar etmiĢsiniz. 
C. YüzbaĢı Ġbrahim Ağa ol gece bölüksüz [?] idi. Bölükten iki onbaĢı alup ince karakola 
gidilmesini Mülazım ġaban Ağa bana emretti. Ben de iki onbaĢı alıp karakola gittim. 
Fakat gece ince karakola gittiğimiz vakit yigirmi otuz adım daha ilerüye onbaĢı 
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gönderilürdi. Ben de birinci onbaĢıyı ilerü keĢf noktasına gönderdim. Biraz arası uzadı, 
onbaĢı gelmediğinden acaba nerede kaldı deyu olduğum noktadan ilerüye vardım, 
göremedim. Biraz daha ilerüye ve sağa sola doğru gittim. Bir de gördüm ki orada bir 
kalabalık var. Meğer Rusyalu‟nun atlu karakolu imiĢ. OnbaĢıyı orada tutmuĢlar ben de 
gece haliyle üzerlerine varmıĢ bulunduğumdan beni dahi tuttular. Benimle beĢ adam 
firar ettiğini binbaĢım ile yüzbaĢım söylüyor ise de karakola iki onbaĢı ile gittim. Birisi 
benimle tutulup esir oldu, diğeri buradadır, ismine Halil derler, ondan dahi sual 
buyurun. Sair firar edenlerden haberim yokdur. Belki onları baĢka noktaya gönderdiler, 
zabitimin bileceği Ģeydir. 
S. Halil OnbaĢı, Osman ÇavuĢ‟un firar ettiğini nasıl bilürsün? Doğrusunu söyle. 
C. Bir bölükte idik. Bölük mülazımı ġaban Ağa iki onbaĢı alup ince karakola gidilmesi-
ni Osman ÇavuĢ‟a emretti. O dahi benimle Hasan OnbaĢı‟yı aldı. Karakola gittik ve 
usul üzere noktalara durup bekler idik. Aradan yarım saat kadar geçti. Osman ÇavuĢ ile 
Hasan OnbaĢı kayboldular. Fakat ol gece ortalık ziyadesiyle karanlık idi. Nasıl 
savuĢtuklarını görmedim. Nöbetden değiĢtik. Bunların savuĢtuğunu ġaban Ağa‟ya 
söyledim. Bunlardan baĢka tabur malı olarak bir çavuĢ ve sınıf-ı taliden elhak [?] 
verilenlerden yine bir çavuĢ ve bir onbaĢı daha kaçmıĢ olduğunu iĢitdim. Bu kadar 
bilürüm. 
S. Bu çavuĢ ile onbaĢının onları [?] firar edeceklerine bölükte lakırdı [?] ettiklerini bilür 
misin ve iĢitdin mi? 
C. Bunların kaçtığı gece karakola çıkılurken bana biz kaçacağız ister isen sen de beraber 
kaçalım dediler. Onlar firar etti ben kaçmadım.  
S. Çünkü böyle ince karakolda bulunmuĢsunuz sen sadakatin üzere kaçmamıĢsın ne 
güzel lakin bunların kaçacağını zabitlere niçün haber vermedin? 
C. Karakola çıktığımızda yanımızda baĢka zabit yoğidi. Zabit yerine bu çavuĢu yollattı. 
Noktadan ayrılıp haber veremedim ki noktadan ayrıldığım içün kabahatli olmayayım. 
S. Osman ÇavuĢ senin anlattığın Ģeyler birbirine benzemiyor. Bunun doğrusunu söyle. 
ĠĢte Halil OnbaĢı‟nın takririni sana okuduk.  
C. Benim ifadem evvelki söylediğim gibidir. Lakin öyle kaçacağım lakırdısını söyleme-
dim. Eğerçi Hasan OnbaĢı söylemiĢ ise bilmem.  
S. OnbaĢı Hasan Ģimdi nerededir? 
C. Benimle beraber tutuldu ve esir oldu. Tiflis‟de hastalanup vefat etti.  
S. Senin karakol nöbetinde durduğun nokta ile keĢif noktasının arası nihayet doksan 
adım kadar olabilüp bundan ilerüde daha piyade olarak süvari askeri karakolları vardır 
ve Rusyalu bu kadar yakın gelemez sen bu süvari karakollarını dahi ilerü geçmiĢsin. 
Demek oluyor ki firar edecek imiĢsin.  
C. O kadar ilerü gitmedim. Hafız PaĢa tabyasının ilerüsünde bizim karakol beklediğimiz 
mahallin önünde bir dere vardır. O kadar gittim. 
S. ĠĢte Halil OnbaĢı yüzüne karĢu keyfiyet böyle oldu diyor. Sen ne dersin? Bunun 
doğrusu nasıldır? 
C. Eğer kaçacak olup da buna dahi söylemiĢ olaydık OnbaĢı Halil‟i de beraber götürür-
dük. Lakin ben öyle Ģey söylemedim. 
S. Senin söylediğin Ģeyler birkaç dürlü ifadeyi cami olup bunun kanğısına itimad 
edelim? 
C. Efendim ben firar değilim. OnbaĢıyı karakolda ararken tutulduk. Açlıktan Erzurum‟a 
gidecek idim deyu söylediğim Ģeyleri açlık sebebiyle kurtulurum hülyasıyla söyledim. 
 
ÇavuĢ-ı merkum bendeleri komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firarı kendüsin-
den ve sair lazım gelenlerden sual ile istintak olundukta vermiĢ oldukları cevabları 
balada baĢka baĢka gösterilmiĢ [?] ve icray-ı icabı rey ve irade-i aliyelerine menut 
bulunmuĢ olmağla ol babda ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 
20 M sene 73. 
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[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, 
Ġbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman 
Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız,  
[Second line] BinbaĢı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, BinbaĢı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa 
Vahdeti  
 
Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının ĢeĢhaneci dördüncü taburu-
nun yedinci bölüğünün birinci onbaĢısı Karahisar-ı ġarkî‟li Mehmed, Kars muhasarası 
esnada firar etmiĢ ve Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü gereft olunarak muahharen Dersaadet‟e 
gelmiĢ olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır. 
 
S. Kars‟da orduy-i hümayun ile bunca müddet ol kadar zahmet çekildi ve cümle asakir-i 
Ģahane sebat eyledi ve sen de onbaĢı bulunmuĢsun. Senin takımında olan neferatın 
muhafazasına bakacak iken böyle firar etmeklik insaniyet ve Ġslamiyete ve askerlik 
Ģanına yakıĢur mu? 
C. Ben kaçmadım. Bir gün bir emir geldi. Beher bölükten ikiĢer nefer aldık. Oduna 
gittik. Orada asker odun aldı. Ben arkadaĢımla silahlı idik. Asker ile beraber gittik. 
Orada biz taĢda saklandık. Sonra savuĢtuk. Çalkadur‟dan [?] dere içine aĢdık [?]. Orada 
Rusyalu karakolları gelüp bizi gece saat üçde tutdu ve ordusuna götürdü. 
S. Demek oluyor ki sen Ģu askerle karakol olarak silahın ile gitmiĢsin Bir adam diğer 
askerin muhafazası zımnında karakol olduğu halde kaçar ise ona ne derler? 
C. Firar derler. 
S. Sen kaçmadım diyorsun Ģimdi buna ne diyelim? 
C. Buna da firar derler. 
S. Kars‟dan firar edenler olur ise gerek Erzurum‟da ve gerek sair mahalde tutulsun 
Ģiddet üzere mücazat olacak deyu daima tenbih verilürdü. Bunu sen iĢitmedin mi? 
C. ĠĢitdim ve Ģiddet üzere mücazat olunduğunu gördüm lakin orada Ģu hal ile sağ 
kalacağımı aklım kesmedi. Kurtulurum hülyasıyla kaçdım fakat beni firar dediniz. Ben 
de firarım ancak bu firar iki dürlüdür biri açlıkdan ve diğeri toklukdan firardır. Ben de 
aç olduğumdan bana firar demezler ve açlık vaktiyle tokluk vakitde firar size malumdur. 
S. Din devlet ve millet uğurunda bir adam gavgaya gider ve bir kalenin muhafazasına 
memur olur ise bunda açlık ve kurĢun ve sair Ģeyden olmak vardır ve bu halde arkadaĢ-
larını bırağup gitmek olur mu? Ve bir adam vakt-i hazırda veyahud böyle muhasara 
halinde firar eder ise bu firarın kanğısı eyü ve kanğısı fenadır ve mücazat olarak 
kanğısına ziyade mücazat olunmak lazım gelür? 
C. Elbette bu halde firar eden fenadır ve bunun mücazatı Ģedid olur. 
 
Merkum komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firarı kendüsinden yegan yegan 
sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiĢ olduğu cevabı balada baĢka baĢka gösterilmiĢ ve icray-
ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuĢ olmağla ol babda ve her 
halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73. 
 
[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, 
Ġbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman 
Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız.  
[Second line, from right to left] BinbaĢı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, BinbaĢı-i top, an aza, 
Mehmed Selim, BinbaĢı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti 
 
Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının ĢeĢhaneci dördüncü taburu-
nun üçüncü bölüğünde beĢinci onbaĢının üçüncü neferi Diyarbekirli Resul, Kars 
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muhasarası esnada firar ederek Rusyalu tarafından ahz ü gereft ile geçende Dersaadet‟e 
gelmiĢ olan komisyonda icra olunan istintakını havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır. 
 
S. Bilürsün ki Kars‟da bu kadar asakir-i Ġslamiye ile düĢmanın müdafaası zımnında 
bunca sıkıntı ve *?* çekildi ki ancak din ve devlet ve milletimize hizmet edelim. Sen de 
asker ve Ġslam olduğun cihetle sair arkadaĢınla niçün orada sabr ü tahammül etmeyip de 
firar kâr-ı mekruhunu irtikab ettin ve askerlik ve Ġslamlığa yakıĢur Ģey midir? 
C. Kars‟da bu kadar vakit sabr ü tahammül ettim. At eti yedim ve daha giderek yigirmi 
otuz gün evvel ölmüĢ ve mezbele [?] içinde kalmıĢ ve ne olduğu bilinmez hayvanın 
ciğerini ve fıĢkı içinden arpayı çıkardım ve yerden geven buldum yedim. Artık sabr ü 
tahammül edemedim. Erzurum‟a giderim ve belki nefsimi kurtarırım deyu Kars‟dan 
firar edip Kum derler bir karyeye vardım. Oranın muhtarı beni hanesine götürdü ve 
biraz yemek verdi yedim ve burada Rusyalu‟nun karakolları vardır. Arpa içün gelmiĢler 
dıĢarı çıkma seni tutarlar dedi. Ben de orada kaldım. Biraz sonra burada Osmanlu var 
imiĢ deyu Kazaklar ol hanenin kapusu önüne gelüp beni buldular ve kollarımı bağlayup 
Rusya ordusuna götürdüler. Siz bilürsünüz ne yaparsanız irade sizindir.  
S. Kars‟dan ne vakit kaçdın? Çadırda veyahud tabyada mı idin ve arkadaĢ ve silahın var 
mıydı ve saat kaçta idi? 
C. Memur olduğumuz Ġngiliz tabyasında çadırda idik. AhĢam namazı vakti oldu. 
Çadırdan suya gittim. Orada bir taĢ ardında gizlendim. Bir saat sonra oradan çıkıp gittim 
ve arkadaĢ ve silahım yoğidi.  
S. Senden baĢka at eti yiyen ve evvelki gavgalardan sonra yine orada sebat eden yok 
muydu ki sen firar ettin ve onlara senden ziyade tayinat mı verilürdi? Onlar da bu kadar 
aç kaldı. 
C. Benden baĢka at eti yemiĢ ve gavgalarda bulunmuĢ daha asker var idi. Lakin onların 
kimisinin parası olup kendülerini idare ederler idi. Benim tayinatım dahi onlarla beraber 
idi ve ben dahi daha evvel olan olan gavgalarda bulundum ve hizmet ettim. Fakat bu 
defa açlığa tahammül edemeyip can cümleden akdem olduğundan Ģeytana uyup ve nefs 
galib gelüp kaçdım. 
S. BaĢkalarının parası var idi onlar kendülerini idare eder idi diyorsun. ÇarĢuda bir Ģey 
bulunur muydu ki onlar idare etmiĢ ve sen aç kalmıĢsın? 
C. Parası olanlar oldukça kendülerini idare ederler idi. Ben asker olduğum günden berü 
devletin gavgalarında bulundum. Sairleri kaçdılar ben kaçmadım. Lakin Ģu açlık herĢeyi 
göze aldırdı. Onun içün kaçdım.  
S. Kars‟dan kaçıp da nereye gidecek idin? 
C. Erzurum‟a gider ve belki kendümi açlıktan kurtarırım deyu kaçdım kader böyle imiĢ 
Rusyalu‟ya tutuldum. 
S. Kars‟dan firar eden ve Erzurum‟a gideyim deyu kaçan olur ise tutulduğunda Ģiddet 
üzere mücazat olunacağı size daima bildirir idik. Sen bunları iĢitmedin mi ve askere 
göre firar etmek töhmet değil midir?  
C. ĠĢittim lakin açlık cihetle aklımda kaldı. Ne olur ise olur deyu kaçdım. 
S. Firar etmek töhmet değil midir? 
C. Bana firar demezler ve ben firar değilim. 
S. Zabitinden izin alup da mı gittin ki firar değilim diyorsun? 
C. Hayır izin almadım lakin bana firar demezler açlık firarisi derler. 
 
Merkum komisyona celb olunarak sebeb ve keyfiyet-i firarı yegan yegan kendüsinden 
sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiĢ olduğu cevabı balada baĢka baĢka gösterilmiĢ ve icray-
ı icabı irade-i aliye-i cenab-ı sipehsalarilerine menut bulunmuĢ olmağla ol babda ve her 
halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73. 
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[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, 
Ġbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman 
Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız.  
[Second line, from right to left] BinbaĢı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, BinbaĢı-i top, an aza, 
Mehmed Selim, BinbaĢı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti  
 
Anadolu orduy-i hümayunu piyade ikinci nizamiye alayının ĢeĢhaneci dördüncü taburu-
nun beĢinci bölüğünde sekizinci onbaĢının ikinci neferi Kemahlı Hüseyin, Kars muhasa-
rası esnada firar etmiĢ ve Rusyalu tarafından tutularak geçende Dersaadet‟e gelmiĢ 
olduğundan komisyonda icra olunan istintakı havi Divan-ı Harb mazbatasıdır. 
 
S. Kars‟da bu kadar müddet ve bunca asakir-i Ģahane ile düĢmanın müdafaasına bakılur 
ve pek çok meĢakkatler çekilürdi. Sen de sair asakir ve arkadaĢların gibi din ve devlete 
hizmet etmek üzere niçün sabır ve sebat etmeyip de firar ettin ve askere göre firar etmek 
töhmet değil midir? 
C. Aç kaldım kaçtım ve askere göre firar etmek töhmettir. 
S. Sair askere acaba ziyade tayın verilip de sana noksan mı verilürdi? Onlar ölünceye 
kadar sabr ettiler sen niçün tahammül ve sebat etmedin? 
C. Cümlemizin tayinatı bir idi. Lakin ben tahammül edemedim. Nefse uydum kaçtım. 
S. Kaçtığın vakit tabyada veyahud karakolda mıydın ve arkadaĢ ve silahın var mıydı ve 
ne vakit ve nerede tutuldun?  
C. Kars‟ta ihtiyatta çadırda idik. Karakolda değildim. Çadırda otururken gece saat iki 
sularında Tahmas tarafından kaçtım ve arkadaĢ ve silahım yoğidi ve Tahmas‟tan aĢağı 
indim. Orada tutuldum. 
S. Kars‟tan firar edersen nereye gidecek idin? 
C. Erzurum‟a gidecek idim. 
S. Kars‟tan kaçan olup da Erzurum‟da ve sair yerde tutulur ise Ģiddet üzere mücazat 
olunacak deyu size daima tenbih olunurdu. Sen bunları iĢitmedin mi? 
C. Tenbihatı iĢittim. Lakin açlığa tahammül edemedim. Lakin kurtulurum ve Erzurum‟a 
giderim hayaliyle kaçtım sonra tutuldum. 
S. Kars‟ta iken Rusyalu‟nun karakolları her tarafta çok idi ve cümlemiz görürdük. Öyle 
yalnız bir adamın çıkıp gidemeyeceğini bilmedin mi? 
C. Kars‟tan sair kaçanlar oldu onlar kurtuldu ben de kurtulurum zann ettim. Lakin sonra 
böyle tutuldum. 
 
Merkum komisyona celb olunarak esbab ve keyfiyat-ı firariyesi yegan yegan 
kendüsinden sual ve istifsar olundukta vermiĢ olduğu cevabı balada baĢka baĢka 
gösterilmiĢ ve icray-ı icabı irade-i aliye-i hıdivilerine menut bulunmuĢ olmağla ol babda 
ve her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül emrindir. Fi 13 S sene 73. 
 
[Seals from right to left] Kaimmakam-ı piyade, an aza, Ali, Miralay-ı top, an aza, 
Ġbrahim, Miralay-ı piyade, an aza, Abdülkadir, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Süleyman 
Hilmi, Mirliva-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa, Ferik, reis-i komisyon, Hafız.  
[Second line, from right to left] BinbaĢı-i süvari, an aza, Mehmed, BinbaĢı-i top, an aza, 
Mehmed Selim, BinbaĢı-i piyade, an aza, Mustafa Vahdeti.  
 
